“Action file” on Tunisia outlines EU’s externalisation plans
An “action file” obtained by Statewatch lays out the objectives and activities of the EU’s cooperation on migration with Tunisia – whose government was heavily criticized by the European Parliament this week for “an authoritarian reversal and an alarming backslide on democracy, human rights and the rule of law.”
Externalisation of migration control
The document (pdf), produced as part of the #Operational_Coordination_Mechanism_for_the_External_Dimension_of_Migration (#MOCADEM) and circulated within the Council in December 2023, summarizes ongoing EU efforts to externalise migration and border control to Tunisia. It covers the main developments since the signature of the EU-Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding of July 2023.
The MoU is cited in the document as a cooperation “framework” whose implementation shall “continue”. Criticism also continues, with the organization Refugees International arguing:
“The short-term securitisation approach to Tunisia advanced by Team Europe is… likely to fail on at least two fronts: both on its own terms by failing to stem irregular migration, and on legal and ethical terms by tying EU support to the inevitability of grave human rights abuses by Tunisian authorities.”
From the document it is clear that the EU has intensified political and technical outreach to Tunisia through high-level visits from both EU and member state representatives and that the Tunisian authorities are involved in different initiatives, including through EU agencies, such as Europol and Frontex. The European Police College (CEPOL), the EU Agency for Asylum (EUAA) and Eurojust are also mentioned as potential actors for cooperation.
The measures listed in the document target all potential migration from Tunisia to the EU. However, distinctions are drawn – including in the language used – between measures addressed to non-Tunisian nationals and measures addressed to Tunisian nationals.
Measures addressed to non-Tunisian nationals
For non-Tunisian nationals, “preventing irregular departures from, as well as irregular arrivals to Tunisia” is the key objective of ongoing cooperation in the areas of border management, anti-smuggling and search and rescue. The EU provides Tunisia different amounts of funding through existing projects.
Border management, including search and rescue
the EU finances the projects Strengthening the Tunisian Coast Guard Training Pillar, run by ICMPD (2023-2026) and the EUTF funded Border Management Programme for the Maghreb region (BMP-Maghreb) (2018-2024). Both projects aim at developing the Tunisian authorities’ border control capacity, for both land and sea borders, thus including search and rescue activities. This is done through the donation of equipment and the training of the Garde National of Tunisia and the Navy.
As for equipment, details about the delivery of boats, engines and spare parts for putting search and rescue vessels to Tunisia are included in the document, including the provision of fuel. A new contract will “build and equip a command-and-control centre for the Tunisian national guard at the border with Libya,” to enhance cross-border cooperation with Libya.
With regard to training, the document mentions a session for two officials in Rome as well as the participation of the Tunisian border control authorities in a Frontex workshop organised in the context of Joint Operation Themis. The MOCADEM reports that Tunisia considers talks on a working arrangement with Frontex “pre-mature.”
Anti-smuggling
The EU pursues the Anti-smuggling Operational Partnership (ASOP) to try to develop the Tunisian police capacity to investigate, prosecute and convict smugglers. Training is also key in this area.
The document mentions a mentorship programme between Tunisia and the EU Member States on migrant smuggling. Cross-border cooperation in investigations is encouraged, also through Europol, information campaigns (in North Africa and along the Central Mediterranean), and regional action. There is an ongoing discussion on a Europol agreement to exchange personal data between Europol and Tunisian authorities.
Return and reintegration of non-Tunisian nationals
the EU finances IOM’s project on Migrant Protection, Return and Reintegration in North Africa, concretely supporting assisted voluntary return from Tunisia to countries of sub-Saharan Africa. The MOCADEM document states that the EU engages “with Tunisian authorities to develop a national mechanism for returns facilitation.”
Direct capacity-building of national authorities to return non-Tunisian nationals to their country of origin is a novelty in the EU migration policies. This is a follow-up of the objective spelled out in the EU-Tunisia MoU of “developing a system for the identification and return of irregular migrants already present in Tunisia”. It is reported that a “new technical assistance programme to further support the return system in Tunisia is under preparation.”
International protection for non-Tunisian nationals
As usual, protection programmes receive much lower funding than other cooperation objectives for the securitisation of migration. In Tunisia, the EU will fund a project run by the UNCHR to enhance reception and access to international protection for asylum seekers and refugees.
Measures addressed to Tunisian nationals
For Tunisian nationals, the EU aims to increase return and readmission of Tunisian nationals deemed to be irregularly staying in the EU to Tunisia, privileging so-called “assisted voluntary return” and reintegration projects for Tunisian nationals over forced returns. At the same time, the EU stresses the importance of increasing opportunities for legal migration through the launch of a “Talent Partnership” and better visa conditions for Tunisian nationals.
Deportations
the EU finances a national reintegration support mechanism called “Tounesna,” as well as the Frontex Joint Reintegration Services, for which Frontex launched a new call for proposals. Key actors in this area are the High Level Network for Return, chaired by the EU Return Coordinator and composed of representatives of all Member States and Frontex.
In October 2023, Tunisia was identified as one of the seven countries targeted for joint deportation actions. The document reports that the negotiations for an EU-Tunisia readmission agreement and visa facilitation agreements, which started in 2016, have been on hold since 2019 and that “Tunisia has shown no interest to date to relaunch the negotiations.”
Legal migration
The EU finances pilot projects under the Mobility Partnership Facility (MPF) and the regional project THAMM (2018-2023), which received extra funding. Again, the launch of an EU-Tunisia Talent Partnership is announced through a Joint Roadmap for a Talent Partnership, which is yet to be finalized.
In the EU-Tunisia MoU, the EU promised to “take appropriate measures to facilitate legal mobility between the two Parties, including facilitating the granting of visas by reducing delays, costs and administrative procedure.” However, in this document there are no prospects for cooperation on visa policy. The document merely contains a reminder that visa policy is conditional on readmission cooperation.
Ongoing cooperation
While the European Parliament this week condemned a decision by the Commission to release €150 million to Tunisia through an urgent written procedure, bypassing the normal-decision making process, with a resolution that said the North African country is undergoing “an authoritarian reversal and an alarming backslide on democracy, human rights and the rule of law.”
The resolution goes on to say that “over the last year, President Kais Saied has had opposition politicians, judges, media workers and civil society activists arbitrarily arrested and detained.”
However, the cooperation being coordinated through MOCADEM remains largely beyond the reach of parliamentary scrutiny. As highlighted by a separate article published today by Statewatch and Migration-Control.info, the parliament’s lawyers agree with MEPs that this needs to change.
▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2024/march/action-file-on-tunisia-outlines-eu-s-externalisation-plans
#Tunisie #externalisation #migrations #réfugiés #financement #Kais_Saied #accord #frontières #EU #UE #Union_européenne #contrôles_frontaliers
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ajouté à la métaliste sur le #Memorandum_of_Understanding (#MoU) avec la #Tunisie :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/1020591
European Commission accused of ‘bankrolling dictators’ by MEPs after Tunisia deal
Members of justice committee say €150m in EU funding went straight to country’s president, Kais Saied
The European Commission has been accused of “bankrolling dictators” by senior MEPs who have claimed that the €150m it gave to Tunisia last year in a migration and development deal has ended up directly in the president’s hands.
A group of MEPs on the human rights, justice and foreign affairs committees at the European parliament launched a scathing attack on the executive in Brussels, expressing anxiety over reports that the commission’s president, Ursula von der Leyen, was about to seal a similar deal with Egypt.
The Greek migration minister, Dimitris Kairidis, confirmed late on Wednesday that a joint declaration between the EU and Egypt had been agreed and would be formally unveiled when von der Leyen and the leaders of Greece, Italy and Belgium visit Cairo on Sunday.
The agreement sees Egypt receiving an aid package of €7.4bn (£6.3bn) “mostly in loans” in return for the country “committing to work harder on migration”, he told the Guardian, adding: “I have said, time and again to my colleagues, that we need to support Egypt which has been so helpful in managing migration and so important for the stability of North Africa and the wider Middle East.”
Kairidis, who held talks with the Egyptian ambassador to Greece on Wednesday, confirmed there had been no boats leaving directly from Egypt, even if arrivals on southern Greek islands of migrants travelling through Libya had soared this year. “Egypt is not only hosting 9 million refugees, it has been very effective in controlling illegal migration,” he said.
The MEPs have accused the commission of refusing to answer questions on the deal with Tunisia and worry that it is looking at a series of “ad hoc” deals with other African countries without regard to democracy and rule of law in those countries.
“It seems that we are bankrolling dictators across the region. And that is not the Europe that we want to see. That is not the place which the EU should be holding in the world,” said the French MEP Mounir Satouri, a member of the parliamentary foreign affairs committee.
At a press conference in Strasbourg, he claimed the money – pledged to Tunisia last year as part of a wider pact aimed at curbing a surge in migration to Italy and people-smuggling – had been diverted, saying that the €150m was supposed to have been invested directly in an EU-agreed project but instead had been “transferred to the president directly”.
Fellow MEPs said there had been an “authoritarian shift” in Tunisia under its president, Kais Saied, but the commissioners had gone ahead with the deal anyway.
A spokesperson for the EU commission said MEPs were entitled to express their views but that it was better to build partnerships to improve democracy and human rights than to “break off relations” and see the situation deteriorate.
“What I can say is that we are absolutely convinced of the necessity to work with countries in our neighbourhood, taking into account the realities on the ground,” the spokesperson said. “We know the criticism related to human rights in those countries, and it is obvious that this is an issue and that these are issues that we take up with those countries.”
The spokesperson added there were “specific mechanisms in place to discuss human rights with the countries in the region, including Egypt”.
The Danish MEP Karen Melchior, coordinator of the justice committee, said parliamentarians’ concerns about the Tunisia deal were “being continually ignored” and that commissioners refused to answer their questions or take their concerns seriously.
“How can we continue to have a memorandum of understanding, how can we give budget support without conditionality to Tunisia, when things are going from bad to worse?” she said.
“To sign an agreement with President Saied, who is continuing to suppress opposition and democracy in Tunisia – this is not the way the EU should be acting. This is not the way that Team Europe should be doing our foreign policy.”
The chair of the human rights committee, Udo Bullman, attacked what he said was a “hush-hush” deal that had been rushed through.
“The commission has to explain why there was so much urgency in the agreement of last summer – why it, hush-hush, very quickly before Christmas, [said] it was of the ‘highest urgency’ and just gave the money … without any critical debate,” he said, adding this was a question for the EU’s commissioner for neighbourhood and enlargement, Olivér Várhelyi, and for von der Leyen.
Michael Gahler, the German CDU MEP who was blocked from visiting Tunisia by the local authorities last year, said the Tunisian people should not be abandoned in the face of “Saied’s autocratic rule” and economic decline.
“That requires us to make sure that European taxpayers’ money truly benefits the Tunisian people and the civil society … and why it has to be clear that European funding to Tunisia needs to be adequately conditioned to that end,” he said.
The concerns are being voiced this week as the EU parliament’s five-year mandate draws to a close before elections in June, with MEPs keen to lay down red lines for any future deals the executive in Brussels intends to do.
Sara Prestianni, the advocacy director for the NGO EuroMed Rights, said she was concerned the EU was about to make a similar “strategic and political” mistake with Cairo, pledging vast sums of money without setting conditions involving enough financial oversight or guarantees on human rights. “It would be an error, particularly if it [the Tunisia deal] is replicated with Egypt,” she said.
Satouri, who is also the parliament’s special rapporteur for Egypt, said: “We need to ensure democratic procedures are followed before money is disbursed. These are not the private fund of Commissioner Várhelyi. These are European funds.”
▻https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/13/european-commission-accused-of-bankrolling-dictators-by-meps-after-tuni
#Tunisie #externalisation #migrations #réfugiés #financement #Kais_Saied #accord
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ajouté à la métaliste sur le #Memorandum_of_Understanding (#MoU) avec la #Tunisie :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/1020591
Meloni, accordo con Rama prevede 2 centri migranti in Albania
“L’accordo prevede di allestire centri per migranti in Albania che possano contenere fino a 3mila persone”. Lo ha detto la premier Giorgia Meloni dopo l’incontro a Palazzo Chigi con il primo ministro dell’Albania Edi Rama. “L’accordo che sigliamo oggi – ha aggiunto - arricchisce di un ulteriore tassello la collaborazione” tra i due Paesi e “quando ne abbiamo iniziato a discutere siamo partiti dall’idea che l’immigrazione illegale di massa è un fenomeno che nessuno Stato Ue può affrontare da solo e la collaborazione tra Stati Ue e Stati per ora extra Ue – per ora - è fondamentale”. “In questi due centri” i migranti resteranno “il tempo necessario per le procedure e una volta a regime nei centri ci potrà essere un flusso annuale complessivo di 36 mila persone”. “L’accordo non riguarda i minori e donne in gravidanza ed i soggetti vulnerabili – precisa – la giurisdizione sarà italiana. L’Albania collabora sulla sorveglianza esterna delle strutture. All’accordo che disegna la cornice, seguiranno una serie di protocolli. Contiamo di rendere operativi i centri in primavera”. (ANSA).
▻https://it.euronews.com/2023/11/06/meloni-accordo-con-rama-prevede-2-centri-migranti-in-albania
#Italie #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Albanie #accord #externalisation #centres
ajouté à la Métaliste sur l’#accord entre #Italie et #Albanie pour la construction de #centres d’accueil (sic) et identification des migrants/#réfugiés sur le territoire albanais...
►https://seenthis.net/messages/1043873
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Et ajouté à la métaliste sur les différentes tentatives de différentes pays européens d’#externalisation non seulement des contrôles frontaliers, mais aussi de la #procédure_d'asile dans des #pays_tiers
►https://seenthis.net/messages/900122
Fewer boat crossings, visit to Frontex : EU and Tunisia implement migration pact
Despite an alleged repayment of funds for migration defence, Tunisia is cooperating with the EU. Fewer refugees are also arriving across the Mediterranean – a decrease by a factor of seven.
In June, the EU Commission signed an agreement on joint migration control with Tunisia. According to the agreement, the government in Tunis will receive €105 million to monitor its borders and “combat people smuggling”. Another €150 million should flow from the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) in the coming years for the purposes of border management and countering the “smuggling” of migrants.
Tunisia received a first transfer under the agreement of €67 million in September. The money was to finance a coast guard vessel, spare parts and marine fuel for other vessels as well as vehicles for the Tunisian coast guard and navy, and training to operate the equipment. Around €25 million of this tranche was earmarked for “voluntary return” programmes, which are implemented by the United Nations Refugee Agency and the International Organisation for Migration.
However, a few weeks after the transfer from Brussels, the government in Tunis allegedly repaid almost the entire sum. Tunisia “does not accept anything resembling favours or alms”, President Kais Saied is quoted as saying. Earlier, the government had also cancelled a working visit by the Commission to implement the agreement.
Successes at the working level
Despite the supposed U-turn, cooperation on migration prevention between the EU and Tunisia has got off the ground and is even showing initial successes at the working level. Under the agreement, the EU has supplied spare parts for the Tunisian coast guard, for example, which will keep “six ships operational”. This is what Commission President Ursula von der Leyen wrote last week to MEPs who had asked about the implementation of the deal. Another six coast guard vessels are to be repaired by the end of the year.
In an undated letter to the EU member states, von der Leyen specifies the equipment aid. According to the letter, IT equipment for operations rooms, mobile radar systems and thermal imaging cameras, navigation radars and sonars have been given to Tunisia so far. An “additional capacity building” is to take place within the framework of existing “border management programmes” implemented by Italy and the Netherlands, among others. One of these is the EU4BorderSecurity programme, which among other things provides skills in sea rescue and has been extended for Tunisia until April 2025.
The Tunisian Garde Nationale Maritime, which is part of the Ministry of the Interior, and the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre benefit from these measures. This MRCC has already received an EU-funded vessel tracking system and is to be connected to the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network. Through this, the EU states exchange information about incidents off their coasts. This year Tunisia has also sent members of its coast guards to Italy as liaison officers – apparently a first step towards the EU’s goal of “linking” MRCC’s in Libya and Tunisia with their “counterparts” in Italy and Malta.
Departures from Tunisia decrease by a factor of seven
Since the signing of the migration agreement, the departures of boats with refugees from Tunisia have decreased by a factor of 7, according to information from Migazin in October. The reason for this is probably the increased frequency of patrols by the Tunisian coast guard. In August, 1,351 people were reportedly apprehended at sea. More and more often, the boats are also destroyed after being intercepted by Tunisian officials. The prices that refugees have to pay to smugglers are presumably also responsible for fewer crossings; these are said to have risen significantly in Tunisia.
State repression, especially in the port city of Sfax, has also contributed to the decline in numbers, where the authorities have expelled thousands of people from sub-Saharan countries from the centre and driven them by bus to the Libyan and Algerian borders. There, officials force them to cross the border. These measures have also led to more refugees in Tunisia seeking EU-funded IOM programmes for “voluntary return” to their countries of origin.
Now the EU wants to put pressure on Tunisia to introduce visa requirements for individual West African states. This is to affect, among others, Côte d’Ivoire, where most of the people arriving in the EU via Tunisia come from and almost all of whom arrive in Italy. Guinea and Tunisia come second and third among these nationalities.
Reception from the Frontex Director
In September, three months after the signing of the migration agreement, a delegation from Tunisia visited Frontex headquarters in Warsaw, with the participation of the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs and Defence. The visit from Tunis was personally received by Frontex Director Hans Leijtens. EU officials then gave presentations on the capabilities and capacities of the border agency, including the training department or the deportation centre set up in 2021, which relies on good cooperation with destination states of deportation flights.
