#italy

▻https://unherd.com/2025/07/kaja-kallas-is-the-real-threat-to-europe

July 11, 2025 6 mins

While Ursula von der Leyen may have survived yesterday’s vote of no confidence, the result has laid bare growing cross-party discontent with her increasingly authoritarian leadership. Support for the European President is eroding.

The most notable shift was from the right-wing #ECR group, which includes #Meloni’s Brothers of Italy. Previously, these MEPs had supported von der Leyen on several key proposals, but few voted against this motion, with most opting to desert it altogether. Also revealing was the support the motion received beyond its Right-populist sponsors: several MEPs from The Left group as well as non-affiliated Left-populist deputies from #Germany and elsewhere, also backed it.

A key point of convergence between these otherwise divergent forces is their shared opposition to the Commission’s belligerent stance on the #Russia - #Ukraine conflict. Indeed, the no-confidence motion also referenced the Commission’s proposal of using an emergency clause in the EU treaty to shut MEPs out of approving a €150 billion loan scheme to boost the joint procurement of weapons by EU countries, mainly to increase military support for Ukraine.

It’s important to note that the motion of #censure wasn’t just directed at von der Leyen but at her entire Commission — in particular, her second-in-command, Kaja Kallas, Commission Vice-President and High Representative for Foreign Affairs, the closest thing the EU has to a foreign minister.

#Kallas, the former Prime Minister of #Estonia — a country of just 1.4 million people, fewer than reside in Paris — was confirmed as the #EU’s new High Representative for Foreign Affairs in December of last year. Since then, she has come to personify, more vividly than anyone else, the EU’s toxic blend of incompetence, irrelevance and outright stupidity.

At a time when the war in Ukraine is unquestionably #Europe’s foremost foreign policy challenge, it is difficult to imagine anyone less suited to the role than Kallas, whose deep-seated hostility towards Russia borders on obsession. On her very first day in the job, during a trip to Kyiv, she tweeted: “The European Union wants Ukraine to win this war” — a statement that immediately caused unease in Brussels, where officials viewed it as out of step with settled EU language two years into the war. “She is still acting like a prime minister”, one diplomat commented.

Just months before her appointment, she proposed breaking Russia into “small states” and, since then, has repeatedly demanded the full restoration of Ukraine’s 1991 borders, including #Crimea — a position that effectively rules out negotiations. While even Donald Trump has acknowledged that Ukrainian #Nato membership is a non-starter, Kallas insists it remain a goal — despite it having been a red line for #Russia for nearly two decades. Kallas has even declared that “if we don’t help Ukraine further, we should all start learning Russian”. Never mind that Russia has no strategic, military or economic reason to attack the EU. Earlier this year, she denounced Trump’s efforts to negotiate an end to the war, dismissing them as a “dirty deal”, which explains why US Secretary of State Marco Rubio abruptly cancelled a scheduled meeting with her in February.

Kallas’s single-minded fixation on Russia has rendered her virtually silent on every other foreign policy issue. As former UK diplomat Ian Proud, who served at the British Embassy in Moscow from 2014 to 2019, observed, she comes across as a “single-issue High Representative” who is “intent only on sustaining the decade-long European policy on non-engagement with Russia, whatever the economic cost”.

Her aggressive, unilateral rhetoric — often delivered without prior consultation with member states — has alienated not only openly Euro- and Nato-sceptic governments in Hungary and #Slovakia, but also countries like #Spain and #Italy, which, while broadly aligned with Nato’s Ukraine policy, don’t share Kallas’s assessment of #Moscow as an imminent threat to the EU. “If you listen to her it seems we are at war with Russia, which is not the EU line”, one EU official complained.

Technically, the High Representative’s role is to reflect the consensus of the member states as an extension of the Council, not to freelance as a supranational policymaker. Yet, Kallas interprets her role otherwise, repeatedly acting as though she speaks on behalf of all Europeans — a top-down, anti-democratic approach that is symptomatic of a broader authoritarian trend supercharged by von der Leyen.

Despite her proclamations about defending democracy, Kallas herself has no democratic mandate. Not only was she never elected to her current office, but her party — the Estonian Reform Party — received fewer than 70,000 votes in the last European Parliament elections, representing less than 0.02% of the European population. Von der Leyen, though, has packed her Commission with these like-minded Baltic officials — hailing from a region of just over six million people — to fill key defence and foreign policy posts. These appointments reflect a strategic alignment between von der Leyen’s centralising ambitions and the ultra-hawkish worldview of the #Baltic political class. Both share an unwavering commitment to the Nato line and a deep hostility to any diplomacy with Moscow.

Kallas’s anti-Russian zeal made her a natural choice for the job. But rarely mentioned is the fact that Kallas’s own family, far from being the victim of Soviet oppression, actually lived a relatively comfortable life as part of the Soviet establishment — or what may very well be considered the Soviet middle class.

In fact, Kaja Kallas was born into one of Estonia’s most powerful political families — a family whose rise was facilitated, in no small part, by the very Soviet system she now demonises. Her father, Siim Kallas, was an influential member of the Soviet nomenklatura and then a key figure in Estonian post-Soviet politics, eventually becoming Prime Minister before serving as a European Commissioner for over a decade. Few will be surprised to learn that immediately after completing her studies, in 2010, Kaja decided to enter politics and joined the Reform Party — her father’s own party — nor that she followed his footsteps in moving to Brussels after serving as Prime Minister from 2021 to 2024. It’s hard to shake the idea that elite continuity and inherited privilege had a helping hand. One is also left wondering, given her upbringing, whether her aggressive anti-Russian posture is a sincerely held conviction, or a cover for personal ambition.

One story sheds particularly interesting light on her geopolitical attitude. In 2023, when Kallas was still Prime Minister, three major Estonian newspapers called for her resignation after it emerged that her husband’s transport company had continued to do business with Russia following its invasion of Ukraine. However, Kallas dismissed the scandal and refused to resign, claiming no wrongdoing, sparking accusations of hypocrisy: demanding the total economic isolation of Russia on one hand, while turning a blind eye to her own family’s business ties with the country.

All things considered, Kallas is dramatically ill-suited for the job — stumbling from one blunder to the next. Only recently, she managed to offend nearly every Irish citizen by suggesting that Ireland’s neutrality stems from not having experienced atrocities such as “mass deportations” or “suppression of culture and language” — a bizarre statement, given Ireland’s long history of British colonial rule and the bloodshed of the Troubles.
“Kallas’s anti-Russian zeal made her a natural choice for the job.”

Some blunders are far more consequential. In a recent meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Kallas demanded that China condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine and fall in line with the “rules-based international order”. Yi, usually soft-spoken, responded sharply, noting that China had not supported Russia militarily — but also had no intention of seeing Moscow defeated, since that would simply bring the West’s wrath upon China next. He may have been alluding to Kallas’s earlier remark: “If Europe cannot defeat Russia, how can it take on China?”. That a senior EU official would frame global affairs in such stark, confrontational terms reflects an astonishing lack of diplomatic nuance.

The fact that Kallas felt comfortable lecturing China on international law and the “rules-based order” reveals not only a striking blindness to Europe’s diminished global standing, but also a profound lack of self-awareness about how the EU’s double standards are viewed in Beijing and across the Global South. While loudly condemning Russian attacks on civilians, Kallas has consistently whitewashed — or outright endorsed — Israel’s atrocities in Gaza. A recently leaked EU report confirmed that Brussels acknowledged a long time ago that Israel was committing war crimes in Gaza, including “starvation, torture, indiscriminate attacks and apartheid” — yet Kallas has neither condemned Israel nor questioned EU-Israel ties. Similarly, she said nothing about US threats to annex Greenland and supported the US-Israeli bombing of Iran — a clear violation of international law.

This selective #moralism has done lasting damage to the EU’s credibility, particularly in the eyes of the Global South. But to lay the blame solely at Kallas’s feet would be a mistake. In the end, it’s not Kallas who should concern us most, but the system that made her possible — a system that rewards the loudest #hawks, holds scant regard for democracy, and replaces statesmanship with social media posturing. If Europe continues on this path, it won’t just lose its place in the world; it will become the most vivid expression of the West’s broader slide into kakistocracy — government by the worst, the least qualified and the most unscrupulous.

#Russie #URSS #OTAN #Estonie
#carrière d’ #oportunisme stratégique #girouette
#phobie et #propagande anglo-américaine
#EU #UE

https://seenthis.net/local/cache-vignettes/L510xH680/3VC1XJTB2IkM772f-e9f3c.jpg

Today, the #EU delivered additional gifts to boost #Libya's border security, proudly labeled as ’sponsored by #Italy #IOM'. The provision of desert ambulances & comm gadgets, including Sat phones & radio equipment appears to be a thinly veiled attempt to facilitate interceptions.

▻https://seenthis.net/messages/1039431

Così l’Italia ha svuotato il diritto alla trasparenza sulle frontiere

Il Consiglio di Stato ha ribadito la inaccessibilità “assoluta” degli atti che riguardano genericamente la “gestione delle frontiere e dell’immigrazione”. Intanto le forniture milionarie del governo a Libia, Tunisia ed Egitto continuano.

▻https://seenthis.net/messages/1039671

Recherche collective sur les représentations des migrations au cinéma (articles, références,...)

https://i.imgur.com/gIgJH61.png

Nous proposons de publier ici des articles, des échanges, des références qui documentent et réfléchissent sur les représentations des migrations au cinéma et dans les médias.

Que sont les images des migrations et que portent elles de sens ?

Quel récit composent ces #images et comment évoluent elles ?

▻http://traces-migrations.org/2020/04/10/recherche-cinema
#images_migrantes

#coronavirus #confinement #art

Voir aussi #pour_s’occuper 4, des #livres, des #films, de la #musique :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/834001

#merci @cdb_77 c’est tombé pile au moment, là je suis à la recherche d’un film autour de #migration et #féminisme sur le #continent_africain pour la soirée corona-film-débat-en-ligne tous les mardi avec les doctorant.es de mon centre ;) J’ajoute les resultats de ma recherche ici !

#Benzine

Tunisia I 2017 I Arabic dialogue with English subtitles l 90 min
12

http://media.maffswe.com/2018/09/4-3.jpg

Many films have dealt with immigration over the past two decades, but most have dealt with it from the point of view of the immigrant or the place where the migration took place. Sarra Abuidi’s Benzine deals with the issue from the point of view of those who stayed behind, through the eyes of parents who have not heard anything about their son for nine months since he moved to Italy.

Director: Sarra Abidi

Writer: Sarra Abidi

Cast: Ali Yahyaoui, Sondos Belhassen, Jamel Chandoul, Fatma Ben Saidane

DOP: Ali Ben Abdallah

Producer: Ali Ben Abdallah

Sarra Abidi, a Tunisian film maker who studied and obtained a maste’s degree from the Higher Institute of Fine Arts in Tunis and a master’s degree in film editing from the Higher Institute of Cinema INSAS in Brussels. Sarra’s first feature film “Benzine” has participated in several international film festivals and has won awards. It has been particularly acclaimed by critics.Now she is finishing a long documentary and writing her second feature.

http://media.maffswe.com/2018/08/Portrait-Sarra-Abidi.jpg

▻http://maffswe.com/benzine

#Tunisia #migration #famliy #parents #Italy

Village d’accueil

▻http://www.art500.fr/article-polka-magazine

First Light – Migration in the Swiss alps

“Escape from hardship, because it is the only hope.” is what the father of the little Iranian boy explained to me as to why his son is named Vihan. (In Persian, the name Vihan can be translated as “First light” or hope)

From August to October 2016 I had the opportunity to work as ‘artist in residence’, on a project for SMART (Sustainable Mountain Art programme) in Switzerland, creating pictures to raise awareness on the challenges facing mountain regions. I chose the theme of migration that has interested me for some time already.

Since the middle ages, demographic pressure, armed conflict and oppression, natural disasters and overpopulation have driven the cause for Migration in the Swiss mountain regions. The largest mass emigration being of the Walser people from Lötschental, who over the course of 2 centuries established themselves over the Valais region and even as far as Austria.

The foreigner’s lot was that of having very limited rights and labeled with the status of ‘inhabitant’, often not welcomed and even restricted by opposition to marriage to locals.

I stayed in the historical village of #Medergen in the Graubünden, established by the #Walser people as early as 1300 with houses dating back to the 1700s, high in the alps at 2000m above sea level. A special, tiny village almost frozen in time, as people live a very modest life with no running water inside the house, which also means no flushing toilets or showers. Wooden stoves are used for cooking and heating water for washing, as there is no electricity either, except for the recent additions of solar panels. People use buckets to fetch water from the fresh water fountains, just like Heidi! :)

In Litzirüti the closest village to Medergen, there is an old ski-hotel, that has been transformed into a temporary home for about 100 asylum seekers from various war torn and heavily oppressed countries such as Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, Turkey, Siria, Gambia, Tibet, awaiting the decision of the Swiss government to announce their fate, if they will be rejected or if they will be given permission to stay in Switzerland.

During the time I worked on the project, I hiked four hours up and down the mountain every second or third day, spending time and getting to know some of the people who reside here. If you ask anyone they will say that they are very thankful to be here in this peaceful village of Litzirüti and to be so well looked after in this beautiful place. And thankful to be in a country where there is peace and modern prosperity.

However, thankful for escaping the unimaginable oppression and life threatening situations in their home countries, it is clear that they now have to deal with new challenges and difficulty in their lives. The youth in particular find it challenging to be in such a tiny village where there isn’t a single shop or anything to stimulate their growing minds. Furthermore, most of the people have been in Switzerland for a year or more, still waiting to have an interview to have their reasons for needing asylum assessed and their fate and extent of freedom, decided accordingly.

What I’ve learnt from my research and looking at both the history of migration and what is happening today, is that the same challenges that existed centuries ago still exist today, namely that whenever there are newcomers, inevitably there is at least a degree of resistance to their acceptance that they are met with and state control that is the decider of their fate, prolonging the process of integration, usually in order to protect the fears of the established.

“Cultural diversity is as essential to humanity as biodiversity is to nature. It makes the world a richer and more varied place and enlarges the range of choices available. It is the breeding ground that allows different cultures to continue and develop and enrich themselves through contact with each other, without drifting towards rigid identities. It is one of the sources of development, which must be perceived not merely in terms of economic growth , but also as a means of attaining to a satisfying intellectual, emotional, moral and spiritual existence.”

