• Clyn App | Kenya
    https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=381179788998847&extid=Y17lSH1SCEeWL8F8

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    #Nouvelle_domesticité #Apps #Kenya

  • On-demand home cleaning service Kisafi launches in Kenya
    https://disrupt-africa.com/2016/04/on-demand-home-cleaning-service-kisafi-launches-in-kenya

    On-demand home cleaning and laundry service Kisafi has launched in Nairobi, Kenya, aiming to bring consumers convenience at the click of a button and spread across the region.

    Kisafi – the name means “it is clean” in Swahili – allows homeowners to use the web or an Android app to have their laundry picked up and taken care of or their homes cleaned.

    The platform has been in private beta since December but launched to the general public on Nairobi today, with launches in Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda to follow before a rollout in West Africa at a later date.

    Complete with a founding team with backgrounds at McKinsey & Co, Citigroup and Accenture, Kisafi has a quality control and assurance centre with modern commercial cleaning equipment in Nairobi, and offers a marketplace of former and current hospitality and hotel employees.

    It has signed partnerships with two of the top laundry and dry cleaning service providers in Nairobi, and also has a tech-enablement suite, including body cameras for the recording of the cleaning process and a high-grade photo filing system for before and after wash clothing pictures.

    Co-founder Janet Otieno said Kisafi was trying to make premium laundry and home cleaning a utility that is available to everyone, and save people time.

    “Given the rate of growth of the emerging affluent and middle class across Sub-Saharan Africa, coupled with the fast pace of work and life, every minute spent on chores counts,” she said.

    “We asked folks that were part of our closed beta why they love the service, and unanimously it was at least two things – ease and affordability.”

    Kisafi – which has seed investment from angels in Lagos and New York – said it was aiming to take a significant portion of emerging affluent market, and has a pan-African focus.

    “This is reflected in our team composition. Our founding and advisory team is made up of folks from Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa,” Otieno said.

    #Nouvelle_domesticité #Kenya #Apps

  • Kenya: Construction of Kenya Somalia Border Wall Resumed

    The construction of the disputed wall, separating Kenya and Somalia is on course, according to the former Somali army officer, Colonel Aden Ruffle.

    He urged local residents in the border areas to prevent Kenya from completing the work of the fence building as it Encroaching into the country’s territory.

    Speaking to Radio Shabelle, Ruffle added the security barrier consists of a concrete wall ringed with a barbed-wire electric fence and trenches. It will also have observation posts where electronic surveillance cameras will be installed to monitor movements on either side of the border.

    In 2016, Kenya has confirmed it will begin construction of a 700-kilometer-long security wall along the northeastern border with Somalia as part of a broader national security plan to curb cross-border terror attacks by #al-Shabab.

    Additionally, the wall will have border posts in #Mandera, #Lamu, and three other border towns, including #Beled-Hawo inside Somalia.

    https://allafrica.com/stories/202008240705.html

    #murs #barrières_frontalières #frontières #Somalie #Kenya #terrorisme #anti-terrorisme #al-Chabab

    ping @fil

  • If you felt cooped up in lockdown, think of refugees confined in camps | Moulid Hujale | Global development | The Guardian
    https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/aug/24/if-you-felt-cooped-up-in-lockdown-think-of-refugees-confined-indefinite
    https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/4bdc7ce5879b796b49e1d95a53d7b45d1a3b0d9e/0_337_5156_3094/master/5156.jpg?width=1200&height=630&quality=85&auto=format&fit=crop&overlay-ali

    Covid-19 has transformed the world beyond imagination, affecting almost everyone in some way.Yet for me the changes have felt familiar – from movement restrictions to quarantines, every measure taken to prevent the spread of the virus reminds me of what it means to live as a refugee in a camp.I was once one of them. After my family fled Somalia, we settled in Kenya’s Dadaab refugee camp, where I lived for many years. As soon as we crossed the border we were registered, put in an isolated camp and basically quarantined from the rest of the Kenyan society.
    This is how refugees are treated when they end up in displacement camps. They are not allowed to leave their designated settlements. They live in prison-like conditions indefinitely, where their movement is controlled by local authorities. I’m one of the lucky ones who got resettled in a third country. I currently live in the UK and have been confined to north-west London.The coronavirus lockdown brought back stark memories of life in the camp. It first started when people were panic buying in March. I had to wake up very early to join a long queue at the local Sainsbury’s. The lines of people holding carrier bags and trolleys to carry as much food and toilet paper as possible reminded me of queues in the camps where refugees wait for the monthly UN food distributions. As no one respected physical distancing rules, I would hear people standing close to me complain about the lack of food in the supermarket, and wondering how they would survive with so little. I would think to myself: “Imagine if these people were in refugee camps where they would receive food only once a month? Imagine if they were forced to skip meals, sleep hungry until the next cycle of distribution?”

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#refugie#grandebretagne#kenya#somalie#sante#mémoire#trauma#santementale#asile

  • L’accord de tous les dangers entre le #Kenya et les États-Unis
    https://www.cetri.be/L-accord-de-tous-les-dangers-entre

    Depuis le 8 juillet dernier, le Kenya négocie officiellement un accord de #Libre-échange avec les #États-Unis, concrétisant un engagement pris en février par le président Uhuru Kenyatta et son homologue américain, Donald Trump. Problème : cet accord compromet les (déjà difficiles) efforts d’intégration régionale et risque à terme de pénaliser l’économie et la population kenyanes. En Afrique, un mélange d’incrédulité et d’irritation a accueilli la nouvelle du lancement des négociations entre les États-Unis et (...) #Le_regard_du_CETRI

    / Kenya, États-Unis, #Le_regard_du_CETRI, #Le_Sud_en_mouvement, Libre-échange, #Commerce, #Analyses, Homepage - Actualités à la (...)

    #Homepage_-_Actualités_à_la_une

  • Nairobi’s street names reveal what those in power want to remember, or forget
    https://neotopo.hypotheses.org/3231

    By: Melissa Wanjiru-Mwita: Post-doctoral Fellow, Université de Genève This article was first published on The Conversation The recent global events of civil and political unrest that started in the US have brought to...

    #African_Neotoponymy_Observatory_in_Network #Catégories #ExploreNeotopo #Notes_de_recherche

  • Organizing amidst Covid-19


    Organizing amidst Covid-19: sharing stories of struggles
    Overviews of movement struggles in specific places

    Miguel Martinez
    Mutating mobilisations during the pandemic crisis in Spain (movement report, pp. 15 – 21)

    Laurence Cox
    Forms of social movement in the crisis: a view from Ireland (movement report, pp. 22 – 33)

    Lesley Wood
    We’re not all in this together (movement report, pp. 34 – 38)

    Angela Chukunzira
    Organising under curfew: perspectives from Kenya (movement report, pp. 39 – 42)

    Federico Venturini
    Social movements’ powerlessness at the time of covid-19: a personal account (movement report, pp. 43 – 46)

    Sobhi Mohanty
    From communal violence to lockdown hunger: emergency responses by civil society networks in Delhi, India (movement report, pp. 47 – 52)
    Feminist and LGBTQ+ activism

    Hongwei Bao
    “Anti-domestic violence little vaccine”: a Wuhan-based feminist activist campaign during COVID-19 (movement report, pp. 53 – 63)

    Ayaz Ahmed Siddiqui
    Aurat march, a threat to mainstream tribalism in Pakistan (movement report, pp. 64 – 71)

    Lynn Ng Yu Ling
    What does the COVID-19 pandemic mean for PinkDot Singapore? (movement report, pp. 72 – 81)

    María José Ventura Alfaro
    Feminist solidarity networks have multiplied since the COVID-19 outbreak in Mexico (movement report, pp. 82 – 87)

    Ben Trott
    Queer Berlin and the Covid-19 crisis: a politics of contact and ethics of care (movement report, pp. 88 – 108)
    Reproductive struggles

    Non Una Di Meno Roma
    Life beyond the pandemic (movement report, pp. 109 – 114)
    Labour organising

    Ben Duke
    The effects of the COVID-19 crisis on the gig economy and zero hour contracts (movement report, pp. 115 – 120)

    Louisa Acciari
    Domestic workers’ struggles in times of pandemic crisis (movement report, pp. 121 – 127)

    Arianna Tassinari, Riccardo Emilia Chesta and Lorenzo Cini
    Labour conflicts over health and safety in the Italian Covid19 crisis (movement report, pp. 128 – 138)

    T Sharkawi and N Ali
    Acts of whistleblowing: the case of collective claim making by healthcare workers in Egypt (movement report, pp. 139 – 163)

    Mallige Sirimane and Nisha Thapliyal
    Migrant labourers, Covid19 and working-class struggle in the time of pandemic: a report from Karnataka, India (movement report, pp. 164 – 181)
    Migrant and refugee struggles

    Johanna May Black, Sutapa Chattopadhyay and Riley Chisholm
    Solidarity in times of social distancing: migrants, mutual aid, and COVID-19 (movement report, pp. 182 – 193)

    Anitta Kynsilehto
    Doing migrant solidarity at the time of Covid-19 (movement report, pp. 194 – 198)

    Susan Thieme and Eda Elif Tibet
    New political upheavals and women alliances in solidarity beyond “lock down” in Switzerland at times of a global pandemic (movement report, pp. 199 – 207)

    Chiara Milan
    Refugee solidarity along the Western Balkans route: new challenges and a change of strategy in times of COVID-19 (movement report, pp. 208 – 212)

    Marco Perolini
    Abolish all camps in times of corona: the struggle against shared accommodation for refugees* in Berlin (movement report, pp. 213 – 224)
    Ecological activism

