• Rapid Response : Decolonizing Italian Cities

    Anti-racism is a battle for memory. Enzo Traverso well underlined how statues brought down in the last year show “the contrast between the status of blacks and postcolonial subjects as stigmatised and brutalised minorities and the symbolic place given in the public space to their oppressors”.

    Material traces of colonialism are in almost every city in Italy, but finally streets, squares, monuments are giving us the chance to start a public debate on a silenced colonial history.

    Igiaba Scego, Italian writer and journalist of Somali origins, is well aware of the racist and sexist violence of Italian colonialism and she points out the lack of knowledge on colonial history.

    “No one tells Italian girls and boys about the squad massacres in Addis Ababa, the concentration camps in Somalia, the gases used by Mussolini against defenseless populations. There is no mention of Italian apartheid (…), segregation was applied in the cities under Italian control. In Asmara the inhabitants of the village of Beit Mekae, who occupied the highest hill of the city, were chased away to create the fenced field, or the first nucleus of the colonial city, an area off-limits to Eritreans. An area only for whites. How many know about Italian apartheid?” (Scego 2014, p. 105).

    In her book, Roma negata. Percorsi postcoloniali nella città (2014), she invites us to visually represent the historical connections between Europe and Africa, in creative ways; for instance, she worked with photographer Rino Bianchi to portray Afro-descendants in places marked by fascism such as Cinema Impero, Palazzo della Civiltà Italiana and Dogali’s stele in Rome.

    Inspired by her book, we decided to go further, giving life to ‘Decolonizing the city. Visual Dialogues in Padova’. Our goal was to question ourselves statues and street names in order to challenge the worldviews and social hierarchies that have made it possible to celebrate/forget the racist and sexist violence of colonialism. The colonial streets of Padova have been re-appropriated by the bodies, voices and gazes of six Italian Afro-descendants who took part in a participatory video, taking urban traces of colonialism out of insignificance and re-signifying them in a creative way.

    Wissal Houbabi, artist “daughter of the diaspora and the sea in between“, moves with the soundtrack by Amir Issa Non respiro (2020), leaving her poetry scattered between Via Cirenaica and Via Libia.

    “The past is here, insidious in our minds, and the future may have passed.

    The past is here, even if you forget it, even if you ignore it, even if you do everything to deny the squalor of what it was, the State that preserves the status of frontiers and jus sanguinis.

    If my people wanted to be free one day, even destiny would have to bend”.

    Cadigia Hassan shares the photos of her Italian-Somali family with a friend of hers and then goes to via Somalia, where she meets a resident living there who has never understood the reason behind the name of that street. That’s why Cadigia has returned to via Somalia: she wants to leave traces of herself, of her family history, of historical intertwining and to make visible the important connections that exist between the two countries.

    Ilaria Zorzan questions the colonial past through her Italo-Eritrean family photographic archive. The Italians in Eritrea made space, building roads, cableways, railways, buildings… And her grandfather worked as a driver and transporter, while her Eritrean grandmother, before marrying her grandfather, had been his maid. Ilaria conceals her face behind old photographs to reveal herself in Via Asmara through a mirror.

    Emmanuel M’bayo Mertens is an activist of the Arising Africans association. In the video we see him conducting a tour in the historic center of Padova, in Piazza Antenore, formerly Piazza 9 Maggio. Emmanuel cites the resolution by which the municipality of Padova dedicated the square to the day of the “proclamation of the empire” by Mussolini (1936). According to Emmanuel, fascism has never completely disappeared, as the Italian citizenship law mainly based on jus sanguinis shows in the racist idea of ​​Italianness transmitted ‘by blood’. Instead, Italy is built upon migration processes, as the story of Antenor, Padova’s legendary founder and refugee, clearly shows.

    Mackda Ghebremariam Tesfau’ questions the colonial map in Piazza delle Erbe where Libya, Albania, Ethiopia and Eritrea are marked as part of a white empire. She says that if people ignore this map it is because Italy’s colonial history is ignored. Moreover, today these same countries, marked in white on the map, are part of the Sub-saharan and Mediterranean migrant routes. Referring then to the bilateral agreements between Italy and Libya to prevent “irregular migrants” from reaching Europe, she argues that neocolonialism is alive. Quoting Aimé Césaire, she declares that “Europe is indefensible”.

    The video ends with Viviana Zorzato, a painter of Eritrean origin. Her house, full of paintings inspired by Ethiopian iconography, overlooks Via Amba Aradam. Viviana tells us about the ‘Portrait of a N-word Woman’, which she has repainted numerous times over the years. Doing so meant taking care of herself, an Afro-descendant Italian woman. Reflecting on the colonial streets she crosses daily, she argues that it is important to know the history but also to remember the beauty. Amba Alagi or Amba Aradam cannot be reduced to colonial violence, they are also names of mountains, and Viviana possesses a free gaze that sees beauty. Like Giorgio Marincola, Viviana will continue to “feel her homeland as a culture” and she will have no flags to bow her head to.

    The way in which Italy lost the colonies – that is with the fall of fascism instead of going through a formal decolonization process – prevented Italy from being aware of the role it played during colonialism. Alessandra Ferrini, in her ‘Negotiating amnesia‘,refers to an ideological collective amnesia: the sentiment of an unjust defeat fostered a sense of self-victimisation for Italians, removing the responsibility from them as they portrayed themselves as “brava gente” (good people). This fact, as scholars such as Nicola Labanca have explained, has erased the colonial period from the collective memory and public sphere, leaving colonial and racist culture in school textbooks, as the historian Gianluca Gabrielli (2015) has shown.

    This difficulty in coming to terms with the colonial past was clearly visible in the way several white journalists and politicians reacted to antiracist and feminist movements’ request to remove the statue of journalist Indro Montanelli in Milan throughout the BLM wave. During the African campaign, Montanelli bought the young 12-year-old-girl “Destà” under colonial concubinage (the so‑called madamato), boasting about it even after being accused by feminist Elvira Banotti of being a rapist. The issue of Montanelli’s highlights Italy’s need to think critically over not only colonial but also race and gender violence which are embedded in it.

    Despite this repressed colonial past, in the last decade Italy has witnessed a renewed interest stemming from bottom-up local movements dealing with colonial legacy in the urban space. Two examples are worth mentioning: Resistenze in Cirenaica (Resistances in Cyrenaica) in Bologna and the project “W Menilicchi!” (Long live Menilicchi) in Palermo. These instances, along with other contributions were collected in the Roots§Routes 2020 spring issue, “Even statues die”.

    Resistenze in Cirenaica has been working in the Cyrenaica neighbourhood, named so in the past due to the high presence of colonial roads. In the aftermath of the second world war the city council decided unanimously to rename the roads carrying fascist and colonial street signs (except for via Libya, left as a memorial marker) with partisans’ names, honouring the city at the centre of the resistance movement during the fascist and Nazi occupation. Since 2015, the collective has made this place the centre of an ongoing laboratory including urban walks, readings and storytelling aiming to “deprovincialize resistances”, considering the battles in the ex-colonies as well as in Europe, against the nazi-fascist forces, as antiracist struggles. The publishing of Quaderni di Cirene (Cyrene’s notebooks) brought together local and overseas stories of people who resisted fascist and colonial occupation, with the fourth book addressing the lives of fighter and partisan women through a gender lens.

    In October 2018, thanks to the confluence of Wu Ming 2, writer and storyteller from Resistenze in Cirenaica, and the Sicilian Fare Ala collective, a public urban walk across several parts of the city was organized, with the name “Viva Menilicchi!”. The itinerary (19 kms long) reached several spots carrying names of Italian colonial figures and battles, explaining them through short readings and theatrical sketches, adding road signs including stories of those who have been marginalized and exploited. Significantly, W Menilicchi! refers to Palermitan socialists and communists’ battle cry supporting king Menelik II who defeated the Italian troops in Aduwa in 1896, thus establishing a transnational bond among people subjected to Italian invasion (as Jane Schneider explores in Italy’s ‘Southern Question’: Orientalism in One Country, South Italy underwent a socio-economic occupation driven by imperial/colonial logics by the north-based Kingdom of Italy) . Furthermore, the urban walk drew attention to the linkage of racist violence perpetrated by Italians during colonialism with the killings of African migrants in the streets of Palermo, denouncing the white superiority on which Italy thrived since its birth (which run parallel with the invasion of Africa).

    These experiences of “odonomastic guerrillas” (street-name activists) have found creative ways of decolonising Italian history inscribed in cities, being aware that a structural change requires not only time but also a wide bottom-up involvement of inhabitants willing to deal with the past. New alliances are developing as different groups network and coordinate in view of several upcoming dates, such as February 19th, which marks the anniversary of the massacre of Addis Ababa which occurred in 1937 at the hands of Italian viceroy Rodolfo Graziani.

    References:
    Gabrielli G. (2015), Il curriculo “razziale”: la costruzione dell’alterità di “razza” e coloniale nella scuola italiana (1860-1950), Macerata: Edizioni Università di Macerata.
    Labanca, N. (2002) Oltremare. Storia dell’espansione coloniale italiana, Bologna: Il Mulino.
    Scego, I. (2014) Roma negata. Percorsi postcoloniali nella città, Roma: Ediesse.
    Schneider J (ed.) (1998) Italy’s ‘Southern Question’: Orientalism in One Country, London: Routledge.

    https://archive.discoversociety.org/2021/02/06/rapid-response-decolonizing-italian-cities

    #décolonisation #décolonial #colonialisme #traces_coloniales #Italie #Italie_coloniale #colonialisme_italien #statues #Padova #Padoue #afro-descendants #Cadigia_Hassan #via_Somalia #Ilaria_Zorzan #Emmanuel_M’bayo_Mertens #Mackda_Ghebremariam_Tesfau #Piazza_delle_erbe #Viviana_Zorzato #Via_Amba_Aradam #Giorgio_Marincola #Alessandra_Ferrini

    ping @postcolonial @cede

    –—

    ajouté à la métaliste sur l’Italie coloniale :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/871953

    • #Negotiating_Amnesia

      Negotiating Amnesia is an essay film based on research conducted at the Alinari Archive and the National Library in Florence. It focuses on the Ethiopian War of 1935-36 and the legacy of the fascist, imperial drive in Italy. Through interviews, archival images and the analysis of high-school textbooks employed in Italy since 1946, the film shifts through different historical and personal anecdotes, modes and technologies of representation.

      https://vimeo.com/429591146?embedded=true&source=vimeo_logo&owner=3319920



      https://www.alessandraferrini.info/negotiating-amnesia

      En un coup d’oeil, l’expansion coloniale italienne :

      #amnésie #film #fascisme #impérialisme #Mussolini #Benito_Mussolini #déni #héritage #mémoire #guerre #guerre_d'Ethiopie #violence #Istrie #photographie #askaris #askari #campagna_d'Africa #Tito_Pittana #Mariano_Pittana #mémoire #prostitution #madamato #madamisme #monuments #Romano_Romanelli #commémoration #mémoriel #Siracusa #Syracuse #nostalgie #célébration #Axum #obélisque #Nuovo_Impero_Romano #Affile #Rodolfo_Graziani #Pietro_Badoglio #Uomo_Nuovo #manuels_scolaires #un_posto_al_sole #colonialismo_straccione #italiani_brava_gente #armes_chimiques #armes_bactériologiques #idéologie

    • My Heritage ?

      My Heritage? (2020) is a site-specific intervention within the vestibule of the former Casa d’Italia in Marseille, inaugurated in 1935 and now housing the Italian Cultural Institute. The installation focuses on the historical and ideological context that the building incarnates: the intensification of Fascist imperial aspirations that culminated in the fascistization of the Italian diaspora and the establishment of the Empire in 1936, as a result of the occupation of Ethiopia. As the League of Nations failed to intervene in a war involving two of its members, the so-called Abyssinian Crisis gave rise to a series of conflicts that eventually led to the WW2: a ‘cascade effect’. On the other hand, the attack on the ‘black man’s last citadel’ (Ras Makonnen), together with the brutality of Italian warfare, caused widespread protests and support to the Ethiopian resistance, especially from Pan-African movements.

      Placed by the entrance of the exhibition Rue d’Alger, it includes a prominent and inescapable sound piece featuring collaged extracts from texts by members of the London-based Pan-African association International African Friends of Ethiopia - CLR James, Ras Makonnen, Amy Ashwood Garvey - intertwined with those of British suffragette Sylvia Pankhurst and Italian anarchist Silvio Corio, founders of the newspaper New Times and Ethiopian News in London.

      Through handwritten notes and the use of my own voice, the installation is a personal musing on heritage as historical responsibility, based on a self-reflective process. My voice is used to highlight such personal process, its arbitrary choice of sources (related to my position as Italian migrant in London), almost appropriated here as an act of thinking aloud and thinking with these militant voices. Heritage is therefore intended as a choice, questioning its nationalist uses and the everlasting and catastrophic effects of Fascist foreign politics. With its loudness and placement, it wishes to affect the visitors, confronting them with the systemic violence that this Fascist architecture outside Italy embodies and to inhibit the possibility of being seduced by its aesthetic.



      https://www.alessandraferrini.info/my-heritage

      #héritage

    • "Decolonizziamo le città": il progetto per una riflessione collettiva sulla storia coloniale italiana

      Un video dal basso in cui ogni partecipante produce una riflessione attraverso forme artistiche differenti, come l’arte figurativa, la slam poetry, interrogando questi luoghi e con essi “noi” e la storia italiana

      Via Eritrea, Viale Somalia, Via Amba Aradam, via Tembien, via Adua, via Agordat. Sono nomi di strade presenti in molte città italiane che rimandano al colonialismo italiano nel Corno d’Africa. Ci passiamo davanti molto spesso senza sapere il significato di quei nomi.

      A Padova è nato un progetto che vuole «decolonizzare la città». L’idea è quella di realizzare un video partecipativo in cui ogni partecipante produca una riflessione attraverso forme artistiche differenti, come l’arte figurativa, la slam poetry, interrogando questi luoghi e con essi “noi” e la storia italiana. Saranno coinvolti gli studenti del laboratorio “Visual Research Methods”, nel corso di laurea magistrale “Culture, formazione e società globale” dell’Università di Padova e artisti e attivisti afrodiscendenti, legati alla diaspora delle ex-colonie italiane e non.

      «Stavamo preparando questo laboratorio da marzo», racconta Elisabetta Campagni, che si è laureata in Sociologia a marzo 2020 e sta organizzando il progetto insieme alla sua ex relatrice del corso di Sociologia Visuale Annalisa Frisina, «già molto prima che il movimento Black Lives Matter riportasse l’attenzione su questi temi».

      Riscrivere la storia insieme

      «Il dibattito sul passato coloniale italiano è stato ampiamente ignorato nei dibattiti pubblici e troppo poco trattato nei luoghi di formazione ed educazione civica come le scuole», si legge nella presentazione del laboratorio, che sarà realizzato a partire dall’autunno 2020. «C’è una rimozione grandissima nella nostra storia di quello che ricordano questi nomi, battaglie, persone che hanno partecipato a massacri nelle ex colonie italiane. Pochi lo sanno. Ma per le persone che arrivano da questi paesi questi nomi sono offensivi».

      Da qui l’idea di riscrivere una storia negata, di «rinarrare delle vicende che nascondono deportazioni e uccisioni di massa, luoghi di dolore, per costruire narrazioni dove i protagonisti e le protagoniste sono coloro che tradizionalmente sono stati messi a tacere o sono rimasti inascoltati», affermano le organizzatrici.

      Le strade «rinarrate»

      I luoghi del video a Padova saranno soprattutto nella zona del quartiere Palestro, dove c’è una grande concentrazione di strade con nomi che rimandano al colonialismo. Si andrà in via Amba Aradam, il cui nome riporta all’altipiano etiope dove nel febbraio 1936 venne combattuta una battaglia coloniale dove gli etiopi vennero massacrati e in via Amba Alagi.

      Una tappa sarà nell’ex piazza Pietro Toselli, ora dedicata ai caduti della resistenza, che ci interroga sul legame tra le forme di resistenza al fascismo e al razzismo, che unisce le ex-colonie all’Italia. In Italia il dibattito si è concentrato sulla statua a Indro Montanelli, ma la toponomastica che ricorda il colonialismo è molta e varia. Oltre alle strade, sarà oggetto di discussione la mappa dell’impero coloniale italiano situata proprio nel cuore della città, in Piazza delle Erbe, ma che passa spesso inosservata.

      Da un’idea di Igiaba Scego

      Come ci spiega Elisabetta Campagni, l’idea nasce da un libro di Igiaba Scego che anni fa ha pubblicato alcune foto con afrodiscendenti che posano davanti ai luoghi che celebrano il colonialismo a Roma come la stele di Dogali, vicino alla stazione Termini, in viale Luigi Einaudi.

      Non è il primo progetto di questo tipo: il collettivo Wu Ming ha lanciato la guerriglia odonomastica, con azioni e performance per reintitolare dal basso vie e piazze delle città o aggiungere informazioni ai loro nomi per cambiare senso all’intitolazione. La guerriglia è iniziata a Bologna nel quartiere della Cirenaica e il progetto è stato poi realizzato anche a Palermo. Un esempio per il laboratorio «Decolonizzare la città» è stato anche «Berlin post colonial», l’iniziativa nata da anni per rititolare le strade e creare percorsi di turismo consapevole.

      Il progetto «Decolonizzare la città» sta raccogliendo i voti sulla piattaforma Zaalab (https://cinemavivo.zalab.org/progetti/decolonizzare-la-citta-dialoghi-visuali-a-padova), con l’obiettivo di raccogliere fondi per la realizzazione del laboratorio.

      https://it.mashable.com/cultura/3588/decolonizziamo-le-citta-il-progetto-per-una-riflessione-collettiva-sull

      #histoire_niée #storia_negata #récit #contre-récit

    • Decolonizzare la città. Dialoghi Visuali a Padova

      Descrizione

      Via Amba Alagi, via Tembien, via Adua, via Agordat. Via Eritrea, via Libia, via Bengasi, via Tripoli, Via Somalia, piazza Toselli… via Amba Aradam. Diversi sono i nomi di luoghi, eventi e personaggi storici del colonialismo italiano in città attraversate in modo distratto, senza prestare attenzione alle tracce di un passato che in realtà non è ancora del tutto passato. Che cosa significa la loro presenza oggi, nello spazio postcoloniale urbano? Se la loro origine affonda le radici in un misto di celebrazione coloniale e nazionalismo, per capire il significato della loro permanenza si deve guardare alla società contemporanea e alle metamorfosi del razzismo.

      Il dibattito sul passato coloniale italiano è stato ampiamente ignorato nei dibattiti pubblici e troppo poco trattato nei luoghi di formazione ed educazione civica come le scuole. L’esistenza di scritti, memorie biografiche e racconti, pur presente in Italia, non ha cambiato la narrazione dominante del colonialismo italiano nell’immaginario pubblico, dipinto come una breve parentesi storica che ha portato civiltà e miglioramenti nei territori occupati (“italiani brava gente”). Tale passato, però, è iscritto nella toponomastica delle città italiane e ciò ci spinge a confrontarci con il significato di tali vie e con la loro indiscussa presenza. Per questo vogliamo partire da questi luoghi, e in particolare da alcune strade, per costruire una narrazione dal basso che sia frutto di una ricerca partecipata e condivisa, per decolonizzare la città, per reclamare una lettura diversa e critica dello spazio urbano e resistere alle politiche che riproducono strutture (neo)coloniali di razzializzazione degli “altri”.

      Il progetto allora intende sviluppare una riflessione collettiva sulla storia coloniale italiana, il razzismo, l’antirazzismo, la resistenza di ieri e di oggi attraverso la realizzazione di un video partecipativo.

      Esso è organizzato in forma laboratoriale e vuole coinvolgere studenti/studentesse del laboratorio “Visual Research Methods” (corso di laurea magistrale “Culture, formazione e società globale”) dell’Università di Padova e gli/le artisti/e ed attivisti/e afrodiscendenti, legati alla diaspora delle ex-colonie italiane e non.

      Il progetto si propone di creare una narrazione visuale partecipata, in cui progettazione, riprese e contenuti siano discussi in maniera orizzontale e collaborativa tra i e le partecipanti. Gli/Le attivisti/e e artisti/e afrodiscendenti con i/le quali studenti e studentesse svolgeranno le riprese provengono in parte da diverse città italiane e in parte vivono a Padova, proprio nel quartiere in questione. Ognuno/a di loro produrrà insieme agli studenti e alle studentesse una riflessione attraverso forme artistiche differenti (come l’arte figurativa, la slam poetry…), interrogando tali luoghi e con essi “noi” e la storia italiana. I partecipanti intrecciano così le loro storie personali e familiari, la storia passata dell’Italia e il loro attivismo quotidiano, espresso con l’associazionismo o con diverse espressioni artistiche (Mackda Ghebremariam Tesfaù, Wissal Houbabi, Theophilus Marboah, Cadigia Hassan, Enrico e Viviana Zorzato, Ilaria Zorzan, Ada Ugo Abara ed Emanuel M’bayo Mertens di Arising Africans). I processi di discussione, scrittura, ripresa, selezione e montaggio verranno documentati attraverso l’utilizzo di foto e filmati volti a mostrare la meta-ricerca, il processo attraverso cui viene realizzato il video finale, e le scelte, di contenuto e stilistiche, negoziate tra i diversi attori. Questi materiali verranno condivisi attraverso i canali online, con il fine di portare a tutti coloro che sostengono il progetto una prima piccola restituzione che renda conto dello svolgimento del lavoro.

      Le strade sono un punto focale della narrazione: oggetto dei discorsi propagandistici di Benito Mussolini, fulcro ed emblema del presunto e mitologico progetto di civilizzazione italiana in Africa, sono proprio le strade dedicate a luoghi e alle battaglie dove si sono consumate le atrocità italiane che sono oggi presenze fisiche e allo stesso tempo continuano ad essere invisibilizzate; e i nomi che portano sono oggi largamente dei riferimenti sconosciuti. Ripercorrere questi luoghi fisici dando vita a dialoghi visuali significa riappropriarsi di una storia negata, rinarrare delle vicende che nascondono deportazioni e uccisioni di massa, luoghi di dolore, per costruire narrazioni dove i protagonisti e le protagoniste sono coloro che tradizionalmente sono stati messi a tacere o sono rimasti inascoltati.

      La narrazione visuale partirà da alcuni luoghi – come via Amba Aradam e via lago Ascianghi – della città di Padova intitolati alla storia coloniale italiana, in cui i protagonisti e le protagoniste del progetto daranno vita a racconti e performances artistiche finalizzate a decostruire la storia egemonica coloniale, troppo spesso edulcorata e minimizzata. L’obiettivo è quello di favorire il prodursi di narrazioni dal basso, provenienti dalle soggettività in passato rese marginali e che oggi mettono in scena nuove narrazioni resistenti. La riappropriazione di tali luoghi, fisica e simbolica, è volta ad aprire una riflessione dapprima all’interno del gruppo e successivamente ad un pubblico esterno, al fine di coinvolgere enti, come scuole, associazioni e altre realtà che si occupano di questi temi sul territorio nazionale. Oltre alle strade, saranno oggetto di discussione la mappa dell’impero coloniale italiano situata proprio nel cuore della città, in Piazza delle Erbe, e l’ex piazza Toselli, ora dedicata ai caduti della resistenza, che ci interroga sul legame tra le forme di resistenza al fascismo e al razzismo, che unisce le ex-colonie all’Italia.

      Rinarrare la storia passata è un impegno civile e politico verso la società contemporanea. Se anche oggi il razzismo ha assunto nuove forme, esso affonda le sue radici nella storia nazionale e coloniale italiana. Questa storia va rielaborata criticamente per costruire nuove alleanze antirazziste e anticolonialiste.

      Il video partecipativo, ispirato al progetto “Roma Negata” della scrittrice Igiaba Scego e di Rino Bianchi, ha l’obiettivo di mostrare questi luoghi attraverso narrazioni visuali contro-egemoniche, per mettere in discussione una storia ufficiale, modi di dire e falsi miti, per contribuire a dare vita ad una memoria critica del colonialismo italiano e costruire insieme percorsi riflessivi nuovi. Se, come sostiene Scego, occupare uno spazio è un grido di esistenza, con il nostro progetto vogliamo affermare che lo spazio può essere rinarrato, riletto e riattraversato.

      Il progetto vuole porsi in continuità con quanto avvenuto sabato 20 giugno, quando a Padova, nel quartiere Palestro, si è tenuta una manifestazione organizzata dall’associazione Quadrato Meticcio a cui hanno aderito diverse realtà locali, randunatesi per affermare la necessita’ di decolonizzare il nostro sguardo. Gli interventi che si sono susseguiti hanno voluto riflettere sulla toponomastica coloniale del quartiere Palestro, problematizzandone la presenza e invitando tutti e tutte a proporre alternative possibili.

      https://cinemavivo.zalab.org/progetti/decolonizzare-la-citta-dialoghi-visuali-a-padova

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=axEa6By9PIA&t=156s

  • Pakistan : Imran Khan accepte le jugement de la Cour suprême, mais dénonce encore une conspiration
    AFP, publié le vendredi 08 avril 2022
    https://actu.orange.fr/monde/pakistan-imran-khan-accepte-le-jugement-de-la-cour-supreme-mais-denonce-

    Le Premier ministre pakistanais, Imran Khan, a dit vendredi avoir accepté le jugement de la Cour suprême qui devrait lui valoir d’être renversé par une motion de censure, tout en continuant à dénoncer une conspiration ourdie par les Etats-Unis.

    L’Assemblée nationale se réunira samedi pour décider du sort de l’ancien joueur vedette de cricket, au pouvoir depuis 2018. Selon toute vraisemblance, il devrait perdre la confiance des députés, l’opposition ayant déjà annoncé posséder la majorité.

    « Je suis déçu par la décision de la Cour suprême, mais je veux dire clairement que je respecte la Cour et le système judiciaire pakistanais », a-t-il déclaré en ouverture d’un discours décousu de 40 minutes qui l’a aussi vu s’en prendre aux deux grands partis d’opposition, la Ligue musulmane du Pakistan (PML-N) et le Parti du peuple pakistanais (PPP), qui se sont partagé le pouvoir, avec l’armée, pendant des décennies et sont désormais unis.

    « J’accepte le jugement de la Cour », a-t-il ajouté, tout en regrettant que la plus haute instance judiciaire du pays n’ait pas pris en compte ses accusations d’’’ingérence" portées à l’encontre des Etats-Unis, auxquels il reproche d’avoir chercher à le renverser avec la complicité de l’opposition.

    A l’en croire, les Etats-Unis, déjà offusqués par ses critiques répétées à l’encontre de la politique américaine en Irak ou en Afghanistan, ont été ulcérés par sa visite à Moscou le jour même du déclenchement de la guerre en Ukraine. Washington a nié toute implication.