(Quote from the SDC – Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation on the importance of culture for development).

By depicting the contrast between the history of migration in the Swiss alps and the rich traditions that has become established in time, with the current asylum seeker and refugee situation mostly being a state of limbo, I aim to raise awareness of the current day migrants (asylum seekers) and remind people that sooner or later in life we all were or will be migrants again.

I believe that through time, if cultures can embrace their differences, be it language, colour, traditions or spirituality, they will see that on the other side is another human being with the same hopes and desires as themselves and that we can all benefit and be so much richer for getting to know each other and giving each other the freedom to live out our own identity that makes us complete and wholesome human beings.

http://i0.wp.com/lavonne.co.za/lavonnebosmanphotographicart/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Play.jpg?resize=1200%2C1200#.jpg http://i2.wp.com/lavonne.co.za/lavonnebosmanphotographicart/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Vihan.jpg?resize=1200%2C1200#.jpg http://i0.wp.com/lavonne.co.za/lavonnebosmanphotographicart/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/HappyBday.jpg?resize=1200%2C1200#.jpg http://i0.wp.com/lavonne.co.za/lavonnebosmanphotographicart/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Nawaf-Renato.jpg?resize=1200%2C1200#.jpg

The Italian Ski Resort

From Libya via Lampedusa. In the dark, the hotel that loomed after the last hairpin bend looked rather like Overlook in Stanley Kubrick’s film The Shining. But that’s where the resemblance ends. Montecampione, altitude 1,800 meters, is a ski resort at the end of the road winding up the Camonica Valley in Lombardy. The most striking thing on arrival here is being greeted with the faces and voices from another continent. Since June 2011, more than 100 Africans who fled the war inhave been settled in this hotel by the Brescia police authority, in line with the Italian government’s policy of spreading thearound the country. In most places the local authorities have been required to house them, but here private enterprise has also been asked to contribute. The hotel in Montecampione houses and feeds the migrants for 40 euros a head per day. The nearest village in the valley is more than 20km away, so the migrants are cut off from the outside world while they await a decision on their fates.
“We live in a strange situation here,” admitted a lively young Ghanaian called Michael. “We’ve got absolutely nothing to do, but we’re all impatient to find work and start our lives again.” The last five migrants to arrive in Montecampione are equally bewildered. They reached Lampedusa early in August, and were taken across Italy. They have got plenty of time to find out about where they have ended up.

http://www.bclaudia.com/files/gimgs/17_mg46481_v2.jpg http://www.bclaudia.com/files/gimgs/17_mg46811.jpg http://www.bclaudia.com/files/gimgs/17_sidibiiaia20mali.jpg

▻http://www.bclaudia.com/libya-refugees/eleanor-rigby
#Italy #stations_de_ski

Des photos, mais aussi un #film...

Ilmurrán

Nell’estate 2014, una giovane ragazza Maasai ha raggiunto una “pastora” piemontese sui pascoli delle Alpi Marittime. Due donne lontanissime tra loro, diverse per colore di pelle, generazione e lingua hanno vissuto una stagione d’alpeggio insieme, condividendo il lavoro, raccontandosi la loro storia, riconoscendosi più vicine.

Le loro voci arrivano da lontano. Silvia si muove tra elementi primordiali, produce il formaggio con gli strumenti dei suoi antenati, ha tramandato la passione a suo figlio come in un rituale. Leah ha impressi a fuoco sulla pelle i simboli di un popolo pastore che ancora sopravvive sugli altipiani del Kenya. L’una e l’altra incarnano culture che oggi si trovano di fronte a scelte decisive, necessarie per la loro sopravvivenza. Ilmurrán significa “guerrieri”, perché la loro è una storia di resistenza.

L’incontro è nato come un’esperienza antropologica a tutti gli effetti, realizzata in regime di completa autoproduzione dall’Associazione Culturale Geronimo Carbonò.

http://www.ilmurran.it/img/p2.jpg http://www.bergamopost.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/menbretti2.jpg http://www.ilmurran.it/img/p6.png

Ailleurs également il y a au moins une discussion sur le recul des heures d’ouverture le dimanche, introduites après la libéralisation des années 1990. La question cruciale est, duquel esprit seront les contenus politiques et les contextualisations avec lesquelles on essaie de justifier la révocation.

Migranti:da inizio anno sbarcati 16.566,-79% rispetto a 2017

Dall’inizio dell’anno ad oggi sono sbarcati in Italia 16.566 migranti, il 79,07% in meno rispetto allo stesso periodo dell’anno scorso, quando ne arrivarono 79.154. Dai dati del Viminale, aggiornati al 28 giugno, emerge dunque che per il dodicesimo mese consecutivo gli sbarchi nel nostro paese sono in calo: l’ultimo picco fu registrato proprio a giugno dell’anno scorso, quando sbarcarono 23.526 migranti (nel 2016 ne arrivarono 22.339 mentre quest’anno il numero è fermo a 3.136). Dal mese di luglio 2017, che ha coinciso con gli accordi siglati con la Libia dall’ex ministro dell’Interno Marco Minniti, si è sempre registrata una diminuzione. Dei 16.566 arrivati nei primi sei mesi del 2018 (la quasi totalità, 15.741, nei porti siciliani), 11.401 sono partiti dalla Libia: un calo nelle partenze dell’84,94% rispetto al 2017 e dell’83,18% rispetto al 2016. Quanto alle nazionalità di quelli che sono arrivati, la prima è la Tunisia, con 3.002 migranti, seguita da Eritrea (2.555), Sudan (1.488) e Nigeria (1.229).

▻http://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/cronaca/2018/06/30/migrantida-inizio-anno-sbarcati-16.566-79-rispetto-a-2017-_30327137-364e-44bf-8

En Méditerranée, les flux de migrants s’estompent et s’orientent vers l’ouest

Pour la première fois depuis le début de la crise migratoire en 2014, l’Espagne est, avant l’Italie et la Grèce, le pays européen qui enregistre le plus d’arrivées de migrants par la mer et le plus de naufrages meurtriers au large de ses côtes.

https://i.imgur.com/M8UWCsF.png

►https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/280618/en-mediterranee-les-flux-de-migrants-s-estompent-et-s-orientent-vers-l-oue
#routes_migratoires

Ecco quanti migranti sono sbarcati in Italia nel 2018

Secondo i dati del Viminale sono 16.316 i profughi sbarcati in Italia dal primo gennaio al 22 giugno. Nello stesso periodo del 2017 erano stati 71.989. Si può parlare quindi di un decremento degli sbarchi pari al 71,06%.

▻https://www.lettera43.it/it/articoli/attualita/2018/06/23/quanti-migranti-in-italia-salvini-porti/221322

Migratory flows in April: Overall drop, but more detections in Greece and Spain

Central Mediterranean
The number of migrants arriving in Italy via the Central Mediterranean route in April fell to about 2 800, down 78% from April 2017. The total number of migrants detected on this route in the first four months of 2018 fell to roughly 9 400, down three-quarters from a year ago.
So far this year, Tunisians and Eritreans were the two most represented nationalities on this route, together accounting for almost 40% of all the detected migrants.

Eastern Mediterranean
In April, the number of irregular migrants taking the Eastern Mediterranean route stood at some 6 700, two-thirds more than in the previous month. In the first four months of this year, more than 14 900 migrants entered the EU through the Eastern Mediterranean route, 92% more than in the same period of last year. The increase was mainly caused by the rise of irregular crossings on the land borders with Turkey. In April the number of migrants detected at the land borders on this route has exceeded the detections on the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea.
The largest number of migrants on this route in the first four months of the year were nationals of Syria and Iraq.

Western Mediterranean
Last month, the number of irregular migrants reaching Spain stood at nearly 1100, a quarter more than in April 2017. In the first four months of 2018, there were some 4600 irregular border crossings on the Western Mediterranean route, 95 more than a year ago.
Nationals of Morocco accounted for the highest number of arrivals in Spain this year, followed by those from Guinea and Mali.

▻https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/migratory-flows-in-april-overall-drop-but-more-detections-in-greece-a
#2018 #Espagne #Grèce

EU’s Frontex warns of new migrant route to Spain

Frontex chief Fabrice Leggeri has warned that Spain could see a significant increase in migrant arrivals. The news comes ahead of the European Commission’s new proposal to strengthen EU external borders with more guards.

Frontex chief Fabrice Leggeri said Friday that some 6,000 migrants had entered the European Union in June by crossing into Spain from Morocco, the so-called western Mediterranean route.

▻https://m.dw.com/en/eus-frontex-warns-of-new-migrant-route-to-spain/a-44563058?xtref=http%253A%252F%252Fm.facebook.com

L’Espagne devient la principale voie d’accès des migrants à l’Europe

La Commission a annoncé trois millions d’euros d’aide d’urgence pour les garde-frontières espagnols, confrontés à un triplement des arrivées de migrants, suite au verrouillage de la route italienne.

–-> v. ici :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/683358

L’aide supplémentaire que l’exécutif a décidé d’allouer à l’Espagne après l’augmentation des arrivées sur les côtes provient du Fonds pour la sécurité intérieure et a pour but de financer le déploiement de personnel supplémentaire le long des frontières méridionales espagnoles.

Le mois dernier, la Commission a déjà attribué 24,8 millions d’euros au ministère de l’Emploi et de la Sécurité sociale et à la Croix-Rouge espagnole, afin de renforcer les capacités d’accueil, de prise en charge sanitaire, de nourriture et de logement des migrants arrivants par la route de l’ouest méditerranéen.

Une enveloppe supplémentaire de 720 000 euros a été allouée à l’organisation des rapatriements et des transferts depuis l’enclave de Ceuta et Melilla.

Cette aide financière s’ajoute aux 691,7 millions que reçoit Madrid dans le cadre du Fonds pour l’asile, l’immigration et l’intégration et du fonds pour la sécurité intérieure pour la période budgétaire 2014-2020.

▻https://www.euractiv.fr/section/migrations/news/avramopoulos-in-spain-to-announce-further-eu-support-to-tackle-migration

En #Méditerranée, les flux de migrants s’orientent vers l’ouest

Entre janvier et juillet, 62 177 migrants ont rejoint l’Europe par la Méditerranée, selon les données de l’Agence des Nations unies pour les réfugiés. Un chiffre en baisse par rapport à 2017 (172 301 sur l’ensemble des douze mois) et sans commune mesure avec le « pic » de 2015, où 1 015 078 arrivées avaient été enregistrées.

Les flux déclinent et se déplacent géographiquement : entre 2014 et 2017, près de 98 % des migrants étaient entrés via la Grèce et l’Italie, empruntant les voies dites « orientales » et « centrales » de la Méditerranée ; en 2018, c’est pour l’instant l’Espagne qui enregistre le plus d’arrivées (23 785), devant l’Italie (18 348), la Grèce (16 142) et, de manière anecdotique, Chypre (73).

https://i.imgur.com/YdWBw5a.png https://i.imgur.com/oLvWW6c.png https://i.imgur.com/UXZlwgW.png

Et des statistiques sur les #morts et #disparus :

https://i.imgur.com/2GYgGY0.png

Statistiques publiées dans le rapport du HCR Desperate journeys. Je sélectionne ici les graphiques sur les arrivées pendant l’#été_2018 :

https://i.imgur.com/dvFCF3S.png https://i.imgur.com/lIIhSYl.png https://i.imgur.com/HZ4Fl8W.png

▻https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/65373#_ga=2.239721027.1599262530.1536038430-796425160.1519149184

The most common Mediterranean migration paths into Europe have changed since 2009

Until 2018, the Morocco-to-Spain route – also known as the western route – had been the least-traveled Mediterranean migration path, with a total of 89,000 migrants arriving along Spain’s coastline since 2009. But between January and August 2018, this route has seen over 28,000 arrivals, more than the central Africa-to-Italy central route (20,000 arrivals) and the Turkey-to-Greece eastern route (20,000 arrivals). One reason for this is that Spain recently allowed rescue ships carrying migrants to dock after other European Union countries had denied them entry.

Toute la Méditerranée:

https://i.imgur.com/pGIesH4.png

#Méditerranée_occidentale:

https://i.imgur.com/nuBFBnM.png

#Méditerranée_centrale:

https://i.imgur.com/shWQSKz.png

#Méditerranée_orientale:

https://i.imgur.com/L3CPRMt.png

▻http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/09/18/the-most-common-mediterranean-migration-paths-into-europe-have-changed-

The “Shift” to the Western Mediterranean Migration Route: Myth or Reality?

How Spain Became the Top Arrival Country of Irregular Migration to the EU

This article looks at the increase in arrivals[1] of refugees and migrants in Spain, analysing the nationalities of those arriving to better understand whether there has been a shift from the Central Mediterranean migration route (Italy) towards the Western Mediterranean route (Spain). The article explores how the political dynamics between North African countries and the European Union (EU) have impacted the number of arrivals in Spain.

The Western Mediterranean route has recently become the most active route of irregular migration to Europe. As of mid-August 2018, a total of 26,350 refugees and migrants arrived in Spain by sea, three times the number of arrivals in the first seven months of 2017. In July alone 8,800 refugees and migrants reached Spain, four times the number of arrivals in July of last year.

But this migration trend did not begin this year. The number of refugees and migrants arriving by sea in Spain grew by 55 per cent between 2015 and 2016, and by 172 per cent between 2016 and 2017.

http://www.mixedmigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/article_55a.png

At the same time, there has been a decrease in the number of refugees and migrants entering the EU via the Central Mediterranean route. Between January and July 2018, a total of 18,510 persons arrived in Italy by sea compared to 95,213 arrivals in the same period in 2017, an 81 per cent decrease.

This decrease is a result of new measures to restrict irregular migration adopted by EU Member States, including increased cooperation with Libya, which has been the main embarkation country for the Central Mediterranean migration route. So far this year, the Libyan Coast Guards have intercepted 12,152 refugees and migrants who were on smuggling boats (more than double the total number of interceptions in 2017). In the last two weeks of July, 99.5 per cent of the refugees and migrants who departed on smuggling boats were caught and returned to Libya, according to a data analysis conducted at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI). The number of people being detained by the Libyan Directorate for Combatting Illegal Migration (DCIM) has continued growing (from 5,000 to 9,300 between May and July 2018), with thousands more held in unofficial detention facilities.

So, was there a shift from the Central to the Western Mediterranean Migration route? In other words, has the decline of arrivals in Italy led to the increase of arrivals in Spain?

