• Le Janus de la science et de l’industrie

    Louis de Colmar

    https://lavoiedujaguar.net/Le-Janus-de-la-science-et-de-l-industrie

    Lorsque Greta Thunberg fustige les puissants de ce monde en les exhortant à « écouter les scientifiques » elle se situe au cœur des contradictions de ce temps. Elle idéalise la science en l’opposant aux basses œuvres de l’industrie, méconnaissant que cette industrie n’est que le bras armé de la science. Historiquement parlant, il est tout à fait impossible de les dissocier : science et industrie obéissent à une même vision du monde, à une même pratique effective du monde. Dans les deux cas, il s’agit d’être capable de reproduire à l’infini, sans pertes ou dégradations, des procédures expertes : la reproductibilité des expériences scientifiques est de même nature que la reproductibilité des mécanismes de fabrication industrielle ; bien plus, le propre de la reproductibilité industrielle est directement tributaire d’approches scientifiques particulières, la reproductibilité industrielle n’est qu’une généralisation et une massification de questionnements scientifiques élaborés à échelle réduite.

    Il est temps de sortir de la fausse opposition entre science-connaissance pure, et applications impures et détournées d’une même conception du monde.

    Le combat contre le réchauffement climatique ne peut qu’être corrélé avec le combat contre l’idéalisation de la science, contre sa mythologisation : le réchauffement climatique a bien pour origine la mise en pratique d’une représentation théorique du monde spécifiquement incarné par la science. L’expérimentation scientifique dans les laboratoires académiques ou privés n’est que le b.a.-ba de sa potentielle industrialisation, qui n’est jamais qu’un changement d’échelle. (...)

    #science #industrie #Greta_Thunberg #rationalité #crise #Guillaume_Carnino #Jérôme_Baschet #capitalisme #monde-robot #nature #idéologie #Marx #Pfizer #Moderna #révolution #économie #Paul_Ricœur

  • Work is where your laptop is: meet the globetrotting digital nomads | Work & careers | The Guardian
    http://www.theguardian.com/money/2021/may/30/work-is-where-your-laptop-is-meet-the-globetrotting-digital-nomads
    https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/76add6d6a1317fc4d03b419b432bfe198a6f63ff/803_299_1929_1159/master/1929.jpg?width=1200&height=630&quality=85&auto=format&fit=crop&overlay-ali

    Work is where your laptop is: meet the globetrotting digital nomads. Worldwide shift to flexible and home working in pandemic has led to rise of new kind of backpacker. Samantha Scott does not miss her daily commutes in London, particularly “the dread of having to wake up and get on the tube, and heading into work sweaty and flustered. I’m still waking up at 6 or 7am, but I’m able to go for a walk on the beach before I start work.”When she and her partner Chris Cerra arrive with their luggage in a new city, they can easily be mistaken for tourists. But they are part of a new generation of “digital nomads” who hop from country to country to live and work.
    The global shift to flexible working triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic means more people are considering ditching their long-term homes to flit around the world, working from their laptops, tablets or smartphones.
    Last week, a report from Airbnb entitled Travel & Living showed that 11% of the company’s long-term stay bookers in 2021 have reported living a nomadic lifestyle, and 5% plan to give up their main homes. Delia Colantuono, a 31-year-old freelance translator from Rome, became a digital nomad five years ago when it was not a “big thing”. She has now lived on all five continents and says the nomadic lifestyle is “not just for rich people – it’s for anyone who can work remotely and wants to do it”. (...)
    They realised during the pandemic that they could keep in touch with their grown kids remotely “and feel close even when we aren’t physically close”.
    Melton left his sales job and the couple now run an accounting business remotely together that Kaye has set up. “We work all day and go on adventures all weekend,” she says. Kaye reckons the couple save 70% by living on the road, and wants to be debt free within five years – and buy a property somewhere eventually. Colantuono and others are aware of the environmental impact of their jetsetter lifestyle, and want to settle down eventually. Several people, writing on a Facebook digital nomads forum with 15,500 members, say age is not a barrier but stress the importance of being fit and healthy; and one says a drawback of this lifestyle might be a sense of rootlessness. There do not appear to be many digital nomad families with children; traditionally, only a few families – who usually home-school – have travelled the globe. Erin Elizabeth Wells, a 41-year-old productivity consultant from Massachusetts, started travelling around the US with her husband and daughter Eleanor, who is nearly four now, in October 2018, and says they are a “world schooling family”. Travelling with family means they travel slowly, but that means they make friends everywhere they visit, she adds. They are living in Airbnbs or other full-furnished rentals and “plan to continue indefinitely until there’s some reason our family needs something else”. As parts of the world gradually reopen after Covid restrictions, growing numbers of people are enjoying new flexibility to work from anywhere. Last year, nearly one in five Airbnb guests used the site to travel and work remotely; and this year 74% of people across its five-country survey have expressed an interest in living somewhere other than where their employer is based. Brian Chesky, the Airbnb chief executive, said: “The boundaries between travel, life and work are blurring.” Cerra says: “For a long time, this kind of lifestyle was considered really, really out there, quite off the beaten track. What we’re seeing is that everything is trending towards this being a bit more normal now, more accepted.”

    #Covid-19#migration#migrant#sante#digitalnomad#frontiere#circulation#economie#famille#modedevie#restrictionsanitaire

  • #Héritage et #fermeture. Une #écologie du #démantèlement

    Nous dépendons pour notre subsistance d’un « monde organisé », tramé par l’#industrie et le #management. Ce monde menace aujourd’hui de s’effondrer. Alors que les mouvements progressistes rêvent de monde commun, nous héritons contre notre gré de #communs moins bucoliques, « négatifs », à l’image des fleuves et sols contaminés, des industries polluantes, des chaînes logistiques ou encore des #technologies_numériques. Que faire de ce lourd #héritage dont dépendent à court terme des milliards de personnes, alors qu’il les condamne à moyen terme ? Nous n’avons pas d’autre choix que d’apprendre, en urgence, à destaurer, fermer et réaffecter ce #patrimoine. Et ce, sans liquider les enjeux de #justice et de #démocratie. Contre le front de #modernisation et son anthropologie du projet, de l’#ouverture et de l’#innovation, il reste à inventer un art de la #fermeture et du #démantèlement : une (anti)écologie qui met « les mains dans le cambouis ».

    https://www.editionsdivergences.com/livre/heritage-et-fermeture
    #livre #effondrement #pollution #anti-écologie #écologie

  • Parution prochaine le 11 juin : Robert Kurz, Raison sanglante. Essais pour une critique émancipatrice de la modernité capitaliste et des Lumières bourgeoises (Editions Crise & Critique)

    http://www.palim-psao.fr/2021/05/parution-prochaine-le-11-juin-robert-kurz-raison-sanglante.essais-pour-un

    Depuis le 11 septembre 2001, c’est avec une arrogance jamais atteinte jusqu’ici que les idéologues de l’économie de marché et de la démocratie invoquent leur enracinement dans la grande philosophie des Lumières. Oubliée la « dialectique de la raison » d’Adorno et Horkheimer, oubliée la critique de l’eurocentrisme : il n’est pas jusqu’à certaines fractions de la gauche qui ne s’accrochent à une prétendue promesse de bonheur bourgeoise, alors même que la mondialisation du capital ravage la planète.