Briefings were also held on the cross-border surveillance system EUROSUR and the “Situation Centre”, where all threads from surveillance with ships, aircraft, drones and satellites come together. The armed “permanent reserve” that Frontex has been building up since 2021 was also presented to the Tunisian ministries. These will also be deployed in third countries, but so far only in Europe in the Western Balkans.
However, Tunisia still does not want to negotiate such a deployment of Frontex personnel to its territory, so a status agreement necessary for this is a long way off. The government in Tunis is also not currently seeking a working agreement to facilitate the exchange of information with Frontex. Finally, the Tunisian coast guard also turned down an offer to participate in an exercise of European coast guards in Greece.
Model for migration defence with Egypt
Aiding and abetting “smuggling” is an offence that the police are responsible for prosecuting in EU states. If these offences affect two or more EU states, Europol can coordinate the investigations. This, too, is now to get underway with Tunisia: In April, EU Commissioner Ylva Johansson had already visited Tunis and agreed on an “operational partnership to combat people smuggling” (ASOP), for which additional funds will be made available. Italy, Spain and Austria are responsible for implementing this police cooperation.
Finally, Tunisia is also one of the countries being discussed in Brussels in the “Mechanism of Operational Coordination for the External Dimension of Migration” (MOCADEM). This working group was newly created by the EU states last year and serves to politically bundle measures towards third countries of particular interest. In one of the most recent meetings, the migration agreement was also a topic. Following Tunisia’s example, the EU could also conclude such a deal with Egypt. The EU heads of government are now to take a decision on this.
▻https://digit.site36.net/2023/11/01/fewer-boat-crossings-visit-to-frontex-eu-and-tunisia-implement-migrati
#Europe #Union_européenne #EU #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #accord #gestion_des_frontières #aide_financière #protocole_d'accord #politique_migratoire #externalisation #Memorandum_of_Understanding (#MoU) #Tunisie #coopération #Frontex #aide_financière #Neighbourhood_Development_and_International_Cooperation_Instrument (#NDICI) #gardes-côtes_tunisiens #militarisation_des_frontières #retours_volontaires #IOM #OIM #UNHCR #EU4BorderSecurity_programme #Seahorse_Mediterranean #officiers_de_liaison #arrivées #départs #chiffres #statistiques #prix #Frontex #operational_partnership_to_combat_people_smuggling (#ASOP) #Mechanism_of_Operational_Coordination_for_the_External_Dimension_of_Migration (#MOCADEM)
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ajouté à la métaliste sur le Mémorandum of Understanding entre l’UE et la Tunisie :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/1020591
EU to step up support for human rights abuses in North Africa
In a letter (▻https://www.statewatch.org/media/4088/eu-com-migration-letter-eur-council-10-23.pdf) to the European Council trumpeting the EU’s efforts to control migration, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen highlighted the provision of vessels and support to coast guards in Libya and Tunisia, where refugee and migrant rights are routinely violated.
The letter (pdf) states:
“…we need to build up the capacity of our partners to conduct effective border surveillance and search and rescue operations. We are providing support to many key partners with equipment and training to help prevent unauthorised border crossings. All five vessels promised to Libya have been delivered and we see the impact of increased patrols. Under the Memorandum of Understanding with Tunisia, we have delivered spare parts for Tunisian coast guards that are keeping 6 boats operational, and others will be repaired by the end of the year. More is expected to be delivered to countries in North Africa in the coming months.”
What it does not mention is that vessels delivered to the so-called Libyan coast guard are used to conduct “pullbacks” of refugees to brutal detention conditions and human rights violations.
Meanwhile in Tunisia, the coast guard has been conducting pullbacks of people who have subsequently been dumped in remote regions near the Tunisian-Algerian border.
According to testimony provided to Human Rights Watch (HRW)¸ a group of people who were intercepted at sea and brought back to shore were then detained by the National Guard, who:
“…loaded the group onto buses and drove them for 6 hours to somewhere near the city of Le Kef, about 40 kilometers from the Algerian border. There, officers divided them into groups of about 10, loaded them onto pickup trucks, and drove toward a mountainous area. The four interviewees, who were on the same truck, said that another truck with armed agents escorted their truck.
The officers dropped their group in the mountains near the Tunisia-Algeria border, they said. The Guinean boy [interviewed by HRW) said that one officer had threatened, “If you return again [to Tunisia], we will kill you.” One of the Senegalese children [interviewed by HRW] said an officer had pointed his gun at the group.”
Von der Leyen does not mention the fact that the Tunisian authorities refused an initial disbursement of €67 million offered by the Commission as part of its more than €1 billion package for Tunisia, which the country’s president has called “small” and said it “lacks respect.” (▻https://apnews.com/article/tunisia-europe-migration-851cf35271d2c52aea067287066ef247) The EU’s ambassador to Tunisia has said that the refusal “speaks to Tunisia’s impatience and desire to speed up implementation” of the deal.
[voir: ▻https://seenthis.net/messages/1020596]
The letter also emphasises the need to “establish a strategic and mutually beneficial partnership with Egypt,” as well as providing more support to Türkiye, Jordan and Lebanon. The letter hints at the reason why – Israel’s bombing of the Gaza strip and a potential exodus of refugees – but does not mention the issue directly, merely saying that “the pressures on partners in our immediate vicinity risk being exacerbated”.
It appears that the consequences rather than the causes of any movements of Palestinian refugees are the main concern. Conclusions on the Middle East agreed by the European Council last night demand “rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access and aid to reach those in need” in Gaza, but do not call for a ceasefire. The European Council instead “strongly emphasises Israel’s right to defend itself in line with international law and international humanitarian law.”
More surveillance, new law
Other plans mentioned in the letter include “increased aerial surveillance” for “combatting human smuggling and trafficking” by Operation IRINI, the EU’s military mission in the Mediterranean, and increased support for strengthening controls at points of departure in North African states as well as “points of entry by migrants at land borders.”
The Commission also wants increased action against migrant smuggling, with a proposal to revise the 2002 Facilitation Directive “to ensure that criminal offences are harmonised, assets are frozen, and coordination strengthened,” so that “those who engage in illegal acts exploiting migrants pay a heavy price.”
It appears the proposal will come at the same time as a migrant smuggling conference organised by the Commission on 28 November “to create a Global Alliance with a Call to Action, launching a process of regular international exchange on this constantly evolving crime.”
Deportation cooperation
Plans are in the works for more coordinated action on deportations, with the Commission proposing to:
“…work in teams with Member States on targeted return actions, with a lead Member State or Agency for each action. We will develop a roadmap that could focus on (1) ensuring that return decisions are issued at the same time as a negative asylum decisions (2) systematically ensuring the mutual recognition of return decisions and follow-up enforcement action; (3) carrying out joint identification actions including through a liaison officers’ network in countries of origin; (4) supporting policy dialogue on readmission with third countries and facilitating the issuance of travel documents, as well as acceptance of the EU laissez passer; and (5) organising assisted voluntary return and joint return operations with the support of Frontex.”
Cooperation on legal migration, meanwhile, will be done by member states “on a voluntary basis,” with the letter noting that any offers made should be conditional on increased cooperation with EU deportation efforts: “local investment and opportunities for legal migration must go hand in hand with strengthened cooperation on readmission.”
More funds
For all this to happen, the letter calls on the European Council to make sure that “migration priorities - both on the internal and external dimension - are reflected in the mid-term review of the Multiannual Financial Framework,” the EU’s 2021-27 budget.
Mid-term revision of the budget was discussed at the European Council meeting yesterday, though the conclusions on that point merely state that there was an “in-depth exchange of views,” with the European Council calling on the Council of the EU “to take work forward, with a view to reaching an overall agreement by the end of the year.”
▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/october/eu-to-step-up-support-for-human-rights-abuses-in-north-africa
#migrations #asile #réfugiés #Afrique_du_Nord #externalisation #Ursula_von_der_Leyen #lettre #contrôles_frontaliers #Tunisie #Libye #bateaux #aide #gardes-côtes_libyens #surveillance_frontalière #surveillance_frontalière_effective #frontières #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #Memorandum_of_Understanding #MoU #pull-backs #Egypte #Turquie #Jourdanie #Liban #réfugiés_palestiniens #Palestine #7_octobre_2023 #Operation_IRINI #IRINI #surveillance_aérienne #passeurs #directive_facilitation #renvois #déportation #officiers_de_liaison #réadmissions #laissez-passer #Frontex
The EU-Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding : A Blueprint for Cooperation on Migration ?
On July 16, 2023, a memorandum of understanding, known as the “migrant deal”, was signed between the EU and Tunisia, at a time when the EU is trying to find ways to limit the arrival of irregular migrants into its territory. The memorandum, however, raises some concerns regarding its content, form, and human rights implications.
This past year, Tunisia became the primary country of departure for migrants attempting to reach the European Union via Italy through the Central Mediterranean route. With a sharp increase of arrivals in the first few months of 2023, which further accelerated during the summer, cooperation with Tunisia has turned into a key priority in the EU’s efforts to limit migration inflows.
On July 16, 2023, after complicated negotiations, Olivér Várhelyi, the EU Commissioner for Neighborhood and Enlargement, and Mounir Ben Rjiba, Secretary of State to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad, signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on “a strategic and global partnership between the European Union and Tunisia,” published in the form of a press release on the European Commission’s website. President Ursula von der Leyen labeled the deal as a “blueprint” for future arrangements, reiterating the commission’s intention to work on similar agreements with other countries. The MoU, however, in terms of its content, form, and the human rights concerns it raises, falls squarely within current trends characterizing EU cooperation on migration with third countries.
The content of the agreement
Known as the “migrant deal,” the MoU covers five areas of cooperation: macro-economic stability, economy and trade, green energy transition, people-to-people contacts, and migration and mobility. The EU agreed to provide €105 million to enhance Tunisia’s border control capabilities while facilitating entry to highly-skilled Tunisians, and €150 million in direct budgetary support to reduce the country’s soaring inflation. It further foresees an extra €900 million in macro-economic support conditioned on Tunisia agreeing to sign an International Monetary Fund bailout. In exchange, Tunisia committed to cooperate on the fight against the smuggling and trafficking of migrants, to carry out search and rescue operations within its maritime borders, and to readmit its own nationals irregularly present in the EU—an obligation already existent under customary international law. Much to Italy’s disappointment, and unlike what happened in the case of Turkey in 2016, Tunisia refused to accept the return of non-Tunisian migrants who transited through the country to reach the EU, in line with the position it has occupied since the onset of the negotiations.
What was agreed on seems to be all but new, seemingly reiterating past commitments
Overall, what was agreed on seems to be all but new, seemingly reiterating past commitments. As for funding, the EU had been providing support to Tunisia to strengthen its border management capabilities since 2015. More broadly, and despite its flaws, the MoU embeds the current carrot-and-stick approach to EU cooperation with third countries, systematically using other external policies of interest to these nations, such as development assistance, trade and investments, and energy—coupled with promises of (limited) opportunities for legal mobility—to induce third countries to cooperate on containing migration flows.
The legal nature of the agreement
The MoU embeds the broader trend of de-constitutionalization and informalization of EU cooperation with third countries, which first appeared in the 2005 “Global Approach to Migration” and the 2011 “Global Approach to Migration and Mobility”, and substantially grew in the aftermath of the 2015 refugee crisis, with the EU-Turkey Statement and the “Joint Way Forward on migration with Afghanistan” being the most prominent examples, in addition to several Mobility Partnerships. The common denominator among these informal arrangements consisted of the use of instruments outside the constitutional framework established for concluding international agreements, notably Article 218 on the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), to agree on bilateral commitments that usually consist in the mobilization of different EU policy areas to deliver on migration containment goals.
Recourse to informal arrangements can have its advantages, as they are capable of adapting quickly to new realities and allow for immediate implementation without requiring parliamentary ratification or authorization procedures, as highlighted by the EU Court of Auditors. However, they might fall short of constitutional guarantees, as they do not follow standard EU treaty-making rules. EU treaties are silent as to how non-binding agreements should be negotiated and concluded, and thus often lack democratic oversight, transparency, and legal certainty. They might also pose issues in terms of judicial review by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), in accordance with Article 263 of the TFEU.
In the much-debated judgment “NF”, the General Court—the jurisdiction of first instance of the CJEU—refused to assess the legality of the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement, which was published as a press release on the website of the European Council. Indeed, the Court concluded at the time that the deal was one of member states acting in their capacity as heads of state and government, and not as part of the European Council as an EU institution, rendering the deal unattributable to the EU. The Court did not specifically refer to the legal nature of the agreement, despite all EU institutions stressing that the document was “not intended to produce legally binding effects nor constitute an agreement or a treaty” (para. 27), it being “merely ‘a political arrangement’” (para. 29).
Overall, it is apparent that the lack of clarity regarding the procedure to be followed and the actors to be involved when it comes to the conclusion of non-binding agreements by the EU is problematic from a rule of law perspective
The EU-Tunisia MoU, on the other hand, was signed by the European Commission alone, making it fully attributable to the EU. This means that it could be potentially challenged before the CJEU, if there is reason to believe that the content of the agreement renders it a legally-binding one, infringing on the procedure foreseen by the EU treaties, or if the competencies of the Council and the Parliament, the two other EU institutions usually involved in the conclusion of international agreements, were otherwise breached. In another case, the CJEU indeed found that, while the treaties do not regulate the matter and thus Article 218 on the TFEU does not apply, the Commission should nonetheless seek prior approval of the Council before signing an MoU in the exercise of its competencies, pursuant to Article 17 (1) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), due to the Council’s “policy-making” powers provided by Article 16 of the TEU. The Court, however, did not clarify whether the Commission should have likewise involved the European Parliament in light of its power to exercise “political control,” provided by Article 14 TEU. With regard to the MoU with Tunisia, however, neither of the two institutions seemed to have been involved. Overall, it is apparent that the lack of clarity regarding the procedure to be followed and the actors to be involved when it comes to the conclusion of non-binding agreements by the EU is problematic from a rule of law perspective.
Concerns over protection of fundamental rights
The EU-Tunisia MoU has been harshly criticized by both civil society organizations and different members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in light of the Tunisian authorities’ documented abuses and hostilities against migrants, amidst a political climate of broader democratic crisis. While vaguely referring to “respect for human rights,” the MoU does not specify how the Commission intends to ensure compliance with fundamental rights. Concerns over the agreement led the European Ombudsman—a body of the EU that investigates instances of maladministration by EU institutions—to ask the EU’s executive arm whether it had conducted a human rights impact assessment before its conclusion, as well as if it intended to monitor its implementation, and if it envisaged the suspension of funding if human rights were not respected. This adds to the growing discontent over the EU’s prioritization of securing its borders over ensuring the protection of fundamental rights of migrants, through the externalization of border controls to third countries with poor human rights records and authoritarian governments, such as Libya, Turkey, Morocco, Egypt, and Sudan, among others.
These episodes exemplify the paradox of externalization, with the EU trying to shield itself from the risk of instrumentalization of migration by third countries on one hand, and making itself dependent upon these actors’ willingness to contain migratory flows, and thus vulnerable to forms of repercussion and bad faith tactics, on the other
In an unprecedented move, Tunisia denied entry to a group of MEPs who were due to visit the country on official duty on September 14. While no official explanation was given, the move was seen as a reaction for speaking out against the agreement. Despite this, and the fact that there is still a lack of clarity as to how compliance with fundamental rights will be guaranteed, the Commission announced that the first tranche of EU funding would be released by the end of September. However, Tunisia declared to have rejected the money precisely over the EU’s excessive focus on migration containment, although Várhelyi stated that the refusal related to budget support is unrelated to the MoU. These episodes exemplify the paradox of externalization, with the EU trying to shield itself from the risk of instrumentalization of migration by third countries on one hand, and making itself dependent upon these actors’ willingness to contain migratory flows, and thus vulnerable to forms of repercussion and bad faith tactics, on the other. Similar deals, posing similar risks, are currently envisaged with Egypt and Morocco. Moving forward, the EU should instead make efforts to create partnerships with third countries based on genuine mutually-shared interests, restoring credibility in its international relations which should be based on support for its founding values: democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.
▻https://timep.org/2023/10/19/the-eu-tunisia-memorandum-of-understanding-a-blueprint-for-cooperation-on-mig
#Tunisie #EU #Europe #Union_européenne #EU #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #accord #gestion_des_frontières #aide_financière #protocole_d'accord #politique_migratoire #externalisation #memorandum_of_understanding #MoU
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ajouté à la métaliste sur le Mémorandum of Understanding entre l’UE et la Tunisie :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/1020591
#Tunisie : le président, #Kaïs_Saïed, refuse les #fonds_européens pour les migrants, qu’il considère comme de la « #charité »
Un #accord a été conclu en juillet entre Tunis et Bruxelles pour lutter contre l’immigration irrégulière. La Commission européenne a précisé que sur les 105 millions d’euros d’aide prévus, quelque 42 millions d’euros allaient être « alloués rapidement ».
Première anicroche dans le contrat passé en juillet entre la Tunisie et l’Union européenne (UE) dans le dossier sensible des migrants. Kaïs Saïed, le président tunisien, a, en effet, déclaré, lundi 2 octobre en soirée, que son pays refusait les fonds alloués par Bruxelles, dont le montant « dérisoire » va à l’encontre de l’entente entre les deux parties.
