#j

  • Bâillonner les #quartiers. Comment le #pouvoir réprime les #mobilisations populaires

    Pourquoi les quartiers populaires ne se révoltent-ils pas plus souvent ? Alors qu’ils sont ravagés depuis des décennies par un #urbanisme au rabais, le #chômage de masse et les #humiliations policières, #Julien_Talpin explore les raisons pour lesquelles ces quartiers peinent à asseoir leurs intérêts. Il montre que les entraves aux mobilisations collectives tiennent moins à ce qui serait l’apathie fataliste des habitants qu’aux multiples tactiques répressives déployées par les #pouvoirs_publics.
    Les différents chapitres décortiquent les logiques disciplinaires qui, sans avoir même besoin d’être coordonnées, garantissent le maintien du #statu_quo. À l’arrière-plan de la #répression_policière et judiciaire, se déploient quotidiennement le #chantage clientélaire aux subventions, la #disqualification islamophobe des opposants ou les piqures anesthésiantes de la #démocratie_participative.
    En documentant la manière dont cette #répression à bas bruit traverse les mobilisations contemporaines, ce livre en dégage la dimension systémique. Il place sous les projecteurs cette trappe à révolte qui fabrique la #domestication_politique, encourage l’#autocensure_collective et suscite la #résignation_individuelle. En livrant les recettes de l’adversaire, il veut contribuer au long chemin des luttes autonomes pour l’#égalité.

    https://lesetaques.org/2020/01/29/baillonner-les-quartiers
    #livre #quartiers_populaires #résistance #révoltes #répression_judiciaire #Julien_Talpin

    ping @cede @karine4

  • The Danger of Anti-Immigrant Extremism Posing as Environmentalism—and Who Funds It

    With President Joe Biden in the White House and Vice President Kamala Harris providing the deciding vote in the Senate, a range of long-sought Democratic policy goals are back in play, albeit just barely. That includes ambitious agendas on immigration and the environment.

    Could this be the administration that pushes through comprehensive immigration reform after decades of failed attempts? Will youth activists and the burgeoning movement for a Green New Deal provide a pathway to major climate legislation? If so, advocates and their funders alike face a tough road ahead, including an obstructionist congressional minority and opponents on both fronts that will look to appeal to the public’s darkest impulses to build opposition.

    At this inflection point, a report this month from the Center for American Progress, “The Extremist Campaign to Blame Immigrants for U.S. Environmental Problems,” offers a timely overview of the history of how opponents of immigration falsely portray it as a threat to the natural world—a strategy we’re likely to see more of in the months ahead. The report offers a valuable review of these efforts, ranging from the past anti-immigrant stances of some of the nation’s best-known environmental groups to the funders that have bankrolled the nation’s largest anti-immigration groups.

    Four years of an administration defined by its opposition to immigration, plus growing attention to climate change, breathed new life into the toxic and racist narrative of immigrants as a cause of environmental degradation. As the report lays out, this argument—often part of a right-wing, white supremacist ideology known as ecofascism, though CAP’s report does not use the term—found allies in the top echelons of government and media, including a former head of the U.S. Bureau of Land Management and conservative commentators like Ann Coulter and Fox News host Tucker Carlson.

    In contemporary politics, this strategy is mainly seen as a right-wing phenomenon or an artifact of the racist and Eurocentric early history of conservation. Yet the fact that anti-immigrant sentiment found a home within top environmental groups, including Earthfirst! and the Sierra Club, which had a major faction in support of these ideas as late as 2004, is a reminder that it has found fertile soil in a variety of political camps. That makes the narrative all the more dangerous, and one against which funders working in both immigration and the environment ought to take a firm and vocal stance.

    Who’s funding anti-immigration work in the name of the environment?

    Although not comprehensive, the report highlights three funders as key backers of anti-immigration groups: Colcom Foundation, Weeden Foundation and Foundation for the Carolinas. The first two are, in their branding and language, environmental funders—and make those grants in the name of preventing further damage to the natural world.

    Colcom, founded by Mellon Bank heir Cordelia Scaife May, is far and away the largest funder. With a roughly $500 million endowment, it has provided a large share of the support for a network of groups founded by John Tanton, a Sierra Club official in the 1980s, whom the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) calls “the racist architect of the modern anti-immigrant movement.”

    Recipients include NumbersUSA, Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), and the Center for Immigration Studies, which we once called “Trump’s favorite immigration think tank.” The latter two are classified as hate groups by the SPLC, a designation the organizations reject.

    In keeping with the bending of reflexive political categories, it’s worth noting that May—who died in 2005—was also a substantial funder of Planned Parenthood due to her prioritization of “population control” as a means of achieving conservation. In 2019, the New York Times documented May’s dark journey to becoming a leading funder of the modern anti-immigrant movement, and the millions her foundation continued to move, long after her death, in support of ideas that gained a receptive audience in a nativist Trump administration. May’s wealth came from the Mellon-Scaife family fortune, which yielded several philanthropists, including another prominent conservative donor, Richard Mellon Scaife.

    Weeden, led by Don Weeden, has funded a similar who’s who of top anti-immigration groups, as well as lower-profile or regional groups like Californians for Population Stabilization, Progressives for Immigration Reform—which CAP calls the “most central organization in the anti-immigrant greenwashing universe”—and the Rewilding Institute.

    Both Weeden and Colcom, as well as the groups they fund, generally say they are neither anti-immigrant nor anti-immigration. Aside from restrictionist policy positions and racist comments by former leaders, it is revealing that the groups they fund are the favored information sources for some of the most virulently anti-immigrant politicians, both historically and among those who rose prominence during the Trump administration. For a deeper dive on Weeden and Colcom, see my colleague Philip Rojc’s excellent 2019 piece on these grantmakers.

    Finally, there is the Foundation for the Carolinas, which in many ways is a typical community foundation, with initiatives on topics from COVID-19 relief to local arts. But it also hosts a donor-advised fund that has supported several anti-immigration groups, including Center for Immigration Studies, FAIR and NumbersUSA. That fund channeled nearly $21 million to nine such groups between 2006 and 2018, according to the report.

    There’s a connection here to a larger problem of private foundations and DAFs, some of which are housed at community foundations, supporting 501(c)(3) nonprofits identified as hate groups, according to a recent analysis from the Chronicle of Philanthropy. Foundation for the Carolinas also made its list of top donors to these groups.

    An ideology funders must fight against

    As the debates over both immigration and climate policies move forward under this new administration, and the opposition marshals efforts to defeat them, this report offers a helpful guide to this enduring and noxious myth. It’s also an important reminder that if these ideas are not called actively combated, they can take root within well-intentioned efforts. Though it seems only a small number of foundations directly fund groups advancing these ideas, anti-immigrant sentiment is insidious.

    For example, while some commentators are suggesting that acceding to Trump-fueled demands for a border wall is how Congress could reach bipartisan action on immigration reform, the report notes how the existing sections of wall are ineffective against furtive crossings, disruptive to species migration, and in violation of Indigenous sacred sites. These facts—and more broadly, the connection to white supremacist and fascist movements—should put foundations on guard, whether they support grantees pushing for immigration reform, action on climate or both.

    With the United States and other nations facing greater and greater pressures from climate change—particularly as it forces migration from regions like Latin America and the Middle East—philanthropy would do well to be proactive now and draw a bright line in countering this ideology’s propagation.

    https://www.insidephilanthropy.com/home/2021/2/24/anti-immigrant-environmentalism-is-resurgent-new-report-looks-at
    #extrême_droite #anti-migrants #USA #Etats-Unis #environnementalisme #environnement #migrations #nature #dégradation_environnementale #écofascisme #éco-fascisme #suprématisme_blanc #extrême_droite #Ann_Coulte #Tucker_Carlson #racisme #Earthfirst #Sierra_Club #deep_ecology #fondations #Colcom_Foundation #Weeden_Foundation #Foundation_for_the_Carolinas #Mellon_Bank #Cordelia_Scaife_May #mécénat #John_Tanton #NumbersUSA #Federation_for_American_Immigration_Reform (#FAIR) #Center_for_Immigration_Studies #Planned_Parenthood #démographie #contrôle_démographique #néo-malthusianisme #néomalthusianisme #protection_de_l'environnement #philanthropie #Richard_Mellon_Scaife #Weeden #Don_Weeden #Californians_for_Population_Stabilization #Progressives_for_Immigration_Reform #Rewilding_Institute

    • The Extremist Campaign to Blame Immigrants for U.S. Environmental Problems

      With growing frequency over the past four years, right-wing pundits, policymakers, and political operatives have fiercely and furiously blamed immigrants for the degradation and decline of nature in the United States. William Perry Pendley, who temporarily ran the U.S. Bureau of Land Management under former President Donald Trump, saw “immigration as one of the biggest threats to public lands,” according to an agency spokesperson.1 A handful of right-wing anti-immigration zealots, including Joe Guzzardi, have repeatedly misused data published by the Center for American Progress on nature loss to make xenophobic arguments for anti-immigration policies.2 This so-called “greening of hate”—a term explored by Guardian reporter Susie Cagle—is a common refrain in a wide range of conservative and white supremacist arguments, including those of Ann Coulter, Fox News host Tucker Carlson, neo-Nazi Richard Spencer, and the manifestos of more than one mass shooter.3

      The claim that immigration is to blame for America’s environmental problems is so absurd, racist, and out of the mainstream that it is easily debunked and tempting to ignore. The scientific community, and the little research that has been conducted in this area, resoundingly refutes the premise. Consider, for example, the environmental damage caused by weak and inadequate regulation of polluting industries; the destruction of wildlife habitat to accommodate wealthy exurbs and second homes; the design and propagation of policies that concentrate toxic poisons and environmental destruction near communities of color and low-income communities; the continued subsidization of fossil fuel extraction and trampling of Indigenous rights to accommodate drilling and mining projects; and the propagation of a throw-away culture by industrial powerhouses. All of these factors and others cause exponentially more severe environmental harm than a family that is fleeing violence, poverty, or suffering to seek a new life in the United States.

      The extremist effort to blame immigrants for the nation’s environmental problems deserves scrutiny—and not merely for the purpose of disproving its xenophobic and outlandish claims. The contours, origins, funding sources, and goals of this right-wing effort must be understood in order to effectively combat it and ensure that the extremists pushing it have no place in the conservation movement. The individuals and organizations that are most fervently propagating this argument come largely from well-funded hate groups that are abusing discredited ideologies that were prevalent in the 19th-century American conservation movement in an attempt to make their racist rhetoric more palatable to a public concerned about the health of their environment.

      While leaders of the contemporary, mainstream environmental movement in the United States have disavowed this strain of thought and are working to confront the legacies of colonialism and racism in environmental organizations and policies, a small set of right-wing political operatives are trying to magnify overtly xenophobic and false environmental arguments to achieve specific political objectives. In particular, these right-wing political operatives and their deep-pocketed funders are seeking to broaden the appeal of their anti-immigration zealotry by greenwashing their movement and supplying their right-wing base with alternative explanations for environmental decline that sidestep the culpability of the conservative anti-regulatory agenda. In their refusal to confront the true reasons for environmental decline, they are hurting the people—immigrants, Indigenous peoples, and people of color—who bear a disproportionate burden of environmental consequences and are increasingly the base of the climate justice and conservation movements.

      (...)

      https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/reports/2021/02/01/495228/extremist-campaign-blame-immigrants-u-s-environmental-problems

  • StructuresMinimalistes sur Twitter

    https://twitter.com/Minimaliste13/status/1364613730533847042

    Aujourd’hui, nous sommes le 24/02.

    Il me semble que nous devrions nous souvenir de cette date, de ce qu’il s’est passé il y a exactement un an, le 24/02/2020, qui fut un point de bascule dans l’histoire de l’épidémie de #Covid_19 en France.