    Robert Kurz qui s’est fait connaître pour ses analyses critiques du capitalisme et de son histoire (La Substance du capital, L’Effondrement de la modernisation), s’attaque ici aux « valeurs occidentales » à contre-courant du mainstream intellectuel dominant et au-delà de la critique passée des Lumières. Dans ces essais théoriques polémiques et fondateurs, on voit s’ébaucher une nouvelle critique radicale de la forme-sujet moderne (déterminée de manière masculine) et ce non pas pour rendre hommage à un romantisme réactionnaire mais afin de montrer que les Lumières et les contre-Lumières bourgeoises ne sont que les deux côtés de la même médaille. L’objectif visé est une « antimodernité émancipatrice » qui refuserait les fausses alternatives se situant toutes sur le terrain du système patriarcal producteur de marchandises.

  • Generalplan Ost - Planungshorizont Krim - Zielrichtung Ukraine - Vo...
    https://diasp.eu/p/12936309

    Generalplan Ost - Planungshorizont Krim - Zielrichtung Ukraine - Vordenker der Vernichtung - Prof. Dr. Götz Aly über die Planer einer neuen Europäischen Ordnung (1941 - 1943) im Gespräch mit Alexander Kluge. | 16.06.2017 - 45 Min.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ZbeI1xzs48

    #Überbevölkerung #Volk_ohne_Raum #Rassismus #Osteuropa #Rassengesetze #Ostkrieg #Armut #Umsiedlungsprojekte #Aussiedlung #Rationalisierung #Modernisierung

  • Facebook’s Secret Rules on Word “Zionist” Impede Criticism of Israel
    https://theintercept.com/2021/05/14/facebook-israel-zionist-moderation

    Obtained by The Intercept, the policies alarmed advocates, who said Facebook is silencing political speech. Facebook’s secret internal rules for moderating the term “Zionist” let the social network suppress criticism of Israel amid an ongoing wave of Israeli abuses and violence, according to people who reviewed the policies. The rules appear to have been in place since 2019, seeming to contradict a claim by the company in March that no decision had been made on whether to treat the term (...)

    #Facebook #antisémitisme #censure #modération

  • Résurgence du conflit israélo-palestinien : les nouveaux alliés arabes d’Israël sur la corde raide
    https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2021/05/13/resurgence-du-conflit-israelo-palestinien-les-nouveaux-allies-arabes-d-israe

    [...] le « nouveau #Moyen-Orient », censé surgir des accords de normalisation conclus l’an passé entre l’Etat hébreu et plusieurs pays arabes, n’a jamais autant ressemblé à l’ancien. Le retour au premier plan du conflit israélo-palestinien place en porte-à-faux ces Etats qui, sans le dire, avaient parié sur l’effacement de cette question, ou du moins sa relégation définitive tout en bas de l’agenda diplomatico-médiatique.

    #comparses « #modérés » et soit disant pragmatiques.
    #paywall

  • The power of private philanthropy in international development

    In 1959, the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations pledged seven million US$ to establish the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) at Los Baños in the Philippines. They planted technologies originating in the US into the Philippines landscape, along with new institutions, infrastructures, and attitudes. Yet this intervention was far from unique, nor was it spectacular relative to other philanthropic ‘missions’ from the 20th century.

    How did philanthropic foundations come to wield such influence over how we think about and do development, despite being so far removed from the poor and their poverty in the Global South?

    In a recent paper published in the journal Economy and Society, we suggest that metaphors – bridge, leapfrog, platform, satellite, interdigitate – are useful for thinking about the machinations of philanthropic foundations. In the Philippines, for example, the Ford and Rockefeller foundations were trying to bridge what they saw as a developmental lag. In endowing new scientific institutions such as IRRI that juxtaposed spaces of modernity and underdevelopment, they saw themselves bringing so-called third world countries into present–day modernity from elsewhere by leapfrogging historical time. In so doing, they purposively bypassed actors that might otherwise have been central: such as post–colonial governments, trade unions, and peasantry, along with their respective interests and demands, while providing platforms for other – preferred – ideas, institutions, and interests to dominate.

    We offer examples, below, from three developmental epochs.

    Scientific development (1940s – 70s)

    From the 1920s, the ‘big three’ US foundations (Ford, Rockefeller, Carnegie) moved away from traditional notions of charity towards a more systematic approach to grant-making that involved diagnosing and attacking the ‘root causes’ of poverty. These foundations went on to prescribe the transfer of models of science and development that had evolved within a US context – but were nevertheless considered universally applicable – to solve problems in diverse and distant lands. In public health, for example, ‘success against hookworm in the United States helped inspire the belief that such programs could be replicated in other parts of the world, and were indeed expanded to include malaria and yellow fever, among others’. Similarly, the Tennessee Valley Authority’s model of river–basin integrated regional development was replicated in India, Laos, Vietnam, Egypt, Lebanon, Tanzania, and Brazil.

    The chosen strategy of institutional replication can be understood as the development of satellites––as new scientific institutions invested with a distinct local/regional identity remained, nonetheless, within the orbit of the ‘metropolis’. US foundations’ preference for satellite creation was exemplified by the ‘Green Revolution’—an ambitious programme of agricultural modernization in South and Southeast Asia spearheaded by the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations and implemented through international institutions for whom IRRI was the template.

    Such large-scale funding was justified as essential in the fight against communism.

    The Green Revolution offered a technocratic solution to the problem of food shortage in South and Southeast Asia—the frontier of the Cold War. Meanwhile, for developmentalist regimes that, in the Philippines as elsewhere, had superseded post-independence socialist governments, these programmes provided a welcome diversion from redistributive politics. In this context, institutions like IRRI and their ‘miracle seeds’ were showcased as investments in and symbols of modernity and development. Meanwhile, an increasingly transnational agribusiness sector expanded into new markets for seeds, agrichemicals, machinery, and, ultimately, land.