First of all, while this article only analyses the changes in the use of these two sea routes and among those trying to go to Europe, for most West Africans, the intended destination is actually North Africa, including Libya and Algeria, where they hope to find jobs. A minority intends to move onwards to Europe and this is confirmed by MMC’s 4Mi data referred to below.

The answer to the question on whether or not there has been a shift between the two routes can be found in the analysis of the origin countries of the refugees and migrants that were most commonly using the Central Mediterranean route before it became increasingly difficult to reach Europe. Only if a decrease of the main nationalities using the Central Mediterranean Route corresponds to an increase of the same group along the Western Mediterranean route we can speak of “a shift”.

The two nationalities who were – by far – the most common origin countries of refugees and migrants arriving in Italy in 2015 and in 2016 were Nigeria and Eritrea. The total number of Nigerians and Eritreans arriving in Italy in 2015 was 50,018 and slightly lower (47,096) in the following year. Then, between 2016 and last year, the total number of Nigerian and Eritrean arrivals in Italy decreased by 66 per cent. The decrease has been even more significant in 2018; in the first half of this year only 2,812 Nigerians and Eritreans arrived in Italy.

However, there has not been an increase in Nigerians and Eritreans arriving in Spain. Looking at the data, it is clear that refugees and migrants originating in these two countries have not shifted from the Central Mediterranean route to the Western route.

http://www.mixedmigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/article_55b.png

The same is true for refugees and migrants from Bangladesh, Sudan and Somalia – who were also on the list of most common countries of origin amongst arrivals in Italy during 2015 and 2016. While the numbers of Bangladeshis, Sudanese and Somalis arriving in Italy have been declining since 2017, there has not been an increase in arrivals of these nationals in Spain. Amongst refugees and migrants from these three countries, as with Nigerians and Eritreans, there has clearly not been a shift to the Western route. In fact, data shows that zero refugees and migrants from Eritrea, Bangladesh and Somalia arrived in Spain by sea since 2013.

However, the data tells a different story when it comes to West African refugees and migrants. Between 2015 and 2017, the West African countries of Guinea, Mali, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia and Senegal were also on the list of most common origin countries amongst arrivals in Italy. During those years, about 91 per cent of all arrivals in the EU from these five countries used the Central Mediterranean route to Italy, while 9 per cent used the Western Mediterranean route to Spain.

But in 2018 the data flipped: only 23 per cent of EU arrivals from these five West African countries used the Central Mediterranean route, while 76 per cent entered used the Western route. It appears that as the Central Mediterranean route is being restricted, a growing number of refugees and migrants from these countries are trying to reach the EU on the Western Mediterranean route.

http://www.mixedmigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/article_55d.png

These finding are reinforced by 3,224 interviews conducted in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso between July 2017 and June 2018 by the Mixed Migration Monitoring Mechanism initiative (4Mi), which found a rise in the share of West African refugees and migrants stating their final destination is Spain and a fall in the share of West African refugees and migrants who say they are heading to Italy.[2]

A second group who according to the data shifted from the Central Mediterranean route to the Western route are the Moroccans. Between 2015 and 2017, at least 4,000 Moroccans per year entered the EU on the Central Mediterranean route. Then, in the first half of this year, only 319 Moroccan refugees and migrants arrived by sea to Italy. Meanwhile, an opposite process has happened in Spain, where the number of Moroccans arriving by sea spiked, increasing by 346 per cent between 2016 and last year. This increase has continued in the first six months of this year, in which 2,600 Moroccans reached Spain through the Western Mediterranean route.

http://www.mixedmigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/article_55c.png

On-going Political Bargaining

The fact that so many Moroccans are amongst the arrivals in Spain could be an indication that Morocco, the embarkation country for the Western Mediterranean route, has perhaps been relaxing its control on migration outflows, as recently suggested by several media outlets. A Euronews article questioned whether the Moroccan government is allowing refugees and migrants to make the dangerous sea journey towards Spain as part of its negotiations with the EU on the size of the support it will receive. Der Spiegel reported that Morocco is “trying to extort concessions from the EU by placing Spain under pressure” of increased migration.

The dynamic in which a neighbouring country uses the threat of increased migration as a political bargaining tool is one the EU is quite familiar with, following its 2016 deal with Turkey and 2017 deal with Libya. In both occasions, whilst on a different scale, the response of the EU has been fundamentally the same: to offer its southern neighbours support and financial incentives to control migration.

The EU had a similar response this time. On August 3, the European Commission committed 55 million euro for Morocco and Tunisia to help them improve their border management. Ten days later, the Moroccan Association for Human Rights reported that Moroccan authorities started removing would-be migrants away from departure points to Europe.

Aside from Morocco and Libya, there is another North African country whose policies may be contributing to the increase of arrivals in Spain. Algeria, which has been a destination country for many African migrants during the past decade (and still is according to 4Mi interviews), is in the midst of a nationwide campaign to detain and deport migrants, asylum seekers and refugees.

The Associated Press reported “Algeria’s mass expulsions have picked up since October 2017, as the European Union renewed pressure on North African countries to discourage migrants going north to Europe…” More than 28,000 Africans have been expelled since the campaign started in August of last year, according to News Deeply. While Algeria prides itself on not taking EU money – “We are handling the situation with our own means,” an Algerian interior ministry official told Reuters – its current crackdown appears to be yet another element of the EU’s wider approach to migration in the region.
Bargaining Games

This article has demonstrated that – contrary to popular reporting – there is no blanket shift from the Central Mediterranean route to the Western Mediterranean route. A detailed analysis on the nationalities of arrivals in Italy and Spain and changes over time, shows that only for certain nationalities from West Africa a shift may be happening, while for other nationalities there is no correlation between the decrease of arrivals in Italy and the increase of arrivals in Spain. The article has also shown that the recent policies implemented by North African governments – from Libya to Morocco to Algeria – can only be understood in the context of these countries’ dialogue with the EU on irregular migration.

So, while the idea of a shift from the Central Mediterranean route to the Western route up until now is more myth than reality, it is clear that the changes of activity levels on these migration routes are both rooted in the same source: the on-going political bargaining on migration between the EU and North African governments. And these bargaining games are likely to continue as the EU intensifies its efforts to prevent refugees and migrants from arriving at its shores.

▻http://www.mixedmigration.org/articles/shift-to-the-western-mediterranean-migration-route
#Méditerranée_centrale #Méditerranée_occidentale

IOM, the UN Migration Agency, reports that 80,602 migrants and refugees entered Europe by sea in 2018 through 23 September, with 35,653 to Spain, the leading destination this year. In fact, with this week’s arrivals Spain in 2018 has now received via the Mediterranean more irregular migrants than it did throughout all the years 2015, 2016 and 2017 combined.

The region’s total arrivals through the recent weekend compare with 133,465 arrivals across the region through the same period last year, and 302,175 at this point in 2016.

Spain, with 44 per cent of all arrivals through the year, continues to receive seaborne migrants in September at a volume nearly twice that of Greece and more than six times that of Italy. Italy’s arrivals through late September are the lowest recorded at this point – the end of a normally busy summer sailing season – in almost five years. IOM Rome’s Flavio Di Giacomo on Monday reported that Italy’s 21,024 arrivals of irregular migrants by sea this year represent a decline of nearly 80 per cent from last year’s totals at this time. (see chart below).

IOM’s Missing Migrants Project has documented the deaths of 1,730 people on the Mediterranean in 2018. Most recently, a woman drowned off the coast of Bodrum, Turkey on Sunday while attempting to reach Kos, Greece via the Eastern Mediterranean route. The Turkish Coast Guard reports that 16 migrants were rescued from this incident. On Saturday, a 5-year-old Syrian boy drowned off the coast of Lebanon’s Akkar province after a boat carrying 39 migrants to attempt to reach Cyprus capsized.

IOM Spain’s Ana Dodevska reported Monday that total arrivals at sea in 2018 have reached 35,594 men, women and children who have been rescued in Western Mediterranean waters through 23 September (see chart below).

IOM notes that over this year’s first five months, a total of 8,150 men, women and children were rescued in Spanish waters after leaving Africa – an average of 54 per day. In the 115 days since May 31, a total of 27,444 have arrived – or just under 240 migrants per day. The months of May-September this year have seen a total of 30,967 irregular migrants arriving by sea, the busiest four-month period for Spain since IOM began tallying arrival statistics, with just over one week left in September.

With this week’s arrivals Spain in 2018 has now received via the Mediterranean more irregular migrants than it did throughout all the years 2015, 2016 and 2017 combined (see charts below).

On Monday, IOM Athens’ Christine Nikolaidou reported that over four days (20-23 September) this week the Hellenic Coast Guard (HCG) units managed at least nine incidents requiring search and rescue operations off the islands of Lesvos, Chios, Samos and Farmakonisi.

The HCG rescued a total 312 migrants and transferred them to the respective islands. Additional arrivals of some 248 individuals to Kos and some of the aforementioned islands over these past four days brings to 22,821 the total number of arrivals by sea to Greece through 23 September (see chart below).

Sea arrivals to Greece this year by irregular migrants appeared to have peaked in daily volume in April, when they averaged at around 100 per day. That volume dipped through the following three months then picked up again in August and again in September, already this year’s busiest month – 3,536 through 23 days, over 150 per day – with about a quarter of the month remaining. Land border crossing also surged in April (to nearly 4,000 arrivals) but have since fallen back, with fewer than 2,000 crossings in each of the past four months (see charts below).

IOM’s Missing Migrants Project has recorded 2,735 deaths and disappearances during migration so far in 2018 (see chart below).

In the Americas, several migrant deaths were recorded since last week’s update. In Mexico, a 30-year-old Salvadoran man was killed in a hit-and-run on a highway in Tapachula, Mexico on Friday. Another death on Mexico’s freight rail network (nicknamed “La Bestia”) was added after reports of an unidentified man found dead on tracks near San Francisco Ixhuatan on 15 September.

In the United States, on 16 September, an unidentified person drowned in the All-American Canal east of Calexico, California – the 55th drowning recorded on the US-Mexico border this year. A few days later a car crash south of Florence, Arizona resulted in the deaths of eight people, including four Guatemalan migrants, on Wednesday. Two others killed included one of the vehicles’ driver and his partner, who authorities say had been involved with migrant smuggling in the past.

https://i.imgur.com/w5Wkc5y.png

▻https://reliefweb.int/report/spain/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-reach-80602-2018-deaths-reach-1730

Analyse de Matteo Villa sur twitter :

Irregular sea arrivals to Italy have not been this low since 2012. But how do the two “deterrence policies” (#Minniti's and #Salvini's) compare over time?

https://i.imgur.com/TGUPLkm.jpg

Why start from July 15th each year? That’s when the drop in sea arrivals in 2017 kicked in, and this allows us to do away with the need to control for seasonality. Findings do not change much if we started on July 1st this year.
Zooming in, in relative terms the drop in sea arrivals during Salvini’s term is almost as stark as last year’s drop.

In the period 15 July - 8 October:

Drop during #Salvini: -73%.
Drop during #Minniti: -79%.

https://i.imgur.com/12qHByl.jpg

But looking at actual numbers, the difference is clear. In less than 3 months’ time, the drop in #migrants and #refugees disembarking in #Italy under #Minniti had already reached 51,000. Under #Salvini in 2018, the further drop is less than 10,000.

https://i.imgur.com/ofBEJJY.jpg

To put it another way: deterrence policies under #Salvini can at best aim for a drop of about 42,000 irregular arrivals in 12 months. Most likely, the drop will amount to about 30.000. Under #Minniti, sea arrivals the drop amounted to 150.000. Five times larger.

https://i.imgur.com/pUD1N87.jpg

BOTTOM LINE: the opportunity-cost of deterrence policies is shrinking fast. Meanwhile, the number of dead and missing along the Central Mediterranean route has not declined in tandem (in fact, in June-September it shot up). Is more deterrence worth it?

▻https://twitter.com/emmevilla/status/1049978070734659584

Le papier qui explique tout cela :
Sea Arrivals to Italy : The Cost of Deterrence Policies

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DpJDKlCXcAA8U2I.jpg

Méditerranée : forte baisse des traversées en 2018 et l’#Espagne en tête des arrivées (HCR)

Pas moins de 113.482 personnes ont traversé la #Méditerranée en 2018 pour rejoindre l’Europe, une baisse par rapport aux 172.301 qui sont arrivés en 2017, selon les derniers chiffres publiés par le Haut-Commissariat de l’ONU pour les réfugiés (HCR).
L’Agence des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés rappelle d’ailleurs que le niveau des arrivées a également chuté par rapport au pic de 1,015 million enregistré en 2015 et à un moindre degré des 362.753 arrivées répertoriées en 2016.

Toutefois pour l’année 2018, si l’on ajoute près de 7.000 migrants enregistrés dans les enclaves espagnoles de #Ceuta et #Melilla (arrivées par voie terrestre), on obtient un total de 120.205 arrivées en Europe.

L’an dernier l’Espagne est redevenue la première porte d’entrée en Europe, avec 62.479 arrivées (dont 55.756 par la mer soit deux fois plus qu’en 2017, avec 22.103 arrivées).

La péninsule ibérique est suivie par la #Grèce (32.497), l’Italie (23.371), #Malte (1.182) et #Chypre (676).

►https://news.un.org/fr/story/2019/01/1032962

Tribù e centri di detenzione: i nodi dell’Italia in Libia sui migranti

L’imperativo italiano di arginare i flussi di migranti dalla Libia rischia di far commettere a Roma due errori.

http://www.limesonline.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/libia_capitale_energetico_820.jpg

Migrant reception centres to be set up in Chad and Niger

Reception centres for migrants are to be set up in Chad and Niger in an effort to fight illegal immigration through Libya and across the Mediterranean to Italy.

▻https://www.libyaherald.com/2017/05/22/migrant-reception-centres-to-be-set-up-in-chad-and-niger

Migranti, intesa Italia-Africa

Roma si accorda con Libia, Niger e Ciad per gestire il flusso prima che arrivi sulle coste del Mediterraneo

▻http://www.rsi.ch/news/mondo/Migranti-intesa-Italia-Africa-9151882.html
#it_has_begun

Italy inks deal with Libya neighbours to block migrants

Italy has signed a deal with Libya, Chad and Niger to try to stem the flow of migrants across the Mediterranean by beefing up border controls and creating new reception centres in the African nations.