    « En aucun cas je n’accepterai ce gouvernement importé », a-t-il repris, reconnaissant implicitement avoir déjà perdu la partie. Il a appelé les sympathisants de son parti, le Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI, Mouvement du Pakistan pour la justice), à manifester dans le calme dimanche.

    #Pakistan
    ““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““
    Richard Medhurst
    @richimedhurst
    10:04 PM · 9 avr. 2022·
    https://twitter.com/richimedhurst/status/1512884202609516545

    Breaking: Imran Khan is no longer the Prime Minister of Pakistan.

    He has just been removed via a no-confidence vote, with 174 out of 172 votes needed.

    Khan had visited Moscow a few weeks ago to to secure gas & wheat, criticizing US foreign policy and meddling in Pakistan.

    “““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““
    Faisal Sherjan
    @fsherjan
    9:45 PM · 9 avr. 2022
    https://twitter.com/fsherjan/status/1512879463566036998

    Given the circumstances and manner in which an elected Government is being removed I do not wish to continue in the office of Executive Member PEMRA [Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority ] . My resignation will reach the PEMRA Chairman’s office on Monday morning. #IStandWithImranKhan

  • Les Disques #Bongo_Joe, hand in hand with Dunganga records, are pleased to announce the release of the first album of #Istanbul based almighty trio #Lalalar ! Before revealing the entire album of the Turkish punky-electronic band, we share with you an appetizer, the first single Abla Deme Lazım Olur !

    Riding a wave of fierce energy and acclaim generated by their show-stopping festival performances at Le Guess Who and Trans Musicales, Lalalar now unleash their hotly-anticipated debut album, Bi Cinnete Bakar. The brainchild of three of Turkey’s most active and innovative alternative artists – Ali Güçlü Şimşek, Barlas Tan Özemek and Kaan Düzarat – the album is a thrilling mix of punk energy, dark electronics and Turkish instrumentation and samples.

    For listeners whose knowledge of Turkish music extends only as far as 70s Anatolian rock, Lalalar might come as a surprise. Though Ali, main songwriter, suggests that those psychedelic classics are “in the veins” of all three members, Lalalar are much more than just another retro outfit. Instead, they weave subtle samples of timeless Turkish folk music into their electronic stews.

    Bi Cinnete Bakar will be released May 6th, but you can already preorder your copy on Bandcamp ! There’s a very limited SUNDOWN ORANGE version. Be fast and smooth, this one will go fast !!

    https://lalalar.bandcamp.com/album/bi-cinnete-bakar

    https://www.fip.fr/rock/lalalar-les-nouveaux-rebelles-du-rock-turc-18552

    #Turquie #musique

  • Un #harem a Roma

    Addentrarsi tra gli oggetti di un museo smembrato significa muoversi tra polvere e tracce, trovando pezzi, frammenti, schegge che si fanno calce, stoffa, ceramica, gesso, tele e pigmenti. Non sono materiali inerti: sospirano, sussurrano, gemono e graffiano storie. Partire da un oggetto vuol dire perdersi, ritrovarsi, andare verso il centro dal margine e poi farvi ritorno.
    Ho trovato uno spazio pieno di corpi in cui inciampo con la punta dei piedi, che sfioro con le dita, che inseguo mano a mano che la storia si srotola tra la polvere e le omissioni; è un lungo lavoro in fieri, iniziato quando ho avuto accesso ai materiali dell’ex #Museo_Coloniale di Roma, curando parte dell’inventariazione degli oggetti arrivati dopo la dismissione dell’#Istituto_Italiano_per_l’Africa_e_l’Oriente (#IsIAO), presso il Museo preistorico etnografico Luigi Pigorini. Nei magazzini del museo mi sono ritrovata tra le mani i primi pezzi di corpi, ovvero alcuni calchi facciali della missione antropologica in #Fezzan, condotta da #Lidio_Cipriani, negli anni Trenta. «L’impatto visivo ed emotivo scatenato dalla vista di questi oggetti ha contribuito all’idea di ‘disvelamento della memoria’ del fenomeno coloniale italiano e di un museo scomparso che non si vuole venga “ritrovato”» (Fiorletta, 2019). Addentrarsi nella storia e tra i materiali del Museo Coloniale ha significato narrare una parte di storia del colonialismo italiano, intraprendere un lavoro di restituzione dell’immaginario che ha contribuito a plasmare una mentalità, definire un ordine del discorso (Foucault, 2004), le cui categorie sopravvivono ancora oggi. Una strana storia ricolma di silenzi, di assenze pressanti.
    La ricerca condotta sui calchi e sul Museo Coloniale ha portato ad allargare le maglie di una rete fitta, complessa ma soprattutto infeltrita dall’essere stata nascosta per lungo tempo, i nodi che la tengono insieme vedono l’intersecarsi di classe, “razza” e genere, come le principali categorie di riferimento attorno cui ruotano le identità coloniali. Interrogare i calchi apparentemente muti mi ha portato sulle tracce della costruzione della bianchezza degli italiani, sulla quale si innesta l’identità nazionale e la divisione in classi tra madrepatria e colonie. La costruzione del genere e i rapporti tra i generi, altro elemento fondante del colonialismo italiano, definiscono una subalternità femminile varia, complessa e apparentemente contraddittoria, in continuo movimento, simbolicamente densa. Ma di quali donne parliamo? Chi sono le donne nelle colonie?
    Nello spazio di lavoro messo su in questi anni, reale, figurato-metaforico, scorgo le prime donne in alcuni calchi del Fezzan, riconosco i tatuaggi tipici delle popolazioni beduine[1]; escono dalle scatole ricoperte di cellophane statuine che ritraggono donne nere che portano brocche d’acqua, madri con bambini (Manfren, 2019).
    Sento un respiro, percepisco un accenno, sono certa di poter seguire le tracce.
    Mi accingo a scrivere da quello che è ancora un cantiere.

    (...)

    https://www.roots-routes.org/un-harem-a-roma-di-serena-fiorletta

    #Rome #Italie #colonialisme #Italie_coloniale #musée #musée_colonial #histoire #genre #femmes #Serena_Fiorletta

    ping @cede

    –-

    ajouté à la métaliste sur le colonialisme italien :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/871953

    • Unsettling Genealogies

      Unsettling Genealogies is an umbrella term under which I am developing a series of critical incursions in the history of Italian cultural institutions to expose their colonial and fascist roots, highlighting the way such legacies are sanitised, obfuscated or unacknowledged. These interventions take a wide range of forms, responding to the different contexts in which I work and involving networks that I regularly collaborate with, in order to allow for discussion and dissemination. Unsettling Genealogies stems out of the propositions outlined in a statement that I wrote in late 2019 for the journal From the European South (postcolonialitalia): (Re)entering the Archive: critical reflections on archives and whiteness

      The first project is focused on the planned re-exhibition of the former Colonial Museum in Rome, within the ethnographic museum #Museo_delle_Civiltà. Thus far, it consists of two outputs. Firstly, a short article published on the Journal of Visual Culture and Harun Farocki Institut platform in June 2020, which responded to the online press conference held by the museum, in which the re-opening was announced. Secondly, a presentation that I gave at the conference Everything Passes Except the Past held at Fondazione Sandretto Re Rebaudengo, Turin, on 17 October 2020 and organised by the Goethe Institut Brussels (project curated by Jana J. Haeckel).

      https://vimeo.com/487868816?embedded=true&source=vimeo_logo&owner=3319920


      https://www.alessandraferrini.info/unsettling-genealogies
      #musée #museo_coloniale #Rome #Roma

  • #Midnight_Traveler

    Lorsque les talibans mettent sa tête à prix, le réalisateur afghan Hassan Fazili est forcé de prendre la fuite avec sa femme et ses deux jeunes filles. Saisissant leur parcours incertain à l’aide de trois smartphones, Fazili montre à la fois le danger et le désespoir auxquels sont confrontés les réfugiés demandeurs d’asile mais aussi l’immense amour qui le lie à sa famille.

    « Lorsque les talibans mettent sa tête à prix, le réalisateur afghan Hassan Fazili, sa femme et leurs deux filles sont contraints de fuir leur pays. Leur crime ? Avoir ouvert un café proposant des activités culturelles. D’abord réfugiés au Tadjikistan, l’impossibilité d’obtenir l’asile les pousse à prendre à nouveau la route, cette fois pour l’Europe. Commence alors un périple incertain et dangereux qui les met à la merci des passeurs. Pendant trois ans, Hassan Fazili filme sa famille et leur vie d’attente, de peur, d’ennui. Cinéaste sans autre caméra que son téléphone portable, il filme la lutte quotidienne qu’est devenue leur existence, ses filles qui grandissent dans des camps de transit, et l’amour qui les unit. Il filme pour ne pas être oublié. Il filme pour ne pas devenir fou. Ce désir impérieux de créer, même dans les pires conditions, Midnight Traveler nous le fait partager avec une intensité rare. Pour nos yeux tristement accoutumés aux images des migrants, le film est non seulement une odyssée familiale bouleversante, mais aussi une réflexion sur la nature et le pouvoir de ces images. »

    http://www.film-documentaire.fr/4DACTION/w_actualite_film/55325

    –-> film réalisé avec un téléphone portable

    #film #film_documentaire #documentaire

    #Tadjikistan #migrations #talibans #Afghanistan #Hassan_Fazili #asile #réfugiés #réfugiés_afghans #Iran #Qom #frontière_Iran-Turquie #Iran #Turquie #Istanbul #Bulgarie #Sofia #passeurs #camps_de_réfugiés #Ovcha_Kupel #Dimitrovgrad #forêt #Belgrade #Serbie #route_des_Balkans #Krnjaca #Hongrie #Röszke #centre_de_transit

  • Sur le #retour_au_pays / #expulsions de #réfugiés_syriens... une #métaliste.

    Je profite de billet de @gonzo :
    « Le Danemark devient le premier pays européen à dire aux réfugiés syriens qu’ils doivent rentrer chez eux »
    https://seenthis.net/messages/904689

    ... pour créer une métaliste des mouvements de retour ("volontaires" ou « forcés ») des réfugiés syriens vers la #Syrie.
    Car ce mouvement a commencé tôt, déjà en 2015 selon les archives seenthis...

    #asile #migrations #réfugiés

  • L’OMS prévoit l’explosion d’une « super-gonorrhée » due au coronavirus - Sputnik France
    https://fr.sputniknews.com/sante/202012291044997733-loms-prevoit-lexplosion-dune-super-gonorrhee-due-

    L’OMS constate une forte augmentation des cas de gonorrhée favorisée par le #coronavirus suite à l’usage intensif d’antibiotiques. Cette maladie sexuellement transmissible pourrait exploser en 2021.

    Une forme mutante de la gonorrhée résistante aux traitements et résultant de l’usage accru d’antibiotiques pour traiter le coronavirus devrait connaître une forte progression en 2021, prévient l’OMS.

    « L’usage excessif des antibiotiques peut favoriser l’émergence d’une résistance aux antimicrobiens dans la gonorrhée », explique un porte-parole de l’OMS au journal The Sun.

    Et de détailler : « L’azithromycine, un #antibiotique utilisé fréquemment pour traiter les infections respiratoires, a ainsi été utilisée contre le Covid-19 au début de la pandémie ».
    Perturbation des services IST

    Selon l’organisation, pendant la pandémie, les services des infections sexuellement transmissibles (#IST) ont été perturbés et un plus grand nombre de cas d’IST n’ont pas été diagnostiqués correctement et un plus grand nombre de personnes se sont autosoignées.

    « Une telle situation peut alimenter l’émergence d’une résistance dans la #gonorrhée, y compris celle d’une super-gonorrhée dont la résistance aux antibiotiques actuels recommandés pour la traiter sera de très de haut niveau. »

    Une infection facilitant la transmission du VIH

    Les experts de l’OMS recommandent ainsi aux médecins de prescrire moins d’antibiotiques, et de ne le faire qu’en dernier recours. Ils rappellent également la nécessité de se protéger systématiquement lors des rapports sexuels.

    D’autres chercheurs indiquent dans une étude publiée par le Centre américain pour le contrôle et la prévention des maladies que les infections sexuellement transmissibles causées par la bactérie Neisseria gonorrhoeae peuvent faciliter la transmission du virus de l’immunodéficience humaine (#VIH).

  • Profili critici delle attività delle ONG italiane nei centri di detenzione in Libia con fondi A.I.C.S.


    https://sciabacaoruka.asgi.it/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Profili-critici-delle-attivita%CC%80-delle-ONG-italiane-nei-centr

    Résumé du rapport en anglais :
    https://sciabacaoruka.asgi.it/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/ENG-executive-summary.pdf

    –----

    Commentaire sur le site de Melting Pot :

    Profili critici delle attività delle ONG italiane nei centri di detenzione in Libia con fondi #AICS. ASGI presenta il rapporto sugli interventi finanziati dall’#Agenzia_Italiana_per_la_Cooperazione_e_lo_Sviluppo nei centri di detenzione libici

    Tra queste troviamo: #Emergenza_Sorrisi, #Helpcode (già #CCS), #CEFA, #CESVI, #Terre_des_Hommes_Italia, #Fondation_Suisse_de_Deminage, #GVC (già #We_World), #Istituto_di_Cooperazione_Universitaria, #Consorzio_Italiano_Rifugiati (#CIR), #Fondazione_Albero_della_Vita.
    I progetti, alcuni dei quali sono ancora in corso di realizzazione, sono stati finanziati con 6 milioni di euro dall’Agenzia Italiana per la Cooperazione e lo Sviluppo (AICS).

    L’iniziativa ha suscitato, sin dall’emanazione del primo bando a novembre 2017 molto scalpore nell’opinione pubblica, sia perché il sistema di detenzione per migranti in Libia è caratterizzato da gravissimi e sistematici abusi (“è troppo compromesso per essere aggiustato”, aveva detto il Commissario ONU per i diritti umani) sia per la vicinanza temporale con gli accordi Italia-Libia del febbraio 2017. I centri di detenzione libici infatti, soprattutto quelli ubicati nei dintorni di Tripoli che sono destinatari della maggior parte degli interventi italiani, sono destinati ad ospitare anche migranti intercettati in mare dalla Guardia Costiera Libica, a cui l’Italia ha fornito e tuttora fornisce un decisivo appoggio economico, politico e operativo.

    Il rapporto si interroga quindi sulle conseguenze giuridiche degli interventi attuati, a spese del contribuente italiano, nei centri di detenzione libici.

    Anzitutto, si mette in discussione la logica stessa dell’intervento ideato dall’AICS, mostrando come in larga misura le condizioni disumane nei centri, che i Bandi mirano in parte a migliorare, dipendano da precise scelte del governo di Tripoli (politiche oltremodo repressive dell’immigrazione clandestina, gestione affidata a milizie, assenza di controlli sugli abusi, ubicazione in strutture fatiscenti, mancata volontà di spesa, ecc.). I Bandi non condizionano l’erogazione delle prestazioni ad alcun impegno da parte del governo libico a rimediare a tali criticità, rendendo così l’intervento italiano inefficace e non sostenibile nel tempo.

    In secondo luogo, il rapporto osserva come nei centri nei pressi di Tripoli le ONG italiane svolgano un’attività strutturale, che si sostituisce in parte alle responsabilità di gestione quotidiana dei centri che spetterebbe al governo libico. Inoltre, alcuni interventi non sono a beneficio dei detenuti ma della struttura detentiva, preservandone la solidità strutturale e la sua capacità di ospitare, anche in futuro, nuovi prigionieri.

    In terzo luogo, alcuni interventi sono volti a mantenere in efficienza infrastrutture anche costrittive, come cancelli e recinzioni, cosicché potrebbe profilarsi un contributo al mantenimento di detenuti nella disponibilità di soggetti notoriamente coinvolti in gravissime violazioni di diritti fondamentali.

    Infine, il rapporto si interroga sulla destinazione effettiva dei beni e dei servizi erogati. L’assenza di personale italiano sul campo e il fatto che i centri siano in gran parte gestiti da milizie indubbiamente ostacolano un controllo effettivo sulla destinazione dei beni acquistati. L’approssimativa rendicontazione da parte di alcune ONG delle spese sostenute sembra avvalorare il quadro di scarso o nullo controllo su quanto effettivamente attuato dagli implementing partner libici sul campo. Non può così escludersi che di almeno parte dei fondi abbiano beneficiato i gestori dei centri, ossia quelle stesse milizie che sono talora anche attori del conflitto armato sul territorio libico nonché autori delle già ricordate sevizie ai danni dei detenuti.

    Il rapporto conclude osservando che l’intervento italiano è direttamente funzionale alla strategia di contenimento dei flussi irregolari di migranti attraverso meccanismi per la loro intercettazione, trasferimento in Libia, detenzione e successiva rimozione dal territorio libico attraverso rimpatrio nel paese di origine o resettlement in Paesi terzi.

    Il rapporto, pur ponendo alcuni interrogativi cruciali, non fornisce un quadro esaustivo, in quanto l’AICS ha sempre negato l’accesso ad alcuni documenti-chiave, quali i testi dei progetti, necessari a comprendere appieno la situazione.

    https://www.meltingpot.org/Profili-critici-delle-attivita%CC%80-delle-ONG-italiane-nei.html

    #Libye #asile #migrations #centres_de_détention #détention #ONG #ONG_italiennes #rapport #aide_du_développement #développement #coopération_au_développement #financement

    –---

    Ajouté à la métaliste migrations et développement :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/733358

    • La realtà libica raccontata attraverso un rapporto sugli interventi finanziati da fondi AICS nei centri di detenzione

      Il rapporto presentato da ASGI nell’ambito del progetto Sciabaca e Oruka

      Il 15 luglio nell’ambito del progetto Sciabaca e Oruka è stato pubblicato dall’ASGI un interessante rapporto sugli interventi attuati da alcune ONG italiane nei centri di detenzione per stranieri in Libia.

      Il rapporto «Profili critici delle attività delle ONG italiane nei centri di detenzione in Libia con fondi A.I.C.S.» [1] rappresenta un’analisi critica sull’operato in Libia dei progetti di alcune ONG finanziate dal nostro Paese. Si tratta di un’analisi che evidenzia soprattutto le grandi contraddizioni che si celano dietro tali interventi, le enormi lacune e soprattutto le pesanti violazioni dei diritti umani da parte del governo di Tripoli.

      Si parla di progetti, alcuni dei quali ancora in corso, finanziati con 6 milioni di euro dall’Agenzia Italiana per la Cooperazione e lo Sviluppo (AICS). Progetti che non hanno sicuramente migliorato le condizioni dei tanti migranti detenuti presso i centri libici.

      In particolare, il rapporto osserva come “nei centri nei pressi di Tripoli le ONG italiane svolgano un’attività strutturale, che si sostituisce in parte alle responsabilità di gestione quotidiana dei centri che spetterebbe al governo libico”, ma purtroppo tale attività non serve a superare le mancanze del governo libico e a migliorare la condizione generale dei soggetti detenuti. Infatti, vi sono delle pre-condizioni che non permettono di cambiare lo stato delle cose neppure con gli interventi che arrivano attraverso questi progetti.

      A tale proposito, è significativo il contesto generale in cui si inseriscono i progetti presi in considerazione dal rapporto pubblicato da ASGI. Non va infatti dimenticato che in Libia la detenzione di cittadini stranieri nei centri è disposta da un’autorità amministrativa (il Ministero dell’Interno) e che tale decisione non è soggetta ad alcun vaglio da parte delle autorità giurisdizionali. La detenzione, poi, è disposta per un tempo indeterminato e si accompagna alla pratica dei lavori forzati.
      Ma non solo.

      Le autorità libiche, con la limitata eccezione di alcune nazionalità, non distinguono tra migranti irregolari e richiedenti asilo bisognosi di protezione internazionale e, in ultimo, non sono previsti meccanismi successivi di controllo sulla legalità della detenzione disposta. Un quadro molto chiaro che si pone in netta violazione dei più elementari principi di tutela dei diritti umani e in aperto contrasto con il diritto internazionale.

      In questo quadro generale, si inseriscono gli interventi finanziati dal Governo italiano con i Bandi che vengono specificamente analizzati nel rapporto in commento. E, la descrizione che ne viene data è, a dir poco, drammatica. Una situazione, quella nei centri libici, “non determinata dalla temporanea impossibilità di un governo in difficoltà nel fornire assistenza volta a salvare le vite delle persone più vulnerabili”.

      Infatti, le condizioni in cui sono detenute migliaia di cittadini stranieri in Libia sembrano essere dovute non da circostanze esterne indipendenti dalla volontà del governo libico ma da sue precise scelte in merito alla:
      – mancata erogazione di servizi di base (cibo, medicine, ecc.), a fronte di una non trascurabile capacità di spesa pubblica;
      – detenzione di un numero di persone eccessivo rispetto agli spazi disponibili;
      – ubicazione in strutture intrinsecamente inadeguate allo scopo;
      – detenzione di persone vulnerabili quali donne e bambini anche in assenza di garanzie ed appositi servizi loro dedicati;
      – detenzione di persone in modo arbitrario (per durata indefinita, senza alcuna procedura legale, controllo giurisdizionale, registrazione formale o possibilità di accesso ad un avvocato);
      – gestione solo nominale da parte del Ministero libico di molti centri, di fatto gestiti da milizie;
      – assenza di meccanismi di prevenzione o controllo sugli abusi commessi in tali centri.

      Nello specifico, il rapporto fa emergere una serie di contraddizioni che sono intrinseche alla situazione politica della Libia e rispetto alle quali gli aiuti economici e logistici approvati con gli accordi tra Libia ed Italia del 2017 nulla possono.

      La ragione di questi accordi allora è da rinvenire esclusivamente nella volontà di limitare l’afflusso di migranti verso il continente europeo, senza alcuna considerazione di quelle che sono le condizioni in cui versano coloro che vengono trattenuti nel paese libico.

      Come più volte sottolineato dai più attenti osservatori, assistiamo ad un fenomeno di “esternalizzazione” delle frontiere europee con l’aggravante che in questi nuovi territori ove si esercita il controllo si ha una vera e propria sospensione del diritto internazionale e continue violazioni dei diritti umani. Non interessa se chi viene trattenuto sia un richiedente asilo o possa essere iscritto ad una categoria protetta. Non vi è distinzione tra uomini, donne e bambini. Sono tutti semplicemente migranti destinati a vivere la stessa drammatica situazione di detenzione arbitraria e indefinita, di violenze e di torture.

      In più, dalla lettura del rapporto, viene in evidenza l’esistenza di un problema a monte che concerne le politiche migratorie europee che sono, purtroppo, finalizzare esclusivamente al contenimento dei flussi migratori. Si tratta di una impostazione del discorso da parte dei Paesi europei che influenza pesantemente le scelte legislative che vengono compiute e gli interventi concreti che vengono fatti. Una errata impostazione delle politiche migratorie che si aggiunge ai tanti problemi concreti presenti in Libia. Non possiamo infatti dimenticare che la Libia è un paese politicamente instabile, caratterizzato da un controllo del territorio da parte di milizie armate che estromettono lo Stato e si sostituiscono a questo. Milizie rispetto alle quali è impossibile intervenire da parte delle ONG che non possono neppure effettuare un controllo sull’utilizzo effettivo che viene fatto dei beni acquistati con il denaro pubblico.

      Stando così le cose, non stupisce lo stato dei centri di detenzione libici. Una situazione di grande precarietà, di sovraffollamento, di carenza di cibo, di carenze strutturali degli edifici utilizzati, di mancanza di attenzione alle donne e ai bambini, di assenza di assistenza sanitaria.

      Nelle conclusioni del Rapporto, i ricercatori che si sono dedicati a questa attenta analisi dei progetti delle ONG italiane in Libia evidenziano quanto già abbiamo avuto modo di dire in precedenza. Tali progetti sono uno dei tasselli di cui si compone il complesso mosaico che riguardo i rapporti bilaterali tra Italia e Libia.

      Una stagione di accordi che prende le mosse dal noto memorandum del mese di febbraio 2017 e che mira soprattutto a limitare l’afflusso di migranti privi di visto di ingresso dal territorio libico a quello italiano.

      Un altro tassello è sicuramente costituito dalle missioni (peraltro rifinanziate dal nostro Parlamento pochi giorni fa) di addestramento e sostegno alla Guardia Costiera libica sempre da parte del nostro Stato.

      Lo scopo di questi accordi è quello di bloccare o riportare in Libia i migranti irregolari, detenerli in questo Paese e, poi, eventualmente smistarli verso altri paese terzi come il Niger o il Ruanda (o rimpatriarli nei paesi di origine).

      Tutto quello che accade durante e dopo non interessa. Non interessano gli strumenti che vengono utilizzati per bloccare le partenze, non interessano i metodi che vengono adoperati dalla Guardia costiera per bloccare i migranti, non interessa lo stato di detenzione a cui sono sottoposti. In vista del contenimento dei flussi migratori tutto è consentito alla Libia.

      https://www.meltingpot.org/La-realta-libica-raccontata-attraverso-un-rapporto-sugli.html

  • Maurice Born

    Daniel de Roulet

    https://lavoiedujaguar.net/Maurice-Born

    Il y a différentes manières d’évoquer un homme comme Maurice Born. On peut donner deux dates entre parenthèses et un trait d’union au milieu (1943-2020), calculer qu’il est mort le 9 juillet à soixante-seize ans et trouver une signification au trait d’union entre les deux dates. On peut parler de ce qu’il a fait, des films, des livres, des débats et même des maisons en dur.

    Mais il ne faut pas oublier Maurice en mouvement. Plus d’une fois, il a déménagé, s’est posé en nous jurant qu’il ne bougerait plus. Au bout d’un certain temps lui venait l’envie de repartir. Françoise, sa femme, me dit que si la maladie qui lui a rongé les poumons ne l’en avait pas empêché, il aurait peut-être une fois de plus décidé d’abandonner la Crète.

    Il a commencé sa vie à Saint-Imier où sa mère nous faisait d’excellentes tartines pour le goûter tandis que son père installait l’électricité dans les maisons et vendait des postes de radio. Quand on naît à Saint-Imier dans le Jura suisse à la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, on est imprégné par la tradition horlogère et par la révolte qui en a fait partie. Dès le début, les horlogers, travailleurs indépendants, refusaient les transformations qu’apportaient les manufactures. D’où, à la fin du XIXe siècle, le développement des idées anarchistes dans tout le Vallon. (...)

    #Maurice_Born #biographie #Daniel_de_Roulet #Jura #Saint-Imier #Bakounine #anarchisme #Laborit #cinéma #Jean-Daniel_Pollet #Crète #lépreux #Istrati #Orwell #édition

  • İstanbul is still a center like Wuhan, warns Turkish Medical Association -English Bianet
    The Turkish Medical Association (TTB) has noted that “premature reopening” amid COVID-19 pandemic is leading to alarming consequences in Turkey. “İstanbul is still a center like China’s Wuhan,” the TTB has warned.