    The turn to partnerships (1970s – 2000s)

    By the 1970s, the era of large–scale investment in technical assistance to developing country governments and public bureaucracies was coming to an end. The Ford Foundation led the way in pioneering a new approach through its population programmes in South Asia. This new ‘partnership’ mode of intervention was a more arms-length form of satellite creation which emphasised the value of local experience. Rather than obstacles to progress, local communities were reimagined as ‘potential reservoirs of entrepreneurship’ that could be mobilized for economic development.

    In Bangladesh, for example, the Ford Foundation partnered with NGOs such as the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and Concerned Women for Family Planning (CWFP) to mainstream ‘economic empowerment’ programmes that co-opted local NGOs into service provision to citizens-as-consumers. This approach was epitomised by the rise of microfinance, which merged women’s empowerment with hard-headed pragmatism that saw women as reliable borrowers and opened up new areas of social life to marketization.

    By the late-1990s private sector actors had begun to overshadow civil society organizations in the constitution of development partnerships, where state intervention was necessary to support the market if it was to deliver desirable outcomes. Foundations’ efforts were redirected towards brokering increasingly complex public-private partnerships (PPPs). This mode of philanthropy was exemplified by the Rockefeller Foundation’s role in establishing product development partnerships as the institutional blueprint for global vaccine development. Through a combination of interdigitating (embedding itself in the partnership) and platforming (ensuring its preferred model became the global standard), it enabled the Foundation to continue to wield ‘influence in the health sphere, despite its relative decline in assets’.

    Philanthrocapitalism (2000s – present)

    In the lead up to the 2015 UN Conference at which the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were agreed, a consensus formed that private development financing was both desirable and necessary if the ‘trillions’ needed to close the ‘financing gap’ were to be found. For DAC donor countries, the privatization of aid was a way to maintain commitments while implementing economic austerity at home in the wake of the global finance crisis. Philanthrocapitalism emerged to transform philanthropic giving into a ‘profit–oriented investment process’, as grant-making gave way to impact investing.

    The idea of impact investing was hardly new, however. The term had been coined as far back as 2007 at a meeting hosted by the Rockefeller Foundation at its Bellagio Centre. Since then, the mainstreaming of impact investing has occurred in stages, beginning with the aforementioned normalisation of PPPs along with their close relative, blended finance. These strategies served as transit platforms for the formation of networks shaped by financial logics. The final step came with the shift from blended finance as a strategy to impact investing ‘as an asset class’.

    A foundation that embodies the 21st c. transition to philanthrocapitalism is the Omidyar Network, created by eBay founder Pierre Omidyar in 2004. The Network is structured both as a non–profit organization and for–profit venture that ‘invests in entities with a broad social mission’. It has successfully interdigitated with ODA agencies to further align development financing with the financial sector. In 2013, for example, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) launched Global Development Innovation Ventures (GDIV), ‘a global investment platform, with Omidyar Network as a founding member’.

    Conclusion

    US foundations have achieved their power by forging development technoscapes centred in purportedly scale–neutral technologies and techniques – from vaccines to ‘miracle seeds’ to management’s ‘one best way’. They have become increasingly sophisticated in their development of ideational and institutional platforms from which to influence, not only how their assets are deployed, but how, when and where public funds are channelled and towards what ends. This is accompanied by strategies for creating dense, interdigitate connections between key actors and imaginaries of the respective epoch. In the process, foundations have been able to influence debates about development financing itself; presenting its own ‘success stories’ as evidence for preferred financing mechanisms, allocating respective roles of public and private sector actors, and representing the most cost–effective way to resource development.

    Whether US foundations maintain their hegemony or are eclipsed by models of elite philanthropy in East Asia and Latin America, remains to be seen. Indications are that emerging philanthropists in these regions may be well placed to leapfrog over transitioning philanthropic sectors in Western countries by ‘aligning their philanthropic giving with the new financialized paradigm’ from the outset.

    Using ‘simple’ metaphors, we have explored their potential and power to map, analyse, theorize, and interpret philanthropic organizations’ disproportionate influence in development. These provide us with a conceptual language that connects with earlier and emergent critiques of philanthropy working both within and somehow above the ‘field’ of development. Use of metaphors in this way is revealing not just of developmental inclusions but also its exclusions: ideascast aside, routes not pursued, and actors excluded.

    https://developingeconomics.org/2021/05/10/the-power-of-private-philanthropy-in-international-development

    #philanthropie #philanthrocapitalisme #développement #coopération_au_développement #aide_au_développement #privatisation #influence #Ford #Rockefeller #Carnegie #soft_power #charité #root_causes #causes_profondes #pauvreté #science #tranfert #technologie #ressources_pédagogiques #réplique #modernisation #fondations #guerre_froide #green_revolution #révolution_verte #développementalisme #modernité #industrie_agro-alimentaire #partnerships #micro-finance #entrepreneuriat #entreprenariat #partenariat_public-privé (#PPP) #privatisation_de_l'aide #histoire #Omidyar_Network #Pierre_Omidyar

  • #Covid-19 : le Sénat commande une #étude pour « débattre de façon plus objective » de la stratégie à suivre | Public Senat
    https://www.publicsenat.fr/article/parlementaire/covid-19-le-senat-commande-une-etude-pour-debattre-de-facon-plus-objecti

    La mission d’information du Sénat sur les effets du confinement a commandé une étude de #modélisation sur l’évolution de l’épidémie. Son président, Bernard Jomier, interroge la stratégie du gouvernement de laisser circuler le virus. Il évoque deux autres pistes : « La stratégie d’élimination du virus, appelée zéro covid, ou celle de circulation minimale ».

  • The Death of Asylum and the Search for Alternatives

    March 2021 saw the announcement of the UK’s new post-Brexit asylum policy. This plan centres ‘criminal smuggling gangs’ who facilitate the cross border movement of people seeking asylum, particularly in this case, across the English Channel. It therefore distinguishes between two groups of people seeking asylum: those who travel themselves to places of potential sanctuary, and those who wait in a refugee camp near the place that they fled for the lottery ticket of UNHCR resettlement. Those who arrive ‘spontaneously’ will never be granted permanent leave to remain in the UK. Those in the privileged group of resettled refugees will gain indefinite leave to remain.

    Resettlement represents a tiny proportion of refugee reception globally. Of the 80 million displaced people globally at the end of 2019, 22,800 were resettled in 2020 and only 3,560 were resettled to the UK. Under the new plans, forms of resettlement are set to increase, which can only be welcomed. But of course, the expansion of resettlement will make no difference to people who are here, and arriving, every year. People who find themselves in a situation of persecution or displacement very rarely have knowledge of any particular national asylum system. Most learn the arbitrary details of access to work, welfare, and asylum itself upon arrival.