    Le 24/02/2020, l’OMS termine sa mission d’évaluation de la réponse chinoise à l’épidémie de #Covid_19 à Wuhan. Le rapport afférent souligne le danger présenté par #Sars-CoV-2.

    https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/report-of-the-who-china-joint-mission-on-coronavirus-disease-2019-(covid-19)

    « It must be considered capable of causing enormous health, economic and societal impacts in any setting. It is not SARS and it is not influenza. [We risk failing to] exploit all possible measures to slow transmission of the COVID-19 virus, reduce disease and save lives. »

    Ce rapport recommande le port du masque en population générale, recommande de se préparer à une augmentation drastique des besoins en oxygène et réanimation et informe du risque de pénurie globale d’équipements médicaux de base, en pointant à nouveau spécifiquement les masques.

    Dès cette date, la plus haute autorité compétente en la matière alertait sur la nécessité de planifier le port du masque en population générale, de préparer l’approvisionnement des soignants en masques FFP2 (p32 et 33) et de préparer des lits de réanimation.

    Toute personne qui, passée cette date, vous a dit que l’on ne savait pas, que c’était une grippette, que l’#OMS ne recommandait pas le masque, que « moi par exemple je ne sais pas mettre un masque », que « un masque pour mes enfants, ah non pas du tout »

    https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/273863-sibeth-ndiaye-04032020-crise-coronavirus-covid-19

    ou que « au début du mois de mars même, encore plus en février ou en janvier, personne ne parlait de masques » est un incompétent criminel ou un menteur (ou plus probablement les deux).

    https://twitter.com/Minimaliste13/status/1262621727588319233

    Le 24/02, c’est aussi le lundi suivant le meeting évangélique de Mulhouse, l’un des événements majeurs de super-contamination en France. C’est aussi la semaine où les résultats de traçages du cluster de l’Oise révèlent... que l’on a perdu le contrôle de l’épidémie dans l’Oise.

    Le lendemain, la première victime française du #Covid_19, un enseignant de Crépy-en-Valois décèdera. De nombreux enseignants des établissements scolaires seront testés positifs. Ils se seront contaminés « ailleurs ».

    Je ne laisserai personne dire que l’exécutif ne s’est pas montré à la hauteur. Le 24/02, #Agnès_Buzyn, qui était ministre de la santé exactement 7 jours auparavant encore, déclare que le traçage suffit en France, que l’épidémie est sous contrôle mais reproche à Hidalgo de ne pas avoir assez préparé l’arrivée de la pandémie. Il faut (re)voir cette vidéo.

    « Nous avons tout anticipé, nous avons préparé, dans l’hypothèse où le virus circulerait. S’il y a une chose que je sais faire, c’est de la gestion de crise ».

    https://www.europe1.fr/politique/pour-agnes-buzyn-anne-hidalgo-na-pas-prepare-paris-a-larrivee-du-coronavirus

    Surtout, il faut voir le visage ravagé d’Agnès Buzyn qui, contrairement à #Jean-Michel_Blanquer n’a pas reçu la grâce d’être une psychopathe et de pouvoir mentir sans vergogne.

    #Olivier_Véran, le ministre en activité, déclare de son côté que le virus ne circule plus en France.

    « Il n’y a pas de malade identifié ce soir sur le territoire national. Il n’y a ce soir pas de circulation du virus sur le territoire national »

    https://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/coronavirus-une-11e-guerison-en-france-plus-aucun-malade-hospitalise-202002

    Du côté de la majorité législative, on est aussi très en pointe dans la surveillance de l’épidémie. Ce jour-là, c’est #Cendra_Motin qui se distinguera. Dans une intervention devenue célèbre, elle demande « honnêtement qui aujourd’hui, s’il connaissait le régime universel, accepterait de revenir en arrière ? Nous vous proposons un grand bond en arrière (applaudissements sur les bancs de la majorité) ».

    C’est vrai, qui refuserait ce grand bond en arrière ?

    https://video.twimg.com/ext_tw_video/1232006648736120832/pu/vid/854x480/aNzYrjRCUU3S4BbL.mp4?tag=10

    https://twitter.com/sebastienjumel/status/1232006750292893696

    Tous les métiers du soin peut-être, pour qui l’impact de la #réforme_des_retraites est résumé ci-dessous sur la base du travail exceptionnel de simulation produit par #Bruno_Scherrer

    Aide-soignante, départ à 62 ans : 42% du SMIC. Infirmière : 71%.

    https://twitter.com/Minimaliste13/status/1244648706277806082

    Et encore, c’est la première pension et sous l’hypothèse (improbable) d’une longue carrière sans temps partiel ni interruption, après cela se dégrade.

    Une infirmière qui part à la retraite à 62 ans avec 71% du SMIC.

    Rien que d’y penser, j’ai des larmes aux yeux. Et la rage.

    Voilà ce qu’il s’est passé il y a un an. On savait ce qu’il fallait faire, Buzyn reprochait à sa rivale de ne pas en faire assez, Véran déclarait qu’il n’y avait plus de circulation du virus et Motin célébrait la destruction de la retraite des infirmières.

    Ni oubli, ni pardon.

    #in_retrospect

  • Vie « en pause », vie qui « déraille », vie qui « s’écroule » : paroles de jeunes au bout du rouleau - Charente Libre.fr
    https://www.charentelibre.fr/2021/02/25/vie-en-pause-vie-qui-deraille-vie-qui-s-ecroule-paroles-de-jeunes-au-b

    « A chaque rebond épidémique, on reperd tout » : étudiants « privés de job », diplômés en quête « désespérée » de stages ou travailleurs plongés dans la précarité, plusieurs jeunes ont raconté leur vie « en pause » ou « bouleversée » par le Covid-19, parfois jusqu’au « déraillement »

    #jeunesse #étudiants #précarité #confinements

  • Basculements
    Mondes émergents, possibles désirables

    Ernest London

    https://lavoiedujaguar.net/Basculements-Mondes-emergents-possibles-desirables

    Dénonçant la notion d’effondrement, qui dépolitise les enjeux en postulant une trajectoire unique et comme jouée d’avance, Jérôme Baschet, qui a enseigné à l’Universidad Autonoma de Chiapas, à San Cristóbal de Las Casas, propose celle de « basculements » qui fait place, au contraire, à l’imprévisibilité croissante de notre temps et au rôle central de la mobilisation politique. Alors qu’« un microscopique fragment de l’à peine-vivant » a provoqué « la paralysie d’une machinerie aussi ample et ramifiée que l’économie mondiale », supposant la reproduction d’autres crises systémiques du capitalisme, il esquisse plusieurs scénarios, dont celui d’une ouverture des possibles qui nous engagerait vers des manières de vivre échappant aux logiques du système-monde capitaliste.

    Il tente, tout d’abord, de cerner les tendances principales que la crise du coronavirus a pu induire, amplifier ou affecter significativement : accélération de la numérisation généralisée ; modification des équilibres géostratégiques, confirmant l’effritement de l’hégémonie états-unienne et la montée en puissance de la Chine ; reconfiguration des circuits de la globalisation, notamment avec un mouvement de relocalisations productives dans un souci de souveraineté plutôt que dans une perspective écologique ; interventionnisme accru de l’État dont on attend une réponse face à la pandémie, que l’on critique ses manquements ou l’excès des mesures d’exception. Toutefois, ce serait une erreur de postuler une « opposition diamétrale » entre néolibéralisme et État, puisque le premier a toujours eu besoin du second pour assurer sa bonne régulation, l’État étant appelé à la rescousse pour socialiser les pertes et se désengageant à nouveau pour permettre la privatisation des bénéfices. (...)

    #Jérôme_Baschet #capitalisme #économie #globalisation #néolibéralisme #État #pandémie #crise #effondrement #modèle_chinois #Frédéric_Lordon #Murray_Bookchin #Erik_Olin_Wright #expérience_zapatiste #Gilets_jaunes #stratégies #rupture

  • Débat Twitch avec les écoles de journalisme
    http://www.davduf.net/20-presse-puree-sur-twitter-%F0%9F%8E%99-on-va-parler-du

    Ce mercredi 24 février en direct sur Twitch https://www.twitch.tv/davduf, 18h45 Purée ! 🥔 🎈On parle de la presse et du journalisme. Les pieds dans le plat ! Presse-Purée est une chaîne animée par des étudiant.e.s en journalisme. 🎈À chaque stream, un.e invité.e partagera ses réflexions, ses doutes et ses espoirs sur le journalisme et les médias, et répondra à vos questions dans le chat. 🎈Suivez notre chaîne pour les prochains streams 👉 https://www.twitch.tv/presse_puree_ 🎈Retrouvez-nous aussi sur Twitter (...) #Agenda

    https://www.twitch.tv/davduf

    #journalisme #médias #critique

  • Les usages politiques du #droit
    https://laviedesidees.fr/Les-usages-politiques-du-droit.html

    À propos de : Liora Israël, À la gauche du droit. Mobilisations politiques du droit et de la #justice en France (1968-1981), EHESS. Des procès de Bobigny à l’Affaire du siècle, le droit peut-il constituer un instrument politique efficace pour les luttes sociales ? À rebours de l’image d’un droit foncièrement conservateur, la sociologue L. Israël revient sur les usages stratégiques du droit par la gauche française de l’après-68.

    #Histoire #mobilisation
    https://laviedesidees.fr/IMG/pdf/20210224_usagesdudroit.pdf
    https://laviedesidees.fr/IMG/docx/20210224_usagesdudroit.docx

  • Du refus d’empreinte à la préventive...
    Incarcération d’E. suite à la manif contre Génération identitaire

    Arrêté seul lors d’un contrôle préventif avant toute manif, il est accusé de « groupement en vue de » et port d’un cadenas de vélo. Il a refusé la comparution et a été maintenu en détention dans l’attente du procès malgré toutes les garanties de représentation juste parce qu’il a refusé de donner la signalétique, le juge affirmant qu’il s’agit d’un principe normal : pas d’empreintes = détention provisoire.

    Edit

    La juge Rhiyouri avait la possibilité de placer ce justiciable sous contrôle judiciaire, ce qui l’aurait contraint à donner ses empreintes pour obtenir sa libération. Cela n’a pas été le cas.
    Cette prise d’empreintes devrait intervenir pendant la détention. Comme ce refus de signalétique est le seul motif invoqué pour ordonner l’incarcération, il est probable qu’une demande de mise en liberté soit alors accordée.

    #manifestation #police #justice #prison #détention_provisoire

    • juste pour mon information, le E. avait un vélo à la main - autre arme par destination - quand il a été arrêté avec son cadenas ?

    • Pas que je sache, cela n’a pas été rapporté, et il me semble que le tract aurait mentionné un tel fait :) Ce qui est clair en revanche c’est que c’est le refus de donner ses empreintes et lui seul qui lui vaut d’être détenu alors que comme la défense l’a signalé on ne demande pas à la juge de donner ses empreintes lorsque son identité est vérifiée et qu’il avait non seulement des papiers en règle mais diverses attestations (dont domicile et emploi, combien ne peuvent en produire autant ?) pour faire valoir des « garanties de représentation » qui sont le moyen usuel d’éviter une détention provisoire qui en principe est supposée être l’exception.

    • Suite à la contre manifestation de Génération Identitaire, 22 février 2021
      https://paris-luttes.info/suite-a-la-contre-manifestation-de-14779

      Toutefois, de nombreux·ses camarades ont été interpelé·es (au moins une quinzaine de gardes à vue en cours), contrôlé·es, fouillé·es, et verbalisé·es (plusieurs dizaines d’amendes de 135€) en justifiant qu’ils et elles « ont prévu de rejoindre une manifestation interdite ». Suite à quoi les camarades verbalisé·es ont été menacé·es d’interpellation et arrestation si ils et elles étaient recontrôlé·es dans le rassemblement prétendument interdit.