La Commission européenne avait annoncé le 22 septembre qu’elle commencerait à allouer « rapidement » les fonds prévus dans le cadre de l’accord avec la Tunisie afin de faire baisser les arrivées de migrants au départ de ce pays. La Commission a précisé que sur les 105 millions d’euros d’aide prévus par cet accord pour lutter contre l’immigration irrégulière, quelque 42 millions d’euros allaient être « alloués rapidement ». Auxquels s’ajoutent 24,7 millions d’euros déjà prévus dans le cadre de programmes en cours.
« La Tunisie, qui accepte la #coopération, n’accepte pas tout ce qui s’apparente à de la charité ou à la faveur, car notre pays et notre peuple ne veulent pas de la sympathie et ne l’acceptent pas quand elle est sans respect », stipule un communiqué de la présidence tunisienne. « Par conséquence, la Tunisie refuse ce qui a été annoncé ces derniers jours par l’UE », a dit M. Saïed qui recevait son ministre des affaires étrangères, Nabil Ammar.
Il a expliqué que ce refus n’était pas lié au « montant dérisoire (…) mais parce que cette proposition va à l’encontre » de l’accord signé à Tunis et « de l’esprit qui a régné lors de la conférence de Rome », en juillet.
Une aide supplémentaire de 150 millions d’euros
La Tunisie est avec la Libye le principal point de départ pour des milliers de migrants qui traversent la Méditerranée centrale vers l’Europe, et arrivent en Italie.
Selon la Commission européenne, l’aide doit servir en partie à la remise en état de bateaux utilisés par les #garde-côtes_tunisiens et à la coopération avec des organisations internationales à la fois pour la « protection des migrants » et pour des opérations de retour de ces exilés depuis la Tunisie vers leurs pays d’origine.
Ce #protocole_d’accord entre la Tunisie et l’UE prévoit en outre une #aide_budgétaire directe de 150 millions d’euros en 2023 alors que le pays est confronté à de graves difficultés économiques. Enfin, M. Saïed a ajouté que son pays « met tout en œuvre pour démanteler les réseaux criminels de trafic d’êtres humains ».
►https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2023/10/03/tunisie-le-president-kais-saied-rejette-les-fonds-europeens-pour-les-migrant
#refus #Memorandum_of_Understanding (#MoU) #externalisation #migrations #asile #réfugiés #UE #EU #Union_européenne
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ajouté à la métaliste sur le #Memorandum_of_Understanding (#MoU) avec la #Tunisie :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/1020591
#Métaliste sur le #Memorandum_of_Understanding (#MoU) avec la #Tunisie
#Europe #Union_européenne #EU #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #accord #gestion_des_frontières #aide_financière #protocole_d'accord #politique_migratoire #externalisation
]]>Immigration : après la #Tunisie, l’Union européenne viserait des #partenariats_migratoires avec l’#Egypte et le #Maroc
L’#Union_européenne souhaite négocier avec l’Égypte et le Maroc des partenariats similaires à celui qu’elle vient de conclure avec la Tunisie, portant sur la lutte contre l’immigration irrégulière.
L’UE et la Tunisie ont signé ce dimanche 16 juillet à Tunis un protocole d’accord pour un « #partenariat_stratégique », qui concerne aussi le développement économique du pays et les énergies renouvelables.
Sur le volet migratoire, il prévoit une aide européenne de 105 millions d’euros destinée à empêcher les départs de bateaux de migrants vers l’UE depuis les côtes tunisiennes et lutter contre les passeurs.
Mais aussi à faciliter les retours dans ce pays de Tunisiens qui sont en situation irrégulière dans l’UE, ainsi que les retours depuis la Tunisie vers leurs pays d’origine de migrants d’Afrique subsaharienne.
La présidente de la Commission européenne Ursula von der Leyen a dit souhaiter que ce partenariat soit un #modèle pour de futurs #accords avec les pays de la région.
L’Égypte et le Maroc sont deux pays qui pourraient être concernés, a indiqué un haut responsable européen s’exprimant sous couvert de l’anonymat, soulignant les bénéfices de ce type de partenariat pour les deux rives de la Méditerranée.
Mais cet accord avec Tunis a aussi suscité des critiques en raison du traitement des migrants d’Afrique sub-saharienne dans ce pays du Maghreb. Des centaines de migrants ont été arrêtés en Tunisie puis « déportés » par la police, selon les ONG, vers des zones inhospitalières aux frontières avec Algérie et Libye.
▻https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/immigration-apres-la-tunisie-lunion-europeenne-viserait-des-pa
#externalisation #migrations #asile #réfugiés #frontières #partenariat #modèle_tunisien
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ajouté à la métaliste sur le #memorandum_of_understanding avec la Tunisie :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/1020591
ping @_kg_
L’agenzia europea che costruisce le frontiere in Tunisia
▻https://irpimedia.irpi.eu/thebigwall-icmpd-tunisia
A metà luglio è stato siglato il Memorandum of understanding tra Ue e Tunisia, con al centro il tema migratorio. Le esigenze di Tunisi sono rappresentate all’Europa anche da un’agenzia austriaca, l’Icmpd, di un cui un documento interno svela alcuni segreti Clicca per leggere l’articolo L’agenzia europea che costruisce le frontiere in Tunisia pubblicato su IrpiMedia.
]]>La Tunisia rifiuta i respingimenti collettivi e le deportazioni di migranti irregolari proposti da #Meloni e #Piantedosi
1.Il risultato del vertice di Tunisi era già chiaro prima che Giorgia Meloni, la presidente della Commissione europea Von del Leyen ed il premier olandese Mark Rutte incontrassero il presidente Saied. Con una operazione di immagine inaspettata, il giorno prima del vertice, l’uomo che aveva lanciato mesi fa la caccia ai migranti subsahariani presenti nel suo paese, parlando addirittura del rischio di sostituzione etnica, si recava a Sfax, nella regione dalla quale si verifica la maggior parte delle partenze verso l’Italia, e come riferisce Il Tempo, parlando proprio con un gruppo di loro, dichiarava : “ Siamo tutti africani. Questi migranti sono nostri fratelli e li rispettiamo, ma la situazione in Tunisia non è normale e dobbiamo porre fine a questo problema. Rifiutiamo qualsiasi trattamento disumano di questi migranti che sono vittime di un ordine mondiale che li considera come ‘numeri’ e non come esseri umani. L’intervento su questo fenomeno deve essere umanitario e collettivo, nel quadro della legge”. Lo stesso Saied, secondo quanto riportato dalla Reuters, il giorno precedente la visita, aggiungeva che di fronte alla crescente mobilità migratoria “La soluzione non sarà a spese della Tunisia… non possiamo essere una guardia per i loro paesi”.
Alla fine del vertice non c’è stata una vera e propria conferenza stampa congiunta, ma è stata fatta trapelare una Dichiarazione sottoscritta anche da Saied che stabilisce una sorta di roadmap verso un futuro Memorandum d’intesa (MoU) tra la Tunisia e l’Unione europea, che si dovrebbe stipulare entro il prossimo Consiglio europeo dei capi di governo che si terrà a fine giugno. L’Ue e la Tunisia hanno dato incarico, rispettivamente, al commissario europeo per l’Allargamento Oliver Varheliy e al ministro degli Esteri tunisino Nabil Ammar di stilare un memorandum d’intesa (Memorandum of Understanding, MoU) sul pacchetto di partnership allargata, che dovrebbe essere sottoscritto dalla Tunisia e dall’Ue “prima di fine giugno”. Una soluzione che sa tanto di rinvio, nella quale certamente non si trovano le richieste che il governo Meloni aveva cercato di fare passare, già attraverso il Consiglio dei ministri dell’Unione europea di Lussemburgo, restando poi costretto ad accettare una soluzione di compromesso, che non prevedeva affatto -come invece era stato richiesto- i respingimenti collettivi in alto mare, delegati alla Guardia costiera tunisina, e le deportazioni in Tunisia di migranti irregolari o denegati, dopo una richiesta di asilo, giunti in Italia dopo un transito temporaneo da quel paese.
Secondo Piantedosi, “la Tunisia è già considerata un Paese terzo sicuro da provvedimenti e atti ufficiali italiani” e “La Farnesina ha già una lista formale di Stati terzi definiti sicuri. Sia in Africa, penso al Senegal, così come nei Balcani”. Bene che nella sua conferenza stampa a Catania, censurata dai media, non abbia citato la Libia, dopo avere chiesto la collaborazione del generale Haftar per bloccare le partenze verso l’Italia. Ma rimane tutto da dimostrare che la Tunisia sia un “paese terzo sicuro”, soprattutto per i cittadini non tunisini, generalmente provenienti dall’area subsahariana, perchè il richiamo strumentale che fa il ministro dell’interno alla lista di “paesi terzi sicuri” approvata con decreti ministeriali ed ampliata nel corso del tempo, riguarda i cittadini tunisini che chiedono asilo in Italia, e che comunque possono fare valere una richiesta di protezione internazionale, non certo i migranti provenienti da altri paesi e transitati in Tunisia, che si vorrebbero deportare senza troppe formalità, dopo procedure rapide in frontiera. Una possibilità che ancora non è concessa allo stato della legislazione nazionale e del quadro normativo europeo (in particolare dalla Direttiva Rimpatri 2008/115/CE), che si dovrebbe comunque modificare prima della entrata in vigore, ammsso che ci si arrivi prima delle prossime elezioni europee, del Patto sulla migrazione e l’asilo recentemente approvato a Lussemburgo.
La Presidente della Comissione Europea, nella brevissima conferenza stampa tenuta dopo la chiusura del vertice di Tunisi ha precisato i punti essenziali sui quali si dovrebbe trovare un accordo tra Bruxelles e Tunisi, Fondo monetario internazionale permettendo. Von der Leyen ha confermato che la Ue è pronta a mobilitare 900 milioni di euro di assistenza finanziaria per Tunisi. I tempi però non saranno brevi. “La Commissione europea valuterà l’assistenza macrofinanziaria non appena sarà trovato l’accordo (con il Fmi) necessario. E siamo pronti a mobilitare fino a 900 milioni di euro per questo scopo di assistenza macrofinanziaria. Come passo immediato, potremmo fornire subito un ulteriore sostegno al bilancio fino a 150 milioni di euro”. Come riferisce Adnkronos, “Tunisi dovrebbe prima trovare l’intesa con il Fondo Monetario Internazionale su un pacchetto di aiuti, a fronte del quale però il Fondo chiede riforme, che risulterebbero impopolari e che la leadership tunisina esita pertanto ad accollarsi”. Secondo Adnkronos, L’Ue intende “ripristinare il Consiglio di associazione” tra Ue e Tunisia e l’Alto Rappresentante Josep Borrell “è pronto ad organizzare il prossimo incontro entro la fine dell’anno”, ha sottolineato la presidente della Commissione Europea Ursula von der Leyen al termine dell’incontro. L’esecutivo comunitario è pronto ad aiutare la Tunisia con un pacchetto basato su cinque pilastri, il principale dei quali è costituito da aiuti finanziari per oltre un miliardo di euro. Il primo è lo sviluppo economico. “Sosterremo la Tunisia, per rafforzarne l’economia. La Commissione Europea sta valutando un’assistenza macrofinanziaria, non appena sarà trovato l’accordo necessario. Siamo pronti a mobilitare fino a 900 milioni di euro per questo scopo. E, come passo immediato, potremmo fornire altri 150 milioni di euro di sostegno al bilancio“. “Il secondo pilastro – continua von der Leyen – sono gli investimenti e il commercio. L’Ue è il principale investitore straniero e partner commerciale della Tunisia. E noi proponiamo di andare oltre: vorremmo modernizzare il nostro attuale accordo commerciale. C’è molto potenziale per creare posti di lavoro e stimolare la crescita qui in Tunisia. Un focus importante per i nostri investimenti è il settore digitale. Abbiamo già una buona base“. Sempre secondo quanto riferito da Adnkronos, “La Commissione Europea sta lavorando ad un memorandum di intesa con la Tunisia nelle energie rinnovabili, campo nel quale il Paese nordafricano ha un potenziale “enorme”, mentre l’Ue ne ha sempre più bisogno, per alimentare il processo di elettrificazione e decarbonizzazione della sua economia, spiega la presidente. L’energia è “il terzo pilastro” del piano in cinque punti che von der Leyen ha delineato al termine della riunione”.
Quest’anno l’Ue “fornirà alla Tunisia 100 milioni di euro per la gestione delle frontiere, ma anche per la ricerca e il soccorso, la lotta ai trafficanti e il rimpatrio”, annuncia ancora la presidente. Il controllo dei flussi migratori è il quarto pilastro del programma che von der Leyen ha delineato per i rapporti bilaterali tra Ue e Tunisia. Per la presidente della Commissione europea, l’obiettivo “è sostenere una politica migratoria olistica radicata nel rispetto dei diritti umani. Entrambi abbiamo interesse a spezzare il cinico modello di business dei trafficanti di esseri umani. È orribile vedere come mettono deliberatamente a rischio vite umane, a scopo di lucro. Lavoreremo insieme su un partenariato operativo contro il traffico di esseri umani e sosterremo la Tunisia nella gestione delle frontiere”.
Nel pacchetto di proposte comprese nel futuro Memorandum d’intesa UE-Tunisia, che si dovrebbe sottoscrivere entro la fine di giugno, rientrerebbero anche una serie di aiuti economici all’economia tunisina, in particolare nei settori dell’agricoltura e del turismo, e nuove possibilità di mobilità studentesca, con programmi tipo Erasmus. Nulla di nuovo, ed anche una dotazione finanziaria ridicola, se si pensa ai 200 milioni di euro stanziati solo dall’Italia con il Memorandum d’intesa con la Tunisia siglato da Di Maio per il triennio 2021-2023. Semmai sarebbe interessante sapere come stati spesi quei soldi, visti i risultati sulla situazione dei migranti in transito in Tunisia, nelle politiche di controllo delle frontiere e nei soccorsi in mare.
2. Non è affatto vero dunque che sia passata la linea dell’Italia per due ragioni fondamentali. L’Italia chiedeva una erogazione immediata degli aiuti europei alla Tunisia e una cooperazione operativa nei respingimenti collettivi in mare ed anche la possibilità di riammissione in Tunisia di cittadini di paesi terzi ( non tunisini) giunti irregolarmente nel nostro territorio, o di cui fosse stata respinta la domanda di protezione nelle procedure in frontiera. Queste richieste della Meloni (e di Piantedosi) sono state respinte, e non rientrano nel Memorandum d’intesa che entro la fine del mese Saied dovrebbe sottoscrivere con l’Unione Europea (il condizionale è d’obbligo).
Gli aiuti europei sono subordinati all’accettazione da parte di Saied delle condizioni poste dal Fondo Monetario internazionale per l’erogazione del prestito fin qui rifiutato dal presidente. Un prestito che sarebbe condizionato al rispetto di paramentri monetari e di abbattimento degli aiuti pubblici, e forse anche al rispetto dei diritti umani, che in questo momento non sono accettati dal presidente tunisino, ormai di fatto un vero e proprio autocrate. Con il quale la Meloni, ormai lanciata verso il presidenzialismo all’italiana, si riconosce più di quanto non facciano esponenti politici di altri paesi europei. Al punto che persino Mark Rutte, che nel suo paese ha attuato politiche migratorie ancora più drastiche di quelle propagandate dal governo italiano, richiama, alla fine del suo intervento, l’esigenza del rispetto dei diritti umani delle persone migranti, come perno del nuovo Memorandum d’intesa tra la Tunisia e l’Unione Europea.
Per un altro verso, la “lnea dell’Italia”, dunque la politica dei “respingimenti su delega”, che si vorrebbe replicare con la Tunisia, sul modello di quanto avviene con le autorità libiche, delegando a motovedette, donate dal nostro paese e coordinate anche dall’agenzia europea Frontex, i respingimenti collettivi in acque internazionali, non sembra di facile applicazione per evidenti ragioni geografiche e geopolitiche.
La Tunisia non e’ la Libia (o la Turchia), le autorità centrali hanno uno scarso controllo dei punti di partenza dei migranti e la corruzione è molto diffusa. Sembra molto probabile che le partenze verso l’Italia continueranno ad aumentare in modo esponenziale nelle prossime settimane. Aumentare le dotazioni di mezi e i supporti operativi in favore delle motovedette tunisine si è già dimostrata una politica priva di efficacia e semmai foriera di stragi in mare. Sulle stragi in mare neppure una parola dopo il vertice di Tunisi. Non è vero che la diminuzione delle partenze dalla Tunisia nel mese di maggio sia conseguenza della politica migratoria del governo Meloni, risultando soltanto una conseguenza di un mese caratterizzato da condizioni meteo particolarmente sfavorevoli, come ha riconosciuto anchel’OIM e l’Alto Commissariato delle Nazioni Unite per i rifugiati (UNHCR), e come tutti hanno potuto constatare anche in Italia. Vedremo con il ritorno dell’estate se le partenze dalla Tunisia registreranno ancora un calo.
