• France attacks religion secularism radicalism blasphemy
    –-> article retiré:


    https://www.politico.eu/article/france-attacks-religion-secularism-radicalism-blasphemy-islam

    –—

    Copié ici:

    Another string of jihadist attacks has shaken France. The most recent, at a church in Nice, left three people dead, only two weeks after a teacher was beheaded on the outskirts of Paris after he displayed cartoons of the prophet Mohammed in his classroom.

    Why is France targeted, over and over again, by violent extremists? Germany, England, Italy and even Denmark — where cartoons of controversial Mohammed were first published — have not seen comparable violence.

    The reason is simple: France’s extreme form of secularism and its embrace of blasphemy, which has fueled radicalism among a marginalized minority.

    Specifically, the latest round of violence follows the decision earlier this month by the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo to mark the beginning of a trial over a murderous attack on its newsroom in 2015 by republishing the blasphemous cartoons of Mohammed that prompted the original assault.

    This duo — radical secularism and religious radicalism — have been engaged in a deadly dance ever since.

    Traditionally, French secularism requires the state to be neutral and calls for respect for religions in the public space, in order to avoid the rise of religious intolerance.

    In modern times, however, it has become something far more extreme. The moderate secularism that prevailed as recently as the 1970s has been replaced with something more like a civil religion.

    It’s a belief system that has its own priests (government ministers), its pontiff (the president of the republic), its acolytes (intellectuals) and its heretics (anyone who calls for a less antagonistic attitude toward Islam is rejected and branded an “Islamo-leftist”).

    One of the defining features of this new secularism is the promotion of religious blasphemy — and, in particular, its extreme expression in the form of caricatures like those of Mohammed.

    This embrace was on full display following the murder of the teacher who showed cartoons of Mohammed in his classes, when many French intellectuals came out in praise of blasphemy and defended the government’s unequivocal defense of the right to free expression.

    They should have considered their words more carefully.

    In Western Europe the right to blaspheme is legally recognized. But it is one thing to protect the freedom to blaspheme and another to enthusiastically exhort blasphemy, as is the case in France.

    Blasphemy is a non-argumentative and sarcastic form of free speech. It should be used, at best, with moderation in a country where between 6 percent and 8 percent of the population is Muslim, most of whose parents or grandparents emigrated from French colonies in North Africa.

    Defenders of blasphemy invoke freedom of expression, but what blasphemy does, in fact, is trap France in a vicious cycle of reactivity to jihadist terror that makes it less free and less autonomous.

    The immoderate use of caricatures in name of the right to blaspheme ultimately undermines public debate: It stigmatizes and humiliates even the most moderate or secular Muslims, many of whom do not understand French secularists’ obsessive focus on Islam, the veil, daily prayers or Islamic teachings.

    The result is a harmful cycle: provocation, counter-provocation, and a society’s descent into hell. As French secularism has become radicalized, the number of jihadist attacks in the country has multiplied.

    French secularists claim to be fighting for freedom of expression. As they do so, innocent people are dying, Muslims around the world are rejecting French values and boycotting the country’s products, and French Muslims are facing restrictions on their freedom of expression in the name of thwarting Islamist propaganda.

    France is paying a heavy price for its fundamentalist secularism, both inside and outside its own borders.

    https://www.1news.info/european-news/france-s-dangerous-religion-of-secularism-798875

    #Farhad_Khosrokhavar #terrorisme #religion #sécularisme #blasphème #extrémisme #France #violence #minorité_marginalisée #radicalisme #radicalisation #Charlie_Hebdo #radicalisme_religieux #sécularisme_radical #religion_civile #islamo-gauchisme #caricatures #liberté_d'expression #débat_public #provocation #contre-provocation #sécularisme_fondamentaliste

    ping @karine4 @cede @isskein

    • « On a oublié le rôle de l’#humiliation dans l’Histoire », par #Olivier_Abel

      Pour le philosophe, « en sacralisant les #caricatures, nous sommes devenus incapables de percevoir ce que les Grecs anciens désignaient par le #tragique ».

      Quel rapport entre les crimes abjects des djihadistes, le danger que représentent à certains égards les « réseaux sociaux » pour la démocratie et la civilité, la question de la liberté d’expression et du blasphème, le durcissement quasi-guerrier de la laïcité, les gilets jaunes, les majorités dangereuses qui ont porté Trump ou Erdogan au pouvoir, et qui poussent à nos portes ? Nous ne comprenons pas ce qui nous arrive, ces colères qui montent en miroir sans plus rien chercher à comprendre, nous ne savons et sentons plus ce que nous faisons. Je voudrais proposer ici une hypothèse.

      Nous avons globalement fait fausse route. Le drame des caricatures n’est que la partie visible d’un énorme problème. Nous nous sommes enfoncés dans le #déni de l’humiliation, de son importance, de sa gravité, de son existence même. Nous sommes sensibles aux #violences, comme aux #inégalités, mais insensibles à l’humiliation qui les empoisonne. Comme l’observait le philosophe israélien Avishaï Margalit, nous n’imaginons même pas ce que serait une société dont les institutions (police, préfectures, administrations, prisons, hôpitaux, écoles, etc.) seraient non-humiliantes. Dans l’état actuel de rétrécissement des ressources planétaires, on aura beaucoup de mal à faire une société plus juste, mais pourquoi déjà ne pas essayer une société moins humiliante ?

      Ni quantifiable, ni mesurable

      Il faut dire que l’humiliation est une notion – et une réalité - compliquée. L’#offense est subjective, et dépend au moins autant de ceux qui la reçoivent que de ceux qui l’émettent. Ce qui humiliera l’un laissera l’autre indifférent, et cela dépend même du moment où ça tombe. L’humiliation n’est pas quantifiable, mesurable, comme le sont les coups et blessures. D’où la tentation de dire que là où il n’y a pas de #dommage ni #préjudice il n’y a pas de #tort. Ce n’est pas une affaire de #droit mais seulement de #sentiment ou de #morale personnelle, donc circulez, il n’y a rien à dire.

      Et pourtant… Si les violences s’attaquent au #corps de l’autre, dans ses capacités et sa #vulnérabilité, l’humiliation fait encore pire : elle s’attaque au visage de l’autre, dans son #estime et son #respect_de_soi : elle le fait blanchir ou rougir, et souvent les deux en même temps.

      Car l’humiliation se présente de deux façons, en apparence contradictoires. Par un côté, elle porte atteinte à l’estime de soi, en faisant #honte à l’individu de son expression, de ce qu’il voudrait montrer et faire valoir, elle le rabroue et l’exclut du cercle de ceux qui sont autorisés à parler. Mais, par un autre côté, elle porte atteinte également au #respect et à la #pudeur, en dévoilant ce qui voulait se cacher, en forçant l’individu à montrer ce qui constitue sa réserve, en le surexposant au #regard_public, en lui interdisant de se retirer.

      L’humiliation s’attaque au sujet parlant. Les humains ne se nourrissent pas de pain et de cirques seulement, mais de #paroles_vives en vis-à-vis : ils n’existent qu’à se reconnaître mutuellement comme des sujets parlants, crédités comme tels, et reconnus dans leur crédibilité. L’humiliation fait taire le sujet parlant, elle lui fait honte de son expression, elle ruine sa confiance en soi.

      Quand le faible est trop faible

      Elle peut également atteindre des formes de vie, des minorités langagières, sexuelles, raciales, religieuses, sociales, etc. Il peut même arriver qu’une majorité endormie dans sa complaisance soit humiliée par une minorité active. Elle devient ce que j’appelais plus haut une majorité « dangereuse », pour elle-même et pour les autres.

      Une #parole_humiliée devient sujette à ces deux maladies du langage que sont la #dévalorisation ou la #survalorisation de soi. Ou, pour le dire autrement : la #dérision ou le #fanatisme. Commençons par la genèse du fanatisme. Simone Weil avait proposé d’expliquer les affaires humaines par cette loi : « on est toujours #barbares avec les faibles ». Il faudrait donc que nul ne soit laissé trop faible et sans aucun #contre-pouvoir, et que le plus fort soit suffisamment « déprotégé » pour rester sensible au faible, bon gagnant si je puis dire, et conscient qu’il ne sera pas toujours le plus fort.

      Mais quand le faible est trop faible pour infliger quelque tort que ce soit au plus fort, le pacte politique posé par Hobbes est rompu. Les faibles n’ont plus rien à perdre, ne sont plus tenus par le souci de la sécurité des biens et des corps, il ne leur reste que l’au-delà et ils basculent dans le #sacrifice_de_soi, dans une parole portée à la folie. Ici la #religion vient juste au dernier moment pour habiller, nommer, justifier cette mutation terrible.

      « C’est à l’humiliation que répond la #barbarie »

      La violence appelle la violence, dans un échange réciproque qui devrait rester à peu près proportionné, même si bien souvent la #violence s’exerce elle-même de manière humiliante, et nous ne savons pas ce que serait une violence vraiment non-humiliante. Avec l’humiliation cependant, le cercle des échanges devient vicieux, les retours sont longuement différés, comme sans rapport, et ils ont quelque chose de démesuré. Ils sont parallèles, mais en négatif, aux circuits de la #reconnaissance dont on sait qu’ils prennent du temps.

      C’est pourquoi les effets de l’humiliation sont si dévastateurs. Ils courent dans le temps, car les humiliés seront humiliants au centuple. Comme le remarquait #Ariane_Bazan, ils peuvent aller jusqu’à détruire méthodiquement toute scène de reconnaissance possible, toute réparation possible : la mère tuera tous ses enfants, comme le fait Médée rejetée par Jason. Lisant Euripide, elle concluait : « c’est à l’humiliation que répond la barbarie ». Les grandes tragédies sont des scènes de la reconnaissance non seulement manquée, mais écrabouillée.

      Pourquoi nos sociétés occidentales sont-elles collectivement aussi insensibles à l’humiliation ? Est-ce la différence avec ce qu’on a appelé les sociétés de honte, le Japon, le monde arabe ? Sans doute est-ce d’abord aujourd’hui parce que nous sommes une société managée par des unités de mesure quantifiable, la monnaie, l’audimat, et par une juridicisation qui ne reconnaît que les torts mesurables, compensables, sinon monnayables.

