• #Libye #Libya : série d’ #Assassinats des chefs de la #Police

    http://www.argotheme.com/organecyberpresse/spip.php?article1539

    Ni la #Sécurité, ni les #Juges n’ont le mot devant les #Milices

    Huit mois de sédition révolutionnaire en 2011 ont brisé la #Tyrannie d’un psychopathe dont l’accoutrement, la posture, le comportement et les discours « tartarinesques » justifiaient grandement qu’il soit destitué. Après 42 années sous #Kadhafi, la Libye, à l’instar de pays livrés à l’instabilité, les #Meurtres de personnes liées #Institutions civiques ont emprunté une dérive nouvelle en cette fin d’année 2012.

    Voir en ligne : Notre #Dossier : Libye.

  • Harsh but true : Of Stupid Men and Smart Machines

    http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/7361/of-stupid-men-and-smart-machines%20

    For four years, the unnoted deaths of hundreds of civilians in Yemen and Pakistan who were wrongfully killed by these “smart” weapons have not given the Obama administration enough reason to question the troubling consequences of drone warfare. Perhaps the tragic deaths of four Americans in Libya finally will.

    #Obama #Pakistan #Yemen #Egypt #libya #Alqaida

  • iyad_elbaghdadi
    This is the final final version of your tweet session. I believe it is complete.

    #Syria OK guys, I’m starting an important tweet session on #Syria and Islamist/Jihadist fears. I urge you to pay attention.

    This may be all over the place because I’m typing as I go, so please do have patience with me. #Syria

    As many of you know, I’ve been warning about #Syria becoming a Jihadist magnet for nearly a year now.

    For example, I tweeted this some six months ago: bit.ly/PkOI40 - and we may be witnessing it happening. #Syria

    What ticks me off is when everything is jumbled into the statement “There are Alqaeda in #Syria”.

    So I’m going to try to do what I can do demystify this maze of Islamism & Salafism & Jihadism & and how they relate to #Syria's revolution.

    I’ll have to start with “Islamism”, notoriously difficult to define. #Syria

    Islamism is a wide spectrum. The acid test for an Islamist is they believe Islam has something to say beyond the personal sphere. #Syria

    Non-Islamists (Seculars) are happy enough with Islam being restricted strictly to private life. #Syria

    That there is a wide umbrella. There are all sorts of people under that “Islamist” umbrella. But I’ll focus on what’s relevant for #Syria.

    What’s urgently relevant for #Syria concerns these titles: Salafi, Jihadi, Alqaeda, Takfiri. Yes, there’re not all one and the same.

    Why this is significant is because you have to know a group’s ideology to predict what it will or won’t do. #Syria

    Today in #Syria there are both Salafi & non-Salafi Islamists, and there are a few Jihadists. No Alqaeda link is proven and no Takfiris.

    A useful generalization is that Islamism is the superset, and Salafis, Jihadis, Alqaeda are successive subsets. #Syria

    Salafis are Islamists but not all Islamists are Salafis. #Syria

    Jihadis are Salafis but not all Salafis are Jihadis. #Syria

    Alqaeda are Jihadi Salafis but not all Jihadi Salafis are Alqaeda. #Syria

    So I guess I have to start with Salafism, another word that causes so much confusion. #Syria

    I have to distinguish between Salafism as a Sunni school of jurisprudence and as a specific socio-political group. #Syria

    As a Sunni school, Salafism is a legitimate “manhaj” (or method) associated mostly with Hanbali jurisprudence. #Syria

    As a socio-political group, Salafism refers to certain groups with known leaders, political positions, and spheres of influence. #Syria

    When we use “Salafi” today we mostly mean the socio-political group. Specific positions, leaders, a religious hierarchy. #Syria

    I think I’ll have to take a step back here and talk about what distinguishes Salafis from other Islamists wrt political vision. #Syria

    Islamists generally believe the Prophet established a unique form of government in Medina, an Islamic state. #Syria

    Islamists are deeply divided about how much of this “state” is mandated, and how much is open to human interpretation. #Syria

    Salafis generally tend towards looking upon the entire early Islamic political experience as religiously mandated. #Syria

    (This itself is contradictory since the early Islamic state did not have a religious police for example, but I digress.) #Syria

    Most Muslims (and many Islamists) believe that modern democratic instutions are compatible with Islam. #Syria

    Salafis however tend to reject democracy since it entails putting Islam to the vote rather than mandating or establishing it. #Syria

    So if you speak to an Islamist who rejects democracy he’s probably a Salafi. Not Alqaeda, just Salafi. #Syria

    #Eypt's recent experience tells us that even this is flexible. Salafis who for years badmouthed democracy eventually formed parties. #Syria

    Now lemme establish how this applies to #Syria specifically. We hear “Jihadi” a lot, it’s actually short for “Jihadi Salafism”.