    Clara Thompson
    #FightEveryCrisis: Re-framing the climate movement in times of a pandemic (movement report, pp. 225 – 231)

    Susan Paulson
    Degrowth and feminisms ally to forge care-full paths beyond pandemic (movement report, pp. 232 – 246)

    Peterson Derolus [FR]
    Coronavirus, mouvements sociaux populaires anti-exploitation minier en Haïti (movement report, pp. 247 – 249)

    Silpa Satheesh
    The pandemic does not stop the pollution in River Periyar (movement report, pp. 250 – 257)

    Ashish Kothari
    Corona can’t save the planet, but we can, if we listen to ordinary people (movement report, pp. 258 – 265)
    Food sovereignty organising

    Dagmar Diesner
    Self-governance food system before and during the Covid-crisis on the example of CampiAperti, Bologna (movement report, pp. 266 – 273)

    URGENCI
    Community Supported Agriculture is a safe and resilient alternative to industrial agriculture in the time of Covid-19 (movement report, pp. 274 – 279)

    Jenny Gkougki
    Corona-crisis affects small Greek farmers who counterstrike with a nationwide social media campaign to unite producers and consumers on local level! (movement report, pp. 280 – 283)

    John Foran
    Eco Vista in the quintuple crisis (movement report, pp. 284 – 291)
    Solidarity and mutual aid

    Michael Zeller
    Karlsruhe’s “giving fences”: mobilisation for the needy in times of COVID-19 (movement report, pp. 292 – 303)

    Sergio Ruiz Cayuela
    Organising a solidarity kitchen: reflections from Cooperation Birmingham (movement report, pp. 304 – 309)

    Clinton Nichols
    On lockdown and locked out of the prison classroom: the prospects of post-secondary education for incarcerated persons during pandemic (movement report, pp. 310 – 316)

    Micha Fiedlschuster and Leon Rosa Reichle
    Solidarity forever? Performing mutual aid in Leipzig, Germany (movement report, pp. 317 – 325)
    Artistic and digital resistance

    Kerman Calvo and Ester Bejarano
    Music, solidarities and balconies in Spain (movement report, pp. 326 – 332)

    Neto Holanda and Valesca Lima [PT]
    Movimentos e ações político-culturais do Brasil em tempos de pandemia do Covid-19 (movement report, pp. 333 – 338)

    Margherita Massarenti
    How Covid-19 led to a #Rentstrike and what it can teach us about online organizing (movement report, pp. 339 – 346)

    Dounya
    Knowledge is power: virtual forms of everyday resistance and grassroots broadcasting in Iran (movement report, pp. 347 – 354)
    Imagining a new world

    Donatella della Porta
    How progressive social movements can save democracy in pandemic times (movement report, pp. 355 – 358)

    Jackie Smith
    Responding to coronavirus pandemic: human rights movement-building to transform global capitalism (movement report, pp. 359 – 366)

    Yariv Mohar
    Human rights amid Covid-19: from struggle to orchestration of tradeoffs (movement report, pp. 367 – 370)

    Julien Landry, Ann Marie Smith, Patience Agwenjang, Patricia Blankson Akakpo, Jagat Basnet, Bhumiraj Chapagain, Aklilu Gebremichael, Barbara Maigari and Namadi Saka,
    Social justice snapshots: governance adaptations, innovations and practitioner learning in a time of COVID-19 (movement report, pp. 371 – 382)

    Roger Spear, Gulcin Erdi, Marla A. Parker and Maria Anastasia
    Innovations in citizen response to crises: volunteerism and social mobilization during COVID-19 (movement report, pp. 383 – 391)

    Breno Bringel
    Covid-19 and the new global chaos (movement report, pp. 392 – 399)

    https://www.interfacejournal.net/interface-volume-12-issue-1

    #mouvements_sociaux #résistance #covid-19 #confinement #revue #aide_mutuelle #Espagne #résistance #Irlande #Kenya #impuissance #sentiment_d'impuissance #faim #violence #Delhi #Inde #féminisme #Wuhan #Pakistan #PinkDot #LGBT #Singapour #solidarité_féministe #solidarité #Mexique #care #Berlin #Allemagne #queer #gig_economy #travail #travail_domestique #travailleurs_domestiques #Italie #Egypte #travailleurs_étrangers #Karnataka #distanciation_sociale #migrations #Suisse #route_des_Balkans #Balkans #réfugiés #camps_de_réfugiés #FightEveryCrisis #climat #changement_climatique #décroissance #Haïti #extractivisme #pollution #River_Periyar #Periyar #souveraineté_alimentaire #nourriture #alimentation #CampiAperti #Bologne #agriculture #Grèce #Karlsruhe #Cooperation_Birmingham #UK #Angleterre #Leipzig #musique #Brésil #Rentstrike #Iran #droits_humains #justice_sociale #innovation #innovation_sociale

    ping @isskein @karine4

  • UK Deportations 2020: how BA, #Easyjet and other airlines collaborate with the border regime

    The Home Office’s deportation machine has slowed during the corona crisis, with hundreds of people released from detention. But a recent charter flight to Poland shows the motor is still ticking over. Will things just go “back to normal” as the lockdown lifts, or can anti-deportation campaigners push for a more radical shift? This report gives an updated overview of the UK deportation system and focuses in on the role of scheduled flights run by major airlines including: #BA, Easyjet, #Kenya_Airways, #Qatar_Airways, #Turkish_Airlines, #Ethiopian_Airlines, #Air_France, #Royal_Jordanian, and #Virgin.

    On 30 April, with UK airports largely deserted during the Covid-19 lockdown, a Titan Airways charter plane took off from Stansted airport deporting 35 people to Poland. This was just a few days after reports of charter flights in the other direction, as UK farmers hired planes to bring in Eastern European fruit-pickers.

    The Home Office’s deportation machine has slowed during the corona crisis. Hundreds of people have been released from detention centres, with detainee numbers dropping by 900 over the first four months of 2020. But the Poland flight signals that the Home Office motor is still ticking over. As in other areas, perhaps the big question now is whether things will simply go “back to normal” as the lockdown lifts. Or can anti-deportation campaigners use this window to push for a more radical shift?
    An overview of the UK’s deportation machine

    Last year, the UK Home Office deported over seven thousand people. While the numbers of people “removed” have been falling for several years, deportation remains at the heart of the government’s strategy (if that is the term) for “tackling illegal immigration”. It is the ultimate threat behind workplace and dawn raids, rough-sleeper round-ups, “right to rent” checks, reporting centre queues, and other repressive architecture of the UK Border Regime.

    This report gives an overview of the current state of UK deportations, focusing on scheduled flights run by major airlines. Our previous reports on UK deportations have mainly looked at charter flights: where the Home Office aims to fill up chartered planes to particular destinations, under heavy guard and typically at night from undisclosed locations. These have been a key focus for anti-deportation campaigners for a number of reasons including their obvious brutality, and their use as a weapon to stifle legal and direct resistance. However, the majority of deportations are on scheduled flights. Deportees are sitting – at the back handcuffed to private security “escorts” – amongst business or holiday travellers.

    These deportations cannot take place without extensive collaboration from businesses. The security guards are provided by outsourcing company Mitie. The tickets are booked by business travel multinational Carlson Wagonlit. The airlines themselves are household names, from British Airways to Easyjet. This report explains how the Home Office and its private sector collaborators work together as a “deportation machine” held together by a range of contractual relationships.

    Some acknowledgements

    Many individuals and campaign groups helped with information used in this report. In particular, Lesbians and Gays Support the Migrants shared their valuable research and legal advice, discussed below.

    We have produced this report in collaboration with the Air Deportation Project led by William Walters at the University of Carleton in Canada, funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Corporate Watch received funding from this project as a contribution for our work on this report.

    Names, numbers

    First a quick snapshot of deportation numbers, types and destinations. We also need to clear up some terminology.

    We will use the term “deportations” to refer to all cases where the Home Office moves someone out of the country under direct force (for scheduled flights, this usually means handcuffed to a security “escort”). In the Home Office’s own jargon, these are called “enforced returns”, and the word “deportation” is reserved for people ejected on “public policy” rather than “immigration” grounds – mostly Foreign National Offenders who have been convicted by criminal courts. The Home Office refers to deportations carried out under immigration law euphemistically, calling them “removals” or “returns”.i

    As well as “enforced returns”, there are also so-called “voluntary returns”. This means that there is no direct use of force – no guard, no leg or arm restraints. But the term “voluntary” is stretched. Many of these take place under threat of force: e.g., people are pressured to sign “voluntary return” agreements to avoid being forcibly deported, or as the only chance of being released from detention. In other cases, people may agree to “voluntary return” as the only escape route from a limbo of reporting controls, lack of rights to work or rent legally, or destitution threatened by “no recourse to public funds”.

    In 2019, the Home Office reported a total of 18,782 returns: 7,361 “enforced” and 11,421 “voluntary”.ii
    These figures include 5,110 “Foreign National Offenders” (27%). (The Home Office says the majority of these were enforced returns, although no precise figure is provided.)
    There is a notable trend of declining removals, both enforced and “voluntary”. For example, in 2015 there were 41,789 returns altogether, 13,690 enforced and 28,189 “voluntary”. Both enforced and voluntary figures have decreased every year since then.
    Another notable trend concerns the nationalities of deportees. Europeans make up an increasing proportion of enforced deportations. 3,498, or 48%, of all enforced returns in 2019 were EU citizens – and this does not include other heavily targeted non-EU European nationalities such as Albanians. In 2015, there were 3,848 EU enforced returns – a higher absolute figure, but only 28% of a much higher overall total. In contrast, EU nationals still make up a very small percentage of “voluntary” returns – there were only 107 EU “voluntary returns” in 2019.
    The top nationalities for enforced returns in 2019 were: Romania (18%), Albania (12%), Poland (9%), Brazil (8%) and Lithuania (6%). For voluntary returns they were: India (16%), China (9%), Pakistan (9%).