    In making smugglers the focus of asylum policy, the UK is inaugurating what Alison Mountz calls the death of asylum. There is of course little difference between people fleeing persecution who make the journey themselves to the UK, or those who wait in a camp with a small chance of resettlement. The two are often, in fact, connected, as men are more likely to go ahead in advance, making perilous journeys, in the hope that safe and legal options will then be opened up for vulnerable family members. And what makes these perilous journeys so dangerous? The lack of safe and legal routes.

    Britain, and other countries across Europe, North America and Australasia, have gone to huge efforts and massive expense in recent decades to close down access to the right to asylum. Examples of this include paying foreign powers to quarantine refugees outside of Europe, criminalising those who help refugees, and carrier sanctions. Carrier sanctions are fines for airlines or ferry companies if someone boards an aeroplane without appropriate travel documents. So you get the airlines to stop people boarding a plane to your country to claim asylum. In this way you don’t break international law, but you are certainly violating the spirit of it. If you’ve ever wondered why people pay 10 times the cost of a plane ticket to cross the Mediterranean or the Channel in a tiny boat, carrier sanctions are the reason.

    So government policy closes down safe and legal routes, forcing people to take more perilous journeys. These are not illegal journeys because under international law one cannot travel illegally if one is seeking asylum. Their only option becomes to pay smugglers for help in crossing borders. At this point criminalising smuggling becomes the focus of asylum policy. In this way, government policy creates the crisis which it then claims to solve. And this extends to people who are seeking asylum themselves.

    Arcane maritime laws have been deployed by the UK in order to criminalise irregular Channel crossers who breach sea defences, and therefore deny them sanctuary. Specifically, if one of the people aboard a given boat touches the tiller, oars, or steering device, they become liable to be arrested under anti-smuggling laws. In 2020, eight people were jailed on such grounds, facing sentences of up to two and a half years, as well as the subsequent threat of deportation. For these people, there are no safe and legal routes left.

    We know from extensive research on the subject, that poverty in a country does not lead to an increase in asylum applications elsewhere from that country. Things like wars, genocide and human rights abuses need to be present in order for nationals of a country to start seeking asylum abroad in any meaningful number. Why then, one might ask, is the UK so obsessed with preventing people who are fleeing wars, genocide and human rights abuses from gaining asylum here? On their own terms there is one central reason: their belief that most people seeking asylum today are not actually refugees, but economic migrants seeking to cheat the asylum system.

    This idea that people who seek asylum are largely ‘bogus’ began in the early 2000s. It came in response to a shift in the nationalities of people seeking asylum. During the Cold War there was little concern with the mix of motivations in relation to fleeing persecution or seeking a ‘better life’. But when people started to seek asylum from formerly colonised countries in the ‘Third World’ they began to be construed as ‘new asylum seekers’ and were assumed to be illegitimate. From David Blunkett’s time in the Home Office onwards, these ‘new asylum seekers’, primarily black and brown people fleeing countries in which refugee producing situations are occurring, asylum has been increasingly closed down.

    The UK government has tended to justify its highly restrictive asylum policies on the basis that it is open to abuse from bogus, cheating, young men. It then makes the lives of people who are awaiting a decision on their asylum application as difficult as possible on the basis that this will deter others. Forcing people who are here to live below the poverty line, then, is imagined to sever ‘pull factors’ for others who have not yet arrived. There is no evidence to support the idea that deterrence strategies work, they simply costs lives.

    Over the past two decades, as we have witnessed the slow death of asylum, it has become increasingly difficult to imagine alternatives. Organisations advocating for people seeking asylum have, with diminishing funds since 2010, tended to focus on challenging specific aspects of the system on legal grounds, such as how asylum support rates are calculated or whether indefinite detention is lawful.

    Scholars of migration studies, myself included, have written countless papers and books debunking the spurious claims made by the government to justify their policies, and criticising the underlying logics of the system. What we have failed to do is offer convincing alternatives. But with his new book, A Modern Migration Theory, Professor of Migration Studies Peo Hansen offers us an example of an alternative strategy. This is not a utopian proposal of open borders, this is the real experience of Sweden, a natural experiment with proven success.

    During 2015, large numbers of people were displaced as the Syrian civil war escalated. Most stayed within the region, with millions of people being hosted in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. A smaller proportion decided to travel onwards from these places to Europe. Because of the fortress like policies adopted by European countries, there were no safe and legal routes aboard aeroplanes or ferries. Horrified by the spontaneous arrival of people seeking sanctuary, most European countries refused to take part in burden sharing and so it fell to Germany and Sweden, the only countries that opened their doors in any meaningful way, to host the new arrivals.

    Hansen documents what happened next in Sweden. First, the Swedish state ended austerity in an emergency response to the challenge of hosting so many refugees. As part of this, and as a country that produces its own currency, the Swedish state distributed funds across the local authorities of the country to help them in receiving the refugees. And third, this money was spent not just on refugees, but on the infrastructure needed to support an increased population in a given area – on schools, hospitals, and housing. This is in the context of Sweden also having a welfare system which is extremely generous compared to Britain’s stripped back welfare regime.

    As in Britain, the Swedish government had up to this point spent some years fetishizing the ‘budget deficit’ and there was an assumption that spending so much money would worsen the fiscal position – that it would lead both to inflation, and a massive national deficit which must later be repaid. That this spending on refugees would cause deficits and hence necessitate borrowing, tax hikes and budget cuts was presented by politicians and the media in Sweden as a foregone conclusion. This foregone conclusion was then used as part of a narrative about refugees’ negative impact on the economy and welfare, and as the basis for closing Sweden’s doors to people seeking asylum in the future.

    And yet, the budget deficit never materialised: ‘Just as the finance minister had buried any hope of surpluses in the near future and repeated the mantra of the need to borrow to “finance” the refugees, a veritable tidal wave of tax revenue had already started to engulf Sweden’ (p.152). The economy grew and tax revenue surged in 2016 and 2017, so much that successive surpluses were created. In 2016 public consumption increased 3.6%, a figure not seen since the 1970s. Growth rates were 4% in 2016 and 2017. Refugees were filling labour shortages in understaffed sectors such as social care, where Sweden’s ageing population is in need of demographic renewal.

    Refugees disproportionately ended up in smaller, poorer, depopulating, rural municipalities who also received a disproportionately large cash injections from the central government. The arrival of refugees thus addressed the triple challenges of depopulation and population ageing; a continuous loss of local tax revenues, which forced cuts in services; and severe staff shortages and recruitment problems (e.g. in the care sector). Rather than responding with hostility, then, municipalities rightly saw the refugee influx as potentially solving these spiralling challenges.