    Salafism itself is deeply divided into mainstream (or government-approved, or Islahi) Salafism and Jihadi Salafism. #Syria

    Islahi Salafis wish to bring about their vision through reform ("Islah"), by propagation while coexisting with current regimes. #Syria

    Such Salafis have an unspoken win-win with rulers - they can preach, so long they teach people that revolt is a form of corruption. #Syria

    That’s how you understand the positions of certain Salafi leaders towards the Arab Spring, Mubarak, and SCAF. #Syria

    Diametrically opposite are Jihadi Salafis, who believe that their vision of an Islamic state can only be achieved through making war. #Syria

    Salafi Jihadis consider virtually all modern Muslim rulers to be infidels, and consider anyone who works for them to be an infidel. #Syria

    For Salafi Jihadis, anyone who willingly serves in Assad’s army, or works directly for him, is under suspicion of having apostatized. #Syria

    Salafis (all, not just Jihadi) are notorious for extreme enmity towards what they consider heretical Islamic sects, especially Shias. #Syria

    Anti-Shiism fits the agendas of some governments who pour more gas on the fire, allowing overt sectarianism in the name of Salafism. #Syria

    So, recapping - Some Muslims are Islamists, some Islamists are Salafi, and some Salafis are Jihadist. Now on to Alqaeda. #Syria

    Alqaeda is a Jihadi Salafi organization but it doesn’t have a monopoly there. Not every Jihadi Salafist is an Alqaeda. #Syria

    There just isn’t any evidence so far that any group in #Syria has organizational or operational links with Alqaeda.

    Many have unfortunately pinned the label “Alqaeda” on anyone raising the black-and-white Islamic flag. Kinda ticks me off. #Syria

    The black & white banner has been an Islamic symbol for centuries. Alqaeda uses it, but they don’t own its copyrights. #Syria

    The black flag does not equal Alqaeda. It means Islamists. How do you know?Check if they’re raising another flag next to it. #Syria

    Jihadi Salafis do not believe in the nation-state and deride the word “watan” (nation) as a “wathan” (idol). #Syria

    Therefore Jihadi Salafis will not raise any national flag. If they’re raising #Syria's national flag they’re not Jihadi Salafis.

    If they’re raising the black flag only, they may be Jihadi Salafis. (Saying they’re Alqaeda is a speculative jump from there.) #Syria

    If they’re raising the black flag next to #Syria's independence flag, they are Islamic-inspired Syrian fighters, but not Jihadi Salafis.

    So, recapping, there are Islamic-inspired fighters in #Syria. There are a few Jihadi Salafis. There may be Alqaeda but there’s no proof.

    Once again the reason this is important is that to predict what these groups will do or plan strategically you gotta know them. #Syria

    So after finishing with all of this I’m going to look back and see which part of this is scary and which is just overblown. #Syria

    Of cousre I’m not vindicating Alqaeda but you gotta know them to know what can and cannot be attributed to them. #Syria

    Now, if you interpret “Takfiri” more narrowly, then you can say that Salafi Jihadis do have an element of Takfir, and here’s how. #Syria

    Some Salafis (not all, mind you) consider Shias and heretic Muslim sects to be infidels; in this specific case they’d be “takfiris”. #Syria

    Note that this is a contentious issue even within Alqaeda. Zarqawi for example considered Shias infidels while Al-Zawahiri did not. #Syria

    Now I can go into more details and nuances but let’s zoom out and see why this information is so important for #Syria's revolution.

    The details I just narrated can help you predict the action of groups, and help you attribute certain actions to certain groups. #Syria

    Takfiris for example will kill just about everyone (Algeria’s massacres come to mind), but even Alqaeda aren’t that kinda Takfiris. #Syria

    That’s why when #Assad tried to pin the Houla massacre on Alqaeda I saw the BS there. #Syria

    It’s probably easy to just look at all Jihadis as criminals but they’re ideologically inspired so you gotta read them right. #Syria

    What Alqaeda (or Jihadi Salafis) would do is attack the regime with reckless abandon regardless of civilian casualties. #Syria

    (Once again there’s no proof that Alqaeda is in #Syria, just Jihadi Salafi groups, and their presence is tiny and recent.)