    We won’t present any analysis of these figures and trends here. The latest figures show continuing evidence of patterns we looked at in our book The UK Border Regime.iii One key point we made there was that, as the resources and physical force of the detention and deportation system are further diminished, the Border Regime is more than ever just a “spectacle” of immigration enforcement – a pose for media and key voter audiences, rather than a realistic attempt to control migration flows. We also looked at how the scapegoat groups targeted by this spectacle have shifted over recent decades – including, most recently, a new focus on European migration accompanying, or in fact anticipating, the Brexit debate.

    Deportation destinations

    Home Office Immigration Statistics also provide more detailed dataiv on the destinations people are “returned” to, which will be important when we come to look at routes and airline involvement. Note that, while there is a big overlap between destinations and nationalities, they are of course not the same thing. For example, many of those deported to France and other western European countries are “third country” removals of refugees under the Dublin agreement – in which governments can deport an asylum seeker where they have already been identified in another EU country.

    Here are the top 20 destinations for deportations in 2019 – by which, to repeat, we mean all enforced returns:

    It is worth comparing these figures with a similar table of top 20 deportation destinations in the last 10 years – between 2010 and 2019. This comparison shows very strongly the recent shift to targeting Europeans.

    The Home Office: who is targeted and how

    As we will see, the actual physical business of deporting people is outsourced to private companies. The state’s role remains giving the orders about who is targeted for arrest and detention, who is then released, and who is forced onto a plane. Here we’ll just take a very quick look at the decision-making structures at work on the government side. This is based on the much more detailed account in The UK Border Regime.

    The main state body responsible for immigration control in the UK is the Home Office, the equivalent of other countries’ Interior Ministries. In its current set-up, the Home Office has three divisions: Homeland Security, which runs security and intelligence services; Public Safety, which oversees the police and some other institutions; and Borders, Immigration and Citizenship. The last of these is further divided into three “directorates”: UK Visas and Immigration, which determines visa and asylum applications; Border Force, responsible for control at the frontiers; Immigration Enforcement, responsible for control within the national territory – including detention and deportations. Immigration Enforcement itself has an array of further departments and units. Regular restructuring and reshuffling of all these structures is known to bewilder immigration officers themselves, contributing to the Home Office’s notoriously low morale.v

    At the top of the tree is the Home Secretary (interior minister), supported by a more junior Immigration Minister. Along with the most senior civil servants and advisors, these ministers will be directly involved in setting top-level policies on deportations.

    For example, an enquiry led by then prisons and probation ombudsman Stephen Shaw into the Yarl’s Wood detention centre revolt in 2002 has given us some valuable insight into the development of modern Home Office deportation policy under the last Labour government. Then Home Secretary Jack Straw, working with civil servants including the Home Office permanent secretary Sir David Omand, introduced the first deportation targets we are aware of, in 2000. They agreed a plan to deport 12,000 people in 2000-1, rising to 30,000 people the next year, and eventually reaching 57,000 in 2003-4.vi

    Nearly two decades later, Home Secretary Amber Rudd was pushed to resign after a leak confirmed that the Home Office continued to operate a deportation targets policy, something of which she had denied knowledge.vii The 2017-18 target, revealed in a leaked letter to Rudd from Immigration Enforcement’s director general Hugh Ind, was for 12,800 enforced returns.viii

    As the figures discussed above show, recent austerity era Conservative governments are more modest than the last Labour government in their overall deportation targets, and have moved to target different groups. Jack Straw’s deportation programme was almost entirely focused on asylum seekers whose claims had been refused. This policy derived from what the Blair government saw as an urgent need to respond to media campaigns demonising asylum seekers. Twenty years on, asylum seekers now make up a minority of deportees, and have been overtaken by new media bogeymen including European migrants.

    In addition, recent Home Office policy has put more effort into promoting “voluntary” returns – largely for cost reasons, as security guards and detention are expensive. This was the official rationale behind Theresa May’s infamous “racist van” initiative, where advertising vans drove round migrant neighbourhoods parading “Go Home” slogans and a voluntary return hotline number.

    How do Home Office political targets translate into operations on the ground? We don’t know all the links, but can trace some main mechanisms. Enforced returns begin with arrests. One of the easiest ways to find potential deportees is to grab people as they walk in to sign at an Immigration Reporting Centre. 80,000 migrants in the UK are “subject to reporting requirements”, and all Reporting Centres include short-term holding cells.ix Other deportees are picked up during immigration raids – such as daytime and evening raids on workplaces, or dawn raids to catch “immigration offenders” in their beds.x

    Both reporting centre caseworkers and Immigration Compliance and Enforcement (ICE) raid squads are issued with targets and incentives to gather deportees. An Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration (ICIBI) report from 2017 explains how reporting centre staff work specifically to deportation targets. The inspector also tells us how:

    Staff at the London Reporting Centres worked on the basis that to meet their removal targets they needed to detain twice the number of individuals, as around half of those detained would later raise a barrier to removal and be released from detention.

    ICE raid teams are set monthly priorities by national and regional commanders, which may include targeting specific nationalities for deportation. For example, the Home Office has repeatedly denied that it sets nationality targets in order to fill up charter flights to particular destinations – but this practice was explicitly confirmed by an internal document from 2014 (an audit report from the director of Harmondsworth detention centre) obtained by Corporate Watch following a Freedom of Information legal battle.xi

    Day-to-day deportation and detention decisions are overseen by a central unit called the National Removals Command (NRC). For example, after ICE raid officers make arrests they must call NRC to authorise individuals’ detention. This decision is made on the basis of any specific current targets, and otherwise on general “removability”.

    “Removability” means the chance of successfully getting their “subject” onto a plane without being blocked by lack of travel documents, legal challenges and appeals, or other obstacles. For example, nationals of countries with whom the UK has a formal deportation agreement are, all other things being equal, highly removable. This includes the countries with which the UK has set up regular charter flight routes – including Albania, Pakistan, Nigeria and Ghana, and more recently Jamaica and a number of EU countries. On the other extreme, some nationalities such as Iranians present a problem as their governments refuse to accept deportees.

    The Home Office: “arranging removal” procedure

    A Home Office document called “Arranging Removal” sets out the steps Immigration Enforcement caseworkers need to take to steer their “subject” from arrest to flight.xii

    On the one hand, they are under pressure from penny-pinching bosses keen to get the job done as quick and cheap as possible. On the other, they have to be careful not to make any mistakes deportees’ lawyers could use to get flights cancelled. Immigration Officers have the legal power to order deportations without the need for any court decision – however, many deportations are blocked on appeal to courts.

    Here are some of the main steps involved:

    Removability assessment. The caseworker needs to assess that: there are no “casework barriers” – e.g., an ongoing asylum claim or appeal that would lead to the deportation being stopped by a court; the detainee is medically “fit to fly”; any family separation is authorised correctly; the detainee has a valid travel document.
    Travel Document. If there is no valid travel document, the caseworker can try to obtain an “emergency travel document” through various routes.
    Executive approval. If all these criteria are met, the caseworker gets authorisation from a senior office to issue Removal Directions (RD) paperwork.
    Risk Assessment. Once the deportation is agreed, the caseworker needs to assess risks that might present themselves on the day of the flight – such as medical conditions, the likelihood of detainee resistance and of public protest. At this point escorts and/or medics are requested. A version of this risk assessment is sent to the airline – but without case details or medical history.xiii
    Flight booking. The caseworker must first contact the Airline Ticketing Team who grant access to an online portal called the Electronic Removal Form (ERF). This portal is run by the Home Office’s flight booking contractor Carlson Wagonlit (see below). Tickets are booked for escorts and any medics as well as the deportee. There are different options including “lowest cost” non-refundable fares, or “fully refundable” – the caseworker here should assess how likely the deportation is to be cancelled. One of the options allows the caseworker to choose a specific airline.
    Notice of removal. Finally, the deportee must be served with a Removal Directions (RD) document that includes notification of the deportation destination and date. This usually also includes the flight number. The deportee must be given sufficient notice: for people already in detention this is standardly 72 hours, including two working days, although longer periods apply in some situations.

    In 2015 the Home Office brought in a new policy of issuing only “removal window” notification in many cases – this didn’t specify the date but only a wide timeframe. The window policy was successfully challenged in the courts in March 2019 and is currently suspended.

    #Carlson_Wagonlit

    The electronic booking system is run by a private company, #Carlson_Wagonlit_Travel (#CWT). CWT is also in charge of contracting charter flights.

    Carlson Wagonlit has been the Home Office’s deportation travel agent since 2004, with the contract renewed twice since then. Its current seven year contract, worth £5.7 million, began in November 2017 and will last until October 2024 (assuming the two year extension period is taken up after an initial five years). The Home Office estimated in the contract announcement that it will spend £200 million on deportation tickets and charters over that seven year period.xiv

    Carlson is a global #business travel services company, i.e., a large scale travel agent and booker for companies and government agencies. Its official head office is in France, but it is 100% owned by US conglomerate #Carlson_Companies Inc. It claims to be active in more than 150 countries.