    #Covid-19#Turquie#Seconde_vague#Istanbul#Pandémie#migrant#migration

    http://bianet.org/english/health/225955-istanbul-is-still-a-center-like-wuhan-warns-turkish-medical-associati

  • Ciblés par les #rafles, les #Syriens d’#Istanbul vivent dans la peur des #expulsions

    Depuis la victoire de l’opposition sociale-démocrate à Istanbul, lors des municipales du 23 juin, la police turque multiplie les rafles contre les réfugiés syriens et les migrants clandestins, désignés comme les responsables de la défaite du parti présidentiel. Menacés d’un renvoi forcé vers une autre ville turque, voire vers la Syrie, les Syriens de la métropole vivent désormais dans la peur des expulsions.

    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/221219/cibles-par-les-rafles-les-syriens-d-istanbul-vivent-dans-la-peur-des-expul
    #renvois #réfugiés_syriens #Turquie #retour_au_pays #réfugiés #migrations #refoulement #refoulements #asile

    –-> ça date de décembre 2019...

  • Istanbul Mayor reiterates call for city-wide curfew amid increasing number of coronavirus cases

    Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğu has reiterated his call on the government for the imposition of a city-wide curfew. “In line with our prior statements, Minister of Health Fahrettin Koca has just confirmed that #Istanbul is the epicenter of the #coronavirus pandemic in Turkey with 60% of the cases. I reiterate my call for a partial curfew to be imposed for Istanbul as quickly as possible,” İmamoğlu said

    Erdogan still refuses curfew, applying instead a “voluntary quarantine”.
    #Covid-19#Turquie#Istanbul#Quarantine#curfew#migration

    https://www.duvarenglish.com/health-2/coronavirus/2020/04/02/istanbul-mayor-reiterates-call-for-city-wide-curfew-amid-increasing-nu

  • Les règles des femmes, sujet d’un rapport inédit à l’Assemblée nationale | Le Huffington Post LIFE
    https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/entry/les-regles-des-femmes-sujet-dun-rapport-inedit-a-lassemblee-nationale

    Déplorant une “connaissance insuffisante” des filles et des femmes sur ce sujet, notamment concernant la “diversité des produits de protection”, les “précautions d’usage et d’hygiène” ou les “risques sanitaires”, les deux députées préconisent que le cycle menstruel soit systématiquement abordé dès la classe de 6e, et qu’un site internet public soit créé pour délivrer des “informations ludiques et accessibles”.

    “Informer au plus tôt c’est le mieux, dans un premier temps en abordant cette question de l’éducation à la sexualité”, a indiqué à l’AFP Laëtitia Romeiro Dias.

    C’est bien, sauf que l’éducation à la vie affective et sexuelle à l’école est prise en charge par des associations sous-dotées (et que personne à l’école n’est formé pour les remplacer).

    Baisses de financements des établissements d’information, de conseil conjugal et familial : on vous explique ! | Le planning familial
    https://www.planning-familial.org/fr/vie-du-mouvement/baisses-de-financements-des-etablissements-dinformation-de-consei

    Pour le Planning, sur l’ensemble du territoire, au vu des besoins, il n’y a pas de régions sur-dotées, il n’y a que des régions sous-dotées ! Comment poursuivre un travail de qualité et garantir l’égalité d’accès avec des moyens en baisse alors qu’ils ne suffisent déjà pas à couvrir les besoins ? Les besoins des populations et l’état des lieux des ressources pour y répondre devraient être les seuls critères recevables.
    Plutôt qu’une « répartition » des actions sur les territoires à moyens constants, démunissant les uns pour mal munir les autres, il est urgent d’augmenter la ligne budgétaire nationale affectée aux missions des EVARS EICCF : 2,8M€ pour toute la France métropolitaine et DROM, avec une moyenne de 800 000 jeunes par classe d’âge, c’est largement insuffisant !

    Ici aussi : https://twitter.com/KarinePlassard/status/1228048932619636737

    Je vais être obsessionnelle !
    Le planning familial du Puy de Dôme risque de fermer bientôt parce que l’état leur a retiré une subvention importante.
    Alors je sais Twitter c’est le Puy de Dôme loin des préoccupations de beaucoup d’entre vous mais pour nous ça veut dire beaucoup
    👇

    Le PF 63 intervient dans les collèges dans tout le département pour faire de la prévention. Pour cela l’asso était financé depuis des années.
    Il y a quelques mois, on leur a annoncé que désormais l’éducation nationale pourrait le faire seul, sauf que

    Sauf que les établissements continuent de solliciter le planning, car personne n’a été formé à quoique ce soit et que du coup, cette année aucun élève de collège n’aura d’intervention.
    Je rappelle que la loi prévoit 3 séances par an par classe d’âge ! C

    C’est une vrai mise en danger des jeunes...
    Par ailleurs ce manquement financier met en péril la structure même, la fermeture du planning 63 ça veut dire la fermeture du plus gros centre de planification du département

    Ça veut dire la fin des consultations pour des jeunes filles mineures qui venait avoir un suivi contraceptif, ça veut dire la fin de la prise en charge des femme victimes de violences, ça veut dire la fin des interventions auprès des migrantes, des détenues...

    La liste est longue de toutes les actions essentielles que mènent l’équipe du Planning familial, les attaquer en leur supprimant leur financement, c’est nous attaquer toutes !
    Il faut nous mobiliser, parce qu’aujourd’hui c’est ici et demain ce sera ailleurs !

    Même les capotes manquent... On le rappelle, c’est des investissements minuscules au regard de ce que leur manque peut coûter à la société en matière de santé, de violences à l’égard des femmes et de recul de leurs droits et de leur présence dans la sphère publique.

    Des pénuries de préservatifs gratuits inquiètent les associations | Slate.fr
    https://www.slate.fr/story/180273/penurie-preservatifs-planning-familial-mst-jeunes-prevention?amp

    Cet été, le Planning familial soulève pourtant une inquiétude. Il commence à s’alarmer d’un début de pénurie de préservatifs gratuits dans certains départements. Une préoccupation que l’association souhaite partager, notamment à travers une plateforme d’appels à témoignages, afin d’évaluer l’ampleur de la problématique sur les territoires.

    #santé #femmes #éducation_sexuelle #avortement #contraception #violences_sexuelles #IST #règles #préservatifs #Planning_familial

  • Les passagers du #Bosphore

    Le Bosphore est un pont entre l’Europe et l’Asie. Ses deux rives se regardent et se rencontrent sans cesse, comme une respiration. Ce bras de mer est inscrit dans l’identité vivante d’#Istanbul, dans les représentations et les imaginaires de ses habitants.

    Les trois épisodes des Passagers du Bosphore proposent un voyage sonore immersif, en son #binaural, à écouter avec un casque ou des oreillettes pour profiter de l’expérience, comme une invitation à ressentir le battement de cet espace mouvant : à bord d’un vapeur, d’une rive à l’autre, remonter le Bosphore.

    https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/lexperience-le-podcast-original/les-passagers-du-bosphore

    https://cdn.radiofrance.fr/s3/cruiser-production/2019/10/febeec5c-5fca-4ce5-a017-b69819414213/bnc_pad_unit_binau_bos01.mp3

    #france_culture #podcast #radio #audio

  • The business of building walls

    Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe is once again known for its border walls. This time Europe is divided not so much by ideology as by perceived fear of refugees and migrants, some of the world’s most vulnerable people.

    Who killed the dream of a more open Europe? What gave rise to this new era of walls? There are clearly many reasons – the increasing displacement of people by conflict, repression and impoverishment, the rise of security politics in the wake of 9/11, the economic and social insecurity felt across Europe after the 2008 financial crisis – to name a few. But one group has by far the most to gain from the rise of new walls – the businesses that build them. Their influence in shaping a world of walls needs much deeper examination.

    This report explores the business of building walls, which has both fuelled and benefited from a massive expansion of public spending on border security by the European Union (EU) and its member states. Some of the corporate beneficiaries are also global players, tapping into a global market for border security estimated to be worth approximately €17.5 billion in 2018, with annual growth of at least 8% expected in coming years.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAuv1QyP8l0&feature=emb_logo

    It is important to look both beyond and behind Europe’s walls and fencing, because the real barriers to contemporary migration are not so much the fencing, but the vast array of technology that underpins it, from the radar systems to the drones to the surveillance cameras to the biometric fingerprinting systems. Similarly, some of Europe’s most dangerous walls are not even physical or on land. The ships, aircrafts and drones used to patrol the Mediterranean have created a maritime wall and a graveyard for the thousands of migrants and refugees who have no legal passage to safety or to exercise their right to seek asylum.

    This renders meaningless the European Commission’s publicized statements that it does not fund walls and fences. Commission spokesperson Alexander Winterstein, for example, rejecting Hungary’s request to reimburse half the costs of the fences built on its borders with Croatia and Serbia, said: ‘We do support border management measures at external borders. These can be surveillance measures. They can be border control equipment...But fences, we do not finance’. In other words, the Commission is willing to pay for anything that fortifies a border as long as it is not seen to be building the walls themselves.

    This report is a sequel to Building Walls – Fear and securitization in the European Union, co-published in 2018 with Centre Delàs and Stop Wapenhandel, which first measured and identified the walls that criss-cross Europe. This new report focuses on the businesses that have profited from three different kinds of wall in Europe:

    The construction companies contracted to build the land walls built by EU member states and the Schengen Area together with the security and technology companies that provide the necessary accompanying technology, equipment and services;

    The shipping and arms companies that provide the ships, aircraft, helicopters, drones that underpin Europe’s maritime walls seeking to control migratory flows in the Mediterranean, including Frontex operations, Operation Sophia and Italian operation Mare Nostrum;
    And the IT and security companies contracted to develop, run, expand and maintain EU’s systems that monitor the movement of people – such as SIS II (Schengen Information System) and EES (Entry/Exit Scheme) – which underpin Europe’s virtual walls.

    Booming budgets

    The flow of money from taxpayers to wall-builders has been highly lucrative and constantly growing. The report finds that companies have reaped the profits from at least €900 million spent by EU countries on land walls and fences since the end of the Cold War. The partial data (in scope and years) means actual costs will be at least €1 billion. In addition, companies that provide technology and services that accompany walls have also benefited from some of the steady stream of funding from the EU – in particular the External Borders Fund (€1.7 billion, 2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders Fund (€2.76 billion, 2014-2020).

    EU spending on maritime walls has totalled at least €676.4 million between 2006 to 2017 (including €534 million spent by Frontex, €28.4 million spent by the EU on Operation Sophia and €114 million spent by Italy on Operation Mare Nostrum) and would be much more if you include all the operations by Mediterranean country coastguards. Total spending on Europe’s virtual wall equalled at least €999.4m between 2000 and 2019. (All these estimates are partial ones because walls are funded by many different funding mechanisms and due to lack of data transparency).

    This boom in border budgets is set to grow. Under its budget for the next EU budget cycle (2021–2027) the European Commission has earmarked €8.02 billion to its Integrated Border Management Fund (2021-2027), €11.27bn to Frontex (of which €2.2 billion will be used for acquiring, maintaining and operating air, sea and land assets) and at least €1.9 billion total spending (2000-2027) on its identity databases and Eurosur (the European Border Surveillance System).
    The big arm industry players

    Three giant European military and security companies in particular play a critical role in Europe’s many types of borders. These are Thales, Leonardo and Airbus.

    Thales is a French arms and security company, with a significant presence in the Netherlands, that produces radar and sensor systems, used by many ships in border security. Thales systems, were used, for example, by Dutch and Portuguese ships deployed in Frontex operations. Thales also produces maritime surveillance systems for drones and is working on developing border surveillance infrastructure for Eurosur, researching how to track and control refugees before they reach Europe by using smartphone apps, as well as exploring the use of High Altitude Pseudo Satellites (HAPS) for border security, for the European Space Agency and Frontex. Thales currently provides the security system for the highly militarised port in Calais. Its acquisition in 2019 of Gemalto, a large (biometric) identity security company, makes it a significant player in the development and maintenance of EU’s virtual walls. It has participated in 27 EU research projects on border security.
    Italian arms company Leonardo (formerly Finmeccanica or Leonardo-Finmeccanica) is a leading supplier of helicopters for border security, used by Italy in the Mare Nostrum, Hera and Sophia operations. It has also been one of the main providers of UAVs (or drones) for Europe’s borders, awarded a €67.1 million contract in 2017 by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) to supply them for EU coast-guard agencies. Leonardo was also a member of a consortium, awarded €142.1 million in 2019 to implement and maintain EU’s virtual walls, namely its EES. It jointly owns Telespazio with Thales, involved in EU satellite observation projects (REACT and Copernicus) used for border surveillance. Leonardo has participated in 24 EU research projects on border security and control, including the development of Eurosur.
    Pan-European arms giant Airbus is a key supplier of helicopters used in patrolling maritime and some land borders, deployed by Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania and Spain, including in maritime Operations Sophia, Poseidon and Triton. Airbus and its subsidiaries have participated in at least 13 EU-funded border security research projects including OCEAN2020, PERSEUS and LOBOS.
    The significant role of these arms companies is not surprising. As Border Wars (2016), showed these companies through their membership of the lobby groups – European Organisation for Security (EOS) and the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) – have played a significant role in influencing the direction of EU border policy. Perversely, these firms are also among the top four biggest European arms dealers to the Middle East and North Africa, thus contributing to the conflicts that cause forced migration.

    Indra has been another significant corporate player in border control in Spain and the Mediterranean. It won a series of contracts to fortify Ceuta and Melilla (Spanish enclaves in northern Morocco). Indra also developed the SIVE border control system (with radar, sensors and vision systems), which is in place on most of Spain’s borders, as well as in Portugal and Romania. In July 2018 it won a €10 million contract to manage SIVE at several locations for two years. Indra is very active in lobbying the EU and is a major beneficiary of EU research funding, coordinating the PERSEUS project to further develop Eurosur and the Seahorse Network, a network between police forces in Mediterranean countries (both in Europe and Africa) to stop migration.

    Israeli arms firms are also notable winners of EU border contracts. In 2018, Frontex selected the Heron drone from Israel Aerospace Industries for pilot-testing surveillance flights in the Mediterranean. In 2015, Israeli firm Elbit sold six of its Hermes UAVs to the Switzerland’s Border Guard, in a controversial €230 million deal. It has since signed a UAV contract with the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), as a subcontractor for the Portuguese company CEIIA (2018), as well as contracts to supply technology for three patrol vessels for the Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
    Land wall contractors

    Most of the walls and fences that have been rapidly erected across Europe have been built by national construction companies, but one European company has dominated the field: European Security Fencing, a Spanish producer of razor wire, in particular a coiled wire known as concertinas. It is most known for the razor wire on the fences around Ceuta and Melilla. It also delivered the razor wire for the fence on the border between Hungary and Serbia, and its concertinas were installed on the borders between Bulgaria and Turkey and Austria and Slovenia, as well as at Calais, and for a few days on the border between Hungary and Slovenia before being removed. Given its long-term market monopoly, its concertinas are very likely used at other borders in Europe.

    Other contractors providing both walls and associated technology include DAT-CON (Croatia, Cyprus, Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia and Ukraine), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén and Eulen (Spain/Morocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov and Indra (Bulgaria/Turkey), Nordecon and Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft and SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Latvia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lithuania/Russia), Minis and Legi-SGS(Slovenia/Croatia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia and Zaun Ltd (France/UK).

    In many cases, the actual costs of the walls and associated technologies exceed original estimates. There have also been many allegations and legal charges of corruption, in some cases because projects were given to corporate friends of government officials. In Slovenia, for example, accusations of corruption concerning the border wall contract have led to a continuing three-year legal battle for access to documents that has reached the Supreme Court. Despite this, the EU’s External Borders Fund has been a critical financial supporter of technological infrastructure and services in many of the member states’ border operations. In Macedonia, for example, the EU has provided €9 million for patrol vehicles, night-vision cameras, heartbeat detectors and technical support for border guards to help it manage its southern border.
    Maritime wall profiteers

    The data about which ships, helicopters and aircraft are used in Europe’s maritime operations is not transparent and therefore it is difficult to get a full picture. Our research shows, however, that the key corporations involved include the European arms giants Airbus and Leonardo, as well as large shipbuilding companies including Dutch Damen and Italian Fincantieri.

    Damen’s patrol vessels have been used for border operations by Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Portugal, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the UK as well as in key Frontex operations (Poseidon, Triton and Themis), Operation Sophia and in supporting NATO’s role in Operation Poseidon. Outside Europe, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey use Damen vessels for border security, often in cooperation with the EU or its member states. Turkey’s €20 million purchase of six Damen vessels for its coast guard in 2006, for example, was financed through the EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), intended for peace-building and conflict prevention.

    The sale of Damen vessels to Libya unveils the potential troubling human costs of this corporate trade. In 2012, Damen supplied four patrol vessels to the Libyan Coast Guard, sold as civil equipment in order to avoid a Dutch arms export license. Researchers have since found out, however, that the ships were not only sold with mounting points for weapons, but were then armed and used to stop refugee boats. Several incidents involving these ships have been reported, including one where some 20 or 30 refugees drowned. Damen has refused to comment, saying it had agreed with the Libyan government not to disclose information about the ships.

    In addition to Damen, many national shipbuilders play a significant role in maritime operations as they were invariably prioritised by the countries contributing to each Frontex or other Mediterranean operation. Hence, all the ships Italy contributed to Operation Sophia were built by Fincantieri, while all Spanish ships come from Navantia and its predecessors. Similarly, France purchases from DCN/DCNS, now Naval Group, and all German ships were built by several German shipyards (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Other companies in Frontex operations have included Greek company, Motomarine Shipyards, which produced the Panther 57 Fast Patrol Boats used by the Hellenic Coast Guard, Hellenic Shipyards and Israel Shipyards.

    Austrian company Schiebel is a significant player in maritime aerial surveillance through its supply of S-100 drones. In November 2018, EMSA selected the company for a €24 million maritime surveillance contract for a range of operations including border security. Since 2017, Schiebel has also won contracts from Croatia, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The company has a controversial record, with its drones sold to a number of countries experiencing armed conflict or governed by repressive regimes such as Libya, Myanmar, the UAE and Yemen.

    Finland and the Netherlands deployed Dornier aircraft to Operation Hermes and Operation Poseidon respectively, and to Operation Triton. Dornier is now part of the US subsidiary of the Israeli arms company Elbit Systems. CAE Aviation (Luxembourg), DEA Aviation (UK) and EASP Air (Netherlands) have all received contracts for aircraft surveillance work for Frontex. Airbus, French Dassault Aviation, Leonardo and US Lockheed Martin were the most important suppliers of aircraft used in Operation Sophia.

    The EU and its member states defend their maritime operations by publicising their role in rescuing refugees at sea, but this is not their primary goal, as Frontex director Fabrice Leggeri made clear in April 2015, saying that Frontex has no mandate for ‘proactive search-and-rescue action[s]’ and that saving lives should not be a priority. The thwarting and criminalisation of NGO rescue operations in the Mediterranean and the frequent reports of violence and illegal refoulement of refugees, also demonstrates why these maritime operations should be considered more like walls than humanitarian missions.
    Virtual walls

    The major EU contracts for the virtual walls have largely gone to two companies, sometimes as leaders of a consortium. Sopra Steria is the main contractor for the development and maintenance of the Visa Information System (VIS), Schengen Information System (SIS II) and European Dactyloscopy (Eurodac), while GMV has secured a string of contracts for Eurosur. The systems they build help control, monitor and surveil people’s movements across Europe and increasingly beyond.

    Sopra Steria is a French technology consultancy firm that has to date won EU contracts worth a total value of over €150 million. For some of these large contracts Sopra Steria joined consortiums with HP Belgium, Bull and 3M Belgium. Despite considerable business, Sopra Steria has faced considerable criticism for its poor record on delivering projects on time and on budget. Its launch of SIS II was constantly delayed, forcing the Commission to extend contracts and increase budgets. Similarly, Sopra Steria was involved in another consortium, the Trusted Borders consortium, contracted to deliver the UK e-Borders programme, which was eventually terminated in 2010 after constant delays and failure to deliver. Yet it continues to win contracts, in part because it has secured a near-monopoly of knowledge and access to EU officials. The central role that Sopra Steria plays in developing these EU biometric systems has also had a spin-off effect in securing other national contracts, including with Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Romania and Slovenia GMV, a Spanish technology company, has received a succession of large contracts for Eurosur, ever since its testing phase in 2010, worth at least €25 million. It also provides technology to the Spanish Guardia Civil, such as control centres for its Integrated System of External Vigilance (SIVE) border security system as well as software development services to Frontex. It has participated in at least ten EU-funded research projects on border security.

    Most of the large contracts for the virtual walls that did not go to consortia including Sopra Steria were awarded by eu-LISA (European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) to consortia comprising computer and technology companies including Accenture, Atos Belgium and Morpho (later renamed Idema).
    Lobbying

    As research in our Border Wars series has consistently shown, through effective lobbying, the military and security industry has been very influential in shaping the discourse of EU security and military policies. The industry has succeeded in positioning itself as the experts on border security, pushing the underlying narrative that migration is first and foremost a security threat, to be combatted by security and military means. With this premise, it creates a continuous demand for the ever-expanding catalogue of equipment and services the industry supplies for border security and control.

    Many of the companies listed here, particularly the large arms companies, are involved in the European Organisation for Security (EOS), the most important lobby group on border security. Many of the IT security firms that build EU’s virtual walls are members of the European Biometrics Association (EAB). EOS has an ‘Integrated Border Security Working Group’ to ‘facilitate the development and uptake of better technology solutions for border security both at border checkpoints, and along maritime and land borders’. The working group is chaired by Giorgio Gulienetti of the Italian arms company Leonardo, with Isto Mattila (Laurea University of Applied Science) and Peter Smallridge of Gemalto, a digital security company recently acquired by Thales.

    Company lobbyists and representatives of these lobby organisations regularly meet with EU institutions, including the European Commission, are part of official advisory committees, publish influential proposals, organise meetings between industry, policy-makers and executives and also meet at the plethora of military and security fairs, conferences and seminars. Airbus, Leonardo and Thales together with EOS held 226 registered lobbying meetings with the European Commission between 2014 and 2019. In these meetings representatives of the industry position themselves as the experts on border security, presenting their goods and services as the solution for ‘security threats’ caused by immigration. In 2017, the same group of companies and EOS spent up to €2.65 million on lobbying.

    A similar close relationship can be seen on virtual walls, with the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission arguing openly for public policy to foster the ‘emergence of a vibrant European biometrics industry’.
    A deadly trade and a choice

    The conclusion of this survey of the business of building walls is clear. A Europe full of walls has proved to be very good for the bottom line of a wide range of corporations including arms, security, IT, shipping and construction companies. The EU’s planned budgets for border security for the next decade show it is also a business that will continue to boom.

    This is also a deadly business. The heavy militarisation of Europe’s borders on land and at sea has led refugees and migrants to follow far more hazardous routes and has trapped others in desperate conditions in neighbouring countries like Libya. Many deaths are not recorded, but those that are tracked in the Mediterranean show that the proportion of those who drown trying to reach Europe continues to increase each year.

    This is not an inevitable state of affairs. It is both the result of policy decisions made by the EU and its member states, and corporate decisions to profit from these policies. In a rare principled stand, German razor wire manufacturer Mutanox in 2015 stated it would not sell its product to the Hungarian government arguing: ‘Razor wire is designed to prevent criminal acts, like a burglary. Fleeing children and adults are not criminals’. It is time for other European politicians and business leaders to recognise the same truth: that building walls against the world’s most vulnerable people violates human rights and is an immoral act that history will judge harshly. Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is time for Europe to bring down its new walls.

    https://www.tni.org/en/businessbuildingwalls

    #business #murs #barrières_frontalières #militarisation_des_frontières #visualisation #Europe #UE #EU #complexe_militaro-industriel #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #Indra #Israel_Aerospace_Industries #Elbit #European_Security_Fencing #DAT-CON #Geo_Alpinbau #Dragados #Ferrovial, #Proyectos_Y_Tecnología_Sallén #Eulen #Patstroy_Bourgas #Infra_Expert #Patengineeringstroy #Geostroy_Engineering #Metallic-Ivan_Mihaylov #Nordecon #Defendec #DAK_Acélszerkezeti_Kft #SIA_Ceļu_būvniecības_sabiedrība_IGATE #Gintrėja #Minis #Legi-SGS #Groupe_CW #Jackson’s_Fencing #Sorhea #Vinci #Eurovia #Zaun_Ltd #Damen #Fincantieri #Frontex #Damen #Turquie #Instrument_contributing_to_Stability_and_Peace (#IcSP) #Libye #exernalisation #Operation_Sophia #Navantia #Naval_Group #Flensburger_Schiffbau-Gesellschaft #HDW #Lürssen_Gruppe #Motomarine_Shipyards #Panther_57 #Hellenic_Shipyards #Israel_Shipyards #Schiebel #Dornier #Operation_Hermes #CAE_Aviation #DEA_Aviation #EASP_Air #French_Dassault_Aviation #US_Lockheed_Martin #murs_virtuels #Sopra_Steria #Visa_Information_System (#VIS) #données #Schengen_Information_System (#SIS_II) #European_Dactyloscopy (#Eurodac) #GMV #Eurosur #HP_Belgium #Bull #3M_Belgium #Trusted_Borders_consortium #économie #biométrie #Integrated_System_of_External_Vigilance (#SIVE) #eu-LISA #Accenture #Atos_Belgium #Morpho #Idema #lobby #European_Organisation_for_Security (#EOS) #European_Biometrics_Association (#EAB) #Integrated_Border_Security_Working_Group #Giorgio_Gulienetti #Isto_Mattila #Peter_Smallridge #Gemalto #murs_terrestres #murs_maritimes #coût #chiffres #statistiques #Joint_Research_Centre_of_the_European_Commission #Mutanox

    Pour télécharger le #rapport :


    https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/business_of_building_walls_-_full_report.pdf

    déjà signalé par @odilon ici :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/809783
    Je le remets ici avec des mots clé de plus

    ping @daphne @marty @isskein @karine4

    • La costruzione di muri: un business

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del Muro di Berlino, l’Europa fa parlare di sé ancora una volta per i suoi muri di frontiera. Questa volta non è tanto l’ideologia che la divide, quanto la paura di rifugiati e migranti, alcune tra le persone più vulnerabili al mondo.