La zona Sar (di ricerca e salvataggio) tunisina si limita alle acque territoriali (12 miglia dalla costa) ed i controlli affidati alle motovedette tunisine non si possono svolgere oltre. Difficile che le motovedette tunisine si spingano nella zona Sar “libica” o in quella maltese. Continueranno ad intercettare a convenienza, quando i trafficanti non pagheranno abbastanza per corrompere, ed i loro interventi, condotti spesso con modalità di avvicinamento che mettono a rischio la vita dei naufraghi, non ridurranno di certo gli arrivi sulle coste italiane di cittadini tunisini e subsahariani. Per il resto il futuribile Memorandum d’intesa Tunisia-Libia, che ancora e’ una scatola vuota, e che l’Unione europea vincola al rispetto dei diritti umani, dunque anche agli obblighi internazionali di soccorso in mare, non può incidere in tempi brevi sui rapporti bilaterali tra Roma e Tunisi, che sono disciplinati da accordi bilaterali che si dovrebbero modificare successivamente, sempre in conformità con la legislazione ( e la Costituzione) italiana e la normativa euro-unitaria. Dunque non saranno ogettto di nuovi accordi a livello europeo con la Tunisia i respingimenti collettivi vietati dall’art.19 della Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione Europea e non si potranno realizzare, come vorrebero la Meloni e Piantedosi, deportazioni in Tunisia di cittadini di altri paesi terzi, peraltro esclusi dai criteri di “connessione” richiesti nella “proposta legislativa” adottata dal Consiglio dei ministri dell’interno di Lussemburgo. E si dovranno monitorare anche i respingimenti di cittadini tunisini in Tunisia, dopo la svolta autoritaria impressa dall’autocrate Saied che ha fatto arrestare giornalisti e sindacalisti, oltre che numerosi membri dei partiti di opposizione. In ogni caso non si dovranno dimenticare le condanne ricevute dall’Italia da parte della Corte europea dei diritti dell’Uomo, proprio per i respingimenti differiti effettuati ai danni di cittadini tunisini (caso Khlaifia). Faranno morire ancora centinaia di innocenti. Dare la colpa ai trafficanti non salva dal fallimento politico e morale nè l’Unione Europea nè il governo Meloni.
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Saied, inaccettabili centri migranti in Tunisia
(ANSA) – TUNISI, 11 GIU – Il presidente tunisino Kais Saied, nel suo incontro con la presidente del Consiglio, Giorgia Meloni, della presidente della Commissione Ue, Ursula von der Leyen e del primo ministro olandese Mark Rutte “ha fatto notare che la soluzione che alcuni sostengono segretamente di ospitare in Tunisia migranti in cambio di somme di denaro è disumana e inaccettabile, così come le soluzioni di sicurezza si sono dimostrate inadeguate, anzi hanno aumentato le sofferenze delle vittime della povertà e delle guerre”. Lo si legge in un comunicato della presidenza tunisina, pubblicato al termine dell”incontro. (ANSA).
2023-06-11 18:59
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ANSA/Meloni e l”Ue incassano prima intesa ma Saied alza posta
(dell”inviato Michele Esposito)
(ANSA) – TUNISI, 11 GIU – Una visita lampo, una dichiarazione congiunta che potrebbe portare ad un cruciale memorandum d”intesa, un orizzonte ancora confuso dal continuo alzare la posta di Kais Saied. Il vertice tra Ursula von der Leyen, Giorgia Meloni, Mark Rutte e il presidente tunisino potrebbe segnare un prima e un dopo nei rapporti tra l”Ue e il Paese nordafricano. Al tavolo del palazzo presidenziale di Cartagine, per oltre due ore, i quattro hanno affrontato dossier a dir poco spigolosi, dalla gestione dei migranti alla necessità di un”intesa tra Tunisia e Fmi. La luce verde sulla prima intesa alla fine si è accesa. “E” un passo importante, dobbiamo arrivare al Consiglio europeo con un memorandum già siglato tra l”Ue e la Tunisia”, è l”obiettivo fissato da Meloni, che ha rilanciato il ruolo di prima linea dell”Italia nei rapporti tra l”Europa e la sponda Sud del Mediterraneo. Nel Palazzo voluto dal padre della patria tunisino, Habib Bourguiba, von der Leyen, Meloni e Rutte sono arrivati con l”ideale divisa del Team Europe. I tre, di fatto, hanno rappresentato l”intera Unione sin da quando, a margine del summit in Moldavia della scorsa settimana, è nata l”idea di accelerare sul dossier tunisino. I giorni successivi sono stati segnati da frenetici contatti tra gli sherpa. Il compromesso, iniziale e generico, alla fine è arrivato. L”Ue sborserà sin da subito, e senza attendere il Fondo Monetario Internazionale, 150 milioni di euro a sostegno del bilancio tunisino. E” un primo passo ma di certo non sufficiente per Saied. Sulla seconda parte del sostegno europeo, il pacchetto di assistenza macro-finanziaria da 900 milioni, l”Ue tuttavia non ha cambiato idea: sarà sborsato solo dopo l”intesa tra Saied e l”Fmi. Intesa che appare ancora lontana: poco dopo la partenza dei tre leader europei, la presidenza tunisina ha infatti invitato il Fondo a “rivedere le sue ricette” ed evitare “diktat”, sottolineando che gli aiuti da 1,9 miliardi, sotto forma di prestiti, “non porteranno benefici” alla popolazione. La difficoltà di mettere il punto finale al negoziato tra Ue e Tunisia sta anche in un altro dato: la stessa posizione europea è frutto di un compromesso tra gli Stati membri. Non è un caso, ad esempio, che sia stato Rutte, portatore delle istanze dei Paesi del Nord, a spiegare come la cooperazione tra Ue e Tunisia sulla gestione dei flussi irregolari debba avvenire “in accordo con i diritti umani”. La dichiarazione congiunta, in via generica, fa riferimento ai principali nodi legati ai migranti: le morti in mare, la necessità di aumentare i rimpatri dell”Europa degli irregolari, la lotta ai trafficanti. Von der Leyen ha messo sul piatto sovvenzioni da 100 milioni di euro per sostenere i tunisini nel contrasto al traffico illegale e nelle attività di search & rescue. Meloni, dal canto suo, ha annunciato “una conferenza su migrazione e sviluppo in Italia, che sarà un ulteriore tappa nel percorso del partenariato” tra l”Ue e Tunisi. Saied ha assicurato il suo impegno sui diritti umani e nella chiusura delle frontiere sud del Paese, ma sui rimpatri la porta è aperta solo a quella per i tunisini irregolari. L”ipotesi che la Tunisia, come Paese di transito sicuro, ospiti anche i migranti subsahariani, continua a non decollare. “L”idea, che alcuni sostengono segretamente, che il Paese ospiti centri per i migranti in campo di somme di danaro è disumana e inaccettabile”, ha chiuso Saied. La strada, insomma, rimane in salita. La strategia dell”Ue resta quella adottata sin dalla prima visita di un suo commissario – Paolo Gentiloni – lo scorso aprile: quella di catturare il sì di Saied con una partnership economica ed energetica globale e di lungo periodo, in cui la migrazione non è altro che un ingranaggio. Ma Tunisi, su diritti e rule of law, deve fare di più. “L”Ue vuole investire nella stabilità tunisina. Le difficoltà del suo percorso democratico si possono superare”, ha detto von der Leyen. Delineando la mano tesa dell”Europa ma anche la linea rossa entro la quale va inquadrata la nuova partnership. (ANSA).
2023-06-11 19:55
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Statement 11 June 2023 Tunis
The European Union and Tunisia agreed to work together on a comprehensive partnership package (▻https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_23_3202)
European Commission – Statement
The European Union and Tunisia agreed to work together on a comprehensive partnership package
Tunis, 11 June 2023
Building on our shared history, geographic proximity, and strong relationship, we have agreed towork together on a comprehensive partnership package, strengthening the ties that bind us in a mutually beneficial manner.
We believe there is enormous potential to generate tangible benefits for the EU and Tunisia. The comprehensive partnership would cover the following areas:
- Strengthening economic and trade ties ,
- A sustainable and competitive energy partnership
- Migration
- People-to-people contacts
The EU and Tunisia share strategic priorities and in all these areas, we will gain from working together more closely.
Our economic cooperation will boost growth and prosperity through stronger trade and investment links, promoting opportunities for businesses including small and medium sized enterprises. Economic support, including in the form of Macro Financial Assistance, will also be considered. Our energy partnership will assist Tunisia with the green energy transition, bringing down costs and creating the framework for trade in renewables and integration with the EU market.
As part of our joint work on migration, the fight against irregular migration to and from Tunisia and the prevention of loss of life at sea, is a common priority, including fighting against smugglers and human traffickers, strengthening border management, registration and return in full respect of human rights.
People-to-people contacts are central to our partnership and this strand of work will encompass stronger cooperation on research, education, and culture, as well as developing Talent Partnerships, opening up new opportunities for skills development and mobility, especially for youth.
Enhanced political and policy dialogue within the EU-Tunisia Association Council before the end of the year will offer an important opportunity to reinvigorate political and institutional ties, with the aim of addressing common international challenges together and preserving the rules-based order.
We have tasked the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad and the
Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement to work out a Memorandum of Understanding on the comprehensive partnership package, to be endorsed by Tunisia and the European Union before the end of June.
▻https://www.a-dif.org/2023/06/11/la-tunisia-rifiuta-i-respingimenti-collettivi-e-le-deportazioni-di-migranti-i
#Tunisie #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Memorandum_of_Understanding (#MoU) #Italie #frontières #externalisation_des_frontières #réadmission #accord_de_réadmission #refoulements_collectifs #pays_tiers_sûr #développement #aide_au_développement #conditionnalité_de_l'aide #énergie #énergies_renouvelables
]]>UK-Rwanda migration deal expanded
THE United Kingdom’s Home Secretary, Suella Braverman, and Rwanda’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vincent Biruta, on Saturday, March 18, signed an addendum that will expand the scope of the existing UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership.
Braverman made the announcement at a press briefing in Kigali.
She did not reveal details about the addendum.
“Today, we have signed an addendum to the Migration and Economic Development Partnership, which will expand the provision of support to people being relocated to Rwanda,” she said.
In April 2022, UK and Rwanda signed a migration and economic development partnership that seeks to give a dignified life to people who leave their countries to seek asylum in European countries.
Under the deal, some of these people will be relocated to Rwanda where they will be empowered through different initiatives.
“There is a global migration crisis. Many countries around the world are grappling with unprecedented numbers of illegal migrants and I sincerely believe that this world leading partnership between two allies and two friends, the United Kingdom and Rwanda, will lead the way in finding a solution which is both humanitarian and compassionate and also fair and balanced,” said the UK Home Secretary.
Earlier, she visited Norrsken Africa, a regional tech hub based in Kigali and Bwiza estates to assess the skills, services and the welfare program the migrants would be accorded upon arrival in Rwanda.
“I’ve been incredibly impressed with my visit today, both to meet local innovators and entrepreneurs and to see the job and wealth creation going on in the vibrant economy of Rwanda. Also, I have been impressed with Bwiza estates; its extensive construction work, some of which (the estates) will be used for the resettlement and integration of migrants coming from the UK,” she said.
Biruta believes the partnership between the two countries will contribute to addressing the global migration crisis.
“This innovative partnership represents an important development in our efforts to address irregular migration and we are glad to be working closely with the UK on this. The UK is investing in Rwanda’s capability to offer better opportunities for migrants and Rwandans as well,” he said.
In 2022, the UK received 45,000 migrants which reflected a 60 per cent increase compared to the previous year.
“We look forward to working together to create a new model which helps to address the root causes of the global migration crisis. This will not only help dismantle criminal human smuggling networks but also save lives and contribute to correcting the global imbalance in human development opportunities,” he said.
Under the UK-Rwanda migration deal, those who will benefit from the partnership will have the option of applying for asylum, locally, and be facilitated to resettle in Rwanda or to be facilitated to return to their home countries, having received support through the programme.
The UK will fund the programme, initially releasing an upfront investment of £120 million, which will fund invaluable opportunities for the migrants and Rwandans as well.
This includes “secondary qualifications, vocational and skills training, language lessons, and higher education.”
The UK will also support in terms of accommodation prior to local integration and resettlement.
According to the deal, they will be entitled to full protection under Rwandan law, equal access to employment, and enrollment in healthcare and social care services.
▻https://www.newtimes.co.rw/article/5888/news/rwanda/uk-rwanda-migration-deal-expanded
#Angleterre #UK #asile #migrations #réfugiés
#offshore_asylum_processing #externalisation #Rwanda
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voir la métaliste sur la mise en place de l’#externalisation des #procédures_d'asile au #Rwanda par l’#Angleterre :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/966443
Boris Johnson annonce avoir signé un accord avec Kigali pour envoyer des demandeurs d’asile au #Rwanda
Ce projet, susceptible de s’appliquer à toutes les personnes entrées illégalement sur le territoire, a suscité des réactions scandalisées des organisations de défense des droits humains.
Le premier ministre britannique, Boris Johnson, a décidé de durcir la politique migratoire du Royaume-Uni, en prenant une décision pour le moins controversée. Le Royaume-Uni a annoncé, jeudi 14 avril, avoir pour projet d’envoyer au Rwanda des demandeurs d’asile arrivés illégalement, espérant ainsi dissuader les traversées clandestines de la Manche, qui sont en pleine augmentation.
Ce projet, susceptible de s’appliquer à toutes les personnes entrées illégalement sur le territoire, d’où qu’elles viennent (Iran, Syrie, Erythrée…), a suscité des réactions scandalisées. Des organisations de défense des droits humains ont dénoncé son « inhumanité ». L’opposition a jugé que le premier ministre tentait de détourner l’attention après l’amende qu’il a reçue pour une fête d’anniversaire en plein confinement. Le Haut-Commissariat des Nations unies pour les réfugiés (HCR) a, de son côté, fait part de « sa forte opposition » :
« Les personnes fuyant la guerre, les conflits et les persécutions méritent compassion et empathie. Elles ne devraient pas être échangées comme des marchandises et transférées à l’étranger pour être traitées. »
Un projet chiffré à 144 millions d’euros
Alors que M. Johnson avait promis de contrôler l’immigration, un des sujets-clés dans la campagne du Brexit, le nombre de traversées illégales de la Manche a triplé en 2021, année marquée notamment par la mort de vingt-sept personnes dans un naufrage à la fin de novembre. Londres reproche régulièrement à Paris de ne pas en faire assez pour empêcher les traversées.
« A partir d’aujourd’hui (…), toute personne entrant illégalement au Royaume-Uni ainsi que celles qui sont arrivées illégalement depuis le 1er janvier pourront désormais être transférées au Rwanda », a annoncé le dirigeant conservateur dans un discours dans le Kent (sud-est de l’Angleterre). Le Rwanda pourra accueillir « des dizaines de milliers de personnes dans les années à venir », a-t-il ajouté, décrivant ce pays d’Afrique de l’Est comme l’un des « plus sûrs du monde, mondialement reconnu pour son bilan d’accueil et d’intégration des migrants ».
En vertu de l’accord annoncé jeudi, Londres financera dans un premier temps le dispositif à hauteur de 144 millions d’euros. Le gouvernement rwandais a précisé qu’il proposerait la possibilité « de s’installer de manière permanente au Rwanda [à ces personnes si elles] le souhaitent ».
Désireux de regagner en popularité avant des élections locales le mois prochain, M. Johnson et son gouvernement cherchent depuis des mois à conclure des accords avec des pays tiers où envoyer les clandestins en attendant de traiter leur dossier.
Le contrôle de la Manche confié à la marine
« Notre compassion est peut-être infinie, mais notre capacité à aider des gens ne l’est pas », a déclaré M. Johnson, qui anticipe des recours en justice contre le dispositif. « Ceux qui essaient de couper la file d’attente ou d’abuser de notre système n’auront pas de voie automatique pour s’installer dans notre pays mais seront renvoyés de manière rapide et humaine dans un pays tiers sûr ou leur pays d’origine », a-t-il ajouté.
Les migrants arrivant au Royaume-Uni ne seront plus hébergés dans des hôtels, mais dans des centres d’accueil, à l’image de ceux qui existent en Grèce, avec un premier centre « ouvrant bientôt », a annoncé M. Johnson.
Dans le cadre de ce plan, qui vient compléter une vaste loi sur l’immigration actuellement au Parlement et déjà critiqué par l’Organisation des Nations unies (ONU), le gouvernement confie dès jeudi le contrôle des traversées illégales de la Manche à la marine, équipée de matériel supplémentaire. En revanche, il a renoncé à son projet de repousser les embarcations entrant dans les eaux britanniques, mesure décriée côté français.
Les ONG scandalisées
En envoyant des demandeurs d’asile à plus de 6 000 kilomètres du Royaume-Uni, Londres veut décourager les candidats à l’immigration, toujours plus nombreux : 28 500 personnes ont effectué ces périlleuses traversées en 2021, contre 8 466 en 2020, selon des chiffres du ministère de l’intérieur.
Amnesty International a critiqué « une idée scandaleusement mal conçue » qui « fera souffrir tout en gaspillant d’énormes sommes d’argent public », soulignant aussi le « bilan lamentable en matière de droits humains » du Rwanda.
Daniel Sohege, directeur de l’organisation de défense des droits humains Stand For All, a déclaré à l’Agence France-Presse que l’initiative du gouvernement était « inhumaine, irréalisable et très coûteuse », recommandant plutôt d’ouvrir des voies d’entrée au Royaume-Uni « plus sûres » car celles qui existent sont « très limitées ».
▻https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2022/04/14/londres-a-signe-un-accord-avec-kigali-pour-envoyer-des-demandeurs-d-asile-au
#Angleterre #UK #asile #migrations #réfugiés
#offshore_asylum_processing
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ajouté à la métaliste sur les différentes tentatives de différentes pays européens d’#externalisation non seulement des contrôles frontaliers, mais aussi de la #procédure_d'asile dans des #pays_tiers
►https://seenthis.net/messages/900122
et ajouté à la métaliste sur la mise en place de l’#externalisation des #procédures_d'asile au #Rwanda par l’#Angleterre (2022) :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/900122
#Leonardo sbarca in #Somalia, la sua fondazione promuove l’italiano e addestra l’esercito
Leonardo punta a rafforzare la propria presenza in Corno d’Africa e affida l’affaire all’ex ministro dell’Interno Marco Minniti (Pd), alla guida della Fondazione Med-Or costituita dall’holding del complesso militare-industriale italiano per promuovere progetti di “cooperazione” e scambi culturali-accademici con i Paesi del cosiddetto Mediterraneo allargato (Med) e del Medio ed Estremo Oriente (Or).
