• Des journalistes demandent l’arrêt de la surveillance par apple
    https://www.rts.ch/info/monde/12423902-des-journalistes-demandent-larret-de-la-surveillance-par-apple.html

    Des associations de journalistes de Suisse, d’Allemagne et d’Autriche demandent l’arrêt de la surveillance annoncée par l’entreprise Apple des téléphones portables en Europe. Elles dénoncent une violation de la liberté de presse.

    La semaine dernière, Apple a annoncé la mise en place d’un système de traque des photos pédopornographiques. Des critiques ont alors mis en garde contre le fait qu’un Etat autoritaire pourrait également tenter d’infiltrer la base de données avec des photos à motifs politiques afin de savoir qui possède ces photos sur son téléphone portable.

    Les préoccupations des associations de journalistes des pays germanophones vont dans le même sens. Dans un appel commun publié mardi, adressé aux gouvernements de leurs Etats et à la présidente de la Commission européenne, Ursula von der Leyen, elles protestent contre l’intention de la société Apple.

    Big Apple is watching you
    « Tous les journalistes ont des contenus confidentiels sur leurs smartphones », a déclaré l’ancienne correspondante suisse aux Etats-Unis, Priscilla Imboden, du Syndicat suisse des mass média (SSM), dans un communiqué. Pour elle, il est inacceptable qu’une entreprise privée américaine juge de l’admissibilité des contenus et veuille également les consulter et les transmettre.

    Les associations de leur côté pensent que « le chemin n’est pas très long entre la surveillance présumée de la scène pédopornographique et l’examen des données des utilisateurs d’opposants au régime en Turquie ou de la communauté LGBT en Hongrie ». Elles demandent donc aux autorités responsables d’empêcher le projet d’Apple dans tous les pays européens.
    ats/aps

    #profiling #surveillance #bigdata #porte_dérobée #Snowden #apple #smartphone #algorithme #iphone #domination #publicité #bénéfices #géolocalisation #technologisme #mac #apple

  • Namensauflösung im #Internet: Fragmentierung schlimmer als Konzentration
    https://www.heise.de/news/Namensaufloesung-im-Internet-Fragmentierung-schlimmer-als-Konzentration-607000

    25.06.2021 von Monika Ermert - Mit #IPv6 und I#Pv4 hat das Internet schon keine einheitlichen Adressen. Jetzt steht auch die Einheitlichkeit der DNS-Auflösung auf dem Spiel, fürchten Experten.

    Dem Internet droht sein Charakter als universelle Kommunikationsplattform abhanden zu kommen. Die größte Gefahr sei laut Fachleuten wie Geoff Huston von der asiatisch-pazifischen Internet Registry #APNIC nicht etwa die Konzentration der DNS-Auflösung auf wenige Konzerne, sondern die Fragmentierung auf verschiedene Protokolle und Client-Anwendungen. Eine solche Zersplitterung entsteht durch das Verschieben der #DNS #Namensauflösung zu den Applikationen, warnte Huston kürzlich beim Treffen der IP-Adressverwalter.

    Die Konzentration von vielen DNS-Anfragen bei nur wenigen Resolveranbietern sei nach seiner Auffassung kein großer Risikofaktor, erklärte Huston gegenüber heise online. Der Australier misst seit vielen Jahren die Verbreitung einzelner Protokolle und die Marktmacht der großen Plattformen. Im überschaubaren Feld der offenen #DNS-Resolver thront laut Hustons jüngsten Messungen einer über allem: Google.

    DNS von #Google

    Rund 15 Prozent der erfassten Erstanfragen nach einer Domain lassen die Surfer bewusst oder unbewusst von Googles Resolverfarmen beantworten. Diese sind weltweit unter den IPv4-Adressen 8.8.8.8 und 8.8.4.4 sowie unter den IPv6-Adressen 2001:4860:4860::8888, 2001:4860:4860::8844 zu erreichen. Und wenn der erste Zugriffsversuch auf eine Domain scheitert, verlässt sich zusammengenommen sogar fast ein Drittel der beobachteten Clients auf Googles Dienst.

    Es gibt freilich große kontinentale und länderspezifische Unterschiede. Surfer in vielen asiatischen und afrikanischen Ländern stützen sich fast ausschließlich auf Googles DNS-Service. Seine größte Nutzergruppe verzeichnet der Konzern ausgerechnet im souveränitätsbesessenen Indien. Inderinnen und Inder machen allein ein Fünftel der gesamten DNS-Nutzerschaft von Google aus.

    Besonders beim mobilen Internet greifen Nutzer häufig auf die kostenlosen offenen Resolver zurück. Das Betriebssystem Android schaufelt Googles Resolvern massiv Verkehr zu, bilanziert Huston. Die zunehmende Zentralisierung bei der Beantwortung von DNS-Anfragen spiegelt aus seiner Sicht letztlich nur die Konzentration der darunter liegenden Internetinfrastruktur.

    Dass viele Leute direkt oder indirekt Google nutzen, dürfe man schon für problematisch halten, antwortet Huston auf Anfrage. „Google sieht eine Menge Geheimnisse von Nutzern. Wenn wir aber Gmail, Google Docs und die allgegenwärtige Suche mitbetrachten, ist DNS fast schon ein Randproblem“, notiert Huston.

    Namensauflösung wandert in die Apps

    Der viel größere Risikofaktor ist aus seiner Sicht der Umstieg auf #DNS-over-HTTPS (#DoH). Mit der DNS-Verschlüsselung erhalten die App-Entwickler die Wahl darüber, wem sie die DNS-Anfragen schicken. Ein Beispiel dafür ist Mozillas Firefox-Browser, der auf Installationen in den USA grundsätzlich DoH verwendet und die DNS-Anfragen von US-Amerikanern an Cloudflare sendet. Das ergibt sich teils aus der Entstehungsgeschichte des Protokolls, denn Mozilla und Cloudflare haben von Anfang an dabei zusammengearbeitet. Aber die Konzentration der Firefox-generierten DNS-Anfragen bei Cloudflare liegt auch daran, dass viele Provider, die bisher unverschlüsselte DNS-Anfragen im Rahmen ihrer Internet-Angebote für Kunden aufgelöst haben, noch gar keine verschlüsselnden Resolver betreiben.

    „Das ist ein grundsätzlicher Wandel des DNS“, urteilt Huston. „Künftig wird die DNS-Anfrage kein Bestandteil der allgemeinen Infrastruktur mehr sein, sondern zu einem Applikations-spezifischen Dienst“. Dabei ist nicht vorhersehbar, welche App welches Anfrageprotokoll verwendet (#DNS-over-HTTPS, #Oblivious DNS-over-HTTPS, ...) und man kann nicht mehr erwarten, dass die DNS-Antworten über verschiedene Applikationen hinweg konsistent sind. Deshalb könne man mit Fug und Recht von einem fragmentierten Namensraum sprechen.

    Diese Ansicht und Sorge teilt auch Lars Liman vom Rootbetreiber Netnod. Wenn der Webbrowser am Laptop einen bestimmten Resolver benutzt, das Mobiltelefon und die Kalender-App aber jeweils andere, dann leidet die Konsistenz, erklärte Liman gegenüber heise online.

    „Das könnte verschiedenen Organisationen ein Werkzeug an die Hand geben, Nutzer im Internet in die eine oder andere Richtung zu bugsieren“, so Liman, und nicht alles müsse in guter Absicht geschehen. „Ich glaube, wir sind auf dem Weg zu einem neuen Internet, bei dem das Ergebnis einer Domainabfrage davon abhängig sein wird, wo man sitzt im Internet.“

    Neugierige Augen

    Die gute Absicht, DNS-Anfragen vor neugierigen Augen zu verbergen, sei so nachvollziehbar wie die Ungeduld der App-Industrie, auf die Nachrüstung von DNS-Resolvern bei Providern zu warten, bewertet Huston.