    A report on “outsourced contracts” by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration gives us some information on CWT’s previous (2010-17) contract.xv This is unlikely to be substantially changed in the new version, although deportation numbers have reduced since then. The contract involved:

    management of charter flights and ticketing provision for scheduled flights for migrants subject to enforced removal and escorts, where required, and the management of relationships with carriers to maintain and expand available routes. […] Annually, CWT processed approximately 21,000 booking requests from Home Office caseworkers for tickets for enforced removals. Some booking requests were for multiple travellers and/or more than one flight and might involve several transactions. CWT also managed flight rescheduling, cancellations and refunds. The volume of transactions processed varied from 5,000 to 8,000 per month.

    The inspection report notes the value of CWT’s service to the Home Office through using its worldwide contacts to facilitate deportations:

    Both Home Office and CWT managers noted that CWT’s position as a major travel operator had enabled it to negotiate favourable deals with airlines and, over the life of the contract to increase the range of routes available for enforced removals. (Para 5.10).

    The airlines: regular deportation collaborators

    We saw above that Home Office caseworkers book flight tickets through an online portal set up and managed by Carlson Wagonlit Travel. We also saw how CWT is praised by Home Office managers for its strong relationships with airlines, and ability to negotiate favourable deals.

    For charter flight deportations, we know that CWT has developed a particular relationship with one charter company called Titan Airways. We have looked at Titan in our previous reports on charter flight deportations.

    Does the Home Office also have specific preferred airline partners for scheduled flights? Unfortunately, this isn’t an easy question to answer. Under government procurement rules, the Home Office is required to provide information on contracts it signs – thus, for example, we have at least a redacted version of the contract with CWT. But as all its airline bookings go through the intermediary of CWT, there are no such contracts available. Claiming “commercial confidentiality”, the Home Office has repeatedly information requests on its airline deals. (We will look in a bit more depth at this issue in the annex.)

    As a result, we have no centrally-gathered aggregate data on airline involvement. Our information comes from individual witnesses: deportees themselves; their lawyers and supporters; fellow passengers, and plane crew. Lawyers and support groups involved in deportation casework are a particularly helpful reference, as they may know about multiple deportation cases.

    For this report, we spoke to more than a dozen immigration lawyers and caseworkers to ask which airlines their clients had been booked on. We also spoke to anti-deportation campaign groups including Lesbians and Gays Support the Migrants, who have run recent campaigns calling on airlines to refuse to fly deportees; and to the trade union Unite, who represent flight crew workers. We also looked at media reports of deportation flights that identify airlines.

    These sources name a large number of airlines, and some names come up repeatedly. British Airways is top of the list. We list a few more prominent collaborators below: Easyjet, Kenya Airways, Ethiopian Airlines, Qatar Airways, Turkish Airlines, Royal Jordanian. Virgin Airlines is the only company to have publicly announced it has stopped carrying deportees from the UK – although there have been some questions over whether it is keeping this promise.

    However, the information we have does not allow us to determine the exact nature of the relationship with these airlines. How many airlines appear in the CWT booking system – what determines which ones are included? Does CWT have a preferential arrangement with BA or other frequent deportation airlines? Does the Home Office itself have any direct interaction with these airlines’ management? How many airlines are not included in the CWT booking system because they have refused to carry deportees?

    For now, we have to leave these as open questions.

    British Airways

    We have numerous reports of British Airways flying deportees to destinations worldwide – including African and Caribbean destinations, amongst others. Cabin crew representatives in Unite the Union identify British Airways as the main airline they say is involved in deportation flights.

    The airline has long been a key Home Office collaborator. Back in 2003, at the height of the Labour government’s push to escalate deportations, the “escort” security contractor was a company called Loss Prevention International. In evidence to a report by the House of Commons home affairs committee, its chief executive Tom Davies complained that many airlines at this point were refusing to fly deportees. But he singled out BA as the notable exception, saying: “if it were not for […] the support we get from British Airways, the number of scheduled flight removals that we would achieve out of this country would be virtually nil”.xvi

    In 2010, British Airways’ role was highlighted when Jimmy Mubenga was killed by G4S “escorts” on BA flight 77 from Heathrow to Angola.

    Since 2018, there has been an active calling on BA to stop its collaboration. The profile of this issue was raised after BA sponsored Brighton Pride in May 2018 – whilst being involved in deportations of lesbian and gay migrants to African countries where their lives were in danger. After winning a promise from Virgin Airways to cease involvement in deportations (see below), the group Lesbians and Gays Support the Migrants (LGSM) have made BA the main target for their anti-deportation campaigning.

    The campaign has also now been supported by BA cabin crew organised in the union Unite. In December 2019 Unite cabin crew branches passed a motion against airline scheduled flight deportations.xvii

    Kenya Airways

    We have numerous reports from caseworkers and campaigners of Kenya Airways flying deportees to destinations in Africa.

    The typical route is a flight from Heathrow to Nairobi, followed by a second onward flight. People deported using this route have included refugees from Sudan and Somalia.

    Easyjet

    We have numerous reports of Easyjet flying deportees to European destinations. Easyjet appears to be a favoured airline for deportations to Eastern European countries, and also for “third country” returns to countries including Italy and Germany. While most UK scheduled deportations are carried out from Heathrow and Gatwick, we have also seen accounts of Easyjet deportations from Luton.

    Qatar Airways

    We have numerous reports of Qatar Airways carrying deportees to destinations in the Middle East, Asia and Africa. Qatar Airways has carried deportees to Iraq, according to the International Federation of Iraqi Refugees (IFIR), and also to Sudan. (In March 2019 the airline suspended its Sudan route, but this appears to have been restarted – the company website currently advertises flights to Khartoum in April 2020.xviii) Other destinations include Pakistan, Bangladesh, China, Thailand, the Philippines, and Uganda. The typical route is from Heathrow via Doha.

    Turkish Airlines

    We have numerous reports of Turkish Airlines carrying deportees. The typical route is Heathrow or Gatwick to Istanbul, then an onward flight to further destinations including Iraq and Afghanistan. According to the International Federation of Iraqi Refugees (IFIR), Turkish Airlines has been one of the main companies involved in deportations to Iraq. A media report from June 2019 also mentions Turkish Airlines carrying someone being deported to Somalia via Istanbul.xix In August 2017, a Turkish Airlines pilot notably refused to fly an Afghani refugee from Heathrow to Istanbul, en route to Kabul, after being approached by campaigners – but this does not reflect general company policy.xx

    Ethiopian Airlines

    We have reports of this airline deporting people to Ethiopia and other African countries, including Sudan. Flights are from Heathrow to Addis Ababa. In April 2018, high-profile Yarl’s Wood hunger striker Opelo Kgari was booked on an Ethiopian flight to Addis Ababa en route to Botswana.

    Air France

    Air France are well-known for carrying deportees from France, and have been a major target for campaigning by anti-deportation activists there. We also have several reports of them carrying deportees from the UK, on flights from Heathrow via Paris.

    Royal Jordanian

    According to IFIR, Royal Jordanian has been involved in deportations to Iraq.

    Virgin Airlines

    In June 2018, Virgin announced that it had ceased taking bookings for deportation flights. Virgin had previously been a regular carrier for deportations to Jamaica and to Nigeria. (NB: Nigeria is often used as a deportation transit hub from where people are subsequently removed to other African countries.) The announcement came after the Windrush scandal led to the Home Office apparently suspending deportations to the Caribbean, and following campaigning by Lesbians and Gays Support the Migrants (LGSM) – although Virgin claimed it had made the decision before being contacted by the campaign. A Virgin statement said:

    we made the decision to end all involuntary deportations on our network, and have already informed the Home Office. We believe this decision is in the best interest of our customers and people, and is in keeping with our values as a company.xxi

    But there are doubts over just how much Virgin’s promise is worth. According to a report by The Independent:

    The airline had agreed to deport a man to Nigeria […] a day after announcing the decision. The only reason he wasn’t removed was because the Home Office agreed to consider new representations following legal intervention.xxii

    Do airlines have a choice?

    In response to its critics, British Airways has consistently given the same reply: it has no choice but to cooperate with the Home Office. According to an August 2018 article in The Guardian, BA says that it has “a legal duty under the Immigration Act 1971 to remove individuals when asked to do so by the Home Office.” A company spokesperson is quoted saying:

    Not fulfilling this obligation amounts to breaking the law. We are not given any personal information about the individual being deported, including their sexuality or why they are being deported. The process we follow is a full risk assessment with the Home Office, which considers the safety of the individual, our customers and crew on the flight.xxiii

    The last parts of this answer fit the process we looked at above. When booking the flight, the Home Office caseworker sends the airline a form called an Airline Risk Report (ARA) which alerts it to risk issues, and specifies why escorts or medics are needed – including an assessment of the likelihood of resistance. But no information should be shared on the deportee’s medical issues or immigration case and reasons for deportation.

    But is it true that an airline would be breaking the law if it refused a booking? Lesbians and Gays Support the Migrants have shared with us a legal opinion they received from law firm Duncan Lewis on this issue. We summarise the main points here.

    The law in question is the Immigration Act 1971, Section 27(1)(b)(iii). This states that, when issued the correct legal order by the Home Office, the “owner or agent of a ship or aircraft” must “make arrangements for or in connection with the removal of a person from the United Kingdom when required to do so [by appropriate Removal Directions]”. It is an offence to fail to do so “without reasonable excuse”.

    The offence is punishable by a fine, and potentially a prison sentence of up to six months. As a minor “summary only” offence, any case would be heard by a magistrates’ court rather than a jury.

    In fact many airline captains have refused to carry deportees – as we will see in the next section. But there are no recorded cases of anyone ever being prosecuted for refusing. As with many areas of UK immigration law, there is simply no “case law” on this question.