      Riassunto del rapporto «The Business of Building Walls» [1]:

      Chi ha ucciso il sogno di un’Europa più aperta? Cosa ha dato inizio a questa nuova era dei muri?
      Ci sono evidentemente molte ragioni: il crescente spostamento di persone a causa di conflitti, repressione e impoverimento, l’ascesa di politiche securitarie sulla scia dell’11 settembre, l’insicurezza economica e sociale percepita in Europa dopo la crisi finanziaria del 2008, solo per nominarne alcune. Tuttavia, c’è un gruppo che ha di gran lunga da guadagnare da questo innalzamento di nuovi muri: le imprese che li costruiscono. La loro influenza nel dare forma ad un mondo di muri necessita di un esame più profondo.

      Questo rapporto esplora il business della costruzione di muri, che è stato alimentato e ha beneficiato di un aumento considerevole della spesa pubblica dedicata alla sicurezza delle frontiere dall’Unione Europea (EU) e dai suoi Stati membri. Alcune imprese beneficiarie sono delle multinazionali che approfittano di un mercato globale per la sicurezza delle frontiere che si stima valere approssimativamente 17,5 miliardi di euro nel 2018, con una crescita annuale prevista almeno dell’8% nei prossimi anni.

      È importante guardare sia oltre che dietro i muri e le barriere d’Europa, perché i reali ostacoli alla migrazione contemporanea non sono tanto le recinzioni, quanto la vasta gamma di tecnologie che vi è alla base, dai sistemi radar ai droni, dalle telecamere di sorveglianza ai sistemi biometrici di rilevamento delle impronte digitali. Allo stesso modo, alcuni tra i più pericolosi muri d’Europa non sono nemmeno fisici o sulla terraferma. Le navi, gli aerei e i droni usati per pattugliare il Mediterraneo hanno creato un muro marittimo e un cimitero per i migliaia di migranti e di rifugiati che non hanno un passaggio legale verso la salvezza o per esercitare il loro diritto di asilo.

      Tutto ciò rende insignificanti le dichiarazioni della Commissione Europea secondo le quali essa non finanzierebbe i muri e le recinzioni. Il portavoce della Commissione, Alexander Winterstein, per esempio, nel rifiutare la richiesta dell’Ungheria di rimborsare la metà dei costi delle recinzioni costruite sul suo confine con la Croazia e la Serbia, ha affermato: “Noi sosteniamo le misure di gestione delle frontiere presso i confini esterni. Queste possono consistere in misure di sorveglianza o in equipaggiamento di controllo delle frontiere... . Ma le recinzioni, quelle non le finanziamo”. In altre parole, la Commissione è disposta a pagare per qualunque cosa che fortifichi un confine fintanto che ciò non sia visto come propriamente costruire dei muri.

      Questo rapporto è il seguito di “Building Walls - Fear and securitizazion in the Euopean Union”, co-pubblicato nel 2018 con Centre Delàs e Stop Wapenhandel, che per primi hanno misurato e identificato i muri che attraversano l’Europa.

      Questo nuovo rapporto si focalizza sulle imprese che hanno tratto profitto dai tre differenti tipi di muro in Europa:
      – Le imprese di costruzione ingaggiate per costruire i muri fisici costruiti dagli Stati membri UE e dall’Area Schengen in collaborazione con le imprese esperte in sicurezza e tecnologia che provvedono le tecnologie, l’equipaggiamento e i servizi associati;
      – le imprese di trasporto marittimo e di armamenti che forniscono le navi, gli aerei, gli elicotteri e i droni che costituiscono i muri marittimi dell’Europa per tentare di controllare i flussi migratori nel Mediterraneo, in particolare le operazioni di Frontex, l’operazione Sophia e l’operazione italiana Mare Nostrum;
      – e le imprese specializzate in informatica e in sicurezza incaricate di sviluppare, eseguire, estendere e mantenere i sistemi dell’UE che controllano i movimento delle persone, quali SIS II (Schengen Information System) e EES (Entry/Exii Scheme), che costituiscono i muri virtuali dell’Europa.
      Dei budget fiorenti

      Il flusso di denaro dai contribuenti ai costruttori di muri è stato estremamente lucrativo e non cessa di aumentare. Il report rivela che dalla fine della guerra fredda, le imprese hanno raccolto i profitti di almeno 900 milioni di euro di spese dei paesi dell’UE per i muri fisici e per le recinzioni. Con i dati parziali (sia nella portata e che negli anni), i costi reali raggiungerebbero almeno 1 miliardo di euro. Inoltre, le imprese che forniscono la tecnologia e i servizi che accompagnano i muri hanno ugualmente beneficiato di un flusso costante di finanziamenti da parte dell’UE, in particolare i Fondi per le frontiere esterne (1,7 miliardi di euro, 2007-2013) e i Fondi per la sicurezza interna - Fondi per le Frontiere (2,76 miliardi di euro, 2014-2020).

      Le spese dell’UE per i muri marittimi hanno raggiunto almeno 676,4 milioni di euro tra il 2006 e il 2017 (di cui 534 milioni sono stati spesi da Frontex, 28 milioni dall’UE nell’operazione Sophia e 114 milioni dall’Italia nell’operazione Mare Nostrum) e sarebbero molto superiori se si includessero tutte le operazioni delle guardie costiera nazionali nel Mediterraneo.

      Questa esplosione dei budget per le frontiere ha le condizioni per proseguire. Nel quadro del suo budget per il prossimo ciclo di bilancio dell’Unione Europea (2021-2027), la Commissione europea ha attribuito 8,02 miliardi di euro al suo fondo di gestione integrata delle frontiere (2021-2027), 11,27 miliardi a Frontex (dei quali 2,2 miliardi saranno utilizzati per l’acquisizione, il mantenimento e l’utilizzo di mezzi aerei, marittimi e terrestri) e almeno 1,9 miliardi di euro di spese totali (2000-2027) alle sue banche dati di identificazione e a Eurosur (il sistemo europeo di sorveglianza delle frontiere).
      I principali attori del settore degli armamenti

      Tre giganti europei del settore della difesa e della sicurezza giocano un ruolo cruciale nei differenti tipi di frontiere d’Europa: Thales, Leonardo e Airbus.

      – Thales è un’impresa francese specializzata negli armamenti e nella sicurezza, con una presenza significativa nei Paesi Bassi, che produce sistemi radar e sensori utilizzati da numerose navi della sicurezza frontaliera. I sistemi Thales, per esempio, sono stati utilizzati dalle navi olandesi e portoghesi impiegate nelle operazioni di Frontex.
      Thales produce ugualmente sistemi di sorveglianza marittima per droni e lavora attualmente per sviluppare una infrastruttura di sorveglianza delle frontiere per Eurosus, che permetta di seguire e controllare i rifugiati prima che raggiungano l’Europa con l’aiuto di applicazioni per Smartphone, e studia ugualmente l’utilizzo di “High Altitude Pseudo-Satellites - HAPS” per la sicurezza delle frontiere, per l’Agenzia spaziale europea e Frontex. Thales fornisce attualmente il sistema di sicurezza del porto altamente militarizzato di Calais.
      Con l’acquisto nel 2019 di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza e identità (biometrica), Thales diventa un attore importante nello sviluppo e nel mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE. L’impresa ha partecipato a 27 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      – La società di armamenti italiana Leonardo (originariamente Finmeccanica o Leonardo-Finmeccanica) è uno dei principali fornitori di elicotteri per la sicurezza delle frontiere, utilizzati dalle operazioni Mare Nostrum, Hera e Sophia in Italia. Ha ugualmente fatto parte dei principali fornitori di UAV (o droni), ottenendo un contratto di 67,1 milioni di euro nel 2017 con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima) per fornire le agenzie di guardia costiera dell’UE.
      Leonardo faceva ugualmente parte di un consorzio che si è visto attribuire un contratto di 142,1 milioni di euro nel 2019 per attuare e assicurare il mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE, ossia il Sistema di entrata/uscita (EES). La società detiene, con Thales, Telespazio, che partecipa ai progetti di osservazione dai satelliti dell’UE (React e Copernicus) utilizzati per controllare le frontiere. Leonardo ha partecipato a 24 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere, tra cui lo sviluppo di Eurosur.

      – Il gigante degli armamenti pan-europei Airbus è un importante fornitore di elicotteri utilizzati nella sorveglianza delle frontiere marittime e di alcune frontiere terrestri, impiegati da Belgio, Francia, Germania, Grecia, Italia, Lituania e Spagna, in particolare nelle operazioni marittime Sophia, Poseidon e Triton. Airbus e le sue filiali hanno partecipato almeno a 13 progetti di ricerca sulla sicurezza delle frontiere finanziati dall’UE, tra cui OCEAN2020, PERSEUS e LOBOS.

      Il ruolo chiave di queste società di armamenti in realtà non è sorprendente. Come è stato dimostrato da “Border Wars” (2016), queste imprese, in quanto appartenenti a lobby come EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza) e ASD (Associazione delle industrie aerospaziali e della difesa in Europa), hanno ampiamente contribuito a influenzare l’orientamento della politica delle frontiere dell’UE. Paradossalmente, questi stessi marchi fanno ugualmente parte dei quattro più grandi venditori europei di armi al Medio Oriente e all’Africa del Nord, contribuendo così ad alimentare i conflitti all’origine di queste migrazioni forzate.

      Allo stesso modo Indra gioca un ruolo non indifferente nel controllo delle frontiere in Spagna e nel Mediterraneo. L’impresa ha ottenuto una serie di contratti per fortificare Ceuta e Melilla (enclavi spagnole nel Nord del Marocco). Indra ha ugualmente sviluppato il sistema di controllo delle frontiere SIVE (con sistemi radar, di sensori e visivi) che è installato nella maggior parte delle frontiere della Spagna, così come in Portogallo e in Romania. Nel luglio 2018, Indra ha ottenuto un contratto di 10 milioni di euro per assicurare la gestione di SIVE su più siti per due anni. L’impresa è molto attiva nel fare lobby presso l’UE. È ugualmente una dei grandi beneficiari dei finanziamenti per la ricerca dell’UE, che assicurano il coordinamento del progetto PERSEUS per lo sviluppo di Eurosur e il Seahorse Network, la rete di scambio di informazioni tra le forze di polizia dei paesi mediterranei (in Europa e in Africa) per fermare le migrazioni.

      Le società di armamenti israeliane hanno anch’esse ottenuto numerosi contratti nel quadro della sicurezza delle frontiere in UE. Nel 2018, Frontex ha selezionato il drone Heron delle Israel Aerospace Industries per i voli di sorveglianza degli esperimenti pilota nel Mediterraneo. Nel 2015, la società israeliana Elbit Systems ha venduto sei dei suoi droni Hermes al Corpo di guardie di frontiera svizzero, nel quadro di un contratto controverso di 230 milioni di euro. Ha anche firmato in seguito un contratto per droni con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima), in quanto subappaltatore della società portoghese CEIIA (2018), così come dei contratti per equipaggiare tre navi di pattugliamento per la Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
      Gli appaltatori dei muri fisici

      La maggioranza di muri e recinzioni che sono stati rapidamente eretti attraverso l’Europa, sono stati costruiti da società di BTP nazionali/società nazionali di costruzioni, ma un’impresa europea ha dominato nel mercato: la European Security Fencing, un produttore spagnolo di filo spinato, in particolare di un filo a spirale chiamato “concertina”. È famosa per aver fornito i fili spinati delle recinzioni che circondano Ceuta e Melilla. L’impresa ha ugualmente dotato di fili spinati le frontiere tra l’Ungheria e la Serbia, e i suoi fili spinati “concertina” sono stati installati alle frontiere tra Bulgaria e Turchia e tra l’Austria e la Slovenia, così come a Calais e, per qualche giorno, alla frontiera tra Ungheria e Slovenia, prima di essere ritirati. Dato che essi detengono il monopolio sul mercato da un po’ di tempo a questa parte, è probabile che i fili spinati “concertina” siano stati utilizzati presso altre frontiere in Europa.

      Tra le altre imprese che hanno fornito i muri e le tecnologie ad essi associate, si trova DAT-CON (Croazia, Cipro, Macedonia, Moldavia, Slovenia e Ucraina), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén e Eulen (Spagna/Marocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov et Indra (Bulgaria/Turchia), Nordecon e Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft e SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Lettonia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lituania/Russi), Minis e Legi-SGS (Slovenia/Croazia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia e Zaun Ltd (Francia/Regno Unito).

      I costi reali dei muri e delle tecnologie associate superano spesso le stime originali. Numerose accuse e denunce per corruzione sono state allo stesso modo formulate, in certi casi perché i progetti erano stati attribuiti a delle imprese che appartenevano ad amici di alti funzionari. In Slovenia, per esempio, accuse di corruzione riguardanti un contratto per la costruzione di muri alle frontiere hanno portato a tre anni di battaglie legali per avere accesso ai documenti; la questione è passata poi alla Corte suprema.

      Malgrado tutto ciò, il Fondo europeo per le frontiere esterne ha sostenuto finanziariamente le infrastrutture e i servizi tecnologici di numerose operazioni alle frontiere degli Stati membri. In Macedonia, per esempio, l’UE ha versato 9 milioni di euro per finanziare dei veicoli di pattugliamento, delle telecamere a visione notturna, dei rivelatori di battito cardiaco e sostegno tecnico alle guardie di frontiera nell’aiuto della gestione della sua frontiera meridionale.
      Gli speculatori dei muri marittimi

      I dati che permettono di determinare quali imbarcazioni, elicotteri e aerei sono utilizzati nelle operazioni marittime in Europa mancano di trasparenza. È dunque difficile recuperare tutte le informazioni. Le nostre ricerche mostrano comunque che tra le principali società implicate figurano i giganti europei degli armamenti Airbus e Leonardo, così come grandi imprese di costruzione navale come l’olandese Damen e l’italiana Fincantieri.

      Le imbarcazioni di pattugliamento di Damen sono servite per delle operazioni frontaliere portate avanti da Albania, Belgio, Bulgaria, Portogallo, Paesi Bassi, Romania, Svezia e Regno Unito, così come per le vaste operazioni di Frontex (Poseidon, Triton e Themis), per l’operazione Sophia e hanno ugualmente sostento la NATO nell’operazione Poseidon.

      Al di fuori dell’Europa, la Libia, il Marocco, la Tunisia e la Turchia utilizzano delle imbarcazioni Damen per la sicurezza delle frontiere, spesso in collaborazione con l’UE o i suoi Stati membri. Per esempio, le sei navi Damen che la Turchia ha comprato per la sua guardia costiera nel 2006, per un totale di 20 milioni di euro, sono state finanziate attraverso lo strumento europeo che contribuirebbe alla stabilità e alla pace (IcSP), destinato a mantenere la pace e a prevenire i conflitti.

      La vendita di imbarcazioni Damen alla Libia mette in evidenza l’inquietante costo umano di questo commercio. Nel 2012, Damen ha fornito quattro imbarcazioni di pattugliamento alla guardia costiera libica, che sono state vendute come equipaggiamento civile col fine di evitare la licenza di esportazione di armi nei Paesi Bassi. I ricercatori hanno poi scoperto che non solo le imbarcazioni erano state vendute con dei punti di fissaggio per le armi, ma che erano state in seguito armate ed utilizzate per fermare le imbarcazioni di rifugiati. Numerosi incidenti che hanno implicato queste imbarcazioni sono stati segnalati, tra i quali l’annegamento di 20 o 30 rifugiati. Damen si è rifiutata di commentare, dichiarando di aver convenuto col governo libico di non divulgare alcuna informazione riguardante le imbarcazioni.

      Numerosi costruttori navali nazionali, oltre a Damen, giocano un ruolo determinante nelle operizioni marittime poiché sono sistematicamente scelti con priorità dai paesi partecipanti a ogni operazione di Frontex o ad altre operazioni nel Mediterraneo. Tutte le imbarcazioni fornite dall’Italia all’operazione Sophia sono state costruite da Fincantieri e tutte quelle spagnole sono fornite da Navantia e dai suoi predecessori. Allo stesso modo, la Francia si rifornisce da DCN/DCNS, ormai Naval Group, e tutte le imbarcazioni tedesche sono state costruite da diversi cantieri navali tedeschi (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Altre imprese hanno partecipato alle operazioni di Frontex, tra cui la società greca Motomarine Shipyards, che ha prodotto i pattugliatori rapidi Panther 57 utilizzati dalla guardia costiera greca, così come la Hellenic Shipyards e la Israel Shipyards.

      La società austriaca Schiebel, che fornisce i droni S-100, gioca un ruolo importante nella sorveglianza aerea delle attività marittime. Nel novembre 2018, è stata selezionata dall’EMSA per un contratto di sorveglianza marittima di 24 milioni di euro riguardante differenti operazioni che includevano la sicurezza delle frontiere. Dal 2017, Schiebel ha ugualmente ottenuto dei contratti con la Croazia, la Danimarca, l’Islanda, l’Italia, il Portogallo e la Spagna. L’impresa ha un passato controverso: ha venduto dei droni a numerosi paesi in conflitto armato o governati da regimi repressivi come la Libia, il Myanmar, gli Emirati Arabi Uniti e lo Yemen.

      La Finlandia e i Paesi Bassi hanno impiegato degli aerei Dornier rispettivamente nel quadro delle operazioni Hermès, Poseidon e Triton. Dornier appartiene ormai alla filiale americana della società di armamenti israeliana Elbit Systems.
      CAE Aviation (Lussemburgo), DEA Aviation (Regno Unito) e EASP Air (Paesi Bassi) hanno tutte ottenuto dei contratti di sorveglianza aerea per Frontex.
      Airbus, Dassault Aviation, Leonardo e l’americana Lockheed Martin hanno fornito il più grande numero di aerei utilizzati per l’operazione Sophia.

      L’UE e i suoi Stati membri difendono le loro operazioni marittime pubblicizzando il loro ruolo nel salvataggio dei rifugiati in mare. Ma non è questo il loro obiettivo principale, come sottolinea il direttore di Frontex Fabrice Leggeri nell’aprile 2015, dichiarando che “le azioni volontarie di ricerca e salvataggio” non fanno parte del mandato affidato a Frontex, e che salvare delle vite non dovrebbe essere una priorità. La criminalizzazione delle operazioni di salvataggio da parte delle ONG, gli ostacoli che esse incontrano, così come la violenza e i respingimenti illegali dei rifugiati, spesso denunciati, illustrano bene il fatto che queste operazioni marittime sono volte soprattutto a costituire muri piuttosto che missioni umanitarie.
      I muri virtuali

      I principali contratti dell’UE legati ai muri virtuali sono stati affidati a due imprese, a volte in quanto leader di un consorzio.
      Sopra Steria è il partner principale per lo sviluppo e il mantenimento del Sistema d’informazione dei visti (SIV), del Sistema di informazione Schengen (SIS II) e di Eurodac (European Dactyloscopy) e GMV ha firmato una serie di contratti per Eurosur. I sistemi che essi concepiscono permettono di controllare e di sorvegliare i movimenti delle persone attraverso l’Europa e, sempre più spesso, al di là delle sue frontiere.

      Sopra Steria è un’impresa francese di servizi per consultazioni in tecnologia che ha, ad oggi, ottenuto dei contratti con l’UE per un valore totale di più di 150 milioni di euro. Nel quadro di alcuni di questi grossi contratti, Sopra Steria ha formato dei consorzi con HP Belgio, Bull e 3M Belgio.

      Malgrado l’ampiezza di questi mercati, Sopra Steria ha ricevuto importanti critiche per la sua mancanza di rigore nel rispetto delle tempistiche e dei budget. Il lancio di SIS II è stato costantemente ritardato, costringendo la Commissione a prolungare i contratti e ad aumentare i budget. Sopra Steria aveva ugualmente fatto parte di un altro consorzio, Trusted Borders, impegnato nello sviluppo del programma e-Borders nel Regno Unito. Quest’ultimo è terminato nel 2010 dopo un accumulo di ritardi e di mancate consegne. Tuttavia, la società ha continuato a ottenere contratti, a causa del suo quasi monopolio di conoscenze e di relazioni con i rappresentanti dell’UE. Il ruolo centrale di Sopra Steria nello sviluppo dei sistemi biometrici dell’UE ha ugualmente portato alla firma di altri contratti nazionali con, tra gli altri, il Belgio, la Bulgaria, la Repubblica ceca, la Finlandia, la Francia, la Germania, la Romania e la Slovenia.

      GMV, un’impresa tecnologica spagnola, ha concluso una serie di grossi contratti per Eurosur, dopo la sua fase sperimentale nel 2010, per almeno 25 milioni di euro. Essa rifornisce ugualmente di tecnologie la Guardia Civil spagnola, tecnologie quali, ad esempio, i centri di controllo del suo Sistema integrato di sorveglianza esterna (SIVE), sistema di sicurezza delle frontiere, così come rifornisce di servizi di sviluppo logistico Frontex. L’impresa ha partecipato ad almeno dieci progetti di ricerca finanziati dall’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      La maggior parte dei grossi contratti riguardanti i muri virtuali che non sono stati conclusi con consorzi di cui facesse parte Sopra Steria, sono stati attribuiti da eu-LISA (l’Agenzia europea per la gestione operazionale dei sistemi di informazione su vasta scale in seno allo spazio di libertà, di sicurezza e di giustizia) a dei consorzi di imprese specializzate nell’informazione e nelle nuove tecnologie, tra questi: Accenture, Atos Belgium e Morpho (rinominato Idemia).
      Lobby

      Come testimonia il nostro report “Border Wars”, il settore della difesa e della sicurezza, grazie ad una lobbying efficace, ha un’influenza considerabile nell’elaborazione delle politiche di difesa e di sicurezza dell’UE. Le imprese di questo settore industriale sono riuscite a posizionarsi come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, portando avanti il loro discorso secondo il quale la migrazione è prima di tutto una minaccia per la sicurezza che deve essere combattuta tramite mezzi militari e securitari. Questo crea così una domanda continua del catalogo sempre più fornito di equipaggiamenti e servizi che esse forniscono per la sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere.

      Un numero alto di imprese che abbiamo nominato, in particolare le grandi società di armamenti, fanno parte dell’EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza), il più importante gruppo di pressione sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      Molte imprese informatiche che hanno concepito i muri virtuali dell’UE sono membri dell’EAB (Associazione Europea per la Biometria). L’EOS ha un “Gruppo di lavoro sulla sicurezza integrata delle frontiere” per “permettere lo sviluppo e l’adozione delle migliori soluzioni tecnologiche per la sicurezza delle frontiere sia ai checkpoint che lungo le frontiere marittime e terrestri”.
      Il gruppo di lavoro è presieduto da Giorgio Gulienetti, della società di armi italiana Leonardo, Isto Mattila (diplomato all’università di scienze applicate) e Peter Smallridge di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza numerica, recentemente acquisita da Thales.

      I lobbisti di imprese e i rappresentanti di questi gruppi di pressione incontrano regolarmente le istituzioni dell’UE, tra cui la Commissione europea, nel quadro di comitati di consiglio ufficiali, pubblicano proposte influenti, organizzano incontri tra il settore industriale, i policy-makers e i dirigenti e si ritrovano allo stesso modo in tutti i saloni, le conferenze e i seminari sulla difesa e la sicurezza.

      Airbus, Leonardo e Thales e l’EOS hanno anche assistito a 226 riunioni ufficiali di lobby con la Commissione europea tra il 2014 e il 2019. In queste riunioni, i rappresentanti del settore si presentano come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, e propongono i loro prodotti e servizi come soluzione alle “minacce alla sicurezza” costituite dall’immigrazione. Nel 2017, queste stesse imprese e l’EOS hanno speso fino a 2,56 milioni di euro in lobbying.

      Si constata una relazione simile per quanto riguarda i muri virtuali: il Centro comune della ricerca della Commissione europea domanda apertamente che le politiche pubbliche favoriscano “l’emergenza di una industria biometrica europea dinamica”.
      Un business mortale, una scelta

      La conclusione di questa inchiesta sul business dell’innalzamento di muri è chiara: la presenza di un’Europa piena di muri si rivela molto fruttuosa per una larga fetta di imprese del settore degli armamenti, della difesa, dell’informatica, del trasporto marittimo e delle imprese di costruzioni. I budget che l’UE ha pianificato per la sicurezza delle frontiere nei prossimi dieci anni mostrano che si tratta di un commercio che continua a prosperare.

      Si tratta altresì di un commercio mortale. A causa della vasta militarizzazione delle frontiere dell’Europa sulla terraferma e in mare, i rifugiati e i migranti intraprendono dei percorsi molto più pericolosi e alcuni si trovano anche intrappolati in terribili condizioni in paesi limitrofi come la Libia. Non vengono registrate tutte le morti, ma quelle che sono registrate nel Mediterraneo mostrano che il numero di migranti che annegano provando a raggiungere l’Europa continua ad aumentare ogni anno.

      Questo stato di cose non è inevitabile. È il risultato sia di decisioni politiche prese dall’UE e dai suoi Stati membri, sia dalle decisioni delle imprese di trarre profitto da queste politiche. Sono rare le imprese che prendono posizione, come il produttore tedesco di filo spinato Mutinox che ha dichiarato nel 2015 che non avrebbe venduto i suoi prodotti al governo ungherese per il seguente motivo: “I fili spinati sono concepiti per impedire atti criminali, come il furto. Dei rifugiati, bambini e adulti, non sono dei criminali”.

      È tempo che altri politici e capi d’impresa riconoscano questa stessa verità: erigere muri contro le popolazioni più vulnerabili viola i diritti umani e costituisce un atto immorale che sarà evidentemente condannato dalla storia.

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del muro di Berlino, è tempo che l’Europa abbatta i suoi nuovi muri.

      https://www.meltingpot.org/La-costruzione-di-muri-un-business.html

    • How the arms industry drives Fortress Europe’s expansion

      In recent years, rising calls for deterrence have intensified the physical violence migrants face at the EU border. The externalization of the border through deals with sending and transit countries signals the expansion of this securitization process. Financial gains by international arms firms in this militarization trend form an obstacle for policy change.

      In March, April, and May of this year, multiple European countries deployed military forces to their national borders. This was done to assist with controls and patrols in the wake of border closures and other movement restrictions due to the Covid-19 crisis. Poland deployed 1,460 soldiers to the border to support the Border Guard and police as part of a larger military operation in reaction to Covid-19. And the Portuguese police used military drones as a complement to their land border checks. According to overviews from NATO, the Czech Republic, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands (military police), Slovakia, and Slovenia all stationed armed forces at their national borders.

      While some of these deployments have been or will be rolled back as the Corona crisis dies down, they are not exceptional developments. Rather, using armed forces for border security and control has been a common occurrence at EU external borders since the so-called refugee crisis of 2015. They are part of the continuing militarisation of European border and migration policies, which is known to put refugees at risk but is increasingly being expanded to third party countries. Successful lobbying from the military and security industry has been an important driver for these policies, from which large European arms companies have benefited.