    Auf die Frage warum das Vorpreschen der App-Betreiber mit der Aufgabe des einheitlichen Namensraums einhergehen muss, antwortet Huston mit der Gegenfrage: Warum sollten diejenigen, die eine App-basierte Namensinfrastruktur unterstützen, den alten DNS-Namensraum noch in die neue Welt hinüberretten? Lokale, nicht-DNS bezogene Namen, könnten eine natürliche Weiterentwicklung sein. Solche innerhalb der App vergebene Namen könnten schnell, sicher und für alle anderen unsichtbar sein, sagt Huston, nur universell wären sie nicht mehr.

    Doch wenn eine App eine Zieldomain nicht erreichen kann, wird die Fehlersuche zum Detektivspiel. Gute Fehlermeldungen oder ausreichend Intuition vorausgesetzt, kann der Nutzer das DNS-Problem an den App-Hersteller richten. Nutzer, die den DNS-Dienst in der Zuständigkeit des Providers sehen, können sich zwar auch an dessen Hotline wenden. Diese kann das Problem aber womöglich gar nicht reproduzieren, weil ihr die App gar nicht zur Verfügung steht. Oder sie kann versuchen nachzuvollziehen, welche App DNS-Probleme macht und welchen Resolver der App-Entwickler gewählt hat. Untersteht der befragte Resolver einer bestimmten Jurisdiktion, die bestimmte Domains sperrt? Oder ist der Resolver einfach nur mit einem Defekt ausgefallen? Die Suche nach der Ursache kann jedenfalls vertrackt sein und es ist fraglich, ob Provider den Aufwand überhaupt auf sich nehmen wollen.

  • DST Root CA X3 Expiration (September 2021) - Let’s Encrypt
    https://letsencrypt.org/docs/dst-root-ca-x3-expiration-september-2021

    Modernisation des certificats utilisés par Lets Encrypt : au 30 septembre certains terminaux pas à jour pourraient ne plus fonctionner :

    When we got started, that older root certificate (DST Root CA X3) helped us get off the ground and be trusted by almost every device immediately. The newer root certificate (ISRG Root X1) is now widely trusted too - but some older devices won’t ever trust it because they don’t get software updates (for example, an iPhone 4 or an HTC Dream). Click here for a list of which platforms trust ISRG Root X1.

    (...si seulement ça pouvait débarrasser l’internet des iPhone 4 et de son Safari moisi !)

    #letsEncrypt #iphone_4 #certificat_SSL

  • about hic et nunc
    https://www.hicetnunc.xyz
    https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Latin_phrases_(H)#hic_et_nunc

    The imperative motto for the satisfaction of desire. “I need it, Here and Now”

    .

    The present decentralized application allows its users to manage decentralized digital assets, serving as a public smart contract infrastructure on Tezos Blockchain.

    IPFS NFTs can be minted and traded by permissionless means. such experiment was designed intending to imagine alternative crypto economies.

    We’re concerned about your security and autonomy. please verify informations while making transactions.

    For consulting, networking or questions get in touch by email, discord, or on reddit

    WIKI is available

    Issues can be reported here

    #art #ipfs #nft

  • L’Afnic devient organisme de formation certifié Qualiopi® ! Découvrez nos 3 premières formations sur https://www.afnic.fr/observatoire-ressources/actualites/lafnic-devient-organisme-de-formation-certifie-qualiopi #IPv6 #DNSSEC #Sécurité #Formation #DNS

    Afnic obtains Qualiopi® certification as a training organisation! Discover our 3 first training courses on https://www.afnic.fr/en/observatory-and-resources/news/afnic-obtains-qualiopi-certification-as-a-training-organisation #Training #IPv6 #DNSSEC #DNS

  • The fortified gates of the Balkans. How non-EU member states are incorporated into fortress Europe.

    Marko Gašperlin, a Slovenian police officer, began his first mandate as chair of the Management Board of Frontex in spring 2016. Less than two months earlier, then Slovenian Prime Minister Miro Cerar had gone to North Macedonia to convey the message from the EU that the migration route through the Balkans — the so-called Balkan route — was about to close.

    “North Macedonia was the first country ready to cooperate [with Frontex] to stop the stampede we had in 2015 across the Western Balkans,” Gašperlin told K2.0 during an interview conducted at the police headquarters in Ljubljana in September 2020.

    “Stampede” refers to over 1 million people who entered the European Union in 2015 and early 2016 in search of asylum, the majority traveling along the Balkan route. Most of them were from Syria, but also some other countries of the global South where human rights are a vague concept.

    According to Gašperlin, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency’s primary interest at the EU’s external borders is controlling the movement of people who he describes as “illegals.”

    Given numerous allegations by human rights organizations, Frontex could itself be part of illegal activity as part of the push-back chain removing people from EU territory before they have had the opportunity to assert their right to claim asylum.

    In March 2016, the EU made a deal with Turkey to stop the flow of people toward Europe, and Frontex became even more active in the Aegean Sea. Only four years later, at the end of 2020, Gašperlin established a Frontex working group to look into allegations of human rights violations by its officers. So far, no misconduct has been acknowledged. The final internal Frontex report is due at the end of February.

    After allegations were made public during the summer and fall of 2020, some members of the European Parliament called for Frontex director Fabrice Leggeri to step down, while the European Ombudsman also announced an inquiry into the effectiveness of the Agency’s complaints mechanism as well as its management.

    A European Parliament Frontex Scrutiny Working Group was also established to conduct its own inquiry, looking into “compliance and respect for fundamental rights” as well as internal management, and transparency and accountability. It formally began work this week (February 23) with its fact-finding investigation expected to last four months.

    2021 started with more allegations and revelations.

    In January 2021 the EU anti-fraud office, OLAF, confirmed it is leading an investigation over allegations of harassment and misconduct inside Frontex, and push-backs conducted at the EU’s borders.

    Similar accusations of human rights violations related to Frontex have been accumulating for years. In 2011, Human Rights Watch issued a report titled “The EU’s Dirty Hands” that documented the ill-treatment of migrant detainees in Greece.

    Various human rights organizations and media have also long reported about Frontex helping the Libyan Coast Guard to locate and pull back people trying to escape toward Europe. After being pulled back, people are held in notorious detention camps, which operate with the support of the EU.

    Nonetheless, EU leaders are not giving up on the idea of expanding the Frontex mission, making deals with governments of non-member states in the Balkans to participate in their efforts to stop migration.

    Currently, the Frontex plan is to deploy up to 10,000 border guards at the EU external borders by 2027.

    Policing Europe

    Frontex, with its headquarters in Poland, was established in 2004, but it remained relatively low key for the first decade of its existence. This changed in 2015 when, in order to better control Europe’s visa-free Schengen area, the European Commission (EC) extended the Agency’s mandate as it aimed to turn Frontex into a fully-fledged European Border and Coastguard Agency. Officially, they began operating in this role in October 2016, at the Bulgarian border with Turkey.

    In recent years, the territory they cover has been expanding, framed as cooperation with neighboring countries, with the main goal “to ensure implementation of the European integrated border management.”

    The budget allocated for their work has also grown massively, from about 6 million euros in 2005, to 460 million euros in 2020. According to existing plans, the Agency is set to grow still further and by 2027 up to 5.6 billion euros is expected to have been spent on Frontex.

    As one of the main migration routes into Europe the Balkans has become the key region for Frontex. Close cooperation with authorities in the region has been growing since 2016, particularly through the “Regional Support to Protection-Sensitive Migration Management in the Western Balkans and Turkey” project: https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Partners/Third_countries/IPA_II_Phase_II.pdf.

    In order to increase its powers in the field, Frontex has promoted “status agreements” with the countries in the region, while the EC, through its Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) fund, has dedicated 3.4 million euros over the two-year 2019-21 period for strengthening borders.

    The first Balkan state to upgrade its cooperation agreement with Frontex to a status agreement was Albania in 2018; joint police operations at its southern border with Greece began in spring 2019. According to the agreement, Frontex is allowed to conduct full border police duties on the non-EU territory.

    Frontex’s status agreement with Albania was followed by a similar agreement with Montenegro that has been in force since July 2020.

