#mali

Sur la Carte, il faut considérer Calais comme un mur et la France devrait donc être en vert.

La costruzione di muri: un business

Trent’anni dopo la caduta del Muro di Berlino, l’Europa fa parlare di sé ancora una volta per i suoi muri di frontiera. Questa volta non è tanto l’ideologia che la divide, quanto la paura di rifugiati e migranti, alcune tra le persone più vulnerabili al mondo.

Riassunto del rapporto «The Business of Building Walls» [1]:

Chi ha ucciso il sogno di un’Europa più aperta? Cosa ha dato inizio a questa nuova era dei muri?
Ci sono evidentemente molte ragioni: il crescente spostamento di persone a causa di conflitti, repressione e impoverimento, l’ascesa di politiche securitarie sulla scia dell’11 settembre, l’insicurezza economica e sociale percepita in Europa dopo la crisi finanziaria del 2008, solo per nominarne alcune. Tuttavia, c’è un gruppo che ha di gran lunga da guadagnare da questo innalzamento di nuovi muri: le imprese che li costruiscono. La loro influenza nel dare forma ad un mondo di muri necessita di un esame più profondo.

Questo rapporto esplora il business della costruzione di muri, che è stato alimentato e ha beneficiato di un aumento considerevole della spesa pubblica dedicata alla sicurezza delle frontiere dall’Unione Europea (EU) e dai suoi Stati membri. Alcune imprese beneficiarie sono delle multinazionali che approfittano di un mercato globale per la sicurezza delle frontiere che si stima valere approssimativamente 17,5 miliardi di euro nel 2018, con una crescita annuale prevista almeno dell’8% nei prossimi anni.

È importante guardare sia oltre che dietro i muri e le barriere d’Europa, perché i reali ostacoli alla migrazione contemporanea non sono tanto le recinzioni, quanto la vasta gamma di tecnologie che vi è alla base, dai sistemi radar ai droni, dalle telecamere di sorveglianza ai sistemi biometrici di rilevamento delle impronte digitali. Allo stesso modo, alcuni tra i più pericolosi muri d’Europa non sono nemmeno fisici o sulla terraferma. Le navi, gli aerei e i droni usati per pattugliare il Mediterraneo hanno creato un muro marittimo e un cimitero per i migliaia di migranti e di rifugiati che non hanno un passaggio legale verso la salvezza o per esercitare il loro diritto di asilo.

Tutto ciò rende insignificanti le dichiarazioni della Commissione Europea secondo le quali essa non finanzierebbe i muri e le recinzioni. Il portavoce della Commissione, Alexander Winterstein, per esempio, nel rifiutare la richiesta dell’Ungheria di rimborsare la metà dei costi delle recinzioni costruite sul suo confine con la Croazia e la Serbia, ha affermato: “Noi sosteniamo le misure di gestione delle frontiere presso i confini esterni. Queste possono consistere in misure di sorveglianza o in equipaggiamento di controllo delle frontiere... . Ma le recinzioni, quelle non le finanziamo”. In altre parole, la Commissione è disposta a pagare per qualunque cosa che fortifichi un confine fintanto che ciò non sia visto come propriamente costruire dei muri.

Questo rapporto è il seguito di “Building Walls - Fear and securitizazion in the Euopean Union”, co-pubblicato nel 2018 con Centre Delàs e Stop Wapenhandel, che per primi hanno misurato e identificato i muri che attraversano l’Europa.

Questo nuovo rapporto si focalizza sulle imprese che hanno tratto profitto dai tre differenti tipi di muro in Europa:
– Le imprese di costruzione ingaggiate per costruire i muri fisici costruiti dagli Stati membri UE e dall’Area Schengen in collaborazione con le imprese esperte in sicurezza e tecnologia che provvedono le tecnologie, l’equipaggiamento e i servizi associati;
– le imprese di trasporto marittimo e di armamenti che forniscono le navi, gli aerei, gli elicotteri e i droni che costituiscono i muri marittimi dell’Europa per tentare di controllare i flussi migratori nel Mediterraneo, in particolare le operazioni di Frontex, l’operazione Sophia e l’operazione italiana Mare Nostrum;
– e le imprese specializzate in informatica e in sicurezza incaricate di sviluppare, eseguire, estendere e mantenere i sistemi dell’UE che controllano i movimento delle persone, quali SIS II (Schengen Information System) e EES (Entry/Exii Scheme), che costituiscono i muri virtuali dell’Europa.
Dei budget fiorenti

Il flusso di denaro dai contribuenti ai costruttori di muri è stato estremamente lucrativo e non cessa di aumentare. Il report rivela che dalla fine della guerra fredda, le imprese hanno raccolto i profitti di almeno 900 milioni di euro di spese dei paesi dell’UE per i muri fisici e per le recinzioni. Con i dati parziali (sia nella portata e che negli anni), i costi reali raggiungerebbero almeno 1 miliardo di euro. Inoltre, le imprese che forniscono la tecnologia e i servizi che accompagnano i muri hanno ugualmente beneficiato di un flusso costante di finanziamenti da parte dell’UE, in particolare i Fondi per le frontiere esterne (1,7 miliardi di euro, 2007-2013) e i Fondi per la sicurezza interna - Fondi per le Frontiere (2,76 miliardi di euro, 2014-2020).

Le spese dell’UE per i muri marittimi hanno raggiunto almeno 676,4 milioni di euro tra il 2006 e il 2017 (di cui 534 milioni sono stati spesi da Frontex, 28 milioni dall’UE nell’operazione Sophia e 114 milioni dall’Italia nell’operazione Mare Nostrum) e sarebbero molto superiori se si includessero tutte le operazioni delle guardie costiera nazionali nel Mediterraneo.

Questa esplosione dei budget per le frontiere ha le condizioni per proseguire. Nel quadro del suo budget per il prossimo ciclo di bilancio dell’Unione Europea (2021-2027), la Commissione europea ha attribuito 8,02 miliardi di euro al suo fondo di gestione integrata delle frontiere (2021-2027), 11,27 miliardi a Frontex (dei quali 2,2 miliardi saranno utilizzati per l’acquisizione, il mantenimento e l’utilizzo di mezzi aerei, marittimi e terrestri) e almeno 1,9 miliardi di euro di spese totali (2000-2027) alle sue banche dati di identificazione e a Eurosur (il sistemo europeo di sorveglianza delle frontiere).
I principali attori del settore degli armamenti

Tre giganti europei del settore della difesa e della sicurezza giocano un ruolo cruciale nei differenti tipi di frontiere d’Europa: Thales, Leonardo e Airbus.

– Thales è un’impresa francese specializzata negli armamenti e nella sicurezza, con una presenza significativa nei Paesi Bassi, che produce sistemi radar e sensori utilizzati da numerose navi della sicurezza frontaliera. I sistemi Thales, per esempio, sono stati utilizzati dalle navi olandesi e portoghesi impiegate nelle operazioni di Frontex.
Thales produce ugualmente sistemi di sorveglianza marittima per droni e lavora attualmente per sviluppare una infrastruttura di sorveglianza delle frontiere per Eurosus, che permetta di seguire e controllare i rifugiati prima che raggiungano l’Europa con l’aiuto di applicazioni per Smartphone, e studia ugualmente l’utilizzo di “High Altitude Pseudo-Satellites - HAPS” per la sicurezza delle frontiere, per l’Agenzia spaziale europea e Frontex. Thales fornisce attualmente il sistema di sicurezza del porto altamente militarizzato di Calais.
Con l’acquisto nel 2019 di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza e identità (biometrica), Thales diventa un attore importante nello sviluppo e nel mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE. L’impresa ha partecipato a 27 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

– La società di armamenti italiana Leonardo (originariamente Finmeccanica o Leonardo-Finmeccanica) è uno dei principali fornitori di elicotteri per la sicurezza delle frontiere, utilizzati dalle operazioni Mare Nostrum, Hera e Sophia in Italia. Ha ugualmente fatto parte dei principali fornitori di UAV (o droni), ottenendo un contratto di 67,1 milioni di euro nel 2017 con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima) per fornire le agenzie di guardia costiera dell’UE.
Leonardo faceva ugualmente parte di un consorzio che si è visto attribuire un contratto di 142,1 milioni di euro nel 2019 per attuare e assicurare il mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE, ossia il Sistema di entrata/uscita (EES). La società detiene, con Thales, Telespazio, che partecipa ai progetti di osservazione dai satelliti dell’UE (React e Copernicus) utilizzati per controllare le frontiere. Leonardo ha partecipato a 24 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere, tra cui lo sviluppo di Eurosur.

– Il gigante degli armamenti pan-europei Airbus è un importante fornitore di elicotteri utilizzati nella sorveglianza delle frontiere marittime e di alcune frontiere terrestri, impiegati da Belgio, Francia, Germania, Grecia, Italia, Lituania e Spagna, in particolare nelle operazioni marittime Sophia, Poseidon e Triton. Airbus e le sue filiali hanno partecipato almeno a 13 progetti di ricerca sulla sicurezza delle frontiere finanziati dall’UE, tra cui OCEAN2020, PERSEUS e LOBOS.

Il ruolo chiave di queste società di armamenti in realtà non è sorprendente. Come è stato dimostrato da “Border Wars” (2016), queste imprese, in quanto appartenenti a lobby come EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza) e ASD (Associazione delle industrie aerospaziali e della difesa in Europa), hanno ampiamente contribuito a influenzare l’orientamento della politica delle frontiere dell’UE. Paradossalmente, questi stessi marchi fanno ugualmente parte dei quattro più grandi venditori europei di armi al Medio Oriente e all’Africa del Nord, contribuendo così ad alimentare i conflitti all’origine di queste migrazioni forzate.

Allo stesso modo Indra gioca un ruolo non indifferente nel controllo delle frontiere in Spagna e nel Mediterraneo. L’impresa ha ottenuto una serie di contratti per fortificare Ceuta e Melilla (enclavi spagnole nel Nord del Marocco). Indra ha ugualmente sviluppato il sistema di controllo delle frontiere SIVE (con sistemi radar, di sensori e visivi) che è installato nella maggior parte delle frontiere della Spagna, così come in Portogallo e in Romania. Nel luglio 2018, Indra ha ottenuto un contratto di 10 milioni di euro per assicurare la gestione di SIVE su più siti per due anni. L’impresa è molto attiva nel fare lobby presso l’UE. È ugualmente una dei grandi beneficiari dei finanziamenti per la ricerca dell’UE, che assicurano il coordinamento del progetto PERSEUS per lo sviluppo di Eurosur e il Seahorse Network, la rete di scambio di informazioni tra le forze di polizia dei paesi mediterranei (in Europa e in Africa) per fermare le migrazioni.

Le società di armamenti israeliane hanno anch’esse ottenuto numerosi contratti nel quadro della sicurezza delle frontiere in UE. Nel 2018, Frontex ha selezionato il drone Heron delle Israel Aerospace Industries per i voli di sorveglianza degli esperimenti pilota nel Mediterraneo. Nel 2015, la società israeliana Elbit Systems ha venduto sei dei suoi droni Hermes al Corpo di guardie di frontiera svizzero, nel quadro di un contratto controverso di 230 milioni di euro. Ha anche firmato in seguito un contratto per droni con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima), in quanto subappaltatore della società portoghese CEIIA (2018), così come dei contratti per equipaggiare tre navi di pattugliamento per la Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
Gli appaltatori dei muri fisici

La maggioranza di muri e recinzioni che sono stati rapidamente eretti attraverso l’Europa, sono stati costruiti da società di BTP nazionali/società nazionali di costruzioni, ma un’impresa europea ha dominato nel mercato: la European Security Fencing, un produttore spagnolo di filo spinato, in particolare di un filo a spirale chiamato “concertina”. È famosa per aver fornito i fili spinati delle recinzioni che circondano Ceuta e Melilla. L’impresa ha ugualmente dotato di fili spinati le frontiere tra l’Ungheria e la Serbia, e i suoi fili spinati “concertina” sono stati installati alle frontiere tra Bulgaria e Turchia e tra l’Austria e la Slovenia, così come a Calais e, per qualche giorno, alla frontiera tra Ungheria e Slovenia, prima di essere ritirati. Dato che essi detengono il monopolio sul mercato da un po’ di tempo a questa parte, è probabile che i fili spinati “concertina” siano stati utilizzati presso altre frontiere in Europa.

Tra le altre imprese che hanno fornito i muri e le tecnologie ad essi associate, si trova DAT-CON (Croazia, Cipro, Macedonia, Moldavia, Slovenia e Ucraina), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén e Eulen (Spagna/Marocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov et Indra (Bulgaria/Turchia), Nordecon e Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft e SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Lettonia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lituania/Russi), Minis e Legi-SGS (Slovenia/Croazia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia e Zaun Ltd (Francia/Regno Unito).

I costi reali dei muri e delle tecnologie associate superano spesso le stime originali. Numerose accuse e denunce per corruzione sono state allo stesso modo formulate, in certi casi perché i progetti erano stati attribuiti a delle imprese che appartenevano ad amici di alti funzionari. In Slovenia, per esempio, accuse di corruzione riguardanti un contratto per la costruzione di muri alle frontiere hanno portato a tre anni di battaglie legali per avere accesso ai documenti; la questione è passata poi alla Corte suprema.

Malgrado tutto ciò, il Fondo europeo per le frontiere esterne ha sostenuto finanziariamente le infrastrutture e i servizi tecnologici di numerose operazioni alle frontiere degli Stati membri. In Macedonia, per esempio, l’UE ha versato 9 milioni di euro per finanziare dei veicoli di pattugliamento, delle telecamere a visione notturna, dei rivelatori di battito cardiaco e sostegno tecnico alle guardie di frontiera nell’aiuto della gestione della sua frontiera meridionale.
Gli speculatori dei muri marittimi

I dati che permettono di determinare quali imbarcazioni, elicotteri e aerei sono utilizzati nelle operazioni marittime in Europa mancano di trasparenza. È dunque difficile recuperare tutte le informazioni. Le nostre ricerche mostrano comunque che tra le principali società implicate figurano i giganti europei degli armamenti Airbus e Leonardo, così come grandi imprese di costruzione navale come l’olandese Damen e l’italiana Fincantieri.

Le imbarcazioni di pattugliamento di Damen sono servite per delle operazioni frontaliere portate avanti da Albania, Belgio, Bulgaria, Portogallo, Paesi Bassi, Romania, Svezia e Regno Unito, così come per le vaste operazioni di Frontex (Poseidon, Triton e Themis), per l’operazione Sophia e hanno ugualmente sostento la NATO nell’operazione Poseidon.

Al di fuori dell’Europa, la Libia, il Marocco, la Tunisia e la Turchia utilizzano delle imbarcazioni Damen per la sicurezza delle frontiere, spesso in collaborazione con l’UE o i suoi Stati membri. Per esempio, le sei navi Damen che la Turchia ha comprato per la sua guardia costiera nel 2006, per un totale di 20 milioni di euro, sono state finanziate attraverso lo strumento europeo che contribuirebbe alla stabilità e alla pace (IcSP), destinato a mantenere la pace e a prevenire i conflitti.

La vendita di imbarcazioni Damen alla Libia mette in evidenza l’inquietante costo umano di questo commercio. Nel 2012, Damen ha fornito quattro imbarcazioni di pattugliamento alla guardia costiera libica, che sono state vendute come equipaggiamento civile col fine di evitare la licenza di esportazione di armi nei Paesi Bassi. I ricercatori hanno poi scoperto che non solo le imbarcazioni erano state vendute con dei punti di fissaggio per le armi, ma che erano state in seguito armate ed utilizzate per fermare le imbarcazioni di rifugiati. Numerosi incidenti che hanno implicato queste imbarcazioni sono stati segnalati, tra i quali l’annegamento di 20 o 30 rifugiati. Damen si è rifiutata di commentare, dichiarando di aver convenuto col governo libico di non divulgare alcuna informazione riguardante le imbarcazioni.

Numerosi costruttori navali nazionali, oltre a Damen, giocano un ruolo determinante nelle operizioni marittime poiché sono sistematicamente scelti con priorità dai paesi partecipanti a ogni operazione di Frontex o ad altre operazioni nel Mediterraneo. Tutte le imbarcazioni fornite dall’Italia all’operazione Sophia sono state costruite da Fincantieri e tutte quelle spagnole sono fornite da Navantia e dai suoi predecessori. Allo stesso modo, la Francia si rifornisce da DCN/DCNS, ormai Naval Group, e tutte le imbarcazioni tedesche sono state costruite da diversi cantieri navali tedeschi (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Altre imprese hanno partecipato alle operazioni di Frontex, tra cui la società greca Motomarine Shipyards, che ha prodotto i pattugliatori rapidi Panther 57 utilizzati dalla guardia costiera greca, così come la Hellenic Shipyards e la Israel Shipyards.

La società austriaca Schiebel, che fornisce i droni S-100, gioca un ruolo importante nella sorveglianza aerea delle attività marittime. Nel novembre 2018, è stata selezionata dall’EMSA per un contratto di sorveglianza marittima di 24 milioni di euro riguardante differenti operazioni che includevano la sicurezza delle frontiere. Dal 2017, Schiebel ha ugualmente ottenuto dei contratti con la Croazia, la Danimarca, l’Islanda, l’Italia, il Portogallo e la Spagna. L’impresa ha un passato controverso: ha venduto dei droni a numerosi paesi in conflitto armato o governati da regimi repressivi come la Libia, il Myanmar, gli Emirati Arabi Uniti e lo Yemen.

La Finlandia e i Paesi Bassi hanno impiegato degli aerei Dornier rispettivamente nel quadro delle operazioni Hermès, Poseidon e Triton. Dornier appartiene ormai alla filiale americana della società di armamenti israeliana Elbit Systems.
CAE Aviation (Lussemburgo), DEA Aviation (Regno Unito) e EASP Air (Paesi Bassi) hanno tutte ottenuto dei contratti di sorveglianza aerea per Frontex.
Airbus, Dassault Aviation, Leonardo e l’americana Lockheed Martin hanno fornito il più grande numero di aerei utilizzati per l’operazione Sophia.

L’UE e i suoi Stati membri difendono le loro operazioni marittime pubblicizzando il loro ruolo nel salvataggio dei rifugiati in mare. Ma non è questo il loro obiettivo principale, come sottolinea il direttore di Frontex Fabrice Leggeri nell’aprile 2015, dichiarando che “le azioni volontarie di ricerca e salvataggio” non fanno parte del mandato affidato a Frontex, e che salvare delle vite non dovrebbe essere una priorità. La criminalizzazione delle operazioni di salvataggio da parte delle ONG, gli ostacoli che esse incontrano, così come la violenza e i respingimenti illegali dei rifugiati, spesso denunciati, illustrano bene il fatto che queste operazioni marittime sono volte soprattutto a costituire muri piuttosto che missioni umanitarie.
I muri virtuali

I principali contratti dell’UE legati ai muri virtuali sono stati affidati a due imprese, a volte in quanto leader di un consorzio.
Sopra Steria è il partner principale per lo sviluppo e il mantenimento del Sistema d’informazione dei visti (SIV), del Sistema di informazione Schengen (SIS II) e di Eurodac (European Dactyloscopy) e GMV ha firmato una serie di contratti per Eurosur. I sistemi che essi concepiscono permettono di controllare e di sorvegliare i movimenti delle persone attraverso l’Europa e, sempre più spesso, al di là delle sue frontiere.