      The militarization of borders happens when EU member states send armies to border regions, as they did in Operation Sophia off the Libyan coast. This was the first outright EU military mission to stop migration. But border militarization also includes the use of military equipment for migration control, such as helicopters and patrol vessels, as well as the the EU-wide surveillance system Eurosur, which connects surveillance data from all individual member states. Furthermore, EU countries now have over 1,000 kilometers of walls and fences on their borders. These are rigged with surveillance, monitoring, and detection technologies, and accompanied by an increasing use of drones and other autonomous systems. The EU also funds a constant stream of Research & Technology (R&T) projects to develop new technologies and services to monitor and manage migration.

      This process has been going on for decades. The Schengen Agreement of 1985, and the subsequent creation of the Schengen Area, which coupled the opening of the internal EU borders with robust control at the external borders, can be seen as a starting point for these developments. After 2011, when the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ led to fears of mass migration to Europe, and especially since the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the EU accelerated the boosting and militarising of border security, enormously. Since then, stopping migration has been at the top of the EU agenda.

      An increasingly important part of the process of border militarization isn’t happening at the European borders, but far beyond them. The EU and its member states are incentivizing third party countries to help stop migrants long before they reach Europe. This externalising of borders has taken many forms, from expanding the goals of EUCAP missions in Mali and Niger to include the prevention of irregular migration, to funding and training the Libyan Coast Guard to return refugees back to torture and starvation in the infamous detention centers in Libya. It also includes the donation of border security equipment, for example from Germany to Tunisia, and funding for purchases, such as Turkey’s acquisition of coast guard vessels to strengthen its operational capacities.

      Next to the direct consequences of European border externalisation efforts, these policies cause and worsen problems in the third party countries concerned: diverting development funds and priorities, ruining migration-based economies, and strengthening authoritarian regimes such as those in Chad, Belarus, Eritrea, and Sudan by providing funding, training and equipment to their military and security forces. Precisely these state organs are most responsible for repression and abuses of human rights. All this feeds drivers of migration, including violence, repression, and unemployment. As such, it is almost a guarantee for more refugees in the future.

      EU border security agency Frontex has also extended its operations into non-EU-countries. Ongoing negotiations and conclusions of agreements with Balkan countries resulted in the first operation in Albania having started in May 2019. And this is only a small part of Frontex’ expanding role in recent years. In response to the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the European Commission launched a series of proposals that saw large increases in the powers of the agency, including giving member states binding advice to boost their border security, and giving Frontex the right to intervene in member states’ affairs (even without their consent) by decision of the Commission or Council.

      These proposals also included the creation of a 10,000 person strong standing corps of border guards and a budget to buy or lease its own equipment. Concretely, Frontex started with a budget of €6 million in 2005, which grew to €143 million in 2015. This was then quickly increased again from €239 million in 2016 to €460 million in 2020. The enormous expansion of EU border security and control has been accompanied by rapidly increasing budgets in general. In recent years, billions of euros have been spent on fortifying borders, setting up biometric databases, increasing surveillance capacities, and paying non-EU-countries to play their parts in this expansion process.

      Negotiations about the next seven-year-budget for the EU, the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, are still ongoing. In the European Commission’s latest proposal, which is clearly positioned as a response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the fund for strengthening member states’ border security, the Integrated Border Management Fund, has been allotted €12.5 billion. Its predecessors, the External Borders Fund (2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders (2014-2020), had much smaller budgets: €1.76 billion and €2.70 billion, respectively. For Frontex, €7.5 billion is reserved, with €2.2 billion earmarked for purchasing or leasing equipment such as helicopters, drones, and patrol vessels. These huge budget increases are exemplary of the priority the EU attaches to stopping migration.

      The narrative underlying these policies and budget growths is the perception of migration as a threat; a security problem. As researcher, Ainhoa Ruiz (Centre Delàs) writes, “the securitisation process also includes militarisation,” because “the prevailing paradigm for providing security is based on military principles: the use of force and coercion, more weapons equating to more security, and the achievement of security by eliminating threats.”

      This narrative hasn’t come out of the blue. It is pushed by right wing politicians and often followed by centrist and leftist parties afraid of losing voters. Importantly, it is also promoted by an extensive and successful industrial lobby. According to Martin Lemberg-Pedersen (Assistant Professor in Global Refugee Studies, Aalborg University), arms companies “establish themselves as experts on border security, and use this position to frame immigration to Europe as leading to evermore security threats in need of evermore advanced [security] products.” The narrative of migration as a security problem thus sets the stage for militaries, and the security companies behind the commercial arms lobby, to offer their goods and services as the solution. The range of militarization policies mentioned so far reflects the broad adoption of this narrative.

      The lobby organizations of large European military and security companies regularly interact with the European Commission and EU border agencies. They have meetings, organise roundtables, and see each other at military and security fairs and conferences. Industry representatives also take part in official advisory groups, are invited to present new arms and technologies, and write policy proposals. These proposals can sometimes be so influential that they are adopted as policy, almost unamended.

      This happened, for instance, when the the Commission decided to open up the Instrument contributing to Security and Peace, a fund meant for peace-building and conflict prevention. The fund’s terms were expanded to cover provision of third party countries with non-lethal security equipment, for example, for border security purposes. The new policy document for this turned out to be a step-by-step reproduction of an earlier proposal from lobby organisation, Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD). Yet, perhaps the most far-reaching success of this kind is the expansion of Frontex, itself, into a European Border Guard. Years before it actually happened, the industry had already been pushing for this outcome.

      The same companies that are at the forefront of the border security and control lobby are, not surprisingly, also the big winners of EU and member states’ contracts in these areas. These include three of the largest European (and global) arms companies, namely, Airbus (Paneuropean), Leonardo (Italy) and Thales (France). These companies are active in many aspects of the border security and control market. Airbus’ and Leonardo’s main product in this field are helicopters, with EU funds paying for many purchases by EU and third countries. Thales provides radar, for example, for border patrol vessels, and is heavily involved in biometric and digital identification, especially after having acquired market leader, Gemalto, last year.

      These three companies are the main beneficiaries of the European anti-migration obsession. At the same time, these very three companies also contribute to new migration streams to Europe’s shores through their trade in arms. They are responsible for significant parts of Europe’s arms exports to countries at war, and they provide the arms used by parties in internal armed conflicts, by human rights violators, and by repressive regimes. These are the forces fueling the reasons for which people are forced to flee in the first place.

      Many other military and security companies also earn up to hundreds of millions of euros from large border security and control projects oriented around logistics and transport. Dutch shipbuilder Damen provided not only many southern European countries with border patrol vessels, but also controversially sold those to Libya and Turkey, among others. Its ships have also been used in Frontex operations, in Operation Sophia, and on the Channel between Calais and Dover.

      The Spanish company, European Security Fencing, provided razor wire for the fences around the Spanish enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla, in Morocco, as well as the fence at Calais and the fences on the borders of Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), and Greece leased border surveillance drones from Elbit and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). These are Israeli military companies that routinely promote their products as ‘combat-proven’ or ‘battlefield tested’ against Palestinians.

      Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe. These are just a few examples of the companies that benefit from the billions of euros that the EU and its member states spend on a broad range of purchases and projects in their bid to stop migration.

      The numbers of forcibly displaced people in the world grew to a staggering 79.5 million by the end of last year. Instead of helping to eliminate the root causes of migration, EU border and migration policies, as well as its arms exports to the rest of the world, are bound to lead to more refugees in the future. The consequences of these policies have already been devastating. As experts in the field of migration have repeatedly warned, the militarisation of borders primarily pushes migrants to take alternative migration routes that are often more dangerous and involve the risks of relying on criminal smuggling networks. The Mediterranean Sea has become a sad witness of this, turning into a graveyard for a growing percentage of refugees trying to cross it.

      The EU approach to border security doesn’t stand on its own. Many other countries, in particular Western ones and those with authoritarian leaders, follow the same narrative and policies. Governments all over the world, but particularly those in the US, Australia, and Europe, continue to spend billions of euros on border security and control equipment and services. And they plan to increase budgets even more in the coming years. For military and security companies, this is good news; the global border security market is expected to grow by over 7% annually for the next five years to a total of $65 billion in 2025. It looks like they will belong to the very few winners of increasingly restrictive policies targeting vulnerable people on the run.

      https://crisismag.net/2020/06/27/how-the-arms-industry-drives-fortress-europes-expansion
      #industrie_militaire #covid-19 #coronavirus #frontières_extérieures #Operation_Sophia #Eurosur #surveillance #drones #technologie #EUCAP #externalisation #Albanie #budget #Integrated_Border_Management_Fund #menace #lobby_industriel #Instrument_contributing_to_Security_and_Peace #conflits #paix #prévention_de_conflits #Aerospace_and_Defence_Industries_Association_of_Europe (#ASD) #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #hélicoptères #radar #biométrie #identification_digitale #Gemalto #commerce_d'armes #armement #Damen #European_Security_Fencing #barbelé #European_Maritime_Safety_Agency (#EMSA) #Elbit #Israel_Aerospace_Industries (#IAI) #Civipol #Safran #base_de_données

      –—

      Pour @etraces :

      Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe

    • GUARDING THE FORTRESS. The role of Frontex in the militarisation and securitisation of migration flows in the European Union

      The report focuses on 19 Frontex operations run by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex) to explore how the agency is militarising borders and criminalising migrants, undermining fundamental rights to freedom of movement and the right to asylum.

      This report is set in a wider context in which more than 70.8 million people worldwide have been forcibly displaced, according to the 2018 figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (UNHCR, 2019). Some of these have reached the borders of the European Union (EU), seeking protection and asylum, but instead have encountered policy responses that mostly aim to halt and intercept migration flows, against the background of securitisation policies in which the governments of EU Member States see migration as a threat. One of the responses to address migration flows is the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex), established in 2004 as the EU body in charge of guarding what many have called ‘Fortress Europe’, and whose practices have helped to consolidate the criminalisation of migrants and the securitisation of their movements.

      The report focuses on analysing the tools deployed by Fortress Europe, in this case through Frontex, to prevent the freedom of movement and the right to asylum, from its creation in 2004 to the present day.

      The sources used to write this report were from the EU and Frontex, based on its budgets and annual reports. The analysis focused on the Frontex regulations, the language used and its meaning, as well as the budgetary trends, identifying the most significant items – namely, the joint operations and migrant-return operations.

      A table was compiled of all the joint operations mentioned in the annual reports since the Agency was established in 2005 up to 2018 (see annexes). The joint operations were found on government websites but were not mentioned in the Frontex annual reports. Of these operations, we analysed those of the longest duration, or that have showed recent signs of becoming long-term operations. The joint operations are analysed in terms of their objectives, area of action, the mandates of the personnel deployed, and their most noteworthy characteristics.

      Basically, the research sought to answer the following questions: What policies are being implemented in border areas and in what context? How does Frontex act in response to migration movements? A second objective was to analyse how Frontex securitises the movement of refugees and other migrants, with the aim of contributing to the analysis of the process of border militarisation and the security policies applied to non-EU migrants by the EU and its Member States.

      https://www.tni.org/en/guarding-the-fortress

      Pour télécharger le rapport_
      https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/informe40_eng_ok.pdf

      #rapport #TNI #Transnational_institute

    • #Frontex aircraft : Below the radar against international law

      For three years, Frontex has been chartering small aircraft for the surveillance of the EU’s external borders. First Italy was thus supported, then Croatia followed. Frontex keeps the planes details secret, and the companies also switch off the transponders for position display during operations.

      The European Commission does not want to make public which private surveillance planes Frontex uses in the Mediterranean. In the non-public answer to a parliamentary question, the EU border agency writes that the information on the aircraft is „commercially confidential“ as it contains „personal data and sensitive operational information“.

      Frontex offers EU member states the option of monitoring their external borders using aircraft. For this „Frontex Aerial Surveillance Service“ (FASS), Frontex charters twin-engined airplanes from European companies. Italy first made use of the service in 2017, followed a year later by Croatia. In 2018, Frontex carried out at least 1,800 flight hours under the FASS, no figures are yet available for 2019.

      Air service to be supplemented with #drones

      The FASS flights are carried out under the umbrella of „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, which includes satellite surveillance as well as drones. Before the end of this year, the border agency plans to station large drones in the Mediterranean for up to four years. The situation pictures of the European Union’s „pre-frontier area“ are fed into the surveillance system EUROSUR, whose headquarter is located at Frontex in Warsaw. The national EUROSUR contact points, for example in Spain, Portugal and Italy, also receive this information.

      In addition to private charter planes, Frontex also uses aircraft and helicopters provided by EU Member States, in the central Mediterranean via the „Themis“ mission. The EU Commission also keeps the call signs of the state aircraft operating there secret. They would be considered „sensitive operational information“ and could not be disclosed to MEPs.

      Previously, the FOIA platform „Frag den Staat“ („Ask the State“) had also tried to find out details about the sea and air capacities of the member states in „Themis“. Frontex refused to provide any information on this matter. „Frag den Staat“ lost a case against Frontex before the European Court of Justice and is now to pay 23,700 Euros to the agency for legal fees.

      Real-time tracking with FlightAware

      The confidentiality of Frontex comes as a surprise, because companies that monitor the Mediterranean for the agency are known through a tender. Frontex has signed framework contracts with the Spanish arms group Indra as well as the charter companies CAE Aviation (Canada), Diamond-Executive Aviation (Great Britain) and EASP Air (Netherlands). Frontex is spending up to 14.5 million euros each on the contracts.

      Finally, online service providers such as FlightAware can also be used to draw conclusions about which private and state airplanes are flying for Frontex in the Mediterranean. For real-time positioning, the providers use data from ADS-B transponders, which all larger aircraft must have installed. A worldwide community of non-commercial trackers receives this geodata and feeds it into the Internet. In this way, for example, Italian journalist Sergio Scandura documents practically all movements of Frontex aerial assets in the central Mediterranean.

      Among the aircraft tracked this way are the twin-engined „DA-42“, „DA-62“ and „Beech 350“ of Diamond-Executive Aviation, which patrol the Mediterranean Sea on behalf of Frontex as „Osprey1“, „Osprey3“ and „Tasty“, in former times also „Osprey2“ and „Eagle1“. They are all operated by Diamond-Executive Aviation and take off and land at airports in Malta and Sicily.

      „Push-backs“ become „pull-backs“

      In accordance with the Geneva Convention on Refugees, the EU Border Agency may not return people to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Libya is not a safe haven; this assessment has been reiterated on several occasions by the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees, among others.

      Because these „push-backs“ are prohibited, Frontex has since 2017 been helping with so-called „pull-backs“ by bringing refugees back to Libya by the Libyan coast guard rather than by EU units. With the „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, Frontex is de facto conducting air reconnaissance for Libya. By November 2019, the EU border agency had notified Libyan authorities about refugee boats on the high seas in at least 42 cases.

      Many international law experts consider this practice illegal. Since Libya would not be able to track down the refugees without the help of Frontex, the agency must take responsibility for the refoulements. The lawyers Omer Shatz and Juan Branco therefore want to sue responsibles of the European Union before the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

      Frontex watches refugees drown

      This is probably the reason why Frontex disguises the exact location of its air surveillance. Private maritime rescue organisations have repeatedly pointed out that Frontex aircrafts occasionally switch off their transponders so that they cannot be tracked via ADS-B. In the answer now available, this is confirmed by the EU Commission. According to this, the visibility of the aircraft would disclose „sensitive operational information“ and, in combination with other kinds of information, „undermine“ the operational objectives.

      The German Ministry of the Interior had already made similar comments on the Federal Police’s assets in Frontex missions, according to which „general tracking“ of their routes in real time would „endanger the success of the mission“.

      However, Frontex claims it did not issue instructions to online service providers to block the real-time position display of its planes, as journalist Scandura described. Nonetheless, the existing concealment of the operations only allows the conclusion that Frontex does not want to be controlled when the deployed aircraft watch refugees drown and Italy and Malta, as neighbouring EU member states, do not provide any assistance.

      https://digit.site36.net/2020/06/11/frontex-aircraft-blind-flight-against-international-law
      #avions #Italie #Croatie #confidentialité #transparence #Frontex_Aerial_Surveillance_Service (#FASS) #Multipurpose_Aerial_Surveillance #satellites #Méditerranée #Thermis #information_sensible #Indra #CAE_Aviation #Diamond-Executive_Aviation #EASP_Air #FlightAware #ADS-B #DA-42 #DA-62 #Beech_350 #Osprey1 #Osprey3 #Tasty #Osprey2 #Eagle1 #Malte #Sicile #pull-back #push-back #refoulement #Sergio_Scandura

    • Walls Must Fall: Ending the deadly politics of border militarisation - webinar recording
      This webinar explored the trajectory and globalization of border militarization and anti-migrant racism across the world, the history, ideologies and actors that have shaped it, the pillars and policies that underpin the border industrial complex, the resistance of migrants, refugees and activists, and the shifting dynamics within this pandemic.

      - #Harsha_Walia, author of Undoing Border Imperialism (2013)
      - #Jille_Belisario, Transnational Migrant Platform-Europe (TMP-E)
      - #Todd_Miller, author of Empire of Borders (2020), Storming the Wall (2019) and TNI’s report More than A Wall (2019)
      - #Kavita_Krishnan, All India Progressive Women’s Association (AIPWA).
      https://www.tni.org/en/article/walls-must-fall
      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T8B-cJ2bTi8&feature=emb_logo

      #conférence #webinar

    • Le business meurtrier des frontières

      Le 21ème siècle sera-t-il celui des barrières ? Probable, au rythme où les frontières nationales se renforcent. Dans un livre riche et documenté, publié aux éditions Syllepse, le géographe Stéphane Rosière dresse un indispensable état des lieux.

      Une nuit du mois de juin, dans un centre de rétention de l’île de Rhodes, la police grecque vient chercher une vingtaine de migrant·e·s, dont deux bébés. Après un trajet en bus, elle abandonne le groupe dans un canot de sauvetage sans moteur, au milieu des eaux territoriales turques. En août, le New York Times publie une enquête révélant que cette pratique, avec la combinaison de l’arrivée aux affaires du premier ministre conservateur Kyriakos Mitsotakis et de la diffusion de la pandémie de Covid-19, est devenue courante depuis mars.

      Illégales au regard du droit international, ces expulsions illustrent surtout le durcissement constant de la politique migratoire de l’Europe depuis 20 ans. Elles témoignent aussi d’un processus mondial de « pixellisation » des frontières : celles-ci ne se réduisent pas à des lignes mais à un ensemble de points plus ou moins en amont ou en aval (ports, aéroports, eaux territoriales…), où opèrent les polices frontalières.
      La fin de la fin des frontières

      Plus largement, le récent ouvrage de Stéphane Rosière, Frontières de fer, le cloisonnement du monde, permet de prendre la mesure d’un processus en cours de « rebordering » à travers le monde. À la fois synthèse des recherches récentes sur les frontières et résultats des travaux de l’auteur sur la résurgence de barrières frontalières, le livre est une lecture incontournable sur l’évolution contemporaine des frontières nationales.

      D’autant qu’il n’y a pas si longtemps, la mondialisation semblait promettre l’affaissement des frontières, dans la foulée de la disparition de l’Union soviétique et, corollairement, de la généralisation de l’économie de marché. La Guerre froide terminée annonçait la « fin de l’histoire » et, avec elle, la disparition des limites territoriales héritées de l’époque moderne. Au point de ringardiser, rappelle Stéphane Rosière, les études sur les frontières au sein de la géographie des années 1990, parallèlement au succès d’une valorisation tous azimuts de la mobilité dans le discours politique dominant comme dans les sciences sociales.

      Trente ans après, le monde se réveille avec 25 000 kilomètres de barrières frontalières – record pour l’Inde, avec plus de 3 000 kilomètres de clôtures pour prévenir l’immigration depuis le Bangladesh. Barbelés, murs de briques, caméras, détecteurs de mouvements, grilles électrifiées, les dispositifs de contrôle frontalier fleurissent en continu sur les cinq continents.
      L’âge des « murs anti-pauvres »

      La contradiction n’est qu’apparente. Les barrières du 21e siècle ne ferment pas les frontières mais les cloisonnent – d’où le titre du livre. C’est-à-dire que l’objectif n’est pas de supprimer les flux mondialisés – de personnes et encore moins de marchandises ni de capitaux – mais de les contrôler. Les « teichopolitiques », terme qui recouvre, pour Stéphane Rosière, les politiques de cloisonnement de l’espace, matérialisent un « ordre mondial asymétrique et coercitif », dans lequel on valorise la mobilité des plus riches tout en assignant les populations pauvres à résidence.

      De fait, on observe que les barrières frontalières redoublent des discontinuités économiques majeures. Derrière l’argument de la sécurité, elles visent à contenir les mouvements migratoires des régions les plus pauvres vers des pays mieux lotis économiquement : du Mexique vers les États-Unis, bien sûr, ou de l’Afrique vers l’Europe, mais aussi de l’Irak vers l’Arabie Saoudite ou du Pakistan vers l’Iran.

      Les dispositifs de contrôle frontalier sont des outils parmi d’autres d’une « implacable hiérarchisation » des individus en fonction de leur nationalité. Comme l’a montré le géographe Matthew Sparke à propos de la politique migratoire nord-américaine, la population mondiale se trouve divisée entre une classe hypermobile de citoyen·ne·s « business-class » et une masse entravée de citoyen·ne·s « low-cost ». C’est le sens du « passport index » publié chaque année par le cabinet Henley : alors qu’un passeport japonais ou allemand donne accès à plus de 150 pays, ce chiffre descend en-dessous de 30 avec un passeport afghan ou syrien.
      Le business des barrières

      Si les frontières revêtent une dimension économique, c’est aussi parce qu’elles sont un marché juteux. À l’heure où les pays européens ferment des lits d’hôpital faute de moyens, on retiendra ce chiffre ahurissant : entre 2005 et 2016, le budget de Frontex, l’agence en charge du contrôle des frontières de l’Union européenne, est passé de 6,3 à 238,7 millions d’euros. À quoi s’ajoutent les budgets colossaux débloqués pour construire et entretenir les barrières – budgets entourés d’opacité et sur lesquels, témoigne l’auteur, il est particulièrement difficile d’enquêter, faute d’obtenir… des fonds publics.

      L’argent public alimente ainsi une « teichoéconomie » dont les principaux bénéficiaires sont des entreprises du BTP et de la sécurité européennes, nord-américaines, israéliennes et, de plus en plus, indiennes ou saoudiennes. Ce complexe sécuritaro-industriel, identifié par Julien Saada, commercialise des dispositifs de surveillance toujours plus sophistiqués et prospère au rythme de l’inflation de barrières entre pays, mais aussi entre quartiers urbains.

      Un business d’autant plus florissant qu’il s’auto-entretient, dès lors que les mêmes entreprises vendent des armes. On sait que les ventes d’armes, alimentant les guerres, stimulent les migrations : un « cercle vertueux » s’enclenche pour les entreprises du secteur, appelées à la rescousse pour contenir des mouvements de population qu’elles participent à encourager.
      « Mourir aux frontières »

      Bénéfices juteux, profits politiques, les barrières font des heureux. Elles tuent aussi et l’ouvrage de Stéphane Rosière se termine sur un décompte macabre. C’est, dit-il, une « guerre migratoire » qui est en cours. Guerre asymétrique, elle oppose la police armée des puissances économiques à des groupes le plus souvent désarmés, venant de périphéries dominées économiquement et dont on entend contrôler la mobilité. Au nom de la souveraineté des États, cette guerre fait plusieurs milliers de victimes par an et la moindre des choses est de « prendre la pleine mesure de la létalité contemporaine aux frontières ».

      Sur le blog :

      – Une synthèse sur les murs frontaliers : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2019/01/28/lamour-des-murs

      – Le compte rendu d’un autre livre incontournable sur les frontières : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2019/08/03/frontieres-en-mouvement

      – Une synthèse sur les barricades à l’échelle intraurbaine : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2020/10/21/gated-communities-le-paradis-entre-quatre-murs

      http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2020/11/05/le-business-meurtrier-des-frontieres

    • How Private Security Firms Profit Off the Refugee Crisis

      The UK has pumped money to corporations turning #Calais into a bleak fortress.

      Tall white fences lined with barbed wire – welcome to Calais. The city in northern France is an obligatory stop for anyone trying to reach the UK across the channel. But some travellers are more welcome than others, and in recent decades, a slew of private security companies have profited millions of pounds off a very expensive – an unattractive – operation to keep migrants from crossing.

      Every year, thousands of passengers and lorries take the ferry at the Port of Calais-Fréthun, a trading route heavily relied upon by the UK for imports. But the entrance to the port looks more like a maximum-security prison than your typical EU border. Even before Brexit, the UK was never part of the Schengen area, which allows EU residents to move freely across 26 countries. For decades, Britain has strictly controlled its southern border in an attempt to stop migrants and asylum seekers from entering.

      As early as 2000, the Port of Calais was surrounded by a 2.8 metre-high fence to prevent people from jumping into lorries waiting at the ferry departure point. In 1999, the Red Cross set up a refugee camp in the nearby town of Sangatte which quickly became overcrowded. The UK pushed for it to be closed in 2002 and then negotiated a treaty with France to regulate migration between the two countries.

      The 2003 Le Toquet Treaty allowed the UK to check travellers on French soil before their arrival, and France to do the same on UK soil. Although the deal looks fair on paper, in practice it unduly burdens French authorities, as there are more unauthorised migrants trying to reach the UK from France than vice versa.

      The treaty effectively moved the UK border onto French territory, but people still need to cross the channel to request asylum. That’s why thousands of refugees from conflict zones like Syria, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia have found themselves stranded in Calais, waiting for a chance to cross illegally – often in search of family members who’ve already made it to the UK. Many end up paying people smugglers to hide them in lorries or help them cross by boat.

      These underlying issues came to a head during the Syrian crisis, when refugees began camping out near Calais in 2014. The so-called Calais Jungle became infamous for its squalid conditions, and at its peak, hosted more than 7,000 people. They were all relocated to other centres in France before the camp was bulldozed in 2016. That same year, the UK also decided to build a €2.7 million border wall in Calais to block access to the port from the camp, but the project wasn’t completed until after the camp was cleared, attracting a fair deal of criticism. Between 2015 and 2018, the UK spent over €110 million on border security in France, only to top it up with over €56 million more in 2018.

      But much of this public money actually flows into the accounts of private corporations, hired to build and maintain the high-tech fences and conduct security checks. According to a 2020 report by the NGO Care4Calais, there are more than 40 private security companies working in the city. One of the biggest, Eamus Cork Solutions (ECS), was founded by a former Calais police officer in 2004 and is reported to have benefited at least €30 million from various contracts as of 2016.