  • #Uber drivers are workers not self-employed, Supreme Court rules

    Uber drivers must be treated as workers rather than self-employed, the UK’s Supreme Court has ruled.

    The decision could mean thousands of Uber drivers are entitled to minimum wage and holiday pay.

    The ruling could leave the ride-hailing app facing a hefty compensation bill, and have wider consequences for the gig economy.

    Uber said the ruling centred on a small number of drivers and it had since made changes to its business.

    In a long-running legal battle, Uber had finally appealed to the Supreme Court after losing three earlier rounds.

    Uber’s share price dipped as US trading began on Friday as investors grappled with what impact the London ruling could have on the firm’s business model.

    It is being challenged by its drivers in multiple countries over whether they should be classed as workers or self-employed.
    What’s the background to the ruling?

    Former Uber drivers James Farrar and Yaseen Aslam took Uber to an employment tribunal in 2016, arguing they worked for Uber. Uber said its drivers were self employed and it therefore was not responsible for paying any minimum wage nor holiday pay.

    The two, who originally won an employment tribunal against the ride hailing app giant in October 2016, told the BBC they were “thrilled and relieved” by the ruling.

    “I think it’s a massive achievement in a way that we were able to stand up against a giant,” said Mr Aslam, president of the App Drivers & Couriers Union (ADCU).

    “We didn’t give up and we were consistent - no matter what we went through emotionally or physically or financially, we stood our ground.”

    Uber appealed against the employment tribunal decision but the Employment Appeal Tribunal upheld the ruling in November 2017.

    The company then took the case to the Court of Appeal, which upheld the ruling in December 2018.

    The ruling on Friday was Uber’s last appeal, as the Supreme Court is Britain’s highest court, and it has the final say on legal matters.

    Delivering his judgement, Lord Leggatt said that the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed Uber’s appeal that it was an intermediary party and stated that drivers should be considered to be working not only when driving a passenger, but whenever logged in to the app.

    The court considered several elements in its judgement:

    - Uber set the fare which meant that they dictated how much drivers could earn
    - Uber set the contract terms and drivers had no say in them
    - Request for rides is constrained by Uber who can penalise drivers if they reject too many rides
    - Uber monitors a driver’s service through the star rating and has the capacity to terminate the relationship if after repeated warnings this does not improve

    Looking at these and other factors, the court determined that drivers were in a position of subordination to Uber where the only way they could increase their earnings would be to work longer hours.

    Jamie Heywood, Uber’s Regional General Manager for Northern and Eastern Europe, said: "We respect the Court’s decision which focussed on a small number of drivers who used the Uber app in 2016.

    "Since then we have made some significant changes to our business, guided by drivers every step of the way. These include giving even more control over how they earn and providing new protections like free insurance in case of sickness or injury.

    “We are committed to doing more and will now consult with every active driver across the UK to understand the changes they want to see.”
    What did Uber argue?

    Uber has long argued that it is a booking agent, which hires self-employed contractors that provide transport.

    By not being classified as a transport provider, Uber is not currently paying 20% VAT on fares.

    The Supreme Court ruled that Uber has to consider its drivers “workers” from the time they log on to the app, until they log off.

    This is a key point because Uber drivers typically spend time waiting for people to book rides on the app.

    Previously, the firm had said that if drivers were found to be workers, then it would only count the time during journeys when a passenger is in the car.

    “This is a win-win-win for drivers, passengers and cities. It means Uber now has the correct economic incentives not to oversupply the market with too many vehicles and too many drivers,” said James Farrar, ADCU’s general secretary.

    “The upshot of that oversupply has been poverty, pollution and congestion.”
    Why are some drivers unhappy with Uber?

    Mr Aslam, who claims Uber’s practices forced him to leave the trade as he couldn’t make ends meet, is considering becoming a driver for the app again. But he is upset that the ruling took so long.

    “It took us six years to establish what we should have got in 2015. Someone somewhere, in the government or the regulator, massively let down these workers, many of whom are in a precarious position,” he said.

    - Uber drivers launch legal battle over ’favouritism’
    - The Uber driver evicted from home and left to die of coronavirus

    Mr Farrar points out that with fares down 80% due to the pandemic, many drivers have been struggling financially and feel trapped in Uber’s system.

    “We’re seeing many of our members earning £30 gross a day right now,” he said, explaining that the self-employment grants issued by the government only cover 80% of a driver’s profits, which isn’t even enough to pay for their costs.

    “If we had these rights today, those drivers could at least earn a minimum wage to live on.”
    Will we pay more for Uber rides?

    That remains to be seen, but it could potentially happen.

    When Uber listed its shares in the United States in 2019, its filing with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) included a section on risks to its business.

    The company said in this section that if it had to classify drivers as workers, it would “incur significant additional expenses” in compensating the drivers for things such as the minimum wage and overtime.

    “Further, any such reclassification would require us to fundamentally change our business model, and consequently have an adverse effect on our business and financial condition,” it added.
    What is the VAT issue about?

    Uber also wrote in the filing that if Mr Farrar and Mr Aslam were to win their case, HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) would then classify the firm as a transport provider, and Uber would need to pay VAT on fares.

    This relates to a judicial review filed by Jolyon Maugham QC in 2019.

    Mr Maugham, a barrister specialising in tax and employment law, applied to HMRC to ask for a judicial review and that HMRC demand that Uber pay VAT.

    “I tried to force the issue by suing Uber for a VAT receipt, because I thought that, that way, even if HMRC didn’t want to charge Uber, I would be able to force it to,” he told the BBC.

    “The Supreme Court has fundamentally answered two questions at the same time: one is whether drivers are workers for Uber, and the other is whether Uber is liable to pay VAT to HMRC,” said Mr Maugham, who also heads up campaign group The Good Law Project.

    “It makes it extremely difficult for Uber to continue to resist paying what I understand to be more than £1bn in VAT and interest.”

    HMRC and Uber are still in dispute about the firm’s VAT liability.
    What does this mean for the gig economy?

    Tom Vickers is a senior lecturer in sociology at Nottingham Trent University and head of the Work Futures Research Group, which studies the jobs that people do and how they change over time.

    He thinks the Supreme Court’s ruling has wider implications for a lot of other gig economy workers like other private hire drivers, couriers and delivery drivers.

    "The central point for me is that the ruling focuses on the control that companies exercise over people’s labour - this control also carries with it responsibilities for their conditions and wellbeing.

    “This is even more important in the context of the pandemic.”

    As for Uber, Rachel Mathieson, senior associate at Bates Wells, which represented Mr Farrar and Mr Aslam, said her firm’s position was that the ruling applies to all 90,000 drivers who have been active with Uber since and including 2016.

    “Our position is that the ruling applies to all of their drivers at large,” she said.

    Dr Alex Wood, an Internet Institute research associate on gig economy at Oxford University, disagrees.

    He told the BBC that because the UK doesn’t have a labour inspectorate, these “rules aren’t enforced and it falls to workers to bring subsequent tribunals”.

    This means that “in reality, it’s very easy for Uber to just ignore this until more tribunals come for the remaining 40,000 [drivers]”.

    https://www.bbc.com/news/business-56123668
    #travail #justice #UK #Angleterre #cour_suprême #travail #travailleurs_indépendants #vacances #salaire #salaire_minimum #conditions_de_travail #TVA

    ping @isskein @karine4

  • Extrait du Rapport annuel du référent déontologue ministériel - 2019 cité par le Canard enchaîné du 17 février.
    https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/fr/content/download/126152/1008827/file/rapport-annuel-du-referent-deontologue-mi-2019.pdf

    * FOCUS SUR L’USAGE DE LA #FORCE_PUBLIQUE***

    Depuis plus d’un an, le contexte particulier de la contestation sociale interroge sur l’usage de la force par les #policiers et les #gendarmes engagés sur des dispositifs de maintien de l’ordre. S’il n’est pas contestable que police et gendarmerie sont bien les dépositaires du monopole de la #force_légitime, ni que l’usage de la force légitime puisse s’avérer violent, au sens commun du terme, cet usage ne peut, en tout cas, se concevoir que dans le but de protéger les intérêts de la société et la sécurité des personnes et des biens. Prévu par le droit, l’usage de la force, et c’est ce qui fonde sa légitimité, doit être également accepté par la population.

    Aussi se pose la question de son mésusage ou des abus qui peuvent en être faits dès lors qu’il excède, notamment, les conditions de nécessité et de proportionnalité auxquelles il est soumis. C’est une interrogation qui questionne en permanence les inspections générales de la #police et de la #gendarmerie, instances de contrôle des deux institutions, lorsqu’elles ont à enquêter sur les conditions d’usage de la force publique. Mais c’est aussi une question qui interpelle l’ensemble du corps social et mérite une réflexion ouverte et globale qui permette de comprendre comment l’usage de la force peut répondre aux exigences de l’#ordre_public, tout en étant conforme aux #droits_de_l’Homme et à l’évolution des mœurs.

    Consulté par le ministre de l’intérieur sur la #déontologie des forces de l’ordre dans le maintien de l’ordre public, le référent déontologue ministériel a formulé plusieurs observations :

    « Plus que par le passé, la France est observée, parfois critiquée, par le monde et ses organisations politiques, juridictionnelles ou associatives, du #GRECO du #Conseil_de_l’Europe aux ONG comme l’#Action_des_chrétiens_pour_l’abolition_de_la_torture dans son rapport de mars 2020. Nous ne pouvons nous satisfaire de décisions comme celle de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme [#CEDH] le 30 avril 2020 qui condamne la France à l’unanimité pour une interpellation menée le 18 juin 2002 par les forces de sécurité durant laquelle les policiers ont eu des gestes « particulièrement violents » et « pas strictement nécessaires » à l’encontre du requérant, alors suspecté dans une affaire de menaces de mort et subornation de témoins avant d’être blanchi.

    Nous travaillons sur plusieurs aspects de la déontologie qui sont communs à tous les secteurs du ministère de l’intérieur : probité, gestion des conflits d’intérêts et cadeaux, présence sur les réseaux sociaux, apparence physique en service.

    Mais, même en dehors de saisine à lui destinée sur ce point, le référent déontologue ministériel est attentif à l’usage de la force par les personnels. Car cette question délicate est spécifique à ce ministère chargé de la paix publique et de la police judiciaire, condition d’exercice plénier de la #justice.

    Le référent ministériel insiste sur la fonction des forces de sécurité qui est de faire respecter le droit et les libertés. La police et la gendarmerie nationales ne sont pas là pour atténuer ou restreindre les libertés, elles sont là pour garantir les conditions d’exercice des libertés conformément à notre Constitution (art.12 de la Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen).

    La manifestation sur la voie publique est un droit. Bien entendu, ni l’insulte, ni l’agression des forces de l’ordre, ni les atteintes aux biens publics ou privés, lesquelles sont des délits. Le fonctionnaire et le militaire doivent savoir résister aux tensions et ne passer à l’action que quand ils en ont reçu l’ordre. Au commandement revient l’impératif de ne donner qu’un ordre légal et de l’accompagner des moyens raisonnables de mise en œuvre. Le manifestant n’est pas un ennemi. Il reste une personne qu’il convient de ramener dans le cadre de la loi et d’interpeller s’il commet des délits mais il ne s’agit ni de le « chasser » ni de le « réduire ».

    Et ce premier rapport ne peut éviter de souligner cinq points :

    1° En premier lieu, une déontologie de l’usage proportionné de la force et des armes est essentielle pour que les forces de sécurité (police et gendarmeries nationales) jouent le rôle que la République leur a confié.
    Ce principe exprimé notamment aux articles L435-1 et R434-18 du code de la sécurité intérieure (code de déontologie de la police et de la gendarmerie nationales) est essentiel pour les métiers publics de sécurité. Il implique de tous, et d’abord de la hiérarchie, sens de la nécessité, de la proportionnalité.