    For two decades now we have been witnessing the slow death of asylum in the UK. Basing policy on prejudice rather than evidence, suspicion rather than generosity, burden rather than opportunity. Every change in the asylum system heralds new and innovative ways of circumventing human rights, detaining, deporting, impoverishing, and excluding. And none of this is cheap – it is not done for the economic benefit of the British population. It costs £15,000 to forcibly deport someone, it costs £95 per day to detain them, with £90 million spent each year on immigration detention. Vast sums of money are given to private companies every year to help in the work of denying people who are seeking sanctuary access to their right to asylum.

    The Swedish case offers a window into what happens when a different approach is taken. The benefit is not simply to refugees, but to the population as a whole. With an economy to rebuild after Covid and huge holes in the health and social care workforce, could we imagine an alternative in which Sweden offered inspiration to do things differently?

    https://discoversociety.org/2021/04/07/the-death-of-asylum-and-the-search-for-alternatives

    #asile #alternatives #migrations #alternative #réfugiés #catégorisation #tri #réinstallation #death_of_asylum #mort_de_l'asile #voies_légales #droit_d'asile #externalisation #passeurs #criminalisation_des_passeurs #UK #Angleterre #colonialisme #colonisation #pull-factors #pull_factors #push-pull_factors #facteurs_pull #dissuasion #Suède #déficit #économie #welfare_state #investissement #travail #impôts #Etat_providence #modèle_suédois

    ping @isskein @karine4

    –-

    ajouté au fil de discussion sur le lien entre économie et réfugiés/migrations :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/705790

    • A Modern Migration Theory. An Alternative Economic Approach to Failed EU Policy

      The widely accepted narrative that refugees admitted to the European Union constitute a fiscal burden is based on a seemingly neutral accounting exercise, in which migrants contribute less in tax than they receive in welfare assistance. A “fact” that justifies increasingly restrictive asylum policies. In this book Peo Hansen shows that this consensual cost-perspective on migration is built on a flawed economic conception of the orthodox “sound finance” doctrine prevalent in migration research and policy. By shifting perspective to examine migration through the macroeconomic lens offered by modern monetary theory, Hansen is able to demonstrate sound finance’s detrimental impact on migration policy and research, including its role in stoking the toxic debate on migration in the EU. Most importantly, Hansen’s undertaking offers the tools with which both migration research and migration policy could be modernized and put on a realistic footing.

      In addition to a searing analysis of EU migration policy and politics, Hansen also investigates the case of Sweden, the country that has received the most refugees in the EU in proportion to population. Hansen demonstrates how Sweden’s increased refugee spending in 2015–17 proved to be fiscally risk-free and how the injection of funds to cash-strapped and depopulating municipalities, which received refugees, boosted economic growth and investment in welfare. Spending on refugees became a way of rediscovering the viability of welfare for all. Given that the Swedish approach to the 2015 refugee crisis has since been discarded and deemed fiscally unsustainable, Hansen’s aim is to reveal its positive effects and its applicability as a model for the EU as a whole.

      https://cup.columbia.edu/book/a-modern-migration-theory/9781788210553
      #livre #Peo_Hansen

  • Comment Facebook laisse des dirigeants tromper leur population
    https://www.courrierinternational.com/article/revelations-comment-facebook-laisse-des-dirigeants-tromper-le

    Un utilisateur de Facebook ne peut avoir qu’un seul compte. Mais il peut créer plusieurs pages capables de liker, commenter, partager d’autres comptes, et ainsi créer du “faux engagement”. Cette faille dans la réglementation de Facebook contribue à de vastes opérations de manipulation, révèle une enquête du quotidien britannique The Guardian. Facebook a, à plusieurs reprises, laissé des dirigeants et des personnalités politiques tromper la population ou harceler des opposants sur sa plateforme, bien que (...)

    #Facebook #manipulation #modération

  • The invention of whiteness: the long history of a dangerous idea

    Before the 17th century, people did not think of themselves as belonging to something called the white race. But once the idea was invented, it quickly began to reshape the modern world.

    In 2008, a satirical blog called Stuff White People Like became a brief but boisterous sensation. The conceit was straightforward, coupling a list, eventually 136 items long, of stuff that white people liked to do or own, with faux-ethnographic descriptions that explained each item’s purported racial appeal. While some of the items were a little too obvious – indie music appeared at #41, Wes Anderson movies at #10 – others, including “awareness” (#18) and “children’s games as adults” (#102), were inspired. It was an instant hit. In its first two months alone, Stuff White People Like drew 4 million visitors, and it wasn’t long before a book based on the blog became a New York Times bestseller.

    The founder of the blog was an aspiring comedian and PhD dropout named Christian Lander, who’d been working as an advertising copywriter in Los Angeles when he launched the site on a whim. In interviews, Lander always acknowledged that his satire had at least as much to do with class as it did with race. His targets, he said, were affluent overeducated urbanites like himself. Yet there’s little doubt that the popularity of the blog, which depended for its humour on the assumption that whiteness was a contentless default identity, had much to do with its frank invocation of race. “As a white person, you’re just desperate to find something else to grab on to,” Lander said in 2009. “Pretty much every white person I grew up with wished they’d grown up in, you know, an ethnic home that gave them a second language.”

    Looking back at Stuff White People Like today, what marks the site’s age is neither the particularities of its irony nor the broad generalities of its targets. There are still plenty of white people with too much time and too much disposable income on their hands, and plenty of them still like yoga (#15), Vespa scooters (#126), and “black music that black people don’t listen to any more” (#116).

    What has changed, however – changed in ways that date Stuff White People Like unmistakably – is the cultural backdrop. Ten years ago, whiteness suffused mainstream culture like a fog: though pervasive to the point of omnipresence, it was almost nowhere distinct. When the sorts of white people for and about whom Lander was writing talked about being white, their conversations tended to span the narrow range between defensiveness and awkwardness. If they weren’t exactly clamouring to dispense with their racial identity, and the privileges that came with it, they were also not eager to embrace, or even discuss it, in public.

    In the years since, especially among the sort of people who might have once counted themselves fans of Lander’s blog, the public significance of whiteness has undergone an almost wholesale re-evaluation. Far from being a punchline for an anxious, cathartic joke, whiteness is now earnestly invoked, like neoliberalism or populism, as a central driver of cultural and political affairs. Whereas Lander could score a bestseller in 2008 with a book mocking whiteness as a bland cultural melange whose greatest sin was to be uninteresting, just nine years later Ta-Nehisi Coates would have his own bestseller that described whiteness as “an existential danger to the country and the world”.