      Stéphane Rosière, a geography professor at the University of Reims, wrote his book Iron Borders (only available in French) about the many border walls erected around the world. Rosière calls this the “security-industrial” complex – private firms that have largely replaced the traditional military-industrial sector in Europe since WW2.

      “These companies are getting rich by making security systems adaptable to all types of customers – individuals, companies or states,” he said. According to Rosière, three-quarters of the world’s border security barriers were built in the 21st century.

      Brigitte, a pensioner living close to the former site of the Calais Jungle, has seen her town change drastically over the past two decades. “Everything is cordoned off with wire mesh," she said. "I have the before and after photos, and it’s not a pretty sight. It’s just wire, wire, wire.” For the past 15 years, Brigitte has been opening her garage door for asylum seekers to stop by for a cup of tea and charge their phones and laptops, earning her the nickname "Mama Charge”.

      “For a while, the purpose of these fences and barriers was to stop people from crossing,” said François Guennoc, president of L’Auberge des Migrants, an NGO helping displaced migrants in Calais.

      Migrants have still been desperate enough to try their luck. “They risked a lot to get into the port area, and many of them came back bruised and battered,” Guennoc said. Today, walls and fences are mainly being built to deter people from settling in new camps near Calais after being evicted.

      In the city centre, all public squares have been fenced off. The city’s bridges have been fitted with blue lights and even with randomly-placed bike racks, so people won’t sleep under them.

      “They’ve also been cutting down trees for some time now,” said Brigitte, pointing to a patch near her home that was once woods. Guennoc said the authorities are now placing large rocks in areas where NGOs distribute meals and warm clothes, to prevent displaced people from receiving the donations. “The objective of the measures now is also to make the NGOs’ work more difficult,” he said.

      According to the NGO Refugee Rights Europe, about 1,500 men, women and minors were living in makeshift camps in and around Calais as of April 2020. In July 2020, French police raided a camp of over 500 people, destroying residents’ tents and belongings, in the largest operation since the Calais Jungle was cleared. An investigation by Slate found that smaller camps are cleared almost every day by the French police, even in the middle of winter. NGOs keep providing new tents and basic necessities to displaced residents, but they are frustrated by the waste of resources. The organisations are also concerned about COVID-19 outbreaks in the camps.

      As VICE World News has previously reported, the crackdown is only pushing people to take more desperate measures to get into the UK. Boat crossings reached record-highs in 2020, and four people have died since August 2020 while trying to cross, by land and sea. “When you create an obstacle, people find a way to get around it,” Guennoc said. “If they build a wall all the way along the coast to prevent boat departures, people will go to Normandy – and that has already started.” Crossing the open sea puts migrants at even greater risk.

      Rosière agrees security measures are only further endangering migrants.“All locks eventually open, no matter how complex they may be. It’s just a matter of time.”

      He believes the only parties who stand to profit from the status quo are criminal organisations and private security firms: “At the end of the day, this a messed-up use of public money.”

      https://www.vice.com/en/article/wx8yax/how-private-security-firms-profit-off-the-refugee-crisis

      En français:
      À Calais, la ville s’emmure
      https://www.vice.com/fr/article/wx8yax/a-calais-la-ville-semmure

    • Financing Border Wars. The border industry, its financiers and human rights

      This report seeks to explore and highlight the extent of today’s global border security industry, by focusing on the most important geographical markets—Australia, Europe, USA—listing the human rights violations and risks involved in each sector of the industry, profiling important corporate players and putting a spotlight on the key investors in each company.

      Executive summary

      Migration will be one of the defining human rights issues of the 21st century. The growing pressures to migrate combined with the increasingly militarised state security response will only exacerbate an already desperate situation for refugees and migrants. Refugees already live in a world where human rights are systematically denied. So as the climate crisis deepens and intersects with other economic and political crises, forcing more people from their homes, and as states retreat to ever more authoritarian security-based responses, the situation for upholding and supporting migrants’ rights looks ever bleaker.

      States, most of all those in the richest countries, bear the ultimate responsibility to uphold the human rights of refugees and migrants recognised under International Human Rights Law. Yet corporations are also deeply implicated. It is their finance, their products, their services, their infrastructure that underpins the structures of state migration and border control. In some cases, they are directly involved in human rights violations themselves; in other cases they are indirectly involved as they facilitate the system that systematically denies refugees and migrants their rights. Most of all, through their lobbying, involvement in government ‘expert’ groups, revolving doors with state agencies, it becomes clear that corporations are not just accidental beneficiaries of the militarisation of borders. Rather they actively shape the policies from which they profit and therefore share responsibility for the human rights violations that result.

      This state-corporate fusion is best described as a Border Industrial Complex, drawing on former US President Eisenhower’s warning of the dangers of a Military-Industrial Complex. Indeed it is noticeable that many of the leading border industries today are also military companies, seeking to diversify their security products to a rapidly expanding new market.

      This report seeks to explore and highlight the extent of today’s global border security industry, by focusing on the most important geographical markets—Australia, Europe, USA—listing the human rights violations and risks involved in each sector of the industry, profiling important corporate players and putting a spotlight on the key investors in each company.
      A booming industry

      The border industry is experiencing spectacular growth, seemingly immune to austerity or economic downturns. Market research agencies predict annual growth of the border security market of between 7.2% and 8.6%, reaching a total of $65–68 billion by 2025. The largest expansion is in the global Biometrics and Artificial Intelligence (AI) markets. Markets and Markets forecasts the biometric systems market to double from $33 billion in 2019 to $65.3 billion by 2024—of which biometrics for migration purposes will be a significant sector. It says that the AI market will equal US$190.61 billion by 2025.

      The report investigates five key sectors of the expanding industry: border security (including monitoring, surveillance, walls and fences), biometrics and smart borders, migrant detention, deportation, and audit and consultancy services. From these sectors, it profiles 23 corporations as significant actors: Accenture, Airbus, Booz Allen Hamilton, Classic Air Charter, Cobham, CoreCivic, Deloitte, Elbit, Eurasylum, G4S, GEO Group, IBM, IDEMIA, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Mitie, Palantir, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Serco, Sopra Steria, Thales, Thomson Reuters, Unisys.

      – The border security and control field, the technological infrastructure of security and surveillance at the border, is led by US, Australian, European and Israeli firms including Airbus, Elbit, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Airbus, Leonardo and Thales— all of which are among the world’s major arms sellers. They benefit not only from border contracts within the EU, US, and Australia but also increasingly from border externalisation programmes funded by these same countries. Jean Pierre Talamoni, head of sales and marketing at Airbus Defence and Space (ADS), said in 2016 that he estimates that two thirds of new military market opportunities over the next 10 years will be in Asia and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Companies are also trying to muscle in on providing the personnel to staff these walls, including border guards.

      - The Smart Borders sector encompasses the use of a broad range of (newer) technologies, including biometrics (such as fingerprints and iris-scans), AI and phone and social media tracking. The goal is to speed up processes for national citizens and other acceptable travellers and stop or deport unwanted migrants through the use of more sophisticated IT and biometric systems. Key corporations include large IT companies, such as IBM and Unisys, and multinational services company Accenture for whom migration is part of their extensive portfolio, as well as small firms, such as IDEMIA and Palantir Technologies, for whom migration-related work is central. The French public–private company Civipol, co-owned by the state and several large French arms companies, is another key player, selected to set up fingerprint databases of the whole population of Mali and Senegal.

      – Deportation. With the exception of the UK and the US, it is uncommon to privatise deportation. The UK has hired British company Mitie for its whole deportation process, while Classic Air Charter dominates in the US. Almost all major commercial airlines, however, are also involved in deportations. Newsweek reported, for example, that in the US, 93% of the 1,386 ICE deportation flights to Latin American countries on commercial airlines in 2019 were facilitated by United Airlines (677), American Airlines (345) and Delta Airlines (266).

      - Detention. The Global Detention Project lists over 1,350 migrant detention centres worldwide, of which over 400 are located in Europe, almost 200 in the US and nine in Australia. In many EU countries, the state manages detention centres, while in other countries (e.g. Australia, UK, USA) there are completely privatised prisons. Many other countries have a mix of public and private involvement, such as state facilities with private guards. Australia outsourced refugee detention to camps outside its territories. Australian service companies Broadspectrum and Canstruct International managed the detention centres, while the private security companies G4S, Paladin Solutions and Wilson Security were contracted for security services, including providing guards. Migrant detention in third countries is also an increasingly important part of EU migration policy, with the EU funding construction of migrant detention centres in ten non-EU countries.

      - Advisory and audit services are a more hidden part of public policies and practices, but can be influential in shaping new policies. A striking example is Civipol, which in 2003 wrote a study on maritime borders for the European Commission, which adopted its key policy recommendations in October 2003 and in later policy documents despite its derogatory language against refugees. Civipol’s study also laid foundations for later measures on border externalisation, including elements of the migration deal with Turkey and the EU’s Operation Sophia. Since 2003 Civipol has received funding for a large number of migration-related projects, especially in African countries. Between 2015 and 2017, it was the fourth most-funded organisation under the EU Trust Fund. Other prominent corporations in this sector include Eurasylum, as well as major international consultancy firms, particularly Deloitte and PricewaterhouseCoopers, for which migration-related work is part of their expansive portfolio.

      Financing the industry

      The markets for military and border control procurement are characterized by massively capital intensive investments and contracts, which would not be possible without the involvement of financial actors. Using data from marketscreener.com, the report shows that the world’s largest investment companies are also among the major shareholders in the border industry.

      – The Vanguard Group owns shares in 15 of the 17 companies, including over 15% of the shares of CoreCivic and GEO Group that manage private prisons and detention facilities.

      - Other important investors are Blackrock, which is a major shareholder in 11 companies, Capital Research and Management (part of the Capital Group), with shares in arms giants Airbus and Lockheed Martin, and State Street Global Advisors (SsgA), which owns over 15% of Lockheed Martin shares and is also a major shareholder in six other companies.

      - Although these giant asset management firms dominate, two of the profiled companies, Cobham and IDEMIA, are currently owned by the private equity firm Advent International. Advent specialises in buyouts and restructuring, and it seems likely that it will attempt to split up Cobham in the hope of making a profit by selling on the component companies to other owners.

      - In addition, three large European arms companies, Airbus, Thales and Leonardo, active in the border security market, are partly owned by the governments of the countries where they are headquartered.

      In all cases, therefore, the financing depends on our money. In the case of state ownership, through our taxes, and in terms of asset management funds, through the way individual savings, pension funds, insurance companies and university endowments are directly invested in these companies via the giant Asset Management Funds. This financing means that the border industry survives on at least the tacit approved use of the public’s funds which makes it vulnerable to social pressure as the human rights costs of the industry become ever more clear.
      Human rights and the border industry

      Universal human rights apply to every single human being, including refugees and migrants. While the International Bill of Human Rights provides the foundation, including defining universal rights that are important in the context of migration, such as the right to life, liberty and security of person, the right to freedom from torture or cruel or inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, and freedom from discrimination, there are other instruments such as the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention or Geneva Convention) of 1951 that are also relevant. There are also regional agreements, including the Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) that play a role relevant to the countries that have ratified them.

      Yet despite these important and legally binding human rights agreements, the human rights situation for refugees and migrants has become ever more desperate. States frequently deny their rights under international law, such as the right to seek asylum or non-refoulement principles, or more general rights such as the freedom from torture, cruel or inhumane treatment. There is a gap with regard to effective legal means or grievance mechanisms to counter this or to legally enforce or hold to account states that fail to implement instruments such as the UDHR and the Refugee Convention of 1951. A Permanent Peoples Tribunal in 2019 even concluded that ‘taken together, the immigration and asylum policies and practices of the EU and its Member States constitute a total denial of the fundamental rights of people and migrants, and are veritable crimes against humanity’. A similar conclusion can be made of the US and Australian border and immigration regime.

      The increased militarisation of border security worldwide and state-sanctioned hostility toward migrants has had a deeply detrimental impact on the human rights of refugees and migrants.

      – Increased border security has led to direct violence against refugees, pushbacks with the risk of returning people to unsafe countries and inhumane circumstances (contravening the principle of non-refoulement), and a disturbing rise in avoidable deaths, as countries close off certain migration routes, forcing migrants to look for other, often more dangerous, alternatives and pushing them into the arms of criminal smuggling networks.

      – The increased use of autonomous systems of border security such as drones threaten new dangers related to human rights. There is already evidence that they push migrants to take more dangerous routes, but there is also concern that there is a gradual trend towards weaponized systems that will further threaten migrants’ lives.

      – The rise in deportations has threatened fundamental human rights including the right to family unity, the right to seek asylum, the right to humane treatment in detention, the right to due process, and the rights of children’. There have been many instances of violence in the course of deportations, sometimes resulting in death or permanent harm, against desperate people who try to do everything to prevent being deported. Moreover, deportations often return refugees to unsafe countries, where they face violence, persecution, discrimination and poverty.

      - The widespread detention of migrants also fundamentally undermines their human rights . There have been many reports of violence and neglect by guards and prison authorities, limited access to adequate legal and medical support, a lack of decent food, overcrowding and poor and unhealthy conditions. Privatisation of detention exacerbates these problems, because companies benefit from locking up a growing number of migrants and minimising costs.

      – The building of major migration databases such as EU’s Eurodac and SIS II, VIS gives rise to a range of human rights concerns, including issues of privacy, civil liberties, bias leading to discrimination—worsened by AI processes -, and misuse of collected information. Migrants are already subject to unprecedented levels of surveillance, and are often now treated as guinea pigs where even more intrusive technologies such as facial recognition and social media tracking are tried out without migrants consent.

      The trend towards externalisation of migration policies raises new concerns as it seeks to put the human costs of border militarisation beyond the border and out of public sight. This has led to the EU, US and Australia all cooperating with authoritarian regimes to try and prevent migrants from even getting close to their borders. Moreover as countries donate money, equipment or training to security forces in authoritarian regimes, they end up expanding and strengthening their capacities which leads to a rise in human rights violations more broadly. Nowhere are the human rights consequences of border externalisation policies clearer than in the case of Libya, where the EU and individual member states (in particular Italy and Malta) funding, training and cooperation with security forces and militias have led to violence at the borders, murder, disappearances, rape, enslavement and abuse of migrants in the country and torture in detention centres.

      The 23 corporations profiled in this report have all been involved in or connected to policies and practices that have come under fire because of violations of the human rights of refugees and migrants. As mentioned earlier, sometimes the companies are directly responsible for human rights violations or concerns. In other cases, they are indirectly responsible through their contribution to a border infrastructure that denies human rights and through lobbying to influence policy-making to prioritize militarized responses to migration. 11 of the companies profiled publicly proclaim their commitment to human rights as signatories to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), but as these are weak voluntary codes this has not led to noticeable changes in their business operations related to migration.

      The most prominent examples of direct human rights abuses come from the corporations involved in detention and deportation. Classic Air Charter, Cobham, CoreCivic, Eurasylum, G4S, GEO Group, Mitie and Serco all have faced allegations of violence and abuse by their staff towards migrants. G4S has been one of the companies most often in the spotlight. In 2017, not only were assaults by its staff on migrants at the Brook House immigration removal centre in the UK broadcast by the BBC, but it was also hit with a class suit in Australia by almost 2,000 people who are or were detained at the externalised detention centre on Manus Island, because of physical and psychological injuries as a result of harsh treatment and dangerous conditions. The company eventually settled the case for A$70 million (about $53 million) in the largest-ever human rights class-action settlement. G4S has also faced allegations related to its involvement in deportations.

      The other companies listed all play a pivotal role in the border infrastructure that denies refugees’ human rights. Airbus P-3 Orion surveillance planes of the Australian Air Force, for example, play a part in the highly controversial maritime wall that prevents migrants arriving by boat and leads to their detention in terrible conditions offshore. Lockheed Martin is a leading supplier of border security on the US-Mexico border. Leonardo is one of the main suppliers of drones for Europe’s borders. Thales produces the radar and sensor systems, critical to patrolling the Mediterrean. Elbit Systems provides surveillance technologies to both the EU and US, marketed on their success as technologies used in the separation wall in the Palestinian occupied territories. Accenture, IDEMIA and Sopra Steria manage many border biometric projects. Deloitte has been one of the key consulting companies to the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency since 2003, while PriceWaterhouseCoopers provides similar consultancy services to Frontex and the Australian border forces. IBM, Palantir and UNISYS provide the IT infrastructure that underpins the border and immigration apparatus.
      Time to divest

      The report concludes by calling for campaigns to divest from the border industry. There is a long history of campaigns and movements that call for divestment from industries that support human rights violations—from the campaigns to divest from Apartheid South Africa to more recent campaigns to divest from the fossil fuel industry. The border industry has become an equally morally toxic asset for any financial institution, given the litany of human rights abuses tied to it and the likelihood they will intensify in years to come.

      There are already examples of existing campaigns targeting particular border industries that have borne fruit. A spotlight on US migrant detention, as part of former President Trump’s anti- immigration policies, contributed to six large US banks (Bank of America, BNP Paribas, Fifth Third Bancorp, JPMorgan Chase, SunTrust, and Wells Fargo) publicly announcing that they would not provide new financing to the private prison industry. The two largest public US pension funds, CalSTRS and CalPERS, also decided to divest from the same two companies. Geo Group acknowledged that these acts of ‘public resistance’ hit the company financially, criticising the banks as ‘clearly bow[ing] down to a small group of activists protesting and conducting targeted social media campaigns’.

      Every company involved or accused of human rights violations either denies them or says that they are atypical exceptions to corporate behavior. This report shows however that a militarised border regime built on exclusion will always be a violent apparatus that perpetuates human rights violations. It is a regime that every day locks up refugees in intolerable conditions, separates families causing untold trauma and heartbreak, and causes a devastating death toll as refugees are forced to take unimaginable dangerous journeys because the alternatives are worse. However well-intentioned, any industry that provides services and products for this border regime will bear responsibility for its human consequences and its human rights violations, and over time will suffer their own serious reputational costs for their involvement in this immoral industry. On the other hand, a widespread exodus of the leading corporations on which the border regime depends could force states to change course, and to embrace a politics that protects and upholds the rights of refugees and migrants. Worldwide, social movements and the public are starting to wake up to the human costs of border militarisation and demanding a fundamental change. It is time now for the border industry and their financiers to make a choice.

      https://www.tni.org/en/financingborderwars

      #TNI #rapport
      #industrie_frontalière #militarisation_des_frontières #biométrie #Intelligence_artificielle #AI #IA

      #Accenture #Airbus #Booz_Allen_Hamilton #Classic_Air_Charter #Cobham #CoreCivic #Deloitte #Elbit #Eurasylum #G4S #GEO_Group #IBM #IDEMIA #Leonardo #Lockheed_Martin #Mitie #Palantir #PricewaterhouseCoopers #Serco #Sopra_Steria #Thales #Thomson_Reuters #Unisys
      #contrôles_frontaliers #surveillance #technologie #Jean-Pierre_Talamoni #Airbus_Defence_and_Space (#ADS) #smart_borders #frontières_intelligentes #iris #empreintes_digitales #réseaux_sociaux #IT #Civipol #Mali #Sénégal #renvois #expulsions #déportations #Mitie #Classic_Air_Charter #compagnies_aériennes #United_Airlines #ICE #American_Airlines #Delta_Airlines #rétention #détention_administrative #privatisation #Broadspectrum #Canstruct_International #Paladin_Solutions #Wilson_Security #Operation_Sophia #EU_Trust_Fund #Trust_Fund #externalisation #Eurasylum #Deloitte #PricewaterhouseCoopers #Vanguard_Group #CoreCivic #Blackrock #investisseurs #investissement #Capital_Research_and_Management #Capital_Group #Lockheed_Martin #State_Street_Global_Advisors (#SsgA) #Cobham #IDEMIA #Advent_International #droits_humains #VIS #SIS_II #P-3_Orion #Accenture #Sopra_Steria #Frontex #Australie

    • Outsourcing oppression. How Europe externalises migrant detention beyond its shores

      This report seeks to address the gap and join the dots between Europe’s outsourcing of migrant detention to third countries and the notorious conditions within the migrant detention centres. In a nutshell, Europe calls the shots on migrant detention beyond its shores but is rarely held to account for the deeply oppressive consequences, including arbitrary detention, torture, forced disappearance, violence, sexual violence, and death.

      Key findings

      – The European Union (EU), and its member states, externalise detention to third countries as part of a strategy to keep migrants out at all costs. This leads to migrants being detained and subjected to gross human rights violations in transit countries in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, West Asia and Africa.

      – Candidate countries wishing to join the EU are obligated to detain migrants and stop them from crossing into the EU as a prerequisite for accession to the Union. Funding is made available through pre-accession agreements specifically for the purpose of detaining migrants.

      – Beyond EU candidate countries, this report identifies 22 countries in Africa, Eastern Europe, the Balkans and West Asia where the EU and its member states fund the construction of detention centres, detention related activities such as trainings, or advocate for detention in other ways such as through aggressively pushing for detention legislation or agreeing to relax visa requirements for nationals of these countries in exchange for increased migrant detention.

      - The main goal of detention externalisation is to pre-empt migrants from reaching the external borders of the EU by turning third countries into border outposts. In many cases this involves the EU and its member states propping up and maintaining authoritarian regimes.

      – Europe is in effect following the ‘Australian model’ that has been highly criticised by UN experts and human rights organisations for the torturous conditions inside detention centres. Nevertheless, Europe continues to advance a system that mirrors Australia’s outsourced model, focusing not on guaranteeing the rights of migrants, but instead on deterring and pushing back would-be asylum seekers at all costs.

      - Human rights are systematically violated in detention centres directly and indirectly funded by the EU and its member states, including cases of torture, arbitrary and prolonged detention, sexual violence, no access to legal recourse, humanitarian assistance, or asylum procedures, the detention of victims of trafficking, and many other serious violations in which Europe is implicated.

      - Particularly horrendous is the case of Libya, which continues to receive financial and political support from Europe despite mounting evidence of brutality, enslavement, torture, forced disappearance and death. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), implement EU policies in Libya and, according to aid officials, actively whitewash the consequences of European policies to safeguard substantial EU funding.

      - Not only does the EU deport and push back migrants to unsafe third countries, it actively finances and coercively pushes for their detention in these countries. Often they have no choice but to sign ‘voluntary’ agreements to be returned to their countries of origin as the only means of getting out of torturous detention facilities.

      - The EU implements a carrot and stick approach, in particular in its dealings with Africa, prolonging colonialist dynamics and uneven power structures – in Niger, for example, the EU pushed for legislation on detention, in exchange for development aid funding.

      – The EU envisages a greater role for migrant detention in third countries going forward, as was evidenced in the European Commission’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum.

      - The EU acts on the premise of containment and deterrence, namely, that if migrants seeking to reach Europe are intercepted and detained along that journey, they will be deterred from making the journey in the first place. This approach completely misses the point that people migrate to survive, often fleeing war and other forms of violence. The EU continues to overlook the structural reasons behind why people flee and the EU’s own role in provoking such migration.

      – The border industrial complex profits from the increased securitisation of borders. Far from being passive spectators, the military and security industry is actively involved in shaping EU border policies by positioning themselves as experts on the issue. We can already see a trend of privatising migrant detention, paralleling what is happening in prison systems worldwide.

      https://www.tni.org/en/outsourcingoppression

      pour télécharger le rapport :
      https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/outsourcingoppression-report-tni.pdf

      #externalisation #rétention #détention #détention_arbitraire #violence #disparitions #disparitions_forcées #violence #violence_sexuelle #morts #mort #décès #Afrique #Europe_de_l'Est #Balkans #Asie #modèle_australien #EU #UE #Union_européenne #torture #Libye #droits_humains #droits_fondamentaux #HCR #UNHCR #OIM #IOM #dissuasion #privatisation

    • Fortress Europe: the millions spent on military-grade tech to deter refugees

      We map out the rising number of #high-tech surveillance and deterrent systems facing asylum seekers along EU borders.

      From military-grade drones to sensor systems and experimental technology, the EU and its members have spent hundreds of millions of euros over the past decade on technologies to track down and keep at bay the refugees on its borders.

      Poland’s border with Belarus is becoming the latest frontline for this technology, with the country approving last month a €350m (£300m) wall with advanced cameras and motion sensors.

      The Guardian has mapped out the result of the EU’s investment: a digital wall on the harsh sea, forest and mountain frontiers, and a technological playground for military and tech companies repurposing products for new markets.

      The EU is central to the push towards using technology on its borders, whether it has been bought by the EU’s border force, Frontex, or financed for member states through EU sources, such as its internal security fund or Horizon 2020, a project to drive innovation.

      In 2018, the EU predicted that the European security market would grow to €128bn (£108bn) by 2020. Beneficiaries are arms and tech companies who heavily courted the EU, raising the concerns of campaigners and MEPs.

      “In effect, none of this stops people from crossing; having drones or helicopters doesn’t stop people from crossing, you just see people taking more risky ways,” says Jack Sapoch, formerly with Border Violence Monitoring Network. “This is a history that’s so long, as security increases on one section of the border, movement continues in another section.”

      Petra Molnar, who runs the migration and technology monitor at Refugee Law Lab, says the EU’s reliance on these companies to develop “hare-brained ideas” into tech for use on its borders is inappropriate.

      “They rely on the private sector to create these toys for them. But there’s very little regulation,” she says. “Some sort of tech bro is having a field day with this.”

      “For me, what’s really sad is that it’s almost a done deal that all this money is being spent on camps, enclosures, surveillance, drones.”

      Air Surveillance

      Refugees and migrants trying to enter the EU by land or sea are watched from the air. Border officers use drones and helicopters in the Balkans, while Greece has airships on its border with Turkey. The most expensive tool is the long-endurance Heron drone operating over the Mediterranean.

      Frontex awarded a €100m (£91m) contract last year for the Heron and Hermes drones made by two Israeli arms companies, both of which had been used by the Israeli military in the Gaza Strip. Capable of flying for more than 30 hours and at heights of 10,000 metres (30,000 feet), the drones beam almost real-time feeds back to Frontex’s HQ in Warsaw.

      Missions mostly start from Malta, focusing on the Libyan search and rescue zone – where the Libyan coastguard will perform “pull backs” when informed by EU forces of boats trying to cross the Mediterranean.

      German MEP Özlem Demirel is campaigning against the EU’s use of drones and links to arms companies, which she says has turned migration into a security issue.

      “The arms industries are saying: ‘This is a security problem, so buy my weapons, buy my drones, buy my surveillance system,’” says Demirel.

      “The EU is always talking about values like human rights, [speaking out] against violations but … week-by-week we see more people dying and we have to question if the EU is breaking its values,” she says.