Sopra Steria è un’impresa francese di servizi per consultazioni in tecnologia che ha, ad oggi, ottenuto dei contratti con l’UE per un valore totale di più di 150 milioni di euro. Nel quadro di alcuni di questi grossi contratti, Sopra Steria ha formato dei consorzi con HP Belgio, Bull e 3M Belgio.

Malgrado l’ampiezza di questi mercati, Sopra Steria ha ricevuto importanti critiche per la sua mancanza di rigore nel rispetto delle tempistiche e dei budget. Il lancio di SIS II è stato costantemente ritardato, costringendo la Commissione a prolungare i contratti e ad aumentare i budget. Sopra Steria aveva ugualmente fatto parte di un altro consorzio, Trusted Borders, impegnato nello sviluppo del programma e-Borders nel Regno Unito. Quest’ultimo è terminato nel 2010 dopo un accumulo di ritardi e di mancate consegne. Tuttavia, la società ha continuato a ottenere contratti, a causa del suo quasi monopolio di conoscenze e di relazioni con i rappresentanti dell’UE. Il ruolo centrale di Sopra Steria nello sviluppo dei sistemi biometrici dell’UE ha ugualmente portato alla firma di altri contratti nazionali con, tra gli altri, il Belgio, la Bulgaria, la Repubblica ceca, la Finlandia, la Francia, la Germania, la Romania e la Slovenia.

GMV, un’impresa tecnologica spagnola, ha concluso una serie di grossi contratti per Eurosur, dopo la sua fase sperimentale nel 2010, per almeno 25 milioni di euro. Essa rifornisce ugualmente di tecnologie la Guardia Civil spagnola, tecnologie quali, ad esempio, i centri di controllo del suo Sistema integrato di sorveglianza esterna (SIVE), sistema di sicurezza delle frontiere, così come rifornisce di servizi di sviluppo logistico Frontex. L’impresa ha partecipato ad almeno dieci progetti di ricerca finanziati dall’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

La maggior parte dei grossi contratti riguardanti i muri virtuali che non sono stati conclusi con consorzi di cui facesse parte Sopra Steria, sono stati attribuiti da eu-LISA (l’Agenzia europea per la gestione operazionale dei sistemi di informazione su vasta scale in seno allo spazio di libertà, di sicurezza e di giustizia) a dei consorzi di imprese specializzate nell’informazione e nelle nuove tecnologie, tra questi: Accenture, Atos Belgium e Morpho (rinominato Idemia).
Lobby

Come testimonia il nostro report “Border Wars”, il settore della difesa e della sicurezza, grazie ad una lobbying efficace, ha un’influenza considerabile nell’elaborazione delle politiche di difesa e di sicurezza dell’UE. Le imprese di questo settore industriale sono riuscite a posizionarsi come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, portando avanti il loro discorso secondo il quale la migrazione è prima di tutto una minaccia per la sicurezza che deve essere combattuta tramite mezzi militari e securitari. Questo crea così una domanda continua del catalogo sempre più fornito di equipaggiamenti e servizi che esse forniscono per la sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere.

Un numero alto di imprese che abbiamo nominato, in particolare le grandi società di armamenti, fanno parte dell’EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza), il più importante gruppo di pressione sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

Molte imprese informatiche che hanno concepito i muri virtuali dell’UE sono membri dell’EAB (Associazione Europea per la Biometria). L’EOS ha un “Gruppo di lavoro sulla sicurezza integrata delle frontiere” per “permettere lo sviluppo e l’adozione delle migliori soluzioni tecnologiche per la sicurezza delle frontiere sia ai checkpoint che lungo le frontiere marittime e terrestri”.
Il gruppo di lavoro è presieduto da Giorgio Gulienetti, della società di armi italiana Leonardo, Isto Mattila (diplomato all’università di scienze applicate) e Peter Smallridge di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza numerica, recentemente acquisita da Thales.

I lobbisti di imprese e i rappresentanti di questi gruppi di pressione incontrano regolarmente le istituzioni dell’UE, tra cui la Commissione europea, nel quadro di comitati di consiglio ufficiali, pubblicano proposte influenti, organizzano incontri tra il settore industriale, i policy-makers e i dirigenti e si ritrovano allo stesso modo in tutti i saloni, le conferenze e i seminari sulla difesa e la sicurezza.

Airbus, Leonardo e Thales e l’EOS hanno anche assistito a 226 riunioni ufficiali di lobby con la Commissione europea tra il 2014 e il 2019. In queste riunioni, i rappresentanti del settore si presentano come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, e propongono i loro prodotti e servizi come soluzione alle “minacce alla sicurezza” costituite dall’immigrazione. Nel 2017, queste stesse imprese e l’EOS hanno speso fino a 2,56 milioni di euro in lobbying.

Si constata una relazione simile per quanto riguarda i muri virtuali: il Centro comune della ricerca della Commissione europea domanda apertamente che le politiche pubbliche favoriscano “l’emergenza di una industria biometrica europea dinamica”.
Un business mortale, una scelta

La conclusione di questa inchiesta sul business dell’innalzamento di muri è chiara: la presenza di un’Europa piena di muri si rivela molto fruttuosa per una larga fetta di imprese del settore degli armamenti, della difesa, dell’informatica, del trasporto marittimo e delle imprese di costruzioni. I budget che l’UE ha pianificato per la sicurezza delle frontiere nei prossimi dieci anni mostrano che si tratta di un commercio che continua a prosperare.

Si tratta altresì di un commercio mortale. A causa della vasta militarizzazione delle frontiere dell’Europa sulla terraferma e in mare, i rifugiati e i migranti intraprendono dei percorsi molto più pericolosi e alcuni si trovano anche intrappolati in terribili condizioni in paesi limitrofi come la Libia. Non vengono registrate tutte le morti, ma quelle che sono registrate nel Mediterraneo mostrano che il numero di migranti che annegano provando a raggiungere l’Europa continua ad aumentare ogni anno.

Questo stato di cose non è inevitabile. È il risultato sia di decisioni politiche prese dall’UE e dai suoi Stati membri, sia dalle decisioni delle imprese di trarre profitto da queste politiche. Sono rare le imprese che prendono posizione, come il produttore tedesco di filo spinato Mutinox che ha dichiarato nel 2015 che non avrebbe venduto i suoi prodotti al governo ungherese per il seguente motivo: “I fili spinati sono concepiti per impedire atti criminali, come il furto. Dei rifugiati, bambini e adulti, non sono dei criminali”.

È tempo che altri politici e capi d’impresa riconoscano questa stessa verità: erigere muri contro le popolazioni più vulnerabili viola i diritti umani e costituisce un atto immorale che sarà evidentemente condannato dalla storia.

Trent’anni dopo la caduta del muro di Berlino, è tempo che l’Europa abbatta i suoi nuovi muri.

▻https://www.meltingpot.org/La-costruzione-di-muri-un-business.html

How the arms industry drives Fortress Europe’s expansion

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In recent years, rising calls for deterrence have intensified the physical violence migrants face at the EU border. The externalization of the border through deals with sending and transit countries signals the expansion of this securitization process. Financial gains by international arms firms in this militarization trend form an obstacle for policy change.

In March, April, and May of this year, multiple European countries deployed military forces to their national borders. This was done to assist with controls and patrols in the wake of border closures and other movement restrictions due to the Covid-19 crisis. Poland deployed 1,460 soldiers to the border to support the Border Guard and police as part of a larger military operation in reaction to Covid-19. And the Portuguese police used military drones as a complement to their land border checks. According to overviews from NATO, the Czech Republic, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands (military police), Slovakia, and Slovenia all stationed armed forces at their national borders.

While some of these deployments have been or will be rolled back as the Corona crisis dies down, they are not exceptional developments. Rather, using armed forces for border security and control has been a common occurrence at EU external borders since the so-called refugee crisis of 2015. They are part of the continuing militarisation of European border and migration policies, which is known to put refugees at risk but is increasingly being expanded to third party countries. Successful lobbying from the military and security industry has been an important driver for these policies, from which large European arms companies have benefited.

The militarization of borders happens when EU member states send armies to border regions, as they did in Operation Sophia off the Libyan coast. This was the first outright EU military mission to stop migration. But border militarization also includes the use of military equipment for migration control, such as helicopters and patrol vessels, as well as the the EU-wide surveillance system Eurosur, which connects surveillance data from all individual member states. Furthermore, EU countries now have over 1,000 kilometers of walls and fences on their borders. These are rigged with surveillance, monitoring, and detection technologies, and accompanied by an increasing use of drones and other autonomous systems. The EU also funds a constant stream of Research & Technology (R&T) projects to develop new technologies and services to monitor and manage migration.

This process has been going on for decades. The Schengen Agreement of 1985, and the subsequent creation of the Schengen Area, which coupled the opening of the internal EU borders with robust control at the external borders, can be seen as a starting point for these developments. After 2011, when the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ led to fears of mass migration to Europe, and especially since the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the EU accelerated the boosting and militarising of border security, enormously. Since then, stopping migration has been at the top of the EU agenda.

An increasingly important part of the process of border militarization isn’t happening at the European borders, but far beyond them. The EU and its member states are incentivizing third party countries to help stop migrants long before they reach Europe. This externalising of borders has taken many forms, from expanding the goals of EUCAP missions in Mali and Niger to include the prevention of irregular migration, to funding and training the Libyan Coast Guard to return refugees back to torture and starvation in the infamous detention centers in Libya. It also includes the donation of border security equipment, for example from Germany to Tunisia, and funding for purchases, such as Turkey’s acquisition of coast guard vessels to strengthen its operational capacities.

Next to the direct consequences of European border externalisation efforts, these policies cause and worsen problems in the third party countries concerned: diverting development funds and priorities, ruining migration-based economies, and strengthening authoritarian regimes such as those in Chad, Belarus, Eritrea, and Sudan by providing funding, training and equipment to their military and security forces. Precisely these state organs are most responsible for repression and abuses of human rights. All this feeds drivers of migration, including violence, repression, and unemployment. As such, it is almost a guarantee for more refugees in the future.

EU border security agency Frontex has also extended its operations into non-EU-countries. Ongoing negotiations and conclusions of agreements with Balkan countries resulted in the first operation in Albania having started in May 2019. And this is only a small part of Frontex’ expanding role in recent years. In response to the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the European Commission launched a series of proposals that saw large increases in the powers of the agency, including giving member states binding advice to boost their border security, and giving Frontex the right to intervene in member states’ affairs (even without their consent) by decision of the Commission or Council.

These proposals also included the creation of a 10,000 person strong standing corps of border guards and a budget to buy or lease its own equipment. Concretely, Frontex started with a budget of €6 million in 2005, which grew to €143 million in 2015. This was then quickly increased again from €239 million in 2016 to €460 million in 2020. The enormous expansion of EU border security and control has been accompanied by rapidly increasing budgets in general. In recent years, billions of euros have been spent on fortifying borders, setting up biometric databases, increasing surveillance capacities, and paying non-EU-countries to play their parts in this expansion process.

Negotiations about the next seven-year-budget for the EU, the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, are still ongoing. In the European Commission’s latest proposal, which is clearly positioned as a response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the fund for strengthening member states’ border security, the Integrated Border Management Fund, has been allotted €12.5 billion. Its predecessors, the External Borders Fund (2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders (2014-2020), had much smaller budgets: €1.76 billion and €2.70 billion, respectively. For Frontex, €7.5 billion is reserved, with €2.2 billion earmarked for purchasing or leasing equipment such as helicopters, drones, and patrol vessels. These huge budget increases are exemplary of the priority the EU attaches to stopping migration.

The narrative underlying these policies and budget growths is the perception of migration as a threat; a security problem. As researcher, Ainhoa Ruiz (Centre Delàs) writes, “the securitisation process also includes militarisation,” because “the prevailing paradigm for providing security is based on military principles: the use of force and coercion, more weapons equating to more security, and the achievement of security by eliminating threats.”

This narrative hasn’t come out of the blue. It is pushed by right wing politicians and often followed by centrist and leftist parties afraid of losing voters. Importantly, it is also promoted by an extensive and successful industrial lobby. According to Martin Lemberg-Pedersen (Assistant Professor in Global Refugee Studies, Aalborg University), arms companies “establish themselves as experts on border security, and use this position to frame immigration to Europe as leading to evermore security threats in need of evermore advanced [security] products.” The narrative of migration as a security problem thus sets the stage for militaries, and the security companies behind the commercial arms lobby, to offer their goods and services as the solution. The range of militarization policies mentioned so far reflects the broad adoption of this narrative.

The lobby organizations of large European military and security companies regularly interact with the European Commission and EU border agencies. They have meetings, organise roundtables, and see each other at military and security fairs and conferences. Industry representatives also take part in official advisory groups, are invited to present new arms and technologies, and write policy proposals. These proposals can sometimes be so influential that they are adopted as policy, almost unamended.

This happened, for instance, when the the Commission decided to open up the Instrument contributing to Security and Peace, a fund meant for peace-building and conflict prevention. The fund’s terms were expanded to cover provision of third party countries with non-lethal security equipment, for example, for border security purposes. The new policy document for this turned out to be a step-by-step reproduction of an earlier proposal from lobby organisation, Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD). Yet, perhaps the most far-reaching success of this kind is the expansion of Frontex, itself, into a European Border Guard. Years before it actually happened, the industry had already been pushing for this outcome.

The same companies that are at the forefront of the border security and control lobby are, not surprisingly, also the big winners of EU and member states’ contracts in these areas. These include three of the largest European (and global) arms companies, namely, Airbus (Paneuropean), Leonardo (Italy) and Thales (France). These companies are active in many aspects of the border security and control market. Airbus’ and Leonardo’s main product in this field are helicopters, with EU funds paying for many purchases by EU and third countries. Thales provides radar, for example, for border patrol vessels, and is heavily involved in biometric and digital identification, especially after having acquired market leader, Gemalto, last year.

These three companies are the main beneficiaries of the European anti-migration obsession. At the same time, these very three companies also contribute to new migration streams to Europe’s shores through their trade in arms. They are responsible for significant parts of Europe’s arms exports to countries at war, and they provide the arms used by parties in internal armed conflicts, by human rights violators, and by repressive regimes. These are the forces fueling the reasons for which people are forced to flee in the first place.

Many other military and security companies also earn up to hundreds of millions of euros from large border security and control projects oriented around logistics and transport. Dutch shipbuilder Damen provided not only many southern European countries with border patrol vessels, but also controversially sold those to Libya and Turkey, among others. Its ships have also been used in Frontex operations, in Operation Sophia, and on the Channel between Calais and Dover.

The Spanish company, European Security Fencing, provided razor wire for the fences around the Spanish enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla, in Morocco, as well as the fence at Calais and the fences on the borders of Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), and Greece leased border surveillance drones from Elbit and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). These are Israeli military companies that routinely promote their products as ‘combat-proven’ or ‘battlefield tested’ against Palestinians.

Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe. These are just a few examples of the companies that benefit from the billions of euros that the EU and its member states spend on a broad range of purchases and projects in their bid to stop migration.

The numbers of forcibly displaced people in the world grew to a staggering 79.5 million by the end of last year. Instead of helping to eliminate the root causes of migration, EU border and migration policies, as well as its arms exports to the rest of the world, are bound to lead to more refugees in the future. The consequences of these policies have already been devastating. As experts in the field of migration have repeatedly warned, the militarisation of borders primarily pushes migrants to take alternative migration routes that are often more dangerous and involve the risks of relying on criminal smuggling networks. The Mediterranean Sea has become a sad witness of this, turning into a graveyard for a growing percentage of refugees trying to cross it.

The EU approach to border security doesn’t stand on its own. Many other countries, in particular Western ones and those with authoritarian leaders, follow the same narrative and policies. Governments all over the world, but particularly those in the US, Australia, and Europe, continue to spend billions of euros on border security and control equipment and services. And they plan to increase budgets even more in the coming years. For military and security companies, this is good news; the global border security market is expected to grow by over 7% annually for the next five years to a total of $65 billion in 2025. It looks like they will belong to the very few winners of increasingly restrictive policies targeting vulnerable people on the run.

▻https://crisismag.net/2020/06/27/how-the-arms-industry-drives-fortress-europes-expansion
#industrie_militaire #covid-19 #coronavirus #frontières_extérieures #Operation_Sophia #Eurosur #surveillance #drones #technologie #EUCAP #externalisation #Albanie #budget #Integrated_Border_Management_Fund #menace #lobby_industriel #Instrument_contributing_to_Security_and_Peace #conflits #paix #prévention_de_conflits #Aerospace_and_Defence_Industries_Association_of_Europe (#ASD) #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #hélicoptères #radar #biométrie #identification_digitale #Gemalto #commerce_d'armes #armement #Damen #European_Security_Fencing #barbelé #European_Maritime_Safety_Agency (#EMSA) #Elbit #Israel_Aerospace_Industries (#IAI) #Civipol #Safran #base_de_données

–—

Pour @etraces :

Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe

GUARDING THE FORTRESS. The role of Frontex in the militarisation and securitisation of migration flows in the European Union

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The report focuses on 19 Frontex operations run by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex) to explore how the agency is militarising borders and criminalising migrants, undermining fundamental rights to freedom of movement and the right to asylum.

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This report is set in a wider context in which more than 70.8 million people worldwide have been forcibly displaced, according to the 2018 figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (UNHCR, 2019). Some of these have reached the borders of the European Union (EU), seeking protection and asylum, but instead have encountered policy responses that mostly aim to halt and intercept migration flows, against the background of securitisation policies in which the governments of EU Member States see migration as a threat. One of the responses to address migration flows is the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex), established in 2004 as the EU body in charge of guarding what many have called ‘Fortress Europe’, and whose practices have helped to consolidate the criminalisation of migrants and the securitisation of their movements.

The report focuses on analysing the tools deployed by Fortress Europe, in this case through Frontex, to prevent the freedom of movement and the right to asylum, from its creation in 2004 to the present day.

The sources used to write this report were from the EU and Frontex, based on its budgets and annual reports. The analysis focused on the Frontex regulations, the language used and its meaning, as well as the budgetary trends, identifying the most significant items – namely, the joint operations and migrant-return operations.

A table was compiled of all the joint operations mentioned in the annual reports since the Agency was established in 2005 up to 2018 (see annexes). The joint operations were found on government websites but were not mentioned in the Frontex annual reports. Of these operations, we analysed those of the longest duration, or that have showed recent signs of becoming long-term operations. The joint operations are analysed in terms of their objectives, area of action, the mandates of the personnel deployed, and their most noteworthy characteristics.