    If a case ever does come to court, it might turn on that clause about a “reasonable excuse”. The legal opinion explains that the airline might argue they refused to carry a deportee because doing so would present a risk to the aircraft or passengers, for example if there is resistance or protest. A court might well conclude this was “reasonable”.

    On the other hand, the “reasonable excuse” defence could be harder to apply for an airline that took a principled stand to refuse all deportations as a general rule, whether or not there is disruption.

    Again, though, all this is hypothetical as the Home Office has never actually prosecuted anyone. Virgin Airlines, the first company to have publicly stated that it will not fly deportees from the UK, so far has not faced any legal comeback. As reported in the press, a Virgin spokesperson explained the company’s position like this:

    We’ve made the decision to end all involuntary deportations on our network, and have informed the Home Office. We always comply with the law and would continue to comply with legislation; however, we have ended our contractual agreement to carry involuntary deportees.xxiv

    Due to our lack of information on Home Office agreements with airlines, it’s hard to assess exactly what this means. Possibly, Virgin previously had an outstanding deal with the Home Office and Carlson Wagonlit where their tickets came up on the CWT booking portal and were available for caseworkers, and this has now ended. If the Home Office insisted on contacting them and booking a ticket regardless, they might then be pushed to “comply with the law”.

    Above we saw that, according to evidence referred to in a report of the House of Commons home affairs select committee, in 2003 the majority of airlines actually refused to carry deportees, leaving the Home Office to depend almost exclusively on British Airways. Even in this context there were no prosecutions of airlines.

    This is not an uncommon situation across UK immigration law: much of it has never come to court. For example, as we have discussed in reports on immigration raids, there have been no legal cases testing many of the powers of ICE raid squads. To give another example, on numerous occasions campaigners have obstructed buses taking detainees to charter flights without any prosecution – the Stansted 15 trial of protestors blocking a plane inside the airport was the first high-profile legal case following an anti-deportation action.

    Even if the government has a legal case for prosecuting airlines, this could be a highly controversial move politically. The Home Office generally prefers not to expose the violence of its immigration enforcement activities to the challenge of a public legal hearing.

    Resistance

    We want to conclude this report on an upbeat note. Deportations, and scheduled airline flights in particular, are a major site of struggle. Resistance is not just possible but widespread and often victorious. Thousands of people have managed to successfully stop their “removals” through various means, including the following:

    Legal challenges: a large number of flights are stopped because of court appeals and injunctions.
    Public campaigning: there is a strong tradition of anti-deportation campaigning in the UK, usually supporting individuals with media-focused and political activity. Common tactics include: media articles highlighting the individual’s case; enlisting MPs and appealing to ministers; petitions, letters of support; mass phone calls, emails, etc., to airlines; demos or leafletting at the airport targeting air crew and passengers.
    Solidarity action by passengers: in some high-profile cases, passengers have refused to take their seats until deportees are removed. This creates a safety situation for the airline which may often lead to the pilot ordering escorts to remove their prisoner.
    Direct action by detainees: many detainees have been able to get off flights by putting up a struggle. This may involve, for example: physically resisting escorts; taking off clothes; shouting and appealing to passengers and air crew for help. Unless the deportee is extremely strong physically, the balance of force is with the escorts – and sometimes this can be lethal, as in the case of Jimmy Mubenga. However, pilots may often order deportees off their plane in the case of disruption.

    There are many reports of successful resistance using one or more of these tactics. And we can also get some glimpses of their overall power from a few pieces of aggregate information.

    In a 2016 report, the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration revealed one telling figure. Looking at the figures for six months over 2014-15, he found that “on average 2.5 tickets were issued for each individual successfully removed.”xxv Some of this can be put down to the notorious inefficiency of Home Office systems: the Inspection report looks at several kinds of coordination failures between Home Office caseworkers, the escort contractor (at that point a subsidiary of Capita), and Carlson Wagonlit.

    But this is not the biggest factor. In fact, the same report breaks down the reasons for cancellation for a sample of 136 tickets. 51% of the sampled cancellations were the result of legal challenges. 18% were because of “disruptive or non-compliant behaviour”. 2% (i.e., three cases) were ascribed to “airline refusal to carry”.

    Where there is resistance, there is also reaction. As we have discussed in previous reports, one of the main reasons prompting the development of charter flights was to counter resistance by isolating deportees from passengers and supporters. This was very clearly put in 2009 by David Wood, then strategic director of the UK Border Agency (Home Office), who explained that the charter flight programme is:

    “a response to the fact that some of those being deported realised that if they made a big enough fuss at the airport – if they took off their clothes, for instance, or started biting and spitting – they could delay the process. We found that pilots would then refuse to take the person on the grounds that other passengers would object.”xxvi

    For both deportees and supporters, charter flights are much harder to resist. But they are also very expensive; require specific diplomatic agreements with destination countries; and in some cases (Iraq, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka) have been blocked by legal and political means.xxvii The Home Office cannot avoid the use of scheduled flights for the majority of deportations, and it will continue to face resistance.

    –—
    Annex: issues with accessing airline information

    We will expand a bit here on the issues around obtaining information on the Home Office’s relationships with airlines.

    Under UK and EU public sector procurement rules, central government departments are obliged to publish announcements of all contracts valued over £10,000, including on the contractsfinder website. However, there is no publicly available information on any contracts between the Home Office and specific airlines. This is legally justifiable if the Home Office has no direct contractual agreements with airlines. It has a signed contract with Carlson Wagonlit Travel (CWT), which is published in a redacted form; and CWT then makes arrangements with airlines on a per-ticket basis.

    The Home Office certainly has knowledge of all the tickets booked on its behalf by CWT – indeed, they are booked by its own employees through the CWT maintained portal. And so it certainly knows all the airlines working for it. But it has refused all requests for this information, using the excuse of “commercial confidentiality”.

    There have been numerous attempts to request information on deportation airlines using the Freedom of Information Act.xxviii All have been refused on similar grounds. To give one standard example, in December 2018 A. Liberadzki requested statistics for numbers of removals carried out by British Airways and other scheduled airlines. The response confirmed “that the Home Office holds the information that you have requested.” However, it argued that:

    “we have decided that the information is exempt from disclosure under sections 31(1)e and 43(2) of the FOIA. These provide that information can be withheld if its disclosure would have a detrimental effect on the Home Office and its ability to operate effective immigration controls by carrying out removals or would, or would be likely to, prejudice the commercial interests of any persons (including the public authority holding it).”

    In April 2019 Kate Osamor MP put similar questions to the Home Secretary in parliament.xxix She received the same reply to all her questions:

    “The Home Office does not disclose the details or values of its commercial contracts. Doing so could discourage companies from dealing with the Home Office.”

    Of course this answer is blatantly false – as we just saw, the Home Office is legally obliged to disclose values of commercial contracts over £10,000.

    https://corporatewatch.org/uk-deportations-2020-how-ba-easyjet-and-other-airlines-collaborate-w

    #rapport #corporate_watch #compagnies_aériennes #British_Airways #avions #renvois #expulsions #asile #migrations #déboutés #sans-papiers #UK #Home_Office #résistance #Jimmy_Mubenga

    ping @isskein @karine4 @reka

  • Des centaines de familles de migrants éthiopiens touchés par la COVID-19 reçoivent de la nourriture et de l’aide au Kenya | Organisation internationale pour les migrations
    https://www.iom.int/fr/news/des-centaines-de-familles-de-migrants-ethiopiens-touches-par-la-covid-19-recoiv

    Plus de 300 migrants éthiopiens et leurs familles reçoivent aujourd’hui de la nourriture et d’autres articles essentiels de l’OIM, l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations, à Nairobi, au Kenya, un petit effort pour atténuer l’impact plus large de la COVID-19 dans la région.
    Les migrants, dont beaucoup vivent et travaillent au Kenya depuis des années, ont perdu leur emploi et leurs revenus en raison des restrictions de déplacement et des couvre-feux, ainsi que du ralentissement économique général, tous provoqués par la pandémie.

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#oim#ethiopie#kenya#ethiopie#nourriture

  • HCR - Les réfugiés urbains des régions de l’Est, de la Corne et des Grands Lacs de l’Afrique luttent pour survivre alors que l’impact économique du Covid-19 s’y fait durement ressentir.
    https://www.unhcr.org/fr/news/briefing/2020/5/5eccf3b5a/refugies-urbains-regions-lest-corne-grands-lacs-lafrique-luttent-survivre.htm

    Les réfugiés urbains sont menacés de perdre leur emploi car les entreprises sont obligées de réduire leurs effectifs ou de fermer en raison des restrictions imposées par le Covid-19. Nombre d’entre eux sont des travailleurs journaliers ou travaillent dans l’économie informelle et vivaient déjà au jour le jour avant que la pandémie ne se déclare. Au Rwanda, par exemple, la plupart des 12 000 réfugiés urbains ont vu les principaux pourvoyeurs au sein de leurs familles perdre leur emploi. Beaucoup travaillaient pour des entreprises qui ont fermé ou qui ont du mal à importer des marchandises en raison des restrictions aux frontières.
    De nombreux réfugiés urbains vivent également dans des conditions de promiscuité et d’insalubrité et sont particulièrement vulnérables à la propagation du virus, comme au Kenya où des milliers de réfugiés vivent dans des quartiers pauvres de Nairobi, avec un accès limité à l’eau potable, ce qui rend presque impossible la pratique régulière du lavage des mains.
    Tant au Rwanda qu’au Kenya, le HCR a fourni une aide d’urgence en espèces aux plus vulnérables et étudie la possibilité d’élargir cette assistance. En Ouganda, le HCR et le PAM ont mis en place une aide financière ponctuelle pour quelque 80 000 réfugiés urbains en recourant aux transferts par téléphonie mobile pour leur permettre de payer leur loyer, leur nourriture et de couvrir d’autres dépenses essentielles. Toutefois, il ne s’agit là que de mesures temporaires face à des conditions socio-économiques qui devraient encore se détériorer dans les semaines et les mois à venir.