►http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-4530854/Italy-inks-deal-Libya-neighbours-block-migrants.html

Parola d’ordine esternalizzare: soldi europei agli Stati africani per fermare il flusso dei migranti

Il ministro degli Interni del Niger: «Chiediamo all’Ue infrastrutture militari». Ma il Mali non firma le riammissioni: «Le rimesse ci hanno portato 800 milioni di dollari nel 2016»

▻http://www.lastampa.it/2017/05/24/esteri/speciali/divertedaid/parola-dordine-esternalizzare-soldi-europei-agli-stati-africani-per-fermare-il-flusso-dei-migranti-VKqfQ42Nr9TimSleQzT7XL/pagina.html?platform=hootsuite

Elementi per un esposto nei confronti del governo italiano a seguito dell’applicazione del Memorandum d’intesa sottoscritto con il governo di Tripoli il 2 febbraio 2017
▻http://www.a-dif.org/2017/06/14/elementi-per-un-esposto-nei-confronti-del-governo-italiano-a-seguito-dellappl
#2_février_2017 #2017

Adesso il governo punta sulla missione in Libia per dimezzare gli sbarchi

Oggi passaggio in Parlamento. Le navi italiane potrebbero vigilare sui volontari

▻http://www.lastampa.it/2017/08/01/esteri/adesso-il-governo-punta-sulla-missione-in-libia-per-dimezzare-gli-sbarchi-ZOc8QtIX6otpRhsea3DD5H/pagina.html

Et comme dit bien Fulvio Vassallo:

«Dimezzare gli sbarchi e raddoppiare i morti.»

Rifugiati, i tanti dubbi sull’accordo con la Libia

Alla vigilia della sospensione dell’attività politica per le vacanze estive, arriva quasi a sorpresa e in maniera confusa la notizia di una specie di accordo con la Libia per l’invio di navi da guerra: a sostegno, si dice, della marina libica in lotta con i trafficanti di esseri umani.

▻http://www.aggiornamentisociali.it/articoli/rifugiati-i-tanti-dubbi-sull-accordo-con-la-libia

Vu sur twitter le 02.08.2017 :

http://i.imgur.com/Th8nPBw.png http://i.imgur.com/rDM9WUQ.png

Deploying Italian warships to police Libyan waters will expose refugees to horrific abuse

Proposals to send warships to police Libyan territorial waters are a shameful attempt by the Italian authorities to circumvent their duty to rescue refugees and migrants at sea and to offer protection to those who need it, said Amnesty International, ahead of a vote in the Italian parliament tomorrow.

▻https://www.amnestyusa.org/press-releases/deploying-italian-warships-to-police-libyan-waters-will-expose-refugees-

Italy begins naval mission to help Libya curb migrant flows

ROME (Reuters) - Italy began a limited naval mission on Wednesday to help Libya’s coastguard curb migrant flows, which have become a source of political friction before national elections expected early next year.

▻http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-italy-libya-idUSKBN1AI1JC

Missione navale: Italia pronta a destinare rifugiati e migranti verso orribili violenze

Dopo il voto del parlamento italiano in favore dell’invio di navi da guerra nelle acque libiche per assistere la Guardia costiera della Libia a intercettare migranti e rifugiati e a riportarli a terra, la vicedirettrice di Amnesty International per l’Europa Gauri Van Gulik ha rilasciato questa dichiarazione:

▻https://www.amnesty.it/missione-navale-italia-pronta-destinare-rifugiati-migranti-verso-orribili-vi

Italy : Navy Support for Libya May Endanger Migrants

Help for Libyan Coast Guard Risks Complicity in Abuse

▻https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/02/italy-navy-support-libya-may-endanger-migrants

"L’aiuto dell’Italia alla Guardia costiera libica rischia di tradursi in complicità negli abusi sui migranti"

L’annuncio del supporto operativo delle navi della Marina Militare italiana al governo di Tripoli, nell’intercettazione di barconi di migranti in acque libiche, è stata criticata da Human Rights Watch: «Potrebbe coinvolgere l’Italia in violazioni dei diritti umani a danno dei migranti successivamente detenuti in Libia».

▻http://www.huffingtonpost.it/2017/08/02/l-aiuto-dellitalia-alla-guardia-costiera-libica-rischia-di-tra_a_2306

Libia, la Guardia Costiera viene pagata con i soldi della Cooperazione

Le frontiere esterne dell’Unione Europea si blindano usando fondi destinati allo sviluppo. Dalla polizia del Niger, alle milizie che presidiano i confini in Sudan fino ai militari che controllano le coste del Paese nord africano. La missione ONU per la Libia (Unsmil) in un rapporto parla delle carceri libiche come luoghi di estorsioni e violenze

►http://www.repubblica.it/solidarieta/cooperazione/2017/07/31/news/libia_la_guardia_costiera_viene_pagata_con_i_soldi_della_cooperazione-172

#aide_au_développement

Italia: il sostegno della Marina Militare alla Libia può mettere in pericolo i migranti

Human Rights Watch: l’aiuto alla Guardia costiera libica rischia di tradursi in complicità negli abusi

▻http://www.meltingpot.org/Italia-il-sostegno-della-Marina-Militare-alla-Libia-puo.html

Italy Has a Controversial New Plan to Stop Migrants Crossing the Mediterranean Sea

The Italian government initially hoped to send six ships to Libya’s territorial waters, but plans had to be scaled down following popular protests in Tripoli, Reuters reports. Libyans have reportedly been posting images of Omar al-Mukhtar, a national hero who battled Italian rule in the early 1900s, on social media in response to the Italian presence— reflecting the widespread unease over a former colonial power intervening on domestic affairs. Pinotti said that Italy had no intention of creating a blockade on Libya’s coast.

▻http://time.com/4885415/italy-naval-mission-migrant-smuggling

LIBIA : IL SUCCESSO DEMOCRATICO

C’è solo una cosa che avete perso: la dignità umana.
Credo l’abbiate fatto consapevolmente, perché liberarvi della fatica di difendere la dignità umana era il peso più affrontabile per risolvere questo maledetto problema degli sbarchi.
Creare in pubblico il reato umanitario, confermare e rafforzare le derive più xenofobe e pericolose della nostra società, abbandonare migliaia di persone al loro immobile destino di ingiustizia e povertà, non disturbare la chiusura dell’Europa ricca e respingente, consolidare poteri forti e corrotti in paesi di origine e di transito: questo avete fatto e con questo state vincendo.
Complimenti.
Abbiate almeno il coraggio di non chiamarvi più nemmeno democratici.

▻http://andreasegre.blogspot.ch/2017/08/libia-il-successo-democratico.html
#Andrea_Segre

Avec un ps sur la Suisse :

P.P.S. scrivo tutto ciò da Locarno (Svizzera), dove presenteremo domani il nuovo doc IBI. E non posso non guardarmi intorno. Questo è il cuore dell’Europa ricca che proteggendosi ha ottenuto ciò che le interessava: crescita interna altissima sulle spalle di un mondo esterno da sfruttare e tenere fuori (i corpi ovviamente, i soldi no, se vogliono quelli entrano subito e senza controlli). Il PIL procapite medio da queste parti è circa 80mila euro l’anno. Nei paesi da cui scappano gli invasori raggiunge al massimo 1000 euro. Ma qui non ci arrivano, perché anche qui, soprattutto qui, hanno vinto. Bravi!

Missione navale in Libia: così si nega il diritto d’asilo

In passato l’Italia ha dato un esempio di grande civiltà con le operazioni di salvataggio in mare. Ora invece mandiamo le navi militari a fermare i migranti in Libia, con una missione che solleva non poche perplessità sotto il profilo dei diritti umani.

▻http://www.lavoce.info/archives/48207/missione-navale-libia-cosi-si-nega-diritto-dasilo

Fermare i migranti? Addestrare i libici non funziona

La notte del 23 maggio 2017 il capitano della Iuventa, la nave dell’Ong tedesca Jugend Rettet, denuncia una nuova aggressione in mare da parte di un motoscafo libico, il cui equipaggio avrebbe sparato verso alcune imbarcazioni sovraccariche di profughi, per poi riportare due delle imbarcazioni verso la Libia. Era la Guardia Costiera libica? L’Italia come la sta addestrando, e a che scopo? E quante Guardie Costiere ci sono in Libia in realtà? Francesco Floris ha ricostruito nei dettagli la storia dell’addestramento italiano dei libici e i suoi precedenti.

►https://openmigration.org/analisi/fermare-i-migranti-addestrare-i-libici-non-funziona

Libia, arrivano meno migranti che così finiscono nel lager di #Sabha

Lo dicono i numeri delle ultime settimane: si assiste ad una drastica riduzione del flusso migratorio dalla Libia verso l’Italia. E’ l’effetto dell’accordo italo-libico, sostenuto dall’Unione Europea. Decine di migliaia di migranti subsahariani bloccati. Lo raccontano le duemila testimonianze raccolte da Medici per i Diritti Umani (Medu)

▻http://www.repubblica.it/solidarieta/immigrazione/2017/08/08/news/libia-172648143/?ref=search

Libia, la prima missione degli italiani

A bordo della nave #Tremiti pronta a salpare da Tripoli con i libici che ci ringraziano

▻http://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2017/08/11/news/libia_la_prima_missione_degli_italiani-172814788

Libyan Coast Guard Faces Allegations of Corruption

At the same time, conflict and corruption on the ground have called into question the EU’s plans to train the Libyan Coast Guard and return migrants to Libyan shores. In February, Libya’s UN-backed government in Tripoli agreed to direct its coast guard to return migrants to shore in exchange for training assistance and financial aid. On Monday, Libyan Prime Minister Fayez Serraj negotiated for an additional EU assistance package of $860 million in military equipment, including ships, vehicles, helicopters and communications gear.

▻http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/libyan-coast-guard-faces-allegations-of-corruption
#gardes-côtes #frontières #Libye #gardes-côtes_libyens #corruption #Libye

Libya’s coast guard abuses migrants despite EU funding and training

ZAWIYAH, Libya - The video showed a small rubber dinghy crowded with terrified migrants. Next to it, a uniformed man in a Libyan coast guard boat was yelling and wielding a bullwhip.

►https://seenthis.net/fran%C3%A7ais/article/moteur-de-recherche

L’Italie salue le contrôle mis en place par la Libye face aux migrants

Le gouvernement italien s’est félicité dimanche de l’intensification par Tripoli du contrôle des eaux libyennes, saluant « un rééquilibrage en cours en Méditerranée » pour réduire les départs de migrants.

▻http://www.rts.ch/info/monde/8839520-l-italie-se-rejouit-du-controle-mis-en-place-par-la-libye-face-aux-migra

Armed group stopping migrant boats leaving Libya

Sudden drop in migrant departures caused by a new force in Sabratha, which is preventing migrants from leaving, often by locking them up

►http://news.trust.org/item/20170821162414-79gn2

Exclusive: Armed group stopping migrant boats leaving Libya

TUNIS/ROME (Reuters) - An armed group is stopping migrant boats from setting off across the Mediterranean from a city west of Tripoli that has been a springboard for people smugglers, causing a sudden drop in departures over the past month, sources in the area said.

▻https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-libya-italy-exclusive-idUSKCN1B11XC

Alfano: “Ora Tripoli controlla quelle acque c’è più equilibrio nel Mediterraneo”

Il ministro: le Procure siciliane hanno creato un contesto favorevole

▻http://www.lastampa.it/2017/08/13/italia/politica/ora-tripoli-controlla-quelle-acque-c-pi-equilibrio-nel-mediterraneo-deCXVWjuyXEFBOpkK8SF5M/pagina.html

Italy minister sees light at the end of the tunnel on migrant flows

Italy’s interior minister said on Tuesday (15 August) he saw light at the end of the tunnel for curbing migrant flows from Libya after a slowdown in arrivals across the Mediterranean in recent months.

►http://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/italy-minister-sees-light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel-on-migrant-flows

v. aussi : ▻http://seen.li/ddc1

Supreme Court annuls verdict that suspended implementation of Italy-Libya MoU

The Supreme Court in Libya annulled a previous verdict that suspended the implementation of the #memorandum_of_understanding (MoU) that was signed between Libya’s UN-proposed Presidential Council and Italy.

https://pbs.twimg.com/card_img/901455343150125056/GmnfGmOf?format=jpg&name=600x314#.jpg

L’Italia esibisce in Europa gli accordi con Tripoli. Sotto attacco vittime e testimoni.

Il governo italiano si presenta al vertice di Parigi esibendo, dietro il Codice di condotta per le ONG, autentico specchietto per le allodole, i risultati degli accordi con il premier libico Serraj e alcune tribù del Fezzan, come già prima con il Sudan di Bashir, con un abbattimento su base mensle, in agosto, del 70 per cento degli arrivi di migranti dalla Libia. Adesso si può davvero dire che le frontiere europee raggiungono il Fezzan, le attività di esternalizzazione dei controlli sono molto avanzate e numerosi contingenti militari sono già schierati sul territorio di confine tra Libia, Niger, Chad e Sudan. Poco importa a quale prezzo. Di fatto sono state proprio le milizie della zona di Sabratha, dalla quale si verificavano le partenze della maggior parte dei gommoni, ad intervenire per bloccare tutte le vie di fuga. Perchè di vie di fuga dalla Libia occorre parlare, oltre che di contrasto al traffico di esseri umani.

▻http://www.a-dif.org/2017/08/28/litalia-esibisce-in-europa-gli-accordi-con-tripoli-sotto-attacco-vittime-e-te

DA TRAFFICANTE A COMANDANTE DELLA GUARDIA COSTIERA LIBICA

In un’intervista a “La Stampa” Roberto Saviano racconta oggi che il capo dei trafficanti di #Zawija, base di tante partenze di migranti, a 40 km da Tripoli, è un ragazzo di nemmeno trent’anni, ricchissimo e spietato: #Abdurahman_Al_Milad_Aka_Bija, che tutti conoscono come #Al_Bija. Bene, anzi male: Al Bija è appena diventato il nuovo comandante della Guardia costiera libica della città. Insomma, il referente delle nostre navi militari.