Basically, the research sought to answer the following questions: What policies are being implemented in border areas and in what context? How does Frontex act in response to migration movements? A second objective was to analyse how Frontex securitises the movement of refugees and other migrants, with the aim of contributing to the analysis of the process of border militarisation and the security policies applied to non-EU migrants by the EU and its Member States.

▻https://www.tni.org/en/guarding-the-fortress

Pour télécharger le rapport_
▻https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/informe40_eng_ok.pdf

#rapport #TNI #Transnational_institute

voir aussi :
Asylum Outsourced : McKinsey’s Secret Role in Europe’s Refugee Crisis
►https://seenthis.net/messages/862826

#Frontex aircraft : Below the radar against international law

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For three years, Frontex has been chartering small aircraft for the surveillance of the EU’s external borders. First Italy was thus supported, then Croatia followed. Frontex keeps the planes details secret, and the companies also switch off the transponders for position display during operations.

The European Commission does not want to make public which private surveillance planes Frontex uses in the Mediterranean. In the non-public answer to a parliamentary question, the EU border agency writes that the information on the aircraft is „commercially confidential“ as it contains „personal data and sensitive operational information“.

Frontex offers EU member states the option of monitoring their external borders using aircraft. For this „Frontex Aerial Surveillance Service“ (FASS), Frontex charters twin-engined airplanes from European companies. Italy first made use of the service in 2017, followed a year later by Croatia. In 2018, Frontex carried out at least 1,800 flight hours under the FASS, no figures are yet available for 2019.

Air service to be supplemented with #drones

The FASS flights are carried out under the umbrella of „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, which includes satellite surveillance as well as drones. Before the end of this year, the border agency plans to station large drones in the Mediterranean for up to four years. The situation pictures of the European Union’s „pre-frontier area“ are fed into the surveillance system EUROSUR, whose headquarter is located at Frontex in Warsaw. The national EUROSUR contact points, for example in Spain, Portugal and Italy, also receive this information.

In addition to private charter planes, Frontex also uses aircraft and helicopters provided by EU Member States, in the central Mediterranean via the „Themis“ mission. The EU Commission also keeps the call signs of the state aircraft operating there secret. They would be considered „sensitive operational information“ and could not be disclosed to MEPs.

Previously, the FOIA platform „Frag den Staat“ („Ask the State“) had also tried to find out details about the sea and air capacities of the member states in „Themis“. Frontex refused to provide any information on this matter. „Frag den Staat“ lost a case against Frontex before the European Court of Justice and is now to pay 23,700 Euros to the agency for legal fees.

Real-time tracking with FlightAware

The confidentiality of Frontex comes as a surprise, because companies that monitor the Mediterranean for the agency are known through a tender. Frontex has signed framework contracts with the Spanish arms group Indra as well as the charter companies CAE Aviation (Canada), Diamond-Executive Aviation (Great Britain) and EASP Air (Netherlands). Frontex is spending up to 14.5 million euros each on the contracts.

Finally, online service providers such as FlightAware can also be used to draw conclusions about which private and state airplanes are flying for Frontex in the Mediterranean. For real-time positioning, the providers use data from ADS-B transponders, which all larger aircraft must have installed. A worldwide community of non-commercial trackers receives this geodata and feeds it into the Internet. In this way, for example, Italian journalist Sergio Scandura documents practically all movements of Frontex aerial assets in the central Mediterranean.

Among the aircraft tracked this way are the twin-engined „DA-42“, „DA-62“ and „Beech 350“ of Diamond-Executive Aviation, which patrol the Mediterranean Sea on behalf of Frontex as „Osprey1“, „Osprey3“ and „Tasty“, in former times also „Osprey2“ and „Eagle1“. They are all operated by Diamond-Executive Aviation and take off and land at airports in Malta and Sicily.

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„Push-backs“ become „pull-backs“

In accordance with the Geneva Convention on Refugees, the EU Border Agency may not return people to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Libya is not a safe haven; this assessment has been reiterated on several occasions by the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees, among others.

Because these „push-backs“ are prohibited, Frontex has since 2017 been helping with so-called „pull-backs“ by bringing refugees back to Libya by the Libyan coast guard rather than by EU units. With the „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, Frontex is de facto conducting air reconnaissance for Libya. By November 2019, the EU border agency had notified Libyan authorities about refugee boats on the high seas in at least 42 cases.

Many international law experts consider this practice illegal. Since Libya would not be able to track down the refugees without the help of Frontex, the agency must take responsibility for the refoulements. The lawyers Omer Shatz and Juan Branco therefore want to sue responsibles of the European Union before the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

Frontex watches refugees drown

This is probably the reason why Frontex disguises the exact location of its air surveillance. Private maritime rescue organisations have repeatedly pointed out that Frontex aircrafts occasionally switch off their transponders so that they cannot be tracked via ADS-B. In the answer now available, this is confirmed by the EU Commission. According to this, the visibility of the aircraft would disclose „sensitive operational information“ and, in combination with other kinds of information, „undermine“ the operational objectives.

The German Ministry of the Interior had already made similar comments on the Federal Police’s assets in Frontex missions, according to which „general tracking“ of their routes in real time would „endanger the success of the mission“.

However, Frontex claims it did not issue instructions to online service providers to block the real-time position display of its planes, as journalist Scandura described. Nonetheless, the existing concealment of the operations only allows the conclusion that Frontex does not want to be controlled when the deployed aircraft watch refugees drown and Italy and Malta, as neighbouring EU member states, do not provide any assistance.

▻https://digit.site36.net/2020/06/11/frontex-aircraft-blind-flight-against-international-law
#avions #Italie #Croatie #confidentialité #transparence #Frontex_Aerial_Surveillance_Service (#FASS) #Multipurpose_Aerial_Surveillance #satellites #Méditerranée #Thermis #information_sensible #Indra #CAE_Aviation #Diamond-Executive_Aviation #EASP_Air #FlightAware #ADS-B #DA-42 #DA-62 #Beech_350 #Osprey1 #Osprey3 #Tasty #Osprey2 #Eagle1 #Malte #Sicile #pull-back #push-back #refoulement #Sergio_Scandura

Walls Must Fall: Ending the deadly politics of border militarisation - webinar recording
This webinar explored the trajectory and globalization of border militarization and anti-migrant racism across the world, the history, ideologies and actors that have shaped it, the pillars and policies that underpin the border industrial complex, the resistance of migrants, refugees and activists, and the shifting dynamics within this pandemic.

- #Harsha_Walia, author of Undoing Border Imperialism (2013)
- #Jille_Belisario, Transnational Migrant Platform-Europe (TMP-E)
- #Todd_Miller, author of Empire of Borders (2020), Storming the Wall (2019) and TNI’s report More than A Wall (2019)
- #Kavita_Krishnan, All India Progressive Women’s Association (AIPWA).
▻https://www.tni.org/en/article/walls-must-fall
▻https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T8B-cJ2bTi8&feature=emb_logo

#conférence #webinar

Le business meurtrier des frontières

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Le 21ème siècle sera-t-il celui des barrières ? Probable, au rythme où les frontières nationales se renforcent. Dans un livre riche et documenté, publié aux éditions Syllepse, le géographe Stéphane Rosière dresse un indispensable état des lieux.

Une nuit du mois de juin, dans un centre de rétention de l’île de Rhodes, la police grecque vient chercher une vingtaine de migrant·e·s, dont deux bébés. Après un trajet en bus, elle abandonne le groupe dans un canot de sauvetage sans moteur, au milieu des eaux territoriales turques. En août, le New York Times publie une enquête révélant que cette pratique, avec la combinaison de l’arrivée aux affaires du premier ministre conservateur Kyriakos Mitsotakis et de la diffusion de la pandémie de Covid-19, est devenue courante depuis mars.

Illégales au regard du droit international, ces expulsions illustrent surtout le durcissement constant de la politique migratoire de l’Europe depuis 20 ans. Elles témoignent aussi d’un processus mondial de « pixellisation » des frontières : celles-ci ne se réduisent pas à des lignes mais à un ensemble de points plus ou moins en amont ou en aval (ports, aéroports, eaux territoriales…), où opèrent les polices frontalières.
La fin de la fin des frontières

Plus largement, le récent ouvrage de Stéphane Rosière, Frontières de fer, le cloisonnement du monde, permet de prendre la mesure d’un processus en cours de « rebordering » à travers le monde. À la fois synthèse des recherches récentes sur les frontières et résultats des travaux de l’auteur sur la résurgence de barrières frontalières, le livre est une lecture incontournable sur l’évolution contemporaine des frontières nationales.

D’autant qu’il n’y a pas si longtemps, la mondialisation semblait promettre l’affaissement des frontières, dans la foulée de la disparition de l’Union soviétique et, corollairement, de la généralisation de l’économie de marché. La Guerre froide terminée annonçait la « fin de l’histoire » et, avec elle, la disparition des limites territoriales héritées de l’époque moderne. Au point de ringardiser, rappelle Stéphane Rosière, les études sur les frontières au sein de la géographie des années 1990, parallèlement au succès d’une valorisation tous azimuts de la mobilité dans le discours politique dominant comme dans les sciences sociales.

Trente ans après, le monde se réveille avec 25 000 kilomètres de barrières frontalières – record pour l’Inde, avec plus de 3 000 kilomètres de clôtures pour prévenir l’immigration depuis le Bangladesh. Barbelés, murs de briques, caméras, détecteurs de mouvements, grilles électrifiées, les dispositifs de contrôle frontalier fleurissent en continu sur les cinq continents.
L’âge des « murs anti-pauvres »

La contradiction n’est qu’apparente. Les barrières du 21e siècle ne ferment pas les frontières mais les cloisonnent – d’où le titre du livre. C’est-à-dire que l’objectif n’est pas de supprimer les flux mondialisés – de personnes et encore moins de marchandises ni de capitaux – mais de les contrôler. Les « teichopolitiques », terme qui recouvre, pour Stéphane Rosière, les politiques de cloisonnement de l’espace, matérialisent un « ordre mondial asymétrique et coercitif », dans lequel on valorise la mobilité des plus riches tout en assignant les populations pauvres à résidence.

De fait, on observe que les barrières frontalières redoublent des discontinuités économiques majeures. Derrière l’argument de la sécurité, elles visent à contenir les mouvements migratoires des régions les plus pauvres vers des pays mieux lotis économiquement : du Mexique vers les États-Unis, bien sûr, ou de l’Afrique vers l’Europe, mais aussi de l’Irak vers l’Arabie Saoudite ou du Pakistan vers l’Iran.

Les dispositifs de contrôle frontalier sont des outils parmi d’autres d’une « implacable hiérarchisation » des individus en fonction de leur nationalité. Comme l’a montré le géographe Matthew Sparke à propos de la politique migratoire nord-américaine, la population mondiale se trouve divisée entre une classe hypermobile de citoyen·ne·s « business-class » et une masse entravée de citoyen·ne·s « low-cost ». C’est le sens du « passport index » publié chaque année par le cabinet Henley : alors qu’un passeport japonais ou allemand donne accès à plus de 150 pays, ce chiffre descend en-dessous de 30 avec un passeport afghan ou syrien.
Le business des barrières

Si les frontières revêtent une dimension économique, c’est aussi parce qu’elles sont un marché juteux. À l’heure où les pays européens ferment des lits d’hôpital faute de moyens, on retiendra ce chiffre ahurissant : entre 2005 et 2016, le budget de Frontex, l’agence en charge du contrôle des frontières de l’Union européenne, est passé de 6,3 à 238,7 millions d’euros. À quoi s’ajoutent les budgets colossaux débloqués pour construire et entretenir les barrières – budgets entourés d’opacité et sur lesquels, témoigne l’auteur, il est particulièrement difficile d’enquêter, faute d’obtenir… des fonds publics.

L’argent public alimente ainsi une « teichoéconomie » dont les principaux bénéficiaires sont des entreprises du BTP et de la sécurité européennes, nord-américaines, israéliennes et, de plus en plus, indiennes ou saoudiennes. Ce complexe sécuritaro-industriel, identifié par Julien Saada, commercialise des dispositifs de surveillance toujours plus sophistiqués et prospère au rythme de l’inflation de barrières entre pays, mais aussi entre quartiers urbains.

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Un business d’autant plus florissant qu’il s’auto-entretient, dès lors que les mêmes entreprises vendent des armes. On sait que les ventes d’armes, alimentant les guerres, stimulent les migrations : un « cercle vertueux » s’enclenche pour les entreprises du secteur, appelées à la rescousse pour contenir des mouvements de population qu’elles participent à encourager.
« Mourir aux frontières »

Bénéfices juteux, profits politiques, les barrières font des heureux. Elles tuent aussi et l’ouvrage de Stéphane Rosière se termine sur un décompte macabre. C’est, dit-il, une « guerre migratoire » qui est en cours. Guerre asymétrique, elle oppose la police armée des puissances économiques à des groupes le plus souvent désarmés, venant de périphéries dominées économiquement et dont on entend contrôler la mobilité. Au nom de la souveraineté des États, cette guerre fait plusieurs milliers de victimes par an et la moindre des choses est de « prendre la pleine mesure de la létalité contemporaine aux frontières ».

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Sur le blog :

– Une synthèse sur les murs frontaliers : ►http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2019/01/28/lamour-des-murs

– Le compte rendu d’un autre livre incontournable sur les frontières : ▻http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2019/08/03/frontieres-en-mouvement

– Une synthèse sur les barricades à l’échelle intraurbaine : ►http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2020/10/21/gated-communities-le-paradis-entre-quatre-murs

▻http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2020/11/05/le-business-meurtrier-des-frontieres

The big wall

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An ActionAid investigation into how Italy tried to stop migration from Africa, using EU funds, and how much money it spent

►https://thebigwall.org/en
►https://seenthis.net/messages/905345

#Italie

How Private Security Firms Profit Off the Refugee Crisis

The UK has pumped money to corporations turning #Calais into a bleak fortress.

Tall white fences lined with barbed wire – welcome to Calais. The city in northern France is an obligatory stop for anyone trying to reach the UK across the channel. But some travellers are more welcome than others, and in recent decades, a slew of private security companies have profited millions of pounds off a very expensive – an unattractive – operation to keep migrants from crossing.

Every year, thousands of passengers and lorries take the ferry at the Port of Calais-Fréthun, a trading route heavily relied upon by the UK for imports. But the entrance to the port looks more like a maximum-security prison than your typical EU border. Even before Brexit, the UK was never part of the Schengen area, which allows EU residents to move freely across 26 countries. For decades, Britain has strictly controlled its southern border in an attempt to stop migrants and asylum seekers from entering.

As early as 2000, the Port of Calais was surrounded by a 2.8 metre-high fence to prevent people from jumping into lorries waiting at the ferry departure point. In 1999, the Red Cross set up a refugee camp in the nearby town of Sangatte which quickly became overcrowded. The UK pushed for it to be closed in 2002 and then negotiated a treaty with France to regulate migration between the two countries.

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The 2003 Le Toquet Treaty allowed the UK to check travellers on French soil before their arrival, and France to do the same on UK soil. Although the deal looks fair on paper, in practice it unduly burdens French authorities, as there are more unauthorised migrants trying to reach the UK from France than vice versa.

The treaty effectively moved the UK border onto French territory, but people still need to cross the channel to request asylum. That’s why thousands of refugees from conflict zones like Syria, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia have found themselves stranded in Calais, waiting for a chance to cross illegally – often in search of family members who’ve already made it to the UK. Many end up paying people smugglers to hide them in lorries or help them cross by boat.

These underlying issues came to a head during the Syrian crisis, when refugees began camping out near Calais in 2014. The so-called Calais Jungle became infamous for its squalid conditions, and at its peak, hosted more than 7,000 people. They were all relocated to other centres in France before the camp was bulldozed in 2016. That same year, the UK also decided to build a €2.7 million border wall in Calais to block access to the port from the camp, but the project wasn’t completed until after the camp was cleared, attracting a fair deal of criticism. Between 2015 and 2018, the UK spent over €110 million on border security in France, only to top it up with over €56 million more in 2018.

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But much of this public money actually flows into the accounts of private corporations, hired to build and maintain the high-tech fences and conduct security checks. According to a 2020 report by the NGO Care4Calais, there are more than 40 private security companies working in the city. One of the biggest, Eamus Cork Solutions (ECS), was founded by a former Calais police officer in 2004 and is reported to have benefited at least €30 million from various contracts as of 2016.

Stéphane Rosière, a geography professor at the University of Reims, wrote his book Iron Borders (only available in French) about the many border walls erected around the world. Rosière calls this the “security-industrial” complex – private firms that have largely replaced the traditional military-industrial sector in Europe since WW2.

“These companies are getting rich by making security systems adaptable to all types of customers – individuals, companies or states,” he said. According to Rosière, three-quarters of the world’s border security barriers were built in the 21st century.

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Brigitte, a pensioner living close to the former site of the Calais Jungle, has seen her town change drastically over the past two decades. “Everything is cordoned off with wire mesh," she said. "I have the before and after photos, and it’s not a pretty sight. It’s just wire, wire, wire.” For the past 15 years, Brigitte has been opening her garage door for asylum seekers to stop by for a cup of tea and charge their phones and laptops, earning her the nickname "Mama Charge”.

“For a while, the purpose of these fences and barriers was to stop people from crossing,” said François Guennoc, president of L’Auberge des Migrants, an NGO helping displaced migrants in Calais.

Migrants have still been desperate enough to try their luck. “They risked a lot to get into the port area, and many of them came back bruised and battered,” Guennoc said. Today, walls and fences are mainly being built to deter people from settling in new camps near Calais after being evicted.

In the city centre, all public squares have been fenced off. The city’s bridges have been fitted with blue lights and even with randomly-placed bike racks, so people won’t sleep under them.

“They’ve also been cutting down trees for some time now,” said Brigitte, pointing to a patch near her home that was once woods. Guennoc said the authorities are now placing large rocks in areas where NGOs distribute meals and warm clothes, to prevent displaced people from receiving the donations. “The objective of the measures now is also to make the NGOs’ work more difficult,” he said.

According to the NGO Refugee Rights Europe, about 1,500 men, women and minors were living in makeshift camps in and around Calais as of April 2020. In July 2020, French police raided a camp of over 500 people, destroying residents’ tents and belongings, in the largest operation since the Calais Jungle was cleared. An investigation by Slate found that smaller camps are cleared almost every day by the French police, even in the middle of winter. NGOs keep providing new tents and basic necessities to displaced residents, but they are frustrated by the waste of resources. The organisations are also concerned about COVID-19 outbreaks in the camps.

As VICE World News has previously reported, the crackdown is only pushing people to take more desperate measures to get into the UK. Boat crossings reached record-highs in 2020, and four people have died since August 2020 while trying to cross, by land and sea. “When you create an obstacle, people find a way to get around it,” Guennoc said. “If they build a wall all the way along the coast to prevent boat departures, people will go to Normandy – and that has already started.” Crossing the open sea puts migrants at even greater risk.

Rosière agrees security measures are only further endangering migrants.“All locks eventually open, no matter how complex they may be. It’s just a matter of time.”