    Much of the change, of course, had to do with Donald Trump, for whom, as Coates put it, “whiteness is neither notional nor symbolic, but is the very core of his power”. But it was not only Trump. Whiteness has been implicated in events on both sides of the Atlantic, including Brexit; mass shootings in Norway, New Zealand and the US; the George Floyd and Breonna Taylor killings; and the 6 January insurrection at the US Capitol. Alongside these real-world incidents, a bumper crop of scholarship, journalism, art and literature – by Coates, Nell Irvin Painter, Jordan Peele, Eric Foner, Ava DuVernay, Adam Serwer, Barbara and Karen Fields, Kevin Young, David Olusoga, Nikole Hannah-Jones, Colson Whitehead and Claudia Rankine, among many others – has spurred the most significant reconsideration of racial whiteness in 50 years.

    This reckoning, as it is sometimes called, has had measurable effects. In a Pew poll last October, nearly a third of white Americans said that the recent attention to racial issues signified a “major change” in American attitudes about race – another 45% said it was a “minor change” – and nearly half believed that those changes would lead to policies that would ameliorate racial inequality. In the UK, a YouGov poll from December suggested that more than a third of Britons reported that they were having more discussions about racism than they had previously.

    At the same time, this new focus on whiteness has prompted much confusion and consternation, especially among white people not used to thinking of themselves in racial terms. The Pew poll found that half of white Americans thought there was “too much” discussion of racial issues, and a similar proportion suggested that seeing racism where it didn’t exist was a bigger problem than not seeing racism where it did.

    What these recent debates have demonstrated more than anything, perhaps, is how little agreement still exists about what whiteness is and what it ought to be. Nearly everywhere in contemporary society “white” is presumed to be a meaningful index of identity that, like age and gender, is important enough to get mentioned in news accounts, tallied in political polls, and recorded in government databases. Yet what that identity is supposed to tell us is still substantially in dispute. In many ways, whiteness resembles time as seen by Saint Augustine: we presume we understand it as long as we’re not asked to explain it, but it becomes inexplicable as soon as we’re put to the test.

    A little more than a century ago, in his essay The Souls of White Folk, the sociologist and social critic WEB Du Bois proposed what still ranks as one of the most penetrating and durable insights about the racial identity we call white: “The discovery of personal whiteness among the world’s peoples is a very modern thing – a nineteenth and twentieth century matter, indeed.”

    Though radical in its time, Du Bois’s characterisation of what he called the “new religion of whiteness” – a religion founded on the dogma that “of all the hues of God, whiteness alone is inherently and obviously better than brownness and tan” – would have a profound effect on the way historians and other scholars would come to understand racial identity. In part this had to do with his insistence that a racial category like whiteness was more akin to a religious belief than a biological fact. Du Bois rejected the idea, still common in his day, that the races reflected natural divisions within the human species – as well as the nearly inevitable corollary that the physical, mental and behavioural traits associated with the white race just happened to be the ones most prized by modern societies.

    That had been the view, for instance, of Thomas Jefferson, who had attempted to delineate “the real distinctions which nature has made” between the races, in his Notes on the State of Virginia, first published in 1781. It was also the view that would appear, at least in attenuated form, two centuries later in Charles Murray and Richard J Herrnstein’s Bell Curve, which was published in 1994. Murray and Herrnstein argued that “the most plausible” explanation for the differences between Black and white populations recorded on IQ tests was “some form of mixed gene and environmental source” – in other words, that at least some of the discrepancy owes to natural differences.

    By the time The Bell Curve appeared, Du Bois’s assertion that racial categories were not biologically grounded was widely accepted. In the years since, the scientific evidence for that understanding has only become more overwhelming. A 2017 study examined the DNA of nearly 6,000 people from around the world and found that while some genetic differences among humans can be traced to various ancestral lineages – for example, eastern African, southern European or circumpolar – none of those lineages correspond to traditional ideas about race.

    If it’s easy enough for many people today to accept that whiteness is a purely sociological phenomenon – in some quarters, the idea that “race is a social construct” has become a cliche – the same cannot be said for Du Bois’s suggestion that whiteness is a relatively new thing in human history. And yet just as in the case of genetic science, during the second half of the 20th century a number of historians demonstrated that while Du Bois was off by a few hundred years, he was correct that it was only in the modern period that people started to think of themselves as belonging to something called the white race.

    Of course, it’s important not to overstate the case: the evolution of the idea of whiteness was messy and often indistinct. As the historian Nell Irvin Painter has cautioned, “white identity didn’t just spring to life full-blown and unchanging”. It had important antecedents that included a growing sense of a pan-European identity; longstanding cultural associations that saw white as a symbol of purity and virtue; and bog-standard ethnocentrism.

    Still, with only slightly exaggerated precision, we can say that one of the most crucial developments in “the discovery of personal whiteness” took place during the second half of the 17th century, on the peripheries of the still-young British empire. What’s more, historians such as Oscar and Mary Handlin, Edmund Morgan and Edward Rugemer have largely confirmed Du Bois’s suspicion that while xenophobia appears to be fairly universal among human groupings, the invention of a white racial identity was motivated from the start by a need to justify the enslavement of Africans. In the words of Eric Williams, a historian who later became the first prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago, “slavery was not born of racism: rather, racism was the consequence of slavery”.

    If you asked an Englishman in the early part of the 17th century what colour skin he had, he might very well have called it white. But the whiteness of his skin would have suggested no more suitable basis for a collective identity than the roundness of his nose or the baldness of his head. If you asked him to situate himself within the rapidly expanding borders of the known world, he would probably identify himself, first and most naturally, as an Englishman. If that category proved too narrow – if, say, he needed to describe what it was he had in common with the French and the Dutch that he did not share with Ottomans or Africans – he would almost certainly call himself a Christian instead.

    That religious identity was crucial for the development of the English slave trade – and eventually for the development of racial whiteness. In the early 17th century, plantation owners in the West Indies and in the American colonies largely depended on the labour of European indentured servants. These servants were considered chattel and were often treated brutally – the conditions on Barbados, England’s wealthiest colony, were notorious – but they were fortunate in at least one respect: because they were Christian, by law they could not be held in lifetime captivity unless they were criminals or prisoners of war.

    Africans enjoyed no such privilege. They were understood to be infidels, and thus the “perpetual enemies” of Christian nations, which made it legal to hold them as slaves. By 1640 or so, the rough treatment of indentured servants had started to diminish the supply of Europeans willing to work on the sugar and tobacco plantations, and so the colonists looked increasingly to slavery, and the Atlantic-sized loophole that enabled it, to keep their fantastically profitable operations supplied with labour.

    The plantation owners understood very well that their cruel treatment of indentured Europeans, and their even crueller treatment of enslaved Africans, might lead to thoughts – or worse – of vengeance. Significantly outnumbered, they lived in constant fear of uprisings. They were particularly afraid of incidents such as Bacon’s Rebellion, in 1676, which saw indentured Europeans fighting side-by-side with free and enslaved Africans against Virginia’s colonial government.