    Also, Jihadi Salafis may deliberate attack minorities, especially Alawites, with spectacular (suicide) attacks. #Syria

    Importantly, Jihadi Salafis would be opportunistic, leaning towards spectacular attacks to give them a bigger size than they have. #Syria

    Jihadi Salafis would also use statelessness to bring in recruits from all over the Arab/Muslim worlds. #Syria

    Now looking at past few tweets I wonder, if there are established Jihadis in #Syria why didn’t we see suicide attacks on Alawite villages?

    All of this leads me to believe that the Jihadi Salafi presence in #Syria is tiny and recent and not firmly established.

    Now let me look at the regular Islamic-inspired fighters who aren’t Jihadi Salafis but just devout Syrian Muslims. #Syria

    Those “regular” Islamic-inspired fighters will fight the regime along with the #FSA and won’t give trouble just as yet. #Syria

    I mean, such Islamic-inspired fighters may raise the black flag; some may badmouth democracy; but won’t go on a Shia killing spree. #Syria

    Anyway in light of all this, who should we be afraid of? Which groups would be truly nefarious and destructive to #Syria?

    Non-Salafi Islamist fighters may give a hard time afterwards (will resist a secular state) but won’t destroy #Syria's society. Not scary.

    Jihadi Salafis, especially non-Syrian, would be scary indeed and may have a deeply negative impact on #Syria's society.

    Jihadi Salafis are right now a tiny faction but they can still launch spectacular suicide attacks to show a bigger size. #Syria

    To sum up, the #FSA has Islamists, some may be Salafi, but #FSA is neither Alqaeda nor Jihadi Salafis. #Syria

    It’s Suhoor time here so I have to take a break, but I’ll be back to discuss what the #FSA should do & what foreign powers should do. #Syria

    BREAK

    I’m back for a little while to complete this tweet session coz I’ll probably get too busy to do later. #Syria

    I’ve talked about Islamists, Salafis, Jihadis, Alqaeda, Takfiris, and how all of that relates to #Syria & the #FSA.

    One thing I missed is that whole “#Syria Jihadis are being funded by KSA & Qatar” issue, which I find rather BS.

    As discussed earlier Salafi Jihadis believe that virtually all Muslim leaders are in fact infidels, KSA & Qatar included. #Syria

    Salafi Jihadis hate all Muslim rulers, but have a special place for the rulers of the KSA whom they consider to be the worst. #Syria

    In fact you can find impassioned diatribes against the KSA in the Salafi Jihadi library here: tawhed.ws (Arabic) #Syria

    Basically, “Alqaeda is funded by KSA/Qatar” is a stupid statement. The KSA is Alqaeda’s sworn enemy. #Syria

    For this reason I doubt Salafi Jihadis (especially Alqaeda) will ever want to have anything to do with the KSA or Qatar. #Syria

    If Salafi Jihadis ever accept KSA help it would be on the basis of an intersection of interests, waiting for to pounce on them too. #Syria

    Of course the KSA/Qatar know that nurturing Salafi Jihadis would be like keeping a scorpion for a pet. Eventually it’ll bite you. #Syria

    Essentially if KSA & Qatar are funding any rebel party, it would be the #FSA itself rather than the Jihadi Salafis or Alqaeda. #Syria

    And if Salafi Jihadis are getting any support from KSA (which I doubt) it would be from individual donors, not the state. #Syria

    Finally I want to close this where I started - my year-long warning that #Syria can become a Jihadist magnet...

    For #Syria to become a Jihadist magnet two things are required: attraction & opportunity.

    The attraction factor isn’t lacking with enough bloody footage to recruit any sufficiently passionate/gullible young Muslim. #Syria

    The opportunity however is recent - significant areas beyond regime control so Jihadist groups can slip in. #Syria

    In fact, with regime control shrinking, Jihadists can not just slip in but actually set up shop and start operating. #Syria

    To avoid this, both the #FSA and the world at large have responsibilities. The FSA must become more organized and centralized. #Syria

    To avoid this, both the #FSA and the world at large have responsibilities. The FSA must become more organized and centralized. #Syria

    The #FSA should also attempt some form of local governance in liberated areas, even if by the residents themselves. #Syria

    Finally the #FSA must make a clear stand against any opportunistic groups attempting to establish their own command in #Syria.

    If the #FSA is lousy & disorganized enough, such groups may be able to organize and operate in liberated #Syria.

    However if the #FSA organizes and centralizes, and a credible provisional government is formed, things won’t get that bad. #Syria

    As for the rest of the world, they must first realize the risks involved if #Syria devolves into a sectarian civil war.

    If #Syria devolves into civil war it will spread to Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq; Jordan & Israel will suffer as well.