      Cette évolution a été accélérée par une #morale_libérale, qui est une #morale_minimale, où tout est permis si l’autre est consentant : or on n’a pas besoin du #consentement de l’autre pour afficher sa #liberté, tant que son expression n’est ni violente ni discriminante à l’égard des personnes, et ne porte aucun dommage objectif — les croyances n’existent pas, on peut en faire ce qu’on veut. Le facteur aggravant de l’humiliation, dans une société de réseaux, c’est la diffusion immédiate et sans écrans ralentisseurs des atteintes à la réputation : la #calomnie, la #moquerie, le #harcèlement.

      L’angle mort de notre civilisation

      Mais plus profondément encore, plus anciennement, notre insensibilité à l’humiliation est due à l’entrecroisement, dans nos sociétés, d’une morale stoïcienne de la #modestie, et d’une morale chrétienne de l’#humilité. Celle-ci, en rupture avec les religions de l’imperium, de la victoire, propose en modèle un divin abaissé et humilié dans l’ignominie du supplice de la croix, réservé aux esclaves. Le #stoïcisme est une sagesse dont la stratégie consiste à décomposer l’opinion d’autrui en des énoncés creux dont aucun ne saurait nous atteindre : l’esclave stoïcien n’est pas plus humiliable que l’empereur stoïcien.

      La dialectique hégélienne du maître et de l’esclave est d’ailleurs héritière de ces deux traditions mêlées, quand il fait de l’expérience de l’esclavage une étape nécessaire sur le chemin de la liberté. Cette vertu d’humilité a paradoxalement creusé dans le monde de la chevalerie médiévale, puis dans la société française de cour, et finalement dans le dévouement de l’idéal scientifique, un sillon profond, qui est comme l’angle mort de notre civilisation.

      Et cet angle mort nous a empêchés de voir le rôle de l’humiliation dans l’histoire : c’est l’humiliation du Traité de Versailles qui prépare la venue d’Hitler au pouvoir, celle de la Russie ou de la Turquie qui y maintient Poutine et Erdogan, c’est la manipulation du sentiment d’humiliation qui a propulsé la figure de Trump. Et cette histoire n’est pas finie. Les manipulations machiavéliques des sentiments de peur et les politiques du #ressentiment n’ont jamais atteint, dans tous nos pays simultanément, un tel niveau de dangerosité. Les djihadistes ici jouent sur du velours, car à l’humiliation ancienne de la #colonisation militaire, économique, et culturelle, s’est ajoutée celle des #banlieues et du #chômage, et maintenant les caricatures du prophète, répétées à l’envi.

      #Fanatisme et #dérision

      Car la genèse de la dérision est non moins importante, et concomitante à celle du fanatisme. On a beaucoup entendu parler du #droit_de_blasphémer : curieuse expression, de la part de tous ceux (et j’en suis) qui ne croient pas au #blasphème ! Réclamer le droit de blasphémer, s’acharner à blasphémer, n’est-ce pas encore y croire, y attacher de l’importance ? N’est-ce pas comme les bandes iconoclastes de la Réforme ou de la Révolution qui saccagent les églises, dans une sorte de superstition anti-superstitieuse ?

      Tout le tragique de l’affaire tient justement au fait que ce qui est important pour les uns est négligeable pour les autres. Il faudrait que les uns apprennent à ne pas accorder tant d’importance à de telles #satires, et que les autres apprennent à mesurer l’importance de ce qu’ils font et disent. Ce qui m’inquiète aujourd’hui c’est le sentiment qu’il n’y a plus rien d’important, sauf le droit de dire que rien n’est important.

      Une société où tout est « cool » et « fun » est une société insensible à l’humiliation, immunisée à l’égard de tout scandale, puisqu’il n’y reste rien à transgresser, rien à profaner. Or la fonction du #scandale est vitale pour briser la complaisance d’une société à elle-même. Pire, lorsque l’ironiste adopte un point de vue en surplomb, pointant l’idiotie des autres, il interrompt toute possibilité de #conversation. On peut rire, mais encore faut-il que cela puisse relancer la conversation !

      Sacralisation des caricatures ?

      Le différend tient peut-être aussi au fait que nous ne disposons pas exactement des mêmes genres littéraires. #Salman_Rushdie et #Milan_Kundera observaient que le monde musulman a du mal à comprendre ce que c’est qu’un « roman », comme une forme littéraire typique d’une certaine époque européenne, et qui met en suspens le jugement moral. Nous aussi, nous avons un problème : on dirait parfois que le genre littéraire éminent qui fonde notre culture est la caricature, la dérision, le #comique.

      Ce qui est proprement caricatural, c’est que les caricatures, le #droit_de_rire, soient devenues notre seul sacré. Serions-nous devenus incapables de percevoir ce que les Grecs anciens désignaient par le tragique ? N’avons-nous pas perdu aussi le sens de l’#épopée véritable (celle qui honore les ennemis), et le sens de quoi que ce soit qui nous dépasse nos gentilles libertés bien protégées ?

      Aujourd’hui, aux manipulations de la peur et de la xénophobie par les néonationalistes français, qui sacralisent la #laïcité comme si elle n’était plus le cadre neutre d’une #liberté_d’expression capable de cohabiter paisiblement avec celle des autres, mais la substance même de l’#identité française (une identité aussi moniste et exclusive que jadis l’était le catholicisme pour l’Action française), répond la manipulation cynique du sentiment d’humiliation des musulmans français par les prédicateurs-guerriers du djihadisme, qui n’ont de cesse d’instrumentaliser le ressentiment, dans le monde et en France.

      Liberté d’abjurer et laïcité réelle

      Aux organisations musulmanes françaises, nous dirons : demandez aux pays dominés par l’islam politique d’accorder à leurs minorités les mêmes libertés réelles qui sont celles des musulmans de France, et accordez solennellement à toutes les musulmanes et à tous les musulmans le droit d’abjurer, de se convertir, ou simplement de se marier en dehors de leur communauté.

      Aux néonationalistes, nous dirons : si la laïcité n’est plus que cette identité sacrée, c’est-à-dire le contraire de ce qu’elle a été dans l’histoire réelle (oui, enseignons d’abord l’histoire réelle dans son long cours, ses compromis complexes, et pas les histoires simplistes que nous nous racontons !), le #pacte_laïque sera rompu, et nous ferons sécession, il faudra tout recommencer, ensemble et avec les nouveaux venus.

      Car ce pacte est ce qui, au nom de notre histoire commune, et inachevée, autorise, au sens fort, la #reconnaissance_mutuelle. Il cherche à instituer un théâtre commun d’apparition qui fasse pleinement crédit à la parole des uns et des autres. C’est bien ce qui nous manque le plus aujourd’hui.

      https://www.nouvelobs.com/idees/20201122.OBS36427/on-a-oublie-le-role-de-l-humiliation-dans-l-histoire-par-olivier-abel.htm

  • Porte-voix de la diversité. Des étudiantes en études littéraires créent la #maison_d’édition #Diverses_syllabes.

    Cinq étudiantes du baccalauréat, de la maîtrise et du doctorat en études littéraires viennent de fonder, avec une collègue doctorante en histoire à l’Université de Montréal, Diverses syllabes, une maison d’édition féministe intersectionnelle et queer qui s’est donné pour mission de donner la parole aux personnes racisées et appartenant aux minorités de genre.

    « Ce projet, je le portais en moi depuis un moment déjà, explique Madioula Kébé-Kamara, finissante du bac en études littéraires et directrice générale de Diverses syllabes. Il n’est pas non plus étranger aux réflexions et discussions sur le racisme systémique, déclenchées par la résurgence ces derniers mois du mouvement Black Lives Matter après le meurtre de George Floyd aux États-Unis, et à celles sur les dénonciations d’inconduites sexuelles dans le milieu artistique québécois. »

    Sans aller jusqu’à taxer le milieu littéraire québécois de raciste, l’étudiante s’interroge sur la sous-représentation dans le monde de l’édition d’ouvrages dont les autrices et auteurs appartiennent aux minorités racisées. « Sur les 10 livres dont on a le plus parlé l’an dernier, combien ont été écrits par des femmes racisées, ou par des personnes racisées issues des minorités de genre ? Diverses syllabes leur servira de porte-voix. »

    Créer une nouvelle maison d’édition exige du temps, de l’énergie et, surtout, des moyens financiers. Afin d’assurer son indépendance pour les deux prochaines années, Diverses syllabes a lancé une campagne de sociofinancement. « Nous sommes un organisme sans but lucratif et notre objectif est de recueillir 60 000 dollars, précise Madioula Kébé-Kamara. Cela devrait nous permettre de publier trois titres par année, sachant que Québec accorde des subventions aux maisons d’édition à partir du cinquième livre paru. »

    Les personnes intéressées à souscrire à la campagne de sociofinancement peuvent le faire ici. D’autres liens se retrouvent sur les pages Instagram et Facebook de Diverses syllabes. Un site web sera aussi bientôt créé.
    Un choix éditorial

    Diverses syllabes entend mettre en valeur et faire résonner d’autres voix en publiant essentiellement des ouvrages écrits par des personnes provenant des minorités racisées et de genre. Un choix éditorial, voire politique ? « Éditorial, répond sa directrice. Ces écrivaines ont des expériences et des regards différents. En tant que personnes marginalisées, il leur est souvent difficile de se faire entendre parmi l’ensemble des auteurs et autrices, comme c’est le cas lors des concours littéraires. »

    La nouvelle maison d’édition prévoit publier principalement des œuvres de fiction – romans, poésie –, mais aussi des essais, des bandes dessinées, des livres d’art et des livres jeunesse.