    To ward off such events, the plantation owners initially sought to protect themselves by giving their “Christian” servants legal privileges not available to their enslaved “Negroes”. The idea was to buy off the allegiance of indentured Europeans with a set of entitlements that, however meagre, set them above enslaved Africans. Toward the end of the 17th century, this scheme witnessed a significant shift: many of the laws that regulated slave and servant behaviour – the 1681 Servant Act in Jamaica, for example, which was later copied for use in South Carolina – began to describe the privileged class as “whites” and not as “Christians”.

    One of the more plausible explanations for this change, made by Rugemer and the historian Katharine Gerbner, among others, is that the establishment of whiteness as a legal category solved a religious dilemma. By the 1670s, Christian missionaries, including the Quaker George Fox, were insisting that enslaved Africans should be inducted into the Christian faith. The problem this posed for the planters was obvious: if their African labourers became Christians, and no longer “perpetual enemies” of Christendom, then on what legal grounds could they be enslaved? And what about the colonial laws that gave special privileges to Christians, laws whose authors apparently never contemplated the possibility that Africans might someday join the faith?

    The planters tried to resolve the former dilemma by blocking the conversion of enslaved Africans, on the grounds, as the Barbados Assembly put it in 1680, that such conversion would “endanger the island, inasmuch as converted negroes grow more perverse and intractable than others”. When that didn’t work (the Bishop of London objected) they instead passed laws guaranteeing that baptism could not be invoked as grounds for seeking freedom.

    But the latter question, about privileges for Christians, required the colonialists to think in a new way. No longer could their religious identity separate them and their servants from enslaved Africans. Henceforth they would need what Morgan called “a screen of racial contempt”. Henceforth, they would need to start thinking of themselves as white.

    As late as 1694, a slave-ship captain could still question the racial logic newly employed to justify his trade. (“I can’t think there is any intrinsick value in one colour more than another, nor that white is better than black, only we think it so because we are so,” Thomas Phillips wrote in his diary.) But whiteness quickly proved itself a powerful weapon that allowed transatlantic capitalism to secure the labour – “white” and African – it needed. As the historian Theodore Allen put it, “The plantation bourgeoisie deliberately extended a privileged status to the white poor of all categories as a means of turning to African slavery as the basis of its system of production.”

    The economic utility of the idea of whiteness helped spread it rapidly around the world. Du Bois was not wrong to call it a religion, for like a religion, it operated at every psychological, sociological and political scale, from the most intimate to the most public. Like a religion, too, it adapted to local conditions. What it meant to be white in British Virginia was not identical to what it would mean in New York before the American civil war, in India during the Raj, in Georgia during Jim Crow, in Australia after Federation, or in Germany during the Third Reich. But what united all these expressions was a singular idea: that some group of people called white was naturally superior to all others. As Benjamin Disraeli, the Victorian prime minister and one of the most committed race ideologists of his time, put it, “race implies difference, difference implies superiority, and superiority leads to predominance”.

    The idea of whiteness, in other words, was identical to the idea of white supremacy. For the three centuries that preceded the civil rights movement, this presumption was accepted at the most refined levels of culture, by people who, in other contexts, were among the most vocal advocates of human liberty and equality. It is well known that Immanuel Kant argued we should treat every other person “always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means”. Less well known is his proposal, in his Lectures on Physical Geography, published in 1802, that “humanity is at its greatest perfection in the race of the whites”, or his claim, in his notes for his Lectures on Anthropology, that native “Americans and Negroes cannot govern themselves. Thus, serve only as slaves”. Even Gandhi, during the early part of his life, accepted the basic lie of whiteness, arguing that “the English and the Indians spring from a common stock, called the Indo-Aryan” and that “the white race in South Africa should be the predominating race”.

    As though aware of their own guilty conscience, the evangelists of the religion of whiteness were always desperate to prove that it was something other than mere prejudice. Where the Bible still held sway, they bent the story of Noah’s son Ham into a divine apologia for white supremacy. When anatomy and anthropology gained prestige in the 18th and 19th centuries, they cited pseudo-scientific markers of racial difference like the cephalic index and the norma verticalis. When psychology took over in the 20th, they told themselves flattering stories about divergences in IQ.

    For all their evident success, the devotees of the religion of whiteness were never able to achieve the total vision they longed for. In part, this was because there were always dissenters, including among those who stood to gain from it, who rejected the creed of racial superiority. Alongside those remembered by history – Elizabeth Freeman, Toussaint Louverture, Harriet Tubman, Sitting Bull, Franz Boas, Haviva Reik, Martin Luther King Jr, Nelson Mandela – there were millions of now-forgotten people who used whatever means they possessed to resist it. In part, too, the nonsense logic that regulated the boundaries of whiteness – the one-drop rule in the US, which said that anyone with Black ancestry could not be white; the endless arguments over what “caucasian” was supposed to mean; the “honorary Aryan” status that Hitler extended to the Japanese – was no match for the robust complexities of human society.

    Yet if the religion of whiteness was never able to gain acceptance as an unchallengeable scientific fact, it was still hugely successful at shaping social reality. Some of this success had to do with its flexibility. Thanks to its role in facilitating slavery, whiteness in the US was often defined in opposition to blackness, but between those two extremes was room for tactical accommodations. In 1751, Benjamin Franklin could claim that only the English and Saxons “make the principal Body of White People on the Face of the Earth”, and nearly 80 years later, Ralph Waldo Emerson would insist that the Irish, like the Chinese and the Native American, were not caucasian. Over time, however, the definition of who counted as culturally white expanded to include Catholics from southern Europe, the Irish and even Jews, who for centuries had been seen as quintessential outsiders.

    The religion of whiteness also found success by persuading its adherents that they, and not the people they oppressed, were the real victims. In 1692, colonial legislators in British Barbados complained that “sundry of the Negroes and Slaves of this island, have been long preparing, contriving, conspiring and designing a most horrid, bloody, damnable and detestable rebellion, massacre, assassination and destruction”. From there, it was a more or less straight line to Woodrow Wilson’s claim, in 1903, that the southerners who started the Ku Klux Klan were “aroused by the mere instinct of self-preservation”, and to Donald Trump’s warning, when he launched his presidential campaign in 2015, that Mexican immigrants to the US were “bringing drugs. And they’re bringing crime. And they’re rapists.”