    #covid-19#migrant#migration#ouganda#Rwanda#Kenya#réfugiés-urbains#vulnérabilité#santé#pauvreté#promiscuité#accès-santé#propagation#virus

  • Army man who guarded Kabuga ‘killed’ - Daily Nation
    https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Kenya-Army-men-guarded-killer-Kabuga-/1056-1448938-u10qwz/index.html

    Sunday July 8 2012 by JOHN-ALLAN NAMU - Army marksman Michael Sarunei told his family that his secret job was to guard Rwanda genocide suspect; he disappeared after taking photos

    A Kenya Army soldier allegedly assigned to protect wanted Rwandan genocide suspect Felicien Kabuga disappeared — and may have been murdered — after he secretly took pictures of the fugitive, investigations have revealed.

    The soldier was part of a shadowy unit set up by people close to the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) and the military or who appear to have had access to facilities controlled by the two institutions.

    The unit provided security for the runaway genocide suspect, who has a Sh400 million bounty on his head, while Army marksman Michael Sarunei told his family that his secret job was to guard Rwanda genocide suspect; he disappeared after taking photoshe was hiding in Kenya even as the government denied knowing his whereabouts.

    The startling facts about Kabuga, said to have been one of the brains behind the Rwanda killings, in which close to 800,000 people were hacked to death, were revealed yesterday in an investigative documentary aired on NTV last night.

    The disappearance of Michael Sarunei, an infrantryman who was part of Kabuga’s bodyguard, has raised questions about the government’s handling of the hunt for the fugitive businessman, whom the United States Government has always insisted was being harboured by Kenya.

    Contacted on Sunday, Government spokesman Alfred Mutua denied the involvement of the present government in the Kabuga saga. He said that all the allegations that have been made about Mr Kabuga’s refuge in Kenya point to events before President Kibaki took over at the end of 2002.

    “This particular government has not been aware of anything to do with the protection of Mr Kabuga. We are working very closely with the Rwanda government to ensure that this man is arrested,” Dr Mutua said.

    NTV investigations over the past five months, however, point to Mr Kabuga still being in the country.

    Relatives of Sarunei, who joined the Kenya Army infantry in 1996, told of the soldier’s mysterious disappearance early on February 13, 2009, after saying he was protecting Kabuga.

    They believe he was killed after he secretly took pictures of the elusive businessman. Three of those photographs were given to NTV. Shown to Rwandan Government officials and people who had worked at Kabuga’s radio station in Rwanda, they confirmed that the elderly man in a blue T-shirt was indeed the wanted suspect.

    Sarunei’s disappearance is the latest twist in the Kabuga saga, which previously resulted in the murder of a freelance journalist, Michael Munuhe, who was tortured to death as he prepared to lead FBI agents to Kabuga’s hideout in Nairobi.

    A relative of the soldier, who remains anonymous for his own safety, was interviewed by NTV reporter John-Allan Namu in Rift Valley, where he produced the pictures of a man later identified as Kabuga and video images of a white government Land Rover in which Sarunei was driven away by his captors.

    Said the source: “Four years ago Michael (Sarunei) began earning a lot of money. I asked him whether soldiers were getting paid better these days. He told me that he was working for a very rich man from Rwanda, who the government had wanted to keep in hiding, and that’s why he was getting paid a lot. Michael told me that the rich man who he and others were protecting was called Kabuga.”

    Sarunei had reportedly told his relative that his bosses had ordered him never to reveal anything about the man they were protecting or he would be killed.

    But Sarunei never heeded this warning. According to the source, in late 2008, when Kabuga was still in a Nairobi hospital, the soldier secretly photographed him. Unknown to him, the pictures were discovered by a colleague who alerted Kabuga and his protectors in government.

    According to the relative, on February 13, 2009, Sarunei was led out of his home one morning into a government vehicle, registration GK 029K, never to be seen again.

    NTV showed the pictures to Rwanda’s prosecutor-general Martin Ngoga, who confirmed they were of Kabuga, though 18 years older than widely circulated pictures of him.

    NTV also uncovered shocking new details about the mysterious death of Michael Munuhe, an FBI informer, whose body was found in the Gitu area of Karen in Nairobi on January 13, 2003.

    His brother, Josephat Mureithi Gichuki, is convinced that Munuhe was murdered because he was about to reveal Kabuga’s whereabouts to the US security agency.

    The police verdict was suicide, he says, but all evidence in the room where his brother was found pointed to a violent and bloody confrontation.

    Months after he was buried, a relative was sorting through his old clothes when he found a three-page letter written by Munuhe.

    It detailed how he was abducted one Wednesday night at the Safari Park Hotel exit by three armed men and driven for nearly four hours in the locked boot of a car.

    It is undated, but Munuhe’s elder brother was able to figure out that it was written in late December 2002, a few days before his death.

    He eventually ended up in a dark room where he was beaten and tortured to reveal information about his relations with the FBI.

    Eventually he was taken to a room where he came face-to-face with Kabuga, who was seated with three other men.

    “Kabuga told me about the tapes they had on my conversations with Mr Scott (believed to be his FBI contact) and three people. He criticised me for betraying him and Cheruiyot”.

    The name of then Internal Security permanent secretary Zakayo Cheruiyot has featured often in stories about Kabuga’s refuge in Kenya.

    However, Mr Cheruiyot, now the MP for Kuresoi, has always strenuously denied any involvement.

    The informant, now in hiding, told NTV that he worked in the same squad with Sarunei, and claimed that the name Sadiki Nzakobi was one of the aliases that Kabuga used in Kenya.

    He gave NTV some documents allegedly from the Department of Defence headquarters, and copies of documents procured from the Third Battalion of the Kenya Army in Nakuru.

    These appear to be evidence of the first attempts to legitimise Mr Kabuga’s stay in Kenya, after it became known that he was involved in the Rwanda genocide. The Department of Defence has dismissed the documents and neither NTV nor the Nation could independently verify their authenticity or origin.

    The documents appear to suggest that Mr Kabuga moved from an asylum seeker, to captain in the army and was honourably discharged and offered diplomatic immunity.

    The first letter was dated July 5, 2000. Its reference number is OP/DOD/0324/2000 and is addressed to the DoD commandant, written in reference to one Mr Sadiki Nzakobi.

    It says that Sadiki has sought asylum in Kenya due to insecurity in Somalia and should be assisted with the necessary military documentation to enable him stay in the country safely. It also asks that he be assisted with personal security to enable him access his personal doctor, a Dr Peter Rwakwach, so that he can undergo treatment.

    The letter bears the name of an S.K. Kamau, and was signed on behalf of the permanent secretary in the Ministry of Defence. We could not ascertain whether indeed such an individual ever worked at the Defence ministry.

    The Department of Defence at the time was overseen by the Internal Security PS, then Mr Cheruiyot.

    Colonel (retired) Dr Rwakwach is a medical practitioner who works in Nakuru and served in the armed forces as a military doctor, retiring in 2002. The doctor denied knowing anyone by the name Sadiki Nzakobi.

    The second document bears the letterhead of the Kenya Armed Forces 3rd Battalion in Nakuru and is a request for legal documents for Nzakobi. It claims that Nzokabi was the commanding officer of the DCOY or Delta Company, for seven years, resigning on September 6, 1998.

    Military intelligence

    Another letter, also bearing the same letterhead follows up on the requests made in the letter from the permanent secretary’s office. The letter gave Nzakobi the authority to be treated in any military hospital.

    Another letter, written on February 14, 2001 (Reference number OP/DOD/0652/2001) and also marked as confidential, states: “Please assist the above-mentioned person with military intelligence for his personal security. He is a person staying in this country under diplomatic immunity.”

    This letter bears the name of James Theuri, on behalf of the Defence PS. Again, we could not establish whether this individual worked for the department and in what capacity.

    The last document bearing the Kenya Rifles letterhead is a letter of discharge. This is the kind of letter any army officer would receive were he to have been honourably discharged.

    An officer from DoD told NTV that the letters did not follow the normal protocol for a civilian-led ministry communicating with the commandant.

    However, the informant insists that the documents are authentic.

    NSIS is yet to respond to NTV’s questions about the alleged involvement of government agents or people with access to government facilities in the protection of Kabuga in Kenya.

    NTV’s investigations led it to some of Kabuga’s intermediaries. One of NTV’s operatives was to be picked from Nyali Golf Club in Mombasa by a silver Toyota Harrier with a Tanzanian licence plate to meet two men who are from Rwanda.

    They were to be taken to house that Kabuga allegedly stayed in while in Mombasa. NTV was not able to continue with its quest to meet Kabuga as the deal was terminated for fear that the wanted man would be arrested.

    A day before the NTV crew could travel to Mombasa, the NSIS informant sent an SMS saying that some information about the investigation had leaked.