    Madioula Kébé-Kamara ne souhaite pas que Diverses syllabes devienne ce qu’elle appelle une « niche à doléances ». « Plusieurs stéréotypes entourent les ouvrages produits par les autrices et auteurs des minorités racisées, observe-t-elle, comme s’il fallait que leurs œuvres soient sensationnalistes, ou trash, qu’elles racontent des histoires tragiques : j’ai fait de la prostitution, j’ai dû traverser la Méditerranée à la nage, etc. Certes, ces types de récits ont leur raison d’être, mais nous voulons éviter le misérabilisme, mettre en lumière la richesse et la diversité des imaginaires… offrir de la bonne littérature, quoi ! »
    Un espace bienveillant

    Diverses syllabes sera une maison d’édition dite bienveillante, souligne l’étudiante. « Cela signifie que nous voulons offrir un espace d’édition solidaire et sécuritaire, misant sur la transparence, le respect, l’équité et la reconnaissance du travail des autrices et auteurs, lesquels connaissent souvent des conditions précaires. »

    Alors que le revenu annuel moyen des écrivains est de 9 169 dollars, selon des données de l’Union des écrivains et écrivaines du Québec (UNEQ), Dives syllabes s’engage à allouer aux autrices une rémunération de base de 1000 dollars dès la signature d’un contrat et à doubler le pourcentage de droits d’auteurs habituellement accordé.

    Enfin, la maison d’édition envisage de former une équipe composée essentiellement de #femmes, issues notamment des #minorités_de_genre. « C’est important quand on sait que les femmes qui occupent des postes de cadre ou de direction dans le milieu du livre constituent encore une minorité, tient à rappeler Madioula Kébé-Kamara. Nous voulons offrir des possibilités d’#emploi au sein de notre équipe, que ce soit à titre d’éditrice, de correctrice ou de communicatrice. Le plafond de verre pour les femmes existe dans tous les milieux. Mais ce plafond est encore plus difficile à briser pour celles qui sont minorisées. Diverses syllabes existe pour bâtir du nouveau. »

    https://www.actualites.uqam.ca/2020/diverses-syllabes-porte-voix-diversite
    #féminisme #intersectionnalité #livres #édition #minorités

  • In Turkey, life for Syrian refugees and Kurds is becoming increasingly violent - The conversation

    A spate of attacks in Turkey on Syrian refugees and Kurdish internal migrants and displaced people in recent months have put both communities on edge. In July, a Syrian teenager working as a market seller in Bursa, northwestern Turkey, died after he was attacked by a group of men.
    Since the beginning of the 20th century, nationalist identity politics have played a critical role in systematic violence against minorities in Turkey, particularly Armenians, Assyrians, Greeks and Kurds. This violent, assimilationist approach is borne out of Turkification policies which promote a Sunni-Turkish identity while denying minority rights.

    https://theconversation.com/in-turkey-life-for-syrian-refugees-and-kurds-is-becoming-increasing

    #Covid-19#Turquie#Sociétécivile#Répréssion#Liberté#minorités#kurdes#Syriens#migrant#migration

  • How the link between racism and Covid is being ignored | Ciaran Thapar | Opinion | The Guardian
    https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/nov/02/link-racism-covid-ignored-report-black-and-minority-ethnic-people-dying
    https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/76e480c1bd9e0a9495a0c81092efcabb9e6a0706/0_224_3500_2101/master/3500.jpg?width=1200&height=630&quality=85&auto=format&fit=crop&overlay-ali

    Powerful people like to point out that Covid-19 does not discriminate. Indeed, the rain, too, does not discriminate against those it falls on. But one’s ability to stay dry beneath a downpour is dependent on the availability of an umbrella. Similarly, our access to security in a pandemic depends on the safety net of the state. Umbrellas can be shared or withheld. Those without one can be listened to – or ignored. I’m a youth worker, and throughout 2020 I have mentored young people from black African and Caribbean, and south Asian origins who mostly live in population-dense social housing. More often than not, their parents worked on the frontline throughout the national lockdown – carers, bus drivers, NHS receptionists, cleaners – or have pre-existing health conditions. As part of a book I’m writing, I have also interviewed many community members, including pastors, rappers and youth club managers, who fall into these same demographic groups.
    In doing this, I’ve detected a melancholic harmony among these voices – an awareness that, while the virus is affecting everyone, everywhere, it is affecting particular people disproportionately. It has been reported widely that race is a metric that can illuminate this disparity. In the summer, for example, 36% of critically ill Covid-19 patients were from an ethnic minority group, despite representing only 13% of the general population. This disproportionality can be subtly inferred from the anecdotes I’ve heard: grandparents died, uncles were denied operations, friends were misdiagnosed. My impression that race is relevant to the clarity of this picture is, of course, in some way explained by the relative multiculturalism of the capital, where I live. But still. The Racial Disparity Unit (RDU), led by the equalities minister, Kemi Badenoch, recently published its first quarterly report addressing the repeatedly proven high impact of Covid-19 on ethnic minorities in the UK. It made 13 recommendations for action, including the mandatory recording of ethnicity as part of the death certification process, the monitoring of how policies affect people from ethnic minorities and the forging of culturally sensitive communications with relevant communities about the virus. All of them have been accepted by the prime minister. At a glance, this appears positive. The devil, however, is in the detail.
    Structural racism led to worse Covid impact on BAME groups – report
    The report explains the disproportionality faced by black and Asian groups – particularly African, Bangladeshi and Pakistani men – by focusing on factors such as people’s occupations, where they live and pre-existing health conditions. In other words, it acknowledges that non-white people are dying at a higher rate and puts this down to the fact that they tend to live in particular circumstances such as overcrowded households, or work in jobs that have greater exposure to the public.

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#grandebretagne#sante#minorite#inegalite#race#bame#santementale#racisme

  • Jabeer Butt: Racism and covid-19—a matter of life and death - The BMJ
    https://blogs.bmj.com/bmj/2020/10/28/jabeer-butt-racism-and-covid-19-a-matter-of-life-and-death

    The omission of racism from the government’s new report on covid-19’s health inequalities marks its latest failure to tackle this important issue, says Jabeer Butt. Last week the UK government’s Race Disparity Unit published its first quarterly report on covid-19 health inequalities. Much of the interviews and reporting that accompanied the report’s publication have focused on comments made at the launch of the report, suggesting that racism does not explain the disproportionate impact of covid-19 on Britain’s Black, Asian, and minority ethnic (BAME) communities. This conclusion does not appear in the 62 pages of the report, where neither racism nor racial inequality is mentioned at all, but is rather how Raghib Ali, one of the government’s new expert advisers, chose to present the findings at the media launch.
    Some might say that the report’s focus on “ethnic disparities” means I am being churlish in suggesting the government’s report has not investigated the impact of racism. But the report’s failure to address at all whether racism has played a part in the pandemic is telling, as are the remarks of government adviser Raghib Ali that structural racism does not seem to explain ethnic disparities in the burden of covid-19 on communities. The report concludes that “a range of socioeconomic and geographical factors such as occupational exposure, population density, household composition, and pre-existing health conditions may contribute to the higher infection and mortality rates for ethnic minority groups.” Using the data from this report, a strong argument can be made that all these factors demonstrate the impact of structural racism.
    The report uses multiple datasets to show that there is a higher risk of infection and higher risk of death as a result of infection among BAME communities. While it suggests that the “relative risk” of dying for “Black and South Asian” groups is reduced “when taking into account socioeconomic and geographical factors,” it is silent as to why these communities are at greater risk of experiencing the “deprivation” that is “a good marker of many of these factors.” It is worth here reminding ourselves of the findings of Sir Michael Marmot’s 2020 review of health inequalities over the past 10 years. Marmot’s review noted the toll of austerity, from “…a rise in homelessness, to people with insufficient money to lead a healthy life and resorting to foodbanks in large numbers, to ignored communities with poor conditions and little reason for hope. And these outcomes, on the whole, are even worse for minority ethnic population groups…”

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#grandebretagne#sante#systemesante#inegalite#minorite#diaspora#race#BAME

  • La #surmortalité aux États-Unis dépasse les 300.000 décès durant la #pandémie - World Socialist Web Site
    https://www.wsws.org/fr/articles/2020/10/23/euem-o23.html
    https://www.wsws.org/asset/901e321f-8dfa-442a-877d-dfef06377d31?rendition=image1280

    La conclusion la plus importante du CDC, outre le nombre plus important de décès, était la répartition par #âge. Alors que le plus grand nombre de décès est survenu chez les personnes âgées, le pourcentage le plus élevé d’augmentation des décès par rapport aux niveaux attendus, 26,5 pour cent, a été constaté chez les adultes âgés de 25 à 44 ans, ceux qui sont dans la force de l’âge pour l’emploi .

    Alors que toutes les autres catégories d’âge ont connu une réduction significative des taux de mortalité après le pic initial du printemps, le nombre de décès dans la tranche d’âge 25-44 ans est resté soutenu de mars à juin, puis a recommencé à augmenter en juillet en réponse à la campagne de réouverture de l’économie. Les personnes de ce groupe d’âge étaient les plus susceptibles d’être classées comme « travailleurs essentiels », c’est-à-dire tenus de rester au #travail, quelles que soient les conditions de travail.

    Le CDC a noté que les #minorités étaient représentées de manière disproportionnée dans le nombre de décès. La population hispanique a été la plus touchée, avec 53 pour cent de décès de plus que prévu. Le taux de mortalité des Américains d’origine asiatique a augmenté de 37 pour cent. Enfin, celui des Afro-Américains était de 36 pour cent. Le CDC n’a pas présenté de rapport sur le statut socio-économique des personnes décédées. Il dissimule ainsi le véritable impact de la pandémie sur la classe ouvrière, bien que la collecte et la communication de ces données soient tout à fait dans les capacités de l’agence.