He believes the only parties who stand to profit from the status quo are criminal organisations and private security firms: “At the end of the day, this a messed-up use of public money.”

▻https://www.vice.com/en/article/wx8yax/how-private-security-firms-profit-off-the-refugee-crisis

En français:
À Calais, la ville s’emmure
▻https://www.vice.com/fr/article/wx8yax/a-calais-la-ville-semmure

Financing Border Wars. The border industry, its financiers and human rights

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This report seeks to explore and highlight the extent of today’s global border security industry, by focusing on the most important geographical markets—Australia, Europe, USA—listing the human rights violations and risks involved in each sector of the industry, profiling important corporate players and putting a spotlight on the key investors in each company.

Executive summary

Migration will be one of the defining human rights issues of the 21st century. The growing pressures to migrate combined with the increasingly militarised state security response will only exacerbate an already desperate situation for refugees and migrants. Refugees already live in a world where human rights are systematically denied. So as the climate crisis deepens and intersects with other economic and political crises, forcing more people from their homes, and as states retreat to ever more authoritarian security-based responses, the situation for upholding and supporting migrants’ rights looks ever bleaker.

States, most of all those in the richest countries, bear the ultimate responsibility to uphold the human rights of refugees and migrants recognised under International Human Rights Law. Yet corporations are also deeply implicated. It is their finance, their products, their services, their infrastructure that underpins the structures of state migration and border control. In some cases, they are directly involved in human rights violations themselves; in other cases they are indirectly involved as they facilitate the system that systematically denies refugees and migrants their rights. Most of all, through their lobbying, involvement in government ‘expert’ groups, revolving doors with state agencies, it becomes clear that corporations are not just accidental beneficiaries of the militarisation of borders. Rather they actively shape the policies from which they profit and therefore share responsibility for the human rights violations that result.

This state-corporate fusion is best described as a Border Industrial Complex, drawing on former US President Eisenhower’s warning of the dangers of a Military-Industrial Complex. Indeed it is noticeable that many of the leading border industries today are also military companies, seeking to diversify their security products to a rapidly expanding new market.

This report seeks to explore and highlight the extent of today’s global border security industry, by focusing on the most important geographical markets—Australia, Europe, USA—listing the human rights violations and risks involved in each sector of the industry, profiling important corporate players and putting a spotlight on the key investors in each company.
A booming industry

The border industry is experiencing spectacular growth, seemingly immune to austerity or economic downturns. Market research agencies predict annual growth of the border security market of between 7.2% and 8.6%, reaching a total of $65–68 billion by 2025. The largest expansion is in the global Biometrics and Artificial Intelligence (AI) markets. Markets and Markets forecasts the biometric systems market to double from $33 billion in 2019 to $65.3 billion by 2024—of which biometrics for migration purposes will be a significant sector. It says that the AI market will equal US$190.61 billion by 2025.

The report investigates five key sectors of the expanding industry: border security (including monitoring, surveillance, walls and fences), biometrics and smart borders, migrant detention, deportation, and audit and consultancy services. From these sectors, it profiles 23 corporations as significant actors: Accenture, Airbus, Booz Allen Hamilton, Classic Air Charter, Cobham, CoreCivic, Deloitte, Elbit, Eurasylum, G4S, GEO Group, IBM, IDEMIA, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Mitie, Palantir, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Serco, Sopra Steria, Thales, Thomson Reuters, Unisys.

– The border security and control field, the technological infrastructure of security and surveillance at the border, is led by US, Australian, European and Israeli firms including Airbus, Elbit, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Airbus, Leonardo and Thales— all of which are among the world’s major arms sellers. They benefit not only from border contracts within the EU, US, and Australia but also increasingly from border externalisation programmes funded by these same countries. Jean Pierre Talamoni, head of sales and marketing at Airbus Defence and Space (ADS), said in 2016 that he estimates that two thirds of new military market opportunities over the next 10 years will be in Asia and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Companies are also trying to muscle in on providing the personnel to staff these walls, including border guards.

- The Smart Borders sector encompasses the use of a broad range of (newer) technologies, including biometrics (such as fingerprints and iris-scans), AI and phone and social media tracking. The goal is to speed up processes for national citizens and other acceptable travellers and stop or deport unwanted migrants through the use of more sophisticated IT and biometric systems. Key corporations include large IT companies, such as IBM and Unisys, and multinational services company Accenture for whom migration is part of their extensive portfolio, as well as small firms, such as IDEMIA and Palantir Technologies, for whom migration-related work is central. The French public–private company Civipol, co-owned by the state and several large French arms companies, is another key player, selected to set up fingerprint databases of the whole population of Mali and Senegal.

– Deportation. With the exception of the UK and the US, it is uncommon to privatise deportation. The UK has hired British company Mitie for its whole deportation process, while Classic Air Charter dominates in the US. Almost all major commercial airlines, however, are also involved in deportations. Newsweek reported, for example, that in the US, 93% of the 1,386 ICE deportation flights to Latin American countries on commercial airlines in 2019 were facilitated by United Airlines (677), American Airlines (345) and Delta Airlines (266).

- Detention. The Global Detention Project lists over 1,350 migrant detention centres worldwide, of which over 400 are located in Europe, almost 200 in the US and nine in Australia. In many EU countries, the state manages detention centres, while in other countries (e.g. Australia, UK, USA) there are completely privatised prisons. Many other countries have a mix of public and private involvement, such as state facilities with private guards. Australia outsourced refugee detention to camps outside its territories. Australian service companies Broadspectrum and Canstruct International managed the detention centres, while the private security companies G4S, Paladin Solutions and Wilson Security were contracted for security services, including providing guards. Migrant detention in third countries is also an increasingly important part of EU migration policy, with the EU funding construction of migrant detention centres in ten non-EU countries.

- Advisory and audit services are a more hidden part of public policies and practices, but can be influential in shaping new policies. A striking example is Civipol, which in 2003 wrote a study on maritime borders for the European Commission, which adopted its key policy recommendations in October 2003 and in later policy documents despite its derogatory language against refugees. Civipol’s study also laid foundations for later measures on border externalisation, including elements of the migration deal with Turkey and the EU’s Operation Sophia. Since 2003 Civipol has received funding for a large number of migration-related projects, especially in African countries. Between 2015 and 2017, it was the fourth most-funded organisation under the EU Trust Fund. Other prominent corporations in this sector include Eurasylum, as well as major international consultancy firms, particularly Deloitte and PricewaterhouseCoopers, for which migration-related work is part of their expansive portfolio.

Financing the industry

The markets for military and border control procurement are characterized by massively capital intensive investments and contracts, which would not be possible without the involvement of financial actors. Using data from marketscreener.com, the report shows that the world’s largest investment companies are also among the major shareholders in the border industry.

– The Vanguard Group owns shares in 15 of the 17 companies, including over 15% of the shares of CoreCivic and GEO Group that manage private prisons and detention facilities.

- Other important investors are Blackrock, which is a major shareholder in 11 companies, Capital Research and Management (part of the Capital Group), with shares in arms giants Airbus and Lockheed Martin, and State Street Global Advisors (SsgA), which owns over 15% of Lockheed Martin shares and is also a major shareholder in six other companies.

- Although these giant asset management firms dominate, two of the profiled companies, Cobham and IDEMIA, are currently owned by the private equity firm Advent International. Advent specialises in buyouts and restructuring, and it seems likely that it will attempt to split up Cobham in the hope of making a profit by selling on the component companies to other owners.

- In addition, three large European arms companies, Airbus, Thales and Leonardo, active in the border security market, are partly owned by the governments of the countries where they are headquartered.

In all cases, therefore, the financing depends on our money. In the case of state ownership, through our taxes, and in terms of asset management funds, through the way individual savings, pension funds, insurance companies and university endowments are directly invested in these companies via the giant Asset Management Funds. This financing means that the border industry survives on at least the tacit approved use of the public’s funds which makes it vulnerable to social pressure as the human rights costs of the industry become ever more clear.
Human rights and the border industry

Universal human rights apply to every single human being, including refugees and migrants. While the International Bill of Human Rights provides the foundation, including defining universal rights that are important in the context of migration, such as the right to life, liberty and security of person, the right to freedom from torture or cruel or inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, and freedom from discrimination, there are other instruments such as the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention or Geneva Convention) of 1951 that are also relevant. There are also regional agreements, including the Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) that play a role relevant to the countries that have ratified them.

Yet despite these important and legally binding human rights agreements, the human rights situation for refugees and migrants has become ever more desperate. States frequently deny their rights under international law, such as the right to seek asylum or non-refoulement principles, or more general rights such as the freedom from torture, cruel or inhumane treatment. There is a gap with regard to effective legal means or grievance mechanisms to counter this or to legally enforce or hold to account states that fail to implement instruments such as the UDHR and the Refugee Convention of 1951. A Permanent Peoples Tribunal in 2019 even concluded that ‘taken together, the immigration and asylum policies and practices of the EU and its Member States constitute a total denial of the fundamental rights of people and migrants, and are veritable crimes against humanity’. A similar conclusion can be made of the US and Australian border and immigration regime.

The increased militarisation of border security worldwide and state-sanctioned hostility toward migrants has had a deeply detrimental impact on the human rights of refugees and migrants.

– Increased border security has led to direct violence against refugees, pushbacks with the risk of returning people to unsafe countries and inhumane circumstances (contravening the principle of non-refoulement), and a disturbing rise in avoidable deaths, as countries close off certain migration routes, forcing migrants to look for other, often more dangerous, alternatives and pushing them into the arms of criminal smuggling networks.

– The increased use of autonomous systems of border security such as drones threaten new dangers related to human rights. There is already evidence that they push migrants to take more dangerous routes, but there is also concern that there is a gradual trend towards weaponized systems that will further threaten migrants’ lives.

– The rise in deportations has threatened fundamental human rights including the right to family unity, the right to seek asylum, the right to humane treatment in detention, the right to due process, and the rights of children’. There have been many instances of violence in the course of deportations, sometimes resulting in death or permanent harm, against desperate people who try to do everything to prevent being deported. Moreover, deportations often return refugees to unsafe countries, where they face violence, persecution, discrimination and poverty.

- The widespread detention of migrants also fundamentally undermines their human rights . There have been many reports of violence and neglect by guards and prison authorities, limited access to adequate legal and medical support, a lack of decent food, overcrowding and poor and unhealthy conditions. Privatisation of detention exacerbates these problems, because companies benefit from locking up a growing number of migrants and minimising costs.

– The building of major migration databases such as EU’s Eurodac and SIS II, VIS gives rise to a range of human rights concerns, including issues of privacy, civil liberties, bias leading to discrimination—worsened by AI processes -, and misuse of collected information. Migrants are already subject to unprecedented levels of surveillance, and are often now treated as guinea pigs where even more intrusive technologies such as facial recognition and social media tracking are tried out without migrants consent.

The trend towards externalisation of migration policies raises new concerns as it seeks to put the human costs of border militarisation beyond the border and out of public sight. This has led to the EU, US and Australia all cooperating with authoritarian regimes to try and prevent migrants from even getting close to their borders. Moreover as countries donate money, equipment or training to security forces in authoritarian regimes, they end up expanding and strengthening their capacities which leads to a rise in human rights violations more broadly. Nowhere are the human rights consequences of border externalisation policies clearer than in the case of Libya, where the EU and individual member states (in particular Italy and Malta) funding, training and cooperation with security forces and militias have led to violence at the borders, murder, disappearances, rape, enslavement and abuse of migrants in the country and torture in detention centres.

The 23 corporations profiled in this report have all been involved in or connected to policies and practices that have come under fire because of violations of the human rights of refugees and migrants. As mentioned earlier, sometimes the companies are directly responsible for human rights violations or concerns. In other cases, they are indirectly responsible through their contribution to a border infrastructure that denies human rights and through lobbying to influence policy-making to prioritize militarized responses to migration. 11 of the companies profiled publicly proclaim their commitment to human rights as signatories to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), but as these are weak voluntary codes this has not led to noticeable changes in their business operations related to migration.

The most prominent examples of direct human rights abuses come from the corporations involved in detention and deportation. Classic Air Charter, Cobham, CoreCivic, Eurasylum, G4S, GEO Group, Mitie and Serco all have faced allegations of violence and abuse by their staff towards migrants. G4S has been one of the companies most often in the spotlight. In 2017, not only were assaults by its staff on migrants at the Brook House immigration removal centre in the UK broadcast by the BBC, but it was also hit with a class suit in Australia by almost 2,000 people who are or were detained at the externalised detention centre on Manus Island, because of physical and psychological injuries as a result of harsh treatment and dangerous conditions. The company eventually settled the case for A$70 million (about $53 million) in the largest-ever human rights class-action settlement. G4S has also faced allegations related to its involvement in deportations.

The other companies listed all play a pivotal role in the border infrastructure that denies refugees’ human rights. Airbus P-3 Orion surveillance planes of the Australian Air Force, for example, play a part in the highly controversial maritime wall that prevents migrants arriving by boat and leads to their detention in terrible conditions offshore. Lockheed Martin is a leading supplier of border security on the US-Mexico border. Leonardo is one of the main suppliers of drones for Europe’s borders. Thales produces the radar and sensor systems, critical to patrolling the Mediterrean. Elbit Systems provides surveillance technologies to both the EU and US, marketed on their success as technologies used in the separation wall in the Palestinian occupied territories. Accenture, IDEMIA and Sopra Steria manage many border biometric projects. Deloitte has been one of the key consulting companies to the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency since 2003, while PriceWaterhouseCoopers provides similar consultancy services to Frontex and the Australian border forces. IBM, Palantir and UNISYS provide the IT infrastructure that underpins the border and immigration apparatus.
Time to divest

The report concludes by calling for campaigns to divest from the border industry. There is a long history of campaigns and movements that call for divestment from industries that support human rights violations—from the campaigns to divest from Apartheid South Africa to more recent campaigns to divest from the fossil fuel industry. The border industry has become an equally morally toxic asset for any financial institution, given the litany of human rights abuses tied to it and the likelihood they will intensify in years to come.

There are already examples of existing campaigns targeting particular border industries that have borne fruit. A spotlight on US migrant detention, as part of former President Trump’s anti- immigration policies, contributed to six large US banks (Bank of America, BNP Paribas, Fifth Third Bancorp, JPMorgan Chase, SunTrust, and Wells Fargo) publicly announcing that they would not provide new financing to the private prison industry. The two largest public US pension funds, CalSTRS and CalPERS, also decided to divest from the same two companies. Geo Group acknowledged that these acts of ‘public resistance’ hit the company financially, criticising the banks as ‘clearly bow[ing] down to a small group of activists protesting and conducting targeted social media campaigns’.

Every company involved or accused of human rights violations either denies them or says that they are atypical exceptions to corporate behavior. This report shows however that a militarised border regime built on exclusion will always be a violent apparatus that perpetuates human rights violations. It is a regime that every day locks up refugees in intolerable conditions, separates families causing untold trauma and heartbreak, and causes a devastating death toll as refugees are forced to take unimaginable dangerous journeys because the alternatives are worse. However well-intentioned, any industry that provides services and products for this border regime will bear responsibility for its human consequences and its human rights violations, and over time will suffer their own serious reputational costs for their involvement in this immoral industry. On the other hand, a widespread exodus of the leading corporations on which the border regime depends could force states to change course, and to embrace a politics that protects and upholds the rights of refugees and migrants. Worldwide, social movements and the public are starting to wake up to the human costs of border militarisation and demanding a fundamental change. It is time now for the border industry and their financiers to make a choice.

▻https://www.tni.org/en/financingborderwars

#TNI #rapport
#industrie_frontalière #militarisation_des_frontières #biométrie #Intelligence_artificielle #AI #IA

#Accenture #Airbus #Booz_Allen_Hamilton #Classic_Air_Charter #Cobham #CoreCivic #Deloitte #Elbit #Eurasylum #G4S #GEO_Group #IBM #IDEMIA #Leonardo #Lockheed_Martin #Mitie #Palantir #PricewaterhouseCoopers #Serco #Sopra_Steria #Thales #Thomson_Reuters #Unisys
#contrôles_frontaliers #surveillance #technologie #Jean-Pierre_Talamoni #Airbus_Defence_and_Space (#ADS) #smart_borders #frontières_intelligentes #iris #empreintes_digitales #réseaux_sociaux #IT #Civipol #Mali #Sénégal #renvois #expulsions #déportations #Mitie #Classic_Air_Charter #compagnies_aériennes #United_Airlines #ICE #American_Airlines #Delta_Airlines #rétention #détention_administrative #privatisation #Broadspectrum #Canstruct_International #Paladin_Solutions #Wilson_Security #Operation_Sophia #EU_Trust_Fund #Trust_Fund #externalisation #Eurasylum #Deloitte #PricewaterhouseCoopers #Vanguard_Group #CoreCivic #Blackrock #investisseurs #investissement #Capital_Research_and_Management #Capital_Group #Lockheed_Martin #State_Street_Global_Advisors (#SsgA) #Cobham #IDEMIA #Advent_International #droits_humains #VIS #SIS_II #P-3_Orion #Accenture #Sopra_Steria #Frontex #Australie

Outsourcing oppression. How Europe externalises migrant detention beyond its shores

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This report seeks to address the gap and join the dots between Europe’s outsourcing of migrant detention to third countries and the notorious conditions within the migrant detention centres. In a nutshell, Europe calls the shots on migrant detention beyond its shores but is rarely held to account for the deeply oppressive consequences, including arbitrary detention, torture, forced disappearance, violence, sexual violence, and death.

Key findings

– The European Union (EU), and its member states, externalise detention to third countries as part of a strategy to keep migrants out at all costs. This leads to migrants being detained and subjected to gross human rights violations in transit countries in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, West Asia and Africa.

– Candidate countries wishing to join the EU are obligated to detain migrants and stop them from crossing into the EU as a prerequisite for accession to the Union. Funding is made available through pre-accession agreements specifically for the purpose of detaining migrants.

– Beyond EU candidate countries, this report identifies 22 countries in Africa, Eastern Europe, the Balkans and West Asia where the EU and its member states fund the construction of detention centres, detention related activities such as trainings, or advocate for detention in other ways such as through aggressively pushing for detention legislation or agreeing to relax visa requirements for nationals of these countries in exchange for increased migrant detention.

- The main goal of detention externalisation is to pre-empt migrants from reaching the external borders of the EU by turning third countries into border outposts. In many cases this involves the EU and its member states propping up and maintaining authoritarian regimes.

– Europe is in effect following the ‘Australian model’ that has been highly criticised by UN experts and human rights organisations for the torturous conditions inside detention centres. Nevertheless, Europe continues to advance a system that mirrors Australia’s outsourced model, focusing not on guaranteeing the rights of migrants, but instead on deterring and pushing back would-be asylum seekers at all costs.

- Human rights are systematically violated in detention centres directly and indirectly funded by the EU and its member states, including cases of torture, arbitrary and prolonged detention, sexual violence, no access to legal recourse, humanitarian assistance, or asylum procedures, the detention of victims of trafficking, and many other serious violations in which Europe is implicated.