Il 21 dicembre 2021 è stato firmato a Roma un Memorandum of Understanding tra la Fondazione Med-Or e la Repubblica Federale di Somalia per la “promozione della lingua italiana in Somalia e il sostegno all’alta formazione, attraverso l’erogazione di borse di studio e corsi di formazione professionale”.
A sottoscrivere l’accordo Marco Minniti e il Ministro degli Affari Esteri somalo Abdisaid Muse Ali, ma all’evento erano presenti pure il Ministro degli Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale Luigi Di Maio, il Ministro della Pubblica Istruzione somalo Abdullahi Abukar Haji e l’intero stato maggiore di Leonardo S.p.A., il presidente Luciano Carta (generale ritirato della Guardia di finanza), l’amministratore delegato Alessandro Profumo, il direttore generale Valerio Cioffi e Letizia Colucci, direttrice generale della Fondazione Med-Or.
“La Somalia è un Paese strategico nei complessi equilibri dell’Africa Orientale ed è un partner fondamentale per noi nel Corno d’Africa”, ha dichiarato l’ex ministro Minniti. “L’interesse e l’impegno di Med-Or verso l’ex colonia italiana sono in linea con quanto fatto nel corso degli ultimi anni. Consolideremo la cooperazione in numerosi campi e le relazioni comuni, insieme alle istituzioni somale”.
Il Memorandum firmato con la Repubblica di Somalia segue altri due progetti promossi e finanziati in Africa dalla Fondazione di Leonardo: il primo con la Mohammed VI Polytechnic University di Rabat (finanziamento di alcune borse di studio presso la LUISS “Guido Carli” di Roma, destinate a studenti provenienti dal Marocco); il secondo con la consegna alla Repubblica del Niger di una cinquantina di concentratori di ossigeno per alcune strutture sanitarie impegnate nell’assistenza a malati di Covid-19.
La presenza a Roma alla firma dell’accordo di “cooperazione” dei massimi vertici di Leonardo S.p.A., conferma l’intenzione del gruppo di penetrare nel redditizio mercato dei sistemi d’arma del martoriato Corno d’Africa. Risale a tre anni fa l’ultima importante commessa nella regione, la fornitura al governo federale somalo di sistemi ATC – Air Traffic Control. Nello specifico, la controllata Selex ES Technologies Limited (SETL) con sede in Kenya, ha installato nel 2018 a Mogadiscio un Centro Nazionale ACC (Air Control Centre) per l’integrazione degli strumenti operativi di controllo aereo e tre torri radar in altrettanti aeroporti del Paese per un totale di 16 postazioni operatore, oltre a un sistema radio VHF e una rete satellitare.
Una trattativa per la fornitura di un sofisticato sistema radar è in corso tra Leonardo e le autorità militari di Gibuti, la piccola enclave tra Eritrea, Etiopia e Somaliland, strategica per il controllo dello Stretto Bab El Mandeb che separa il Mar Rosso dal Golfo di Aden, principale rotta commerciale e petrolifera tra l’Asia e l’Europa.
Il 30 gennaio 2020 i manager del gruppo italiano hanno accompagnato una delegazione della Repubblica di Gibuti (presenti tra gli altri il ministro della Difesa Hassan Omar Mohamed e l’ambasciatore a Parigi Ayeid Mousseid Yahya) in visita alla 4ª Brigata Telecomunicazioni e Sistemi per la Difesa Aerea e l’Assistenza al Volo dell’Aeronautica Militare di Borgo Piave, l’ente responsabile della realizzazione, installazione e manutenzione dei sistemi radar, di telecomunicazioni e radio assistenze al volo e alla navigazione aerea.
“Gli ospiti sono stati accolti dal Comandante della 4ª Brigata, generale Vincenzo Falzarano”, riporta la nota dell’ufficio stampa dell’Aeronautica italiana. “La visita ha interessato il Sistema FADR (Fixed Air Defence Radar, modello RAT–31DL, prodotto da Leonardo, nda) che costituisce la struttura portante del sistema di Difesa Aerea. Il FADR è un radar di sorveglianza a lungo raggio (oltre 470 chilometri) e l’Aeronautica Militare, grazie alla sinergia con il mondo industriale nazionale, lo ha utilizzato per il rinnovamento tecnologico di dodici radar fissi a copertura dell’intero spazio aereo nazionale”.
Come nel caso del Niger, la Fondazione Med-Or di Leonardo S.p.A. sembra voler privilegiare le regioni del continente africano dove operano stabilmente le forze armate italiane. In Corno d’Africa l’Italia è presente nell’ambito di due missioni internazionali, EUTM Somalia (European Union Training Mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces) e MIADIT.
L’operazione EUTM ha preso il via nell’aprile 2010 dopo la decisione dell’Unione Europea di “contribuire al rafforzamento del Governo Federale di Transizione della Somalia attraverso l’addestramento delle Forze di sicurezza somale”. Inizialmente il personale militare UE era schierato in Uganda e operava in stretta collaborazione con le forze armate ugandesi.
Furono costituititi un quartier generale a Kampala, una base addestrativa a Bihanga (250 km a ovest della capitale) e un ufficio di collegamento a Nairobi (Kenya). Quando le condizioni di sicurezza in Somalia sembrarono migliori, EUTM inaugurò un centro di formazione presso l’aeroporto internazionale di Mogadiscio (aprile 2013) e, dall’inizio del 2014, sia il quartier generale sia i centri addestrativi furono trasferiti in territorio somalo.
“Focus iniziale della Missione EUTM è stato l’addestramento delle reclute somale e la formazione di istruttori delle Somali National Security Forces, capaci di gestire in proprio l’addestramento di sottufficiali e della truppa”, spiega il Ministero della Difesa italiano. “Con il crescente impegno della Comunità Internazionale e dell’UE nel processo di stabilizzazione del Corno d’Africa, è stato previsto un ulteriore sviluppo della missione. Dall’aprile 2015, con il 4° mandato, essa si è concentrata sempre più sulla componente legata alla consulenza operativa, logistica e amministrativa del Ministero della Difesa e dello Stato Maggiore somalo”. Dal 15 febbraio 2014 il Comando di EUTM è assegnato all’Italia e il contingente nazionale impiegato è di 148 militari e 20 mezzi terrestri.
Dal 2013 le forze armate italiane sono impegnate pure nella Missione Bilaterale di Addestramento delle Forze di Polizia somale e gibutiane – MIADIT. “La missione è volta a favorire la stabilità e la sicurezza della Somalia e dell’intera regione del Corno d’Africa, accrescendo le capacità nel settore della sicurezza e del controllo del territorio da parte delle forze di polizia somale”, spiega ancora il Ministero della Difesa. “L’obiettivo a lungo termine è quello di rigenerare la polizia federale somala mettendola innanzitutto in grado di operare nel complesso scenario e successivamente, con i corsi training of trainers, portarla gradualmente all’autosufficienza formativa”.
Il contingente nazionale impiegato è di 53 militari e 4 mezzi dell’Arma dei Carabinieri. I moduli addestrativi sono diretti a 150-200 agenti somali e gibutini alla volta e hanno una durata di 12 settimane.
Le attività spaziano dall’addestramento individuale al combattimento, agli interventi nei centri abitati, alle tecniche di controllo del territorio e gestione della folla, alla ricerca e neutralizzazione di armi ed esplosivi. Sempre secondo la Difesa, gli istruttori dei Carabinieri hanno già addestrato oltre 2.600 unità appartenenti alla Polizia Somala, alla Polizia Nazionale e alla Gendarmeria Gibutiana, contribuendo inoltre alla ristrutturazione dell’Accademia di Polizia di Mogadiscio.
▻https://www.africa-express.info/2021/12/24/leonardo-sbarca-in-somalia-la-sua-fondazione-promuove-litaliano-e-a
#Italie #néo-colonialisme
#Minniti #Marco_Minniti #Fondazione_Med-Or #complexe_militaro-industriel #Mediterraneo_allargato #Memorandum_of_Understanding #accord #langue #langue_italienne #formation_professionnelle #bourses_d'étude #Abdisaid_Muse_Ali #Luigi_Di_Maio #Abdullahi_Abukar_Haji #Luciano_Carta #Alessandro_Profumo #Valerio_Cioffi #Letizia_Colucci #Corne_d'Afrique #coopération #aide_au_développement #ATC #Air_Traffic_Control #Selex_ES_Technologies_Limited (#SETL) #ACC (#Air_Control_Centre) #radar #système_radar #Bab-el-Mandeb #Vincenzo_Falzarano #Sistema_FADR (#Fixed_Air_Defence_Radar) #RAT–31DL #défense_aérienne #Aeronautica_Militare #armée #EUTM_Somalia #European_Union_Training_Mission_to_contribute_to_the_training_of_Somali_security_forces #MIADIT #Bihanga #Nairobi #Somali_National_Security_Forces #Missione_Bilaterale_di_Addestramento_delle_Forze_di_Polizia_somale_e_gibutiane (#MIADIT) #training_of_trainers #formation #Carabinieri #police
Si formano a Gaeta le forze d’élite della famigerata Guardia Costiera libica
Non bastava addestrare in Italia gli equipaggi delle motovedette libiche che sparano sui migranti nel Mediterraneo o li catturano in mare (oltre 15.000 nei primi sette mesi del 2021) per poi deportarli e torturarli nei famigerati centri di detenzione / lager in Libia. Dalla scorsa estate è nella #Scuola_Nautica della #Guardia_di_Finanza di #Gaeta che si “formano” pure le componenti subacquee di nuova costituzione della #Guardia_Costiera e della #General_Administration_for_Coastal_Security (#GACS).
La presenza a Gaeta delle unità d’élite della #Libyan_Coast_Guard_and_Port_Security (#LCGPS) dipendente dal Ministero della Difesa e della GACS del Ministero dell’Interno è documentata dall’Ufficio Amministrazione - Sezione Acquisti della Guardia di Finanza. Il 18 giugno 2021 l’ente ha autorizzato la spesa per un servizio di interpretariato in lingua araba a favore dei sommozzatori libici “partecipanti al corso di addestramento che inizierà il 21 giugno 2021 presso la Scuola Nautica nell’ambito della Missione bilaterale della Guardia di Finanza in Libia”. Nell’atto amministrativo non vengono fornite informazioni né sul numero degli allievi-sub libici né la durata del corso, il primo di questa tipologia effettuato in Italia.
Dal 29 agosto al 29 settembre del 2019 ne era stato promosso e finanziato uno simile a #Spalato, in Croazia da #EUNAVFOR_MED (la forza navale europea per le operazioni anti-migranti nel Mediterraneo, meglio nota come #Missione_Irini). Le attività vennero svolte in collaborazione con la Marina militare croate e riguardarono dodici sommozzatori della Guardia costiera e della Marina libica.
A fine ottobre 2020 un’altra attività addestrativa del personale subacqueo venne condotta in Libia da personale della Marina militare della Turchia, provocando molte gelosie in Italia e finanche le ire dell’(ex) ammiraglio #Giuseppe_De_Giorgi, già comandante della Nato Response Force e Capo di Stato Maggiore della Marina Militare dal 2013 al 2016.
“In un tweet, la Marina turca riferisce che le operazioni rientrano a pieno nel novero di attività di supporto, consultazione e addestramento militare e di sicurezza incluse nell’accordo raggiunto nel novembre del 2019 tra il GNA tripolino e Ankara: non può sfuggire come questo avvenimento sia un ulteriore affondo turco a nostre spese e l’ennesimo spregio all’Italia”, scrisse l’ammiraglio #De_Giorgi su Difesaonline. “Nelle foto allegate al tweet, infatti, sono presenti le navi che proprio l’Italia nel 2018 aveva donato alla Libia in seguito all’accordo siglato con il primo #Memorandum che avrebbe previsto da parte nostra la presa in carico della collaborazione con la Guardia Costiera libica, non solo per tenere a bada il fenomeno migratorio in generale, ma soprattutto per dare un freno al vergognoso traffico di esseri umani. In particolare, si può vedere la motovedetta #Ubari_660, gemella della #Fezzan_658, entrambe della classe #Corrubia”.
“Oltre al danno, anche la beffa di veder usare le nostre navi per un addestramento che condurrà un altro Stato, la Turchia”, concluse l’ex Capo di Stato della Marina. “Mentre Erdogan riporta la Tripolitania nella sfera d’influenza ottomana si conferma l’assenteismo italiano conseguenza di una leadership spaesata, impotente, priva di autorevolezza, inadeguata”.
Le durissime parole dell’ammiraglio De Giorgi hanno colpito in pieno il bersaglio; così dal cappello dell’esecutivo Draghi è uscito bello e pronto per i sommozzatori libici un corso d’addestramento estivo a Gaeta, viaggio, vitto e alloggio, tutto pagato.
Il personale dell’ultrachiacchierata Guardia costiera della Libia ha iniziato ad addestrarsi presso la Scuola Nautica della Guardia di Finanza nella primavera del 2017. Trentanove militari e tre tutor giunsero in aereo nella base dell’aeronautica di Pratica di Mare (Roma) il 1° aprile e vennero poi addestrati a Gaeta per un mese. “A selezionarli sono stati i vertici della Marina libica tra i 93 militari che hanno superato il primo modulo formativo di 14 settimane, svolto nell’ambito della missione europea Eunavformed, a bordo della nave olandese Rotterdam e della nostra nave San Giorgio”, riportò la redazione di Latina del quotidiano Il Messaggero.
Nella scuola laziale i libici furono formati prevalentemente alla conduzione delle quattro motovedette della classe “#Bigliani”, già di appartenenza della Guardia di Finanza, donate alla Libia tra il 2009 e il 2010 e successivamente riparate in Italia dopo i danneggiamenti ricevuti nel corso dei bombardamenti NATO del 2011. Le quattro unità, rinominate #Ras_al_Jadar, #Zuwarah, #Sabratha e #Zawia sono quelle poi impiegate per i pattugliamenti delle coste della #Tripolitania e la spietata caccia ai natanti dei migranti in fuga dai conflitti e dalle carestie di Africa e Medio Oriente.
Per la cronaca, alla cerimonia di chiusura del primo corso di formazione degli equipaggi libici intervenne a Gaeta l’allora ministro dell’Interno #Marco_Minniti. Ai giornalisti, #Minniti annunciò che entro la fine del mese di giugno 2017 il governo italiano avrebbe consegnato alla Libia una decina di motovedette. “Quando il programma di fornitura delle imbarcazioni sarà terminato la Marina libica sarà tra le strutture più importanti dell’Africa settentrionale”, dichiarò con enfasi Marco Minniti. “Lì si dovranno incrementare le azioni congiunte e coordinate per il controllo contro il terrorismo e i trafficanti di esseri umani: missioni cruciali per tutta la comunità internazionale”.
Un secondo corso di formazione per 19 ufficiali della Guardia costiera libica venne svolto nel giugno 2017 ancora un volta presso la Scuola Nautica della Guardia di Finanza di Gaeta. Nel corso del 2018, con fondi del Ministero dell’Interno vennero svolti invece due corsi della durata ognuno di tre settimane per 28 militari libici, costo giornaliero stimato 606 euro per allievo.
Nell’ambito del #Sea_Horse_Mediterranean_Project, il progetto UE di “cooperazione e scambio di informazioni nell’area mediterranea tra gli Stati membri dell’Unione di Spagna, Italia, Francia, Malta, Grecia, Cipro e Portogallo e i paesi nordafricani nel quadro di #EUROSUR”, (valore complessivo di 7,1 milioni di euro), la Guardia di Finanza ha concluso uno specifico accordo con la Guardia Civil spagnola, capofila del programma, per erogare sempre nel 2018 un corso di conduzione di unità navali per 63 libici tra guardiacoste del Ministero della Difesa e personale degli Organi per la sicurezza del Ministero dell’Interno.
Istituzionalmente la Scuola Nautica della Guardia di Finanza di Gaeta provvede alla formazione tecnico-operativa degli allievi finanzieri destinati al contingente mare, nonché all’aggiornamento ed alla specializzazione di ufficiali impiegati nel servizio navale. In passato ha svolto attività di formazione a favore del personale militare e della polizia della Repubblica d’Albania e della Guardia Civil spagnola.
L’Istituto ha partecipato anche a due missioni internazionali: la prima sul fiume Danubio, nell’ambito dell’embargo introdotto nel maggio 1992 dal Consiglio di Sicurezza dell’ONU contro l’allora esistente Repubblica Federale di Jugoslavia; poi, a fine anni ’90, a Valona (Albania) per fornire assistenza e consulenza ai locali organi polizia nella “lotta ai traffici illeciti”.
Adesso per la Scuola di Gaeta è scattata l’ora dell’addestramento dei reparti d’élite delle forze navali di Tripoli, sommozzatori in testa.
▻http://antoniomazzeoblog.blogspot.com/2021/11/si-formano-gaeta-le-forze-delite-della.html
–-> Articolo pubblicato in Africa ExPress il 30 novembre 2021, ▻https://www.africa-express.info/2021/11/30/addestrata-in-italia-la-guardia-costiera-libica-accusata-di-crimini
#Gaeta #formation #gardes-côtes_libyens #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Italie #Libye #frontières #Méditerranée #plongeurs
–---
Ajouté à la métaiste sur les formations des gardes-côtes lybiens sur le territoire européen :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/938454
ping @isskein
Australia signs deal with Nauru to keep asylum seeker detention centre open indefinitely
Australia will continue its policy of offshore processing of asylum seekers indefinitely, with the home affairs minister signing a new agreement with Nauru to maintain “an enduring form” of offshore processing on the island state.Since 2012 – in the second iteration of the policy – all asylum seekers who arrive in Australia by boat seeking protection have faced mandatory indefinite detention and processing offshore.