  • ‘It’s like they’re waiting for us to die’: why Covid-19 is battering Black Chicagoans | US news | The Guardian
    https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/oct/23/covid-19-battering-black-chicagoans
    https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/8d0245b3ebc5ce72e1e87416c6b9f253144d615a/0_266_4013_2409/master/4013.jpg?width=1200&height=630&quality=85&auto=format&fit=crop&overlay-ali

    Phillip Thomas, a Black, 48-year-old Chicagoan, was a “great guy” according to his sister Angela McMiller. He was loved by his family and well-liked by his co-workers at Walmart, where he had worked for nine years.
    “I didn’t know about how many friends he had until he passed away,” said Angela. Thomas, who was diabetic, died from Covid-19 this past March.
    After being sick for two weeks and self-quarantining at the recommendation of his doctor, instead of being given an examination, Phillip was then rushed to the hospital, where he died the next day.
    Naba’a Muhammad, 59, a writer and Chicago South Shore neighborhood resident, with a lung disease, also contracted coronavirus and was hospitalized.But while he was fortunate to access the necessary care, he immediately noted health disparities facing other Black Chicagoans in his community.
    “Here you have [Donald Trump] who’s got a helicopter flying him to a special wing of a hospital for help when Black people can’t even get an Uber to the emergency room or a Covid test,” he said, referring to the president’s world-class care at the Walter Reed national military medical center on the outskirts of Washington DC, after being diagnosed with coronavirus in early October.
    Closed Chicago theater in Chicago in March. Almost 1 billion people were confined to their homes worldwide in March as the global coronavirus death toll topped 12,000 and US states rolled out stay-at-home measures already imposed across swathes of Europe.
    In Chicago, Covid-19 is battering Black communities. Despite only accounting for 30% of the city’s population, Black people make up 60% of Covid cases there and have the highest mortality rate out of any racial or ethnic group. Most Chicago Covid-19 deaths are hyper-concentrated in majority-Black neighborhoods such as Austin on the West Side and Englewood and Auburn Gresham on the South Side.
    “The racial and ethnic gaps we’re seeing of who gets the virus and who dies from it are not a surprise,” said Linda Rae Murray, a Chicago doctor, academic, social justice advocate and former president of the American Public Health Association as well as the former chief medical officer of the Cook county department of public health.“They are a reflection of structural racism that exists in our society and inequities that are baked into our country.”
    Chicago is a hyper-segregated city, blighted by yawning divides across many socio-economic conditions.The coronavirus experiences of Black Chicagoans are so starkly different from residents in whiter, wealthier communities it has observers asking: do conditions in majority African American neighborhoods make being Black, effectively, a pre-existing condition there?Muhammad thinks so: “[It] is very true,” he said, adding: “But that truth demands a response. We can’t simply accept that this is going to happen to us.”Many Black neighborhoods in Chicago, as elsewhere in America, experience higher rates of unemployment and poverty while also being less likely to receive pandemic aid, giving them even less of a safety net than usual in a disease outbreak

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#etatsunis#chicago#sante#inegalite#minorite#race#santepublique#accessante#race

  • Covid-19: Increased risk among ethnic minorities is largely due to poverty and social disparities, review finds - bmj.m4099.full.pdf
    https://www.bmj.com/content/bmj/371/bmj.m4099.full.pdf

    Covid-19: Increased risk among ethnic minorities is largely due topoverty and social disparities, review findsGareth IacobucciMost of the increased risk of infection and death fromcovid-19 among people from ethnic minorities isexplained by factors such as occupation, wherepeople live, their household composition, andpre-existing health conditions, a government reviewhas concluded.1But the first quarterly report from the government’sRace Disparity Unit (RDU), based in the CabinetOffice, notes that a part of the excess risk“remainsunexplained”in some groups such as black men, andit said that further work was needed to understandwhich factors may be causing the disparities.The report summarises progress towards tacklingcovid-19 health inequalities since Public HealthEngland published a review on 2 June setting out thedisparities in risks and outcomes.2Since then theRDU has been working with the equalities minister,Kemi Badenoch, across government, with the Officefor National Statistics, and with academics toexamine what is driving these disparities and how totackle them.Raghib Ali, one of the government’s new expertadvisers on covid and ethnicity, said there was“goodevidence”that most excess risk among ethnicminorities was explained by risk factors other thanethnicity

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#angleterre#sante#minorite#race#ethnicite#inegalite#systemesante

  • N.F.L. Team Thrown by False Positive Covid-19 Tests - The New York Times
    https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/10/16/world/covid-coronavirus

    Regardless of race and ethnicity, those aged 65 and older represented the vast majority — 78 percent — of all coronavirus deaths over those four months.The geographic impact of coronavirus deaths shifted from May to August as well, moving from the Northeast to the South and West. And though the virus moved into parts of the country with higher numbers of Hispanic residents, the report’s data showed that alone does not entirely account for the increase in percentage of deaths among Hispanics nationwide.“Covid-19 remains a major public health threat regardless of age or race and ethnicity,” the report states. It attributes an increased risk among racial and ethnic groups who might be more likely to live in places where the coronavirus is more easily spread, such as multigenerational and multifamily households, as well as hold jobs requiring in-person work, have more limited access to health care and who experience discrimination.
    In July, federal data made available after The New York Times sued the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention revealed a clearer and more complete picture of the racial inequalities of the virus: Black and Latino people have been disproportionately affected by the coronavirus in a widespread manner that spans the country, throughout hundreds of counties in urban, suburban and rural areas, and across all age groups.

    #covid-19#migration#migrant#etatsunis#sante#inegalite#minorite#race#ethnicité#discrimnation#accessante

  • Covid-19 and ethnicity: how the information gap exacerbates inequality - The BMJ
    https://blogs.bmj.com/bmj/2020/10/08/covid-19-and-ethnicity-how-the-information-gap-exacerbates-inequality

    The covid-19 pandemic has shone a light on the health and social inequalities that have historically plagued black and minority ethnic (BAME) groups in the UK. The reasons for this are many, however there are numerous examples of ongoing patterns of miscommunication, misinformation, and disinformation that have created an information gap among these groups. This acts as a key factor in differential health seeking behaviour, experiences of healthcare, and ultimately health outcomes. These are all exacerbated by a historical context in which people from BAME groups have experienced greater levels of socioeconomic disadvantage, been ignored or abused by medical science, and received poorer quality of care from the healthcare system.
    As we move on to the next phase of the pandemic, incorporating the lessons we have learnt so far will be essential in preventing and managing the effects of a second wave of covid-19 on BAME groups. Using a more localised approach to outbreak management, which works in partnership with local BAME networks, would allow us to deliver an effective, culturally competent campaign that bridges information gaps. The success of these approaches is entirely dependent on the trust of local populations—particularly when it comes to systems that rely on the individual to self-refer, such as the test and trace system. Disparities in information provision are complex, however, and it is vital to approach any solution with an understanding of the social, political, and structural drivers of this phenomenon.
    UK policy makers have relied on behavioural science to determine communication strategies around the covid-19 response. However, behavioural science has tended to overlook the role of cultural differences in how people make decisions and navigate choice architecture. BAME groups are not a homogenous monolith, and if we want to continue to apply behavioural science to inform the covid-19 response, then we need to ensure that behavioural insights generated from within BAME communities are included.

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#grandebretagne#BAME#inegalite#sante#minorite#ethnicite#race#communaute

  • Covid-19 is still worsening health inequality. Why hasn’t anything been done? | Gurch Randhawa | Opinion | The Guardian
    https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/oct/06/covid-19-still-worsening-health-inequality
    https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/b2fe54b5ef7afd4d35b28c9281b4db4de7fd7cd6/123_90_1833_1100/master/1833.jpg?width=1200&height=630&quality=85&auto=format&fit=crop&overlay-ali

    The first wave of Covid-19 threw the UK’s existing health inequalities into stark relief. Black people were most likely to be diagnosed with Covid-19, and people from a Bangladeshi background were twice as likely to die from the virus compared with white British people. The Public Health England (PHE) review has only confirmed what we all knew anecdotally: Covid-19 hit the black and minority ethnic (BAME) population very hard, both in the community and among healthcare staff.
    Now infection rates are creeping up again, and weekly data shows ethnic minority communities are once again being disproportionately affected by the virus. And yet nothing appears to have been done to reinforce their protection: there is silence from the government as to how and when it will implement PHE’s review recommendations.
    We need urgent action to tackle the structural inequalities affecting these communities. If we fail, we risk sleepwalking into a nightmare version of Groundhog Day, witnessing another significant and disproportionate rise of Covid-19 related deaths among ethnic minority communities.
    Health inequality goes back a long way. We’ve known for a long time that some BAME doctors, nurses and healthcare assistants in the NHS receive poorer treatment than their colleagues. This is a well-documented phenomenon backed by decades of research. During the first wave, ethnic minority staff had worse access to PPE, more trying shift patterns and greater exposure to Covid-19 patients. The recent surveys of staff by the British Medical Association and Royal College of Nursing lend credence to the fact that BAME staff continue to suffer from a lack of PPE. Too little was done to combat this in the years before the virus struck, and now we’re seeing the consequences of this neglect.
    It is not just failed policy initiatives we have an abundance of, it’s laws too. In theory the UK has some of the most progressive laws on equality in the world. We have the Equality Act 2010, the public sector equality duty and equality impact tools, but none were evident in the government’s Covid-19 action plan, published in March. Had they been applied, the government may well have taken a more sophisticated and tailored approach towards public health, rather than the “protect the NHS” position that was adopted.
    The original government action plan didn’t appear to focus very much on preventing people getting the virus. The government response of “people will get ill, we need to protect NHS” translated into political messages of “take it on the chin”, and “we need herd immunity”. It was a medical approach, not a public health approach, and it ignored existing inequalities and specific community sensitivities. Inevitably those on lower incomes, in more crowded housing and with long-term health issues suffered the most. This explains the high and disproportionate death toll in many ethnic minority communities.

    #Covid-19#migration#migrant#grandebretagne#sante#inegalite#minorite#race#BAME#NHS#systemesante

  • Léonora Miano, au nom de l’Afropea - YouTube

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nhL1fLe09dw

    Comment construire son identité entre deux espaces, entre deux filiations et faire un pas de côté face à l’héritage douloureux, subi de l’esclavagisme et du colonialisme ? C’est à cet horizon que se frotte la romancière et essayiste Léonora Miano dans son essai « Afropea : utopie post-occidentale et post-raciste » (Grasset, septembre 2020).

    L’#Afropea de #Léonora_Miano propose à ceux qui s’ancrent dans deux géographies, l’Afrique subsaharienne et l’Europe, de se réinventer, de forger une identité sociale et culturelle choisie et non subie. Ni manifeste ni utopie, son projet est une invitation à prendre la parole pour inventer une représentation de soi.