- Particularly horrendous is the case of Libya, which continues to receive financial and political support from Europe despite mounting evidence of brutality, enslavement, torture, forced disappearance and death. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), implement EU policies in Libya and, according to aid officials, actively whitewash the consequences of European policies to safeguard substantial EU funding.

- Not only does the EU deport and push back migrants to unsafe third countries, it actively finances and coercively pushes for their detention in these countries. Often they have no choice but to sign ‘voluntary’ agreements to be returned to their countries of origin as the only means of getting out of torturous detention facilities.

- The EU implements a carrot and stick approach, in particular in its dealings with Africa, prolonging colonialist dynamics and uneven power structures – in Niger, for example, the EU pushed for legislation on detention, in exchange for development aid funding.

– The EU envisages a greater role for migrant detention in third countries going forward, as was evidenced in the European Commission’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum.

- The EU acts on the premise of containment and deterrence, namely, that if migrants seeking to reach Europe are intercepted and detained along that journey, they will be deterred from making the journey in the first place. This approach completely misses the point that people migrate to survive, often fleeing war and other forms of violence. The EU continues to overlook the structural reasons behind why people flee and the EU’s own role in provoking such migration.

– The border industrial complex profits from the increased securitisation of borders. Far from being passive spectators, the military and security industry is actively involved in shaping EU border policies by positioning themselves as experts on the issue. We can already see a trend of privatising migrant detention, paralleling what is happening in prison systems worldwide.

▻https://www.tni.org/en/outsourcingoppression

pour télécharger le rapport :
▻https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/outsourcingoppression-report-tni.pdf

#externalisation #rétention #détention #détention_arbitraire #violence #disparitions #disparitions_forcées #violence #violence_sexuelle #morts #mort #décès #Afrique #Europe_de_l'Est #Balkans #Asie #modèle_australien #EU #UE #Union_européenne #torture #Libye #droits_humains #droits_fondamentaux #HCR #UNHCR #OIM #IOM #dissuasion #privatisation

#Border_Profiteers. Corporations profiting from borders, detentions and deportations - Berlin edition

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Fortress Europe: the millions spent on military-grade tech to deter refugees

We map out the rising number of #high-tech surveillance and deterrent systems facing asylum seekers along EU borders.

From military-grade drones to sensor systems and experimental technology, the EU and its members have spent hundreds of millions of euros over the past decade on technologies to track down and keep at bay the refugees on its borders.

Poland’s border with Belarus is becoming the latest frontline for this technology, with the country approving last month a €350m (£300m) wall with advanced cameras and motion sensors.

The Guardian has mapped out the result of the EU’s investment: a digital wall on the harsh sea, forest and mountain frontiers, and a technological playground for military and tech companies repurposing products for new markets.

https://i.imgur.com/H565BYR.png

The EU is central to the push towards using technology on its borders, whether it has been bought by the EU’s border force, Frontex, or financed for member states through EU sources, such as its internal security fund or Horizon 2020, a project to drive innovation.

In 2018, the EU predicted that the European security market would grow to €128bn (£108bn) by 2020. Beneficiaries are arms and tech companies who heavily courted the EU, raising the concerns of campaigners and MEPs.

“In effect, none of this stops people from crossing; having drones or helicopters doesn’t stop people from crossing, you just see people taking more risky ways,” says Jack Sapoch, formerly with Border Violence Monitoring Network. “This is a history that’s so long, as security increases on one section of the border, movement continues in another section.”

Petra Molnar, who runs the migration and technology monitor at Refugee Law Lab, says the EU’s reliance on these companies to develop “hare-brained ideas” into tech for use on its borders is inappropriate.

“They rely on the private sector to create these toys for them. But there’s very little regulation,” she says. “Some sort of tech bro is having a field day with this.”

“For me, what’s really sad is that it’s almost a done deal that all this money is being spent on camps, enclosures, surveillance, drones.”

Air Surveillance

Refugees and migrants trying to enter the EU by land or sea are watched from the air. Border officers use drones and helicopters in the Balkans, while Greece has airships on its border with Turkey. The most expensive tool is the long-endurance Heron drone operating over the Mediterranean.

Frontex awarded a €100m (£91m) contract last year for the Heron and Hermes drones made by two Israeli arms companies, both of which had been used by the Israeli military in the Gaza Strip. Capable of flying for more than 30 hours and at heights of 10,000 metres (30,000 feet), the drones beam almost real-time feeds back to Frontex’s HQ in Warsaw.

Missions mostly start from Malta, focusing on the Libyan search and rescue zone – where the Libyan coastguard will perform “pull backs” when informed by EU forces of boats trying to cross the Mediterranean.

https://i.imgur.com/AsNnGoD.png

German MEP Özlem Demirel is campaigning against the EU’s use of drones and links to arms companies, which she says has turned migration into a security issue.

“The arms industries are saying: ‘This is a security problem, so buy my weapons, buy my drones, buy my surveillance system,’” says Demirel.

“The EU is always talking about values like human rights, [speaking out] against violations but … week-by-week we see more people dying and we have to question if the EU is breaking its values,” she says.

Sensors and cameras

EU air assets are accompanied on the ground by sensors and specialised cameras that border authorities throughout Europe use to spot movement and find people in hiding. They include mobile radars and thermal cameras mounted on vehicles, as well as heartbeat detectors and CO2 monitors used to detect signs of people concealed inside vehicles.

Greece deploys thermal cameras and sensors along its land border with Turkey, monitoring the feeds from operations centres, such as in Nea Vyssa, near the meeting of the Greek, Turkish and Bulgarian borders. Along the same stretch, in June, Greece deployed a vehicle-mounted sound cannon that blasts “deafening” bursts of up to 162 decibels to force people to turn back.

Poland is hoping to emulate Greece in response to the crisis on its border with Belarus. In October, its parliament approved a €350m wall that will stretch along half the border and reach up to 5.5 metres (18 feet), equipped with motion detectors and thermal cameras.

Surveillance centres

In September, Greece opened a refugee camp on the island of Samos that has been described as prison-like. The €38m (£32m) facility for 3,000 asylum seekers has military-grade fencing and #CCTV to track people’s movements. Access is controlled by fingerprint, turnstiles and X-rays. A private security company and 50 uniformed officers monitor the camp. It is the first of five that Greece has planned; two more opened in November.

https://i.imgur.com/yvPgDsz.png

▻https://twitter.com/_PMolnar/status/1465224733771939841

At the same time, Greece opened a new surveillance centre on Samos, capable of viewing video feeds from the country’s 35 refugee camps from a wall of monitors. Greece says the “smart” software helps to alert camps of emergencies.

Artificial intelligence

The EU spent €4.5m (£3.8m) on a three-year trial of artificial intelligence-powered lie detectors in Greece, Hungary and Latvia. A machine scans refugees and migrants’ facial expressions as they answer questions it poses, deciding whether they have lied and passing the information on to a border officer.

The last trial finished in late 2019 and was hailed as a success by the EU but academics have called it pseudoscience, arguing that the “micro-expressions” the software analyses cannot be reliably used to judge whether someone is lying. The software is the subject of a court case taken by MEP Patrick Breyer to the European court of justice in Luxembourg, arguing that there should be more public scrutiny of such technology. A decision is expected on 15 December.

►https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/dec/06/fortress-europe-the-millions-spent-on-military-grade-tech-to-deter-refu

Le massacre de la grotte d’#Ouvéa
►https://www.revolutionpermanente.fr/Le-massacre-de-la-grotte-d-Ouvea

http://www.revolutionpermanente.fr/IMG/arton10136.jpg

A un an du référendum sur l’indépendance de la Kanaky, il est temps de faire un retour sur un épisode tragique de l’histoire de cette colonie, le massacre organisé par l’État français d’indépendantistes kanaks dans la grotte d’Ouvéa qui rappelle ce qu’est un pouvoir coloniale. Et c’est 30 ans après le massacre de la grotte d’Ouvéa que le référendum pour l’indépendance de la Kanaky va avoir lieu.

Sadek Basnacki

vendredi 1er décembre 2017

Les essais nucléaires en Polynésie, c’est par là.
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/804162

#Malik_Oussekine
▻https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malik_Oussekine

#Zyed_et_Bouna
▻https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Incidents_de_Clichy-sous-Bois

Financement illégal du #RPR
▻https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Financement_ill%C3%A9gal_du_RPR

#Emplois_fictifs de la #Mairie_de_Paris
▻https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affaire_des_emplois_fictifs_de_la_mairie_de_Paris

Merci ! Les salauderies s’accumulent et on oublie trop vite leurs responsables.

Merci!

#Mali #Syrie #Érythrée #Nigéria #Sénégal #Gambie #Palestine #Bangladesh #Égypte #Libye

▻https://www.dailymotion.com/video/xk3uqj

Le livre (et ce texte) date de 2008, mais il mérite quand même d’être lu...

#Metalor cuts ties with small mines over sustainable gold

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Swiss gold refinery Metalor Technologies has announced it will no longer deal with artisanal mining operations. The company cites the increasing cost of ensuring that gold is being produced by small mines in compliance with human rights and environmental standards.

Metalor has come under repeated fire for doing business with gold mines in South America that care neither for their workers or surrounding habitat. Some of the gold being refined has also been linked by NGOs to money laundering.

The company has refuted many of the charges being levelled at it by human rights groups. But it had nevertheless already ceased doing business with artisanal mines in Peru last year whilst declaring self-regulated measures to combat abuses in the gold trade. Monday’s announcement also signals the end to its artisanal activities in Colombia.

Pressure groups has complained that Metalor’s due diligence was failing to spot back doors through which “dirty gold” was allegedly reaching the refinery.

“The increasing complexity of the supply chain in this sector makes it increasingly difficult for Metalor to continue its commercial relations with artisanal mining operations,” said Metalor CEO, Antoine de Montmollin, in a statement.

“Metalor regrets this well-considered decision, but we will not compromise on defending a more sustainable value chain in the gold sector.”
’Skirting the issue’

Mark Pieth, a champion for greater accountability in the Swiss commodities sector, slammed the refinery’s decision. He believes that cutting ties with trouble spots in response to criticism is not the answer because it strips entire communities of their livelihood.

“It’s really skirting the issue because in fact the refineries should take responsibility and they should be helping to clean up rather than just cutting and running,” Pieth, who is publishing a book on gold laundering this month, told swissinfo.ch.

Pieth also points that sourcing gold exclusively from large-scale mining is no guarantee of a problem free supply chain. Large-scale mining has been associated with environmental pollution, as well as with the displacement and expropriation of indigenous communities.

Hosting four of the world’s major refineries, Switzerland has virtually cornered the market in gold processing. In 2017, the country imported 2,404 tonnes of gold (worth a total of CHF69.6 billion or $69.7 billion) while 1,684 tonnes were exported (CHF66.6 billion).

Last year, the government issued a report of the gold sector and said it was working with the industry to improve “sustainability standards”.

If Swiss refineries shun artisanal gold, this will likely be snatched up by refineries in the United Arab Emirates or India that care even less about following good practices, noted Pieth.

https://www.swissinfo.ch/image/33628832/3x2/640/426/e1eae75c4f705221c68090748b4d1f7b/aI/rtr2yz3n-33628834.jpg

ping @albertocampiphoto

Boycotting artisanal gold miners is not the answer

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Switzerland’s anti-corruption champion #Mark_Pieth thinks Metalor was wrong to drop artisanal miners.
The sudden decision by the giant Swiss refinery Metalor to throw a blanket ban on gold from small-scale mines in Colombia and Peru is an understandable knee-jerk reaction to growing public horror at the human rights, environmental and organised crime issues linked to artisanal mining.

Yet it is a short-sighted business decision, or rather, wilfully blind.

It is true that conditions in many artisanal mines and their surrounding communities can be appalling and dangerous – particularly illegal mines hijacked by organised criminals rather than traditional mining communities where the activity is merely informal.

I have seen with my own eyes women handling mercury with their bare hands and men working 28-day shifts in slave-like conditions in precarious tunnels carved into the rockface, surviving in shanty towns notorious for gun violence, forced prostitution and hijacking like Peru’s La Rinconada.

But – and it’s a big but – if other refineries follow suit rather than engaging with the issues and trying to solve them, it will be catastrophic for the 100 million people worldwide who rely on artisanal mining for their livelihoods.

About 80% of miners work in small-scale mines, but generate only 20% of the 3,200 tonnes of newly mined gold that is refined worldwide every year. The remaining 80% of our gold comes from sprawling industrial mines owned by powerful corporations like US-based Newmont Mining and the Canadian multinational Barrick Gold.

Firstly, it is simply not economically possible to disregard 20% of the world’s gold production. If responsible refineries refuse artisanal gold, it will instead end up in the cauldrons of poorly regulated refineries with zero care for compliance in the United Arab Emirates or India.

Secondly, it is a basic factual mistake to believe that gold from large-scale industrial mines is any cleaner than artisanal gold.

Toxic substances leech into drinking water supplies and major rivers with fatal consequences, through the collapse of cyanide pools (such as the Baia Mare disaster in Romania) or toxic mine drainage after the mines are abandoned. Huge piles of contaminated waste rubble, or tailings, turn landscapes into no-go wastelands.

Violent land-grabbing facilitated by corruption is common: in Ghana, there is even a word, galamsey, for traditional miners pushed into illegality through forced displacement without compensation.

Most importantly, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in its Alignment Assessment 2018 deplores the “risk-averse approach to sourcing” that Metalor has been panicked into taking, and this form of “internal embargo” on artisanal mining. It’s not hard to see why: it doesn’t solve the problems faced by artisanal miners, but instead takes away their only source of livelihood while allowing the refinery to tick a box and turn a blind eye.

So, what should Metalor and other responsible gold refineries with the collective power to change the industry do?

First, acknowledge the scale of the problems and show willingness to engage – with the problems and with others trying to solve them.

Second, pinpoint the obvious no-go areas. Gold coming from conflict areas (like Sudan) or mined by children (child miners are common in many countries, including Burkina Faso, Niger and Côte d’Ivoire), for example.

And third, work together with other refineries to jointly tackle the issues of artisanal mining and help raise standards for those 100 million impoverished people who rely on it.

Metalor cites “resources to secure compliance” as a reason for its blanket ban on artisanally mined gold. But the cost of proper, transparent audits tracing back through the entire gold supply chain is mere pocket money for a refinery of this size – and if the refineries engage in collective action, it’s a matter of gold dust.

▻https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/opinion_metalor--mark-pieth-gold/45037966
#boycott

Une bonne âme abonnée pour partager cet article sur seenthis ?

La polémique a éclaté fin mars. Elle a pour origine la démission de Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, chercheur à l’Institut de recherche pour le développement (IRD), de ses fonctions de rédacteur en chef d’Afrique contemporaine, une revue trimestrielle éditée par l’Agence française de développement (AFD). En cause : l’AFD a refusé la publication d’un dossier consacré au Mali.

Pourtant, les articles de ce numéro spécial, « écrits par des chercheurs réputés, qui connaissent le terrain et écrivent depuis longtemps sur le Mali et l’Afrique, avaient été acceptés et approuvés par le comité de rédaction de la revue », indique Bruno Charbonneau, qui a dirigé ce travail (et qui est lui-même professeur d’études internationales au collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean au Québec).

L’un des textes du dossier, détaille-t-il, analyse les faiblesses de l’approche militaire du contre-terrorisme actuellement privilégiée par les puissances occidentales. Il montre « comment cette approche qui l’emporte sur tout peut être contre-productive et être elle-même génératrice de violences ». Un autre évoque « l’impunité générale et généralisée dont jouissent des représentants de l’État malien dans la mesure où leurs actions illégales, criminelles et autres ne sont pas ou que rarement punis ».
Il semble que ce sont ces deux articles qui ont posé problème à l’AFD, laquelle édite la revue mais la dirige aussi, puisque le directeur de la rédaction, Thomas Melonio, est un de ses agents. Ce dernier est le directeur exécutif du département innovation, recherche et savoirs de l’AFD, et a été conseiller Afrique du président François Hollande, après avoir été délégué national responsable de l’Afrique au parti socialiste. Il était en poste à l’Élysée lors du lancement de l’opération militaire française Serval au Mali, en 2013.

Auteur de l’article consacré aux défaillances de l’armée malienne, le journaliste indépendant Rémi Carayol a confié à Mediapart l’intégralité de son texte, que nous publions ici avec son autorisation.

*

Sept ans après sa déroute dans le nord du Mali face aux combattants du Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad (MNLA), l’armée malienne se reconstruit difficilement. Les résultats des importants moyens mis en œuvre pour lui permettre d’assumer ses missions sont pour l’heure peu probants. Il est vrai qu’elle revient de loin. En 2012, ses défaites successives dans le septentrion avaient révélé d’importantes faiblesses structurelles : manque de moyens matériels, déficit de cohésion au sein des différents corps, mauvaise gestion des ressources humaines, pratiques clientélistes, commandement défaillant, patriotisme à géométrie variable des soldats…

Très vite après la perte d’une partie du territoire national, les partenaires du Mali ont entrepris d’aider les autorités à reconstruire une armée digne de ce nom. Il s’agissait alors de lui permettre, avec le soutien d’une force onusienne, la Mission internationale de soutien au Mali (Misma), de reconquérir au plus vite les régions tombées sous le joug des groupes armés djihadistes, lesquels avaient profité de l’offensive du MNLA pour prendre le contrôle des principales villes du nord. Cette mission a finalement été accomplie par l’armée française, avec l’appui des armées africaines, après le déclenchement de l’opération Serval en janvier 2013.

Lancée dans la foulée de l’intervention française, en février 2013, la mission de formation de l’Union européenne au Mali1 avait pour fonction initiale de former quatre Groupements tactiques interarmes (GTIA), soit un total de 2 600 hommes, destinés à se battre dans le nord. Prolongée à trois reprises en 2014, 2016 et 2018, cette mission en a formé bien plus : environ 12 500 soldats maliens ont officiellement suivi des cours et des entraînements dans le centre de Koulikoro, où sont basés les instructeurs européens. Prévue pour durer au minimum jusqu’en mai 2020, cette mission a pour l’heure coûté près de 133 millions d’euros2.

L’EUTM a pour mandat de fournir des conseils en matière militaire et de contribuer à rétablir les capacités opérationnelles des Forces armées maliennes (Fama). L’instruction des militaires maliens comporte plusieurs volets, dont une formation en matière de droit international humanitaire, de protection des civils et de droits de l’homme. Depuis sa création, la Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation au Mali (Minusma), qui a succédé à la Misma, a elle aussi prodigué des formations en matière de droits humains aux soldats maliens. La France et les États-Unis mènent de leur côté des programmes de formation destinés aux armées de la sous-région, dont celle du Mali.