    The signing of a status agreement with North Macedonia was blocked by Bulgaria in October 2020, while the agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina requires further approvals and the one with Serbia is awaiting ratification by the parliament in Belgrade.

    “The current legal framework is the consequence of the situation in the years from 2014 to 2016,” Gašperlin said.

    He added that he regretted that the possibility to cooperate with non-EU states in returns of “illegals” had subsequently been dropped from the Frontex mandate after an intervention by EU parliamentarians. In 2019, a number of changes were made to how Frontex functions including removing the power to “launch return interventions in third countries” due to the fact that many of these countries have a poor record when it comes to rule of law and respect of human rights.

    “This means, if we are concrete, that the illegals who are in BiH — the EU can pay for their accommodation, Frontex can help only a little with the current tools it has, while when it comes to returns, Frontex cannot do anything,” Gašperlin said.

    Fortification of the borders

    The steady introduction of status agreements is intended to replace and upgrade existing police cooperation deals that are already in place with non-EU states.

    Over the years, EU member states have established various bilateral agreements with countries around the world, including some in the Balkan region. Further agreements have been negotiated by the EU itself, with Frontex listing 20 “working arrangements” with different non-member states on its website.

    Based on existing Frontex working arrangements, exchange of information and “consultancy” visits by Frontex officials — which also include work at border crossings — are already practiced widely across the Balkan-EU borders.

    The new status agreements allow Frontex officers to guard the borders and perform police tasks on the territory of the country with which the agreement is signed, while this country’s national courts do not have jurisdiction over the Frontex personnel.

    Comparing bilateral agreements to status agreements, Marko Gašperlin explained that, with Frontex taking over certain duties, individual EU states will be able to avoid the administrative and financial burdens of “bilateral solidarity.”

    Radoš Đurović, director of the NGO Asylum Protection Centre (APC) which works with migrants in Serbia, questions whether Frontex’s presence in the region will bring better control over violations and fears that if past acts of alleged violence are used it could make matters worse.

    “The EU’s aim is to increase border control and reduce the number of people who legally or illegally cross,” Đurović says in a phone interview for K2.0. “We know that violence does not stop the crossings. It only increases the violence people experience.”

    Similarly, Jasmin Redžepi from the Skopje-based NGO Legis, argues that the current EU focus on policing its borders only entraps people in the region.

    “This causes more problems, suffering and death,” he says. “People are forced to turn to criminals in search of help. The current police actions are empowering criminals and organized crime.”

    Redžepi believes the region is currently acting as some kind of human filter for the EU.

    “From the security standpoint this is solidarity with local authorities. But in the field, it prevents greater numbers of refugees from moving toward central Europe,” Redžepi says.

    “They get temporarily stuck. The EU calls it regulation but they only postpone their arrival in the EU and increase the violations of human rights, European law and international law. In the end people cross, just more simply die along the way.”

    EU accused of externalizing issues

    For the EU, it was a shifting pattern of migratory journeys that signified the moment to start increasing its border security around the region by strengthening its cooperation with individual states.

    The overland Balkan route toward Western Europe has always been used by people on the move. But it has become even more frequented in recent years as changing approaches to border policing and rescue restrictions in the Central Mediterranean have made crossings by sea even more deadly.

    For the regional countries, each at a different stage of a still distant promise of EU membership, partnering with Frontex comes with the obvious incentive of demonstrating their commitment to the bloc.

    “When regional authorities work to stop people crossing towards the EU, they hope to get extra benefits elsewhere,” says APC Serbia’s Radoš Đurovic.

    There are also other potential perks. Jasmin Redžepi from Legis explains that police from EU states often leave behind equipment for under-equipped local forces.

    But there has also been significant criticism of the EU’s approach in both the Balkans and elsewhere, with many accusing it of attempting to externalize its borders and avoid accountability by pushing difficult issues elsewhere.

    According to research by Violeta Moreno-Lax and Martin Lemberg-Pedersen, who have analyzed the consequences of the EU’s approach to border management, the bloc’s actions amount to a “dispersion of legal duties” that is not “ethically and legally tenable under international law.”

    One of the results, the researchers found, is that “repressive forces” in third countries gain standing as valid interlocutors for cooperation and democratic and human rights credentials become “secondary, if at all relevant.”

    APC’s Radoš Đurović agrees, suggesting that we are entering a situation where the power of the law and international norms that prevent illegal use of force are, in effect, limited.

    “Europe may not have enough power to influence the situations in places further away that push migration, but it can influence its border regions,” he says. “The changes we see forced onto the states are problematic — from push-backs to violence.”

    Playing by whose rules?

    One of the particular anomalies seen with the status agreements is that Albanian police are now being accompanied by Frontex forces to better control their southern border at the same time as many of Albania’s own citizens are themselves attempting to reach the EU in irregular ways.

    Asked about this apparent paradox, Marko Gašperlin said he did “not remember any Albanians among the illegals.”

    However, Frontex’s risk analysis for 2020, puts Albania in the top four countries for whose citizens return orders were issued in the preceding two years and second in terms of returns effectively carried out. Eurostat data for 2018 and 2019 also puts Albania in 11th place among countries from which first time asylum seekers come, before Somalia and Bangladesh and well ahead of Morocco and Algeria.

    While many of these Albanian citizens may have entered EU countries via regular means before being subject to return orders for reasons such as breaching visa conditions, people on the move from Albania are often encountered along the Balkan route, according to activists working in the field.

    Meanwhile, other migrants have complained of being subjected to illegal push-backs at Albania’s border with Greece, though there is a lack of monitoring in this area and these claims remain unverified.

    In Serbia, the KlikAktiv Center for Development of Social Policies has analyzed Belgrade’s pending status agreement for Frontex operations.

    It warns that increasing the presence of armed police, from a Frontex force that has allegedly been involved in violence and abuses of power, is a recipe for disaster, especially when they will have immunity from local criminal and civil jurisdiction.

    It also flags that changes in legislation will enable the integration of data systems and rapid deportations without proper safeguards in place.

    Police activities to secure borders greatly depend on — and supply data to — EU information technology systems. But EU law provides fewer protections for data processing of foreign nationals than for that of EU citizens, effectively creating segregation in terms of data protection.

    The EU Fundamental Rights Agency has warned that the establishment of a more invasive system for non-EU nationals could potentially lead to increased discrimination and skew data that could further “fuel existing misperceptions that there is a link between asylum-seekers, migration and crime.”

    A question of standards

    Frontex emphasizes that there are codified safeguards and existing internal appeal mechanisms.

    According to the status agreements, violations of fundamental rights such as data protection rules or the principle of non-refoulement — which prohibits the forcible return of individuals to countries where they face danger through push-backs or other means — are all reasons for either party to suspend or terminate their cooperation.

    In January, Frontex itself suspended its mission in Hungary after the EU member state failed to abide by an EU Court of Justice decision. In December 2020, the court found that Hungarian border enforcement was in violation of EU law by restricting access to its asylum system and for carrying out illegal push-backs into Serbia.

    Marko Gašperlin claimed that Frontex’s presence improved professional police standards wherever it operated.

    However, claims of raising standards have been questioned by human rights researchers and activists.

    Jasmin Redžepi recounts that the first complaint against a foreign police officer that his NGO Legis filed with North Macedonian authorities and international organizations was against a Slovenian police officer posted through bilateral agreement; the complaint related to allegations of unprofessional conduct toward migrants.

    “Presently, people cross illegally and the police push them back illegally,” Redžepi says. “They should be able to ask for asylum but cannot as police push people across borders.”

    Gašperlin told K2.0 that it is natural that there will be a variation of standards between police from different countries.

    In its recruitment efforts, Frontex has sought to enlist police officers or people with a customs or army background. According to Gašperlin, recruits have been disproportionately from Romania and Italy, while fewer have been police officers from northern member states “where standards and wages are better.”

    “It would be illusory to expect that all of the EU would rise up to the level of respect for human rights and to the high standards of Sweden,” he said. “There also has not been a case of the EU throwing a member out, although there have been examples of human rights violations, of different kinds.”