    Additional reporting By Oliver Mathenge

    #Ruanda #Kenya #génocide

  • Coronavirus : les chauffeurs routiers, source d’inquiétude en Afrique de l’Est
    https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2020/05/13/coronavirus-les-chauffeurs-routiers-source-d-inquietude-en-afrique-de-l-est_

    Alors que la plupart des pays est-africains ont restreint les déplacements pour enrayer la propagation du coronavirus, les routiers font partie des rares à pouvoir circuler et livrer leurs précieuses marchandises, souvent des vivres, à l’ensemble de la région. Mais des tests réalisés aux frontières ont révélé un nombre de cas élevé parmi eux et mis en lumière les risques de les voir propager le virus. Le président ougandais, Yoweri Museveni, a d’ailleurs récemment estimé qu’ils constituaient une source d’inquiétude pour l’Afrique de l’Est.
    L’Ouganda, qui a recensé au total 126 cas de Covid-19, a mené des milliers de tests sur les chauffeurs routiers, dont 51, essentiellement des Kényans et des Tanzaniens, se sont révélés positifs au coronavirus. Le Rwanda voisin indique depuis trois semaines que le nombre de cas sur son territoire (actuellement 286) « reflète une augmentation de cas parmi les routiers et leurs assistants », sans préciser leur nombre exact. Ailleurs, au Kenya, en RDC ou au Soudan du Sud, des conducteurs de camion ont aussi été testés positifs.

    #Covid-19#circulation#routiers#propagation#virus#test#frontières#Ouganda#Kenya#soudan#RDC#Tanzanie#Rwanda#circulations

  • L’impensé colonial de la #politique_migratoire italienne

    Les sorties du Mouvement Cinq Étoiles, au pouvoir en Italie, contre le #franc_CFA, ont tendu les relations entre Paris et Rome en début d’année. Mais cette polémique, en partie fondée, illustre aussi l’impensé colonial présent dans la politique italienne aujourd’hui – en particulier lors des débats sur l’accueil des migrants.

    Au moment de déchirer un billet de 10 000 francs CFA en direct sur un plateau télé, en janvier dernier (vidéo ci-dessous, à partir de 19 min 16 s), #Alessandro_Di_Battista savait sans doute que son geste franchirait les frontières de l’Italie. Revenu d’un long périple en Amérique latine, ce député, figure du Mouvement Cinq Étoiles (M5S), mettait en scène son retour dans l’arène politique, sur le plateau de l’émission « Quel temps fait-il ? ». Di Battista venait, avec ce geste, de lancer la campagne des européennes de mai.
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X14lSpRSMMM&feature=emb_logo


    « La France, qui imprime, près de Lyon, cette monnaie encore utilisée dans 14 pays africains, […] malmène la souveraineté de ces pays et empêche leur légitime indépendance », lance-t-il. Di Battista cherchait à disputer l’espace politique occupé par Matteo Salvini, chef de la Ligue, en matière de fermeté migratoire : « Tant qu’on n’aura pas déchiré ce billet, qui est une menotte pour les peuples africains, on aura beau parler de ports ouverts ou fermés, les gens continueront à fuir et à mourir en mer. »

    Ce discours n’était pas totalement neuf au sein du M5S. Luigi Di Maio, alors ministre du travail, aujourd’hui ministre des affaires étrangères, avait développé à peu près le même argumentaire sur l’immigration, lors d’un meeting dans les Abruzzes, à l’est de Rome : « Il faut parler des causes. Si des gens partent de l’Afrique aujourd’hui, c’est parce que certains pays européens, la #France en tête, n’ont jamais cessé de coloniser l’Afrique. L’UE devrait sanctionner ces pays, comme la France, qui appauvrissent les États africains et poussent les populations au départ. La place des Africains est en Afrique, pas au fond de la Méditerranée. »

    À l’époque, cette rhétorique permettait au M5S de creuser sa différence avec la Ligue sur le dossier, alors que Matteo Salvini fermait les ports italiens aux bateaux de migrants. Mais cette stratégie a fait long feu, pour des raisons diplomatiques. Celle qui était alors ministre des affaires européennes à Paris, Nathalie Loiseau, a convoqué l’ambassadrice italienne en France pour dénoncer des « déclarations inacceptables et inutiles ». L’ambassadeur français à Rome a quant à lui été rappelé à Paris, une semaine plus tard – en réaction à une rencontre de dirigeants du M5S avec des « gilets jaunes » français.

    En Italie, cet épisode a laissé des traces, à l’instar d’un post publié sur Facebook, le 5 juillet dernier, par le sous-secrétaire aux affaires étrangères M5S Manlio Di Stefano. À l’issue d’une rencontre entre Giuseppe Conte, premier ministre italien, et Vladimir Poutine, il écrit : « L’Italie est capable et doit être le protagoniste d’une nouvelle ère de #multilatéralisme, sincère et concret. Nous le pouvons, car nous n’avons pas de #squelettes_dans_le_placard. Nous n’avons pas de #tradition_coloniale. Nous n’avons largué de bombes sur personne. Nous n’avons mis la corde au cou d’aucune économie. »

    Ces affirmations sont fausses. Non seulement l’Italie a mené plusieurs #guerres_coloniales, jusqu’à employer des #armes_chimiques – en #Éthiopie de 1935 à 1936, dans des circonstances longtemps restées secrètes –, mais elle a aussi été l’un des premiers pays à recourir aux bombardements, dans une guerre coloniale – la guerre italo-turque de 1911, menée en Libye. Dans la première moitié du XXe siècle, l’Italie fut à la tête d’un empire colonial qui englobait des territoires comme la Somalie, la Libye, certaines portions du Kenya ou encore l’Éthiopie.

    Cette sortie erronée du sous-secrétaire d’État italien a au moins un mérite : elle illustre à merveille l’impensé colonial présent dans la politique italienne contemporaine. C’est notamment ce qu’affirment plusieurs intellectuels engagés, à l’instar de l’écrivaine et universitaire romaine de 45 ans #Igiaba_Scego. Issue d’une famille somalienne, elle a placé la #question_coloniale au cœur de son activité littéraire (et notamment de son roman Adua). Dans une tribune publiée par Le Monde le 3 février, elle critique sans ménagement l’#hypocrisie de ceux qui parlent du « #colonialisme_des_autres ».

    À ses yeux, la polémique sur le franc CFA a soulevé la question de l’effacement de l’histoire coloniale en cours en Italie : « Au début, j’étais frappée par le fait de voir que personne n’avait la #mémoire du colonialisme. À l’#école, on n’en parlait pas. C’est ma génération tout entière, et pas seulement les Afro-descendants, qui a commencé à poser des questions », avance-t-elle à Mediapart.

    Elle explique ce phénomène par la manière dont s’est opéré le retour à la démocratie, après la Seconde Guerre mondiale : #fascisme et entreprise coloniale ont été associés, pour mieux être passés sous #silence par la suite. Sauf que tout refoulé finit par remonter à la surface, en particulier quand l’actualité le rappelle : « Aujourd’hui, le corps du migrant a remplacé le corps du sujet colonial dans les #imaginaires. » « Les migrations contemporaines rappellent l’urgence de connaître la période coloniale », estime Scego.

    Alors que le monde politique traditionnel italien évite ce sujet délicat, la question est sur la table depuis une dizaine d’années, du côté de la gauche radicale. Le mérite revient surtout à un groupe d’écrivains qui s’est formé au début des années 2000 sous le nom collectif de Wu Ming (qui signifie tout à la fois « cinq noms » et « sans nom » en mandarin).

    Sous un autre nom, emprunté à un footballeur anglais des années 1980, Luther Blissett, ils avaient déjà publié collectivement un texte, L’Œil de Carafa (Seuil, 2001). Ils animent aujourd’hui le blog d’actualité politico-culturelle Giap. « On parle tous les jours des migrants africains sans que personne se souvienne du rapport historique de l’Italie à des pays comme l’Érythrée, la Somalie, l’Éthiopie ou la Libye », avance Giovanni Cattabriga, 45 ans, alias Wu Ming 2, qui est notamment le co-auteur en 2013 de Timira, roman métisse, une tentative de « créoliser la résistance italienne » à Mussolini.

    Dans le sillage des travaux du grand historien critique du colonialisme italien Angelo Del Boca, les Wu Ming ont ouvert un chantier de contre-narration historique qui cible le racisme inhérent à la culture italienne (dont certains textes sont traduits en français aux éditions Métailié). Leur angle d’attaque : le mythe d’une Italie au visage bienveillant, avec une histoire coloniale qui ne serait que marginale. Tout au contraire, rappelle Cattabriga, « les fondements du colonialisme italien ont été posés très rapidement après l’unification du pays, en 1869, soit huit ans à peine après la création du premier royaume d’Italie, et avant l’annexion de Rome en 1870 ».

    La construction nationale et l’entreprise coloniale se sont développées en parallèle. « Une partie de l’identité italienne s’est définie à travers l’entreprise coloniale, dans le miroir de la propagande et du racisme que celle-ci véhiculait », insiste Cattabriga. Bref, si l’on se souvient de la formule du patriote Massimo D’Azeglio, ancien premier ministre du royaume de Sardaigne et acteur majeur de l’unification italienne qui avait déclaré en 1861 que « l’Italie est faite, il faut faire les Italiens », on pourrait ajouter que les Italiens ont aussi été « faits » grâce au colonialisme, malgré les non-dits de l’histoire officielle.
    « La gauche nous a abandonnés »

    Au terme de refoulé, Cattabriga préfère celui d’oubli : « D’un point de vue psychanalytique, le refoulé se base sur une honte, un sentiment de culpabilité non résolu. Il n’y a aucune trace de ce sentiment dans l’histoire politique italienne. » À en croire cet historien, l’oubli colonial italien deviendrait la pièce fondamentale d’une architecture victimaire qui sert à justifier une politique de clôture face aux étrangers.

