Article intéressant sur les divergences idéologiques, et donc théologiques, entre les Taliban et l’EI en #Afghanistan :
The key detail in this saga—and the main political factor that drives the Islamic State’s enmity for the Taliban today—is that al-Qa’eda opted to stand by the Taliban instead of joining Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s new caliphate. This forced the Islamic State’s hand; the only way it could respond to this implicit denial of its legitimacy was to attack al-Qa’eda’s ideological credentials. And one of al-Qa’eda’s principal vulnerabilities, at least as the Islamic State saw it, was the fact that this Salafi-jihadist movement had opted to remain loyal to the “heretical sect” of the Deobandi Taliban. In the eyes of the Islamic State, this alone was cause enough for excommunication from the fold of Islam.
In view of this, the Islamic State’s opposition to the Taliban is not just incidental, it is existential. It has no choice but to adopt a position of utmost hostility towards the Taliban because in doing so it delegitimizes al-Qa’eda’s claims and annuls any allegations that its “caliphate” is itself illegitimate. On this basis, ISKP’s war with the Taliban today is not just about advancing the Islamic State’s strategic position in Central Asia. Rather, it is an expression of the Islamic State’s sense of its own global supremacy.
▻https://www.hudson.org/research/17796-making-sense-of-the-islamic-state-s-war-on-the-afghan-taliban