    ‘Monitoring from the air’

    One of the EU member states whose own police have been accused of serious human rights violations against refugees and migrants, including torture, is Croatia.

    Despite the allegations, in January 2020, Croatia’s Ministry of the Interior Police Academy was chosen to lead the first Frontex-financed training session for attendees from police forces across the Balkan route region.

    Frontex currently has a presence in Croatia, at the EU border area with Bosnia and Herzegovina, amongst other places.

    Asked about the numerous reports from international NGOs and collectives, as well as from the national Ombudsman Lora Vidović and the Council of Europe, of mass human rights violations at the Croatian borders, Gašperlin declined to engage.

    “Frontex helps Croatia with monitoring from the air,” he said. “That is all.”

    Gašperlin said that the role of his agency is only to notify Croatia when people are detected approaching the border from Bosnia. Asked if Frontex also monitors what happens to people once Croatian police find them, given continuously worsening allegations, he said: “From the air this might be difficult. I do not know if a plane from the air can monitor that.”

    Pressed further, he declined to comment.

    To claim ignorance is, however, becoming increasingly difficult. A recent statement on the state of the EU’s borders by UNHCR’s Assistant High Commissioner for Protection, Gillian Triggs, notes: “The pushbacks [at Europe’s borders] are carried out in a violent and apparently systematic way.”

    Radoš Đurović from APC Serbia pointed out that Frontex must know about the alleged violations.

    “The question is: Do they want to investigate and prevent them?” he says. “All those present in the field know about the violence and who perpetrates it.”

    Warnings that strict and violent EU border policies are increasing the sophistication and brutality of smugglers, while technological “solutions” and militarization come with vested interests and more potential human rights violations, do not seem to worry the head of Frontex’s Management Board.

    “If passage from Turkey to Germany is too expensive, people will not decide to go,” said Gašperlin, describing the job done by Frontex:

    “We do the work we do. So people cannot simply come here, sit and say — here I am, now take me to Germany, as some might want. Or — here I am, I’m asking for asylum, now take me to Postojna or Ljubljana, where I will get fed, cared for, and then I’ll sit on the bus and ride to Munich where I’ll again ask for asylum. This would be a minimal price.”

    Human rights advocates in the region such as Jasmin Redžepi have no illusions that what they face on the ground reflects the needs and aims of the EU.

    “We are only a bridge,” Redžepi says. “The least the EU should do is take care that its policies do not turn the region into a cradle for criminals and organized crime. We need legal, regular passages and procedures for people to apply for asylum, not illegal, violent push-backs.

    “If we talk about security we cannot talk exclusively about the security of borders. We have to talk about the security of people as well.”

    https://kosovotwopointzero.com/en/the-fortified-gates-of-the-balkans

    #Balkans #route_des_Balkans #frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #externalisation #frontex #Macédoine_du_Nord #contrôles_frontaliers #militarisation_des_frontières #push-backs #refoulements #refoulements_en_chaîne #frontières_extérieures #Regional_Support_to_Protection-Sensitive_Migration_Management_in_the_Western_Balkans_and_Turkey #Instrument_for_Pre-Accession (#IPA) #budget #Albanie #Monténégro #Serbie #Bosnie-Herzégovine #accords_bilatéraux

    –—

    ajouté à la métaliste sur l’externalisation des frontières :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749
    Et plus particulièrement ici :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749#message782649

    ping @isskein @karine4

  • Ciblage publicitaire : attaqué, Apple gagne la première manche
    https://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2021/03/18/ciblage-publicitaire-attaque-apple-gagne-la-premiere-manche_6073574_3234.htm

    L’« App Tracking Transparency » d’Apple, ou la demande de consentement pour le suivi publicitaire, va bien pouvoir s’appliquer en France. L’Autorité française de la concurrence a débouté les acteurs du secteur de la pub. Limiter le ciblage publicitaire sur les iPhone est-il est une victoire pour la vie privée des utilisateurs ? Ou plutôt un moyen pour Apple d’abuser de sa position dominante, dans le but de gêner l’activité des éditeurs d’applications financées par la publicité, tout en s’exonérant (...)

    #Apple #Facebook #iPhone #microtargeting #profiling #publicité #consentement #AutoritédelaConcurrence

    ##publicité

  • Google’s ‘Privacy-First Web’ Is Really a Google-First Web
    https://onezero.medium.com/googles-next-power-play-f296c2e3020e

    Why the search giant can afford to kill the cookie For two decades, the cookie has been an emblem of the online advertising model that powers much of the open web — and the privacy invasions that come with it. Now, the cookie as we know it is dying. Online advertising will live on, of course, and so will privacy invasions. But the changes taking shape today will nonetheless alter how we navigate the web in the future — and define which companies dominate it. The Pattern The internet’s (...)

    #Google #Chrome #cookies #domination #publicité #Apple #Mozilla #GoogleSearch #Gmail #YouTube #Firefox #iPhone #Safari #Android #microtargeting #Alphabet #Criteo (...)

    ##publicité ##EFF

  • GitHub — Balanced Employee IP Agreement (BEIPA)
    https://github.com/github/balanced-employee-ip-agreement

    « BEIPA takes a balanced approach to assigning control of intellectual property (IP) created by an employee. The company gets exclusive control of IP created in the scope of an employee’s job. The employee maintains exclusive control of IP created outside of their job and not related to the company’s business. For IP created outside of an employee’s job but related to the company’s business, the employee maintains ownership and the company gets a non-exclusive and unlimited license. A company using BEIPA doesn’t try to claim control of an employee’s free time knowledge production, nor does it try to extend company control past the period of employment. Think of BEIPA as a commitment to employee autonomy and “work-life balance” — for the mind. »

    #work #contract #ip

  • Facebook et Apple se livrent une guerre ouverte
    https://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2021/02/01/facebook-et-apple-se-livrent-une-guerre-ouverte_6068370_3234.html

    Le constructeur de l’iPhone veut limiter la publicité ciblée, le réseau social y voit une manœuvre déloyale. ’ambiance est électrique entre Facebook et Apple. Au moment d’annoncer des résultats financiers records, leurs PDG ont échangé des petites phrases acides. « Si une entreprise est construite sur la tromperie des utilisateurs, sur l’exploitation des données personnelles et sur des choix qui n’en sont pas, elle ne mérite pas des éloges, elle mérite d’être réformée », a lancé, dans une allusion à peine (...)

    #Apple #Facebook #iPhone #iOS #BigData #lutte #microtargeting #publicité

    ##publicité

  • Apple records most profitable quarter ever as sales soar amid pandemic
    https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jan/27/apple-profits-latest-quarter-surge-pandemic

    Company announces sales for last three months of 2020 totalled $111.4bn, fueled largely by release of latest iPhones Apple finished 2020 with its most profitable quarter ever as sales of its high end iPhones, tablets and laptops soared amid the pandemic. The company announced that sales for the three months ending on 26 December 2020 totalled $111.4bn and it had made a profit of $28.7bn, 29% higher than the same period last year. The holiday period is a crucial time for Apple, accounting (...)

    #Apple #iPhone #smartphone #bénéfices

    https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/b702a7309cb2e1e1143d77765c34483730d90fe6/0_0_3340_2004/master/3340.jpg

  • Apple dépasse pour la première fois 100 milliards de dollars de revenus trimestriels
    https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2021/01/27/apple-depasse-pour-la-premiere-fois-les-100-milliards-de-dollars-de-revenus-

    Le fabricant d’iPhone a dégagé un bénéfice net de 28,7 milliards de dollars au premier trimestre de son exercice décalé 2020-2021, soit une hausse de plus de 29 % sur un an. Apple a fait part, mercredi 27 janvier, d’une forte progression de ses profits trimestriels ainsi que d’un chiffre d’affaires record, pour la première fois supérieur à 100 milliards de dollars (82,5 milliards d’euros). Le fabricant d’iPhone a dégagé un bénéfice net de 28,7 milliards de dollars au premier trimestre de son exercice (...)