There are currently about 108 people held by Australia on Nauru as part of its offshore processing regime. Most have been there more than eight years. About 125 people are still held in Papua New Guinea. No one has been sent offshore since 2014.
However, Nauru is Australia’s only remaining offshore detention centre.PNG’s Manus Island centre was forced to shut down after it was found to be unconstitutional by the PNG supreme court in 2016. Australia was forced to compensate those who had been illegally detained there, and they were forcibly moved out, mostly to Port Moresby.
But the Nauru detention facility will remain indefinitely.
In a statement on Friday, home affairs minister #Karen_Andrews said a new #memorandum_of_understanding with Nauru was a “significant step forwards” for both countries.
“Australia’s strong and successful border protection policies under #Operation_Sovereign_Borders remain and there is zero chance of settlement in Australia for anyone who arrives illegally by boat,” she said.“Anyone who attempts an illegal maritime journey to Australia will be turned back, or taken to Nauru for processing. They will never settle in Australia.”Nauru president, #Lionel_Aingimea, said the new agreement created an “enduring form” of offshore processing.
“This takes the regional processing to a new milestone.
“It is enduring in nature, as such the mechanisms are ready to deal with illegal migrants immediately upon their arrival in Nauru from Australia.”Australia’s offshore processing policy and practices have been consistently criticised by the United Nations, human rights groups, and by refugees themselves.
The UN has said Australia’s system violates the convention against tortureand the international criminal court’s prosecutor said indefinite detention offshore was “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment” and unlawful under international law.
At least 12 people have died in the camps, including being murdered by guards, through medical neglect and by suicide. Psychiatrists sent to work in the camps have described the conditions as “inherently toxic” and akin to “torture”.In 2016, the Nauru files, published by the Guardian, exposed the Nauru detention centre’s own internal reports of systemic violence, rape, sexual abuse, self-harm and child abuse in offshore detention.
The decision to extend offshore processing indefinitely has been met with opprobrium from those who were detained there, and refugee advocates who say it is deliberately damaging to those held.
Myo Win, a human rights activist and Rohingyan refugee from Myanmar, who was formerly detained on Nauru and released in March 2021, said those who remain held within Australia’s regime on Nauru “are just so tired, separated from family, having politics played with their lives, it just makes me so upset”.
“I am out now and I still cannot live my life on a bridging visa and in lockdown, but it is 10 times better than Nauru. They should not be extending anything, they should be stopping offshore processing now. I am really worried about everyone on Nauru right now, they need to be released.
”Jana Favero from the Asylum Seeker Resource Centre said the new memorandum of understanding only extended a “failed system”.“An ‘enduring regional processing capability’ in Nauru means: enduring suffering, enduring family separation, enduring uncertainty, enduring harm and Australia’s enduring shame.
“The #Morrison government must give the men, women and children impacted by the brutality of #offshore processing a safe and permanent home. Prolonging the failure of #offshore_processing on Nauru and #PNG is not only wrong and inhumane but dangerous.”
▻https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/sep/24/australia-signs-deal-with-nauru-to-keep-asylum-seeker-detention-centre-
#Australie #Pacific_solution #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Nauru #externalisation #île #détention #emprisonnement
]]>En Grèce, la gauche convalescente pâtit encore de l’échec de Syriza
3 AOÛT 2020 PAR ELISA PERRIGUEUR
Le parti conservateur Nouvelle Démocratie est en position de force. Face à sa politique de plus en plus ferme et à l’ordre néolibéral qu’il met en place à l’issue de la première phase de la crise sanitaire, la gauche a du mal à être entendue.
Athènes (#Grèce).– #Athènes, fin juillet 2020. Les manifestations sont désormais restreintes, comme le prévoit la loi tout juste adoptée au Parlement. Le gouvernement jugeait que les rassemblements paralysaient l’activité des commerçants, déjà rendue difficile par le #Covid-19. En cette période estivale, les #réfugiés des camps d’identification dits « hotspots » ne sont pas libres de leurs mouvements, car le ministère de l’immigration limite toujours leurs déplacements, officiellement « par mesure de précaution » en raison du virus.
Deux mois après la fin du #confinement, la droite Nouvelle Démocratie (ND) applique sans obstacle sa politique conservatrice sous le sceau de la loi et l’ordre. Le faible impact sanitaire du coronavirus sert son entreprise. Le parti est plébiscité pour sa bonne gestion au début de la pandémie.
En face, l’opposition de #gauche parlementaire, composée de #Syriza, la principale force, des communistes du KKE et des altermondialistes du parti #MeRA_25, critique le manque d’action sociale et les faibles moyens alloués à l’hôpital public durant le confinement. Mais elle a visiblement bien du mal à se faire entendre.
« La Grèce vit actuellement dans un espace de non-idée à gauche, constate Filippa Chatzistavrou, politiste de l’université d’Athènes. Le premier ministre Kyriakos Mitsotakis intervient dans l’urgence dans cette crise. Il joue un rôle de pompier globalement apprécié par la société. » Quant aux difficultés de la gauche, elles sont plus anciennes que la pandémie, ajoute-t-elle. « C’est l’échec de Syriza qui a fait perdre espoir à beaucoup de citoyens. »
Pour comprendre la désillusion de l’électorat de la gauche grecque, il faut remonter à la « capitulation idéologique », selon l’expression de ses partisans amers. Elle a eu lieu le 13 juillet 2015, lorsque l’ancien premier ministre de gauche radicale Alexis #Tsipras a signé le troisième #mémorandum. Selon le parti Syriza, il s’agissait d’éviter une sortie de la zone #euro.
Les électeurs séduits par son programme anti-#austérité, issus du centre, de l’extrême gauche, voire du mouvement anarchiste, ont alors subi un #choc. Beaucoup parlent toujours de « trahison ». D’autant que quelques jours plus tôt, le 5 juillet 2015, 61,3 % des électeurs avaient exprimé leur refus aux mesures d’austérité des créanciers lors d’un référendum. Sur les murs d’Athènes, quelques tags défraîchis « Oxi » (« Non », en grec) rappellent encore aujourd’hui cette séquence intense pour la gauche grecque.
« Je n’étais pas d’accord avec ce mémorandum même si on ne connaît pas les dessous des négociations, il y avait beaucoup de pressions de la part des médias, de l’UE… Le tout sur fond de crise des réfugiés [qui venaient en nombre depuis la Turquie –ndlr]… », se souvient Nikolaos Kourampas, 49 ans, géologue qui partage sa vie entre la Grèce et l’Écosse. Il vote encore Syriza, mais « sans grande conviction ».
La sanction est tombée cinq ans après le référendum lors des législatives anticipées de juillet 2019, auxquelles seulement 58 % des inscrits ont participé. Syriza a été devancé de huit points par la droite ND qui a obtenu 39,8 % des suffrages. Syriza a remplacé l’ex-parti socialiste Pasok comme principale force d’opposition de gauche au Parlement. L’historique mouvement socialiste s’est, lui, fondu dans une coalition centriste baptisée Kinal.
« Les électeurs de gauche attendaient de Syriza qu’il revendique une véritable idéologie contre ce système d’austérité, qu’il propose une politique alternative dépassant les ordres néolibéraux des créanciers internationaux, ce que le parti n’a pas fait. Aujourd’hui, ces personnes, traumatisées, ont perdu confiance et ne s’intéressent plus à l’activité parlementaire », décrypte Seraphim Seferiades, directeur d’un laboratoire de recherches sur les politiques contestataires à l’université Panteion, à Athènes.
Syriza paie toujours son retournement lors du #référendum de 2015, estime aussi l’Athénien Ramin Bakhtiari, 35 ans, salarié d’une organisation internationale d’aide aux migrants. Lui a voté pour le parti de gauche en 2019, « uniquement pour tenter de barrer la route à la ND, ultralibérale, qui veut transformer la Grèce en hôtel », résume-t-il. Ce dernier apprécie la « ligne sociale » du parti, qui durant son mandat a mis en place une aide humanitaire pour les plus démunis, augmenté le salaire minimum, etc. « Mais il se voulait parti antisystème en 2015, il est devenu un parti systémique », regrette-t-il.
Syriza s’est en effet transformé au contact du pouvoir entre 2015 et 2019, constate la politiste Filippa Chatzistavrou. « Mais au lieu de renforcer sa présence dans les syndicats [puissants en Grèce – ndlr] ou au niveau local, le mouvement a préféré constituer un cercle de fidèles autour d’Alexis Tsipras et passer à une organisation verticale. »
Syriza défend désormais sa position de poids au Parlement. « Élu avec 31 % des suffrages, le parti s’est établi comme la force dominante des politiques de gauche et progressiste en Grèce, insiste son porte-parole Alexis Charitsis. Néanmoins, nous sommes ouverts aux critiques. Nous répondons à ceux qui disent à Syriza de “faire plus” avec notre programme déterminé “Restons debout”. » Lancé à la fin du confinement, ce dernier privilégie l’action sociale.
Syriza propose entre autres « des aides sans conditions aux entreprises, particulièrement les PME, le soutien financier aux indépendants et aux scientifiques, un salaire minimum pour les plus vulnérables », détaille Alexis Charitsis. « La période actuelle d’instabilité, de désespoir et d’austérité n’est pas le résultat de la pandémie mais de la politique gouvernementale consistant à prioriser les intérêts des oligarques et des grandes sociétés. »
Mais dans l’hémicycle, aucune alliance ne semble possible face à une droite majoritaire. Le parti communiste #KKE, auquel quelques déçus de Syriza ont donné leur voix en juillet 2019, estime qu’« une grande partie du peuple grec est aux limites de la survie », dénonce l’eurodéputé communiste Lefteris Nikolaou-Alavanos. « Le résultat d’une gestion du gouvernement grec, avec l’accord des partis politiques bourgeois tels que Syriza, Pasok ou Kinal », ajoute-t-il.
Ce parti post-stalinien à la culture très militante, qui continuer à placer la lutte des classes au cœur de sa politique, a toujours fait cavalier seul. Le KKE stagne au Parlement avec des scores allant de 5 à 8 % des voix depuis le milieu des années 1990.
D’autres déçus de Syriza ont donné leur bulletin au jeune parti de gauche radicale MeRA25. Mais son leader, Yanis #Varoufakis, divise. Les critiques jugent l’ancien ministre des finances de Syriza trop « narcissique » ou « provocateur ».
Dimitri*, trentenaire athénien, admire celui « qui a tenté de négocier un accord juste en 2015 alors que les autres membres de Syriza étaient paniqués [au cours des réunions tendues de l’Eurogroupe pour trouver une solution à la crise de la dette, comme l’ont montré (écouter ici) les enregistrements « Varoufakis Leaks » diffusés sur Mediapart]. » Et d’ajouter : « MeRA25 a un programme clair en cas de prise de pouvoir. »
Parmi ses propositions figurent la réduction de la TVA de 24 % à 15 ou 18 %, la création d’une taxe spéciale pour les banques ou les étrangers ayant investi dans l’immobilier pour obtenir un « golden visa » [permettant à des ressortissants non européens de s’établir et voyager dans l’UE – ndlr].
En dépit d’une offre politique peu inspirante, la société civile est prête à bouger. Les violences policières de plus en plus visibles, le traitement controversé des réfugiés, les projets jugés anti-écologiques du gouvernement alimentent une résistance sociale. Elle se manifeste chez des mouvements autonomes, des initiatives anarchistes ou anticapitalistes ou de partis extra-parlementaires, à l’origine de manifestations récentes.
« Pendant le confinement, nous avons organisé des actions contre le fascisme, en faveur de l’hôpital, plusieurs collectes pour les réfugiés », assure Petros Constantinou, l’un des membres du front extra-parlementaire Antarsya, qui rassemble des organisations trotskistes et anticapitalistes. Ses quelques milliers d’adhérents, favorables entre autres au « Grexit » et à l’effacement de la dette, tentent d’être de toutes ces luttes contre le pouvoir.
« Malheureusement, cette gauche extra-parlementaire milite aujourd’hui dans un registre de résistance en proposant des solutions maximalistes [comme la sortie de l’euro ou de l’Otan – ndlr] difficilement applicables dans la conjoncture actuelle, estime la politiste Filippa Chatzistavrou. Ce contre-système attire les jeunes politisés mais n’est qu’un canal de colère. »
Ces résistances pourraient permettre à la gauche radicale de se renouveler, pense au contraire l’expert Seraphim Seferiades. « Je ne serai pas surpris qu’un processus de formation d’une force politique composée de plusieurs groupes soit en cours à l’extérieur de l’hémicycle, dit-il. C’est le même schéma qui avait mené dans les années 2000 à la formation de la coalition Syriza. » Ce processus, qui avait pris de court les partis traditionnels, avait abouti en 2015 à l’accession au pouvoir du parti de gauche radicale.
▻https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/030820/en-grece-la-gauche-convalescente-patit-encore-de-l-echec-de-syriza
]]>Latest Tactic to Push Migrants From Europe ? A Private, Clandestine Fleet
The government of Malta enlisted three privately owned fishing trawlers to intercept migrants in the Mediterranean, and force them back to a war zone, officials and a boat captain say.
With the onset of the coronavirus, Malta announced that it was too overwhelmed to rescue migrants making the precarious crossing of the Mediterranean Sea, where the tiny island nation has been on the front line of the maritime migration route over the past decade.
In secret, however, the Maltese authorities have worked hard to make sure no migrants actually reach the island.
It dispatched a small fleet of private merchant vessels in April to intercept migrants at sea and return them by force to a war zone in Libya, according to information provided by the captain of one of the boats, a senior commander in the Libyan Coast Guard, and a former Maltese official involved in the episode.
The three repurposed fishing trawlers are privately owned, but acted on the instructions of the Armed Forces of Malta, the captain and the others said.
The clandestine operation, which some experts consider illegal under international law, is just the latest dubious measure taken by European countries in recent years to stem the migration from Africa and the Middle East that has sown political chaos in Europe and fueled a populist backlash.
Since 2017, European states, led by Italy, have paid the Libyan government to return more migrants to Libya, hassled the private rescue organizations that try to bring them to Europe, and asked passing merchant vessels to intercept them before they enter European waters.
But Malta’s latest tactic may be among the most egregious, maritime experts say, because it involved a designated flotilla of private vessels, based in a European port, that intercepted and expelled asylum seekers from international waters that fall within the responsibility of European coast guards.
“Against a pattern of increased abuses against asylum seekers in recent years, this newest approach stands out,” said Itamar Mann, an expert in maritime and refugee law at the University of Haifa in Israel. “Its methods chillingly resemble organized crime, and indeed the operations of people smugglers, which European policymakers so adamantly denounce.”
“The facts available raise serious concerns that we are seeing the emergence of a novel systematic pattern, such that may even put Maltese state officials in danger of criminal liability, at home or abroad,” Dr. Mann added.
The Maltese government did not respond to multiple requests for comment.
The activity was first documented on the evening of April 12, when three aging blue trawlers left the Grand Harbour in Valletta, the Maltese capital, within an hour of each other. The three boats — the Dar Al Salam 1, the Salve Regina and the Tremar — departed at the request of the Maltese authorities, according to the captain of the Tremar, Amer Abdelrazek.
A former Maltese official, Neville Gafa, said he was enlisted by the government that same night to use his connections in Libya to ensure the safe passage of the first two boats to Libya.
The boats did not submit paperwork to the immigration police, and switched off their satellite tracking devices soon after leaving port, maritime databases show.
But their mission had already been determined, said Mr. Gafa, who said he had been asked by the Maltese prime minister’s chief of staff, Clyde Caruana, to help coordinate the operation. Mr. Caruana did not respond to requests for comment, but a government spokesman told The Times of Malta that Mr. Gafa had been asked to liaise with Libya on a separate matter that was unconnected to the episode.
The trawlers were sent to intercept a migrant vessel attempting to reach Malta from Libya — and which had been issuing mayday calls for some 48 hours — and then return its passengers to Libya, Mr. Gafa said.
The stricken migrant vessel was still in international waters, according to coordinates provided by the migrants by satellite phone to Alarm Phone, an independent hotline for shipwrecked refugees. But it had reached the area of jurisdiction of Malta’s armed forces, making it Malta’s responsibility under international maritime law to rescue its passengers and provide them with sanctuary.
Two of the trawlers — the Dar Al Salam 1 and the Tremar — reached the migrant vessel early on April 14, guided by a Maltese military helicopter, Mr. Abdelrazek said. Several of the migrants had already drowned, according to testimony later gathered by Alarm Phone.
The roughly 50 survivors were taken aboard the Dar Al Salam 1, Mr. Abdelrazek said.
The Dar Al Salam 1 and the Salve Regina sailed to Tripoli on April 15, the former carrying the migrants and the latter carrying several tons of food and water, as a show of appreciation to the Libyan government, Mr. Abdelrazek and Mr. Gafa said. The Tremar waited in international waters, Mr. Abdelrazek said.
The Maltese authorities told their Libyan counterparts that the Dar Al Salam 1 was in fact a Maltese vessel called the Maria Cristina, said Commodore Masoud Abdalsamad, who oversees international operations at the Libyan Coast Guard. To further obscure its identity, the boat’s crew had also painted over the ship’s name and flew a Maltese flag to confuse the Libyan Coast Guard.