    If #Syria or part of it become a Jihadi Salafi safe haven, the risk won’t be contained to Syria or even the Middle East alone.

    I strongly believe that a major factor that made the world intervene in #Libya was to avoid it becoming a Jihadist magnet/safe haven. #Syria

    With the mix of regime Migs, Jihadis, FSA gains & chemical weapons, I think a #Libya-style intervention in #Syria can be back on the table.

    The worst outcome in #Syria would be a sectarian civil war. The best would be a totally peaceful, #Tahrir-style revolution.

    However, right from the start we said that in #Syria we’re not looking for the best option but for the least bad exit.

    Let’s not kid ourselves - #Syria under Assad will not have a Tahrir square. That ship as long sailed.

    The least we can do, then, is make sure the worst of the worst outcomes (sectarian civil war) is avoided. #Syria

  • Il ne faudrait pas non plus perdre de vue les fondamentaux : le général Wesley Clark interviewé par Amy Goodman (Democracy Now !), 2 mars 2007 :
    http://www.democracynow.org/2007/3/2/gen_wesley_clark_weighs_presidential_bid

    So I came back to see him a few weeks later, and by that time we were bombing in Afghanistan. I said, “Are we still going to war with Iraq?” And he said, “Oh, it’s worse than that.” He reached over on his desk. He picked up a piece of paper. And he said, “I just got this down from upstairs” — meaning the Secretary of Defense’s office — “today.” And he said, “This is a memo that describes how we’re going to take out seven countries in five years, starting with #Iraq, and then #Syria, #Lebanon, #Libya, #Somalia, #Sudan and, finishing off, #Iran.”

  • Rebel spokesman to Haaretz: #Libya needs world’s help, including Israel’s - Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News
    http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/rebel-spokesman-to-haaretz-libya-needs-world-s-help-including-israel-s-1.38

    Libya needs any help it can get from the international community, including from Israel, a spokesman for the opposition to Muammar Gadhafi’s regime told Haaretz Tuesday by phone from London.....
    When Shabani was asked whether a democratically elected government in Libya would recognize Israel, he responded: “That is a very sensitive question. The question is whether Israel will recognize us.”

    • Commentaire aujourd’hui de Angry Arab :

      Haaretz lies and fabrications
      http://angryarab.blogspot.com/2011/08/haaretz-lies-and-fabrications.html

      The internet was abuzz yesterday with “news” from Haaretz reported that a “spokesperson” for the Libyan opposition, Ali Shibani, expressed willingness to accept Israeli help, or silly words to that effect. The thing is that I looked for Shibani on the internet, in Arabic, English, or French and found nothing about him at all.  Those lies and fabrications are common in Zionist propaganda: Israeli media would find an Arab, say a terrorist for the South Lebanon Army, and attribute Zionist statements to him and then hail it as "unprecedented love for Israel from a well-known Arab leader".  The lies of Israel are too stupid these days.  They focus on one Arab who whispers acceptance of peace with Israel--always in a language other than Arabic--and then hail that person as a leader of a mass movement.  Don't feel sorry for Zionist propagandists: that they are now so desperate and so blatant and so deceptive and so dumb. What do you say about propaganda that is more dumb and more crude than Bathist propaganda?

  • Hein de Haas: Europe’s tiny #refugee burden: Putting the Libyan #migration crisis into perspective
    http://heindehaas.blogspot.com/2011/04/europes-tiny-refugee-burden-putting.html?spref=tw

    How dare European politicians insinuate that these people will massively “invade” Europe?

    Just some basic facts:

    So far, only about 2,800 out of a total of 500,000 people fleeing the violence in #Libya have arrived in #Europe. This is less than 0.6 percent of all cross-border movements.

    (via @isskein)

  • America’s secret plan to arm #Libya's rebels - Middle East, World - The Independent
    http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/americas-secret-plan-to-arm-libyas-rebels-2234227.html

    Obama asks Saudis to airlift weapons into Benghazi
    By Robert Fisk, Middle East Correspondent
    Desperate to avoid US military involvement in Libya in the event of a prolonged struggle between the Gaddafi regime and its opponents, the Americans have asked #Saudi_Arabia if it can supply #weapons to the rebels in Benghazi.

    http://www.independent.co.uk/multimedia/dynamic/00571/main-libya-arms_571521t.jpg

  • Twitter / UN Refugee Agency #UNHCR
    http://twitter.com/Refugees/status/41809355133157376

    ~100K have fled #Libya in past week; 55K to #Egypt since 19 Feb, 40K to #Tunisia as of Sat + 10k exp. overnight: diff nationalities

    Selon l’UNHCR, l’Égypte accueille donc déjà 55000 réfugiés en provenance de #Libye, et la Tunisie 40000, en une semaine.