    #bénéfices #5G #smartphone #iPhone #Apple

    • Intéressant (pour les gens qui fabriquent des sites Web) :

      Les autres produits-phares d’Apple ont également vu leurs ventes dopées, notamment l’iPad (+ 41 %, à 8,4 milliards de dollars)

      Ça pourrait être un effet Covid. Par exemple : terminal supplémentaire pour Netflix en confinement, support pour la visio scolaire…

      Mais c’est assez surprenant, parce que la part des tablettes dans les visites des sites Web ne cesse de se réduire comme peau de chagrin d’année en année (c’est assez frustrant, parce que souvent c’est un très joli format d’affichage quand on fabrique un site Web).

    • Juste pour l’anecdote, cela faisait presque 10 ans qu’on avait un iPad pour la consultation de sites web à la maison... Et cette année, on est passé à une tablette Android, parce que naviguer sur le web avec Apple est devenu un calvaire... entre Safari qui plante, et les bloqueurs de pub défaillants... c’était devenu inutilisable.

  • Inside NSO, Israel’s billion-dollar spyware giant
    https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/08/19/1006458/nso-spyware-controversy-pegasus-human-rights

    The world’s most notorious surveillance company says it wants to clean up its act. Go on, we’re listening.

    Maâti Monjib speaks slowly, like a man who knows he’s being listened to.

    It’s the day of his 58th birthday when we speak, but there’s little celebration in his voice. “The surveillance is hellish,” Monjib tells me. “It is really difficult. It controls everything I do in my life.”

    A history professor at the University of Mohammed V in Rabat, Morocco, Monjib vividly remembers the day in 2017 when his life changed. Charged with endangering state security by the government he has fiercely and publicly criticized, he was sitting outside a courtroom when his iPhone suddenly lit up with a series of text messages from numbers he didn’t recognize. They contained links to salacious news, petitions, and even Black Friday shopping deals.

    A month later, an article accusing him of treason appeared on a popular national news site with close ties to Morocco’s royal rulers. Monjib was used to attacks, but now it seemed his harassers knew everything about him: another article included information about a pro-democracy event he was set to attend but had told almost no one about. One story even proclaimed that the professor “has no secrets from us.”

    He’d been hacked. The messages had all led to websites that researchers say were set up as lures to infect visitors’ devices with Pegasus, the most notorious spyware in the world.

    Pegasus is the blockbuster product of NSO Group, a secretive billion-dollar Israeli surveillance company. It is sold to law enforcement and intelligence agencies around the world, which use the company’s tools to choose a human target, infect the person’s phone with the spyware, and then take over the device. Once Pegasus is on your phone, it is no longer your phone.

    NSO sells Pegasus with the same pitch arms dealers use to sell conventional weapons, positioning it as a crucial aid in the hunt for terrorists and criminals. In an age of ubiquitous technology and strong encryption, such “lawful hacking” has emerged as a powerful tool for public safety when law enforcement needs access to data. NSO insists that the vast majority of its customers are European democracies, although since it doesn’t release client lists and the countries themselves remain silent, that has never been verified.

    Monjib’s case, however, is one of a long list of incidents in which Pegasus has been used as a tool of oppression. It has been linked to cases including the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the targeting of scientists and campaigners pushing for political reform in Mexico, and Spanish government surveillance of Catalan separatist politicians. Mexico and Spain have denied using Pegasus to spy on opponents, but accusations that they have done so are backed by substantial technical evidence.

    NSO’s basic argument is that it is the creator of a technology that governments use, but that since it doesn’t attack anyone itself, it can’t be held responsible.

    Some of that evidence is contained in a lawsuit filed last October in California by WhatsApp and its parent company, Facebook, alleging that Pegasus manipulated WhatsApp’s infrastructure to infect more than 1,400 cell phones. Investigators at Facebook found more than 100 human rights defenders, journalists, and public figures among the targets, according to court documents. Each call that was picked up, they discovered, sent malicious code through WhatsApp’s infrastructure and caused the recipient’s phone to download spyware from servers owned by NSO. This, WhatsApp argued, was a violation of American law.

    NSO has long faced such accusations with silence. Claiming that much of its business is an Israeli state secret, it has offered precious little public detail about its operations, customers, or safeguards.

    Now, though, the company suggests things are changing. In 2019, NSO, which was owned by a private equity firm, was sold back to its founders and another private equity firm, Novalpina, for $1 billion. The new owners decided on a fresh strategy: emerge from the shadows. The company hired elite public relations firms, crafted new human rights policies, and developed new self-­governance documents. It even began showing off some of its other products, such as a covid-19 tracking system called Fleming, and Eclipse, which can hack drones deemed a security threat.

    Over several months, I’ve spoken with NSO leadership to understand how the company works and what it says it is doing to prevent human rights abuses carried out using its tools. I have spoken to its critics, who see it as a danger to democratic values; to those who urge more regulation of the hacking business; and to the Israeli regulators responsible for governing it today. The company’s leaders talked about NSO’s future and its policies and procedures for dealing with problems, and it shared documents that detail its relationship with the agencies to which it sells Pegasus and other tools. What I found was a thriving arms dealer—inside the company, employees acknowledge that Pegasus is a genuine weapon—struggling with new levels of scrutiny that threaten the foundations of its entire industry.Retour ligne automatique
    “A difficult task”

    From the first day Shmuel Sunray joined NSO as its general counsel, he faced one international incident after another. Hired just days after WhatsApp’s lawsuit was filed, he found other legal problems waiting on his desk as soon as he arrived. They all centered on the same basic accusation: NSO Group’s hacking tools are sold to, and can be abused by, rich and repressive regimes with little or no accountability.

    Sunray had plenty of experience with secrecy and controversy: his previous job was as vice president of a major weapons manufacturer. Over several conversations, he was friendly as he told me that he’s been instructed by the owners to change NSO’s culture and operations, making it more transparent and trying to prevent human rights abuses from happening. But he was also obviously frustrated by the secrecy that he felt prevented him from responding to critics.

    “It’s a difficult task,” Sunray told me over the phone from the company’s headquarters in Herzliya, north of Tel Aviv. “We understand the power of the tool; we understand the impact of misuse of the tool. We’re trying to do the right thing. We have real challenges dealing with government, intelligence agencies, confidentiality, operational necessities, operational limitations. It’s not a classic case of human rights abuse by a company, because we don’t operate the systems—we’re not involved in actual operations of the systems—but we understand there is a real risk of misuse from the customers. We’re trying to find the right balance.”

    This underpins NSO’s basic argument, one that is common among weapons manufacturers: the company is the creator of a technology that governments use, but it doesn’t attack anyone itself, so it can’t be held responsible.

    Still, according to Sunray, there are several layers of protection in place to try to make sure the wrong people don’t have access.Retour ligne automatique
    Making a sale

    Like most other countries, Israel has export controls that require weapons manufacturers to be licensed and subject to government oversight. In addition, NSO does its own due diligence, says Sunray: its staff examine a country, look at its human rights record, and scrutinize its relationship with Israel. They assess the specific agency’s track record on corruption, safety, finance, and abuse—as well as factoring in how much it needs the tool.

    Sometimes negatives are weighed against positives. Morocco, for example, has a worsening human rights record but a lengthy history of cooperating with Israel and the West on security, as well as a genuine terrorism problem, so a sale was reportedly approved. By contrast, NSO has said that China, Russia, Iran, Cuba, North Korea, Qatar, and Turkey are among 21 nations that will never be customers.

    Finally, before a sale is made, NSO’s governance, risk, and compliance committee has to sign off. The company says the committee, made up of managers and shareholders, can decline sales or add conditions, such as technological restrictions, that are decided case by case. Retour ligne automatique
    Preventing abuse

    Once a sale is agreed to, the company says, technological guardrails prevent certain kinds of abuse. For example, Pegasus does not allow American phone numbers to be infected, NSO says, and infected phones cannot even be physically located in the United States: if one does find itself within American borders, the Pegasus software is supposed to self-destruct.