Though based physically in Malta and owned by a Maltese shipowner, the vessel is legally registered in Tobruk, a port in east Libya controlled by opponents of the authorities in Tripoli. The crew did not want to risk upsetting the Tripoli government by broadcasting its links to Tobruk, leading it to hide its name and home port, Mr. Abdelrazek said.
After disembarking, the migrants were taken to a notorious detention center run by a pro-government militia, where migrants are routinely tortured, held for ransom or sold to other militias. The detention cells stand close to an arms depot, and the surrounding area was hit by shelling in December.
Conditions at the detention center are “utterly appalling,” said Safa Msehli, a spokeswoman for the International Organization for Migration, an arm of the United Nations. “People are caged in overcrowded hangars with barely any access to food or sanitation facilities.”
“Many tell us of the abuse they endure and the inhumane ways in which they are exploited,’’ Ms. Msehli added. ‘‘Reports of migrants being used to load weapons, and the detention center’s proximity to a military facility, raise serious concerns over the safety of people detained there arbitrarily.”
After departing Tripoli, the Dar Al Salam 1 turned its satellite identification system back on, and the boat resurfaced off the coast of Libya on the evening of April 15, data provided by Marine Traffic, a maritime database, shows.
The owner of the Salve Regina, Dominic Tanti, declined to comment through an intermediary, and the owner of the Tremar, Yasser Aziz, did not return a message seeking comment.
The owner of the Dar Al Salam 1, Carmelo Grech, did not to respond to multiple requests for comment sent by text, voice message and a letter hand-delivered to his apartment. But he has confirmed his boat’s involvement to a Maltese newspaper, and several outlets have already highlighted its role, including the Italian newspaper, Avvenire, and the Maltese blogger Manuel Delia.
Mr. Grech and his boat have colorful histories, raising questions in Malta about why the government involved them in a state-led operation.
Mr. Grech has previously recounted how he used the boat, then known as the Mae Yemanja, to bring supplies to Libyan rebels during the Libyan revolution in 2011. In 2012, court records show it was impounded after Mr. Grech was accused, though later acquitted, of smuggling contraband cigarettes from Libya to Malta.
In 2015, Mr. Grech was detained by a Libyan faction for several days for what he later described as a misunderstanding over his visas.
Maltese ship records obtained by The Times show that Mr. Grech canceled his boat’s registration in Malta last February, before repainting it to show it had been re-registered in Tobruk, for undisclosed reasons.
Mr. Abdelrazek also has a criminal history, having been convicted in 2014 of forging documents, court records show.
After appearing briefly in Malta last week, the Dar Al Salam 1 and the Salve Regina returned again to sea on Sunday.
Their satellite trackers were once again switched off shortly afterward.
▻https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/30/world/europe/migrants-malta.html
#privatisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #Malte #Méditerranée #push-backs #refoulement #refoulements #Libye
–—
Commentaire de @isskein via la mailing-list Migreurop :
Depuis avril fonctionne une méthode pro-active : une #flotte_privée de 3 bateaux qui se chargent d’arrêter les bateaux de migrants et de les renvoyer vers la Libye.
Un ancien officiel maltais, #Neville_Gafà, a été engagé par le Premier Ministre pour monter l’affaire avec ses contacts libyens
il est entre autres responsable de la #tragédie_de_Pâques : le gouvernement a ignoré durant 48h un bateau qui se trouvait dans sles eaux internationales (mais dans la juridiction des Forces armées maltaises) , puis envoyé sa flotte privée, qui a pris à son bord 51 migrants dont 8 femmes et 3 enfants, à bord 5 cadavres ; 7 migrants s’étaient noyés auparavant. Ils ont été ramenés à Tripolii
voir ►https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/the-faces-and-names-of-a-migration-tragedy.788723
–---
Dans le mail reçu via la mailing-list Migreurop, Conni parle de #hotspot_mobile :
Yesterday we got news from the Maltese media about a new strategy of the authorities to keep rescued migrants out: a floating hotspot on a cruise ship off their coast:
▻https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/102051/rescued_migrants_to_be_kept_on_captain_morgan_vessel_outside_territor
▻https://www.tvm.com.mt/en/news/rescued-migrants-will-remain-on-vessel-13-miles-outside-maltese-territorial-
via @isskein
#mémorandum Covid-19 pour du #Libre et de l’open en conscience : enseignements et impulsions futures
▻https://framablog.org/2020/04/29/memorandum-covid-19-pour-du-libre-et-de-lopen-en-conscience-enseignements
Nous publions ci-dessous un texte collectif, inititié par différents acteurs du libre et de l’Open(Source|Science|Hardware|Data), suivi des impulsions envisagées. À #Framasoft, nous signons rarement des tribunes en tant qu’organisation. Essentiellement pour trois raisons : 1) elles nous placent dans une situation … Lire la suite
#Internet_et_société #Libres_Cultures #COVID19 #Hardware #open #open_source #OpenAcess #OpenData #tribune
]]>Le 2 novembre 2019, l’#accord de #2017 entre #Italie et #Libye se renouvellera automatiquement...
Des ONG en Italie essaie de l’arrêter...
NO al rinnovo del #Memorandum Italia – Libia
INTERSOS chiede programma di ricerca e salvataggio europeo e canali di ingresso regolari
Il 2 novembre, in mancanza di un intervento del Governo, scatterà la proroga automatica del memorandum d’intesa siglato nel febbraio del 2017 con la Libia. Accordo sulla base del quale, l’Italia continua a sostenere con milioni di euro la cosiddetta Guardia Costiera libica e i centri di detenzione in Libia.
Come organizzazione umanitaria operativa a Tripoli e nel Sud della Libia con programmi di aiuto e protezione per i minori, chiediamo con forza che il Governo italiano annulli il memorandum del 2017 e i precedenti accordi con il Governo libico e che, fatti salvi gli interventi di natura umanitaria, non vengano rifinanziati quelli di supporto alle autorità libiche nella gestione e controllo dei flussi migratori.
Nelle relazioni con la Libia per la gestione dei flussi migratori è il momento della discontinuità. Occorre un nuovo inizio, che rimetta al centro la ricerca di soluzioni finalizzate alla tutela della vita delle persone e del diritto internazionale che ne è garanzia. Chiediamo che si stabilisca un programma efficace di ricerca e salvataggio in mare a livello europeo e che si prevedano canali di ingresso regolari, in modo che le persone non siano più costrette ad affidarsi ai trafficanti.
Quanto accaduto in questi anni non può non essere preso in considerazione. È dimostrato come i finanziamenti italiani siano andati a sostegno anche di veri e propri criminali, come il trafficante di esseri umani Bija, sottoposto a sanzioni dal Consiglio di Sicurezza ONU per i crimini contro l’umanità su cui indaga la Corte penale internazionale.
È dimostrato come i migranti intercettati in mare dalla Guardia Costiera libica e riportati forzatamente in Libia vengano rinchiusi nei centri di detenzione, in condizioni disumane, e siano sistematicamente sottoposti a torture, stupri e violenze. Quando tentano di opporsi al ritorno in Libia, gli ufficiali libici non esitano a sparare e a uccidere.
Come dichiarato dalle Nazioni Unite, dal Consiglio d’Europa e dalla Commissione europea nonché dalla stessa magistratura italiana, la Libia non può in alcun modo essere considerato un Paese sicuro e dunque le persone che tentano di fuggire non possono essere rimandate in quel Paese. Lo vietano il diritto internazionale e la nostra Costituzione. I respingimenti “delegati” dalle autorità italiane alla Guardia costiera libica comportano esattamente le stesse violazioni per le quali l’Italia è già stata condannata dalla Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo nel 2012.
▻https://www.intersos.org/intersos-no-al-rinnovo-del-memorandum-italia-libia
–--------
Plus d’informations sur le memorandum de 2017 sur ce fil :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/600874
Et plus en général sur l’#externalisation_des_frontières en Libye :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/705401
#externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #Méditerranée
ping @isskein
Rwanda to receive over 500 migrants from Libya
Rwanda and Libya are currently working out an evacuation plan for some hundreds of migrants being held in detention centres in the North African country, officials confirmed.
Diyana Gitera, the Director General for Africa at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation told The New Times that Rwanda was working on a proposal with partners to evacuate refugees from Libya.
She said that initially, Rwanda will receive 500 refugees as part of the commitment by President Paul Kagame in late 2017.
President Kagame made this commitment after revelations that tens of thousands of different African nationalities were stranded in Libya having failed to make it across the Mediterranean Sea to European countries.
“We are talking at this time of up to 500 refugees from Libya,” Gitera said, without revealing more details.
She however added that the exact timing of when these would be brought will be confirmed later.
It had earlier been said that Rwanda was ready to receive up to 30,000 immigrants under this arrangement.
Rwanda’s intervention came amid harrowing revelations that the migrants, most of them from West Africa, are being sold openly in modern-day slave markets in Libya.
The immigrants are expected to be received under an emergency plan being discussed with international humanitarian agencies and other partners.
Gitera highlighted that the process was being specifically supported by the African Union (AU) with funding from European Union (EU) and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).
The proposal comes as conflict in war-torn North African country deepens.
The United Nations estimates almost 5,000 migrants are in detention centres in Libya, about 70 per cent of them refugees and asylum seekers, most of whom have been subjected to different forms of abuse.
This is however against the backdrop of accusations against the EU over the plight of migrants.
Already, thousands of the migrants have died over the past few years while trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea to European countries where they hope for better lives.
Human rights groups have documented multiple cases of rape, torture and other crimes at the facilities, some of which are run by militias.
Rwanda hopes to step in to rescue some of these struggling migrants in its capacity.
The Government of Rwanda has been generously hosting refugees for over two decades and coordinates the refugee response with UNHCR, as well as providing land to establish refugee camps and ensuring camp management and security.
Generally, Rwanda offers a favourable protection environment for refugees.
They have the right to education, employment, cross borders, and access to durable solutions (resettlement, local integration and return) is unhindered.
Camps like Gihembe, Kigeme, Kiziba, Mugombwa and Nyabiheke host thousands of refugees, especially from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi where political instabilities have forced people to leave their countries.
▻https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/rwanda-receive-over-500-migrants-libya
#Libye #évacuation #Rwanda #asile #migrations #réfugiés #union_africaine #plan_d'urgence #UE #EU #externalisation #Union_européenne #HCR #UNHCR
via @pascaline
Travail, nom féminin - Vacarme
▻https://vacarme.org/article3260.html
L’histoire de Konstantína Koúneva, militante syndicale défigurée fin décembre 2008 dans un quartier d’Athènes à la suite d’une attaque à l’acide, est traversée par l’histoire grecque de ces dix dernières années et la traverse en retour d’une façon oblique, singulière et sensible.
pas encore lu, je le poste pour le retrouver, mais aussi parce que je sens que ça va planter des arbres.
]]>J’essaie de compiler ici des liens et documents sur les processus d’ #externalisation des #frontières en #Libye, notamment des accords avec l’#UE #EU.
Les documents sur ce fil n’ont pas un ordre chronologique très précis... (ça sera un boulot à faire ultérieurement... sic)
Les négociations avec l’#Italie sont notamment sur ce fil :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/600874
#asile #migrations #réfugiés
Peut-être qu’Isabelle, @isskein, pourra faire ce travail de mise en ordre chronologique quand elle rentrera de vacances ??
Les propositions de Varoufakis qui menaient à l’échec CADTM - 11 août 2017 - Eric Toussaint
Dans son dernier livre Adults in the Room, Yanis Varoufakis donne sa version des raisons qui ont conduit à la capitulation honteuse du gouvernement Tsipras en juillet 2015. Il analyse essentiellement la période 2009-2015 tout en faisant des incursions dans des époques plus lointaines.
Avec ce livre volumineux (550 pages dans la version originale en anglais), Yanis Varoufakis démontre qu’il est un grand narrateur. Il réussit par moment à émouvoir le lecteur. Son style direct permet de suivre de manière vivante le cours des évènements.
Ce premier article porte sur les 4 premiers chapitres d’un livre qui en compte 17. Il concerne les propositions que faisaient Varoufakis avant de participer au gouvernement en janvier 2015.De la démonstration faite par l’auteur, on peut clairement conclure que son comportement et l’orientation politico-économique qu’il a défendue ont contribué à conduire au désastre. En effet, Yanis Varoufakis revendique clairement un rôle de premier plan dans l’élaboration de la stratégie qu’a adoptée avant la victoire électorale de janvier 2015 une poignée de dirigeants de Syriza : Alexis Tsipras, Yanis Dragasakis, Nikkos Pappas essentiellement.
Varoufakis ne plaide pas coupable : il est convaincu que si Tsipras avait réellement appliqué l’orientation qu’il lui a proposée et que Tsipras a acceptée à la fin 2014, cela n’aurait pas débouché sur une défaite pour le peuple grec.
Mais, contrairement à la conviction de Varoufakis, une lecture attentive de son livre aboutit à la conclusion qu’il a contribué à la défaite. . . . . . . . . . . . .
La suite : ►http://www.cadtm.org/Les-propositions-de-Varoufakis-qui
Le récit discutable de Varoufakis des origines de la crise grecque et ses étonnantes relations avec la classe politique CADTM - 17 août 2017 - Eric Toussaint
Dans son dernier livre Adults in the Room, Yanis Varoufakis donne sa version des raisons qui ont conduit à la capitulation honteuse du gouvernement Tsipras en juillet 2015. Il analyse essentiellement la période 2009-2015 tout en faisant des incursions dans des époques plus lointaines.
Dans un premier article au sujet de ce livre, j’ai analysé de manière critique les propositions faites par Varoufakis avant de participer au gouvernement de Tsipras en janvier 2015, en montrant qu’elles menaient à l’échec. Ce deuxième article porte notamment sur les liens entretenus par Yanis Varoufakis avec la classe politique dirigeante grecque (tant le PASOK historiquement lié à la social-démocratie, que le parti conservateur Nouvelle Démocratie) depuis plusieurs années.
Yanis Varoufakis met l’accent à plusieurs reprises sur le large éventail de ses relations dans le milieu politique grec. Il insiste sur son amitié passée avec Yanis Stournaras (l’actuel directeur de la banque centrale de la Grèce, allié de Draghi et des banquiers privés grecs et étrangers), sur ses bons rapports en 2009 avec Georges Papandréou (qui a mis en œuvre la politique conduisant au premier mémorandum), sur ses relations avec Antonis Samaras (qui a dirigé le gouvernement grec après le deuxième mémorandum) et il consacre une partie importante des 4 premiers chapitres du livre à relater la construction de rapports étroits de collaboration et à certains moments de complicité avec 3 dirigeants de Syriza. Il s’agit d’Alexis Tsipras (qui a conduit le peuple grec au troisième mémorandum), Nikos Pappas (l’alter ego de Tsipras, devenu ministre d’État dans le gouvernement Tsipras I) auquel s’est ajouté, en cours de route, Yanis Dragasakis (avant que celui-ci devienne vice-premier ministre des gouvernements Tsipras I et II). Dans cette deuxième partie, je vais aborder le récit du début de la crise grecque ainsi que les relations de Varoufakis avec la classe politique traditionnelle grecque.Varoufakis relate de manière très discutable l’enchaînement des événements qui ont conduit à l’imposition du premier mémorandum de mai 2010. Tout en s’en défendant, il conforte la narration officielle selon laquelle la cause de la crise réside dans l’incapacité de l’État grec à faire face à la dette publique. Bien qu’il dénonce l’état lamentable dans lequel les banques privées grecques s’étaient placées |1|, il met l’accent sur l’incapacité de l’État grec à faire face à la situation et déclare que celui-ci aurait dû se déclarer en faillite. Il écarte la possibilité qui était “offerte” à l’État de refuser d’assumer les pertes des banques. Son raisonnement sur la faillite de l’État grec tient au fait que, selon lui, le passif (=les dettes) des banques privées était, qu’on le veuille ou non, à charge de l’État. Le passif des banques privées était tellement élevé que l’État grec était incapable d’y faire face. Pourtant, à différents moments de l’histoire, des États ont refusé d’assumer les pertes des banques privées. L’Islande l’a fait à partir de 2008 lors de l’effondrement de son secteur bancaire privé et s’en est très bien tirée. Elle a su faire face victorieusement aux menaces de la Grande-Bretagne et des Pays-Bas |2|.
Il ne suffit pas de dire que la Grèce n’est pas l’Islande, il ne suffit pas d’affirmer que la Grèce fait partie de la zone euro et devait y rester pour mettre fin au débat. Varoufakis adopte une attitude en réalité conservatrice du point de vue économique et social. Il dénonce les banquiers grecs mais la solution qu’il a proposée à Alexis Tsipras à partir de juin 2012 consistait à transférer la propriété des banques grecques à l’Union européenne |3|. . . . . . . . .
La suite : ►http://www.cadtm.org/Le-recit-discutable-de-Varoufakis
Comment Tsipras, avec le concours de Varoufakis, a tourné le dos au programme de Syriza CADTM - 31 août 2017 - Eric Toussaint
Yanis Varoufakis fait remonter à 2011 sa collaboration avec Alexis Tsipras et son alter ego, Nikos Pappas. Cette collaboration s’élargit progressivement, à partir de 2013, à Yanis Dragasakis (qui est devenu, en 2015, vice-premier ministre). Une constante dans les rapports entre Varoufakis et Tsipras : Yanis Varoufakis plaide en permanence pour modifier l’orientation adoptée par Syriza. Varoufakis affirme que Tsipras-Pappas-Dragasakis veulent eux-mêmes clairement adopter une orientation différente, nettement plus modérée, de celle décidée par leur parti.