▻https://alganews.wordpress.com/2017/08/15/da-trafficante-a-comandante-della-guardia-costiera-libica

Tripoli. Accordo Italia-Libia, è giallo sui fondi per aiutare il Paese

«Il governo non tratta con i trafficanti», asserisce la Farnesina. Non a torto, perché diverse fonti in Libia e tra la bene informata diaspora a Tunisi, dove risiedono molti membri del Consiglio presidenziale libico, confermano che gli stanziamenti italiani sono destinati alle istituzioni. «Però tutti sanno – aggiungono con sarcasmo – che autorità e contrabbandieri hanno madri diverse, ma lo stesso padre». Da Tripoli, ancora nessuna smentita ufficiale. Le conferme, al contrario, sono molteplici, non tutte anonime. Almeno cinque milioni di euro sono stati consegnati da Roma nelle settimane scorse sotto forma di denaro e medicamenti per le strutture sanitarie di Sabratha. Altri ’aiuti’, per importi analoghi, sono attesi dai sindaci-dignitari che hanno assicurato di voler cooperare con il premier Fayez al-Sarraj e l’Italia. Ci sono poi gli stanziamenti già destinati a Bengasi, nell’area controllata dal generale Khalifa Haftar, l’uomo forte della Cirenaica (a est del Paese) ora in espansione anche nell’ovest del premier al-Sarraj.

▻https://www.avvenire.it/attualita/pagine/accordo-italia-libia-giallo-sui-fondi-per-aiutare-il-paese

vu sur twitter le 11.09.2017 :

https://i.imgur.com/sOOZCqq.png

Entre la Libye et et l’Italie, un accord en eaux troubles contre les migrants

Rome est accusé d’avoir traité avec des milices de passeurs pour endiguer le flux de candidats à l’exil au départ des côtes libyennes

►https://www.letemps.ch/monde/2017/09/14/entre-libye-litalie-un-accord-eaux-troubles-contre-migrants

Italy’s Dodgy #Deal on Migrants

With the blessing of the European Union, Italy is offshoring its Mediterranean migration problem to a former colony, Libya. The goal is to prevent mostly sub-Saharan African migrants from leaving Libya’s shores for Europe. But the tactics could further destabilize Libya and condemn migrants to more misery.

►https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/opinion/migrants-italy-europe.html

I migranti come arma di ricatto tra lotte di potere, ritorsioni e nuovi equilibri in Libia. E i morti aumentano

Nel week end tra il 15 e il 17 settembre sono arrivati in Italia dalla Libia più di 1.800 migranti su una quindicina di gommoni. Senza contare il flusso crescente di “barche fantasma”, pescherecci di varie dimensioni che, partendo dalla Tunisia, approdano in Sicilia, soprattutto sulle coste dell’Agrigentino. Dopo giorni di sbarchi in calo e di continue, “trionfanti” notizie di blocchi effettuati dalla Guardia Costiera libica lungo le coste africane, questo improvviso exploit di sbarchi ha destato non poca sorpresa, contraddicendo almeno in parte le dichiarazioni del Governo italiano sull’efficacia e sulla tenuta dei “muri” eretti nel Mediterraneo e nel Sahara con gli ultimi accordi stipulati da Roma con Tripoli. Non a caso, questo degli sbarchi, è stato uno dei temi guida del dibattito politico e del notiziario dei media nel fine settimana.

▻http://www.a-dif.org/2017/09/22/i-migranti-come-arma-di-ricatto-tra-lotte-di-potere-ritorsioni-e-nuovi-equili

The Italian Job: Playing the Complicity Game in Libya

▻http://www.academia.edu/34619085/The_Italian_Job_Playing_the_Complicity_Game_in_Libya

Italy claims it’s found a solution to Europe’s migrant problem. Here’s why Italy’s wrong.

Motivating the Libyan militias’ newfound zeal for blocking migrant movement is a new policy spearheaded by the Italian government and embraced by the European Union. The approach relies on payment to militias willing to act as migrant deterrent forces. Italian government representatives use intermediaries such as mayors and other local leaders to negotiate terms of the agreements with the armed groups. They also build local support in the targeted areas by distributing humanitarian aid.

▻https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/09/25/italy-claims-its-found-a-solution-to-europes-migrant-problem-heres-w

Libye: La manœuvre périlleuse de l’Italie

Rome est accusée d’avoir financé des passeurs de Sabratha pour endiguer le flux de migrants. Avéré ou non, cet accord a déclenché une guerre entre milices, déstabilisant un peu plus le pays.

Côté face, Marco Minniti, le ministre italien de l’Intérieur, se félicite d’être à l’origine de la chute du nombre de migrants partant de la Libye pour l’Europe : - 50 % en juillet et - 87 % en août par rapport à la même période en 2016. Côté pile, Minniti, ancien chef des services secrets, est aussi la principale causede la guerre actuelle qui se déroule à Sabratha, ville située à 80 kilomètres à l’ouest de Tripoli, depuis le 17 septembre. Les combats ont fait au moins 26 victimes et, près de 170 blessés, endommageant également le théâtre romain antique classé au Patrimoine mondial de l’Unesco. Là, des taches de sang et des centaines de douilles jonchent encore le sol. Le lieu, qui a survécu aux soubresauts de l’histoire libyenne, est aujourd’hui marqué jusque dans ses pierres par ce nouveau drame qui n’a rien de théâtral.

Marco Minniti est accusé d’avoir passé un accord financier avec le chef de milice Ahmed Dabbashi, alias Al-Ammou (« l’Oncle »), pour qu’il mette fin à ses activités de baron du trafic des migrants et ainsi faire baisser le nombre d’arrivées sur les côtes italiennes. L’homme était un des passeurs les plus puissants de Sabratha, dont les plages sont les lieux de départ de la grande majorité des candidats à rejoindre l’Europe.

Dans les cafés de Sabratha, les habitués sourient lorsqu’on évoque le « repentir » d’Ahmed Dabbashi : « Il veut se donner une respectabilité, mais soyez certains qu’à 3 heures du matin, ses bateaux continuent de partir », assure Salah, qui préfère rester anonyme par crainte de représailles du chef mafieux, membre d’une importante famille de la cité antique. En septembre, plus de 3 000 migrants ont été secourus en mer, et un grand nombre d’entre eux était parti des plages de Sabratha. Si les départs ont ralenti, ils n’ont pas totalement disparu.

Une aide italienne a minima

Le conflit qui déchire Sabratha oppose les hommes d’Al-Ammou (alliés à la Brigade 48, dirigée par un frère d’Ahmed Dabbashi), à la Chambre des opérations (CDO) du ministre de la Défense, au Bureau de lutte contre la migration clandestine (BLMC) du ministre de l’Intérieur et à la milice salafiste Al-Wadi, également accusée de trafic humain. Tous se revendiquent d’une affiliation au gouvernement d’union nationale (GUN) de Faïez el-Serraj, soutenu par la communauté internationale. Mais ce dernier ne reconnaît que la CDO et le BLMC. Preuve, s’il en était, que la Libye, en proie au chaos, n’est qu’un camaïeu de gris.

Bachir Ibrahim, le porte-parole du groupe d’Ahmed Dabbashi, a évoqué l’existence d’un accord verbal avec le gouvernement italien et le GUN de Faïez el-Serraj. Mais ces deux derniers démentent toute entente financière avec la milice. La rumeur ne s’est pas éteinte pour autant. Et les habitants de la ville rappellent les forts liens entre la milice de Dabbashi et l’Italie : c’est le groupe armé qui protège le site gazier de Mellitah, situé à l’ouest de Sabratha et géré par le géant italien ENI. D’ailleurs, la milice possède deux bateaux pneumatiques ultra-rapides qui appartenaient à la marine libyenne et dont l’un a été récupéré sur le site de Mellitah… Bassem al-Garabli, le responsable du BLMC, s’étonne, lui, que l’ambassadeur italien, Giuseppe Perrone, n’ait pas visité son unité lors de sa venue à Sabratha, le 10 septembre pour se féliciter de la chute du nombre de départs de migrants. L’ambassadeur italien à Tripoli n’a, de son côté, pas souhaité répondre à nos questions.

« L’Italie a payé, en juillet, 5 millions d’euros à Al-Ammou pour trois mois de tranquillité, affirme sous couvert d’anonymat un membre de la CDO. L’échange s’est fait en haute mer. »Cette source rappelle le double jeu du chef de la milice, qui posséderait quatre hangars où des navires capables d’embarquer plusieurs centaines de migrants seraient restaurés. Pourtant, le 28 juillet, l’Union européenne a débloqué 46 millions d’euros à l’Italie afin qu’elle aide les autorités libyennes à renforcer sa capacité à gérer les flux migratoires et protéger ses frontières. Une somme que reflètent peu les résultats sur le terrain.

A ce jour, seuls 136 marins libyens ont été formés en Italie à rechercher, secourir et perturber le trafic d’êtres humains. Les garde-côtes ont reçu cette année quatre bateaux, reliquats d’un contrat passé en 2008 et, qui plus est, anciens. « L’aide italienne est réelle mais pas au niveau, résume le porte-parole de la marine libyenne, le général Ayoub Gacem. Nous avons besoin de navires neufs pour intercepter les embarcations des migrants qui sont de plus en plus souvent escortées par des hommes armés sur des vedettes rapides. » La marine se montre davantage satisfaite par le « Code Minniti », qui a durci les conditions d’intervention des bateaux d’ONG présents pour secourir les migrants en détresse, au grand dam des organisations humanitaires. « Ces navires sont comme des taxis pour les clandestins, affirme Ayoub Gacem. Les passeurs ont compris qu’il suffit que les migrants atteignent les eaux internationales pour arriver en Europe. »

Encore faut-il les atteindre. « Alors que nous étions au large de Sabratha, un bateau est arrivé, raconte Shaada, un Bangladais de 17 ans. Les hommes nous ont pris notre argent, nos téléphones portables, le téléphone satellite et le moteur avant de repartir. » Aujourd’hui au centre de rétention de Tripoli, Shaada décrit l’amplification de la piraterie à l’encontre des migrants, en mer comme dans le désert. Un phénomène qui explique aussi, en partie, la baisse des départs depuis la Libye.

Boko Haram et l’état islamique

Pour Ayman Dabbashi, cousin d’Al-Ammou mais également membre de la CDO, l’existence d’un « contrat » avec l’Italie ne fait aucun doute. Mais il ne comprend pas la logique italienne. « C’est incompréhensible, parce que mon cousin n’est pas quelqu’un d’éduqué, il sait à peine dire une phrase, affirme-t-il. Il a dit qu’il arrêterait les bateaux mais ce n’est pas vrai. Il va arrêter les bateaux des autres, mais pas les siens. »

« Marco Minniti pousse le gouvernement d’union nationale à "intégrer" les milices comme celle d’Al-Ammou au sein du ministère de la Défense. Le ministre italien l’a reconnu lui-même. Cela est beaucoup plus grave pour la sécurité de la Libye, que l’existence ou non d’échange de valises de billets », prévient Jalel Harchaoui, qui prépare une thèse sur la dimension internationale du conflit libyen à l’université Paris-VIII. Même inquiétude du côté du général Omar Abdoul Jalil, responsable de la Chambre des opérations : « L’Europe doit faire attention avec qui elle négocie. Les passeurs n’ont aucun problème à introduire des terroristes dans des bateaux de migrants. » Il cite ainsi le cas de deux Camerounais récemment trouvés sur une embarcation et aussitôt envoyés en prison à Tripoli pour de forts soupçons d’appartenance à Boko Haram.

Jusqu’en février 2016, des camps d’entrainement de l’Etat islamique étaient installés dans Sabratha, avant que les Américains ne bombardent un site. Le groupe terroriste était dirigé par Abdoullah Dabbashi, un parent d’Al-Ammou. Une accointance familiale qui pourrait servir de prétexte à Khalifa Haftar pour entrer dans la danse. L’homme fort de l’est du pays, bien qu’opposant au gouvernement de Faïez el-Serraj, pourrait envoyer des avions de sa base militaire d’Al-Watiya (à 80 kilomètres au sud-ouest de Sabratha) pour bombarder la milice d’Al-Ammou. Officiellement au nom de sa lutte contre le terrorisme. Officieusement, pour entrer de plain-pied dans la Tripolitaine, région ouest du pays. « Si Haftar intervient, l’altercation ne restera sans doute pas locale, prédit le chercheur Jalel Harchaoui. Un échange violent et soutenu poussera d’autres milices à prendre position et à entrer dans le bras de fer. Cette partie de la Libye est la plus peuplée du pays. Il est possible qu’elle s’enflamme et fasse l’objet d’un réalignement important. »

« c’est une fausse victoire »

Le maréchal Haftar a d’ailleurs été reçu par Marco Minniti mardi dernier à Rome. La question de Sabratha a été abordée. Spécialiste de la Libye au Conseil européen des relations internationales, Mattia Toaldo ne croit pas à l’escalade : « Marco Minniti veut protéger sa politique antimigratoire en persuadant Khalifa Haftar de rester à l’écart. Ce dernier n’a d’ailleurs pas intérêt à intervenir, ce serait une mission kamikaze. »

Que le conflit s’embrase ou non, le trafic des migrants ne disparaîtra pas, les réseaux s’adapteront. « En ce moment pour les trafiquants, c’est plus rentable de faire de la contrebande d’essence ou de nourriture que de transporter des hommes. Mais c’est une fausse victoire. Cela va reprendre », assure Choukri Ftis, qui a participé à un récent rapport de Altai Consulting intitulé « Partir de Libye, rapide aperçu des municipalités de départs ». Il pointe déjà la plage de Sidi Bilal, située à une vingtaine de kilomètres à l’ouest de Tripoli, comme prochain centre d’embarquement. Ici, l’Al-Ammou local se nomme Saborto et dirige une milice de la tribu des Warshefanas, réputée pour ses enlèvements de riches Tripolitains et d’étrangers.

▻http://www.liberation.fr/planete/2017/10/01/libye-la-manoeuvre-perilleuse-de-l-italie_1600209

European priorities, Libyan realities

August 14 began calmly for Riccardo Gatti. On the first morning of a new search and rescue mission in the central Mediterranean, the former yachtsman turned activist walked the grayed wooden deck of the Golfo Azzurro, a trawler that has been stripped of its bulky fishing equipment to make space for life jackets and water bottles.

►http://issues.newsdeeply.com/central-mediterranean-european-priorities-libyan-realities

cc @isskein

Le Commissaire demande des éclaircissements concernant les opérations maritimes italiennes dans les eaux territoriales libyennes

Adressée au ministre italien de l’Intérieur, M. Marco Minniti, et publiée le 11 octobre 2017, le Commissaire sollicite des informations concernant les opérations maritimes menées par l’Italie dans les eaux territoriales libyennes à des fins de gestion des flux migratoires.