    2° Cette déontologie ne peut être fondée que sur le discernement des cadres et de chaque fonctionnaire ou militaire. Tel est bien le discernement rappelé à l’article R434-10 du code de sécurité intérieure (code de déontologie de la police et de la gendarmerie nationales). Le discernement en situation de stress, face à des violences, dont la gravité est en hausse, mérite toute notre attention. Le discernement porte sur l’analyse de la situation, la nature des forces utilisées, l’usage du temps (savoir passer de l’attente nécessaire à la réaction immédiate) et de la géographie (gestion des foules, issue de dispersion toujours ouverte), les ordres de manœuvres et de déplacement donnés aux effectifs et aussi, la nature des procédés qu’il s’agisse d’armes, de matériel ou de techniques d’intervention. (cf l’interdiction de la grenade GLI-F4 en janvier 2020 par le ministre de l’intérieur). Le discernement doit pouvoir maîtriser les mauvaises habitudes : colère et peur ne sont pas bonnes conseillères.

    3° La déontologie qui décrit les procédés adéquats pour mener les missions doit pouvoir être relayée par des recommandations du donneur d’ordres étudiées, testées et clairement exprimées. En ce sens, la publication du nouveau schéma national du maintien de l’ordre est attendue. Il était mentionné dans le rapport de la commission d’enquête sur les forces de sécurité à l’Assemblée nationale présidée par le député Jean-Michel Fauvergue (juillet 2019). La place du renseignement dans la préparation des grands dispositifs lors de manifestations doit être renforcée.

    4° La formation des personnels affectés à cette mission aussi indispensable que difficile du maintien de l’ordre doit être prioritaire.La formation se fait aussi par l’expérience des cadres intermédiaires qui contribuent à former sur le terrain leurs collègues plus jeunes. Quelle réponse à l’outrage et à la rébellion ? Quelles sommations et quelles informations diffuser aux manifestants, avant, pendant et après la manifestation ?

    5° Enfin le contrôle, et d’abord le contrôle interne doit être assumé comme une des causes de fierté de l’institution. Et non pas seulement subi au fil des enregistrements de scènes de rue par les téléphones toujours prompts à filmer les épisodes de fureur réciproques. Ceci suppose choix des équipes d’inspection sachant, quand il le faut, mêler inspection de direction générale (IGPN et IGGN) et inspection généraliste (IGA et même IGJ conformément à l’article 15 du code de procédure pénale). Et pourquoi s’interdire, dans certains cas délicats, de s’adjoindre des « sapiteurs » externes au ministère pour apporter une vue en toute apparence d’impartialité objective au sens de la jurisprudence européenne ? Ceci suppose que ne soient pas acceptées les quelques occasions où, dans une enquête administrative, la manifestation de la vérité est contredite par des témoignages unis et trop semblables ou unanimement mutiques des fonctionnaires et militaires qui participaient à la même action. Ceci suppose enfin, que pédagogie soit tirée des contrôles internes afin de ne plus reproduire des erreurs qui sont lourdes de conséquences. Quant aux contrôles externes, ils exigent une bonne coopération des administrations de sécurité : le Défenseur des droits joue un rôle constructif. Et quant à la justice, elle doit toujours pouvoir exercer sa mission en pleine indépendance. La maîtrise de la force continuera à être observée attentivement par le référent déontologue ministériel et la réunion des référents déontologues spécialisés. »

    Le déontologue est le magistrat Christian Vigouroux : https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christian_Vigouroux

  • Grève générale en Birmanie : mobilisation monstre contre le pouvoir...
    https://diasp.eu/p/12496639

    Grève générale en Birmanie : mobilisation monstre contre le pouvoir militaire

    Des centaines de milliers de personnes sont descendues dans la rue à travers le pays lundi lors d’une journée de grève générale contre le pouvoir militaire malgré les mises en garde des autorités et la répréssion violente du week-end.

    Une mobilisation sans précédent en Birmanie. Des centaines de milliers de personnes sont descendues dans la rue, lundi 22 février, pour manifester contre le pouvoir militaire en Birmanie.

    Les commerces ont fermé leurs portes dans le cadre d’une grève générale et les manifestants se sont rassemblés à travers le pays, malgré l’avertissement effrayant de la junte qui a prévenu qu’une confrontation coûterait des vies supplémentaires.

    Trois semaines après avoir pris le pouvoir et emprisonné la dirigeante (...)

  • Die Wut in Myanmar wächst
    https://diasp.eu/p/12497316

    Die Wut in Myanmar wächst

    Die Protestbewegung in Burma nimmt nach dem Putsch am 1. Februar eine neue Dimension an. Die Militärs waren überrascht über den starken Widerstand der Bevölkerung gegen ihre erneute totalitäre Machtübernahme und gegen die Verhaftung der gewählten Regierungsmitglieder sowie der wichtigsten politischen Führer und Führerinnen, allen voran der bekannten Friedensnobelpreisträgerin Aung Suu Kyi. Aber nicht nur Politiker, auch Künstler, Journalisten und andere Oppositionelle wurden verhaftet. Von Jinthana Sunthorn, Hongkong, aus dem Englischen von der Redaktion.

    Es dauerte nur ein paar Tage, bis sich die burmesische Bevölkerung von der anfänglichen Schockstarre erholt hatte und damit begann, sich zu organisieren. In Burma ist, wie in anderen Ländern auch, eine neue, aufgeklärte (...)

  • Comment l’écologie se vit dans les quartiers populaires - Page 1 | Mediapart
    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/220221/comment-l-ecologie-se-vit-dans-les-quartiers-populaires

    L’écologie est un thème trop souvent associé aux classes aisées ou fortement diplômées. Pourtant, leur empreinte écologique se révèle plus élevée que celle d’autres groupes sociaux moins dotés. De plus, dans les quartiers populaires, des pratiques écologiques existent bel et bien. Elles peuvent être la conséquence d’un héritage ouvrier et paysan, d’une situation de précarité ou d’une volonté politique réelle.

    Pour en savoir plus, Mediapart et le Bondy Blog ont reçu la chercheuse Léa Billen : doctorante à l’université de Nanterre, elle travaille sur les mobilisations écologistes dans les quartiers. Elle échange avec Linda Bouifrou, militante écologiste à Créteil.

    #jardins_ouvriers #jardins_familiaux #jardins_partagés #agriculture_urbaine #précarité #écologie

  • [RussEurope-en-Exil] Annuler la #Dette ? Un Débat européen – par #Jacques_Sapir
    https://www.les-crises.fr/russeurope-en-exil-annuler-la-dette-un-debat-europeen-par-jacques-sapir

    Le magazine russe « Ekspert », qui est l’hebdomadaire de référence en Russie, publie ce lundi 22 février un article de votre serviteur sur le débat actuel concernant l’annulation d’une partie des dettes souveraines. Ce débat, on le sait, a pris une résonance particulière en France mais aussi en Europe. Un appel international a été […]

    #Économie #Christine_Lagarde #Économie,_Christine_Lagarde,_Dette,_Jacques_Sapir

  • Behigorri - Le journal - Les Ruminant-e-s
    http://lesruminants.eklablog.com/behigorri-le-journal-a205194986

    Sommaire :

    Jesuispangoline de Laura Outan 2
    Dans ma cabane, je suis de Nina Terrpl 3
    Leçon de sauvagerie de SaVge 4
    La théorie de la fiction­panier de Ursula K. Le Guin 4
    Civilisation et biogynophobie de Ana Minski 7
    L’âge des couleurs de Colette Daviles­-Estinès 9
    CAPP, collectif abolition porno prostitution 10
    Pornland, Gail Dines 11
    Vous avez dit Satire ! de Cathy Garcia Canalès 12
    Julia Hill Butterfly 13
    Variations de la ville de Rosales Miroslava 14
    Animaux en terres humaines de Ana Minski 15
    Andrea Dworkin 16
    Les lézardes de feu de Ana Minski 16

    http://ekladata.com/YkNQ7S_EOTGBQnVg1fvd8yFhvlM.jpg

    Le PDF :
    http://ekladata.com/GNl9d1q9WrltWDegZwQoGyk6prU/journal-compresse.pdf

    Souvenez-vous, une lecture d’Ana Minski :
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MGA7SoUPxbU

    On ne va pas s’entendre
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d-izn_70LSY

    #Ana_Minski #féminisme #Andrea_Dworkin #fanzine #journal

  • Concerts (19)

    Certains concerts ont laissé des traces, dans l’imaginaire et sur des disques.

    Heureusement, car la présence du public, la nature des salles et d’autres éléments, quelques fois plus contingents, font qu’il se passe quelque chose de plus, un peu au delà… Au hasard de ré-écoutes récentes.

    https://entreleslignesentrelesmots.blog/2021/02/21/concerts-19

    #musique #jazz

  • Decolonisation and humanitarian response

    As part of our annual Careers in Humanitarianism Day, we were joined by:

    #Juliano_Fiori (Save the Children, and PhD Candidate at HCRI)
    – Professor #Patricia_Daley (Oxford University)
    – Professor #Elena_Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (UCL)

    in discussion (and sometimes disagreement!) on the notions of humanitarianism and decolonisation.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?list=PLcf7O1Y_SOZQ24s6vCT8rtR9ANGs0nzEi&v=BSTjc3YCH9I&feature=youtu.b


    #décolonialité #décolonialisme #humanitaire #conférence

    ping @cede @isskein @karine4

    • Migration, Humanitarianism, and the Politics of Knowledge —> An Interview with #Juliano_Fiori.

      Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh: In this issue of Migration and Society we are interested in the overarching theme of “Recentering the South in Studies of Migration.” Indeed, it is increasingly acknowledged that studies of and policy responses to migration and displacement often have a strong Northern bias. For instance, in spite of the importance of different forms of migration within, across, and between countries of the “global South” (i.e., “South-South migration”), there is a significant tendency to focus on migration from “the South” to countries of “the North” (i.e., South-North migration), prioritizing the perspectives and interests of stakeholders associated with the North. Against this backdrop, what is your position with regard to claims of Eurocentrism in studies of and responses to migration?

      Juliano Fiori: To the extent that they emerge from immanent critiques of colonialism and liberal capitalism, I am sympathetic toward them.1 Decentering (or provincializing) Europe is necessarily an epistemological project of deconstruction. But to contribute to a counterhegemonic politics, this project must move beyond the diagnosis of epistemicide to challenge the particular substance of European thought that has produced systems of oppression.

      The idea of “decolonizing the curriculum” is, of course, à la mode (Sabaratnam 2017; Vanyoro 2019). It is difficult to dispute the pedagogical necessity to question epistemic hierarchies and create portals into multiple worlds of knowledge. These endeavors are arguably compatible with the exigencies of Enlightenment reason itself. But, though I recognize Eurocentrism as an expression of white identity politics, I am wary of the notion that individual self-identification with a particular body of knowledge is a worthy or sufficient end for epistemic decolonization—a notion I associate with a prevalent strain of woke post-politics, which, revering the cultural symbols of late capitalism but seeking to resignify them, surely produces a solipsistic malaise. Decolonization of the curriculum must at least aim at the reconstruction of truths.

      Eurocentrism in the study of human migration is perhaps particularly problematic—and brazen—on account of the transnational and transcultural histories that migrants produce. Migrants defy the neat categorization of territories and peoples according to civilizational hierarchies. They redefine the social meaning of physical frontiers, and they blur the cultural frontier between Self and Other. They contribute to an intellectual miscegenation that undermines essentialist explanations of cultural and philosophical heritage. Migration itself is decentering (Achiume 2019).