      Sensors and cameras

      EU air assets are accompanied on the ground by sensors and specialised cameras that border authorities throughout Europe use to spot movement and find people in hiding. They include mobile radars and thermal cameras mounted on vehicles, as well as heartbeat detectors and CO2 monitors used to detect signs of people concealed inside vehicles.

      Greece deploys thermal cameras and sensors along its land border with Turkey, monitoring the feeds from operations centres, such as in Nea Vyssa, near the meeting of the Greek, Turkish and Bulgarian borders. Along the same stretch, in June, Greece deployed a vehicle-mounted sound cannon that blasts “deafening” bursts of up to 162 decibels to force people to turn back.

      Poland is hoping to emulate Greece in response to the crisis on its border with Belarus. In October, its parliament approved a €350m wall that will stretch along half the border and reach up to 5.5 metres (18 feet), equipped with motion detectors and thermal cameras.

      Surveillance centres

      In September, Greece opened a refugee camp on the island of Samos that has been described as prison-like. The €38m (£32m) facility for 3,000 asylum seekers has military-grade fencing and #CCTV to track people’s movements. Access is controlled by fingerprint, turnstiles and X-rays. A private security company and 50 uniformed officers monitor the camp. It is the first of five that Greece has planned; two more opened in November.

      https://twitter.com/_PMolnar/status/1465224733771939841

      At the same time, Greece opened a new surveillance centre on Samos, capable of viewing video feeds from the country’s 35 refugee camps from a wall of monitors. Greece says the “smart” software helps to alert camps of emergencies.

      Artificial intelligence

      The EU spent €4.5m (£3.8m) on a three-year trial of artificial intelligence-powered lie detectors in Greece, Hungary and Latvia. A machine scans refugees and migrants’ facial expressions as they answer questions it poses, deciding whether they have lied and passing the information on to a border officer.

      The last trial finished in late 2019 and was hailed as a success by the EU but academics have called it pseudoscience, arguing that the “micro-expressions” the software analyses cannot be reliably used to judge whether someone is lying. The software is the subject of a court case taken by MEP Patrick Breyer to the European court of justice in Luxembourg, arguing that there should be more public scrutiny of such technology. A decision is expected on 15 December.

      https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/dec/06/fortress-europe-the-millions-spent-on-military-grade-tech-to-deter-refu

  • Des pénuries de préservatifs gratuits inquiètent les associations | Slate.fr
    https://www.slate.fr/story/180273/penurie-preservatifs-planning-familial-mst-jeunes-prevention?amp

    Fin novembre 2018, Agnès Buzyn, ministre des Solidarités et de la Santé, annonçait le remboursement partiel des préservatifs masculins Eden, des laboratoires Majorelle. Délivrés sur ordonnance, ces préservatifs sont pris en charge par l’assurance maladie à 60% du coût. Depuis mars dernier, une seconde marque, Sortez Couverts, est elle aussi remboursable sur prescription médicale.

    L’initiative gouvernementale insistait, dans un communiqué, sur les « 6.000 nouveaux cas de séropositivité découverts chaque année ». Le communiqué précisait que « cette mesure ne se substitue aucunement à la mise à disposition de préservatifs gratuits par les pouvoirs publics (plus de cinq millions de préservatifs). L’accès large sur le territoire et au plus près des publics clés reste un impératif ».

    Cet été, le Planning familial soulève pourtant une inquiétude. Il commence à s’alarmer d’un début de pénurie de préservatifs gratuits dans certains départements.

    #prévention #sida #IST

  • Controversial migrant legislation scrapped in Slovenia

    The Slovenian Constitutional Court has scrapped an article of an immigration law that allowed the country to limit foreigners’ access after a vote in parliament in the event of a migrant crisis.

    The Slovenian Constitutional Court has ruled to scrap a controversial article of an immigration law that allowed strong restrictions on the access of foreigners in the event of particularly intense migrant flows, as were registered in 2015 and 2016.
    The sentence, which was published on Monday, eliminates three paragraphs of the law that would have prevented specific cases from being examined individually.

    The legislation

    The controversial amendment to the immigration law was approved by the country’s National Assembly in January 2017 and came into effect on February 4. Under the amendment, special measures could be approved to limit the access of foreigners after a vote in Parliament.

    Then-interior minister Vesna Gyoerkoes Nidar assured parliament, when the legislation was presented, that it had been written as a measure of last resort if Slovenia were to be unable to apply legislation on international protection in the event of a migrant crisis.

    Over 20 human rights organizations had called for the legislation to be scrapped, saying it went against the principles of the constitution, which rejects discrimination and guarantees equal rights and the principle of non-refoulement, among others.

    28 detained at the border with Croatia

    During the weekend Slovenian police in the district of Koper reported the arrest of 28 migrants who were trying to enter the country from Croatia, according to a police statement. According to the statement, 10 people were apprehended in #Bistrica as they were trying to cross the border illegally, nine in #Koper, six in #Kosina and three in #Piran.

    https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/20197/controversial-migrant-legislation-scrapped-in-slovenia
    #Slovénie #loi #législation #fermeture_des_frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #Croatie #Kozina

    Une petite carte de localisation des lieux dans lesquels les personnes ont été arrêtées en Slovénie :

    c’est donc proche de la frontière croate, mais aussi proche de la frontière italienne... donc de la #frontière_sud-alpine
    #Italie #Trieste #Istrie

  • A #Istanbul, le flow contre la destruction des #quartiers_populaires

    Leur histoire commence en 2008 à Istanbul, alors qu’ils sont encore au lycée : trois jeunes gens, issus de différentes minorités, se rencontrent, #Asil_Koç alias “#Slang”, #Veysi_Özdemir alias “#V.Z.” et #Burak_Kaçar, alias “#Zen-G”. Alors que leur quartier de #Sulukule subit une #gentrification violente, ces trois amis choisissent de transmettre leur colère aux sons de leurs #flows enflammés et sur des beats acérés. Radio Parleur les a rencontrés et vous livre leur histoire à travers ce reportage, qui a reçu le 2e prix du concours Paroles Partagées 2018.

    https://radioparleur.net/2018/07/03/a-istanbul-flow-contre-destruction-quartiers-populaires

    #Turquie #résistance #audio #urban_matter #villes #géographie_urbaines #musique_et_politique #musique

    https://vimeo.com/5071818


    https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=15&v=czcscMoVziI

    ping @sinehebdo

  • 440 pairs of women’s shoes...

    440 pairs of women’s shoes were hung on one of the city walls in Istanbul this week to draw attention to male domestic violence in the country. This is the number of women murdered by their husbands in Turkey in 2019.


    https://twitter.com/diorchild/status/1175355011536175109
    #violence_domestique #femmes #chaussures #manifestation #art_et_politique #Turquie #Istanbul #espace_public #visibilisation #féminicide

    Compte Instagram de l’artiste:
    https://www.instagram.com/vahittuna
    #Vahti_Tuna

    ping @isskein @visionscarto

  • Une contraception sans hormones ni effets secondaires sur les rails - LCI
    https://www.lci.fr/bien-etre/une-contraception-sans-hormones-ni-effets-secondaires-sur-les-rails-2130706.html

    Sous forme de gel, le dispositif est applicable dans le vagin au moins une heure avant un rapport sexuel. Capable de réguler le PH de la flore vaginale, il assure un effet contraceptif. Après un rapport sexuel, le vagin voit en effet son PH augmenter naturellement pour créer un environnement favorable aux spermatozoïdes. En maintenant le PH entre 3,5 et 4,5, le gel crée une situation hostile pour ces derniers, qui ne fécondent alors pas les ovaires. Évalué sur 1.400 femmes âgées de 18 à 35, Amphora aurait montré un taux d’efficacité de 86%. C’est 85% pour le préservatif masculin, et 91% pour la pilule selon le site choisirisacontraception.fr.

    D’après le laboratoire, ce type de contraception « à la demande », c’est-à-dire qui ne nécessite pas d’être prise quotidiennement, avec un très faible taux d’effets secondaires (1%), a amélioré la perception qu’avaient les participantes de leur vie sexuelle. Au travers d’un questionnaire, 45% des femmes ont indiqué avoir constaté avoir une vie sexuelle « un peu » ou « beaucoup » plus épanouie qu’auparavant. « Pour la première fois, nous n’étudions pas seulement les bénéfices cliniques d’une méthode de contraception. Nous sommes aussi à l’écoute des besoins des femmes au travers de leur vie reproductive et sexuelle », se targue dans un communiqué Saundra Pelletier, membre de la direction du laboratoire.

    Ca me fait pensé à du spermicide, mais en plus efficace, moins irritant et avec un effet accrue contre certaines IST.
    https://www.caducee.net/DossierSpecialises/reproductive/barrieres/spermicides.asp

    #contraception #femmes #IST #spermicide

    • Donc, depuis des années les femmes qui ne veulent pas d’enfants sont empoisonnées aux hormones reconnues cancérigènes, que ce soit pour la contraception ou l’avortement. Alors qu’il existe des alternatives simples qui ne rendent pas malades.

      Intéressant que ce soit une question de #PH et de taux d’acidité, il existe depuis longtemps des spermicides au miel (PH entre 3,2 et 5,5) et je lis que certaines ont un temps utilisé le citron (PH 2,5) mais je ne trouve pas de textes pour corroborer sauf à se moquer des femmes.
      https://thewelltimedperiod.blogspot.com/2007/05/honey-cap.html

  • Quelques #films autour de la question de la #gentrification, tirés de ce programme de projections de la Ciguë à Genève (coopérative d’habitation en Suisse) :


    https://twitter.com/coopcigue/status/1165977276472860672
    #urban_matter #villes #géographie_urbaine

    –------

    Gentrification : à qui la faute ?

    La faute aux #bobos et à leur goût pour les quartiers « typiques » bien entendu. C’est en tout cas ce qu’on lit beaucoup ça et là. Pour lever le voile sur tous les autres facteurs qui expliquent la gentrification parfois brutale de certains endroits, Usul et Cotentin ont dégoté un quartier de #Lyon en cours de gentrification, la #Guillotière. Qui gentrifie ? Pourquoi ? Comment ? Trois urbanistes essayent de répondre à ces questions auxquelles on apporte parfois des réponses un peu courtes.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_2tZliXY0AA


    #France #Lyon

    –---------

    #GOOD_WHITE_PEOPLE : A Short Film About Gentrification

    In the Spring of 2001, the African-American community of #Over-the-Rhine in downtown #Cincinnati arose in protest after unarmed 19-year-old, Timothy Thomas, was killed by a white officer named Steven Roach. In the years following, in order to allure prospective residents, Over-the-Rhine was swept into a new narrative of safety and whiteness by the creation of an arts and brewery district for the creative class. While it’s “dangerous and inconvenient” Black history is revitalized from existence, property values rise with presence of police, tax abatements, and zoning amendments to serve and protect those properties.

    Filmed during the peak of Over-the-Rhine’s urban renewal, GOOD WHITE PEOPLE follows the story of Reginald Stroud who runs a karate school and candy store in the storefronts beneath the apartment he and his family have called home for over 10 years. When a for-profit developer purchases the building they rent, Reginald and his family are told they must vacate the building and are given only 45 days to find a new home and relocate their businesses while their neighborhood makes way for start-up incubators, yoga studios, and luxury condominiums.

    Formerly a target of the policies created by the War On Drugs, Cincinnati’s inner-city is now the target of urban development corporations as its black population declines. GOOD WHITE PEOPLE hopes to start a conversation about the use of coded terminology like urban renewal, revitalization, and urban renaissance, and explore how these words help to trivialize and disguise the commercial practice of white supremacy, neocolonialism, and the economic othering of low-income residents.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xdUsZaJ80zI


    #court-métrage #USA

    –---------

    There Goes the Neighbourhood : Gentrification as Class Warfare

    In cities across the world, established urban environments are being transformed according to the dictates of capital. Gentrification is destroying the social fabric of working-class and racialized districts, displacing long-standing residents in order to make way for a new class of upwardly-mobile, and often white professionals – who often view the rich local histories of the spaces they move into as nothing more than kitschy branding appeal. The culture clash that emerges between established community members and these new arrivals is often viewed as the front-line of struggles around gentrification; a quarrel between patrons of a locally-owned roti shop, and those of a new craft beer pub; or a battle between #NIMBY condo-dwellers and the beneficiaries of a local social service agency.

    But while this tension is certainly real, it is only the tip of the iceberg. Gentrification is a systematic process, facilitated by state, regional and local governments and bankrolled by massive financial institutions managing multi-billion dollar portfolios. It is class war playing out in physical space, with all the complexities and contradictions that entails.

    In this month’s episode of Trouble, the first in a two-part series, sub.Media examines gentrification as a process of capitalist urban development, by taking a closer look at how it is playing out in three mega-cities: #Toronto, #New_Orleans and #Istanbul.

    Le trailer : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EW-P-dRmt4s

    #documentaire

  • For Syrians in #Istanbul, fears rise as deportations begin

    Turkey is deporting Syrians from Istanbul to Syria, including to the volatile northwest province of #Idlib, according to people who have been the target of a campaign launched last week against migrants who lack residency papers.

    The crackdown comes at a time of rising rhetoric and political pressure on the country’s 3.6 million registered Syrian refugees to return home. Estimates place hundreds of thousands of unregistered Syrians in Turkey, many living in urban areas such as Istanbul.

    Refugee rights advocates say deportations to Syria violate customary international law, which prohibits forcing people to return to a country where they are still likely to face persecution or risk to their lives.

    Arrests reportedly began as early as 13 July, with police officers conducting spot-checks in public spaces, factories, and metro stations around Istanbul and raiding apartments by 16 July. As word spread quickly in Istanbul’s Syrian community, many people shut themselves up at home rather than risk being caught outside.

    It is not clear how many people have been deported so far, with reported numbers ranging from hundreds to a thousand.

    “Deportation of Syrians to their country, which is still in the midst of armed conflict, is a clear violation of both Turkish and international law.”

    Turkey’s Ministry of Interior has said the arrests are aimed at people living without legal status in the country’s most populous city. Istanbul authorities said in a Monday statement that only “irregular migrants entering our country illegally [will be] arrested and deported.” It added that Syrians registered outside Istanbul would be obliged to return to the provinces where they were first issued residency.

    Mayser Hadid, a Syrian lawyer who runs a law practice catering to Syrians in Istanbul, said that the “deportation of Syrians to their country, which is still in the midst of armed conflict, is a clear violation of both Turkish and international law,” including the “return of Syrians without temporary protection cards.”

    Istanbul authorities maintain that the recent detentions and deportations are within the law.

    Starting in 2014, Syrian refugees in Turkey have been registered under “temporary protection” status, which grants the equivalency of legal residency and lets holders apply for a work permit. Those with temporary protection need special permission to work or travel outside of the area where they first applied for protection.

    But last year, several cities across the country – including Istanbul – stopped registering newly-arrived Syrians.

    In the Monday statement, Istanbul authorities said that Syrians registered outside of the city must return to their original city of registration by 20 August. They did not specify the penalty for those who do not.

    Barely 24 hours after the beginning of raids last week, Muhammad, a 21-year-old from Eastern Ghouta in Syria, was arrested at home along with his Syrian flatmates in the Istanbul suburb of Esenler.

    Muhammad, who spoke by phone on the condition of anonymity for security reasons – as did all Syrian deportees and their relatives interviewed for this article – said that Turkish police officers had forced their way into the building. “They beat me,” he said. “I wasn’t even allowed to take anything with me.”

    Muhammad said that as a relatively recent arrival, he couldn’t register for temporary protection and had opted to live and work in Istanbul without papers.

    After his arrest, Muhammad said, he was handcuffed and bundled into a police van, and transferred to a detention facility on the eastern outskirts of the city.

    There, he said, he was forced to sign a document written in Turkish that he couldn’t understand and on Friday was deported to Syria’s Idlib province, via the Bab al-Hawa border crossing.
    Deportation to Idlib

    Government supporters say that Syrians have been deported only to the rebel-held areas of northern Aleppo, where the Turkish army maintains a presence alongside groups that it backs.

    A representative from Istanbul’s provincial government office did not respond to a request for comment, but Youssef Kataboglu, a pro-government commentator who is regarded as close to the government, said that “Turkey only deports Syrians to safe areas according to the law.”

    He denied that Syrians had been returned to Idlib, where a Syrian government offensive that began in late April kicked off an upsurge in fighting, killing more than 400 civilians and forcing more than 330,000 people to flee their homes. The UN said on Monday alone, 59 civilians were killed, including 39 when a market was hit by airstrikes.

    Kataboglu said that deportation to Idlib would “be impossible.”

    Mazen Alloush, a representative of the border authorities on the Syrian side of the Bab al-Hawa crossing that links Turkey with Idlib, said that more than 3,800 Syrians had entered the country via Bab al-Hawa in the past fortnight, a number he said was not a significant change from how many people usually cross the border each month.

    The crossing is controlled by rebel authorities affiliated to Tahrir a-Sham, the hardline Islamist faction that controls most of Idlib.

    “A large number of them were Syrians trying to enter Turkish territory illegally,” who were caught and forced back across, Alloush said, but also “those who committed offences in Turkey or requested to return voluntarily.”

    “We later found out that he’d been deported to Idlib.”

    He added that “if the Turkish authorities are deporting [Syrians] through informal crossings or crossings other than Bab al-Hawa, I don’t have information about it.”

    Other Syrians caught up in the crackdown, including those who did have the proper papers to live and work in Istanbul, confirmed that they had been sent to Idlib or elsewhere.

    On July 19, Umm Khaled’s son left the family’s home without taking the documents that confirm his temporary protection status, she said. He was stopped in the street by police officers.

    “They [the police] took him,” Umm Khaled, a refugee in her 50s originally from the southern Damascus suburbs, said by phone. “We later found out that he’d been deported to Idlib.”

    Rami, a 23-year-old originally from eastern Syria’s Deir Ezzor province, said he was deported from Istanbul last week. He was carrying his temporary protection status card at the time of his arrest, he added.

    "I was in the street in Esenler when the police stopped me and asked for my identity card,” he recalled in a phone conversation from inside Syria. “They checked it, and then asked me to get on a bus.”

    Several young Syrian men already on board the bus were also carrying protection documents with them, Rami said.

    “The police tied our hands together with plastic cords,” he added, describing how the men were then driven to a nearby police station and forced to give fingerprints and sign return documents.

    Rami said he was later sent to northern Aleppo province.
    Rising anti-Syrian sentiment

    The country has deported Syrians before, and Human Rights Watch and other organisations have reported that Turkish security forces regularly intercept and return Syrian refugees attempting to enter the country. As conflict rages in and around Idlib, an increasing number of people are still trying to get into Turkey.

    Turkey said late last year that more than 300,000 Syrians have returned to their home country voluntarily.

    A failed coup attempt against President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in July 2016 led to an emergency decree that human rights groups say was used to arrest individuals whom the government perceived as opponents. Parts of that decree were later passed into law, making it easier for authorities to deport foreigners on the grounds that they are either linked to terrorist groups or pose a threat to public order.

    The newest wave of deportations after months of growing anti-Syrian sentiment in political debate and on the streets has raised more questions about how this law might be used, as well as the future of Syrian refugees in Turkey.

    In two rounds of mayoral elections that ended last month with a defeat for Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), the winning candidate, Ekrem İmamoğlu of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), repeatedly used anti-Syrian rhetoric in his campaign, capitalising on discontent towards the faltering economy and the increasingly contentious presence of millions of Syrian refugees.

    Shortly after the elections, several incidents of mob violence against Syrian-owned businesses took place. Widespread anti-Syrian sentiment has also been evident across social media; after the mayoral election trending hashtags on Twitter reportedly included “Syrians get out”.

    As the deportations continue, the families of those sent back are wondering what they can do.

    “By God, what did he do [wrong]?” asked Umm Khaled, speaking of her son, now in war-torn Idlib.

    “His mother, father, and all his sisters are living here legally in Turkey,” she said. “What are we supposed to do now?”

    https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2019/07/23/syrians-istanbul-fears-rise-deportations-begin
    #Turquie #asile #migrations #réfugiés_syriens #réfugiés #Syrie #renvois #expulsions #peur

    • Des milliers de migrants arrêtés à Istanbul en deux semaines

      Mardi, le ministre de l’intérieur a indiqué que l’objectif de son gouvernement était d’expulser 80 000 migrants en situation irrégulière en Turquie, contre 56 000 l’an dernier.

      C’est un vaste #coup_de_filet mené sur fond de fort sentiment antimigrants. Les autorités turques ont annoncé, mercredi 24 juillet, avoir arrêté plus de 6 000 migrants en deux semaines, dont des Syriens, vivant de manière « irrégulière » à Istanbul.

      « Nous menons une opération depuis le 12 juillet (…). Nous avons attrapé 6 122 personnes à Istanbul, dont 2 600 Afghans. Une partie de ces personnes sont des Syriens », a déclaré le ministre de l’intérieur, Suleyman Soylu, dans une interview donnée à la chaîne turque NTV. Mardi, ce dernier a indiqué que l’objectif de son gouvernement était d’expulser 80 000 migrants en situation irrégulière en Turquie, contre 56 000 l’an dernier.

      M. Soylu a démenti que des Syriens étaient expulsés vers leur pays, déchiré par une guerre civile meurtrière depuis 2011, après que des ONG ont affirmé avoir recensé des cas de personnes renvoyées en Syrie. « Ces personnes, nous ne pouvons pas les expulser. (…) Lorsque nous attrapons des Syriens qui ne sont pas enregistrés, nous les envoyons dans des camps de réfugiés », a-t-il affirmé, mentionnant un camp dans la province turque de Hatay, frontalière de la Syrie. Il a toutefois assuré que certains Syriens choisissaient de rentrer de leur propre gré en Syrie.

      La Turquie accueille sur son sol plus de 3,5 millions de Syriens ayant fui la guerre, dont 547 000 sont enregistrés à Istanbul. Les autorités affirment n’avoir aucun problème avec les personnes dûment enregistrées auprès des autorités à Istanbul, mais disent lutter contre les migrants vivant dans cette ville alors qu’ils sont enregistrés dans d’autres provinces, voire dans aucune province.

      Le gouvernorat d’Istanbul a lancé lundi un ultimatum, qui expire le 20 août, enjoignant les Syriens y vivant illégalement à quitter la ville. Un groupement d’ONG syriennes a toutefois indiqué, lundi, que « plus de 600 Syriens », pour la plupart titulaires de « cartes de protection temporaires » délivrées par d’autres provinces turques, avaient été arrêtés la semaine dernière à Istanbul et renvoyés en Syrie.

      La Coalition nationale de l’opposition syrienne, basée à Istanbul, a déclaré mardi qu’elle était entrée en contact avec les autorités turques pour discuter des dernières mesures prises contre les Syriens, appelant à stopper les « expulsions ». Son président, Anas al-Abda, a appelé le gouvernement turc à accorder un délai de trois mois aux Syriens concernés pour régulariser leur situation auprès des autorités.

      Ce tour de vis contre les migrants survient après la défaite du parti du président Recep Tayyip Erdogan lors des élections municipales à Istanbul, en juin, lors desquelles l’accueil des Syriens s’était imposé comme un sujet majeur de préoccupation les électeurs.

      Pendant la campagne, le discours hostile aux Syriens s’était déchaîné sur les réseaux sociaux, avec le mot-dièse #LesSyriensDehors. D’après une étude publiée début juillet par l’université Kadir Has, située à Istanbul, la part des Turcs mécontents de la présence des Syriens est passée de 54,5 % en 2017 à 67,7 % en 2019.

      https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2019/07/24/des-milliers-de-migrants-arretes-a-istanbul-en-deux-semaines_5492944_3210.ht
      #arrestation #arrestations

    • Turkey Forcibly Returning Syrians to Danger. Authorities Detain, Coerce Syrians to Sign “Voluntary Return” Forms

      Turkish authorities are detaining and coercing Syrians into signing forms saying they want to return to Syria and then forcibly returning them there, Human Rights Watch said today. On July 24, 2019, Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu denied that Turkey had “deported” Syrians but said that Syrians “who voluntarily want to go back to Syria” can benefit from procedures allowing them to return to “safe areas.”

      Almost 10 days after the first reports of increased police spot-checks of Syrians’ registration documents in Istanbul and forced returns of Syrians from the city, the office of the provincial governor released a July 22 statement saying that Syrians registered in one of the country’s other provinces must return there by August 20, and that the Interior Ministry would send unregistered Syrians to provinces other than Istanbul for registration. The statement comes amid rising xenophobic sentiment across the political spectrum against Syrian and other refugees in Turkey.

      “Turkey claims it helps Syrians voluntarily return to their country, but threatening to lock them up until they agree to return, forcing them to sign forms, and dumping them in a war zone is neither voluntary nor legal,” said Gerry Simpson, associate Emergencies director. “Turkey should be commended for hosting record numbers of Syrian refugees, but unlawful deportations are not the way forward.”

      Turkey shelters a little over 3.6 million Syrian Refugees countrywide who have been given temporary protection, half a million of them in Istanbul. This is more refugees than any other country in the world and almost four times as many as the whole European Union (EU).

      The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) says that “the vast majority of Syrian asylum-seekers continue to … need international refugee protection” and that it “calls on states not to forcibly return Syrian nationals and former habitual residents of Syria.”

      Human Rights Watch spoke by phone with four Syrians who are in Syria after being detained and forcibly returned there.

      One of the men, who was from Ghouta, in the Damascus countryside, was detained on July 17 in Istanbul, where he had been living unregistered for over three years. He said police coerced him and other Syrian detainees into signing a form, transferred them to another detention center, and then put them on one of about 20 buses headed to Syria. They are now in northern Syria.

      Another man, from Aleppo, who had been living in Gaziantep in southeast Turkey since 2013, said he was detained there after he and his brother went to the police to complain about an attack on a shop that they ran in the city. He said the police transferred them from the Gaziantep Karşıyaka police station to the foreigners’ deportation center at Oğuzeli, holding them there for six days and forcing them to sign a deportation form without telling them what it was. On July 9, the authorities forcibly returned the men to Azaz in Syria via the Öncüpınar/Bab al Salama border gate near the Turkish town of Kilis, Human Rights Watch also spoke by phone with two men who said the Turkish coast guard and police intercepted them at checkpoints near the coast as they tried to reach Greece, detained them, and coerced them into signing and fingerprinting voluntary repatriation forms. The authorities then deported them to Idlib and northern Aleppo governorate.

      One of the men, a Syrian from Atmeh in Idlib governorate who registered in the Turkish city of Gaziantep in 2017, said the Turkish coast guard intercepted him on July 9. He said [“Guvenlik”] “security” held him with other Syrians for six days in a detention facility in the town of Aydın, in western Turkey. He said the guards verbally abused him and other detainees, punched him in the chest, and coerced him into signing voluntary repatriation papers. Verbally abusive members of Turkey’s rural gendarmerie police forces [jandarma] deported him on July 15 to Syria with about 35 other Syrians through the Öncüpınar/Bab al-Salameh border crossing.