▻https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/view/-/asset_publisher/ugj3i6qSEkhZ/content/commissioner-seeks-clarifications-over-italy-s-maritime-operations-in-libyan-te

La réponse de Minniti :
▻https://rm.coe.int/reply-of-the-minister-of-interior-to-the-commissioner-s-letter-regardi/168075dd2d

«Ministro Minniti mi incontri, le racconto l’orrore»

Gennaro Giudetti, 26 anni, volontario dell’ong Sea Watch, ha recuperato con le proprie mani decine di persone salvandole da morte certa e un bambino senza vita nel naufragio di ieri 6 novembre 2017: «Ho visto con i miei occhi il folle comportamento dei militari libici, che picchiavano chi voleva raggiungerci e ci lanciavano patate. L’Italia blocchi l’accordo con la Libia». Ecco il suo racconto senza filtri

►http://www.vita.it/it/article/2017/11/07/ministro-minniti-mi-incontri-le-racconto-lorrore/145020

« En Libye, le trafic de migrants va reprendre comme avant »

Ces derniers mois, les traversées depuis la Libye ont diminué de façon spectaculaire. Mais, en concluant un accord secret avec une milice de Sabratha, l’Italie pourrait avoir encore un peu plus déstabilisé le pays.

Entre deux dossiers, dans son bureau de Rome, le ministre de l’Intérieur, Marco Minniti, doit sûrement se demander : « Ai-je eu raison ? » L’ancien chef des services secrets italiens est accusé d’avoir passé, au printemps, un accord financier avec Ahmed Dabbashi alias al-Ammou (l’Oncle), chef d’un des plus importants réseaux de trafic d’êtres humains en Libye, pour que ce dernier arrête son commerce et celui de ses concurrents régionaux.

L’« Oncle » opère depuis Sabratha, à 70 km à l’ouest de Tripoli, d’où partait l’écrasante majorité des candidats à l’exil. Cette alliance a été revendiquée sur les réseaux sociaux par la brigade de l’Oncle, appelée « Anas-Dabbashi », du nom d’un cousin d’Ahmed tué pendant la révolution de 2011.

« L’Italie a promis de verser 5 millions d’euros par trimestre. Le premier échange s’est fait durant l’été sur un bateau dans les eaux internationales », assure, sous couvert d’anonymat, un responsable de la Chambre des opérations de Sabratha, dépendant du gouvernement d’union nationale de Tripoli (reconnu par la communauté internationale) et principal ennemi de Dabbashi.

Une realpolitik qui a eu des résultats spectaculaires : les enregistrements de migrants en Italie en provenance de la Libye ont chuté de 50% en juillet et 87% en août. Seulement, outre l’aspect moral douteux de cette politique, elle a été la principale cause d’une guerre de trois semaines (17 septembre-6 octobre) qui a fait une trentaine de morts et quelque 170 blessés. Les combats ont également profondément endommagé le Théâtre antique romain, classé au patrimoine de l’Unesco. Ils opposaient des forces du gouvernement d’union nationale à Dabbashi et son allié, la brigade 48. Ahmed Dabbashi a été battu et a dû quitter Sabratha. Son réseau n’est plus opérationnel, mais le jeu en valait-il la chandelle ?
Milice payée avec des fonds européens ?

L’Union européenne, qui avait donné quasi carte blanche à l’Italie pour régler la question des migrants, va-t-elle sévir ? Bruxelles avait octroyé 53,3 millions de francs suisses à la Botte pour aider la Libye à protéger ses frontières. L’argent a-t-il servi à payer Dabbashi ? Sur le terrain, les acteurs libyens n’ont pas vu d’amélioration notable. Les garde-côtes n’ont reçu cette année que quatre bateaux qui ont déjà servi, et encore s’agissait-il du reliquat d’un contrat passé en 2008.

« L’aide italienne est réelle mais pas au niveau, résume le porte-parole de la marine libyenne, le général Ayoub Gacem. Nous avons besoin de navires neufs pour intercepter les embarcations des migrants, qui sont maintenant de plus en plus escortés par des hommes armés sur des vedettes rapides. » Car, si Dabbashi est hors-jeu, d’autres réseaux ont pris le relais.

Après les affrontements de Sabratha, près de 15 000 migrants, principalement d’Afrique subsaharienne, ont été retrouvés et emmenés dans des centres de détention officiels dans la région de Tripoli. Dans le pays, ils seraient plusieurs centaines de milliers à attendre l’opportunité de traverser la Méditerranée.
« Une fausse victoire »

Le 31 octobre, deux bateaux pneumatiques avec 299 migrants à leur bord ont été arrêtés par les autorités libyennes. Ils étaient partis des plages de Zliten à 180 km à l’est de Tripoli. « La victoire de Sabratha est une fausse victoire, le trafic va reprendre comme avant dès l’an prochain quand ce sera la saison [été-automne] », prédit Choukri Ftis, un chercheur qui a participé récemment à un rapport sur la migration illégale en Libye.

Cet été, le président français, Emmanuel Macron, avait lancé l’idée de centres d’enregistrement basés dans le sud libyen pour filtrer en amont les migrants. Une idée difficilement réalisable sur un territoire aussi vaste (2000 km de frontière avec l’Algérie, le Niger, le Tchad, le Soudan et l’Egypte) et soumis continuellement aux tensions ethniques entre Arabes, Toubous et Touaregs, qui se partagent le pouvoir dans une zone où l’Etat est quasi absent.

La stratégie de Minniti a donné un coup de pied dans la fourmilière des réseaux de trafic d’êtres humains mais n’a pas fait disparaître le phénomène. Par contre, elle pourrait avoir durablement chamboulé l’équilibre politique du pays. Parmi la coalition armée qui a chassé Dabbashi se trouvait une force d’appui : la brigade al-Wadi. De tendance salafiste, le groupe est un affidé de l’Armée nationale arabe libyenne de Khalifa Haftar. L’homme fort de l’est a donc ainsi pu se draper de la victoire à Sabratha contre Ahmed Dabbashi.
Intérêts gaziers

Le 25 septembre, en plein milieu de la guerre de Sabratha, le maréchal a d’ailleurs été accueilli pour la première fois, bien qu’en catimini, par Marco Minniti et la ministre de la Défense, Roberta Pinotti. Au menu : le contrôle des plages de Sabratha si Dabbashi venait à être vaincu et la sécurisation du complexe gazier de Mellitah tout proche. Le site géré par le géant italien ENI était jusqu’alors protégé par les hommes de l’« Oncle ». Si rien n’a filtré de ce rendez-vous, les craintes sont vives que Haftar, fort d’un possible soutien italien qui aurait retourné sa veste devant la fuite de Dabbashi, n’ait des visées expansionnistes.

« L’altercation ne restera sans doute pas locale, prédit Jalel Harchaoui. Un échange violent et soutenu poussera d’autres milices à prendre position et à entrer dans le bras de fer. Cette partie de la Libye est la plus peuplée du pays. Il est possible qu’elle s’enflamme et fasse l’objet d’un réalignement important. » Marco Minniti, dans son bureau, y pense-t-il parfois ?

▻https://www.letemps.ch/monde/2017/11/05/libye-trafic-migrants-va-reprendre

Depositato il ricorso di ASGI contro lo sviamento di 2,5 milioni di euro dal c.d. Fondo Africa

Supporto tecnico alle autorità libiche per la gestione delle frontiere con fondi destinati a rilanciare il dialogo e la cooperazione con i Paesi africani. ASGI al TAR : E’ sviamento di potere.

▻https://www.asgi.it/asilo-e-protezione-internazionale/libia-italia-ricorso-fondi-cooperazione
#Fonds_afrique

–-> An English synthesis:

Supporting Libyan Coast Guard is a misuse of the so-called “Africa Fund”. Italian Association ASGI brings Italian Foreign Ministry to Court.

The Italian Association for Juridical Studies on Immigration (ASGI) has recently brought legal proceedings before the Regional Administrative Tribunal (TAR) with regard to Decree 4110/47 by which the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation allocates 2,5 million euros to the Ministry of Interior to repair four vessels for Libyan authorities and train them. Such a disbursement is part of the “Africa Fund” (200 million euros) set up by the Italian Parliament to promote cooperation and dialogue with African countries. Being Libya a notoriously unsafe country for migrants and refugees in transit, the compatibility of such a massive allocation of money with the stated goals of the “Africa Fund” – however vague they are – should be questioned. Given that these vessels might be used by the Libyan Coast Guard to pull-back migrants and refugees rescued/intercepted at sea and retain them in appalling detention centers, the main argument before TAR is that this military equipment is a diversion of the funding allocated by the Italian Parliament to contribute to the resolution of the humanitarian crisis in Libya.

The Case for Italy’s Complicity in Libya Push-Backs

Italy has avoided contact with migrants returned to Libya. But Paolo Biondi, a human rights lawyer, argues that its support for the Libyan coast guard violates the principle of non-refoulement.

https://newsdeeply.imgix.net/20171122114920/AFP_T69PJ.jpg?w=640&fit=max&q=60&dpr=2#.jpg

The Case for Italy’s Complicity in Libya Push-Backs

When a boatload of migrants sets off from Libya in the direction of Italy, smugglers often tell those on board to get to international waters before raising the alarm. The migrants hope to be picked up by rescue boats run by humanitarian NGOs and taken on to Italy where they can apply for asylum. The alternative is interception at the hands of the Libyan coast guard and a return to Libya.

▻http://souciant.com/2017/11/the-case-for-italys-complicity-in-libya-push-backs

The rest of the world has woken up, but migrants are still sleepwalking into Libya slave markets

While the West has reacted with outrage to video evidence of Libyan slave markets, potential victims themselves remain unaware of the dangers they face

The trade in human beings has risen sharpy since the Italian government began paying Libyan militant groups and smugglers to stem the flow of migrants over the sea earlier this year.

▻http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/african-migrants-libya-slave-markets-aim-europe-refugees-human-traffi

La strategia italiana nel Mediterraneo

▻http://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/media/img/rapporto_med_maeci_2017_internet_1.pdf

Avec ce commentaire sur FB de Francesco Floris (07.12.2017) :

La Farnesina s’è desta.
Il ministero degli esteri ci fa la cortesia di dirci cosa pensa della Libia. Dopo che Alfano ha speso gli ultimi 12 mesi a fungere da cartonato di Minniti e a implorare diversi magistrati siciliani (e non) di indagare sulle ong invece che sui centri d’accoglienza usati da Ncd come un’american express.
Solo che appena parlano finiscono col confessare.

A pagina 24 del doc. «La strategia italiana nel Mediterraneo» - pamphlet dalla prosa brillante pieno zeppo de «L’Italia ha prontamente reagito», «Roma si è immediatamente attivata», «la task force ha fermamente ribadito» che gli piacciono enormemente gli avverbi - si legge che dopo il 2 febbraio 2017, e su richiesta di Serraj, abbiamo inviato a Tripoli una nave-officina per riparare le unità navali libiche. Ma non solo per amore della meccanica a quanto pare, anche per «fornire un coordinamento alle operazioni di pattugliamento e salvataggio in mare».
Coordinare le operazioni dei libici per riportare i migranti in una nazione che non sottoscrive la Convenzione di Ginevra e dove vige un regime di tortura. Lo scrivono loro. E sarebbe anche illegale qualora a questi manettari con i polsi degli altri interessasse qualcosa.
Quindi ogni volta che sentite le autorità italiane o la Mogherini indignarsi e sbraitare «la Ue e l’Italia non hanno mai respinto nessuno» e altre cazzate fate loro due domande: Cosa ci fa allora una nave italiana a Tripoli a coordinare le operazioni?
E due: ci state prendendo per il culo o cosa?
La seconda è quella giornalisticamente più interessante.

Libya, Italy to join forces against people traffickers

Italy and Libya will set up a joint commission in a bid to fight back against people traffickers and tackle the problem of illegal migration, the Tripoli government said Saturday.

▻https://www.thelocal.it/20171210/libya-italy-to-join-forces-against-people-traffickers

Libya and Italy to set up joint operations to tackle migrant smuggling

Libya’s UN-backed government has entered into an agreement with Italy to establish a joint operations room for tackling migrant smugglers and traffickers.

▻http://www.africanews.com/2017/12/09/libya-and-italy-to-set-up-joint-operations-to-tackle-migrant-smuggling

«Ministre de l’enfer» ("ministro dell’inferno"):

https://www.courrierinternational.com/sites/ci_master/files/styles/image_original_1280/public/assets/images/manifesto-9.jpg?itok=j_zk6-1V#.jpg

Exclusive: Italy plans big handover of sea rescues to Libya coastguard

ROME/TRIPOLI (Reuters) - Italy wants Libya’s coastguard to take responsibility within three years for intercepting migrants across about a tenth of the Mediterranean even as Libyan crews struggle to patrol their own coast and are accused of making deadly mistakes at sea.

▻https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-libya-exclusive/exclusive-italy-plans-big-handover-of-sea-rescues-to-libya-coastguard-idUSK

Italy Strikes Back Again: A Push-back’s Firsthand Account

Evidence is mounting about the Italian Navy’s involvement in facilitating the return of migrants to Libya. There have been alleged cooperation agreements between Italy and Libya to stem the flows to Europe, at the same time, as there have been accusations of pushbacks to Libya. In these cases, Italy stands accused of actively supporting the Libyan Coast Guard in committing unlawful acts, returning intercepted migrants to places where their lives or freedom would be threatened, or where they would face the risk of torture.

▻https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2017/12/italy-strikes?platform=hootsuite

Vu sur twitter, le 15.02.2018 :

Another patch of Libyan Coast Guards #LCG finished training in #Italy , certificates given during a ceremony in #Libya #Migration

https://i.imgur.com/zxQQGQo.png

Et avec ce commentaire de Gerry Simpson :

A reassuring photo of the latest Libyan coastguards receiving certificates after Italy trained them to intercept refugees & migrants heading for the EU & return them to Libya to face guaranteed inhumane detention conditions and a real risk of torture

▻https://twitter.com/GerrySimpsonHRW/status/963976898291355648

Italy Has Reportedly Delivered Further Vessels To Tripoli’s Coast Guard In Libya

“Three further Italian patrol vessels have been delivered to the Libyan Coast Guard right in these days”, the Italian analyst Gerardo Pelosi has revealed on Il Sole 24 Ore while debating the military missions to Libya and Niger Rome approved last January.