    #afrique

  • Xinjiang’s System of Militarized Vocational Training Comes to #Tibet

    Introduction and Summary

    In 2019 and 2020, the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) introduced new policies to promote the systematic, centralized, and large-scale training and transfer of “rural surplus laborers” to other parts of the TAR, as well as to other provinces of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the first 7 months of 2020, the region had trained over half a million rural surplus laborers through this policy. This scheme encompasses Tibetans of all ages, covers the entire region, and is distinct from the coercive vocational training of secondary students and young adults reported by exile Tibetans (RFA, October 29, 2019).

    The labor transfer policy mandates that pastoralists and farmers are to be subjected to centralized “military-style” (军旅式, junlüshi) vocational training, which aims to reform “backward thinking” and includes training in “work discipline,” law, and the Chinese language. Examples from the TAR’s Chamdo region indicate that the militarized training regimen is supervised by People’s Armed Police drill sergeants, and training photos published by state media show Tibetan trainees dressed in military fatigues (see accompanying images).

    Poverty alleviation reports bluntly say that the state must “stop raising up lazy people.” Documents state that the “strict military-style management” of the vocational training process “strengthens [the Tibetans’] weak work discipline” and reforms their “backward thinking.” Tibetans are to be transformed from “[being] unwilling to move” to becoming willing to participate, a process that requires “diluting the negative influence of religion.” This is aided by a worrisome new scheme that “encourages” Tibetans to hand over their land and herds to government-run cooperatives, turning them into wage laborers.

    An order-oriented, batch-style matching and training mechanism trains laborers based on company needs. Training, matching and delivery of workers to their work destination takes place in a centralized fashion. Recruitments rely, among other things, on village-based work teams, an intrusive social control mechanism pioneered in the TAR by Chen Quanguo (陈全国), and later used in Xinjiang to identify Uyghurs who should be sent to internment camps (China Brief, September 21, 2017). Key policy documents state that cadres who fail to achieve the mandated quotas are subject to “strict rewards and punishments” (严格奖惩措施, yange jiangcheng cuoshi). The goal of the scheme is to achieve Xi Jinping’s signature goal of eradicating absolute poverty by increasing rural disposable incomes. This means that Tibetan nomads and farmers must change their livelihoods so that they earn a measurable cash income, and can therefore be declared “poverty-free.”

    This draconian scheme shows a disturbing number of close similarities to the system of coercive vocational training and labor transfer established in Xinjiang. The fact that Tibet and Xinjiang share many of the same social control and securitization mechanisms—in each case introduced under administrations directed by Chen Quanguo—renders the adaptation of one region’s scheme to the other particularly straightforward.

    Historical Context

    As early as 2005, the TAR had a small-scale rural surplus labor training and employment initiative for pastoralists and farmers in Lhasa (Sina, May 13, 2005). The 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) then specified that this type of training and labor transfer was to be conducted throughout the TAR (PRC Government, February 8, 2006). From 2012, the Chamdo region initiated a “military-style training for surplus labor force transfer for pastoral and agricultural regions” (农牧区富余劳动力转移就业军旅式培训, nongmuqu fuyu laodongli zhuanyi jiuye junlüshi peixun) (Tibet’s Chamdo, October 8, 2014). Chamdo’s scheme was formally established in the region’s 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020), with the goal of training 65,000 laborers (including urban unemployed persons) during that time (Chamdo Government, December 29, 2015).

    By 2016, Chamdo had established 45 related vocational training bases (TAR Government, November 17, 2016). Starting in 2016, the TAR’s Shannan region likewise implemented vocational training with “semi-military-style management” (半军事化管理, ban junshihua guanli) (Tibet Shannan Net, April 5, 2017). Several different sources indicate that Chamdo’s military-style training management was conducted by People’s Armed Police drill sergeants.[1]

    Policies of the 2019-2020 Militarized Vocational Training and Labor Transfer Action Plan

    In March 2019, the TAR issued the 2019-2020 Farmer and Pastoralist Training and Labor Transfer Action Plan (西藏自治区2019-2020年农牧民培训和转移就业行动方案, Xizang Zizhiqu 2019-2020 Nian Nongmumin Peixun he Zhuanyi Jiuye Xingdong Fang’an) which mandates the “vigorous promotion of military-style…[vocational] training,” adopting the model pioneered in Chamdo and mandating it throughout the region. [2] The vocational training process must include “work discipline, Chinese language and work ethics,” aiming to “enhance laborers’ sense of discipline to comply with national laws and regulations and work unit rules and regulations.”

    Surplus labor training is to follow the “order-oriented” (订单定向式, dingdan dingxiangshi) or “need-driven” (以需定培, yi xu dingpei) method, [3] whereby the job is arranged first, and the training is based on the pre-arranged job placement. In 2020, at least 40 percent of job placements were to follow this method, with this share mandated to exceed 60 percent by the year 2024 (see [2], also below). Companies that employ a minimum number of laborers can obtain financial rewards of up to 500,000 renminbi ($73,900 U.S. dollars). Local labor brokers receive 300 ($44) or 500 ($74) renminbi per arranged labor transfer, depending whether it is within the TAR or without. [4] Detailed quotas not only mandate how many surplus laborers each county must train, but also how many are to be trained in each vocational specialty (Ngari Government, July 31, 2019).

    The similarities to Xinjiang’s coercive training scheme are abundant: both schemes have the same target group (“rural surplus laborers”—农牧区富余劳动者, nongmuqu fuyu laodongzhe); a high-powered focus on mobilizing a “reticent” minority group to change their traditional livelihood mode; employ military drill and military-style training management to produce discipline and obedience; emphasize the need to “transform” laborers’ thinking and identity, and to reform their “backwardness;” teach law and Chinese; aim to weaken the perceived negative influence of religion; prescribe detailed quotas; and put great pressure on officials to achieve program goals. [5]

    Labor Transfers to Other Provinces in 2020

    In 2020, the TAR introduced a related region-wide labor transfer policy that established mechanisms and target quotas for the transfer of trained rural surplus laborers both within (55,000) and without (5,000) the TAR (TAR Human Resources Department, July 17). The terminology is akin to that used in relation to Xinjiang’s labor transfers, employing phrases such as: “supra-regional employment transfer” (跨区域转移就业, kuaquyu zhuanyi jiuye) and “labor export” (劳务输出, laowu shuchu). Both the 2019-2020 Training and Labor Transfer Action Plan and the TAR’s 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) only mention transfers outside the TAR in passing, without outlining a detailed related policy or the use of terminology akin to that found in related documents from Xinjiang. [6]

    In the first 7 months of 2020, the TAR trained 543,000 rural surplus laborers, accomplishing 90.5% of its annual goal by July. Of these, 49,900 were transferred to other parts of the TAR, and 3,109 to other parts of China (TAR Government, August 12). Each region is assigned a transfer quota. By the end of 2020, this transfer scheme must cover the entire TAR.

    Specific examples of such labor transfers identified by the author to other regions within the TAR include job placements in road construction, cleaning, mining, cooking and driving. [7] Transfers to labor placements outside the TAR include employment at the COFCO Group, China’s largest state-owned food-processing company (Hebei News, September 18, 2020).

    The central terminology employed for the labor transfer process is identical with language used in Xinjiang: “unified matching, unified organizing, unified management, unified sending off” (统一对接、统一组织、统一管理、统一输送 / tongyi duijie, tongyi zuzhi, tongyi guanli, tongyi shusong). [8] Workers are transferred to their destination in a centralized, “group-style” (组团式, zutuanshi), “point-to-point” (点对点, dianduidian) fashion. The policy document sets group sizes at 30 persons, divided into subgroups of 10, both to be headed by (sub-)group leaders (TAR Human Resources Department, July 17). In one instance, this transport method was described as “nanny-style point-to-point service” (“点对点”“保姆式”服务 / “dianduidian” “baomu shi” fuwu) (Chinatibet.net, June 21). As in Xinjiang, these labor transfers to other provinces are arranged and supported through the Mutual Pairing Assistance [or “assist Tibet” (援藏, Yuan Zang)] mechanism, albeit not exclusively. [9] The transferred laborers’ “left-behind” children, wives and elderly family members are to receive the state’s “loving care.” [10]

    Again, the similarities to Xinjiang’s inter-provincial transfer scheme are significant: unified processing, batch-style transfers, strong government involvement, financial incentives for middlemen and for participating companies, and state-mandated quotas. However, for the TAR’s labor transfer scheme, there is so far no evidence of accompanying cadres or security personnel, of cadres stationed in factories, or of workers being kept in closed, securitized environments at their final work destination. It is possible that the transfer of Tibetan laborers is not as securitized as that of Uyghur workers. There is also currently no evidence of TAR labor training and transfer schemes being linked to extrajudicial internment. The full range of TAR vocational training and job assignment mechanisms can take various forms and has a range of focus groups; not all of them involve centralized transfers or the military-style training and transfer of nomads and farmers.

    The Coercive Nature of the Labor Training and Transfer System

    Even so, there are clear elements of coercion during recruitment, training and job matching, as well as a centralized and strongly state-administered and supervised transfer process. While some documents assert that the scheme is predicated on voluntary participation, the overall evidence indicates the systemic presence of numerous coercive elements.

    As in Xinjiang, TAR government documents make it clear that poverty alleviation is a “battlefield,” with such work to be organized under a military-like “command” structure (脱贫攻坚指挥部, tuopin gongjian zhihuibu) (TAR Government, October 29, 2019; Xinhua, October 7, 2018). In mid-2019, the battle against poverty in the TAR was said to have “entered the decisive phase,” given the goal to eradicate absolute poverty by the end of 2020 (Tibet.cn, June 11, 2019). Since poverty is measured by income levels, and labor transfer is the primary means to increase incomes—and hence to “lift” people out of poverty—the pressure for local governments to round up poor populations and feed them into the scheme is extremely high.

    The Training and Labor Transfer Action Plan cited above establishes strict administrative procedures, and mandates the establishment of dedicated work groups as well as the involvement of top leadership cadres, to “ensure that the target tasks are completed on schedule” (see [2]). Each administrative level is to pass on the “pressure [to achieve the targets] to the next [lower] level.” Local government units are to “establish a task progress list [and] those who lag behind their work schedule… are to be reported and to be held accountable according to regulations.” The version adopted by the region governed under Shannan City is even more draconian: training and labor transfer achievements are directly weighed in cadres’ annual assessment scores, complemented by a system of “strict rewards and punishments.” [11] Specific threats of “strict rewards and punishments” in relation to achieving labor training and transfer targets are also found elsewhere, such as in official reports from the region governed under Ngari City, which mandate “weekly, monthly and quarterly” reporting mechanisms (TAR Government, December 18, 2018).