      And it is largely because of this that it is perceived as a threat. Let’s consider Europe’s contemporary backlash against immigration. The economic argument about the strain immigration places on the welfare state—often framed in neo-Malthusian terms—can be readily rebutted with evidence of immigrants’ net economic contribution. But concerns about the dethroning of “European values” are rarely met head-on; progressive political elites have rather responded by doubling down on calls for multiculturalism from below, while promoting universalism from above, intensifying the contradictions of Eurocentricity.

      It is unsurprising that, in the Anglophone world, migration studies developed the trappings of an academic discipline—dedicated university programs, journals, scholarly societies—in the late 1970s, amid Western anxieties about governing increased emigration from postcolonial states. It quickly attracted critical anthropologists and postcolonial theorists. But the study of the itinerant Other has tended to reinforce Eurocentric assumptions. Migration studies has risen from European foundations. Its social scientific references, its lexicon, its institutional frameworks and policy priorities, its social psychological conceptions of identity—all position Europe at the zero point. It has assembled an intellectual apparatus that privileges the Western gaze upon the hordes invading from the barrens. That this gaze might be cast empathetically does nothing to challenge epistemic reproduction: Eurocentrism directs attention toward the non-Western Other, whose passage toward Europe confirms the centrality of Europe and evokes a response in the name of Eurocentrism. To the extent that Western scholars focus on South-South migration, the policy relevance of their research is typically defined by its implications for flows from South to North.

      The Eurocentrism of responses to forced migration by multinational charities, UN agencies, and the World Bank is not only a product of the ideological and cultural origins of these organizations. It also reflects the political interests of their principal donors: Western governments. Aid to refugees in countries neighboring Syria has been amply funded, particularly as the European Union has prioritized the containment of Syrians who might otherwise travel to Europe. Meanwhile, countries like India, South Africa, and Ivory Coast, which host significant numbers of regional migrants and refugees, receive proportionally little attention and support.

      It is an irony of European containment policies that, while adopted as a measure against supposed threats to Europeanness, they undermine the moral superiority that Eurocentrism presupposes. The notion of a humanitarian Europe is unsustainable when European efforts to deter immigration are considered alongside the conditions accepted for other regions of the world. A continent of more than half a billion people, Europe hosts just under 2.3 million refugees; Lebanon, with a population of six million, hosts more than 1.5 million refugees from Syria alone. It should be noted that, in recent years, European citizens’ movements have mobilized resources to prevent the death of people crossing the Mediterranean. Initiatives like Alarm Phone, Open Arms, Sea Watch, and SOS MEDITERRANEE seem to represent a politicized humanitarianism for the network age. But in their overt opposition to an emboldened ethnonationalist politics, they seek to rescue not only migrants and refugees, but also an idea of Europe.

      EFQ: How, if at all, do you engage with constructs such as “the global North,” “the global South,” and “the West” in your own work?

      JF: I inevitably use some of these terms more than others, but they are all problematic in a way, so I just choose the one that I think best conveys my intended meaning in each given context. West, North, and core are not interchangeable; they are associated with distinct, if overlapping, ontologies and temporalities. As are Third World, South, and developing world.

      I try to stick to three principles when using these terms. The first is to avoid the sort of negative framing to which your work on South-South encounters has helpfully drawn attention (i.e., Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2015, 2018; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Daley 2018). When we come across one of these terms being deployed negatively, it invariably describes that which is not of the West or of the North. As such, it centers Europe and North America, and it opens up an analytical terrain on which those residing beyond the imagined cultural bounds of these regions tend to be exoticized. When I need to frame something negatively, I try to do so directly, using the appropriate prefix.

      Second, I try to avoid setting up dichotomies and continuities. Placing East and West or North and South in opposition implies entirely dissimilar bodies, separated by a definite, undeviating frontier. But these terms are mutually constitutive, and it is rarely clear where, or even if, a frontier can be drawn. Such dichotomies also imply a conceptual equilibrium: that what lies on one side of the opposition is ontologically equivalent to what lies on the other. But the concept of the West is not equivalent to what the East represents today; indeed, it is questionable whether a concept of the East is now of much analytical value. South, West, North, and East might be constructed dialectically, but their imagined opposites are not necessarily their antitheses. Each arguably has more than one counterpoint.

      Similarly, I generally don’t use terms that associate countries or regions with stages of development—most obviously, least developed, developing, and developed. They point toward a progressivist and teleological theory of history to which I don’t subscribe. (The world-systems concepts of core, semiperiphery, and periphery offer a corrective to national developmental mythologies, but they are nonetheless inscribed in a systemic teleology.) The idea of an inexorable march toward capitalist modernity—either as the summit of civilization or as the point of maximum contradiction—fails to account for the angles, forks, and dead ends that historical subjects encounter. It also tends to be founded on a Eurocentric and theological economism that narrows human experience and, I would argue, mistakenly subordinates the political.

      Third, I try to use these terms conceptually, without presenting them as fixed unities. They must be sufficiently tight as concepts to transmit meaning. But they inevitably obscure the heterogeneity they encompass, which is always in flux. Moreover, as concepts, they are continuously resignified by discursive struggles and the reordering of the interstate system. Attempts to define them too tightly, according to particular geographies or a particular politics, can give the impression that they are ahistorical. Take Boaventura de Sousa Santos’s definition of the South, for example. For Santos, the South is not a geographical concept: he contends that it also exists in the geographical North (2014, 2016). Rather, it is a metaphor for the human suffering caused by capitalism and colonialism. It is anticapitalist, anticolonialist, antipatriarchal, and anti-imperialist. According to this definition, the South becomes representative of a particular left-wing politics (and it is negative). It thus loses its utility as a category of macrosociological analysis.

      Ultimately, all these terms are problematic because they are sweeping. But it is also for this reason that they can be useful for certain kinds of systemic analysis.

      EFQ: You have written on the history of “Western humanitarianism” (i.e., Fiori 2013; Baughan and Fiori 2015). Why do you focus on the “Western” character of humanitarianism?

      JF: I refer to “Western humanitarianism” as a rejoinder to the fashionable notion that there is a universal humanitarian ethic. Within both the Anglophone academy and the aid sector, it has become a commonplace that humanitarianism needs to be decolonized, and that the way to do this is to recognize and nurture “local” humanitarianisms around the world. In the last decade and a half, enthusiasm for global history has contributed to broader and more sophisticated understandings of how humanitarian institutions and discourses have been constructed. But it has also arguably contributed to the “humanitarianization” of different altruistic impulses, expressions of solidarity, and charitable endeavors across cultures.

      The term “humanitarian” was popularized in English and French in the first half of the nineteenth century, and it soon became associated with humanistic religion. It thus connoted the existence of an ideal humanity within every individual and, as Didier Fassin (2012) has argued, it has come to represent the secularization of the Christian impulse to life. It was used to describe a wide range of campaigns, from abolition and temperance to labor reform. But all promoted a rationalist conception of humanity derived from European philosophy. That is, an abstract humanity, founded upon a universal logos and characterized by the mind-body duality. What is referred to today as the “humanitarian system”—of financial flows and liberal institutions—has been shaped predominantly by Western power and political interests. But the justification for its existence also depends upon the European division between the reasoned human and the unreasoned savage. The avowed purpose of modern humanitarianism is to save, convert, and civilize the latter. To cast modern humanitarian reason as a universal is to deny the specificity of ethical dispositions born of other conceptions of humanity. Indeed, the French philosopher François Jullien (2014) has argued that the concept of “the universal” itself is of the West.

      Of course, there are practices that are comparable to those of Western humanitarian agencies across different cultures. However, claiming these for humanitarianism sets them on European foundations, regardless of their author’s inspiration; and it takes for granted that they reproduce the minimalist politics of survival with which the Western humanitarian project has come to be associated.

      So why not refer to “European humanitarianism”? First, because it must be recognized that, as a set of evolving ethical practices, humanitarianism does not have a linear intellectual genealogy. European philosophy itself has of course been influenced by other traditions of thought (see Amin 1989; Bevilacqua 2018; Hobson 2004; Patel 2018): pre-Socratic Greek thinkers borrowed from the Babylonians, the Persians, and the Egyptians; Enlightenment philosophes had exchanges with Arab intellectuals. Second, reference to the West usefully points to the application of humanitarian ideas through systems of power.

      Since classical antiquity, wars and ruptures have produced various narratives of the West. In the mid-twentieth century, essentialist histories of Western civilization emphasized culture. For Cold War political scientists, West and East often represented distinct ideological projects. I refer to the West as something approaching a sociopolitical entity—a power bloc—that starts to take form in the early nineteenth century as Western European intellectuals and military planners conceive of Russia as a strategic threat in the East. This bloc is consolidated in the aftermath of World War I, under the leadership of the United States, which, as net creditor to Europe, shapes a new liberal international order. The West, then, becomes a loose grouping of those governments and institutional interests (primarily in Europe and North America) that, despite divergences, have been at the forefront of efforts to maintain and renew this order. During the twentieth century, humanitarians were sometimes at odds with the ordering imperatives of raison d’état, but contemporary humanitarianism is a product of this West—and a pillar of liberal order.2

      EFQ: With this very rich historically and theoretically grounded discussion in mind, it is notable that policy makers and practitioners are implementing diverse ways of “engaging” with “the global South” through discourses and practices of “partnership” and supporting more “horizontal,” rather than “vertical,” modes of cooperation. In turn, one critique of such institutionalized policy engagement is that it risks instrumentalizing and co-opting modes of so-called South-South cooperation and “hence depoliticising potential sources of resistance to the North’s neoliberal hegemony” (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Daley 2018: 2). Indeed, as you suggested earlier, it has been argued that policy makers are strategically embracing “South-South migration,” “South-South cooperation,” and the “localisation of aid agenda” as efficient ways both “to enhance development outcomes” and to “keep ‘Southerners’ in the South,” as “part and parcel of Northern states’ inhumane, racist and racialised systems of border and immigration control” (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Daley 2018: 19). What, if any, are the dangers of enhancing “policy engagement” with “the South”? To what extent do you think that such instrumentalization and co-option can be avoided?

      JF: The term “instrumentalization” gives the impression that there are circumstances under which policy engagement can be objectively just and disinterested. Even when framed as humanitarian, the engagement of Western actors in the South is inspired by a particular politics. Policy engagement involves an encounter of interests and a renegotiation of power relations; for each agent, all others are instruments in its political strategy. Co-option is just a symptom of negotiation between unequal agents with conflicting interests—which don’t need to be stated, conscious, or rationally pursued. It is the means through which the powerful disarm and transform agendas they cannot suppress.

      The “localization agenda” is a good example. Measures to enable effective local responses to disaster are now discussed as a priority at international humanitarian congresses. These discussions can be traced at least as far back as Robert Chambers’s work (1983) on participatory rural development, in the 1980s. And they gathered momentum in the mid-2000s, as a number of initiatives promoted greater local participation in humanitarian operations. But, of course, there are different ideas about what localization should entail.

      As localization has climbed the humanitarian policy agenda, the overseas development divisions of Western governments have come to see it as an opportunity to increase “value for money” and, ultimately, reduce aid expenditure. They promote cash transfer programming as the most “empowering” aid technology. Localization then becomes complementary to the integration of emergency response into development agendas, and to the expansion of markets.