Parallèlement à ces initiatives financées par les partenaires du Mali, le gouvernement malien a fait voter une loi d’orientation et de programmation militaire ambitieuse en mars 2015, dont l’objectif était « de se doter à l’horizon 2019 d’une organisation et d’un plan d’équipements, de disposer d’un outil de défense adapté aux besoins de sécurité, et capable en toutes circonstances de défendre l’intégrité du territoire national tout en contribuant à la consolidation de la démocratie ».

D’un coût total estimé à plus de 1 230 milliards de francs CFA (près de 1,9 milliard d’euros3) sur une période de cinq ans, ce qui représente un effort colossal pour l’État malien, cette loi visait notamment à recruter près de 10 000 hommes, afin de porter les effectifs des forces de sécurité à 20 000 éléments, et à acquérir du matériel de guerre.

Alors que « l’horizon 2019 » est bientôt atteint, force est de constater que les objectifs recherchés, tant en matière d’efficacité opérationnelle que de respect des droits humains, sont loin d’avoir été accomplis. Plus que la guerre dans le nord, le conflit multiforme qui secoue le centre du Mali illustre cet échec relatif.

Si les Fama ont participé à la reconquête du nord, elles ne sont intervenues qu’en second rideau, une fois que les djihadistes avaient été chassés du terrain par les troupes françaises et africaines. Les soldats maliens ont très vite été amenés à reprendre leurs positions dans les villes de Tombouctou et de Gao, mais ils n’ont pas été en mesure de s’installer durablement plus au nord, notamment dans la ville de Kidal. Aujourd’hui encore, l’armée malienne est relativement peu présente dans les zones jadis occupées par les djihadistes. La plupart du temps cantonnée dans ses bases, elle ne sort que rarement des centres urbains. Son rôle est en outre dilué du fait de la multiplication des acteurs armés.

L’armée française poursuit ses manœuvres dans le cadre de l’opération Barkhane (4 500 hommes), qui a succédé à l’opération Serval en 2014, et dont la base principale se situe à Gao4. Elle se concentre sur les dirigeants des groupes terroristes, qu’elle traque dans l’ensemble de la sous-région avec une totale liberté d’action.

La Minusma, qui dispose de plus de 12 000 soldats, est également présente sur l’ensemble du territoire septentrional (à Tombouctou, Gao, Tessalit, Aguelhok, Kidal, Goundam, Ber, Gossi, Ansongo et Menaka), ainsi que dans le centre (à Douentza, Sévaré et Diabaly). Si les Casques bleus sortent peu de leurs bases, au grand dam des populations, ils constituent une force non négligeable dans ces villes.

Enfin, les groupes armés signataires de l’accord de paix issu du processus d’Alger, membres de la Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA), qui réunit d’anciens rebelles, ou de la Plateforme, dans laquelle se retrouvent des groupes qualifiés (parfois à tort) de loyalistes à l’égard de Bamako, jouent eux aussi un rôle dans la sécurisation du territoire. Le MNLA, le Haut Conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad (HCUA) ou encore le Groupe autodéfense touareg imghad et alliés (Gatia) assurent le contrôle de certaines zones rurales d’où sont absentes les Fama, en lien parfois avec les forces française et onusienne.

====================

1 European Union Training Mission (EUTM)

2 Le budget de l’EUTM Mali n’a cessé d’augmenter au fil des ans : 12,3 millions d’euros en 2013, 27,7 millions en 2014-2016, 33,4 millions en 2016-2018 et 59,7 millions pour la période 2018-2020. Cette dernière hausse spectaculaire s’explique par une extension du mandat de l’EUTM, qui, désormais, forme également des éléments de la Force conjointe du G5-Sahel. Source : EUTM Mali.

3 427,59 milliards FCFA pour les investissements ; 442,57 milliards CFA pour le fonctionnement ; et 360,38 milliards CFA pour le personnel.

4 Le quartier général de l’opération est basé à N’Djamena (Tchad).

Le centre du Mali, foyer des violences
Dans le centre du pays, par contre, les Fama sont en première ligne, et ont même longtemps été un peu seules. Cette zone, qui englobe la région de Mopti et une partie de la région de Ségou, est aujourd’hui considérée comme l’épicentre des violences au Mali, et est désormais perçue à New York, au siège des Nations unies, comme l’enjeu principal du moment. 40 à 50 % des violences recensées dans le pays en 2018 l’ont été dans ces deux régions.

Selon un décompte de la Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l’homme (FIDH) et de l’Association malienne des droits de l’homme (AMDH), environ 1 200 personnes y ont été tuées ces deux dernières années, dont au moins 500 entre les mois de janvier et août 20185. Or l’armée malienne n’est pas étrangère à un tel bilan.

En 2012, le centre du Mali, zone géographique relativement vague, marquait la séparation entre le nord, placé sous le joug des djihadistes, et le sud, administré par l’État. Ses habitants n’ont pas été exposés aux violences au même degré que ceux du nord, mais ils en ont subi les conséquences de manière plus ou moins directe : désertion des représentants de l’État, y compris des militaires dans certaines zones, multiplication des actes de banditisme, détérioration de la situation économique…

En 2013, dans la foulée des troupes françaises et africaines, les Fama ont réinvesti la zone. Alors que les Français, dont les objectifs se

IBK et Emmanuel Macron lors de la commération du centenaire de la Première Guerre mondiale à Reims le 6 novembre 2018. © Reuters
IBK et Emmanuel Macron lors de la commération du centenaire de la Première Guerre mondiale à Reims le 6 novembre 2018. © Reuters
situaient plus au nord, ne faisaient qu’y passer, et que la Minusma s’y implantait timidement, l’armée malienne, elle, y a repris ses positions. Cette reconquête s’est accompagnée d’exactions contre les populations locales, et plus particulièrement les Peuls, victimes d’amalgames en raison du ralliement de certains d’entre eux aux groupes djihadistes, souvent pour des raisons autres que religieuses6.
Plusieurs dizaines de personnes ont été exécutées et jetées dans des puits par des soldats maliens à Sévaré7. Des cas de tortures ont également été mentionnés8. De nombreuses personnes ont en outre été portées disparues après avoir été arrêtées par l’armée malienne9.

Ce retour « musclé » n’a pas permis pour autant de restaurer la sécurité, et encore moins la confiance entre les populations et l’armée. Outre les violences attribuées aux soldats maliens, des tueries (impunies jusqu’à présent) ont aussi été commises par des bandits armés10, et les pillages n’ont pas cessé.

« Une fois que les Fama sont revenues, les vols de bétail se sont multipliés, précise un élu local de la commune de Nampala. Les gens sont allés voir les militaires pour leur demander de sécuriser les déplacements des troupeaux, mais ils n’ont rien obtenu. Certains se sont alors tournés vers les groupes armés ou ont décidé de s’armer eux-mêmes. »11

C’est dans ce contexte de méfiance à l’égard des représentants de la force publique et de violences diffuses qu’est apparu début 2015 un nouveau mouvement djihadiste : la katiba Macina, affiliée au groupe dirigé par Iyad Ag-Ghaly, Ansar Eddine. Sa première attaque a eu lieu à Nampala, deux ans presque jour pour jour après la bataille de Konna, qui avait vu l’armée française entrer en action.

Le 5 janvier 2015, plusieurs dizaines d’hommes armés lancent l’assaut sur le camp de l’armée malienne, puis investissent la ville et y font flotter leur drapeau noir pendant quelques heures, avant de se replier vers leur base. Depuis lors, les membres de cette katiba n’ont cessé d’étendre leur zone d’influence. Ils ont multiplié les attaques contre l’armée malienne et la Minusma, tuant des dizaines de soldats maliens et onusiens. La plupart du temps, ils profitent du passage d’un convoi pour lancer l’assaut12. Ils attaquent également des bases militaires ou des barrages de la gendarmerie à l’entrée des villes, et s’en prennent à des soldats isolés ou en permission.

Après avoir chassé l’armée malienne des zones les plus difficiles d’accès dès les premiers mois de l’année 2015, les « hommes de la brousse » (c’est ainsi que les habitants de la zone ont pris l’habitude de les dénommer) ont mené une stratégie d’exécutions ciblées et d’enlèvements contre des représentants de l’État, des chefs religieux, des notables locaux et des élus soupçonnés de s’opposer à leur projet ou de collaborer avec l’État.

Aujourd’hui, ils contrôlent une grande partie des zones rurales du centre du pays, où ils rendent justice, règlent les contentieux, imposent des règles de vie aux populations, gèrent l’accès aux ressources… Des centaines d’écoles publiques (dites « françaises ») ont été fermées, et parfois saccagées, ces dernières années13.

Plusieurs facteurs peuvent expliquer la facilité avec laquelle les djihadistes se sont implantés dans le centre, et ont parfois gagné les cœurs de ses habitants : un État perçu depuis longtemps comme prédateur, notamment en raison de la corruption de certains de ses agents ; une économie vacillante, qui a subi de plein fouet les sécheresses des années 1970 et que la guerre au nord a encore un peu plus affaiblie ; la récurrence des litiges liés à l’utilisation des ressources naturelles, qui aboutissent parfois à des conflits communautaires ; la prolifération des armes…

Mais si l’État a perdu le contrôle de pans entiers de cette zone, c’est aussi parce que l’armée malienne s’est jusqu’ici révélée incapable de faire face aux incursions djihadistes, et encore moins de gagner la confiance des populations. À Nampala, une semaine après l’attaque du 5 janvier 2015, un élu rapporte que « les [soldats des] Fama sont revenus. Ils ont dit que les Peuls étaient responsables. Ils ont arrêté des suspects, les ont tabassés. Certains ont été amenés à Bamako, et libérés après avoir dû verser de l’argent. Après ça, la population ne collaborait plus avec eux. » Les djihadistes en ont immédiatement profité : « Ils sont venus dans les villages et ont dit : “On ne vous demande rien, sauf de ne pas nous dénoncer.” Ils ont exécuté plusieurs informateurs de l’armée. »14

Passée cette première phase de repli début 2015, au cours de laquelle elles se sont réfugiées dans les camps situés dans les grands centres urbains, les Fama ont mené des opérations anti-terroristes d’envergure, mais souvent sans lendemain. « Ils venaient, ils passaient quelques heures dans le village, ils arrêtaient des gens, puis ils repartaient, et nous laissaient à la merci des groupes armés », explique un élu local du cercle de Tenenkou15.

International Crisis Group notait en 2016 que « ce type d’intervention vise à contenir l’expansion des groupes armés plutôt qu’à agir sur les sources de l’insécurité »16. L’opération Seno, lancée à l’automne 2015 dans le cercle de Bankass, a permis d’arrêter un certain nombre de suspects. Mais elle a également abouti à des arrestations violentes de personnes n’ayant rien à voir avec la katiba Macina, à des détentions arbitraires, parfois très longues, à des actes de torture17 et à des vexations, dont certaines, filmées et postées sur les réseaux sociaux, ont alimenté un sentiment victimaire chez nombre de Peuls.

Début 2018, sous l’impulsion du nouveau gouvernement dirigé par Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga, un « Plan de sécurisation intégré des régions du Centre » a été élaboré. Ce plan, toujours en vigueur, prévoit le renforcement du dispositif sécuritaire dans les régions de Mopti et Ségou, et des mesures en matière de gouvernance et de développement économique et social. Des aides d’urgence ont été annoncées par le premier ministre lors de divers déplacements sur le terrain. Des représentants de l’administration, dont des sous-préfets, ont repris possession de leur poste dans quelques villes secondaires.

Cependant, nombre de services publics sont toujours inaccessibles aux habitants des zones rurales, et l’État reste un mirage pour une grande partie d’entre eux. Au-delà des quelques promesses opportunément annoncées peu de temps avant l’élection présidentielle (à l’issue de laquelle le président sortant, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, a été réélu), seul le volet militaire a été réellement mis en œuvre.

========================

5 « Dans le centre du Mali, les populations prises au piège du terrorisme et du contre-terrorisme », Rapport d’enquête n° 727 de la Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l’homme et de l’Association malienne des droits de l’homme, novembre 2018.

6 Sangare Boukary, « Le centre du Mali : épicentre du djihadisme ? », note d’analyse du GRIP, mai 2016.

7 Communiqué de Human Rights Watch, 31 janvier 2013 : ▻https://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2013/01/31/mali-larmee-malienne-et-des-groupes-islamistes-ont-execute-des-prisonniers.

8 Communiqué de Human Rights Watch, 26 mars 2013 : ▻https://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2013/03/26/mali-des-soldats-ont-torture-des-detenus-lere.

9 Entretiens avec l’auteur, Bamako, mars 2018.

10 Le 18 mars 2013 à Doungoura (cercle de Tenenkou), au moins 20 personnes, essentiellement des Peuls, ont été tuées et jetées dans un puits par des hommes armés apparentés au MNLA. D’autres exactions ont été rapportées les jours suivants dans la même zone. Sources : entretiens avec l’auteur, Bamako, avril 2016.

11 Entretien avec l’auteur, Bamako, mai 2018.

12 Le premier semestre de l’année 2017 a été particulièrement sanglant. Le 19 janvier 2017, la pose d’une mine, suivie d’une fusillade, aurait provoqué la mort d’au moins dix soldats maliens dans la zone de Diabaly. Le 5 mars, l’attaque d’une patrouille des Fama à Boulikessi a fait 11 morts et 5 blessés. Le 2 mai, une embuscade entre Nampala et Dogofri a tué neuf soldats et en a blessé cinq autres.

13 À la fin de l’année scolaire 2018, deux écoles sur trois de l’académie de Mopti étaient fermées. Source : ONU.

14 Entretien avec l’auteur, Bamako, mai 2018.

15 Entretien avec l’auteur, Bamako, mars 2018.

16 « Mali central, la fabrique d’une insurrection ? », International Crisis Group, Rapport Afrique n° 238, juillet 2016.

17 « Mali : Les abus s’étendent dans le sud du pays », rapport de Human Rights Watch, février 2016.

Des massacres laissés impunis
Dès le mois de janvier 2018, les Fama ont repris le contrôle des camps qu’elles avaient abandonnés trois ans plus tôt, et dans lesquels elles n’étaient revenues qu’occasionnellement. Elles ont en outre mené plusieurs opérations de lutte anti-terroriste, parfois sous commandement du G5-Sahel. Mais ce retour en force n’a pas permis de reprendre le contrôle des territoires perdus, qui restent encore aujourd’hui des zones de non-droit.

Les éléments de la katiba Macina l’ont bien compris : ils évitent soigneusement les patrouilles et se cachent dans leurs repères, souvent situés dans des forêts, jusqu’à ce que les militaires repartent. Le reste du temps, ce sont eux qui dictent leur loi aux habitants. Cette situation empêche ces derniers de collaborer avec les forces de sécurité.

Un sous-officier de l’armée malienne qui a mené plusieurs opérations en 2018 dans le centre du pays admet qu’il est compliqué de créer un lien avec les populations : « Quand on entre dans un village, on voit bien que les gens ont peur. Ils ne nous regardent même pas. Comme l’État n’est pas là la plupart du temps, ils doivent faire avec les djihadistes. Si on passe dans la journée, ils savent que le soir même les djihadistes viendront dans le village et attraperont ceux qui nous ont parlé . »18

Outre cette menace décrite comme omniprésente par les habitants, d’autres raisons sont avancées pour expliquer cette défiance. Des Peuls déplorent notamment l’absence de dialogue avec les militaires maliens. D’autres évoquent la réputation qui les précède. Les opérations de l’armée malienne ont en effet été marquées par de nombreux abus en matière de droits humains ces derniers mois : l’enquête de la FIDH et de l’AMDH a démontré que des unités de l’armée avaient exécuté au moins 67 personnes, des Peuls dans leur grande majorité, au cours de six opérations menées entre février et juillet 2018, la plupart dans le cadre de l’opération « Dambe »19.

D’une tuerie à l’autre, le scénario est sensiblement le même : une colonne de l’armée malienne installe un camp provisoire pendant quelques jours dans une zone considérée comme étant « infestée » de djihadistes ; elle procède à des arrestations sur la base de dénonciations villageoises ou du simple fait de l’appartenance à la communauté peule ; certaines des personnes arrêtées sont passées à tabac avant d’être libérées ou envoyées à Bamako, d’autres sont exécutées et enterrées dans une fosse commune…

Salif Traoré, ministre malien de la sécurité et de la protection civile, en août 2018. © Reuters
Salif Traoré, ministre malien de la sécurité et de la protection civile, en août 2018. © Reuters
Le 21 février 2018 par exemple, dans les environs de Sokolo, les Forces armées maliennes patrouillent dans plusieurs villages et campements peuls. Elles y arrêtent neuf personnes : sept Peuls et deux Bambaras, qui sont relâchés le soir même. Quelques jours après le départ des militaires, des villageois se rendent dans leur campement pour tenter de retrouver les disparus. Sur les lieux, ils trouvent ce qui pourrait être une fosse de 3 mètres sur 2,5 mètres. « Il y avait des petits trous dans la terre, et des traces de sang, comme quand on égorge un mouton », indique un témoin20.
Selon toute vraisemblance, les sept Peuls ont été exécutés et enterrés par des soldats maliens, sur les lieux mêmes où la colonne avait installé son camp provisoire, dans une forêt. Une enquête a été ouverte et très vite refermée. Elle n’a abouti à aucune arrestation21.

Les méthodes employées par les soldats maliens semblent relever de la politique de la terre brûlée. « On a parfois l’impression qu’ils arrêtent n’importe qui, du moment qu’il est peul, et qu’ils ont pour consigne d’en tuer un certain nombre pour effrayer les populations », souligne un observateur onusien déployé dans la région22.

Un officier de l’armée en poste à Bamako, loin du théâtre des opérations, pense pour sa part qu’au contraire, ces pratiques sont liées à l’absence de consignes de la part de la hiérarchie : « On envoie des jeunes éléments sur un terrain très difficile, sans consigne claire sur ce qu’il faut faire. Ils ne connaissent pas le contexte, ni parfois la langue des habitants, ils ont peur, ils sont nerveux, et donc parfois ils tirent dans le tas. »23

Il paraît cependant difficile d’expliquer certaines opérations autrement que par une volonté manifeste de terroriser les populations. Le 5 avril, les Fama ont arrêté 14 hommes dans le hameau de Nelbal, situé à une quinzaine de kilomètres de Dioura. Selon des témoins, les militaires ont encerclé le campement peul, ils ont rassemblé tous les habitants, hommes, femmes et enfants, ont bandé les yeux à tous les hommes valides et les ont emmenés avec eux24. Le lendemain, l’armée a publié un communiqué indiquant que 14 hommes, présentés comme de présumés terroristes, étaient morts en tentant de s’évader de la prison de Dioura25.

Deux mois plus tard, le 13 juin, les soldats maliens ont tué 25 hommes qu’ils avaient arrêtés dans les villages de Nantaka et Kobaka, situés tout près de Mopti, et les ont enterrés dans trois fosses communes à quelques kilomètres des deux villages. Dans un communiqué publié le 19 juin, le ministère de la défense a confirmé « l’existence de fosses communes impliquant certains personnels Fama dans des violations graves ayant occasionné mort d’hommes à Nantaka et Kobaka », et annoncé l’ouverture d’une enquête judiciaire26. Celle-ci n’a pour l’heure abouti à aucune arrestation ni à aucune sanction officielle.