The news apparently echoes a similar one shared by the Libyan outlet Libya Observer‘s journalist Safa Al Harathy, who has written today an only vessel, the “106”, was delivered on February 22nd after being fixed in Tunisia:

“the vessel 106 will join the vessels 109 and 111 at Khums port to contribute in securing the Libyan coast from Tajoura all along to Zlitan city in the east”,

the Libya Observer reports.

▻https://betweenlibyaanditaly.wordpress.com/2018/02/25/italy-has-reportedly-delivered-further-vessels-to-tr

Mancata ratifica parlamentare del memorandum Italia-Libia : al via il ricorso alla Corte Costituzionale

Presentato un ricorso alla Consulta da alcuni parlamentari italiani contro il Governo che, non chiedendo la ratifica dell’ accordo, ha impedito loro di esercitare il diritto di discuterne e di votare, come stabilito dalla Costituzione . La scheda tecnica dell’ASGI sull’azione.

▻https://www.asgi.it/primo-piano/mancata-ratifica-parlamento-memorandum-italia-libia-ricorso-corte-costituzional
#memorandum

Italian work on Libya and migrants OK

Italy’s work on migrants and Libya has been positive, Frontex chief #Fabrice_Leggeri told ANSA in an interview Tuesday.
“Italy is working to use the resources allotted by the EU to find sustainable solutions for Libya” and the migrants held there, he said.
"And for now it is going in the right direction, even though the conditions of the centres in Libya are not in line with our standards, and with basic humanitarian standards.
“But that is not Italy’s fault, all the international community and not only the EU can help”.

http://www.ansa.it/webimages/img_457x/2018/2/20/8fd6aaf11d20e25c53695c2550c97af3.jpg

Migranti, l’accordo Italia-Libia finisce davanti alla Corte costituzionale

Era il 2 febbraio 2017 quando – alla vigilia di un importante vertice europeo a Malta in cui si sarebbe discusso anche di emergenza immigrazione – il Primo ministro Paolo Gentiloni siglava a Roma l’accordo col presidente del Governo di unità nazionale libico Fayez al-Serraj: un memorandum in cui l’Italia si impegnava nei confronti della Libia a fornire strumentazioni e sostegno militare, strategico e tecnologico, oltre a fondi per lo sviluppo, per bloccare le partenze dei migranti in fuga. Un accordo con un Paese, è bene ricordarlo, che non ha ratificato la Convenzione di Ginevra sui rifugiati, e nelle cui carceri i migranti sono quotidianamente oggetto di violenze e soprusi.

▻https://left.it/2018/02/28/migranti-laccordo-italia-libia-finisce-davanti-alla-corte-costituzionale

Le patrouilleur 648 qui a menacé Open Arms, un cadeau de l’Italie à la Lybie.

L’UE a entrainé l’équipage du bateau qui a joué un rôle dans plusieurs incidents avec des ONG de sauvatage.

CRISTINA MAS Barcelona 25/03/2018 00:21

Le bateau de patrouille des gardes-côtes libyens qui a menacé dans les eaux internationales les volontaires d’Open Arms le 15 mars afin qu’ils leur livrent les femmes et les enfants qu’ils étaient en train de secourir, était un cadeau de l’Italie à la Libye. La même embarcation, qui porte le numéro d’identification 648 et le nom de Ras al Jadar, a joué un rôle dans plusieurs autres incidents avec d’autres bateaux des ONG SeaWatch et SOS méditerranée, qui travaillent au sauvetage de naufragés en Méditerranée.

Entre 2009 et 2010, le Premier ministre italien Silvio Berlusconi a alors accordé six patrouilles aux garde-côtes libyens dans le cadre de l’accord amical signé avec le dictateur libyen Mouammar Kadhafi. Le texte prévoyait la construction d’un système de radar dans le but de surveiller les frontières du désert et des patrouilles maritimes conjointes dans les eaux libyennes et internationales pour empêcher que des bateaux quittant la Libye arrivent en Italie.

Mais la vie des six bateaux de patrouille donnés à Kadhafi – toutes du modèle Bigliani, qui étaient auparavant au service du corps militaire Guardia di Finanza - était aussi courte que la période à laquelle le dictateur a survécu au pouvoir. Le 17 février 2011, le printemps arabe atteint la Libye avec une révolte qui a déclenché une intervention de l’OTAN et s’est terminée avec la mort de Kadhafi huit mois plus tard. Deux des embarcations ont été détruites dans les combats, et les quatre autres, dont le 648, ont été réparés à l’usine navale de Fiamme Gialle de Miseno (Naples). En avril dernier, l’Italie les a rendue au gouvernement de Tripoli.

L’incident du 15 mars avec Open Arms n’est pas le premier d’une ONG avec ce bateau de patrouille. Le 6 novembre, l’ONG allemande Sea Watch, travaillant dans la même région, a rapporté qu’à 30 miles de la côte libyenne la même patrouille a interféré dans un sauvetage.

Les migrants à bord ont pris panique, le bateau des gardes-côtes les a rattrapé, certains naufragés ont pu grimper sur le bateau de patrouille sans que les agents ne les aident et, une fois à bord, comme on peut le voir sur la vidéo enregistrée par l’ONG, les gardes-côtes les ont frappés avec les amarres du bateau.

Un jeune a tenté de descendre pour atteindre le bateau de l’ONG et est resté suspendu à l’échelle, au moment où le bateau libyen a accéléré et mis sa vie en danger. Au moins cinq migrants sont morts dans l’opération, des décès qui selon Sea Watch auraient pu être évités.

Le 4 mars, le navire Aquarius, de l’ONG SOS Mediterranée, a également subi l’hostilité de la patrouille 648, qui s’est approchée d’eux au cours d’une collision sans répondre à leurs avertissements radio et finalement ils leur ont ordonné de quitter le site, à 17 milles au large de la côte, alors même s’ils étaient à la recherche d’un bateau.

Un autre vaisseau d’Open Arms a eu, en août, un incident avec un autre bateau de patrouille donné par l’Italie, le 654, qui les a menacé avec deux rafales de balles tirée en l’air et une semaine plus tard les a forcés à naviguer pendant environ deux heures en direction de Tripoli en disant qu’ils étaient sous sa protection.

Rome et l’ensemble de l’UE ont choisi l’un des trois gouvernements qui se disputet le pouvoir dans la guerre civile en Libye, celui dirigé par le Premier ministre Faiez al-Sarraj, qui a le soutien de l’UE et de l’ONU, mais ne contrôle seulement qu’un tiers du pays. La Libye est plongée dans un conflit sans front avec des centaines de milices armées.

Le Premier ministre italien Paolo Gentiloni et Al-Sarraj ont signé le 2 février 2017 un protocole d’accord - dans le cadre de l’accord signé par Berlusconi et Kadhafi - qui établit une coopération bilatérale dans les domaines du développement, l’immigration illegale, le trafic d’êtres humains, la contrebande et le renforcement de la surveillance des frontières entre l’Italie et la Libye. L’Italie livrera à Tripoli six patrouilles supplémentaires totalement neuves.

L’Espagne s’est proposé de former 100 garde-côtes libyens dans la base navale de Carthagène. Dans le cadre de l’opération Sophia de l’OTAN, le programme de formation de la Garde côtière libyenne financé par l’UE avec 46 millions d’euros a déjà formé 93 agents dans un navire italien et dans un autre navire néerlandais. 43 officiers supplémentaires ont été formés en Crète, à Malte et à Rome.

Human Rights Watch lance un cri d’alarme : « Aider les autorités libyennes à capturer des immigrés en haute mer, sachant qu’ils les rendront à un traitement cruel, inhumain ou dégradant dans une détention arbitraire, expose l’Italie et d’autres pays de l’UE à participer à une violation grave des droits de l’homme ». Les accusations ne viennent pas seulement des ONG. Le groupe d’experts de l’ONU sur la Libye a rappelé que « les abus contre les migrants ont été largement collectés, y compris les exécutions, la torture ou la privation de nourriture, d’eau et de médicaments », et prévient que « le département contre l’immigration (libyen) et la garde côtière (italienne) sont directement impliqués dans ces graves violations des droits de l’homme. » Avec les accords d’externalisation du contrôle des frontières de l’UE, le témoignage des ONG en Méditerranée centrale devient de plus en plus gênant."

Traduction, reçu via la mailing list de Migreurop, de cet article paru en catalan:
La patrullera #648 que va amenaçar Open Arms, un regal d’Itàlia a Líbia

La UE va entrenar la tripulació del vaixell que ha protagonitzat diversos incidents amb ONGs de rescat

https://www.ara.cat/2018/03/25/internacional/patrullera-amenacar-Open-Arms-Libia_1984611655_52395086_987x555.jpg

Texte publié par SOS Méditerranée, sur twitter (17.04.2018) :

UPDATE while searching for the boat in distress, the #Aquarius was informed the Libyan coastguard took coordination over 2 boats in distress today. This means more people were taken back to a place where their safety is not guaranteed.

▻https://twitter.com/SOSMedIntl/status/986294580097224705

v. aussi :

UPDATE The #Aquarius was alerted to a boat in distress earlier today. This afternoon, the crew of the #Aquarius found this empty and slashed rubber boat in international waters off the coast of #Libya.

▻https://twitter.com/SOSMedIntl/status/986267126087503872

#refoulement #push-back

Cercate i guardacoste libici? Telefonate a Roma: 06/…

È un numero di telefono a rivelare il rapporto, forse un po’ troppo stretto, tra Roma e Tripoli. Una utenza che corrisponde a un interno della Marina militare italiana, stampato, come recapito del mittente, su un modulo di messaggi utilizzato dalla Guardia costiera libica. Il documento, di cui pubblichiamo il dettaglio, ha consultato porta la […]

▻https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/premium/articoli/cercate-i-guardacoste-libici-telefonate-a-roma-06

Sur le site de la Défense italienne...
Un article de août 2017:
Nave #Tremiti nel porto libico di #Abu_Sittah

Dopo il pattugliatore Comandante Borsini che ha sbarcato nel porto militare di Tripoli (Abu Sittah) il personale italiano che opererà a supporto della Guardia costiera libica, è giunta ieri nel porto della nostra ex colonia Nave Tremiti, una delle 6 unità da 750 tonnellate per il trasporto costiero della Classe Gorgona.

La nave è destinata a garantire supporto tecnico ai mezzi navali libici nell’ambito della cooperazione italo-libica e in applicazione dell’accordo tra i due Paesi del 2008 “riesumato” dal governo di Fayez al-Sarraj.

http://www.analisidifesa.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/a8bd431e-59f8-4851-86b0-88a1048f9ca309Medium.jpg

–-> j’aime bien l’expression «accordo riesumato» = «accord ressuscité»

Et puis cette nouvelle, de 30 mars 2018:
Missioni Militari: Nave #Caprera sostituisce la #Capri nella missione bilaterale di assistenza e supporto in Libia

È previsto nella giornata di oggi il “passaggio di consegne” tra Nave Capri e Nave Caprera nell’ambito della Missione Bilaterale di Assistenza e Supporto in Libia.

In particolare, a questo assetto navale compete, prioritariamente, l’attività di supporto logistico e tecnico-manutentivo dei battelli della Marina e della Guardia Costiera libiche. Nave Caprera giungerà domani al porto di Tripoli, da dove comincerà la sua missione della durata di circa quattro mesi.

Nave Capri aveva iniziato la sua attività a dicembre dello scorso anno, subentrando a Nave Tremiti, e nei suoi circa quattro mesi di missione ha svolto consulenza e formazione del personale militare libico della Marina e della Guardia Costiera nelle attività di manutenzione, riparazione e ripristino dell’efficienza delle unità navali libiche.

L’operazione, inizialmente inquadrata nell’operazione “Mare Sicuro”, era stata avviata ad agosto dello scorso anno, in seguito alla richiesta di supporto avanzata dal Governo di Accordo Nazionale libico al Governo italiano. Per assolvere con efficacia i compiti assegnati, a bordo delle unità navali italiane della “classe Gorgona” – selezionate per alternarsi in questo specifico incarico di natura tecnico-logistica – è prevista la presenza di un container attrezzato a officina meccanica, oltre che di due ulteriori team di personale tecnico-specialistico.

https://www.difesa.it/sites/archive2/sitecollectionimages/1a930d20-e8e3-41ae-871d-ac1d1cb18e64/280a4a8b-7738-4fd4-99a5-cb9a9721b618capreraMedium.jpg

▻https://www.difesa.it/OperazioniMilitari/op_intern_corso/Libia_Missione_bilaterale_di_supporto_e_assistenza/notizie_teatro/Pagine/Nave_Caprera_sostituisce_la_Capri_nella_missione_bilaterale_di_assistenza_e_s

#operazione_Mare_Sicuro

"Playing with Molecules": The Italian Approach to Libya

Cette étude met en lumière la manière dont la politique étrangère italienne a choisi en Libye de traiter avec les divers éléments, ou « molécules », d’un pays entré en décomposition.
La politique impulsée par le gouvernement Gentiloni, et en particulier le ministre de l’Intérieur Marco Minniti, a composé avec les différents acteurs pour « repriser » et stabiliser le terrain, afin de mieux gérer les flux de migrants et les activités illégales en Méditerranée, mais aussi de sécuriser l’approvisionnement énergétique de l’Italie. Cette approche « moléculaire » est à double tranchant : alors que les flux migratoires se sont réduits, que les relations économiques s’intensifient et que les coopérations informelles créent de nouveaux espaces de dialogue, le manque de vision stratégique dans la mise en avant de nouveaux acteurs pourrait nuire aux perspectives de paix et in fine, aux relations entre l’Italie et la Libye.

https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/styles/contenu_cover/public/thumbnails/image/couv_aldo_ligal_2018.jpg?itok=FlECOxGX#.jpg

Most Libyan militias involved in illegal migration activities nominally affiliated to official state security institutions: UN Libya Experts Panel report

Most Libyan militias involved in illegal migration activities are nominally affiliated to official state security institutions, the UN Libya Experts Panel report states in its section on human trafficking and financing of armed groups.

‘‘Armed groups, which were party to larger political-military coalitions, have specialized in illegal smuggling activities, notably human smuggling and trafficking. The drastic rise in the numbers of migrants starting in 2014 indicates that illegal migration in Libya is not the preserve of isolated armed groups but of much larger coalitions. Most armed groups involved in these illegal activities were nominally affiliated to official security institutions. In 2014, the number of migrants that took the central Mediterranean route (great majority through Libya) was 170,664, compared to 45,298 and 15,151, respectively in 2013 and 2012.