    « Jouer les victimes, cela fait partie de la construction nationale. Notre hymne dit : “Noi fummo da sempre calpesti e derisi, perché siam divisi” [“Nous avons toujours été piétinés et bafoués, puisque nous sommes divisés” – ndlr]. Aujourd’hui, le discours dominant présente les Italiens comme des victimes des migrations pour lesquelles ils n’ont aucune responsabilité. Cette victimisation ne pourrait fonctionner si les souvenirs de la violence du colonialisme restaient vifs. »

    Un mécanisme identique serait à l’œuvre dans la polémique sur le franc CFA : « On stigmatise la politique néocoloniale française en soulignant son caractère militaire, à quoi on oppose un prétendu “style italien” basé sur la coopération et l’aide à l’Afrique. Mais on se garde bien de dire que l’Italie détient des intérêts néocoloniaux concurrents de ceux des Français », insiste Cattabriga.

    L’historien Michele Colucci, auteur d’une récente Histoire de l’immigration étrangère en Italie, est sur la même ligne. Pour lui, « l’idée selon laquelle l’Italie serait un pays d’immigration récente est pratique, parce qu’elle évite de reconnaître la réalité des migrations, un phénomène de longue date en Italie ». Prenons le cas des Érythréens qui fuient aujourd’hui un régime autoritaire. Selon les chiffres des Nations unies et du ministère italien de l’intérieur, ils représentaient environ 14 % des 23 000 débarqués en Italie en 2018, soit 3 300 personnes. Ils ne formaient l’année précédente que 6 % des 119 000 arrivés. De 2015 à 2016, ils constituaient la deuxième nationalité, derrière le Nigeria, où l’ENI, le géant italien du gaz et du pétrole, opère depuis 1962.

    « Les migrations de Somalie, d’Éthiopie et d’Érythrée vers l’Italie ont commencé pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Elles se sont intensifiées au moment de la décolonisation des années 1950 [la Somalie est placée sous tutelle italienne par l’ONU de 1950 à 1960, après la fin de l’occupation britannique – ndlr]. Cela suffit à faire de l’Italie une nation postcoloniale. » Même si elle refuse de le reconnaître.

    Les stéréotypes coloniaux ont la peau dure. Selon Giovanni Cattabriga, alias Wu Ming 2, « [ses collègues et lui ont] contribué à sensibiliser une partie de la gauche antiraciste, mais [il n’a] pas l’impression que, globalement, [ils soient] parvenus à freiner les manifestations de racisme » : « Je dirais tout au plus que nous avons donné aux antiracistes un outil d’analyse. »

    Igiaba Scego identifie un obstacle plus profond. « Le problème, affirme-t-elle, est qu’en Italie, les Afro-descendants ne font pas partie du milieu intellectuel. Nous sommes toujours considérés un phénomène bizarre : l’école, l’université, les rédactions des journaux sont des lieux totalement “blancs”. Sans parler de la classe politique, avec ses visages si pâles qu’ils semblent peints. »

    Ce constat sur la « blanchitude » des lieux de pouvoir italiens est une rengaine dans les milieux militants et antiracistes. L’activiste Filippo Miraglia, trait d’union entre les mondes politique et associatif, en est convaincu : « Malgré les plus de cinq millions de résidents étrangers présents depuis désormais 30 ans, nous souffrons de l’absence d’un rôle de premier plan de personnes d’origine étrangère dans la politique italienne, dans la revendication de droits. À mon avis, c’est l’une des raisons des défaites des vingt dernières années. »

    Miraglia, qui fut président du réseau ARCI (l’association de promotion sociale de la gauche antifasciste fondée en 1957, une des plus influentes dans les pays) entre 2014 et 2017 (il en est actuellement le chef du département immigration) et s’était présenté aux législatives de 2018 sur les listes de Libres et égaux (à gauche du Parti démocrate), accepte une part d’autocritique : « Dans les années 1990, les syndicats et les associations ont misé sur des cadres d’origine étrangère. Mais ce n’était que de la cooptation de personnes, sans véritable ancrage sur le terrain. Ces gens sont vite tombés dans l’oubli. Certains d’entre eux ont même connu le chômage, renforçant la frustration des communautés d’origine. »

    L’impasse des organisations antiracistes n’est pas sans rapport avec la crise plus globale des gauches dans le pays. C’est pourquoi, face à cette réalité, les solutions les plus intéressantes s’inventent sans doute en dehors des organisations traditionnelles. C’est le cas du mouvement des Italiens de deuxième génération, ou « G2 », qui réunit les enfants d’immigrés, la plupart nés en Italie, mais pour qui l’accès à la citoyenneté italienne reste compliqué.

    De 2005 à 2017, ces jeunes ont porté un mouvement social. Celui-ci exigeait une réforme de la loi sur la nationalité italienne qui aurait permis d’accorder ce statut à environ 800 000 enfants dans le pays. La loi visait à introduire un droit du sol, sous certaines conditions (entre autres, la présence d’un des parents sur le territoire depuis cinq ans ou encore l’obligation d’avoir accompli un cycle scolaire complet en Italie).

    Ce mouvement était parvenu à imposer le débat à la Chambre basse en 2017, sous le gouvernement de Matteo Renzi, mais il perdit le soutien du même Parti démocrate au Sénat. « La gauche a commis une grave erreur en rejetant cette loi, estime Igiaba Scego, qui s’était investie dans la campagne. Cette réforme était encore insuffisante, mais on se disait que c’était mieux que rien. La gauche nous a abandonnés, y compris celle qui n’est pas représentée au Parlement. Nous étions seuls à manifester : des immigrés et des enfants d’immigrés. Il y avait de rares associations, quelques intellectuels et un grand vide politique. À mon avis, c’est là que l’essor de Matteo Salvini [le chef de la Ligue, extrême droite – ndlr] a commencé. »

    Certains, tout de même, veulent rester optimistes, à l’instar de l’historien Michele Colucci qui signale dans son ouvrage le rôle croissant joué par les étrangers dans les luttes du travail, notamment dans les secteurs de l’agriculture : « Si la réforme de la nationalité a fait l’objet de discussions au sein du Parlement italien, c’est uniquement grâce à l’organisation d’un groupe de personnes de deuxième génération d’immigrés. Ce mouvement a évolué de manière indépendante des partis politiques et a fait émerger un nouvel agenda. C’est une leçon importante à retenir. »

    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/241219/l-impense-colonial-de-la-politique-migratoire-italienne?onglet=full
    #colonialisme #Italie #impensé_colonial #colonisation #histoire #migrations #causes_profondes #push-factors #facteurs_push #Ethiopie #bombardements #guerre_coloniale #Libye #histoire #histoire_coloniale #empire_colonial #Somalie #Kenya #Wu_Ming #Luther_Blissett #littérature #Luther_Blissett #contre-récit #contre-narration #nationalisme #construction_nationale #identité #identité_italienne #racisme #oubli #refoulement #propagande #culpabilité #honte #oubli_colonial #victimes #victimisation #violence #néocolonialisme #stéréotypes_coloniaux #blanchitude #invisibilisation #G2 #naturalisation #nationalité #droit_du_sol #gauche #loi_sur_la_nationalité #livre

    –—
    Mouvement #seconde_generazioni (G2) :

    La Rete G2 - Seconde Generazioni nasce nel 2005. E’ un’organizzazione nazionale apartitica fondata da figli di immigrati e rifugiati nati e/o cresciuti in Italia. Chi fa parte della Rete G2 si autodefinisce come “figlio di immigrato” e non come “immigrato”: i nati in Italia non hanno compiuto alcuna migrazione; chi è nato all’estero, ma cresciuto in Italia, non è emigrato volontariamente, ma è stato portato qui da genitori o altri parenti. Oggi Rete G2 è un network di “cittadini del mondo”, originari di Asia, Africa, Europa e America Latina, che lavorano insieme su due punti fondamentali: i diritti negati alle seconde generazioni senza cittadinanza italiana e l’identità come incontro di più culture.

    https://www.secondegenerazioni.it

    ping @wizo @albertocampiphoto @karine4 @cede

  • Hors de contrôle : crise, Covid-19 et capitalisme en Afrique
    https://www.contretemps.eu/crise-covid19-capitalisme-afrique
    https://roape.net/2020/03/26/out-of-control-crisis-covid-19-and-capitalism-in-africa

    Des militant·e·s et des chercheurs·ses à travers l’Afrique évoquent les conséquences du Covid-19 sur leurs pays respectifs dans cet article publié initialement par ROAPE (Review of African Political Economy). Depuis le Kenya, l’Afrique du Sud, le Burkina Faso, le Nigeria et le Zimbabwe, Femi Aborisade, Heike Becker, Didier Kiendrebeogo, Gacheke Gachihi, Lena Anyuolo et Tafadzwa Choto observent les contours pris par la crise et la manière dont les gouvernements sous couvert de lutte contre le virus étendent la répression, dans le contexte plus général du capitalisme, du changement climatique et des luttes populaires pour des transformations radicales.

    #covid19 #témoignages #Kenya #Afrique_du_Sud #Burkina Faso #Nigeria #Zimbabwe

  • COVID-19 has closed schools at Dadaab, a complex of refugee camps in Kenya that is home to more than 200,000 refugees and asylum seekers. Undaunted, dedicated English teacher Anima gave her lessons over the airwaves.
    https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2020/4/5e79e2410/live-blog-refugees-covid-19-crisis.html
    Amina, a teacher in Kenya’s #Dadaab refugee camps, is giving a live English lesson to refugee and host community students at a local radio station. Radio education programmes are an alternative platform for +100,000 children there, as schools remain closed due to #COVID19. #GCR
    #Covid-19#Migration#Migrant#Kenya#Réfugiés