    As with the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, overcoming Tibetans’ resistance to labor transfer is an integral part of the entire mechanism. Documents state that the “strict military-style management” of the vocational training process causes the “masses to comply with discipline,” “continuously strengthens their patriotic awareness,” and reforms their “backward thinking.” [12] This may also involve the presence of local cadres to “make the training discipline stricter.” [13]

    Because the military-style vocational training process produces discipline and transforms “backward employment views,” it is said to “promote labor transfer.” [14] Rural laborers are to be transformed from “[being] unwilling to move” to becoming willing to participate, a process that requires “diluting the negative influence of religion,” which is said to induce passivity (TAR Commerce Department, June 10). The poverty alleviation and training process is therefore coupled with an all-out propaganda effort that aims to use “thought education” to “educate and guide the unemployed to change their closed, conservative and traditional employment mindset” (Tibet’s Chamdo, July 8, 2016). [15] One document notes that the poverty alleviation and labor transfer process is part of an effort to “stop raising up lazy people” (TAR Government, December 18, 2018).

    A 2018 account from Chamdo of post-training follow-up shows the tight procedures employed by the authorities:

    Strictly follow up and ask for effectiveness. Before the end of each training course, trainees are required to fill in the “Employment Willingness Questionnaire.” Establish a database…to grasp the employment…status of trainees after the training. For those who cannot be employed in time after training, follow up and visit regularly, and actively recommend employment…. [16]

    These “strict” follow-up procedures are increasingly unnecessary, because the mandated “order-oriented” process means that locals are matched with future jobs prior to the training.

    “Grid Management” and the “Double-Linked Household” System

    Coercive elements play an important role during the recruitment process. Village-based work teams, an intrusive social control mechanism pioneered by Chen Quanguo, go from door to door to “help transform the thinking and views of poor households.” [17] The descriptions of these processes, and the extensive government resources invested to ensure their operation, overlap to a high degree with those that are commonly practiced in Xinjiang (The China Quarterly, July 12, 2019). As is the case in Xinjiang, poverty-alleviation work in the TAR is tightly linked to social control mechanisms and key aspects of the security apparatus. To quote one government document, “By combining grid management and the ‘double-linked household’ management model, [we must] organize, educate, and guide the people to participate and to support the fine-grained poverty alleviation … work.” [18]

    Grid management (网格化管理, wanggehua guanli) is a highly intrusive social control mechanism, through which neighborhoods and communities are subdivided into smaller units of surveillance and control. Besides dedicated administrative and security staff, this turns substantial numbers of locals into “volunteers,” enhancing the surveillance powers of the state. [19] Grid management later became the backbone of social control and surveillance in Xinjiang. For poverty alleviation, it involves detailed databases that list every single person “in poverty,” along with indicators and countermeasures, and may include a “combat visualization” (图表化作战, tubiaohua zuozhan) feature whereby progress in the “war on poverty” is visualized through maps and charts (TAR Government, November 10, 2016). Purang County in Ngari spent 1.58 million renminbi ($233,588 dollars) on a “Smart Poverty Alleviation Big Data Management Platform,” which can display poverty alleviation progress on a large screen in real time (TAR Government, February 20, 2019).

    Similarly, the “double-linked household” (双联户, shuang lian hu) system corrals regular citizens into the state’s extensive surveillance apparatus by making sets of 10 “double-linked” households report on each other. Between 2012 and 2016, the TAR established 81,140 double-linked household entities, covering over three million residents, and therefore virtually the region’s entire population (South China Morning Post, December 12, 2016). An August 2020 article on poverty alleviation in Ngari notes that it was the head of a “double-linked” household unit who led his “entire village” to hand over their grassland and herds to a local husbandry cooperative (Hunan Government, August 20).

    Converting Property to Shares Through Government Cooperatives

    A particularly troubling aspect of the Training and Labor Transfer Action Plan is the directive to promote a “poverty alleviation industry” (扶贫产业, fupin chanye) scheme by which local nomads and farmers are asked to hand over their land and herds to large-scale, state-run cooperatives (农牧民专业合作社, nongmumin zhuanye hezuoshe). [20] In that way, “nomads become shareholders” as they convert their usage rights into shares. This scheme, which harks back to the forced collectivization era of the 1950s, increases the disposable incomes of nomads and farmers through share dividends and by turning them into wage laborers. They are then either employed by these cooperatives or are now “free” to participate in the wider labor transfer scheme. [21] In Nagqu, this is referred to as the “one township one cooperative, one village one cooperative ” (“一乡一社”“一村一合” / “yixiang yishe” “yicun yihe”) scheme, indicating its universal coverage. [22] One account describes the land transfer as prodding Tibetans to “put down the whip, walk out of the pasture, and enter the [labor] market” (People.cn, July 27, 2020).

    Clearly, such a radical transformation of traditional livelihoods is not achieved without overcoming local resistance. A government report from Shuanghu County (Nagqu) in July 2020 notes that:

    In the early stages, … most herders were not enthusiastic about participating. [Then], the county government…organized…county-level cadres to deeply penetrate township and village households, convening village meetings to mobilize people, insisted on transforming the [prevailing attitude of] “I am wanted to get rid of poverty” to “I want to get rid of poverty” as the starting point for the formation of a cooperative… [and] comprehensively promoted the policy… Presently… the participation rate of registered poor herders is at 100 percent, [that] of other herders at 97 percent. [23]

    Importantly, the phrase “transforming [attitudes of] ‘I am wanted to get rid of poverty’ to ‘I want to get rid of poverty’” is found in this exact form in accounts of poverty alleviation through labor transfer in Xinjiang. [24]

    Given that this scheme severs the long-standing connection between Tibetans and their traditional livelihood bases, its explicit inclusion in the militarized vocational training and labor transfer policy context is of great concern.

    Militarized Vocational Training: Examining a Training Base in Chamdo

    The Chamdo Golden Sunshine Vocational Training School (昌都市金色阳光职业培训学校, Changdushi Jinse Yangguang Zhiye Peixun Xuexiao) operates a vocational training base within Chamdo’s Vocational and Technical School, located in Eluo Town, Karuo District. The facility conducts “military-style training” (军旅式培训, junlüshi peixun) of rural surplus laborers for the purpose of achieving labor transfer; photos of the complex show a rudimentary facility with rural Tibetan trainees of various ages, mostly dressed in military fatigues. [25]

    Satellite imagery (see accompanying images) shows that after a smaller initial setup in 2016, [26] the facility was expanded in the year 2018 to its current state. [27] The compound is fully enclosed, surrounded by a tall perimeter wall and fence, and bisected by a tall internal wire mesh fence that separates the three main northern buildings from the three main southern ones (building numbers 4 and 5 and parts of the surrounding wall are shown in the accompanying Figure 4). The internal fence might be used to separate dormitories from teaching and administrative buildings. Independent experts in satellite analysis contacted by the author estimated the height of the internal fence at approximately 3 meters. The neighboring vocational school does not feature any such security measures.

    Conclusions

    In both Xinjiang and Tibet, state-mandated poverty alleviation consists of a top-down scheme that extends the government’s social control deep into family units. The state’s preferred method to increase the disposable incomes of rural surplus laborers in these restive minority regions is through vocational training and labor transfer. Both regions have by now implemented a comprehensive scheme that relies heavily on centralized administrative mechanisms; quota fulfilment; job matching prior to training; and a militarized training process that involves thought transformation, patriotic and legal education, and Chinese language teaching.

    Important differences remain between Beijing’s approaches in Xinjiang and Tibet. Presently, there is no evidence that the TAR’s scheme is linked to extrajudicial internment, and aspects of its labor transfer mechanisms are potentially less coercive. However, in a system where the transition between securitization and poverty alleviation is seamless, there is no telling where coercion stops and where genuinely voluntary local agency begins. While some Tibetans may voluntarily participate in some or all aspects of the scheme, and while their incomes may indeed increase as a result, the systemic presence of clear indicators of coercion and indoctrination, coupled with profound and potentially permanent change in modes of livelihood, is highly problematic. In the context of Beijing’s increasingly assimilatory ethnic minority policy, it is likely that these policies will promote a long-term loss of linguistic, cultural and spiritual heritage.

    Adrian Zenz is a Senior Fellow in China Studies at the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, Washington, D.C. (non-resident), and supervises PhD students at the European School of Culture and Theology, Korntal, Germany. His research focus is on China’s ethnic policy, public recruitment in Tibet and Xinjiang, Beijing’s internment campaign in Xinjiang, and China’s domestic security budgets. Dr. Zenz is the author of Tibetanness under Threat and co-editor of Mapping Amdo: Dynamics of Change. He has played a leading role in the analysis of leaked Chinese government documents, to include the “China Cables” and the “Karakax List.” Dr. Zenz is an advisor to the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, and a frequent contributor to the international media.

    Notes

    [1] See for example https://archive.is/wip/4ItV6 or http://archive.is/RVJRK. State media articles from September 2020 indicate that this type of training is ongoing https://archive.is/e1XqL.

    [2] Chinese: 大力推广军旅式…培训 (dali tuiguang junlüshi…peixun). See https://bit.ly/3mmiQk7 (pp.12-17). See local implementation documents of this directive from Shannan City (https://bit.ly/32uVlO5, pp.15-24), Xigatse (https://archive.is/7oJ7p) and Ngari (https://archive.is/wip/R3Mpw).

    [3] See also https://archive.is/wip/eQMGa.

    [4] Provided that the person was employed for at least 6 months in a given year. Source: https://archive.is/KE1Vd.

    [5] See the author’s main work on this in section 6 of: “Beyond the Camps: Beijing’s Long-Term Scheme of Coercive Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang,” Journal of Political Risk (Vol. 7, No. 12), December 2019. https://www.jpolrisk.com/beyond-the-camps-beijings-long-term-scheme-of-coercive-labor-poverty-allev.

    [6] See https://archive.is/wip/Dyapm.