      He said that there were others in the Aydin detention center who had been there for up to four months because they had refused to sign these forms.

      The second man said he fled Maarat al-Numan in 2014 and registered in the Turkish city of Iskenderun. On July 4, police stopped him at a checkpoint as he tried to reach the coast to take a boat to Greece and took him to the Aydin detention facility, where he said the guards beat some of the other detainees and shouted and cursed at them.

      He said the detention authorities confiscated his belongings, including his Turkish registration card, and told him to sign forms. When he refused, the official said they were not deportation forms but just “routine procedure.” When he refused again, he was told he would be detained indefinitely until he agreed to sign and provided his fingerprints. He said that the guards beat another man who had also refused, so he felt he had no choice but to sign. He was then put on a bus for 27 hours with dozens of other Syrians and deported through the Öncüpınar/Bab al-Salameh border crossing.

      In addition, journalists have spoken with a number of registered and unregistered Syrians who told them by phone from Syria that Turkish authorities detained them in the third week of July, coerced them into signing and providing a fingerprint on return documents. The authorities then deported them with dozens, and in some cases as many as 100, other Syrians to Idlib and northern Aleppo governorate through the Cilvegözü/Bab al-Hawa border crossing.

      More than 400,000 people have died because of the Syrian conflict since 2011, according to the World Bank. While the nature of the fighting in Syria has changed, with the Syrian government retaking areas previously held by anti-government groups and the battle against the Islamic State (ISIS) winding down, profound civilian suffering and loss of life persists.

      In Idlib governorate, the Syrian-Russian military alliance continues to indiscriminately bomb civilians and to use prohibited weapons, resulting in the death of at least 400 people since April, including 90 children, according to Save the Children. In other areas under the control of the Syrian government and anti-government groups, arbitrary arrests, mistreatment, and harassment are still the status quo.

      The forcible returns from Turkey indicate that the government is ready to double down on other policies that deny many Syrian asylum seekers protection. Over the past four years, Turkey has sealed off its border with Syria, while Turkish border guards have carried out mass summary pushbacks and killed and injured Syrians as they try to cross. In late 2017 and early 2018, Istanbul and nine provinces on the border with Syria suspended registration of newly arriving asylum seekers. Turkey’s travel permit system for registered Syrians prohibits unregistered Syrians from traveling from border provinces they enter to register elsewhere in the country.

      Turkey is bound by the international customary law of nonrefoulement, which prohibits the return of anyone to a place where they would face a real risk of persecution, torture or other ill-treatment, or a threat to life. This includes asylum seekers, who are entitled to have their claims fairly adjudicated and not be summarily returned to places where they fear harm. Turkey may not coerce people into returning to places where they face harm by threatening to detain them.

      Turkey should protect the basic rights of all Syrians, regardless of registration status, and register those denied registration since late 2017, in line with the Istanbul governor’s July 22 statement.

      On July 19, the European Commission announced the adoption of 1.41 billion euros in additional assistance to support refugees and local communities in Turkey, including for their protection. The European Commission, EU member states with embassies in Turkey, and the UNHCR should support Turkey in any way needed to register and protect Syrians, and should publicly call on Turkey to end its mass deportations of Syrians at the border and from cities further inland.

      “As Turkey continues to shelter more than half of registered Syrian refugees globally, the EU should be resettling Syrians from Turkey to the EU but also ensuring that its financial support protects all Syrians seeking refuge in Turkey,” Simpson said.

      https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/26/turkey-forcibly-returning-syrians-danger
      #retour_volontaire

    • Turquie : à Istanbul, les réfugiés vivent dans la peur du racisme et de la police

      Depuis quelques semaines, le hashtag #StopDeportationsToSyria (#SuriyeyeSınırdışınaSon) circule sur les réseaux sociaux. Il s’accompagne de témoignages de Syriens qui racontent s’être fait arrêter par la police turque à Istanbul et renvoyer en Syrie. Les autorités turques ont décidé de faire la chasse aux réfugiés alors que les agressions se multiplient.

      Le 21 juillet, alors qu’il fait ses courses, le jeune Amjad Tablieh se fait arrêter par la police turque à Istanbul. Il n’a pas sa carte de protection temporaire – kimlik – sur lui et la police turque refuse d’attendre que sa famille la lui apporte : « J’ai été mis dans un bus avec d’autres syriens. On nous a emmenés au poste de police de Tuzla et les policiers on dit que nous serions envoyés à Hatay [province turque à la frontière syrienne] ». La destination finale sera finalement la Syrie.

      Étudiant et disposant d’un kimlik à Istanbul, Amjad ajoute que comme les autres syriens arrêtés ce jour-là, il a été obligé de signer un document reconnaissant qu’il rentrait volontairement en Syrie. Il tient à ajouter qu’il a « vu des personnes se faire frapper pour avoir refusé de signer ce document ». Étudiant en architecture, Hama est arrivé à Istanbul il y a quatre mois pour s’inscrire à l’université. Il a été arrêté et déporté car son kimlik a été délivré à Gaziantep, près de la frontière avec la Syrie. Amr Dabool, également enregistré dans la ville de Gaziantep, a quant à lui été expulsé en Syrie alors qu’il tentait de se rendre en Grèce.
      Pas de statut de réfugié pour les Syriens en Turquie

      Alors que des récits similaires se multiplient sur les réseaux sociaux, le 22 juillet, les autorités d’Istanbul ont annoncé que les Syriens disposant de la protection temporaire mais n’étant pas enregistrés à Istanbul avaient jusqu’au 20 août pour retourner dans les provinces où ils sont enregistrés, faute de quoi ils seront renvoyés de force dans des villes choisies par le ministère de l’Intérieur. Invité quelques jours plus tard à la télévision turque, le ministre de l’intérieur Süleyman Soylu a nié toute expulsion, précisant que certains Syriens choisissaient « de rentrer de leur propre gré en Syrie ».

      Sur les 3,5 millions de Syriens réfugiés en Turquie, ils sont plus de 500 000 à vivre à Istanbul. La grande majorité d’entre eux ont été enregistrés dans les provinces limitrophes avec la Syrie (Gaziantep ou Urfa) où ils sont d’abord passés avant d’arriver à Istanbul pour travailler, étudier ou rejoindre leur famille. Depuis quelques jours, les contrôles se renforcent pour les renvoyer là où ils sont enregistrés.

      Pour Diane al Mehdi, anthropologue et membre du Syrian Refugees Protection Network, ces refoulements existent depuis longtemps, mais ils sont aujourd’hui plus massifs. Le 24 juillet, le ministre de l’intérieur a ainsi affirmé qu’une opération visant les réfugiés et des migrants non enregistrés à Istanbul avait menée à l’arrestation, depuis le 12 juillet, de 1000 Syriens. Chaque jour, environ 200 personnes ont été expulsées vers le nord de la Syrie via le poste frontière de Bab al-Hawa, précise la chercheuse. « Ces chiffres concernent principalement des Syriens vivant à Istanbul », explique-t-elle.

      Le statut d’« invité » dont disposent les Syriens en Turquie est peu clair et extrêmement précarisant, poursuit Diane al Mehdi. « Il n’y a pas d’antécédents légaux pour un tel statut, cela participe à ce flou et permet au gouvernement de faire un peu ce qu’il veut. » Créé en 2013, ce statut s’inscrivait à l’époque dans une logique de faveur et de charité envers les Syriens, le gouvernement ne pensant alors pas que la guerre en Syrie durerait. « À l’époque, les frontières étaient complètement ouvertes, les Syriens avaient le droit d’être enregistrés en Turquie et surtout ce statut comprenait le principe de non-refoulement. Ces trois principes ont depuis longtemps été bafouées par le gouvernement turc. »

      Aujourd’hui, les 3,5 millions de Syriens réfugiés en Turquie ne disposent pas du statut de réfugié en tant que tel. Bien que signataire de la Convention de Genève, Ankara n’octroie le statut de réfugié qu’aux ressortissants des 47 pays membres du Conseil de l’Europe. La Syrie n’en faisant pas partie, les Syriens ont en Turquie un statut moins protecteur encore que la protection subsidiaire : il est temporaire et révocable.
      #LesSyriensDehors : « Ici, c’est la Turquie, c’est Istanbul »

      Si le Président Erdoğan a longtemps prôné une politique d’accueil des Syriens, le vent semble aujourd’hui avoir tourné. En février 2018, il déclarait déjà : « Nous ne sommes pas en mesure de continuer d’accueillir 3,5 millions de réfugiés pour toujours ». Et alors qu’à Istanbul la possibilité d’obtenir le kimlik a toujours été compliquée, depuis le 6 juillet 2019, Istanbul n’en délivre officiellement plus aucun selon Diane al Mehdi.

      Même si le kimlik n’offre pas aux Syriens la possibilité de travailler, depuis quelques années, les commerces aux devantures en arabe sont de plus en plus nombreux dans rues d’Istanbul et beaucoup de Syriens ont trouvé du travail dans l’économie informelle, fournissant une main-d’œuvre bon marché. Or, dans un contexte économique difficile, avec une inflation et un chômage en hausse, les travailleurs syriens entrent en concurrence avec les ressortissants turcs et cela accroît les tensions sociales.

      Au printemps dernier, alors que la campagne pour les élections municipales battait son plein, des propos hostiles accompagnés des hashtags #SuriyelilerDefoluyor (« Les Syriens dehors ») ou #UlkemdeSuriyeliIstemiyorum (« Je ne veux pas de Syriens dans mon pays ») se sont multipliés sur les réseaux sociaux. Le candidat d’opposition et aujourd’hui maire d’Istanbul Ekrem Imamoglu, étonné du nombre d’enseignes en arabe dans certains quartiers, avait lancé : « Ici, c’est la Turquie, c’est Istanbul ».

      Après la banalisation des propos anti-syriens, ce sont les actes de violence qui se sont multipliés dans les rues d’Istanbul. Fin juin, dans le quartier de Küçükçekmece, une foule d’hommes a attaqué des magasins tenus par des Syriens. Quelques jours plus tard, les autorités d’Istanbul sommaient plus de 700 commerçants syriens de turciser leurs enseignes en arabe. Publié dans la foulée, un sondage de l’université Kadir Has à Istanbul a confirmé que la part des Turcs mécontents de la présence des Syriens est passée de 54,5 % en 2017 à 67,7 % en 2019.
      Climat de peur

      Même s’ils ont un kimlik, ceux qui ne disposent pas d’un permis de travail - difficile à obtenir - risquent une amende d’environs 550 euros et leur expulsion vers la Syrie s’ils sont pris en flagrant délit. Or, la police a renforcé les contrôles d’identités dans les stations de métro, les gares routières, les quartiers à forte concentration de Syriens mais aussi sur les lieux de travail. Cette nouvelle vague d’arrestations et d’expulsions suscite un climat de peur permanente chez les Syriens d’Istanbul. Aucune des personne contactée n’a souhaité témoigner, même sous couvert d’anonymat.

      « Pas protégés par les lois internationales, les Syriens titulaires du kimlik deviennent otages de la politique turque », dénonce Syrian Refugees Protection Network. Et l’[accord signé entre l’Union européenne et Ankara au printemps 2016 pour fermer la route des Balkans n’a fait que détériorer leur situation en Turquie. Pour Diane al-Mehdi, il aurait fallu accorder un statut qui permette aux Syriens d’avoir un avenir. « Tant qu’ils n’auront pas un statut fixe qui leur permettra de travailler, d’aller à l’école, à l’université, ils partiront en Europe. » Selon elle, donner de l’argent - dont on ne sait pas clairement comment il bénéficie aux Syriens - à la Turquie pour que le pays garde les Syriens n’était pas la solution. « Évidemment, l’Europe aurait aussi dû accepter d’accueillir plus de Syriens. »

      https://www.courrierdesbalkans.fr/Turquie-a-Istanbul-les-refugies-vivent-dans-la-peur-du-racisme-et

    • En Turquie, les réfugiés syriens sont devenus #indésirables

      Après avoir accueilli les réfugiés syriens à bras ouverts, la Turquie change de ton. Une façon pour le gouvernement Erdogan de réagir aux crispations qu’engendrent leur présence dans un contexte économique morose.

      Les autorités avaient donné jusqu’à mardi soir aux migrants sans statut légal pour régulariser leur situation, sous peine d’être expulsés. Mais selon plusieurs ONG, ces expulsions ont déjà commencé et plus d’un millier de réfugiés ont déjà été arrêtés. Quelque 600 personnes auraient même déjà été reconduites en Syrie.

      « Les policiers font des descentes dans les quartiers, dans les commerces, dans les maisons. Ils font des contrôles d’identité dans les transports en commun et quand ils attrapent des Syriens, ils les emmènent au bureau de l’immigration puis les expulsent », décrit Eyup Ozer, membre du collectif « We want to live together initiative ».

      Le gouvernement turc dément pour sa part ces renvois forcés. Mais cette vague d’arrestations intervient dans un climat hostile envers les 3,6 millions de réfugiés syriens installés en Turquie.

      Solidarité islamique

      Bien accueillis au début de la guerre, au nom de la solidarité islamique défendue par le président turc Recep Tayyip Erdogan dans l’idée de combattre Bachar al-Assad, ces réfugiés syriens sont aujourd’hui devenus un enjeu politique.

      Retenus à leur arrivée dans des camps, parfois dans des conditions difficiles, nombre d’entre eux ont quitté leur point de chute pour tenter leur chance dans le reste du pays et en particulier dans les villes. A Istanbul, le poumon économique de la Turquie, la présence de ces nouveaux-venus est bien visible. La plupart ont ouvert des commerces et des restaurants, et leurs devantures, en arabe, agacent, voire suscitent des jalousies.

      « L’économie turque va mal, c’est pour cette raison qu’on ressent davantage les effets de la crise syrienne », explique Lami Bertan Tokuzlu, professeur de droit à l’Université Bilgi d’Istanbul. « Les Turcs n’approuvent plus les dépenses du gouvernement en faveur des Syriens », relève ce spécialiste des migrations.
      Ressentiment croissant

      Après l’euphorie économique des années 2010, la Turquie est confrontée depuis plus d’un an à la dévaluation de sa monnaie et à un taux de chômage en hausse, à 10,9% en 2018.

      Dans ce contexte peu favorable et alors que les inégalités se creusent, la contestation s’est cristallisée autour de la question des migrants. Celle-ci expliquerait, selon certains experts, la déroute du candidat de Recep Tayyip Erdogan à la mairie d’Istanbul.

      Conscient de ce ressentiment dans la population et des conséquences potentielles pour sa popularité, le président a commencé à adapter son discours dès 2018. L’ultimatum lancé à ceux qui ont quitté une province turque où ils étaient enregistrés pour s’installer à Istanbul illustre une tension croissante.

      https://www.rts.ch/info/monde/10649380-en-turquie-les-refugies-syriens-sont-devenus-indesirables.html

    • Europe’s Complicity in Turkey’s Syrian-Refugee Crackdown

      Ankara is moving against Syrians in the country—and the European Union bears responsibility.

      Under the cover of night, Turkish police officers pushed Ahmed onto a large bus parked in central Istanbul. In the darkness, the Syrian man from Damascus could discern dozens of other handcuffed refugees being crammed into the vehicle. Many of them would not see the Turkish city again.

      Ahmed, who asked that his last name not be used to protect his safety, was arrested after police discovered that he was registered with the authorities not in Istanbul, but in a different district. Turkish law obliges Syrian refugees with a temporary protection status to remain in their locale of initial registration or obtain separate permission to travel, and the officers reassured him he would simply be transferred back to the right district.

      Instead, as dawn broke, the bus arrived at a detention facility in the Istanbul suburb of Pendik, where Ahmed said he was jostled into a crowded cell with 10 others and no beds, and received only one meal a day, which was always rotten. “The guards told us we Syrians are just as rotten inside,” he told me. “They kept shouting that Turkey will no longer accept us, and that we will all go back to Syria.”

      Ahmed would spend more than six weeks in the hidden world of Turkey’s so-called removal centers. His account, as well as those of more than half a dozen other Syrians I spoke to, point to the systemic abuse, the forced deportations, and, in some cases, the death of refugees caught in a recent crackdown here.
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      Yet Turkey is not the only actor implicated. In a deeper sense, the backlash also exposes the long-term consequences of the European Union’s outsourcing of its refugee problem. In March 2016, the EU entered into a controversial deal with Turkey that halted much of the refugee influx to Europe in return for an aid package worth €6 billion ($6.7 billion) and various political sweeteners for Ankara. Preoccupied with its own border security, EU decision makers at the time were quick to reassure their critics that Turkey constituted a “safe third country” that respected refugee rights and was committed to the principle of non-refoulement.

      As Europe closed its doors, Turkey was left with a staggering 3.6 million registered Syrian refugees—the largest number hosted by any country in the world and nearly four times as many as all EU-member states combined. While Turkish society initially responded with impressive resilience, its long-lauded hospitality is rapidly wearing thin, prompting President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government to take measures that violate the very premise of the EU-Turkey deal.

      Last month, Turkish police launched operations targeting undocumented migrants and refugees in Istanbul. Syrian refugees holding temporary protection status registered in other Turkish districts now have until October 30 to leave Istanbul, whereas those without any papers are to be transferred to temporary refugee camps in order to be registered.

      Both international and Turkish advocates of refugee rights say, however, that the operation sparked a wave of random arrests and even forced deportations. The Istanbul Bar Association, too, reported its Legal Aid Bureau dealt with 3.5 times as many deportation cases as in June, just before the operation was launched. UNHCR, the UN’s refugee agency, and the European Commission have not said whether they believe Turkey is deporting Syrians. But one senior EU official, who asked for anonymity to discuss the issue, estimated that about 2,200 people were sent to the Syrian province of Idlib, though he said it was unclear whether they were forcibly deported or chose to return. The official added that, were Turkey forcibly deporting Syrians, this would be in explicit violation of the principle of non-refoulement, on which the EU-Turkey deal is conditioned.

      The Turkish interior ministry’s migration department did not respond to questions about the allegations. In a recent interview on Turkish television, Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu said that “it is not possible for us to deport any unregistered Syrian” and insisted that returns to Syria were entirely voluntary.

      Ahmed and several other Syrian refugees I spoke to, however, experienced firsthand what voluntary can look like in practice.

      After being transferred from the facility in Pendik to a removal center in Binkılıç, northwest of Istanbul, Ahmed said he was pressured into signing a set of forms upon arrival. The female official in charge refused to explain the papers’ contents, he said. As Ahmed was about to sign and fingerprint the last document, he noticed she was deliberately using her fingers to cover the Arabic translation of the words voluntary return. When he retracted his finger, she called in the guards, who took Ahmed to a nearby bathroom with another Syrian who had refused to sign. There, he said, the two were intimidated for several hours, and he was shown images of a man who had been badly beaten and tied to a chair with plastic tape. According to Ahmed, an official told him, “If you don’t sign, you’ll end up like that.”

      The other Syrian present at the time, Hussein, offered a similar account. In a phone interview from Dubai, where he escaped to after negotiating deportation to Malaysia instead of Syria, Hussein, who asked to be identified by only his first name to protect relatives still in Turkey, detailed the abuse in the same terms as Ahmed, and added that he was personally beaten by one of the guards. When the ordeal was over, both men said, the other Syrians who had arrived with them were being taken to a bus, apparently to be deported.

      Ahmed was detained in Binkılıç for a month before being taken to another removal center in nearby Kırklareli, where he said he was made to sleep outside in a courtyard together with more than 100 other detainees. The guards kept the toilets locked throughout the day, he said, so inmates had to either wait for a single 30-minute toilet break at night or relieve themselves where they were sleeping. When Ahmed fell seriously ill, he told me, he was repeatedly denied access to a doctor.

      After nine days in Kırklareli, the nightmare suddenly ended. Ahmed was called in by the facility’s management, asked who he was, and released when it became clear he did in fact hold temporary protection status, albeit for a district other than Istanbul. The Atlantic has seen a photo of Ahmed’s identity card, as well as his release note from the removal center.

      The EU has funded many of the removal centers in which refugees like Ahmed are held. As stated in budgets from 2010 and 2015, the EU financed at least 12 such facilities as part of its pre-accession funding to Turkey. And according to a 2016 report by an EU parliamentary delegation, the removal center in Kırklareli in which Ahmed was held received 85 percent of its funding from the EU. The Binkılıç facility, where Syrians were forced to sign return papers, also received furniture and other equipment funded by Britain and, according to Ahmed, featured signs displaying the EU and Turkish flags.

      It is hard to determine the extent to which the $6.7 billion allocated to Ankara under the 2016 EU-Turkey deal has funded similar projects. While the bulk of it went to education, health care, and direct cash support for refugees, a 2018 annual report also refers to funding for “a removal center for 750 people”—language conspicuously replaced with the more neutral “facility for 750 people” in this year’s report.

      According to Kati Piri, the European Parliament’s former Turkey rapporteur, even lawmakers like her struggle to scrutinize the precise implementation of EU-brokered deals on migration, which include agreements not just with Turkey, but also with Libya, Niger, and Sudan.

      “In this way, the EU becomes co-responsible for human-rights violations,” Piri said in a telephone interview. “Violations against refugees may have decreased on European soil, but that’s because we outsourced them. It’s a sign of Europe’s moral deficit, which deprives us from our credibility in holding Turkey to account.” According to the original agreement, the EU pledged to resettle 72,000 Syrian refugees from Turkey. Three years later, it has taken in less than a third of that number.

      Many within Turkish society feel their country has simply done enough. With an economy only recently out of recession and many Turks struggling to make a living, hostility toward Syrians is on the rise. A recent poll found that those who expressed unhappiness with Syrian refugees rose to 67.7 percent this year, from 54.5 percent in 2017.

      Just as in Europe, opposition parties in Turkey are now cashing in on anti-refugee sentiment. In municipal elections this year, politicians belonging to the secularist CHP ran an explicitly anti-Syrian campaign, and have cut municipal aid for refugees or even banned Syrians’ access to beaches since being elected. In Istanbul, on the very evening the CHP candidate Ekrem İmamoğlu was elected mayor, a jubilantly racist hashtag began trending on Twitter: “Syrians are fucking off” (#SuriyelilerDefoluyor).

      In a statement to The Atlantic, a Turkish foreign-ministry spokesperson said, “Turkey has done its part” when it came to the deal with the EU. “The funds received amount to a fraction of what has been spent by Turkey,” the text noted, adding that Ankara expects “more robust support from the EU” both financially and in the form of increased resettlements of Syrian refugees from Turkey to Europe.

      Though international organizations say that more evidence of Turkey’s actions is needed, Nour al-Deen al-Showaishi argues the proof is all around him. “The bombs are falling not far from here,” he told me in a telephone interview from a village on the outskirts of Idlib, the Syrian region where he said he was sent. Showaishi said he was deported from Turkey in mid-July after being arrested in the Istanbul neighborhood of Esenyurt while having coffee with friends. Fida al-Deen, who was with him at the time, confirmed to me that Showaishi was arrested and called him from Syria two days later.

      Having arrived in Turkey in early 2018, when the governorate of Istanbul had stopped giving out identity cards to Syrians, Showaishi did not have any papers to show the police. Taken to a nearby police station, officers assured him that he would receive an identity card if he signed a couple of forms. When he asked for more detail about the forms, however, they changed tactics and forced him to comply.

      Showaishi was then sent to a removal center in Tuzla and, he said, deported to Syria the same day. He sent me videos to show he was in Idlib, the last major enclave of armed resistance against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. According to the United Nations, the region contains 3 million people, half of them internally displaced, and faces a humanitarian disaster now that Russia and the Assad regime are stepping up an offensive to retake the territory.

      The only way out leads back into Turkey, and, determined to prevent yet another influx of refugees, Ankara has buttressed its border.

      Still, Hisham al-Steyf al-Mohammed saw no other option. The 21-year-old was deported from Turkey in mid-July despite possessing valid papers from the governorate of Istanbul, a photo of which I have seen. Desperate to return to his wife and two young children, he paid a smuggler to guide him back to Turkey, according to Mohammed Khedr Hammoud, another refugee who joined the perilous journey.

      Shortly before sunset on August 4, Hammoud said, a group of 13 refugees set off from the village of Dirriyah, a mile from the border, pausing in the mountains for the opportune moment to cross into Turkey. While they waited, Mohammed knelt down to pray, but moments later, a cloud of sand jumped up next to him. Realizing it was a bullet, the smuggler called for the group to get moving, but Mohammed lay still. “I crawled up to him and put my ear on his heart,” Hammoud told me, “but it wasn’t beating.” For more than an hour, he said, the group was targeted by bullets from Turkish territory, and only at midnight was it able to carry Mohammed’s body away.

      I obtained a photo of Mohammed’s death certificate issued by the Al-Rahma hospital in the Darkoush village in Idlib. The document, dated August 5, notes, “A bullet went through the patient’s right ear, and came out at the level of the left neck.”

      The Turkish interior ministry sent me a statement that largely reiterated an article published in Foreign Policy last week, in which an Erdoğan spokesman said Mohammed was a terror suspect who voluntarily requested his return to Syria. He offered no details on the case, though.

      Mohammed’s father, Mustafa, dismissed the spokesman’s argument, telling me in an interview in Istanbul, “If he really did something wrong, then why didn’t they send him to court?” Since Mohammed had been the household’s main breadwinner, Mustafa said he now struggled to feed his family, including Mohammed’s 3-month-old baby.

      Yet he is not the only one struck by Mohammed’s death. In an interview in his friend’s apartment in Istanbul, where he has returned but is in hiding from the authorities, Ahmed had just finished detailing his week’s long detention in Turkey’s removal centers when his phone started to buzz—photos of Mohammed’s corpse were being shared on Facebook.

      “I know him!” Ahmed screamed, clasping his friend’s arm. Mohammed, he said, had been with him in the removal center in Binkılıç. “He was so hopeful to be released, because he had a valid ID for Istanbul. But when he told me that he had been made to sign some forms, I knew it was already too late.”

      “If I signed that piece of paper,” Ahmed said, “I could have been dead next to him.”

      It is this thought that pushes Ahmed, and many young Syrians like him, to continue on to Europe. He and his friend showed me videos a smuggler had sent them of successful boat journeys, and told me they planned to leave soon.

      “As long as we are in Turkey, the Europeans can pretend that they don’t see us,” Ahmed concluded. “But once I go there, once I stand in front of them, I am sure that they will care about me.”

      https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/08/europe-turkey-syria-refugee-crackdown/597013
      #responsabilité

  • A Istanbul, Erdogan connaît son plus grand échec en dix-sept ans de pouvoir
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    #Analyse #Istanbul,_turquie,_A_la_Une

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