    NSO says Israeli phone numbers are among others also protected, though who else gets protection and why remains unclear.

    When a report of abuse comes in, an ad hoc team of up to 10 NSO employees is assembled to investigate. They interview the customer about the allegations, and they request Pegasus data logs. These logs don’t contain the content the spyware extracted, like chats or emails—NSO insists it never sees specific intelligence—but do include metadata such as a list of all the phones the spyware tried to infect and their locations at the time.

    According to one recent contract I obtained, customers must “use the system only for the detection, prevention, and investigation of crimes and terrorism and ensure the system will not be used for human rights violations.” They must notify the company of potential misuse. NSO says it has terminated three contracts in the past for infractions including abuse of Pegasus, but it refuses to say which countries or agencies were involved or who the victims were.

    “We’re not naïve”

    Lack of transparency is not the only problem: the safeguards have limits. While the Israeli government can revoke NSO’s license for violations of export law, the regulators do not take it on themselves to look for abuse by potential customers and aren’t involved in the company’s abuse investigations.

    Many of the other procedures are merely reactive as well. NSO has no permanent internal abuse team, unlike almost any other billion-dollar tech firm, and most of its investigations are spun up only when an outside source such as Amnesty International or Citizen Lab claims there has been malfeasance. NSO staff interview the agencies and customers under scrutiny but do not talk to the alleged victims, and while the company often disputes the technical reports offered as evidence, it also claims that both state secrecy and business confidentiality prevent it from sharing more information.

    The Pegasus logs that are crucial to any abuse inquiry also raise plenty of questions. NSO Group’s customers are hackers who work for spy agencies; how hard would it be for them to tamper with the logs? In a statement, the company insisted this isn’t possible but declined to offer details.

    If the logs aren’t disputed, NSO and its customers will decide together whether targets are legitimate, whether genuine crimes have been committed, and whether surveillance was done under due process of law or whether autocratic regimes spied on opponents.

    Sunray, audibly exasperated, says he feels as if secrecy is forcing him to operate with his hands tied behind his back.

    “It’s frustrating,” he told me. “We’re not naïve. There have been misuses. There will be misuses. We sell to many governments. Even the US government—no government is perfect. Misuse can happen, and it should be addressed.”

    But Sunray also returns to the company’s standard response, the argument that underpins its defense in the WhatsApp lawsuit: NSO is a manufacturer, but it’s not the operator of the spyware. We built it but they did the hacking—and they are sovereign nations.

    That’s not enough for many critics. “No company that believes it can be the independent watchdog of their own products ever convinces me,” says Marietje Schaake, a Dutch politician and former member of the European Parliament. “The whole idea that they have their own mechanisms while they have no problem selling commercial spyware to whoever wants to buy it, knowing that it’s used against human rights defenders and journalists—I think it shows the lack of responsibility on the part of this company more than anything.”

    So why the internal push for more transparency now? Because the deluge of technical reports from human rights groups, the WhatsApp lawsuit, and increasing governmental scrutiny threaten NSO’s status quo. And if there is going to be a new debate over how the industry gets regulated, it pays to have a powerful voice. Retour ligne automatique
    Growing scrutiny

    Lawful hacking and cyber-espionage have grown enormously as a business over the past decade, with no signs of retreat. NSO Group’s previous owners bought the company in 2014 for $130 million, less than one-seventh of the valuation it was sold for last year. The rest of the industry is expanding too, profiting from the spread of communications technology and deepening global instability. “There’s no doubt that any state has the right to buy this technology to fight crime and terrorism,” says Amnesty International’s deputy director, Danna Ingleton. “States are rightfully and lawfully able to use these tools. But that needs to be accompanied more with a regulatory system that prevents abuses and provides an accountability mechanism when abuse has happened.” Shining a much brighter light on the hacking industry, she argues, will allow for better regulation and more accountability.

    Earlier this year Amnesty International was in court in Israel arguing that the Ministry of Defense should revoke NSO’s license because of abuses of Pegasus. But just as the case was starting, officials from Amnesty and 29 other petitioners were told to leave the courtroom: a gag order was being placed on the proceedings at the ministry’s urging. Then, in July, a judge rejected the case outright.

    “I do not believe as a matter of principle and as a matter of law that NSO can claim a complete lack of responsibility for the way their tools are being used,” says United Nations special rapporteur Agnès Callamard. “That’s not how it works under international law.”

    Callamard advises the UN on extrajudicial executions and has been vocal about NSO Group and the spyware industry ever since it emerged that Pegasus was being used to spy on friends and associates of Khashoggi shortly before he was murdered. For her, the issue has life-or-death consequences.

    If NSO loses the WhatsApp case, one lawyer says, it calls into question all those companies that make their living by finding flaws in software and exploiting them.

    “We’re not calling for something radically new,” says Callamard. “We are saying that what’s in place at the moment is proving insufficient, and therefore governments or regulatory agencies need to move into a different gear quickly. The industry is expanding, and it should expand on the basis of the proper framework to regulate misuse. It’s important for global peace.”

    There have been calls for a temporary moratorium on sales until stronger regulation is enacted, but it’s not clear what that legal framework would look like. Unlike conventional arms, which are subject to various international laws, cyber weapons are currently not regulated by any worldwide arms control agreement. And while nonproliferation treaties have been suggested, there is little clarity on how they would measure existing capabilities, how monitoring or enforcement would work, or how the rules would keep up with rapid technological developments. Instead, most scrutiny today is happening at the national legal level.

    In the US, both the FBI and Congress are looking into possible hacks of American targets, while an investigation led by Senator Ron Wyden’s office wants to find out whether any Americans are involved in exporting surveillance technology to authoritarian governments. A recent draft US intelligence bill would require a government report on commercial spyware and surveillance technology.

    The WhatsApp lawsuit, meanwhile, has taken aim close to the heart of NSO’s business. The Silicon Valley giant argues that by targeting California residents—that is, WhatsApp and Facebook—NSO has given the court in San Francisco jurisdiction, and that the judge in the case can bar the Israeli company from future attempts to misuse WhatsApp’s and Facebook’s networks. That opens the door to an awful lot of possibilities: Apple, whose iPhone has been a paramount NSO target, could feasibly mount a similar legal attack. Google, too, has spotted NSO targeting Android devices.

    And financial damages are not the only sword hanging over NSO’s head. Such lawsuits also bring with them the threat of courtroom discovery, which has the potential to bring details of NSO’s business deals and customers into the public eye.

    “A lot depends on exactly how the court rules and how broadly it characterizes the violation NSO is alleged to have committed here,” says Alan Rozenshtein, a former Justice Department lawyer now at the University of Minnesota Law School. “At a minimum, if NSO loses this case, it calls into question all of those companies that make their products or make their living by finding flaws in messaging software and providing services exploiting those flaws. This will create enough legal uncertainty that I would imagine these would-be clients would think twice before contracting with them. You don’t know if the company will continue to operate, if they’ll get dragged to court, if your secrets will be exposed.” NSO declined to comment on the alleged WhatsApp hack, since it is still an active case. Retour ligne automatique
    “We are always spied on”

    In Morocco, Maâti Monjib was subjected to at least four more hacking attacks throughout 2019, each more advanced than the one before. At some point, his phone browser was invisibly redirected to a suspicious domain that researchers suspect was used to silently install malware. Instead of something like a text message that can raise the alarm and leaves a visible trace, this one was a much quieter network injection attack, a tactic valued because it’s almost imperceptible except to expert investigators.

    On September 13, 2019, Monjib had lunch at home with his friend Omar Radi, a Moroccan journalist who is one of the regime’s sharpest critics. That very day, an investigation later found, Radi was hit with the same kind of network injection attacks that had snared Monjib. The hacking campaign against Radi lasted at least into January 2020, Amnesty International researchers said. He’s been subject to regular police harassment ever since.

    At least seven more Moroccans received warnings from WhatsApp about Pegasus being used to spy on their phones, including human rights activists, journalists, and politicians. Are these the kinds of legitimate spying targets—the terrorists and criminals—laid out in the contract that Morocco and all NSO customers sign?