La narration faite par Varoufakis ne manque pas de piment. À travers son témoignage, on voit comment, à des étapes très importantes, des choix sont faits dans le dos de Syriza au mépris des principes démocratiques élémentaires.
Varoufakis s’attribue un rôle central et, en effet, il a exercé une influence sur la ligne adoptée par le trio Tsipras-Pappas-Dragasakis. Il est également certain que Tsipras et Pappas ont cherché à construire, en dehors de Syriza, des rapports plus ou moins étroits avec des personnes et des institutions afin de mettre en pratique une politique qui s’est éloignée de plus en plus de l’orientation que Syriza avait faite sienne. Varoufakis n’est pas la seule personne à avoir été contactée mais effectivement, à un moment donné, Tsipras et Pappas ont considéré qu’il était l’homme de la situation pour aller négocier avec les institutions européennes et le FMI. Début 2011, premiers contacts de Varoufakis avec Tsipras et Pappas
Varoufakis décrit sa première rencontre avec Alexis Tsipras et Nikos Pappas début 2011. Pappas lui avait donné rendez-vous dans un petit hôtel restaurant proche du local de Syriza.
• « Quand je suis arrivé à l’hôtel, Alexis et Pappas étaient déjà en train de commander leur déjeuner. Alexis avait une voix chaleureuse, un sourire sincère et la poignée de main d’un éventuel ami. Pappas avait un regard plus illuminé et une voix plus haute. […] Il était évident qu’il avait l’oreille du jeune prince et qu’il lui servait à la fois de guide, de frein et d’aiguillon, une impression que j’aurai toujours au fil des années tumultueuses qui suivraient : deux jeunes hommes du même âge mais de tempéraments différents, qui agissaient et pensaient comme un seul homme. |1| »
Varoufakis explique que Tsipras hésitait sur l’orientation à prendre quant à une sortie éventuelle de la zone euro.
• « Depuis 2011, Syriza était déchiré par les divisions internes face au problème : fallait-il officiellement soutenir le Grexit (quitter la zone euro, mais pas nécessairement l’Union européenne) ? Je trouvais l’attitude d’Alexis face à la question à la fois cavalière et immature. Son objectif était de maîtriser les tendances rivales au sein de son parti plus que de se faire une opinion claire et personnelle. À en juger par les regards complices de Pappas, il était évident qu’il partageait mon point de vue. Il comptait sur moi pour l’aider à empêcher le leader du parti de jongler avec l’idée du Grexit.
• J’ai fait de mon mieux pour impressionner Alexis et le convaincre que viser le Grexit était une erreur aussi grave que de ne pas s’y préparer du tout. J’ai reproché à Syriza de s’engager à la légère (…). »
Tsipras a soumis à Varoufakis l’idée de menacer les dirigeants européens d’une sortie de la Grèce de la zone euro, en cas de refus de leur part de remettre en cause la politique mémorandaire. Varoufakis lui a répondu qu’il éviter de sortir de la zone euro car il était possible par la négociation d’obtenir une solution favorable à la Grèce, notamment une nouvelle restructuration de sa dette.
Tsipras a répliqué que des économistes renommés, comme Paul Krugman, affirmaient que la Grèce irait bien mieux sans l’euro.
Varoufakis poursuit son récit : « Je lui ai répondu qu’on irait bien mieux si on n’était jamais entrés dans la zone euro, mais ne pas y être entrés était une chose, en sortir était une autre. […] Pour le persuader d’abandonner ce raisonnement paresseux, je lui ai fait le tableau de ce qui nous attendait en cas de Grexit. Contrairement à l’Argentine qui avait renoncé à la parité entre le peso et le dollar, la Grèce n’avait pas de pièces ni de billets à elle en circulation. » Pour le convaincre, Varoufakis fait observer à Tsipras que : « Créer une nouvelle monnaie demande des mois. »
En réalité cet argument qui a été utilisé à de multiples reprises par Varoufakis et d’autres opposants à la sortie de l’euro n’est pas solide. En effet, il était possible d’adopter une nouvelle monnaie en utilisant les billets en euro après les avoir estampillés. Les distributeurs automatiques des banques auraient délivré des billets en euro qui auraient été préalablement marqués d’un sceau. C’est notamment ce que James Galbraith a expliqué dans une lettre à son ami Varoufakis en juillet 2015 |2|.
En réalité, ce que souhaite Varoufakis, c’est convaincre Tsipras qu’il est possible de rester dans la zone euro tout en rompant avec la politique anti sociale appliquée jusque-là :
. . . . . . . . .
La suite : ▻http://www.cadtm.org/Comment-Tsipras-avec-le-concours
#Grèce #euro #crise-grecque organisée #union-européenne #banque #alexis-tsipras #yanis-varoufakis #mémorandum #pillage
]]>#Yorgos_Katrougalos : ce qu’a produit la réforme du marché du travail en #Grèce
▻https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/economie/070917/yorgos-katrougalos-ce-qu-produit-la-reforme-du-marche-du-travail-en-grece
Alors que le président français se rend ces jeudi et vendredi en Grèce, rencontre avec Yorgos Katrougalos, secrétaire d’État aux affaires européennes du gouvernement Tsipras et ancien ministre du travail. Où l’on retrouve toute l’ambiguïté dans laquelle se trouve aujourd’hui l’exécutif #Syriza.
#Economie #austérité #droit_du_travail #hiérarchie_des_normes #mémorandum #social-démocratie #union_européenne
]]>#Yorgos_Katrougalos : ce qu’a produit la réforme du marché du travail en #Grèce
▻https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/economie/070917/yorgos-katrougalos-ce-qua-produit-la-reforme-du-marche-du-travail-en-grece
Alors que le président français se rend ces jeudi et vendredi en Grèce, rencontre avec Yorgos Katrougalos, secrétaire d’État aux affaires européennes du gouvernement Tsipras et ancien ministre du travail. Où l’on retrouve toute l’ambiguïté dans laquelle se trouve aujourd’hui l’exécutif #Syriza.
#Economie #austérité #droit_du_travail #hiérarchie_des_normes #mémorandum #social-démocratie #union_européenne
]]>« Le contrat individuel règne dans l’économie grecque »
▻https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/economie/070917/le-contrat-individuel-regne-dans-leconomie-grecque
Alors que le président français se rend ces jeudi et vendredi en #Grèce, rencontre avec #Yorgos_Katrougalos, secrétaire d’État aux affaires européennes du gouvernement Tsipras et ancien ministre du travail. Où l’on retrouve toute l’ambiguïté dans laquelle se trouve aujourd’hui l’exécutif #Syriza.
#Economie #austérité #droit_du_travail #hiérarchie_des_normes #mémorandum #social-démocratie #union_européenne
]]>MH-17: Memorandum zur Weitergabe von Informationen zwischen der Ukraine und den Niederlanden | TP heise.de 2017-09-01
#MH17 #Flugzeugabsturz
#Memorandum #Niederlande #Ukraine #USA
#Geheimdienste
Migranti, vertice al Viminale dei ministri dell’Interno di Italia, Ciad, Libia e Niger
Una cooperazione congiunta per il contrasto al terrorismo e alla tratta di esseri umani. Istituita una cabina di regia che opererà per monitorare sui temi oggetto dell’incontro
#Anarchists attack the riot police outside the greek parliament (#Athens, Greece – 17 May 2017)
“We won’t live like slaves - The only lost battles are the ones that they have not been given”.
On Wednesday 17 May 2017 thousands of people joined the general #strike #protests all over Greece, against the new harsh financial measures of 4.9 billion euros incorporated in the 4th Memorandum signed by the greek government, aimed once again against the lower income classes rather, than the #banks and the wealthy.
The self proclaimed left government of #SYRIZA in co-operation with the right wing party of ANEL have unleashed a new class war, this time specifically aimed against people with disability and pensioners that have worked all their lives and paid their share under the false notion -as it seems- that during the time when they will be most vulnerable, they would have free public health services and subsidies that would help them get by. On the contrary after 23(!) severe cuts in pensions and allowances during the 8 years of the financial crisis in #Greece (amounting to more than 50 billion euros in pension and allowances cuts during the last 7 years), that has forced people to live like beggars, a further 18% cut will be imposed on pensions under the 4th #Memorandum being voted in the greek parliament these days and a “freezing” of even the slightest raise in pensions until 2022.
▻https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=193&v=XjuvJ6in9kk
]]>Les familles grecques démantelées par la crise
Il se souvient très bien du jour où il a quitté sa maison...
L’#orphelinat dans la #Grèce des #mémorandums : une maison de substitution pour des enfants qui ne sont pas orphelins.
Sept ans après le début de la #crise de la #dette grecque, les plus jeunes sont désormais touchés et la #famille, l’un des piliers de la #société, est ébranlée.
// Arte, #documentaire moyen métrage. //
Jouer avec le feu : sur l’instrumentalisation des mouvements sociaux par la “gauche radicale” grecque
Fondé sur l’instrumentalisation puis sur la négation des mouvements sociaux, le gouvernement Syriza apparaît ainsi, à partir du 13 juillet 2015, comme un pouvoir ayant pour effet principal de saper un contre-pouvoir existant, établi dans la durée (le mouvement multiforme de mobilisation né au sein de la société grecque depuis 2011). Étouffer l’insurrection en en prenant la tête, voire en feignant d’en avoir l’initiative : tel est le mouvement magnifiquement décrit par Walter Benjamin dans la première nouvelle du recueil Rastelli raconte, ensemble de fictions rédigées au tout début des années 30.
#austérité #autogestion #dette #Grèce #mouvements #gauche #Syriza #Europe #UE #mémorandum #instrumentalisation
▻https://oulaviesauvage.wordpress.com/2016/12/17/jouer-avec-le-feu
]]>Serbie : Trente ans plus tard, que reste-t-il du nationaliste « mémorandum de la SANU » ? - Le Courrier des Balkans
Un document confus et dangereux qui n’avait aucune valeur scientifique.
▻http://www.courrierdesbalkans.fr/articles/le-memorandum-de-l-academie-serbe-des-sciences-et-des-arts-une-ta
dans la série des « plans d’aide à la Grèce »
Fin septembre, sous pression européenne, le Parlement grec a donné son feu vert à la relance des privatisations. Une aubaine dont comptent profiter plusieurs entreprises françaises, en premier lieu Suez qui vise les services d’eau d’#Athènes et Thessalonique. Coïncidence ? La France, qui se complaît tant à se présenter comme une amie de la #Grèce, a placé deux hauts fonctionnaires de #Bercy à des positions clés pour influencer le processus de privatisation.
#privatisations #néo-libéralisme #austérité #mémorandums #Syriza
►http://multinationales.org/Privatisations-grecques-la-France-place-ses-hauts-fonctionnaires-po
]]>"Italia deporta illegalmente migranti in Sudan"
«È un fatto gravissimo. Il Ministero dell’Interno ha disposto per oggi la deportazione di 48 migranti da Malpensa verso il Sudan con modalità assolutamente fuori legge»: Pippo Civati denuncia irregolarità da parte del Ministro dell’Interno e coglie l’occasione per discutere di Europa e immigrazione.
▻http://www.fanpage.it/la-denuncia-di-civati-italia-deporta-illegalmente-migranti-in-sudan
#Soudan #Italie #renvois #expulsions #asile #migrations #réfugiés #réfugiés_soudanais #déportation
"Nous sommes à un point que l’on peut qualifier ainsi : « trêve des plaisanteries, dorénavant ». Des plaisanteries telles que la possibilité de prendre des mesures positives dites « compensatrices » à celles qui découleront de l’application du nouveau programme d’austérité. Nous sommes arrivés au moment où la vérité sur le mémorandum 3 sera exposée au grand jour, où le gouvernement devra signer « l’accord » avec les créanciers et faire adopter par le parlement des mesures meurtrières ayant trait à la sécurité sociale, aux impôts, aux salaires et aux embauches dans les services publics, ainsi qu’aux créances hypothécaires impayées."
#Grèce #Troika #Syriza #mémorandum #austérité #UE #Tsipras
▻http://alencontre.org/europe/grece-le-moment-de-verite-pour-le-memorandum-3.html
]]>Message reçu de Laurence Pillant, via la mailing-list Migreurop:
Extrait de la revue de presse de l’ambassade concernant la visite allemande en Grèce et les négociations sur les hotspots et #patrouilles_conjointes #Grèce-#Turquie
Ta Nea résume ainsi la visite de M. Steinmeier en Grèce : « L’Allemagne exerce des pressions sur la Grèce pour une collaboration plus étroite avec la Turquie dans la gestion de la crise des réfugiés. La question des patrouilles communes en #mer_Egée a également fait l’objet des entretiens de M. Steinmeier à Athènes. En même temps, l’Allemagne fait savoir par tous les moyens qu’elle dissocie pleinement la question des réfugiés du mémorandum grec et rejette toute tentative d’Athènes d’assouplir les mesures convenues ». Le journal souligne en titre que Berlin demande « un mémorandum » entre la Grèce et la Turquie sur la crise des réfugiés. Sous le titre « Soutien parcimonieux du ministre allemand des AE », Ethnos relève que M. Steinmeier a reconnu la charge importante qui pèse sur la Grèce en raison des flux des réfugiés mais a évité de discuter sur un éventuel assouplissement des conditions du #mémorandum. Sur la crise des réfugiés, le PM grec, M. Tsipras, et le ministre grec des AE, M. Kotzias, ont insisté sur la nécessité de gérer les flux migratoires depuis le territoire turc. Toutefois, M. Steinmeier a évité de commenter la position ferme de la Grèce sur la création de « hot spots » en Turquie. Enfin, M. Kotzias a de nouveau rejeté l’éventualité de patrouilles communes gréco-turques en mer Egée, en soulignant que la crise des réfugiés ne peut et ne doit pas devenir le prétexte pour la violation de la souveraineté nationale. Avghi relève pour sa part qu’à l’occasion de l’entretien avec M. Steinmeier, le PM grec, M. Tsipras, a insisté sur la nécessité pour l’UE de soutenir la Grèce dans ses efforts pour faire face à la crise migratoire.
Tsipras says level of EU debate on migrants is ’sad’
“I feel shamed as a member of this European leadership, both for the inability of Europe in dealing with this human drama, and for the level of debate at a senior level, where one is passing the buck to the other,” Tsipras told Parliament.
“These are hypocritical, crocodile tears which are being shed for the dead children on the shores of the Aegean. Dead children always incite sorrow, But what about the children that are alive who come in thousands and are stacked on the streets? Nobody likes them.”
More than 500,000 migrants and refugees have crossed through Greece to central and northern Europe since the beginning of the year, exposing deep fissures among EU member states in dealing with one of the worst humanitarian crises in decades. [Reuters]
▻http://www.ekathimerini.com/202975/article/ekathimerini/news/tsipras-says-level-of-eu-debate-on-migrants-is-sad
Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras slammed on Friday the level of debate among European Union governments in dealing with the migrant crisis as ’sad’ for a lack of cohesive action in dealing with the crisis.
#réfugiés #asile #migrations #chantage #politique_migratoire #Europe #EU #UE #Allemagne #externalisation
]]>Yanis Varoufakis à propos des élections du 20 septembre
▻http://blogs.mediapart.fr/en/blog/monica-m/210915/yanis-varoufakis-propos-des-elections-du-20-septembre
L’article de Y.Varoufakis paru dans le Guardian - en version française.
Le plus grand gagnant est la Troïka elle-même. Au cours des cinq dernières années, les projets de loi de la Troïka sont passés par le parlement avec des majorités ultra-minces, procurant des nuits blanches à leurs auteurs. Maintenant, les projets de loi nécessaires au troisième Mémorandum passent avec de confortables majorités, car Syriza s’y est engagé. Presque tous les députés de l’opposition (à l’exception des communistes du KKE et les nazis de l’Aube dorée) votent pour eux.
Bien sûr, pour en arriver là, il a fallu meurtrir profondément la démocratie grecque. Un million 600.000 Grecs qui avaient voté lors du référendum de Juillet n’ont pas pris la peine de se présenter aux bureaux de vote dimanche - ce n’est pas une grande perte pour les bureaucrates de Bruxelles, Francfort et Washington, qui semblent concevoir la démocratie comme une nuisance.
#mémorandum #Troika #Grèce #Syriza #Tsipras
]]>nous sommes tous vulnérables
nous devons tous agir
"Comme membre active de la société civile, je comprends de plus en plus qu’il est temps d’agir. Je ne parle pas du type d’actions qui créent un filet de sécurité et que nous avons exécutées avec détermination tout au long de ces années de crise, en essayant de récupérer la dignité perdue de la population vulnérable. L’adjectif « vulnérable » nous dépasse. Maintenant, nous sommes tous vulnérables d’une certaine façon. Le temps de se retrouver et de prendre des mesures pour créer de nouvelles formes à tous les niveaux est arrivé. Nouvelles structures, nouvelles activités de non coopération avec les politiques inappropriées et nouvelles propositions pour le système de gouvernance, vu que la démocratie représentative s’est effondrée excessivement au cours de l’été."
▻http://www.pressenza.com/fr/2015/09/elections-en-grece-nous-avons-besoin-dinspiration
#Grèce #Syriza #UE #austérité #mémorandum
]]>« bouffez du mémorandum
c’est Syriza qui régale »
▻http://www.greekcrisis.fr/2015/09/Fr0465.html?spref=fb
#Grèce #Syriza #UE #austérité #mémorandum
]]>