D’autres massacres commis par les Fama paraissent pouvoir répondre d’un esprit de vengeance. Ce qui s’est passé à Boulikessi le 19 mai 2018 en fournit une illustration. En 2015, face à la menace des djihadistes, l’armée avait quitté le camp qui jouxte cette ville. Le 28 décembre 2017, un détachement de l’armée malienne, sous commandement du G5-Sahel, a réinvesti le camp. Quelques jours après son arrivée, un lieutenant a organisé une réunion avec les habitants, au cours de laquelle il aurait annoncé que si les militaires subissaient une attaque, ils s’en prendraient aux habitants. « Pour un mort de notre côté, on en tuera vingt de votre côté », aurait-il dit à plusieurs reprises, selon des notables locaux27.

Le 19 mai, jour de foire à Boulikessi, les militaires ont mis leur menace à exécution. Ce jour-là, un soldat qui patrouillait près du marché a été tué par un homme venu à moto et reparti aussitôt. Trente minutes plus tard, les militaires sont revenus en nombre. Ils ont tiré de manière indiscriminée sur les gens qui étaient restés sur les lieux, tuant dix hommes, puis ils sont allés chercher deux autres personnes dans la maison d’un commerçant, qu’ils ont exécutées sous les yeux du chef de village28.

À l’évidence, les formations en matière de droits humains promulguées par l’EUTM et la Minusma n’ont pas eu l’effet escompté. Quant aux efforts consentis par l’État malien pour renforcer l’armée, ils ne lui ont pas permis pour l’heure d’engranger les victoires. Certes, des caches de la katiba Macina ont été découvertes et des combattants ont été arrêtés ou parfois tués. Un important travail a également été mené au niveau du renseignement.

LIRE AUSSI
Le Mali est au centre d’une polémique entre l’Agence française de développement et des chercheurs-universitaires
PAR FANNY PIGEAUD
Au Mali, un pogrom mené au nez et à la barbe de l’armée fait 136 morts
PAR RÉMI CARAYOL
Dans le centre du Mali, les milices massacrent en toute impunité
PAR RÉMI CARAYOL
Le Mali s’avère incapable de juger les djihadistes
PAR RÉMI CARAYOL
Mais la lutte anti-terroriste ne peut se résumer à ce seul tableau de chasse. Jusqu’à présent, les forces de sécurité se sont montrées incapables de protéger les civils, comme en témoigne ce chiffre de l’ONU : lors des seuls mois d’avril, mai et juin 2018, au moins 287 personnes ont été tuées dans le centre du pays29.
Les Fama n’ont pas été plus efficaces face aux différentes milices qui se sont constituées ces trois dernières années dans cette zone. Afin de remédier à l’absence de l’État, des mouvements armés dits « d’autodéfense » ont été créés de manière plus ou moins spontanée, sur la base de l’appartenance communautaire : dogon, peul, bambara. Mais ils ne protègent que leur propre communauté, et s’en prennent plus souvent aux civils issus de la communauté « concurrente » qu’aux combattants de la katiba Macina.

Ces milices ont commis de nombreux massacres en 2018, plus particulièrement à l’approche de la saison des pluies30. Elles ont incendié des villages et ont obligé des milliers de personnes à se déplacer. Certaines d’entre elles ont agi au nez et à la barbe des soldats maliens, et parfois avec le soutien de responsables politiques et militaires.

Il semble notamment que les Dozos (chasseurs traditionnels), qui jouent un rôle majeur dans les milices bambara et dogon, ont été dans un premier temps utilisés par les Fama comme éclaireurs ou informateurs, avant de participer plus activement aux combats. Or cette stratégie a d’ores et déjà montré ses limites : au fil du temps, ces groupes armés ont gagné en autonomie ; ils menacent désormais de s’en prendre à l’armée si elle se met en travers de leur route31 et mènent des expéditions meurtrières d’une ampleur inédite au Mali32.

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18 Entretien avec l’auteur, Ségou, mars 2018.

19 Rapport d’enquête n° 727 de la Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l’homme et de l’Association malienne des droits de l’homme, novembre 2018.

20 Entretien avec l’auteur, Bamako, mai 2018.

21 ▻https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/04/13/au-mali-les-autorites-enquetent-sur-des-soupcons-d-executions-sommaires-par-.

22 Entretien avec l’auteur, Mopti, mai 2018.

23 Entretien avec l’auteur, Bamako, mars 2018.

24 Entretiens avec l’auteur, Bamako et Mopti, mai 2018.

25 ▻http://www.fama.ml/tentative-devasion-des-suspects-trouvent-la-mort-a-dioura.

26 ▻https://www.jeuneafrique.com/579883/societe/mali-le-gouvernement-confirme-lexistence-de-fosses-communes-impliquant.

27 Entretiens avec l’auteur, Bamako, juin 2018.

28 Entretiens avec l’auteur, Bamako, juin 2018. Voir également le rapport d’enquête de la Minusma : ▻https://minusma.unmissions.org/la-minusma-conclut-son-enqu%C3%AAte-sur-les-incidents-de-boulkes.

29 Rapport du Secrétaire général des Nations unies, S/2018/866, 25 septembre 2018.

30 « “Avant, nous étions des frères”. Exactions commises par des groupes d’autodéfense dans le centre du Mali », rapport de Human Rights Watch, décembre 2018.

31 ▻https://www.voaafrique.com/a/l-arm%C3%A9e-cible-un-groupe-arm%C3%A9-dogon-au-mali/4474766.html.

32 Le 23 mars 2019, une attaque menée par des Dozos sur le village peul d’Ogossagou, dans le centre du Mali, a fait au moins 160 morts.

Merci :)

Fondos de cooperación al desarrollo para levantar un muro invisible a 2.000 kilómetros de Europa

Abdelaziz se escabulle entre la gente justo al bajarse del autobús, con una alforja en mano y rostro de alivio y cansancio. Tiene 21 años y es de Guinea Conakry. Acaba de llegar al centro de tránsito de la Organización Internacional de Migraciones (OIM) en Agadez (Níger), desde Argelia. La policía argelina le detuvo mientras trabajaba en una cantera en Argel. Se lo requisó todo y lo metió en un autobús de vuelta. Lo mismo le sucedió a Ousmane, de Guinea Bissau. “Fui al hospital para que me quitaran una muela y allí me cogieron. Hablé hasta no poder más, pero me dijeron que no tenía derechos porque no tenía papeles. Me lo quitaron todo y me enviaron al desierto”.

Les abandonaron en pleno Sáhara, después de maltratarles y humillarles. “La policía nos trató como animales, nos pegó con bastones”, afirma Mamadou. Todos tuvieron que andar 14 kilómetros para llegar a Níger, uno de los países más pobres del planeta, convertido en frontera de la UE. El “basurero donde se tira todo lo que la UE rechaza”, en palabras del periodista nigerino, Ibrahim Manzo Diallo.

La arena y el calor sofocante marcan el día a día en este lugar, principal cruce migratorio de África. Los migrantes expulsados de Argelia, más de 35.000 desde 2014 y solo 11.000 en 2018, coinciden aquí, en las instalaciones de la OIM, con repatriados de Libia. La mayoría pasó por ambos países, no siempre con la voluntad de llegar a Europa –según la ONU, el 70% de las migraciones de África Subsahariana se dan en el interior del continente–. “Podría estar aquí dos semanas explicándote todo lo que he vivido en Libia y no acabaría. Vendían a personas como ovejas”, relata Ibrahim, de Senegal. “Estuve en Libia dos años y luego trabajé en Argel durante tres más. Un día, la policía llegó, me atrapó y me expulsó. Hemos sufrido mucho”, narra Ousmane.

En las infraestructuras de la agencia vinculada a la ONU juegan al fútbol, reciben atención médica y psicológica y esperan su turno, a menudo lento, para su repatriación. “La capacidad del centro es de entre 400 y 500 plazas, pero a veces hemos tenido que gestionar hasta 1.800 personas por el retraso en la obtención de documentos”, describe el director de la instalación, Lincoln Gaingar. Con fondos europeos, la OIM recoge a los migrantes en el lado nigerino de la frontera con Argelia y organiza caravanas de vuelta a sus países de origen. A este programa lo llama “retorno voluntario”. Buena parte de la sociedad civil y expertos lo califica como regresos “claramente forzados”. “No se deciden de forma libre, sino condicionados por una expulsión previa”, explica el sociólogo burkinés Idrissa Zidnaba. “Argelia hace el trabajo sucio de Europa, que luego se cobra en sus negociaciones con la UE”, afirma Mahamadou Goita, activista maliense pro derechos humanos.

https://especiales.eldiario.es/llaves-de-europa/assets/images/sahel_transito_agadez.jpg

El aumento de las deportaciones es una de las estrategias de la UE para construir su particular valla en medio del desierto. Otras pasan por el refuerzo del control de fronteras, las trabas a los defensores de los migrantes o la utilización de fondos de ayuda al desarrollo condicionados a frenar a quienes intentar alcanzar las costas europeas. Todo un dispositivo de contención desplegado en Níger, que ejerce de muro invisible de Europa.

Un pequeño hangar de tela intenta protegerles del sol ardiente a media mañana. Algunos han salido, pero otros, la mayoría, pasa el día en el gheto –albergue clandestino, propiedad de traficantes– sin saber muy bien qué hacer ni cómo seguir. “Estamos bloqueados, pero no queremos volver atrás, nuestro objetivo es Europa”, explica Hassan, de Guinea Conakry. “La vida en África no merece la pena, queremos ir a Europa para ganar dinero y regresar”, afirma Mahamadou, de Gambia.

En una habitación adyacente, el pequeño Melvin duerme plácidamente. Su madre ha salido a buscar trabajo con el fin de reunir la cantidad necesaria para pagar un pasaje hacia el norte. “Los precios dependen del traficante, pero están entre 800.000 y un millón de FCFA –unos 1.500 euros–”, según Daouda. La ruta está cada vez más difícil por los obstáculos que la UE y el Gobierno de Níger imponen a la travesía.

El principal escollo llegó en 2015 en forma de ley, la 036, muy conocida en el país, que establece como delito el tráfico ilegal de personas para desmantelar redes en Agadez. Se confiscaron 200 vehículos, se detuvo a decenas de transportistas y se asestó un duro golpe a la economía regional, históricamente dedicada al contrabando –desde tejidos, oro y sal en la Edad Media hasta armas, drogas y personas, en la actualidad–.

“Hemos practicado una represión enorme, lo admito. En Agadez, la población rechaza la ley y pide su modificación, pero somos inflexibles y no la cambiaremos. Agadez dice que su economía se fundamenta en el tráfico ilícito de migrantes, pero yo me pregunto. ¿A pesar de que la droga sustente a centenares de familias se tiene que autorizar? La respuesta es no”, afirma la directora de la agencia contra la trata de personas de Níger, Gogé Maimouna Gazibo.

Las autoridades locales, por su parte, denuncian falta de previsión y de entendimiento, así como que se priorice la visión securitaria por delante del desarrollo en una de las regiones más necesitadas del planeta. “El bloqueo brusco del comercio sin atender las necesidades de nuestra población ha comportado el despliegue de vías alternativas que mantienen el tráfico de manera más informal, mucho más peligrosa y extremadamente cara”, asegura el vicealcalde de Agadez, Ahmed Koussa.

Algunos han dejado de formar parte del negocio con el programa de reconversión de traficantes lanzado por la UE. “Me dieron tres motos y ahora trabajo como taxi-moto. Ahora no me pongo en riesgo, pero nos dan muy poco. Nosotros estamos habituados a ganar mucho dinero”, explica Laouli, extraficante, durante una reunión de la asociación que han creado para canalizar las ayudas europeas. Los retrasos y la insuficiencia son sus quejas recurrentes. “Nos prometieron un millón de FCFA para poner en marcha una actividad empresarial y abandonar el tráfico con el que ganábamos dos o tres millones de FCFA por semana –unos 3.000 euros–. Pero hasta ahora, no hemos recibido nada”, asegura Ahmed, exconductor de la ruta hacia Libia.

https://especiales.eldiario.es/llaves-de-europa/assets/images/sahel_7.jpg

El Estado reconoce que, de las más de 5.000 personas que debían recibir fondos, solo se ha apoyado a 370. “Aunque las medidas son escasas, nuestra voluntad es que el Estado esté presente, que estas personas vean que no les dejamos, porque el riesgo en el norte es que se incendie [que grupos rebeldes de la zona vuelvan a coger las armas]”, asegura el director de estabilización de la Alta Autoridad para la Consolidación a la Paz de Níger, Hamidou Boubacar.
Los flujos a través de Níger se han reducido un 90%, según la OIM

Tanto la UE como la OIM afirman que los flujos a través de Níger se han reducido notablemente, en un 90%, pasando de 330.000 personas en 2016 a 18.000 en 2017 y a menos de 10.000 en 2018. El tráfico continúa, pero de forma menos visible. Los vehículos siguen agolpándose al comienzo de la semana a las afueras de Agadez para iniciar su viaje, en “el convoy de los lunes”, pero hay menos coches y más militares en el puesto de control. Los viajeros se apean antes de la barrera, cruzan a pie y vuelven a subir al vehículo, corriendo. Unos palos en la parte trasera de la pick-up sobresalen. Son su apoyo para evitar caídas durante el trayecto, a gran velocidad para evitar ser vistos.

Cada coche acoge a unas 25 personas hacinadas. El desierto aguarda y la muerte acecha. “Dicen que ahora ya no hay migrantes en Agadez, pero sí los hay, aunque más escondidos”, reconoce Bachir, que mantiene su actividad ligada a la migración. “Antes la gente iba en convoy por la vía principal y no podías estar un día sin ver a alguien. Ahora, en cambio, si tienes una avería por las rutas secundarias, por las dunas profundas, nadie te ve, no hay puntos de agua y puede resultar fatal”, asegura Djibril, que dejó el tráfico como consecuencia de la ley. “Desde su implementación todo se hace de forma encubierta y clandestina. Han llevado a la gente a la ilegalidad y eso aumenta la vulnerabilidad de los migrantes, que pasan por caminos más complicados”, confirma el responsable de Médicos Sin Fronteras en Níger, Francisco Otero.

https://especiales.eldiario.es/llaves-de-europa/assets/images/sahel_furgoneta_migrantes.jpg

Las organizaciones humanitarias procuran identificar los nuevos itinerarios, aunque resulta difícil porque se bifurcan por la inmensidad del Sáhara, hacia Chad y sobre todo hacia Malí. El país vecino, sumido en una crisis securitaria y sin presencia del Estado en la mitad de su territorio, es un espacio de proliferación de grupos armados. El cerco en Agadez desvía las rutas hacia esta ’tierra de nadie’, a través de la ciudad de Gao.
“Traslada el problema a otro país, sin resolverlo”

“Si se cierra una vía, otras se abren”, admite el consejero técnico del Ministerio de Malienses en el Exterior, Boulaye Keita. La Casa del Migrante de Gao ha registrado un incremento notable del movimiento por la ciudad, de 7.000 personas en 2017 a 100.000 en 2018. Para Sadio Soukouna, investigadora del Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD) en Bamako, esto demuestra que la mano dura contra la migración en Níger “traslada el problema a otro país, sin resolverlo”.

En la misma línea, Hamani Oumarou, sociólogo del LASDEL, el centro de estudios sociales más importante de Níger, afirma: “Cuanto más cerramos las fronteras, más vulnerables hacemos a los migrantes, porque rodean los puestos de control y toman rutas menos seguras y mejor controladas por los traficantes. Este es el gran riesgo de los dispositivos de control”.

Los migrantes se enfrentan a la presencia de grupos terroristas en la zona. “Interceptan sus vehículos y les dicen que pueden ganar algo de dinero si les siguen y algunos lo hacen. Otros, en cambio, son secuestrados en contra de su voluntad y su familia debe pagar el rescate. El año pasado liberamos a 14 personas”, revela el responsable de la Casa del Migrante de Gao, Eric Alain Kamdem. “Hay familias que una vez en la frontera se dividen para que al menos uno de los dos sobreviva”, asegura el activista Mahamadou Goita.

Las autoridades vinculan en ocasiones el terrorismo con la migración para justificar el refuerzo de fronteras con controles biométricos. “Ayudamos a las autoridades a securizar sus fronteras e instalamos programas muy sofisticados para el registro de la gente que entra y sale. Estamos muy contentos de tener una cooperación tan estrecha en este ámbito”, afirma el jefe de la misión de la OIM en Níger, Martin Wyss. Reconoce la voluntad europea de empujar las fronteras hacia Níger y trabajar por “una migración regular, segura y ordenada”, en la línea del Pacto Mundial de migraciones.

Níger es uno de los beneficiarios de la ayuda europea al desarrollo, no solo por su vulnerabilidad sino también por sus esfuerzos en el control fronterizo. Hasta 2020, prevé recibir más de 1.800 millones de euros procedentes del Fondo Fiduciario de Emergencia para África (EUTF), un mecanismo que emplea recursos destinados a la cooperación al desarrollo para frenar la llegada de migrantes a Europa.

La mayoría de este fondo –que cuenta con 4.200 millones– proviene del principal instrumento de cooperación de la UE, el Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo. Sin embargo, casi la mitad de este dinero no se está dedicando a erradicar la pobreza: cerca del 40% de su presupuesto está siendo desviado directamente para control migratorio en terceros países, según han constatado las ONG europeas en 2018, tres años después de su creación.

El fondo fiduciario fue ideado en la Cumbre de La Valeta de 2015 para “atacar las causas profundas de las migraciones”. Desde entonces, la UE apuesta por la formación militar de ejércitos africanos –a través de misiones como EUCAP Sahel– para desmantelar redes de tráfico y promueve proyectos de desarrollo local para intentar evitar desplazamientos.

En Níger, el fondo dedica 253 millones de euros. Entre ellos, la UE destina 90 millones al proyecto de apoyo a la justicia y la seguridad en el país, que proporciona ayuda directa a las autoridades nigerinas. Parte de este dinero ha dependido de una serie de condiciones, como elaborar una estrategia nacional contra la migración irregular, adquirir equipos de seguridad para mejorar los controles fronterizos, rehabilitar o construir puestos fronterizos en zonas estratégicas, crear unidades especiales de policía de fronteras o levantar centros de migrantes, según ha documentado la red de ONG europeas Concord. El programa incluye establecer un equipo conjunto de investigación compuesto por agentes de policía franceses, españoles y nigerinos para apoyar a las autoridades del país, de acuerdo con su investigación.

Los riesgos que acarrea esta política de reforzar los servicios de seguridad e imponer controles fronterizos más estrictos en Níger son varios, según las ONG, desde impulsar “prácticas corruptas” por parte de policías hasta la detención “sin pruebas suficientes” de presuntos traficantes de personas.