    In December, Monjib and the other victims sent a letter to Morocco’s data protection authority asking for an investigation and action. Nothing formally came of it, but one of the men, the pro-democracy economist Fouad Abdelmoumni, says his friends high up at the agency told him the letter was hopeless and urged him to drop the matter. The Moroccan government, meanwhile, has responded by threatening to expel Amnesty International from the country.

    What’s happening in Morocco is emblematic of what’s happening around the world. While it’s clear that democracies are major beneficiaries of lawful hacking, a long and growing list of credible, detailed, technical, and public investigations shows Pegasus being misused by authoritarian regimes with long records of human rights abuse.

    “Morocco is a country under an authoritarian regime who believe people like Monjib and myself have to be destroyed,” says Abdelmoumni. “To destroy us, having access to all information is key. We always consider that we are spied on. All of our information is in the hands of the palace.”

    #Apple #NSO #Facebook #WhatsApp #iPhone #Pegasus #smartphone #spyware #activisme #journalisme #écoutes #hacking #surveillance #Amnesty (...)

    ##CitizenLab

  • Plus de chargeur pour les produits apple, afin d’augmenter la marge. L’écologie a bon dos.
    https://www.lefigaro.fr/medias/pour-moins-polluer-les-marques-suppriment-les-chargeurs-20201228

    apple a donné le la. Lors du lancement de ses derniers iPhone 12, en octobre, la marque a annoncé qu’ils seraient livrés sans bloc de charge dans la boîte, ni écouteurs (sauf en France). . . . .

    Lisa Jackson, vice-présidente chargée du développement durable chez Apple, avait alors expliqué que les consommateurs étaient déjà largement équipés. « Plus de 2 milliards de chargeurs sont déjà en circulation dans le monde, avait-elle expliqué.En ne les produisant pas, nous allons économiser 2 millions de tonnes d’émission de CO2. C’est comme si nous avions retiré de la circulation 450.000 voitures ». Sans chargeur, les boîtes en carton sont plus petites, et donc les coûts de transport réduits.
    . . . . . .

    #apple #bénéfices #marge #smartphone #iphone #gafam #mac #prétexte #écologique

  • Les iPhone de journalistes d’Al-Jazira ciblés par des logiciels d’espionnage ultrasophistiqués
    https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2020/12/21/les-iphone-de-journalistes-d-al-jazira-cibles-par-des-logiciels-d-espionnage

    Des dizaines d’iPhone de journalistes de la chaîne d’informations qatarie ont été surveillés de manière indétectable grâce à des outils de l’entreprise israélienne NSO Group, révèle un rapport du Citizen Lab de Toronto, expert dans l’étude des logiciels espions. Les iPhone de dizaines d’employés de la chaîne d’information Al-Jazira auraient été espionnés, en 2019 et en 2020, grâce à des outils d’espionnage sophistiqués fourni par l’entreprise israélienne NSO Group. L’accusation, qui repose sur une analyse (...)

    #NSO #iPhone #Pegasus #smartphone #spyware #journalisme #écoutes #hacking #surveillance (...)

    ##CitizenLab

  • Journalists Hacked with Suspected NSO Group iMessage ’Zero-Click’ Exploit
    https://citizenlab.ca/2020/12/the-great-ipwn-journalists-hacked-with-suspected-nso-group-imessage-zero-

    Summary & Key Findings In July and August 2020, government operatives used NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware to hack 36 personal phones belonging to journalists, producers, anchors, and executives at Al Jazeera. The personal phone of a journalist at London-based Al Araby TV was also hacked. The phones were compromised using an exploit chain that we call KISMET, which appears to involve an invisible zero-click exploit in iMessage. In July 2020, KISMET was a zero-day against at least (...)

    #NSO #iPhone #Pegasus #smartphone #spyware #journalisme #écoutes #hacking #surveillance #CitizenLab

  • Why Tech’s Great Powers Are Warring
    https://onezero.medium.com/apple-v-facebook-c53efb4c0ad4

    The feud between Apple and Facebook enters a new era An adage of international relations holds that great powers have no permanent friends or allies, only permanent interests. (The original quote, from a 19th-century English statesman known as Lord Palmerston, is a bit less pithy.) It accounts for how the United States and Russia were allies in World War II, then bitter enemies soon after ; or how Japan fought with the Allies in World War I but joined the Axis in World War II. Today, the (...)

    #Apple #Google #Amazon #Facebook #Instagram #iPhone #iPad #smartphone #iOS #Microsoft #consentement #domination #interopérabilité #lutte #microtargeting #publicité #Bing #Gmail #Outlook (...)

    ##interopérabilité ##publicité ##Android
    https://miro.medium.com/max/679/0*KBi5U7GpAN2M1qek

  • Apple supplier Wistron puts India plant damage at up to $7 million
    https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-india-wistron/apple-supplier-wistron-puts-india-plant-damage-at-up-to-7-million-idUSKBN28

    TAIPEI (Reuters) - The ransacking of an iPhone manufacturing facility in India caused up to T$200 million ($7.12 million) in damage though production facilities were not as badly hit as reported, its Taiwan-based operator Wistron Corp said on Tuesday. Thousands of contract workers gathered on the grounds of the Wistron site on the outskirts of India’s tech hub of Bengaluru on Saturday demanding unpaid wages and better working hours. As police arrived, the crowd turned violent and video (...)

    #Apple #Wistron #iPhone #smartphone #violence #lutte #travail

    https://static.reuters.com/resources/r

    • the company said major production facilities and warehouses had not suffered as serious damage as reported by local media, and that it was initially estimating losses at T$100-200 million.

      Ce ne sont donc pas essentiellement les machines qui ont été touchées

      Apple Inc said on Monday it was investigating whether Wistron had flouted supplier guidelines. Apple said it was sending staff and auditors to the site and was cooperating with police in their investigation. Wistron is one of Apple’s top global suppliers.

      Il n’existe pas, par ailleurs, une campagne internationale contre les pratiques de sous-traitance d’Apple ? J’ai l’impression d’avoir déjà entendu parler d’une telle initiative.

  • Une usine de fabrication d’iPhone saccagée en Inde, des employés affirment ne pas avoir été payés
    https://www.nextinpact.com/lebrief/45104/une-usine-fabrication-diphone-saccagee-en-inde-employes-affirment-ne-pas

    Ce week-end, des milliers de salariés de Wistron, un des principaux fournisseurs d’Apple, se sont regroupés pour manifester sur le site de leur usine en Inde, dans la région de Bengaluru. Ils réclament des salaires impayés et de meilleures conditions de travail, comme le rapporte Reuters. Lorsque la police est arrivée sur place, les choses auraient dégénéré et certains s’en sont pris aux voitures et aux installations (voir cette vidéo). Un employé explique à Times of India qu’on avait promis un (...)

    #Apple #Wistron #iPhone #smartphone #violence #lutte #travail

  • Inde : des salariés saccagent leur usine de fabrication d’iPhone - Le Parisien
    https://www.leparisien.fr/economie/inde-des-salaries-d-un-fournisseur-d-apple-saccagent-leur-usine-13-12-202

    Inde : des salariés saccagent leur usine de fabrication d’iPhone
    Dans cette usine proche de Bangalore ; l’équipe de nuit dénonçait des salaires inférieurs à ceux promis par la firme taïwanaise Wistron.

    L’usine de Wistron à 60 km de Bangalore est très récente, les autorités ont multiplié les démarches pour faire venir la firme taïwanaise. AFP/Manjunath Kiran
    Par J.Cl.
    Le 13 décembre 2020 à 13h21, modifié le 13 décembre 2020 à 14h32

    Une centaine de personnes ont été arrêtées après la mise à sac d’une usine fabriquant des iPhone dans le sud de l’Inde par des ouvriers en colère.