    Il me semble important de se souvenir de ces chiffres lorsque les journalistes parlent des « risques d’immigration » vers les pays européens...

    Par exemple ce genre d’indécence « communautaire » publiée vendredi :
    http://www.lesechos.fr/economie-politique/monde/dossier/0201176723068-l-europe-divisee-sur-les-risques-d-immigration.htm

    Réunis hier à Bruxelles, les ministres européens des Affaires intérieures ont évoqué les scénarios possibles, qui pourraient aboutir à un afflux de réfugiés en provenance de Libye, comme le craint l’Italie. Dans l’incertitude, aucune décision n’a été prise, pas même un engagement informel de se partager les « migrants » en cas d’imprévu.

    Tout ça parce que :

    Pour l’instant, l’Italie doit faire face à l’arrivée de 6.300 Tunisiens sur son île de Lampedusa, mais rien n’indique encore de mouvements en provenance de Libye.

  • GADDAFI AND CHAVEZ — «REVOLUTIONARY BROTHERS»
    http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/10/09CARACAS1284.html

    espérons que non :

    The two Presidents congratulated each other on their “revolutions,” with Chavez asserting, “What Simon Bolivar is to the Venezuelan people, Gaddafi is to the Libyan people.” Chavez also awarded Gaddafi the “Orden del Libertador,” Venezuela’s highest civilian decoration, and presented him with a replica of Simon Bolivar’s sword. Gaddafi praised Chavez for “having driven out the colonialists,” just like he had driven out those in Libya. “We share the same destiny, the same battle in the same trench against a common enemy, and we will conquer.”

    #wikileaks #cablegate #venezuela #libya

  • Qaddafi approached by Bernie Madoff | WikiLeaked
    http://wikileaks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/23/qaddafi_approached_by_bernie_madoff

    le cauchemar est profond #cablegate #wikileaks

    Lehman Brothers, Allen Stanford, and Bernard #Madoff. The cable describes a meeting between the U.S. ambassador and Mohamed Layas, chairman of the Libyan Investment Authority. The two discussed possible investment opportunities for U.S. businesses in #Libya as well as the country’s financial state more broadly:

  • #UK firm defends #Libya #military_sales | World news | The Guardian
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/21/uk-firm-defends-libya-military-sales

    Oliver said: “I don’t have a problem with that. What we have taught them is the British policing system and using an escalated response and not carrying any lethal weapons.” He added this involved the police giving rioters “lots and lots of warnings” before they used more forceful weapons.

    #cynisme

  • Frattini and Berlusconi Slow to Criticise Gaddafi | MIGRANTS AT SEA
    http://migrantsatsea.wordpress.com/2011/02/21/frattini-and-berlusconi-slow-to-criticise-gaddafi

    la politique anti-#migrants de l’UE va coûter cher

    As reported by the EU Observer, while the EU and most member states are now condemning #Libya’s actions, “[o]n the other side of the EU divide, #Italy is horrified at the possible loss of a close ally. Foreign minister and ex-EU-commissioner Franco Frattini is trying to convince other European states that Mr Gaddafi has promised constitutional reforms and that the bloc should allow him to make good. ‘Italy as you know is the closest neighbour of both Tunisia and Libya so we are extremely concerned about the repercussions on the migratory situation in the southern Mediterranean,’ Mr Frattini told reporters on Sunday. The previous day, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi said he did not want to ‘disturb’ his long-time friend with appeals for restraint.”

    http://euobserver.com/9/31842

    Berlusconi dit, texto : « je n’ai pas de nouvelles de Kadhafi ; et comme la situation évolue, je préfère ne pas le déranger »

    “I haven’t yet heard from Gaddafi. The situation is evolving and so I don’t feel I should disturb anyone.”

    #libye

  • Libya: Governments Should Demand End to Unlawful Killings | Human Rights Watch
    http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/02/20/libya-governments-should-demand-end-unlawful-killings

    Les copains de #Kadhafi :

    Human Rights Watch calls on the African Union, the European Union, #France, #Italy, the #United_Kingdom, the #United_States, and other governments with ties to Libya to:

    Publicly demand an end to unlawful use of force against peaceful protesters;
    Announce that those responsible for serious violations of international human rights law must be held individually accountable and will be subjected to appropriate measures;
    Impose an embargo on all exports of arms and security equipment to Libya; and
    Tell #Libya to restore access to the internet.