La Unión Europea niega el concepto de “externalización de fronteras”, pero admite un despliegue de todos sus instrumentos en el país por su importancia en cuestión migratoria. Su embajadora, Denise-Elena Ionete, asegura que “Níger ha hecho mucho para disminuir el sufrimiento y la pérdida de vidas humanas en el desierto y el Mediterráneo y eso explica el poderoso aumento de nuestra cooperación los últimos años”.

https://especiales.eldiario.es/llaves-de-europa/assets/images/sahel_mujer_transito.jpg

Organizaciones de la sociedad civil africana y europea denuncian que se condicionen fondos de desarrollo al freno migratorio y el desvío de estos hacia programas de seguridad. Para el periodista Ibrahim Manzo Diallo, se trata de “un chantaje en toda regla, una coacción a África y a los pobres”. Las entidades también consideran las donaciones escasas e ineficaces, puesto que “el desarrollo está vinculado a una intensificación de la movilidad” y no al revés, según el director del grupo de investigación sobre migraciones de la Universidad de Niamey, Harouna Mounkaila. No son las personas más pobres las que migran ni proceden de los países más vulnerables, como demuestra el propio Níger con índices ínfimos de migrantes en Europa.

Otros colectivos sociales señalan que el refuerzo de fronteras obstaculiza la movilidad regional mayoritaria y vulnera el protocolo de libre circulación de la Comunidad de Estados de África Occidental (CEDEAO), similar al Espacio Schengen. Consideran que la contención va en contra de la apuesta de la Unión Africana (UA) por la libertad de movimiento continental y rompe consensos propios.

Las autoridades nigerinas rechazan estas acusaciones y defienden que la ley contra el tráfico proporciona mayores garantías a las personas en tránsito y no quebranta, en ningún caso, el derecho a moverse. Solo exigen, explican, viajar con documentación identificativa y rechazan un incremento de las muertes en el desierto como consecuencia del aumento de los controles. “Si me quieren decir que debemos abrir nuestras fronteras porque los migrantes que atraviesan Níger cambian de ruta, se desvían y mueren, pues digo que no. Ningún responsable político podría decir eso y, además, no tengo pruebas de que ahora haya más muertos que antes”, asegura Gogé Maimouna.

Tanto la UE como la OIM alaban la “mejora” de la gestión migratoria en Níger y comparan los posibles efectos negativos con la ilegalización de la droga. “Está claro que cuando conviertes algo legal en ilegal obligas a que lo responsables se escondan. Europa tenía que hacer algo en este tema, porque la falta de una gestión ordenada de la migración ha facilitado el auge de los extremismos y ha dividido a nuestro continente”, afirma Wyss, de la OIM. Las migraciones son cada vez menos visibles, mientras los mecanismos de control se expanden por la región de forma más perceptible.

La frontera llega a #Mali y Burkina Faso

El edificio es nuevo, se inauguró en 2018, con capacidad para 240 personas. Las decenas de habitaciones contienen literas, un gran comedor preside el lugar y una bandera de la República de Mali ondea en lo alto. Es uno de los centros donde opera la OIM en Bamako, pero su titularidad es del Estado. Esa es la diferencia con Níger. “La OIM tiene serias dificultades en asentarse en Mali. Hace años que lo intenta pero no tiene centros de tránsito propios, sino que colabora con asociaciones locales. El factor clave es la importancia de la diáspora maliense”, asegura Eric Kamden.

Cinco millones de malienses viven en el extranjero, un 15% en Europa, sobre todo en Francia. Es una diáspora dinámica y movilizada que con sus remesas aporta más que toda la Ayuda Oficial al Desarrollo (AOD). “Mali tiene una tradición migratoria muy larga. Es un país de origen y de tránsito, a diferencia de Níger. Eso significa que para tomar cualquier decisión en Mali, se debe tener en cuenta a la diáspora, no solo desde un punto de vista cuantitativo sino porque los migrantes son escuchados y respetados en sus pueblos, familias y comunidades, porque las sustentan”, afirma el asesor del Ministerio de Malienses en el Exterior, Boulaye Keita. Este mayor margen de negociación de Mali ya tumbó los acuerdos de readmisión promovidos por la UE en 2014.

No obstante, el país es uno de los principales receptores de fondos europeos con 214 millones de euros y la inversión se percibe en el crecimiento de la OIM y su dispositivo de contención. Las nuevas edificaciones que gestionan los “retornos voluntarios” lo demuestran. A ellas llegan migrantes malienses expulsados de Argelia o repatriados de Libia, Gabón, Angola o Francia. “Para mí Argelia es agua pasada, no volveré a allí. Ahora, por fin, estoy en casa y me voy a quedar aquí”, asegura Moctar, nacido en la región oeste de Kayes y visiblemente cansado tras el largo viaje en autobús desde Niamey. Algunos habían estado también en Agadez y repiten sus historias sobre malos tratos recibidos en Argelia, aunque sin cerrar la puerta a volver a partir.

“Quizás vuelvo a irme a otro país, pero no a Argelia. Son muy racistas con nosotros y eso no está bien”, atestigua Kalidou. Para ellos, sin reconocimiento del estatuto de refugiado o solicitante de asilo, a pesar de la guerra abierta que azota el norte de su país, Bamako supone el fin del periplo organizado por la #OIM, forzado por las circunstancias. Este organismo internacional, critica el antropólogo y activista Mauro Armanino, “acaricia por un lado y por el otro golpea”. Por una parte protege, sensibiliza y apoya a los migrantes más necesitados, pero por el otro “ejerce de brazo armado de las políticas europeas” y “agencia de deportación”, sostiene el investigador de la Universidad de Bamako Bréma Dicko.

El responsable de programas de la OIM en Mali, David Cumber, se defiende asegurando que no quieren frenar la migración, aunque admite la voluntad de la institución de “reducir la migración irregular”. Sus argumentos apuntan “la necesidad de que las personas viajen con documentos”, a la vez que reconoce su incapacidad para reclamar “más vías legales y seguras”, al tratarse de una agencia intraestatal financiada por potencias internacionales.

En #BurkinaFaso, el discurso disuasorio y a favor del retorno ha calado en el régimen surgido de la revolución de 2014, inestable, ávido de recursos y víctima creciente del terrorismo. Este país es lugar de paso de las rutas hacia el norte, punto de avituallamiento previo a Níger. Abdoulaye, por ejemplo, de Costa de Marfil, salió a la aventura hacia España, pero se quedó en Ouagadougou, capital de Burkina Faso, para ganar un poco de dinero y seguir su camino.

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Hoy trabaja en la cafetería de una estación de autobuses de la capital donde ya lleva casi un año, pero no renuncia a pisar suelo español. “Intentaré hacerme el visado, pero me faltan recursos. Tengo amigos que viven allí y por eso quiero ir”. Los burkineses en Europa son minoritarios, solo hay pequeñas comunidades en Italia y escasas en España. La OIM, junto a ONG locales, intenta disuadir la movilidad explicando los peligros del camino. “Estamos subcontratados por la OIM, nos pagan para ir por los pueblos a exponer los riesgos del viaje. Eso no nos impide denunciar que el cierre de fronteras europeo provoca más curiosidad y más ganas de partir a las personas. Si las fronteras estuvieran abiertas, mucha gente iría y volvería sin problema”, expone Sebastien Ouédraogo, coordinador de la entidad Alert Migration.

Para Moussa Ouédraogo, responsable de la ONG burkinesa Grades, su país se ha convertido en la “prefrontera, donde cerrar el paso a cuanta más gente mejor”. Los puestos de control policial se han propagado por todo el país bajo el pretexto de lucha contra el terrorismo, pero “sin duda es por la migración, porque la intensificación de la vigilancia intimida a la gente de partir”, afirma. Se han instalado controles biométricos en la frontera entre Burkina Faso y Níger, en Kantchari, además de puntos de vigilancia en todas las carreteras del territorio, lo que aumenta también la corrupción. “Muchas veces los migrantes tienen los papeles en regla, pero los policías les piden dinero igualmente”, explica el presidente de la ONG local Tocsin, Harouna Sawadogo.

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La colaboración entre la UE, la OIM y las autoridades parece funcionar. La vinculación entre migración y desarrollo va en sintonía y el Gobierno la asume, aunque reclama, de forma tímida, una flexibilización en la concesión de visados para reducir los flujos irregulares. “Los Estados son soberanos para aceptar o no la entrada de extranjeros, pero los burkineses queremos viajar para aprender y traer capital humano que ayude a desarrollarnos. Por eso, Europa debe dar más visados”, argumenta Gustave Bambara, director de política de población del Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas. El Gobierno de Níger apoya esta visión y reivindica una mayor recompensa a sus esfuerzos por aplicar sus recetas.

“Níger está haciendo lo que puede para frenar los flujos, pero si Europa sigue cerrando sus fronteras, habrá más gente descontenta de la que ya hay y esto, a la larga, no será rentable para nuestro Estado”, advierte Gogé Maimouna Gazibo, responsable de la agencia contra el tráfico de personas.

En un centro de acogida en Ouagadougou, Jimmy, de 19 años, originario de Liberia, repite una posición extendida entre quienes regresan. “Sigo queriendo ir a Europa, porque yo no quería volver a mi país. En cuanto regrese, volveré a probar la ruta de Marruecos, intentaré saltar las vallas: entrar o morir”.

▻https://especiales.eldiario.es/llaves-de-europa/sahel.html?_ga=2.228431199.379866320.1572532596-1969249460.15619

#Geneviève_Legay #Nice #gilets_jaunes #violences_policières #maintien_de_l'ordre #mensonge #contradictions

Défi du jour :
Est-ce que quelqu’un-e peut citer un seul cas où il n’y a pas eut orchestration mensongère PPP (police-prefecture-procureur) dans le cadre des #ViolencesPolicieres ?
Un ?
De #Malik_Oussekine (ma première prise de conscience) à #Genevieve_Legay, je n’en ai jamais vu.
Pourtant les mainstream les relaient systématiquement sans sourciller...
Ha, et puis #paywall aussi, hélas, mais ayant suivi de près même les dénonciations des méthodes de Cauchy, c’est sans surprise.

Être responsable, c’est de comprendre que si on ne respecte pas la loi, on va se faire castagner, voire tuer.

A ceux qui pensaient qu’on était dans un état (de droit, ne rigolez pas) où la culpabilité, et la réparation éventuelle étaient définies par la Justice, et bien, réjouissez vous, c’est toujours le cas, si, si. Avec un peu de sagesse et de compassion, l’État, en la personne de son Président, vous indiquent que tout se passera bien. Et que dans le cas contraire, faut pas s’étonner. Notez que c’est ce que j’entends quotidiennement dans le pays où je vis... pays où Montesquieu n’est plus qu’un truc dont on plaisante en citant Sarkozy et sa dispensable opinion sur la Princesse idoine (je sais, ça ne veut rien dire, mais vous aurez compris qu’il s’agit de retranscrire le niveau des échanges de ce grand pays...).

« Je lui souhaite un prompt rétablissement, et peut-être une forme de sagesse. »
Emmanuel 1er ajouta que sans sa bontė cette femme aurait due expier son crime de lese majesté par éborgnement, mais qu’il tenait à maintenir la liberté d’expression le Royaume, alors même que les gueux n’avaient rien d’intelligent à dire.
Emmanuel 1er ajouta que cette sagesse était toute contenue dans la vie exemplaire du martyr du Saint Ruissellement, Alexandre de Bientabassé.

▻https://twitter.com/MFrippon/status/1110093401247100930

La France, une démocratie à condition de ne pas s’en servir…
André Gunthert

Vieilles sages et vieilles folles

Elle n’a pas été bousculée par un malfrat pour lui voler sa (petite) retraite. Elle aurait eu droit, alors, à toute la commisération indignée de nos « messieurs qu’on nomme grands ». Elle allait.... manifester ! Manifester ? Passe encore de bâtir ou de planter à cet âge, mais manifester ? Espérons que les coups qu’elle a pris sur la tronche vont lui mettre un peu de plomb dans la cervelle, à défaut de quelques éclats de grenade comme celle qui a tué Zineb Redouane, ou des vraies balles dont nous menacent Luc Ferry et quelques autres en mots crus ou voilés.

Zineb, elle était plutôt sage. Elle manifestait pas, elle fermait sagement ses volets. Au quatrième étage. Et la grenade qui lui a bousillé la mâchoire, et finalement la vie, ne l’a pas rendue plus sage, ni plus folle. Quand elle a dit « ils m’ont visée », elle commençait peut être à devenir folle... ou sage, allez savoir, lucide en tout cas. Pas eu le temps d’approfondir.

Dans la parabole de l’évangile, les sages sont celles qui veillent, qui gardent de l’huile dans leur lampe, les folles celles qui s’endorment.

Moi qui fais plutôt partie des vieilles sages, camouflée derrière mon ordi et/ou ma télé, voilà que ça me donne envie de faire la vieille folle. Si on créait un comité des vieilles sages qui applaudissent les vieilles folles, des vieilles folles qui s’appuient sur le soutien des vieilles sages ?
« Veillez donc, puisque vous ne savez ni le jour, ni l’heure »

►https://blogs.mediapart.fr/cultive-ton-jardin/blog/250319/vieilles-sages-et-vieilles-folles

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Emmanuel 1er souligna que « cette dame n’a pas été en contact avec les forces de l’ordre ».

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Robert Pandraud sur #Malik_Oussekine en 1986 :

si j’avais un fils sous dialyse, je l’empêcherais de faire le con dans la nuit

▻https://www.lemonde.fr/disparitions/article/2010/02/19/robert-pandraud-ancien-ministre-charge-de-la-securite_1308510_3382.html

Fred Sochard souligne à raison que cela fait écho au « voilà des élèves qui se tiennent sages » des flics occupés à maintenir à genoux et mains sur la tête des dizaines de lycéens de Mantes la Jolie en décembre dernier.

Les « fragiles » doivent pas manifester nous dit le pemier flic de France. L’avertissement s’adresse à tous les retraités #Gilets_Jaunes et à tous ceux susceptibles de s’opposer aux « réformes » programmées (fonction publique, chômage retraites) : soyez sages ou nous vous briseront.

Enlysée soutient la Fragilité, la Sagesse et la Responsabilité remarquable de Geniève Legay
▻https://enlyseeboutique.fr/blogs/infos/enlysee-soutien-la-fragilite-la-sagesse-et-la-responsabilite-remarqu

https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0047/7924/5666/files/37_MOCKUP_T_Shirt_Fragile.jpg?v=1553516721

Ce weekend, Geneviève Legay, 73 ans, qui manifestait pour le droit à la manifestation, armée d’un drapeau de Paix, a été grièvement blessée par la police.
Nous avons passé 48h très inquiets pour l’état de santé de cette femme qui souffre de plusieurs fractures du crâne suite à une charge de CRS à Nice ce samedi.
Ce matin notre cher Président a encore su trouver les mots justes pour nous rassurer et apaiser nos craintes et notre colère.
Nous avons immédiatement réagi et créé un T-Shirt en hommage à la Sagesse, la Fragilité et la Responsabilité de cette grande dame, militante auprès de l’association ATTAC.
Nous attendons la réponse de ces derniers pour savoir à qui seront reversés les bénéfices de la vente de ce T-Shirt que vous pouvez trouver dès aujourd’hui sur notre boutique.
Toutes nos pensées et notre soutien vont à la famille de Geneviève et des nombreux autres blessés de la démocratie macronienne.

Emmanuel Macron, le vertige autoritaire

La décision de mobiliser la troupe, samedi, pour endiguer les manifestations à Paris est sans précédent depuis les grandes grèves de 1947-48. Année après année, le mouvement social est un peu plus criminalisé et les libertés bafouées. Homme sans limites et sans mémoire, le chef de l’État franchit un nouveau pas.

▻https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/210319/emmanuel-macron-le-vertige-autoritaire?onglet=full
#autoritarisme

Dérive autoritaire

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Plus rien ni personne ne semble en mesure de freiner la dérive autocratique d’Emmanuel Macron. Ni l’escalade policière, et désormais militaire, s’abattant sur les gilets jaunes. Après l’adoption d’une nouvelle loi anticasseurs, des périmètres entiers, comme les Champs-Elysées à Paris, seront interdits de cortèges. Pour un mot de trop, les opposants politiques sont menacés de poursuites judiciaires. L’armée sera appelée en renfort ce samedi, pour l’acte XIX. Elle protégera certains établissements publics afin de permettre aux CRS de se déployer au contact des manifestants. Un véritable retour en arrière : ce n’était pas arrivé en métropole depuis la répression de la #grève_des_mineurs en 1947, et la #Guerre_d’Algérie.

Dans la rue, ceux qui osent encore manifester, qui ne sont pas déjà amendés, en prison ou assignés à résidence, courent le risque de se faire gazer, tabasser, voire de perdre une main ou un œil. #Zineb_Redouane, une octogénaire victime d’un tir tendu de lacrymogène, est même décédée à Marseille, dans l’indifférence du gouvernement. D’autres morts devront-ils s’ajouter à la longue liste des victimes de #violences_policières en France ? Les centaines d’#Algériens en 1961, les communistes du #métro_Charonne un an plus tard, les manifestants de mai-juin 1968, #Vital_Michalon en 1977 à #Super-Phénix, #Malik_Oussekine en 1986, #Rémi_Fraisse en 2014…

Enfermé dans ses certitudes et son mépris de classe, le gouvernement n’entend pas dialoguer. Sa seule réponse consiste à traiter le mouvement social par la #répression. #Nicolas_Sarkozy avait ouvert la voie pour mater les #banlieues. Une politique poursuivie par #Manuel_Valls lors des manifestations contre la #Loi_travail et #Nuit_debout. Rien sur le fond. Certes, il y a eu des débats. Un grand show, même. Mais d’inflexion de la politique menée, point. Des revendications des gilets jaunes (pouvoir d’achat, rétablissement de l’ISF, démocratisation de la vie politique, etc.), il ne restera rien, ou alors l’indexation des retraites. Et encore.

Comme il paraît lointain le temps des rassemblements paisibles sur les ronds-points. Le mouvement était trop populaire. Il fallait le casser, le morceler, le discréditer, le pousser à la radicalisation. Instiller la #peur. Réduire le mouvement social à une bande de #casseurs. Les chaînes d’info en continu ont contribué à alimenter un climat de #guerre_civile. Histoire d’obliger tout le monde à rentrer chez soi. Reposer le couvercle sur la marmite. Jusqu’aux prochaines élections. Ça pourrait marcher. Espérons que non.

►https://lecourrier.ch/2019/03/21/derive-autoritaire

Briefing: The civilian fallout from the Sahel’s spreading militancy

A surge in violence across West Africa’s Sahel has displaced hundreds of thousands of people and left thousands dead since January, as Islamist militants with links to al-Qaeda and so-called Islamic State extend their reach across the region at a time when they are losing ground in their Middle Eastern strongholds.

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The Sahel in flames

For 10 months The New Humanitarian has been on the ground reporting as a surge in violence rips through West Africa. Here’s what we found.

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▻https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/in-depth/sahel-flames-Burkina-Faso-Mali-Niger-militancy-conflict

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