    [7] See https://archive.is/wip/XiZfl, https://archive.is/RdnvS, https://archive.is/w1kfx, https://archive.is/wip/NehA6, https://archive.is/wip/KMaUo, https://archive.is/wip/XiZfl, https://archive.is/RdnvS, https://archive.is/w1kfx.

    [8] See https://archive.is/KE1Vd and https://archive.is/wip/8afPF.

    [9] See https://archive.is/KE1Vd and https://archive.is/wip/8afPF.

    [10] See https://archive.is/KE1Vd.

    [11] See https://bit.ly/32uVlO5, p.24.

    [12] See https://archive.is/wip/fN9hz and https://archive.is/NYMwi, compare https://archive.is/wip/iiF7h and http://archive.is/Nh7tT.

    [13] See https://archive.is/wip/kQVnX. A state media account of Tibetan waiters at a tourism-oriented restaurant in Xiexong Township (Chamdo) notes that these are all from “poverty-alleviation households,” and have all gone through “centralized, military-style training.” Consequently, per this account, they have developed a “service attitude of being willing to suffer [or: work hard]”, as is evident from their “vigorous pace and their [constant] shuttling back and forth” as they serve their customers. https://archive.is/wip/Nfxnx (account from 2016); compare https://archive.is/wip/dTLku.

    [14] See https://archive.is/wip/faIeL and https://archive.is/wip/18CXh.

    [15] See https://archive.is/iiF7h.

    [16] See https://archive.is/wip/ETmNe

    [17] See https://archive.is/wip/iEV7P, see also e.g. https://archive.is/wip/1p6lV.

    [18] See https://archive.is/e45fJ.

    [19] See https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/securitizing-xinjiang-police-recruitment-informal-policing-and-ethnic-minority-cooptation/FEEC613414AA33A0353949F9B791E733 and https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/03/20/china-alarming-new-surveillance-security-tibet.

    [20] E.g. https://archive.is/R3Mpw. This scheme was also mentioned in the TAR’s 13th 5-Year-Plan (2016-2020) (https://archive.is/wip/S3buo). See also similar accounts, e.g. https://archive.is/IJUyl.

    [21] Note e.g. the sequence of the description of these cooperatives followed by an account of labor transfer (https://archive.is/gIw3f).

    [22] See https://archive.is/wip/gIw3f or https://archive.is/wip/z5Tor or https://archive.is/wip/PR7lh.

    [23] See https://archive.is/wip/85zXB.

    [24] See the author’s related work on this in section 2.2 of: “Beyond the Camps: Beijing’s Long-Term Scheme of Coercive Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang,” Journal of Political Risk (Vol. 7, No. 12), December 2019. https://www.jpolrisk.com/beyond-the-camps-beijings-long-term-scheme-of-coercive-labor-poverty-allev.

    [25] Located as part of the 昌都市卡若区俄洛镇昌都市职业技术学校 campus. See https://bit.ly/2Rr6Ekc; compare https://archive.is/wip/uUTCp and https://archive.is/wip/lKnbe.

    [26] See https://archive.is/wip/WZsvQ.

    [27] Coordinates: 31.187035, 97.091817. Website: https://bit.ly/2Rr6Ekc. The timeframe for construction is indicated by historical satellite imagery and by the year 2018 featured on a red banner on the bottom-most photo of the website.

    https://jamestown.org/program/jamestown-early-warning-brief-xinjiangs-system-of-militarized-vocational-

    #Chine #transfert_de_population #déplacement #rural_surplus_laborers #formaation_professionnelle #armée #travail #agriculture #discipline #discipline_de_travail #Chamdo #préjugés #terres #salariés #travailleurs_salariés #Chen_Quanguo #Xinjiang #Oïghours #camps #pauvreté #contrôle_social #pastoralisme #Farmer_and_Pastoralist_Training_and_Labor_Transfer_Action_Plan #minorités #obédience #discipline #identité #langue #religion #COFCO_Group #mots #terminologie #vocabulaire #Mutual_Pairing_Assistance #pauvreté #Shannan_City #Ngari_City #surveillance #poverty_alleviation #coopératives #salaire #Nagqu #Chamdo_Golden_Sunshine_Vocational_Training_School #Eluo_Town

  • Covid-19 skin rash website criticised for lack of BAME examples | World news | The Guardian
    https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/28/covid-19-skin-rash-website-criticised-for-lack-of-bame-examples
    https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/69358bc7177a3bc3790e95154fec524189a0c743/122_831_1569_942/master/1569.jpg?width=1200&height=630&quality=85&auto=format&fit=crop&overlay-ali

    Ore Odubiyi, the director of BME Medics, a platform committed to improving diversity and inclusion in healthcare, said the lack of images showing how Covid rashes manifest on people of darker skin tones may mean healthcare professionals are less equipped to diagnose potential cases. “When we consider that certain BAME communities in the UK are disproportionately impacted by Covid-19, it is crucial that visual resources which show how Covid-related skin changes may appear in darker skin tones are made readily available at a similar standard seen in resources exemplifying signs of disease in fairer skin tones.”Around 3,000 images of suspected Covid rashes were uploaded via the app, but although the survey specifically requested images from BAME groups, only 173 were received. “This may be explained, in part, by cultural factors but also because rashes are less visible on darker skin and may have been difficult to photograph,” said a spokesperson for BAD, adding that they had to cull those that were not of sufficient quality or had other issues identified by reviewers. Dr Ifeoma Ejikeme, a cosmetic doctor and founder of the Adonia Medical Clinic in London, said: “At this point, I would rather put up poor quality images than no images. They now need to be speaking to and liaising with GPs to get those pictures.”
    The problem isn’t confined only to Covid-19. “There are so many situations in which black people may not present themselves to medical professionals because they may not recognise themselves in the language or the pictures that we use typically use,” said Margot Turner, a senior lecturer in diversity and medical education at St George’s, University of London, and co-author of a new handbook of clinical signs on black and brown skin.For instance, meningitis awareness posters often talk about looking out for a red rash, which can be difficult to see on darker skin, and bruising is also less obvious, which may result in fewer cases of domestic violence being detected during GP visits, she said.

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#grandebretagne#BAME#minorite#race#inegalite#sante

  • Brazil Indigenous group celebrates 6 months without COVID-19
    https://apnews.com/0d03018fbfbc9a0e4acfb354b2a9c699

    The Tembé are the western branch of the Tenetehara ethnicity, located in the Alto Rio Guama Indigenous territory on the western edge of Para state. The virus has infiltrated the lands of dozens of Indigenous groups after they came to nearby cities to trade, buy staples and collect emergency welfare payments from the government.The hundreds of Tembé people of the Cajueiro, Tekohaw and Canindé villages locked their gate and allowed people out only in case of emergency, while restricting entry to agents from the federal Indigenous health care provider, SESAI. Now, after the number of daily COVID-19 cases and deaths in Para has finally plunged, the Tembé have begun believing they will emerge from the pandemic unscathed.
    “We didn’t go to the city, we didn’t go to other villages. We remained in quarantine. We got through, we are still getting through,” said Sérgio Muxi Tembé, the leader of the Tekohow village. “We are doing a small commemoration because of that, and it’s because of that we are happy that today we do not have any cases.”

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#bresil#sante#indigene#minorite#isolement#migrationinterne

  • Minorities much more likely than white people to test positive for Covid – study | World news | The Guardian
    https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/16/minorities-more-likely-than-white-people-test-positive-covid-study
    https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/7aa575da8349add76abcef2eb63ada8ce379306f/155_0_3646_2190/master/3646.jpg?width=1200&height=630&quality=85&auto=format&fit=crop&overlay-ali

    People of colour are significantly more likely than white people to test positive for Covid-19 – and are at higher risk of hospitalisation and death when they are diagnosed – according to a new study that lays bare the racial disparities among millions of coronavirus patients across America.The research, published on Wednesday by Epic Health Research Network Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF), analysed the health record data of about 50 million patients from 53 health systems across 21 states. It reported that Hispanic patients were more than two and a half times more likely than white patients to have a positive result. Black and Asian patients, meanwhile, were nearly twice as likely as white people to get a positive result. Hospitalisation and death rates were dramatically higher for people of colour with coronavirus. Among Hispanic patients, hospitalisations were more than four times higher than for white people, while among Black patients it was more than triple the rate, the report said.And death rates were more than double among Black and Hispanic patients what they were for white patients.

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#etatsunis#sante#inegalité#minorite#race#depistage#surmortalité

  • Coronavirus kills far more Hispanic and Black children than White youths, CDC study finds - The Washington Post
    https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/09/15/covid-deaths-hispanic-black-children

    The coronavirus is killing Hispanic, Black and American Indian children at much higher numbers than their White peers, according to federal statistics released Tuesday.
    The numbers — the most comprehensive U.S. accounting to date of pediatric infections and fatalities — show there have been 391,814 known cases and 121 deaths among people under the age of 21 from February to July.Of those killed by covid-19, the illness caused by the coronavirus, more than 75 percent have been Hispanic, Black and American Indian children, even though they represent 41 percent of the U.S. population, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The federal agency collected data from health departments throughout the country.The disproportionate deaths among youths echo pandemic disparities well-documented among adults. Previous studies have found the virus’s death toll is twice as high among people of color under age 65 as for White Americans. People of color also disproportionately make up “excess deaths” — those killed by the virus without being diagnosed or those killed indirectly by the virus’s wide effects on the health-care system. The racial disparities among children are in some ways even more stark. Of the children and teens killed, 45 percent were Hispanic, 29 Black and 4 percent American Indian. “This is the strongest evidence yet that there are deep racial disparities in children just like there are in adults,” said John Williams, chief of pediatric infectious diseases at UPMC Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh. “What that should mean for people is steps like wearing a mask are not just about protecting your family and yourself. It is about racial equity.”