      Western humanitarian agencies that call for localization—and there are those, notably some branches of Médecins Sans Frontières, that do not—have generally fallen in line with this developmental interpretation, on account of their own ideological preferences as much as coercion by donor governments. But they have also presented localization as a moral imperative: a means of “shifting power” to the South to decolonize humanitarianism. While localization might be morally intuitive, Western humanitarians betray their hubris in supposing that their own concessions can reorder the aid industry and the geostrategic matrix from which it takes form. Their proposed solutions, then, including donor budgetary reallocations, are inevitably technocratic. Without structural changes to the political economy of aid, localization becomes a pretext for Western governments and humanitarian agencies to outsource risk. Moreover, it sustains a humanitarian imaginary that associates Westerners with “the international”—the space of politics, from which authority is born—and those in disaster-affected countries with “the local”—the space of the romanticized Other, vulnerable but unsullied by the machinations of power. (It is worth stating that the term “localization” itself implies the transformation of something “global” into something local, even though “locals”—some more than others—are constitutive of the global.)

      There are Southern charities and civil society networks—like NEAR,3 for example—that develop similar narratives on localization, albeit in more indignant tones. They vindicate a larger piece of the pie. But, associating themselves with a neomanagerial humanitarianism, they too embrace a politics incapable of producing a systemic critique of the coloniality of aid.

      Yet demands for local ownership of disaster responses should also be situated within histories of the subaltern. Some Western humanitarian agencies that today advocate for localization, including Save the Children, once faced opposition from anticolonial movements to their late imperial aid projects. More recently, so-called aid recipient perception surveys have repeatedly demonstrated the discontent of disaster-affected communities regarding impositions of foreign aid, but they have also demonstrated anguish over histories of injustice in which the Western humanitarian is little more than an occasional peregrine. It is the structural critique implicit in such responses that the localization agenda sterilizes. In the place of real discussion about power and inequalities, then, we get a set of policy prescriptions aimed at the production of self-sufficient neoliberal subjects, empowered to save themselves through access to markets.

      While some such co-option is always likely in policy engagement, it can be reduced through the formation of counterhegemonic coalitions. Indeed, one dimension of what is now called South-South cooperation involves a relatively old practice among Southern governments of forming blocs to improve their negotiating position in multilateral forums. And, in the twenty-first century, they have achieved moderate successes on trade, global finance, and the environment. But it is important to recognize that co-option occurs in South-South encounters too. And, of course, that political affinities and solidarity can and do exist across frontiers.

      EFQ: You edited the first issue of the Journal of Humanitarian Affairs, which focused on “humanitarianism and the end of liberal order” (see Fiori 2019), and you are also one of the editors of a forthcoming book on this theme, Amidst the Debris: Humanitarianism and the End of Liberal Order. New populisms of the right now challenge the liberal norms and institutions that have shaped the existing refugee regime and have promoted freer movement of people across borders. Can decolonial and anticolonial thinking provide a basis for responses to displacement and migration that do more than resist?

      JF: Any cosmopolitan response to migration is an act of resistance to the political organization of the interstate system.4 As blood-and-soil politicians now threaten to erect walls around the nation-state, the political meaning and relevance of cosmopolitan resistance changes. But if this resistance limits itself to protecting the order that appears to be under threat, it is likely to be ineffective. Moreover, an opportunity to articulate internationalisms in pursuit of a more just order will be lost.

      In recent years, liberal commentators have given a great deal of attention to Trump, Salvini, Duterte, Orbán, Bolsonaro, and other leading figures of the so-called populist Right. And these figures surely merit attention on account of their contributions to a significant conjunctural phenomenon. But the fetishization of their idiosyncrasies and the frenzied investigation of their criminality serves a revanchist project premised on the notion that, once they are removed from office (through the ballot box or otherwise), the old order of things will be restored. To be sure, the wave that brought them to power will eventually subside; but the structures (normative, institutional, epistemological) that have stood in its way are unlikely to be left intact. Whether the intention is to rebuild these structures or to build new ones, it is necessary to consider the winds that produced the wave. In other words, if a cosmopolitan disposition is to play a role in defining the new during the current interregnum, resistance must be inscribed into strategies that take account of the organic processes that have produced Trumpism and Salvinism.

      French geographer Christophe Guilluy offers an analysis of one aspect of organic change that I find compelling, despite my discomfort with the nativism that occasionally flavors his work. Guilluy describes a hollowing out of the Western middle class (2016, 2018). This middle class was a product of the postwar welfarist pact. But, since the crisis of capitalist democracy in the 1970s, the internationalization of capital and the financialization of economies have had a polarizing effect on society. According to Guilluy, there are now two social groupings: the upper classes, who have profited from neoliberal globalization or have at least been able to protect themselves from its fallout; and the lower classes, who have been forced into precarious labor and priced out of the city. It is these lower classes who have had to manage the multicultural integration promoted by progressive neoliberals of the center-left and center-right. Meanwhile, the upper classes have come to live in almost homogenous citadels, from which they cast moral aspersions on the reactionary lower classes who rage against the “open society.” An assertion of cultural sovereignty, this rage has been appropriated by conservatives-turned-revolutionaries, who, I would argue, represent one side of a new political dichotomy. On the other side are the progressives-turned-conservatives, who cling to the institutions that once seemed to promise the end of politics.

      This social polarization would appear to be of significant consequence for humanitarian and human rights endeavors, since their social base has traditionally been the Western middle class. Epitomizing the open society, humanitarian campaigns to protect migrants deepen resentment among an aging precariat, which had imagined that social mobility implied an upward slope, only to fall into the lower classes. Meanwhile, the bourgeois bohemians who join the upper classes accommodate themselves to their postmodern condition, hunkering down in their privileged enclaves, where moral responses to distant injustices are limited to an ironic and banalizing clicktivism. The social institutions that once mobilized multiclass coalitions in the name of progressive causes have long since been dismantled. And, despite the revival of democratic socialism, the institutional Left still appears intellectually exhausted after decades in which it resigned itself to the efficient management of neoliberal strategies.

      And yet, challenges to liberal order articulated through a Far Right politics create a moment of repoliticization; and they expose the contradictions of globalization in an interstate system, without undermining the reality of, or the demand for, connectivity. As such, they seem to open space for the formulation of radical internationalisms with a basis in the reconstruction of migrant rights. In this space, citizens’ movements responding to migration have forged a politics of transnational solidarity through anarchistic practices of mutual aid and horizontalism more than through the philosophizing of associated organic intellectuals. Fueled by disaffection with politics, as much as feelings of injustice, they have attracted young people facing a precarious future, and migrants themselves; indeed, there are movements led by migrants in Turkey, in Germany, in Greece, and elsewhere. They construct social commons with a basis in difference, forming “chains of equivalence.” Decolonial and anticolonial thinking is thus more likely to influence their responses to migration and displacement than those of Western governments and conventional humanitarian agencies. Indeed, beyond the political inspiration that horizontalism often draws from anticolonial struggles, decolonial and postcolonial theories offer a method of deconstructing hierarchy from the inside that can transform resistance into the basis for a pluralist politics built from the bottom up. But for this sort of internationalism to reshape democratic politics, the movements promoting it would need to build bridges into political institutions and incorporate it into political strategies that redress social polarization. To the extent that this might be possible, it will surely dilute their more radical propositions.

      I rather suspect that the most likely scenario, in the short term at least, involves a political reordering through the reassertion of neoliberal strategies. We could see the development of the sort of political economy imagined by the early neoliberal thinker Gottfried Haberler (1985): that is, one in which goods, wages, and capital move freely, but labor doesn’t. This will depend on the consolidation of authoritarian states that nonetheless claim a democratic mandate to impose permanent states of emergency.

      https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/migration-and-society/3/1/arms030114.xml

      #migrations

    • Conceptualising the global South and South–South encounters

      Long before the institutional interest in ‘engaging with’, and ostensibly mobilising and co-opting actors from across the global South, rich, critical literatures have been published in diverse languages around the world, demonstrating the urgency of developing and applying theoretical and methodological frameworks that can be posited as Southern, anti-colonial, postcolonial and/or decolonial in nature.[1] These and other approaches have traced and advocated for diverse ways of knowing and being in a pluriversal world characterised (and constituted) by complex relationalities and unequal power relations, and equally diverse ways of resisting these inequalities – including through historical and contemporary forms of transnational solidarities.

      Of course, the very term ‘South’ which is included not once but twice in the title of the Handbook of South-South Relations, is itself a debated and diversely mobilised term, as exemplified in the different usages and definitions proposed (and critiqued) across the Handbook’s constituent chapters.

      For instance, a number of official, institutional taxonomies exist, including those which classify (and in turn interpellate) different political entities as ‘being’ from and of ‘the South’ or ‘the North’. Such classifications have variously been developed on the basis of particular readings of a state’s geographical location, of its relative position as a (formerly) colonised territory or colonising power, and/or of a state’s current economic capacity on national and global scales.[2]

      In turn, Medie and Kang (2018) define ‘countries of the global South’ as ‘countries that have been marginalised in the international political and economic system’. Indeed, Connell (2007) builds upon a long tradition of critical thinking to conceptualise the South and the North, respectively, through the lens of the periphery and the metropole, as categories that transcend fixed physical geographies. And of course, as stressed by Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Kenneth Tafira in their contribution to the Handbook, such geographies have never been either static or defined purely through reference to physical territories and demarcations:

      ‘imperial reason and scientific racism were actively deployed in the invention of the geographical imaginaries of the global South and the global North.’

      Through conceptualising the South and North through the lenses of the periphery and metropole, Connell argues that there are multiple souths in the world, including ‘souths’ (and southern voices) within powerful metropoles, as well as multiple souths within multiple peripheries. As Sujata Patel notes in her chapter in the Handbook, it is through this conceptualisation that Connell subsequently posits that

      ‘the category of the south allows us to evaluate the processes that permeate the non-recognition of its theories and practices in the constitution of knowledge systems and disciplines’.

      It enables, and requires us, to examine how, why and with what effect certain forms of knowledge and being in the world come to be interpellated and protected as ‘universal’ while others are excluded, derided and suppressed ‘as’ knowledge or recognisable modes of being.[3] Indeed, in her chapter, Patel follows both Connell (2007) and de Sousa Santos (2014) in conceptualising ‘the South’ as ‘a metaphor’ that ‘represents the embeddedness of knowledge in relations of power’.

      In turn, in their contribution to the Handbook, Dominic Davies and Elleke Boehmer centralise the constitutive relationality of the South by drawing on Grovogu (2011), who defines ‘the term “Global South” not as an exact geographical designation, but as “an idea and a set of practices, attitudes, and relations” that are mobilised precisely as “a disavowal of institutional and cultural practices associated with colonialism and imperialism”’ (cited in Davies and Boehmer). Viewing the South, or souths, as being constituted by and mobilising purposeful resistance to diverse exploitative systems, demonstrates the necessity of a contrapuntal reading of, and through, the South.

      As such, as Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Tafira powerfully argue in their chapter,

      ‘the global South was not only invented from outside by European imperial forces but it also invented itself through resistance and solidarity-building.’

      In this mode of analysis, the South has been constituted through a long history of unequal encounters with, and diverse forms of resistance to, different structures and entities across what can be variously designated the North, West or specific imperial and colonial powers. An analysis of the South therefore necessitates a simultaneous interrogation of the contours and nature of ‘the North’ or ‘West’, with Mignolo arguing (2000) that ‘what constitutes the West more than geography is a linguistic family, a belief system and an epistemology’.

      Indeed, the acknowledgement of the importance of relationality and such mutually constitutive dynamics provides a useful bridge between these rich theoretical and conceptual engagements of, with and from ‘the South’ on the one hand, and empirically founded studies of the institutional interest in ‘South–South cooperation’ as a mode of technical and political exchange for ‘international development’ on the other. In effect, as noted by Urvashi Aneja in her chapter, diverse policies, modes of political interaction and ‘responses’ led by political entities across the South and the North alike ‘can thus be said to exist and evolve in a mutually constitutive relationship’, rather than in isolation from one another.

      An important point to make at this stage is that it is not our aim to propose a definitive definition of the South or to propose how the South should be analysed or mobilised for diverse purposes – indeed, we would argue that such an exercise would be antithetical to the very foundations of the debates we and our contributors build upon in our respective modes of research and action.