    L’émeute s’est produite entre vendredi soir et samedi dans l’usine du groupe taïwanais Wistron Infocomm Manufacturing en banlieue de Bangalore. Des images tournées sur place montrent des vitres pulvérisées par des membres de l’équipe de nuit. Les caméras de vidéosurveillance, des lampes et des ventilateurs ont également été brisés, les bureaux des cadres dirigeants étant pris pour cible, et une voiture a été incendiée.

    • Pas si vite ! Mélenchon ou un ami à lui - rentier d’une quelconque république, lui aussi ?- a peut-être choisi de conseiller discrètement l’employeur (cf. passage en gras plus bas).

      ...ils affirment qu’ils étaient sous-payés et que leurs heures supplémentaires n’étaient pas rétribuées.

      Il est 6 h du matin, samedi, et c’est l’heure du changement d’équipe dans cette usine de la banlieue de Bangalore, au sud du pays. Les salariés viennent de recevoir leur paie, et c’est alors que la révolte éclate.

      Beaucoup estiment qu’ils sont exploités par la compagnie taiwainaise Wistron, car ils sont payés environ deux fois moins que ce qui leur était promis. 130 euros pour un ingénieur, 60 euros pour un ouvrier qualifié, qui fabriquent entre autres le modèle iPhone SE. Les heures supplémentaires, elles, ne seraient pas rétribuées.

      Cette gronde dure depuis des mois, elle éclate finalement de manière anarchique. Certains prennent des batons, et détruisent tout ce qu’ils trouvent : les vitres de l’entrée de l’usine, les bureaux à l’intérieur. Ils retournent aussi six voitures et incendient deux véhicules utilitaires.

      Un délégué syndical dénonce une « exploitation brutale des ouvriers », mais la société taiwanaise soutient que ce sont des personnes extérieures qui sont responsables du sacage, sans raison apparente, dit elle. Le producteur d’Iphone restera dans tous les cas fermé pendant une semaine afin de tout remettre en ordre.

      https://www.rfi.fr/fr/asie-pacifique/20201213-inde-saccage-dans-une-usine-d-iphone?ref=tw_i
      #Inde #salaire #travail #ouvriers #sous-traitance #révolte

    • En toile de fond de la révolte des ouvriers de cette usine de fabrication d’iPhone, grèves ouvrières et blocus paysans

      Inde, colère paysanne (menace de blocus sur New Delhi)
      https://seenthis.net/messages/890431
      https://seenthis.net/messages/890424

      En Inde, la plus grande #grève de l’histoire mondiale
      https://www.humanite.fr/en-inde-la-plus-grande-greve-de-lhistoire-mondiale-696823

      La plus grande grève du monde : 200 millions de travailleurs paralysent l’Inde (fin novembre)
      https://www.revolutionpermanente.fr/La-plus-grande-greve-du-monde-200-millions-de-travailleurs-para

      Jeudi, quelque 200 millions de travailleurs ont participé à une grève générale en Inde, à l’appel de dix centrales syndicales, contre les politiques du gouvernement de Narendra Modi, le Premier ministre du pays. Le train de réformes comprend de nouvelles lois sur le travail, une plus grande flexibilisation (des réglementations plus souples) sur les régulations en matière de santé et de sécurité sur le lieu de travail et dans le secteur agricole, ainsi que des privatisations du secteur public.

      Le gouvernement a approuvé quatre codes du travail qui remplacent les lois protégeant les travailleurs. Ces réglementations permettent aux employeurs et aux gouvernements d’augmenter la charge de travail, de contraindre encore davantage l’obtention de salaires équitables, de licencier facilement les travailleurs, de réduire la couverture d’assurance maladie et de rendre plus difficile la création de syndicats.
      En coordination avec les syndicats, une plateforme de plus de 300 organisations d’agriculteurs a appelé à une manifestation pour ce vendredi 27 novembre.

      Les travailleurs des principaux secteurs industriels tels que la production d’acier, de charbon, les télécommunications, l’ingénierie, les transports, les ports et docks, les banques et transporteurs de fond se sont joints à la grève, tandis que dans plusieurs Etats (l’Inde est une république fédérale composée de vingt-huit États et huit territoires de l’Union), une grève rurale est en préparation.

      Les réformes proposées par le gouvernement contre les droits des travailleurs s’inscrivent dans le contexte des effets de la pandémie de coronavirus sur le pays. Le gouvernement de Modi répond à la pandémie en donnant la priorité aux profits des grandes entreprises et en protégeant la fortune des milliardaires plutôt que la vie et les moyens de subsistance des travailleurs.

      L’Inde compte plus de 9,2 millions de personnes infectées par le COVID-19, le deuxième plus grand nombre au monde et près de 135 000 décès, selon les données officielles. La pandémie s’est étendue aux grandes villes comme Delhi, Mumbai et d’autres centres urbains, ainsi qu’aux zones rurales où les soins de santé publique sont rares ou inexistants.

      Des millions de personnes ont perdu leurs revenus, et ce dans un pays où, avant la pandémie, 50 % des enfants étaient en malnutrition. L’économie indienne a connu une chute de 23,9 % de son produit intérieur brut (PIB) au cours du trimestre d’avril-juin, alors qu’elle devrait baisser au total d’environ 10 % au cours de l’exercice 2020-2021. Dans ce contexte, des dizaines de millions de personnes ont perdu leur emploi de façon permanente, ou ont vu leurs heures de travail réduites. Selon un rapport du FMI publié en octobre, d’ici la fin de 2020, 40 millions d’Indiens supplémentaires se retrouveront dans une « pauvreté extrême », définie comme le fait de survivre avec 1,60€ ou moins par jour.

      Les salariés de l’industrie, les employés du secteur des services et du public exigent une augmentation du salaire minimum, la fin du travail précaire, le contrôle des prix des produits de première nécessité et la fin de la politique gouvernementale de privatisation du secteur public.

      Les revendications incluent 10 kilos de nourriture pour les familles dans le besoin, la fourniture d’une aide d’urgence aux secteurs les plus démunis de la population, effectuer un paiement unique de 7 500 roupies (environ 85 euros), le renforcement du système de distribution publique, le retrait des nouveaux codes du travail et des trois lois agricoles qui ouvrent les portes à l’agrobusiness, ainsi que l’abandon de la nouvelle politique d’éducation.

      En outre, les travailleurs revendiquent l’allocation de 5% du PIB à l’éducation, aux soins de santé pour tous et de 6% du PIB pour la santé. Les agriculteurs réclament depuis des années de meilleurs prix pour leurs produits, que l’exécutif annonce des prix minimaux de soutien sur la base de la recommandation faite il y a 16 ans par la Commission nationale des agriculteurs, et l’élimination de la dette des travailleurs ruraux.

      Les directions syndicales ont appelé à la grève pour désamorcer le mécontentement de millions d’indiens contre le gouvernement, mais pour l’instant elles ne donnent pas de réelle continuité aux protestations.

      Le profil nationaliste et de droite du gouvernement a répondu à la pandémie en intensifiant son discours contre les minorités religieuses, comme les musulmans, et en cherchant à attaquer les droits de millions de personnes avec des lois qui aboutiraient à une plus grande flexibilité du travail au profit des seuls milliardaires locaux et des entreprises étrangères.

      La rhétorique nationaliste de Modi s’est également intensifiée, en particulier contre la Chine, en plus d’approfondir la coopération stratégique et militaire avec les États-Unis en essayant de tirer profit du différend entre Washington et Pékin.

      #paysans #grève_générale

  • Apple faces lawsuits in Europe over slowing down older iPhones
    https://edition.cnn.com/2020/12/02/tech/apple-iphone-slowing-europe-lawsuit/index.html

    London (CNN Business) Apple is facing new legal action in Europe over its controversial practice of slowing down older iPhones. Euroconsumers, the advocacy group bringing the action, said in a statement Wednesday that the class-action lawsuits cover up to 2 million iPhone 6, 6 Plus, 6S and 6S Plus devices in Belgium, Spain, Italy and Portugal. Apple has faced public backlash and legal action around the world after it admitted in 2017 that software updates designed to prevent the batteries (...)

    #Apple #iPhone #smartphone #obsolescence