Role of SDF and links with smugglers

The Special Deterrence Force (SDF) is an armed group affiliated to the Government of National Accord’s Ministry of Interior, with policing and security functions, including investigation of human traffickers and the arrest of illegal migrants.

Testimonies of migrants, originating from Eritrea, reveal that when they reached Tripoli from Bani Walid in July 2016, they were arrested by SDF. They confirmed that, once arrested by SDF, they were handed over, against payment, to various migrant smuggling rings for onward journeys to Zawiyah and Sabratha.

Some were handed over to the Mitiga detention centre, while others were taken to the Tajura and Abu Slim detention centres. These three centres are theoretically subordinated to the Ministry of Interior’s Department Combatting Illegal Migration (DCIM). The group detained in Mitiga had to pay the SDF between 300 and 400 USD each, for their release and transfer from Tripoli to Sabratha.

Four Bangladeshis told the Panel that they landed in Tripoli from Dhaka on 15 July 2015, holding valid Libyan work visas. On arrival, SDF seized their passports and detained them for three months in Mitiga. They were subsequently transferred to Sabratha, and sent on boats against their will to Europe after being extorted of 300 USD paid in cash to the SDF elements.

The Panel is assessing whether the SDF’s leadership was aware of collusion and trafficking being conducted within its ranks.

Role of Eritrean smugglers

In Tripoli, a well-structured network of smugglers coming from East Africa has operated since 2008. Multiple testimonies collected and corroborated by judicial authorities indicate that the leadership is composed of two Eritreans living in Tripoli, Ermias Ghermay and Abd al-Razzak Fitwi.

They play a key role in organizing the smuggling from the migrants’ homeland to Italy against substantial payments. Interviewees claimed that Fitwi acts as a broker and receives up to 1,500 US dollars per person, to release the migrants held in the official detention centres in Tripoli and to send them to Sabratha.

An armed group member from Tripoli, told the Panel that Fitwi and Ghermay paid substantial fees to prominent armed groups to pursue their activities and to guarantee their safety. They also have private detention camps in Tajura, Abu Slim and Gargaresh guarded by Africans. From there they transport migrants to Sabratha or Zawiyah.

Use of State detention facilities for trafficking

The Directorate Combatting Illegal Migration (DCIM) is responsible for 24 detention centres and employs 5,000 staff. Under Libyan legislation, the migrants are detained because they are considered as illegal aliens, subject to investigation by judicial authorities.

According to international agencies, the DCIM has no control over its detention centres. The administration is almost non-existent, and records on the migrants, who have been detained, are poor. A minister of the GNA admitted in a discussion that the armed groups are stronger than the authorities in handling the flows of migrants. Several migrants also confirmed that the local armed group controlled the centres they stayed in.

Smugglers in Sabratha

Sabratha is the main departing point of migrants to Italy. The city is divided between two competing armed groups involved in migrant smuggling. The eastern zone is under control of Mosab Abu Grein al Wadi armed group. The western zone is held by Ahmad al-Dabbashi’s Martyr Anas al-Dabbashi Brigade.

Anas al-Dabbashi Martyr Brigade

The commander of Anas al-Dabbashi Martyr’s Brigade, Ahmad al-Dabbashi (alias al- ‘Amu), was the main smuggler in Sabratha from 2014 until he was ousted in October 2017. West African migrants rescued in Lampedusa in April 2017 testified in Italy on al-Dabbashi’s modus operandi.

The interviewees were forced to call their families to transfer money to specific bank accounts located in Europe, Africa or the Middle East. From October 2016 to April 2017, they had to pay up to 2,000 USD each for their travel. The money was extorted by armed guards composed of Libyans, Nigerians and Gambians. The African guards work for three months to pay their own migration to Europe. The interviewees sailed, on 13 April 2017, with two of their former guards from Sabratha to Lampedusa.

The Panel is investigating the GNA’s creation and financing of the anti-illegal migration unit, “Brigade 48”. Although it was supposedly under the Ministry of Defence and the Chief of Staff, sources stated that al-Amu’s brother, Mohamed al-Dabbashi, headed it. In summer 2017, al-Dabbashi’s brigade had apparently shifted from trafficking to policing migrants for the GNA’s account.

Furthermore, several open sources reported an alleged deal with al-Dabbashi to contain the migration flows from Sabratha. Although the information was denied, it triggered violent clashes between competing armed groups involved in smuggling. Ahmad al-Dabbashi was defeated and escaped Sabratha on 6 October 2017. The PC dissolved the Brigade 48 on 16 November 2017.

Role of Mos’ab Abu Grein

Mos’ab Abu Grein (alias “The Doctor”), a leader of al-Wadi Brigade, operates in the eastern part of Sabratha. He is connected to a network of smugglers composed of Salafi armed groups in Tripoli, Sebha and Kufra. The Panel interviewed three different Eritrean migrants who reported that they were taken from SDF’s Mitiga detention centre to the Abu Grein facility in Sabratha in July 2016. They were detained in a hangar with African guards from where Abu Grein organizes departures on inflatable rubber boats to Italy.

The interviewees said they paid Abu Grein 1,500 USD cash via a Nigerian broker to cross the Mediterranean. According to official sources, Mos’ab Abu Grein enjoys impunity for his activities in migrant smuggling because he collaborates with the SDF to counter drug traffickers, consumption of alcohol and combats alleged links of Sabratha and Zawiyah traffickers to listed entities such as ISIL.

Abu Grein and Dabbashi have been in close competition, both seeking to monopolize the trafficking in Sabratha. From 21 September, Abu Grein supported the anti-ISIL Operation Room (AIOR) to combat the Brigade 48 armed group. The Panel notes that the warring parties, the AIOR and the Brigade 48, were officially financed by the GNA until the conflict broke out in Sabratha.

Zawiyah

Al Nasr Brigade and the Coast Guards

Between Tripoli and Sabratha, Zawiyah port plays a distribution role. According to interviews of migrants and judicial reports, ‘Al Nasr Brigade’ 56, headed by Mohamed Koshlaf, and Zawiyah Coast Guards, was connected to Ahmad al-Dabbashi’s organization. Several migrants paid 100,000 to 150,000 Francs CFA57 to a Burkinabe broker operating between Koshlaf and the migrants.

Other interviewees, who travelled in April 2017, asserted that their group left Zawiyah by night, crammed on a 10-meter inflatable rubber boat. While at sea, men with an official boat and wearing Coast Guard uniforms stopped them. They shot in the air and extorted the passengers’ money and valuables. When the boat arrived at calling distance off the Italian shores, the same official boat returned to seize the rubber boat’s engine. Similar incidents have been reported previously.

Southern Region

Brigade Subul al-Salam

Eritrean and Ethiopian interviewees described their transfer, in January 2015, from the Sudanese border to Al Kufra. An Eritrean fixer, called Afra Waiki, transported and handed them over to an armed group, Brigade Subul al-Salam, affiliated with the LNA and under the command of Abd al Rahman Hashem from the Zway tribe in al-Kufra.

The interviewees said they were put in a prison where the guards were dressed in police uniforms and driving official police cars. For their release, each migrant had to transfer up to 300 USD to a foreign bank account. In July 2015, they could continue their travel to Bani Walid driven by another Eritrean fixer known as Wadi Isaaq.

Role of Tebu armed groups and Sudanese armed groups

Sources indicated active involvement of Tebu and Darfuri armed groups, supported by Darfuri mercenaries in the south, in migrant smuggling. They operate particularly in the Tamassa region, in the south west of Jebel Arrush, Murzuq and al Kufra. The Tebu manage their own warehouses for migrants while Darfuri armed groups provide protection and escort to the traffickers.

Recent developments have shown attempts to counter the groups involved in migrant smuggling. In September 2017, an armed group called the ‘Suqur al Sahara’ headed by the Tebu commander, Barka Shedimi, claimed the closure of the borders with Niger, Sudan and Chad to halt human trafficking. Similarly, a coalition of armed groups linked to Murzuq Municipality also created their own border protection force. The Panel is investigating these decisions, particularly the political and the financial motivations behind them”.

▻https://www.libyaherald.com/2018/03/11/most-libyan-militias-involved-in-illegal-migration-activities-nominally
signalé par @isskein via Fulvio Vassallo sur FB

Eleven children among the 80 migrants returned to Libyan shore by coast guard this afternoon in #Tripoli. The majority of migrants come from Nigeria, the Ivory Coast and Ghana. @IOM_Libya continues to be at disembarkation point for provision of emergency assistance #Libya

https://i.imgur.com/pz9B1UO.jpg https://i.imgur.com/CHHcCuF.jpg

#OIM #IOM

Sauvetage de migrants : tensions entre gardes-côtes et ONG au large de la Libye

Plusieurs associations dénoncent le traitement infligé aux migrants par les garde-côtes libyens. Ces derniers travaillent en coordination avec l’Italie.

Toujours pas d’apaisement en Méditerranée entre ONG et gardes-côtes libyens. Ce week-end, plusieurs navires humanitaires souhaitant s’approcher d’embarcations de migrants en détresse se sont vus refuser l’accès.

« Les Libyens agissent comme des pirates dans les eaux internationales, exigeant que leur soit reconnue une autorité. Ils agissent hors du droit et ils le font avec des moyens fournis par le gouvernement italien », a accusé sur Twitter le député italien de gauche Riccadro Magi. Samedi, il était à bord de l’Astral, un voilier appartenant à l’ONG Proactiva Open Arms, lorsqu’une vedette libyenne a ordonné au navire de s’éloigner.

Bis repetita dimanche avec l’Aquarius. Ce bateau, affrété par SOS-Méditerranée et Médecins sans frontières (MSF) avait été prévenu par les gardes-côtes italiens de la présence d’un canot surchargé au large de Tripoli. Mais Rome a aussi prévenu ses homologues libyens, qui ont pris la coordination de l’opération et interdit au navire de s’approcher. Leur a également été demandé de s’éloigner quand des migrants ont sauté à l’eau pour tenter d’éviter d’être reconduits en Libye. En début de soirée, la marine libyenne a annoncé avoir secouru plus de 300 migrants dans trois opérations distinctes, faisant état d’un mort et d’un disparu.

Flou autour de l’identité de ces gardes-côtes

Le porte-parole de la marine libyenne a prévenu que les tensions avec les ONG risquent de s’aggraver dans les prochains jours, les navires humanitaires « s’approchant de plus en plus » des eaux libyennes, selon M. Kacem. La Libye, qui accuse les ONG d’être liées aux réseaux de passeurs, est soutenue par l’Italie et l’Union européenne qui finance la formation de ces officiers dans cette région en proie aux tensions inter-tribales.

« Certains ont des uniformes mais on ne sait pas qui ils sont vraiment, décrivait pour le Parisien Francis Vallat, président de SOS Méditerranée. Certains dépendent du gouvernement libyen reconnu internationalement, tandis que d’autres relèvent de chefs féodaux plus ou moins provinciaux. On ne sait pas si ces gens respectent le droit. En tout cas, ils ont une attitude qui permet d’en douter. »

LIRE AUSSI >Des migrants « secourus » sur fond d’accusations de traitements inhumains

Trois responsables de l’ONG Proactiva Open Arms font actuellement l’objet d’une enquête judiciaire en Italie pour avoir refusé de remettre des migrants aux Libyens lors d’une opération mi-mars. Même si un juge a estimé qu’ils avaient agi « en état de nécessité » compte tenu de l’insécurité pour les migrants en Libye.
La crainte de l’« enfer libyen »

Le pays fait régulièrement l’objet de critiques pour les traitements infligés aux migrants, notamment africains, qui passent sur son territoire dans l’espoir de rejoindre l’Europe pour une vie meilleure. En novembre, CNN révélait au monde abasourdi l’existence de ventes aux enchères d’hommes réduits aux rangs d’esclaves, dans une vidéo glaçante tournée près de Tripoli, la capitale libyenne.

Cette semaine, MSF a dénoncé la situation dans un centre de détention libyen à Zouara (ouest), où ses équipes ont vu plus de 800 personnes tellement entassées qu’elles ont à peine la place de s’allonger, « sans un accès adéquat à l’eau et à la nourriture ».

LIRE AUSSI >Esclavage en Libye : Ousmane a vécu six mois d’enfer dans les geôles libyennes

La coordination entre Rome et Tripoli a fait chuter drastiquement les départs vers les côtes européennes. Selon les autorités italiennes, près de 9 500 migrants ont débarqué cette année, soit une baisse de 75 % par rapport à la même période en 2017. Dans le même temps, les gardes-côtes libyens ont secouru et ramené en Libye plus de 5 000 migrants, selon l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM), qui fait aussi état d’un bilan d’au moins 379 morts ou disparus au large de la Libye.

▻http://www.leparisien.fr/international/sauvetage-de-migrants-tensions-entre-gardes-cotes-et-ong-au-large-de-la-l

Riportati dalla Guardia costiera in Libia, torturati e venduti : le associazioni fanno ricorso alla CEDU

Ricorso alla Corte Europea dei Diritti umani contro l’Italia per aver coordinato la Guardia Costiera libica nei respingimenti che hanno portato ad abusi e al decesso di migranti

Il 6 Novembre 2017 l’ONG Sea-Watch è stata ostacolata dalla Guardia Costiera Libica durante un’operazione di salvataggio di 130 cittadini migranti da un gommone alla deriva, partito dalle coste libiche. Almeno venti dei migranti sono morti, tra cui due minori. L’intervento è stato coordinato a distanza dal Centro di Coordinamento Marittimo (MRCC) della Guardia Costiera italiana e la motovedetta libica coinvolta era stata donata dal governo italiano alcuni mesi prima. La Guardia Costiera libica ha poi riportato in Libia quarantasette dei sopravvissuti, che sono stati rinchiusi in condizioni disumane, subendo percosse, estorsioni, fame e stupri. Due di loro sono stati successivamente “venduti” e torturati con elettrochoc. Nella conferenza stampa verrà illustrato il ricorso alla Corte Europea dei Diritti umani e verrà presentato un rapporto audio-visivo prodotto da Forensic Oceanography/Forensic Architecture che ricostruisce questo ed altri casi di respingimento.

▻https://www.asgi.it/allontamento-espulsione/migranti-libia-guardia-costiera-cedu
#CEDH