      Nonetheless, a common starting point for most, if not all, of the contributions in the Handbook is a rejection of conceptualisations of the South as that which is ‘non-Western’ or ‘non-Northern’. As noted by Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (here and in the Handbook), it is essential to continue actively resisting negative framings of the South as that which is not of or from ‘the West’ or ‘the North’ – indeed, this is partly why the (still problematic) South/North binary is often preferred over typologies such as Western and non-Western, First and Third World, or developed and un(der)developed countries, all of which ‘suggest both a hierarchy and a value judgment’ (Mawdsley, 2012).

      In effect, as Fiddian-Qasmiyeh argues in the Handbook (drawing on Brigg), such modes of negative framing risk ‘maintaining rather than disrupting the notion that power originates from and operates through a unidirectional and intentional historical entity’. She – like other contributors to the Handbook addressing the relationships between theoretical, conceptual and empirical dynamics and modes of analysis, response and action – advocates for us to ‘resist the tendency to reconstitute the power of “the North” in determining the contours of the analysis’, while simultaneously acknowledging the extent to which ‘many Southern-led responses are purposefully positioned as alternatives and challenges to hegemonic, Northern-led systems’.

      This is, in many ways, a ‘double bind’ that persists in many of our studies of the world, including those of and from the South: our aim not to re-inscribe the epistemic power of the North, while simultaneously acknowledging that diverse forms of knowledge and action are precisely developed as counterpoints to the North.

      As noted above, in tracing this brief reflection on conceptualisations of the South it is not our intention to offer a comprehensive definition of ‘the South’ or to posit a definitive account of Southern approaches and theories. Rather, the Handbook aims to trace the debates that have emerged about, around, through and from the South, in all its heterogeneity (and not infrequent internal contradictions), in such a way that acknowledges the ways that the South has been constructed in relation to, with, through but also against other spaces, places, times, peoples, modes of knowledge and action.

      Such processes are, precisely, modes of construction that resist dependence upon hegemonic frames of reference; indeed, the Handbook in many ways exemplifies the collective power that emerges when people come together to cooperate and trace diverse ‘roots and routes’ (following Gilroy) to knowing, being and responding to the world – all with a view to better understanding and finding more nuanced ways of responding to diverse encounters within and across the South and the North.

      At the same time as we recognise internal heterogeneity within and across the South/souths, and advocate for more nuanced ways of understanding the South and the North that challenge hegemonic epistemologies and methodologies, Ama Biney’s chapter in the Handbook reminds us of another important dynamic that underpins the work of most, perhaps all, of the contributors to the Handbook. While Biney is writing specifically about pan-Africanism, we would argue that the approach she delineates is essential to the critical theoretical perspectives and analyses presented throughout the Handbook:

      ’Pan-Africanism does not aim at the external domination of other people, and, although it is a movement operating around the notion of being a race conscious movement, it is not a racialist one … In short, pan-Africanism is not anti-white but is profoundly against all forms of oppression and the domination of African people.’

      While it is not our aim to unequivocally idealise or romanticise decolonial, postcolonial, anti-colonial, or Southern theories, or diverse historical or contemporary modes of South South Cooperation and transnational solidarity – such processes are complex, contradictory, and at times are replete of their own forms of discrimination and violence – we would nonetheless posit that this commitment to challenging and resisting all forms of oppression and domination, of all peoples, is at the core of our collective endeavours.

      With such diverse approaches to conceptualising ‘the South’ (and its counterpoint, ‘the North’ or ‘the West’), precisely how we can explore ‘South–South relations’ thus becomes, first, a matter of how and with what effect we ‘know’, ‘speak of/for/about’, and (re)act in relation to different spaces, peoples and objects around the world; subsequently, it is a process of tracing material and immaterial connections across time and space, such as through the development of political solidarity and modes of resistance, and the movement of aid, trade, people and ideas. It is with these overlapping sets of debates and imperatives in mind, that the Handbook aims to explore a broad range of questions regarding the nature and implications of conducting research in and about the global South, and of applying a ‘Southern lens’ to such a wide range of encounters, processes and dynamics around the world.[4]

      […]

      From a foundational acknowledgement of the dangers of essentialist binaries such as South–North and East–West and their concomitant hierarchies and modes of exploitation, the Handbook aims to explore and set out pathways to continue redressing the longstanding exclusion of polycentric forms of knowledge, politics and practice. It is our hope that the Handbook unsettles thinking about the South and about South–South relations, and prompts new and original research agendas that serve to transform and further complicate the geographic framing of the peoples of the world for emancipatory futures in the 21st century.

      This extract from Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Patricia Daley’s Introduction to The Handbook of South-South Relations has been slightly edited for the purposes of this blog post. For other pieces published as part of the Southern Responses blog series on Thinking through the Global South, click here.

      References cited

      Anzaldúa, G., 1987. Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza. San Francisco: Spinsters/Aunt Lute.

      Brigg, M., 2002. ‘Post-development, Foucault and the Colonisation Metaphor.’ Third World Quarterly 23(3), 421–436.

      Chakrabarty, D., 2007. Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

      Connell, R., 2007. Southern Theory: The Global Dynamics of Knowledge in Social Science. London: Polity.

      Dabashi, H., 2015. Can Non-Europeans Think? London: Zed Books.

      de Sousa Santos, B., 2014. Epistemologies of the South: Justice Against Epistemicide. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.

      Dussel, E., 1977. Filosofía de Liberación. Mexico City: Edicol.

      Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E., 2015. South-South Educational Migration, Humanitarianism and Development: Views from the Caribbean, North Africa and the Middle East. Oxford: Routledge.

      Gilroy, P., 1993. The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness. London: Verso.

      Grosfoguel, R., 2011. Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of Political-Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality. Transmodernity: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World 1(1). Available from: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/21k6t3fq [Accessed 7 September 2018].

      Grovogu, S., 2011. A Revolution Nonetheless: The Global South in International Relations. The Global South 5(1), Special Issue: The Global South and World Dis/Order, 175–190.

      Kwoba, B, Nylander, O., Chantiluke, R., and Nangamso Nkopo, A. (eds), 2018. Rhodes Must Fall: The Struggle to Decolonise the Racist Heart of Empire. London: Zed Books.

      Mawdsley, E., 2012. From Recipients to Donors: The Emerging Powers and the Changing Development Landscape. London: Zed Books.

      Medie, P. and Kang, A.J., 2018. Power, Knowledge and the Politics of Gender in the Global South. European Journal of Politics and Gender 1(1–2), 37–54.

      Mignolo, W.D., 2000. Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

      Mignolo, W.D., 2015. ‘Foreword: Yes, We Can.’ In: H. Dabashi, Can Non-Europeans Think? London and New York: Zed Books, pp. viii–xlii.

      Minh-ha, Trinh T., 1989. Woman, Native, Other: Writing Postcoloniality and Feminism, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

      Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J., 2013. Empire, Global Coloniality and African Subjectivity. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books.

      Quijano, A., 1991. Colonialidad y Modernidad/Racionalidad. Perú Indígena 29, 11–21.

      Said, E., 1978. Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient. New York: Vintage Books.

      Spivak, G.C., 1988. In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics. New York: Routledge.

      Sundberg, J., 2007. Reconfiguring North–South Solidarity: Critical Reflections on Experiences of Transnational Resistance. Antipode 39(1), 144–166.

      Tuhiwai Smith, L., 1999. Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples. London: Zed Books.

      wa Thiong’o, N., 1986. Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature. London: Heinemann Educational.

      Wynter, S., 2003. Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation – An Argument. The New Centennial Review 3(3), 257–337.

      * Notes

      [1] For instance, see Anzaldúa 1987; Chakrabarty 2007; Connell 2007; de Sousa Santos 2014; Dussell 1977; Grosfoguel 2011; Kwoba et al. 2018; Mignolo 2000; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013; Quijano 1991, 2007; Said 1978; Spivak 1988; Sundberg 2007; Trinh T. Minh-ha 1989; Tuhiwai Smith 1999; wa Thiong’o 1986; Wynter 2003.

      [2] Over 130 states have defined themselves as belonging to the Group of 77 – a quintessential South–South platform – in spite of the diversity of their ideological and geopolitical positions in the contemporary world order, their vastly divergent Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and per capita income, and their rankings in the Human Development Index – for a longer discussion of the challenges and limitations of diverse modes of definition and typologies, see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2015.

      [3] Also see Mignolo 2000; Dabashi 2015.

      [4] Indeed, Connell notes that ‘#Southern_theory’ is a term I use for social thought from the societies of the global South. It’s not necessarily about the global South, though it often is. Intellectuals from colonial and postcolonial societies have also produced important analyses of global-North societies, and of worldwide structures (e.g. Raúl Prebisch and Samir Amin).

      https://southernresponses.org/2018/12/05/conceptualising-the-global-south-and-south-south-encounters
      #développement

    • Exploring refugees’ conceptualisations of Southern-led humanitarianism

      By Prof Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Principal Investigator, Southern Responses to Displacement Project

      With displacement primarily being a Southern phenomena – circa 85-90% of all refugees remain within the ‘global South – it is also the case that responses to displacement have long been developed and implemented by states from the South (a construct we are critically examining throughout the Southern Responses to Displacement project – see here). Some of these state-led responses to displacement have been developed and implemented within the framework of what is known as ‘South-South Cooperation’. This framework provides a platform from which states from the global South work together to complement one another’s abilities and resources and break down barriers and structural inequalities created by colonial powers. It can also be presented as providing an alternative mode of response to that implemented by powerful Northern states and Northern-led organisations (see here).

      An example of this type of South-South Cooperation, often driven by principles of ‘internationalism,’ can be found in the international scholarship programmes and schools established by a number of Southern states to provide primary, secondary and university-level education for refugees from across the Middle East and North Africa. In particular, since the 1960s, Cuba has provided free education through a scholarship system for Palestinian refugees based in camps and cities across the Middle East following the Nakba (the catastrophe) and for Sahrawi refugees who have lived in desert-based refugee camps in Algeria since the mid-1970s.

      In line with the Southern Responses to Displacement project, which aims to purposefully centralise refugees’ own experiences of and perspectives on Southern-led initiatives to support refugees from Syria, throughout my previous work I have examined how Palestinian and Sahrawi refugees have conceptualised, negotiated or, indeed, resisted, diverse programmes that have been developed and implemented ‘on their behalf.’ While long-standing academic and policy debates have addressed the relationship between humanitarianism, politics and ideology, few studies to date have examined the ways in which refugee beneficiaries – as opposed to academics, policymakers and practitioners – conceptualise the programmes which are designed and implemented ‘for refugees’. The following discussion addresses this gap precisely by centralising Palestinian and Sahrawi graduates’ reflections on the Cuban scholarship programme and the extent to which they conceptualise political and ideological connections as being compatible with humanitarian motivations and outcomes.

      This blog, and my previous work (here and here) examines how Palestinian and Sahrawi refugees have understood the motivations, nature and impacts of Cuba’s scholarship system through reference to identity, ideology, politics and humanitarianism. Based on my interviews with Palestinians and Sahrawis while they were still studying in Cuba, and with Palestinian and Sahrawi graduates whom I interviewed after they had returned to their home-camps in Lebanon and Algeria respectively, this short piece examines the complex dynamics which underpin access to, as well as the multifaceted experiences and outcomes of, the scholarship programme on both individual and collective levels.
      Balancing ‘the humanitarian’

      Although both Palestinian and Sahrawi interviewees in Cuba and Sahrawi graduates in their Algeria-based home-camps repeatedly asserted the humanitarian nature of the Cuban scholarship programme, precisely what this denomination of ‘humanitarianism’ might mean, and how compatible it could be given the ideological and political links highlighted by Palestinian graduates whom I interviewed in a range of refugee camps in Lebanon, requires further discussion.