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#etatsunis#sante#minorité#inegalite#accessante#race#surmortalite

  • Covid-19 has exposed the reality of Britain: poverty, insecurity and inequality | Richard Horton | Opinion | The Guardian
    https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/sep/08/covid-19-britain-poverty-insecurity-inequality-fairer-society
    https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/a811224c27b705b5ec7d7d5b75addb8c10ef3054/0_317_6048_3629/master/6048.jpg?width=1200&height=630&quality=85&auto=format&fit=crop&overlay-ali

    he writer Elif Shafak, in her recently published essay How to Stay Sane in an Age of Division, recalls seeing signs in public parks during the pandemic asking: “When all this is over, how do you want the world to be different?” She points out that we are suffering from a widespread disillusionment about our bewildering predicament, and describes how people are feeling anxious and angry. She argues that alienation and exclusion are breeding mistrust, that communication between people and politicians is broken, and that despite the crisis we face we are nowhere near being able to answer a question about how we want the world to be.
    How do we begin to answer that question? First, we must understand the true nature of the crisis that confronts us. Our nation suffers from a political disease of historic proportions. The bonds that once held communities together are fraying. The confidence we once felt that generations after our own would have greater opportunities has ebbed away. And the beliefs we once embraced about the inherent strength and resilience of our national institutions and welfare state have been exposed as mere illusions. The coronavirus pandemic has exposed the reality of contemporary Britain: the country is defined by poverty, insecurity and inequality.
    To solve this crisis, we must begin by hearing the stories and listening to the experiences of those who have borne the brunt of Covid-19, especially the families who have suffered grievous losses and those who fell ill on the frontlines of the response. Illness and death have been concentrated among the elderly, those living with chronic disease, people from black, Asian and minority ethnic communities, and those who have been working in frontline public services, from health and social care to transport, food production and distribution.
    The closure of schools has placed a particular burden on children and young people. And a shadow pandemic has harmed women and children, who have suffered rising levels of violence and domestic abuse at home. A more equal society is a safer, kinder and more prosperous society. Specific policies to meet the urgent needs of these groups can lay the foundations for economic recovery and build resilience to future crises. We must demand parental support to improve prospects for child development and policies to advance adolescent physical and mental health. We should have stronger assistance and legal protections for women and children at risk of domestic violence and abuse. And we need more interventionist disease prevention and health promotion campaigns across people’s lifetimes, prioritising cancer prevention, heart disease and severe lung disease – and recognising the role that poverty and insecurity play in determining ill health

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#grandebretagne#sante#minorite#inegalite#vulnerablite#diaspora#pauvrete#insecurite#santementale

  • Covid-19 death rate among African Americans and Latinos rising sharply | World news | The Guardian
    https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/08/covid-19-death-rate-african-americans-and-latinos-rising-sharply
    https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/c88b9398ca57aa1814aa95fe9314e886204fccb2/0_98_5040_3024/master/5040.jpg?width=1200&height=630&quality=85&auto=format&fit=crop&overlay-ali

    The death rate in the US from Covid-19 among African Americans and Latinos is rising sharply, exacerbating the already staggering racial divide in the impact of the pandemic which has particularly devastated communities of color.New figures compiled by the Color of Coronavirus project shared with the Guardian show that both total numbers of deaths and per capita death rates have increased dramatically in August for black and brown Americans. Though fatalities have also increased for white Americans, the impact on this group has been notably less severe.
    The latest figures record that in the two weeks from 4 to 18 August the death rate of African Americans shot up from 80 to 88 per 100,000 population – an increase of 8 per 100,000. By contrast the white population suffered half that increase, from 36 to 40 per 100,000, an increase of 4 per 100,000. For Latino Americans the increase was even more stark, rising from 46 to 54 per 100,000 – an increase of 9 per 100,000.The new batch of statistics is a cause for concern on a number of levels. The death rate for all racial and ethnic groups had been falling through the summer but after the virus began surging through the south and midwest in July it produced a time-lagged spike in deaths in August that has driven the human suffering back up to previous grim heights.
    “We are seeing more deaths among African Americans and Latinos than at any time this summer. So as we go into the fall, with schools and colleges reopening and other new avenues for exposure, it portends a very frightening future,” said Andi Egbert, senior researcher with APM Research Lab, the non-partisan research arm of American Public Media that compiles the data.On 18 August, the latest date on which the researchers have crunched the numbers, almost 36,000 African Americans had died from Covid-19. The new uptick means that 1 in 1,125 black Americans have died from the disease, compared with 1 in 2,450 white Americans – half the rate.
    That striking disparity underlines a major failing at the heart of the US response to Covid. It has been known now for several months that the virus is extracting an especially punishing toll among communities of color, yet federal and state governments have not taken steps effectively to ameliorate the disaster. “It’s not breaking news that black and Latino communities are suffering and dying from Covid-19 in much higher rates than white Americans. But as the months drag on we see the death rates continuing to be much higher and even accelerating for vulnerable groups,” Egbert said.

    #covid-19#migrant#migration#etatsunis#minorite#inegalité#mortalite#morbidite#sante#diaspora#vulnerabilite#communaute

  • Coronavirus exposes hidden struggles of poor Indonesian-Chinese families | South China Morning Post
    https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/people/article/3099986/coronavirus-exposes-hidden-struggles-poor-indonesian-chinese

    As the coronavirus ravages Indonesia– which has recorded some 194,100 cases and Southeast Asia’s highest death toll of more than 8,000 – Lie’s monthly income has taken a hit, making it harder to reach the 4.5 million rupiah (US$300) needed to cover rent, food, necessities and school fees.
    The struggling family also often endured stares from people, Lie said, because of a perception in the country that ethnic Chinese tended to be wealthy. Lie, whose children are 10, six and a year old, said it felt as if her family’s circumstances were “embarrassing the Chinese” in Indonesia. Others have judged her as being “crazy” for travelling with her husband, children and goods all on one motorbike.“In my heart, I think: ‘God, I do not want to be like this either’,” Lie said.The street vendor is not alone in feeling pressure from the wider society in Indonesia, which links ethnic Chinese with the upper class, a bias the government has long endorsed, according to one analyst.Since the coronavirus hit, various associations have been reaching out to support some struggling families across the country, a move that has thrown light on the diversity of backgrounds within the ethnic Chinese community. Indonesian-Chinese are thought to make up less than 2 per cent of the 270-million population, but control many conglomerates and a large portion of wealth, leading to a widespread belief that they are rich, or middle class, and live mainly in the urban provinces

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#indonesie#chine#sante#inegalite#minorite#famille#diaspora#economie

  • Un an de « siège numérique » au Cachemire
    https://www.cetri.be/Un-an-de-siege-numerique-au

    Il y a un peu plus d’un an, le 5 août 2019, l’Inde révoquait l’autonomie qui régissait le statut du Cachemire depuis 1947. Cette escalade sans précédent contre le droit à l’autodétermination des Cachemiris s’est accompagnée d’un « siège d’internet » aux conséquences dramatiques, comme le révèle un rapport fouillé de la « Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society » (JKCCS) . Le document fait 125 pages. Le dernier tiers reconstitue méticuleusement les 300 premiers jours de « siège d’internet » qui ont accompagné le (...) #Le_regard_du_CETRI

    / #Pakistan, #Minorités_ethniques, #Enjeux_numériques, #Inde, #Le_Sud_en_mouvement, #Analyses, Le regard du (...)

    #Le_regard_du_CETRI

  • Academic marginalisation of Hong Kong’s ethnic minority groups increases amid coronavirus pandemic | South China Morning Post
    https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/economics/article/3099339/academic-marginalisation-hong-kongs-ethnic-minority-groups

    After several months of learning from home, the government has decided to start the new academic year online following a third wave of Covid-19 cases. Advocates have warned that the city’s poorest are being disproportionately impacted by the pandemic, as more than one in four children are believed to live in poverty. For ethnic minority children from low-income families, the challenges seem even greater. According to official statistics, people from ethnic minority groups account for about 4 per cent of Hong Kong’s population, excluding foreign domestic workers. Out of this group, Pakistanis, Indonesians, Thais and Nepalis registered the highest poverty rates.Amod Rai, a Nepali online teaching consultant, said it was essential to have teachers better trained at delivering online classes. “Teachers need to upgrade their skills on how to deliver content online, while schools should provide resources to help their students,” he said.
    “Among ethnic minority children, both parents tend to work and have little time. Online learning requires more support and the children need to be motivated. We need to work with the parents so they can understand how to help their kids.”

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#kongkong#nepal#thailande#travailleurmigrant#eenfant#education#sante#resilience#inegalite#minorite

  • Coronavirus hits India’s remote Great Andamanese tribe, of whom only 53 people remain | South China Morning Post
    https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/south-asia/article/3099153/coronavirus-hits-indias-remote-great-andamanese-tribe

    “The Andaman authorities must act urgently to prevent the virus reaching more Great Andamanese and to prevent infection in the other tribes,” said Sophie Grig, a senior researcher with Survival.“The waters around North Sentinel must be properly policed and no outsiders should enter the territories of any of the Andaman tribes without their consent,” she said. “We’ve certainly seen in the US, in Brazil, in Peru, indigenous communities [being] disproportionately hit. In Brazil where there are more than a hundred uncontacted tribes still living, fear of the disease is getting into those communities.”

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#inde#insularite#sante#contamination#minorite#autochtone#circulation

  • BAME Britons less likely to trust Covid health officials – survey | World news | The Guardian
    https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/27/bame-britons-less-likely-trust-covid-health-officials-survey
    https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/cb4dbad553203ad2ecadc1e8aa3473530974fcca/69_205_3110_1865/master/3110.jpg?width=1200&height=630&quality=85&auto=format&fit=crop&overlay-ali

    Black and minority ethnic people trusted government scientists and public health officials less than white people did at the height of the UK’s coronavirus outbreak, according to a study that raises fresh questions about the pandemic’s disproportionate impact. BAME people were more likely to believe their employers’ advice than anything Boris Johnson or the government said, and trusted the NHS and Public Health England (PHE) less than white people did, the research suggests. At the same time they felt more vulnerable to the impact of Covid-19 and were far more likely to say it was difficult to follow the restrictions in place to prevent the spread of infection, according to the survey for the Wellcome Trust carried out in March and April as the virus reached its peak. The findings prompted questions about whether more could have been done to better communicate with different communities, with one council leader querying the impact of daily Downing Street briefings that were frequently presented by three white men.

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#grandebretagne#BAME#minorite#inegalite#sante#communication#NHS#santepublique