      The contemporary international humanitarianism regime is habitually equated with the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence (Ferris 2011: 11), and a strict separation is firmly upheld by Western humanitarian institutions between morality and politics (as explored in more detail by Pacitto and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2013). However, many critics reject the assertion that humanitarianism can ever be separated from politics, since ‘“humanitarianism” is the ideology of hegemonic states in the era of globalisation’ (Chimni 2000:3). Recognising the extent to which the Northern-led and Northern-dominated humanitarian regime is deeply implicated in, and reproduces, ‘the ideology of hegemonic [Northern] states’ is particularly significant since many (Northern) academics, policymakers and practitioners reject the right of Southern-led initiatives to be denominated ‘humanitarian’ in nature on the basis that such projects and programmes are motivated by ideological and/or faith-based principles, rather than ‘universal’ humanitarian principles.

      Palestinians who at the time of our interviews were still studying in Cuba, in addition to those who had more recently graduated from Cuban universities, medical and dentistry schools and had ‘returned’ to their home-camps in Lebanon, repeatedly referred to ‘ideology’, ‘politics’, ‘humanitarianism’ and ‘human values’ when describing the Cuban scholarship programme. Yet, while they maintained that Cuba’s programme for Palestinian refugees is ‘humanitarian’ in nature, Palestinian graduates offered different perspectives regarding the balance between these different dimensions, implicitly and at times explicitly noting the ways in which these overlap or are in tension.

      Importantly, these recurrent concepts are to be contrasted with the prevalent terminology and frames of reference arising in Sahrawi refugees’ accounts of the Cuban educational programme. Having also had access to the Cuban educational migration programme, Sahrawi graduates’ accounts can perhaps be traced to the continued significance of Spanish – the language learned and lived (following Bhabha 2006:x) in Cuba – amongst graduates following their return to the Sahrawi refugee camps, where Spanish is the official language used in the major camp-based Sahrawi medical institutions.

      As such, in interviews and in informal conversations in the Sahrawi camps, Cuban-educated Sahrawis (commonly known as Cubarauis) consistently used the Spanish-language term solidaridad (solidarity) to define both the nature of the connection between the Sahrawi people and Cuba, and the nature of the scholarship programme; they also regularly cited Cuban revolutionary figures such as José Martí and Fidel Castro. In contrast, no such quotes were offered by the Palestinian graduates I interviewed in Lebanon, even if the significance of Fidel Castro and Ché Guevara was noted by many during our interviews in Cuba.

      Explaining his understanding of the basis of the scholarship programme for Palestinians, Abdullah elaborated that this was:

      ‘mainly prompted because Cuban politics is based upon human values and mutual respect, and in particular upon socialism, which used to be very prominent in the Arab world during that time.’

      In turn, referring to the common visions uniting both parties and facilitating Cuba’s scholarship programme for Palestinian refugees, Hamdi posited that:

      ‘Certain ideological and political commonalities contributed to this collaboration between the Cuban government and the PLO. However, the humanitarian factor was present in these negotiations.’ (Emphasis added)

      These accounts reflect the extent to which ideology and humanitarianism are both recognised as playing a key role in the scholarship programme, and yet Hamdi’s usage of the term ‘however’, and his reference to ‘the humanitarian factor’, demonstrate an awareness that a tension may be perceived to exist between ideology/politics and humanitarian motivations.

      Indeed, rather than describing the programme as a humanitarian programme per se, eight of my interviewees offered remarkably similar humanitarian ‘qualifiers’: the Cuban education programme is described as having ‘a humanitarian component’ (Marwan), ‘a humanitarian dimension’ (Younis), a ‘humanitarian aspect’ (Saadi), and ‘humanitarian ingredients’ (Abdel-Wahid); while other interviewees argued that it is ‘a mainly humanitarian system’ (Nimr) which ‘carr[ies] humanitarian elements’ (Hamdi) and ‘shares its humanitarian message in spite of the embargo [against Cuba]’ (Ibrahim).

      As exemplified by these qualifiers, Palestinians who participated in this programme themselves recognise that humanitarianism was not the sole determining justification for the initiative, but rather that it formed part of the broader Cuban revolution and a particular mode of expressing support for other liberation movements, including the Palestinian cause.

      In terms of weighting these different motivating and experiential elements, Mohammed argued that the ‘humanitarian aspect outweighs the ideological one’, emphasising the ‘programme’s strong humanitarian aspect’. In turn, Ahmed and Nimr declared that the Cuban scholarships were offered ‘without conditions or conditionalities’ and without ‘blackmailing Palestinians to educate them’.

      These references are particularly relevant when viewed alongside critiques of neoliberal development programmes and strategies which have often been characterised by ‘tied aid’ or diverse economic, socio-political and gendered conditionalities which require beneficiaries to comply with Northern-dominated priorities vis-à-vis ‘good governance’ – all of which are, in effect, politically and/or ideologically driven.

      Concurrently, Khalil argued that the programme is ‘humanitarian if used correctly’, thereby drawing attention to the extent to which the nature of the programme transcends either Cuba’s or the PLO’s underlying motivating factors per se, and is, rather, characterised both by the way in which the programme has been implemented since the 1970s, and its longer-term impacts.

      With reference to the former, claims regarding the absence of conditionalities on Cuba’s behalf must be viewed alongside the extent to which Palestinians could only access the scholarships if they were affiliated with specific Palestinian factions (as I explore in the book): can the programme be ‘truly’ humanitarian if individual participation has historically been contingent upon an official declaration of ideological commonality with a leftist faction and/or the Cuban internationalist project?

      With universality, neutrality and impartiality being three of the core ‘international’ humanitarian principles, a tension is apparent from the perspective of ‘the Northern relief elite’ who arguably monopolise the epithet humanitarian (Haysom, cited in Pacitto and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2013: 6). Indeed, although José Martí’s humanitarian principle to ‘compartir lo que tienes, no dar lo que te sobra’ (‘to share what you have, not what is left over’) has historically guided many of the Cuban state’s revolutionary programmes on national(ist) and international(ist) levels, precisely who Cuba should share with (on a collective) has often been geopolitically framed. Whilst designed to overcome the historical legacy of diverse exclusionary processes in Cuba, the programme could itself be conceptualised as being guided by an ideological commitment to inclusion with exclusionary underpinnings.

      The imposition of a hegemonic discourse leaves people out, primarily on ideological grounds. Ideological repression means that everybody who questions the regime in a fundamental way is basically left out in the dark. There is a creation of boundaries between Self and Other that leaves very little room for fundamental critique. However, the existence of a hegemonic discourse, and demands for students to publicly assert their affiliation to an official ideological stance, whether this refers to Cuban or Palestinian discourses, should not necessarily be equated with the exclusion of individuals and groups who do not share particular opinions and beliefs.

      In the case explored in this blog and in the book it is based on, a distinction can therefore perhaps be usefully made between the collective basis of scholarships primarily being offered to groups and nations with political and ideological bonds to Cuba’s revolutionary project, and the extent to which individual Palestinian students have arguably negotiated the Cuban system and the factional system alike to maximise their personal, professional and political development. To achieve the latter, individuals have developed official performances of ideological loyalty to access and complete their university studies in Cuba, whilst ultimately maintaining or developing political and ideological opinions, and critiques, of their own.

      With reference to the broader outcomes of the programme, is it sufficient to announce, as seven Palestinian graduates did, that the project was ‘humanitarian’ in nature precisely because the beneficiaries of the scheme were refugees, and the overarching aim was to achieve professional self-sufficiency in refugee camps?

      In effect, and as explored in my other research (here) Cuba’s programme might appear to fall under the remit of a developmental approach, rather than being ‘purely’ humanitarian in nature, precisely due to the official aim of maximising self-sufficiency as opposed to addressing immediate basic needs in an emergency phase (with the latter more readily falling under the remit of ‘humanitarian’ assistance).

      Nonetheless, Cuba’s aim to enhance refugees’ self-sufficiency corresponds to the UNHCR’s well-established Development Assistance to Refugees approach, and programmes supporting medium- and long-term capacity building are particularly common in protracted refugee situations. At the same time, it could be argued that the distinction between humanitarianism and development is immaterial given that the rhetoric of solidarity underpins all of Cuba’s internationalist projects, whether in contexts of war or peace, and, furthermore, since Cuba has offered scholarships not only to refugees but also to citizens from across the Global South.

      Related to the programme’s reach to citizens and refugees alike, and simultaneously to the nature of the connection between humanitarianism and politics, Younis drew attention to another pivotal dimension: ‘although the educational system had a humanitarian dimension, I don’t think it is possible to separate the human being from politics’. Cuba’s political (in essence, socialist) commitment to the ‘human being’ was reasserted throughout the interviews, with Saadi, for instance, referring to Cuba’s prioritisation of the ‘relationship between a human being and a fellow human being’, and Khalil explaining that Cuba had adopted ‘the cause of the human being, and that’s why it supported Palestinians in their struggle’.

      While critiques of Northern-led human rights discourses have been widespread, and such critiques have often paralleled or influenced critical analyses of humanitarianism (as I explore elsewhere), in their responses Palestinian graduates invoked an alternative approach to supporting the rights of human beings.

      By conceptualising Cuba’s commitment to human beings as being inherently connected to politics, graduates, by extension, also highlighted that politics cannot be separated from approaches geared towards supporting humanity, whether external analysts consider that such approaches should be labelled ‘development’ or ‘humanitarianism’. Whilst absent from the terminology used by Palestinian graduates, it can be argued that the notion of solidarity centralised in Cubaraui (and Cuban) accounts captures precisely these dimensions of Cuba’s internationalist approach.
      Moving Forward

      These dynamics – including conceptualisations of the relationship between politics, ideology, and humanitarianism; of short-, medium- and long-term responses to displacement; and how refugees themselves negotiate and conceptualise responses developed by external actors ‘on their behalf’ – will continue to be explored throughout the Southern Responses to Development from Syria project. This ongoing research project aims, amongst other things, to examine how people displaced from Syria – Syrians, Palestinians, Iraqis, Kurds … -, experience and perceive the different forms of support that ‘Southern’ states, civil society groups, and refugees themselves have developed in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey since the outbreak of the Syrian conflict in 2011. This will include reflections on how refugees conceptualise (and resist) both the construct of ‘the South’ itself and diverse responses developed by states such as Malaysia and Indonesia, but also by different groups of refugees themselves. The latter include Palestinian refugees whose home-camps in Lebanon have been hosting refugees from Syria, but also whose educational experiences in Cuba mean that they are amongst the medical practitioners who are treating refugees from Syria, demonstrating the complex legacies of the Cuban scholarship programme for refugees from the Middle East.

      *

      For more information on Southern-led responses to displacement, including vis-à-vis South-South Cooperation, read our introductory mini blog series here, and the following pieces:

      Carpi, E. (2018) ‘Empires of Inclusion‘

      Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. (2019) ‘Looking Forward. Disasters at 40′

      Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. (2018) Histories and spaces of Southern-led responses to displacement

      Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. (2018) Internationalism and solidarity

      Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. (2018) Refugee-refugee humanitarianism

      Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. (2014) The Ideal Refugees: Islam, Gender, and the Sahrawi Politics of Survival

      Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. and Daley, P. (2018) Conceptualising the global South and South–South encounters

      Featured Image: A mural outside a school in Baddawi camp, N. Lebanon. Baddawi has been home to Palestinian refugees from the 1950s, and to refugees from Syria since 2011 (c) E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2017

      https://southernresponses.org/2019/04/08/exploring-refugees-conceptualisations-of-southern-led-humanitaria

      #réfugiés #post-colonialisme #ressources_pédagogiques