    Where the religion of whiteness was not able to win converts with persuasion or fear, it deployed cruder measures to secure its power, conscripting laws, institutions, customs and churches to enforce its prerogatives. Above all, it depended on force. By the middle of the 20th century, the presumption that a race of people called white were superior to all others had supplied the central justification not just for the transatlantic slave trade but also for the near-total extinction of Indians in North America; for Belgian atrocities in Congo; for the bloody colonisation of India, east Africa and Australia by Britain; for the equally bloody colonisation of north and west Africa and south-east Asia by France; for the deployment of the Final Solution in Nazi Germany; and for the apartheid state in South Africa. And those are merely the most extreme examples. Alongside those murdered, raped and enslaved in the name of whiteness, the total number of whom runs at least to nine figures, are an almost unthinkable number of people whose lives were shortened, constrained, antagonised and insulted on a daily basis.

    It was not until the aftermath of the second world war that frank endorsements of white supremacy were broadly rejected in Anglo-American public discourse. That this happened at all was thanks largely to the efforts of civil rights and anti-colonial activists, but the war itself also played a role. Though the horrors of the Nazi regime had been more acute in their intensity than anything happening at the time in the US or the UK, they supplied an unflattering mirror that made it impossible to ignore the racism that was still prevalent in both countries. (A New York Times editorial in 1946 made the connection explicit, arguing that “this is a particularly good year to campaign against the evils of bigotry, prejudice and race hatred because we have recently witnessed the defeat of enemies who tried to found a mastery of the world upon such a cruel and fallacious policy”.)

    Political appeals to white solidarity diminished slowly but certainly. In 1955, for example, Winston Churchill could still imagine that “Keep England White” was a winning general-election theme, and even as late as 1964, Peter Griffiths, a Conservative candidate for parliament, would score a surprise victory after endorsing a nakedly racist slogan. By 1968, however, when Enoch Powell delivered his “Rivers of Blood” speech – in which he approvingly quoted a constituent who lamented that “in 15 or 20 years’ time, the black man will have the whip hand over the white man” – he would be greeted by outrage in the Times, which called it an “evil speech”, and expelled from the Conservative shadow cabinet. In the US, too, where a century of racial apartheid had followed a century of slavery, open expressions of racism met with increasing public censure. Throughout the 60s and into the 70s, Congress passed a series of statutes that rendered explicit racial discrimination illegal in many areas of public life.

    This gradual rejection of explicit, government-enforced white supremacy was hugely consequential in terms of public policy. Yet it did not mean that whiteness, as a political force, had lost its appeal: in the weeks after Powell’s speech, to take just one example, a Gallup poll found that 74% of Britons supported his suggestion that brown-skinned immigrants ought to be repatriated. It also left unresolved the more difficult question of whether whiteness was truly separable from its long history of domination.

    Instead of looking too hard at the sordid history of whiteness, many white people found it easier to decide that the civil rights movement had accomplished all the anti-racism work that needed doing. The result was a strange détente. On the one hand, whiteness retreated as a subject of public attention, giving way to a new rhetoric of racial colour-blindness. On the other hand, vast embedded economic and cultural discrepancies allowed white people continue to exercise the institutional and structural power that had accumulated on their behalf across the previous three centuries.

    Similarly, while blatant assertions of white power – such as the 1991 gubernatorial campaign of David Duke, a former Ku Klux Klan grand wizard, in Louisiana – met with significant elite resistance, what counted as racist (and therefore subject to the taboo) was limited to only the most flagrant instances of racial animus. Among liberals and conservatives, racism was widely understood as a species of hatred, which meant that any white person who could look into his heart and find an absence of open hostility could absolve himself of racism.

    Even the phrase “white supremacy”, which predates the word “racism” in English by 80 years and once described a system of interlocking racial privileges that touched every aspect of life, was redefined to mean something rare and extreme. In 1923, for example, under the headline White Supremacy Menaced, the New York Times would print an article which took at face value a Harvard professor’s warning that “one of the gravest and most acute problems before the world today” was “the problem of saving the white race from submergence in the darker races”. In 1967, the US supreme court invalidated a law that prevented whites from marrying people who were not white, on the grounds that it was “obviously an endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy”, and two years later, the critic Albert Murray would use the phrase to describe everything from anti-Black prejudice in police departments to bigoted media representations of Black life to influential academic studies such as Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s The Negro Family.

    By the 80s and 90s, however, at least in white-dominated media, “white supremacy” was reserved only for the most shocking and retrograde examples of racism. For many people who grew up at that time, as I did, the phrase evoked cross burnings and racist hooligans, rather than an intricate web of laws and norms that maintained disparities of wealth, education, housing, incarceration and access to political power.

    Perhaps most perverse of all was the charge of “reverse racism”, which emboldened critics of affirmative action and other “race-conscious” policies to claim that they, and not the policies’ proponents, were the true heralds of racial equality. In 1986, Ronald Reagan went so far as to defend his opposition to minority-hiring quotas by invoking Martin Luther King Jr: “We want a colour-blind society,” Reagan declared. “A society, that in the words of Dr King, judges people not by the colour of their skin, but by the content of their character.”

    Of course not everyone accepted this new dispensation, which scholars have variously described as “structural racism”, “symbolic racism” or “racism without racists”. In the decades following the civil rights movement, intellectuals and activists of colour continued to develop the Du Boisian intellectual tradition that understood whiteness as an implement of social domination. In the 80s and 90s, a group of legal scholars that included Derrick Bell, Kimberlé Crenshaw, Cheryl Harris and Richard Delgado produced a body of research that became known as critical race theory, which was, in Bell’s words, “ideologically committed to the struggle against racism, particularly as institutionalised in and by law”.

    Alongside critical race theory, and in many ways derived from it, a new academic trend, known as whiteness studies, took shape. Historians working in this subfield demonstrated the myriad ways in which the pursuit of white supremacy – like the pursuit of wealth and the subjection of women – had been one of the central forces that gave shape to Anglo-American history. For many of them, the bill of indictment against whiteness was total: as the historian David Roediger put it, “it is not merely that whiteness is oppressive and false; it is that whiteness is nothing but oppressive and false.”

    In the fall of 1992, a new journal co-founded by Noel Ignatiev, one of the major figures in whiteness studies, appeared in bookstores around Cambridge, Massachusetts. Called Race Traitor, the magazine wore its motto and guiding ethos on its cover: Treason to Whiteness is Loyalty to Humanity. The issue opened with an editorial whose headline was equally provocative: “Abolish the white race – by any means necessary.” This demand, with its echoes of Sartre by way of Malcolm X, was not, as it turned out, a call for violence, much less for genocide. As Ignatiev and his co-editor, John Garvey, explained, they took as their foundational premise that “the white race is a historically constructed social formation”, a sort of club whose membership “consists of those who partake of the privileges of the white skin in this society”.

    For Ignatiev and Garvey, whiteness had been identified with white supremacy for so long that it was folly to think it was salvageable. “So long as the white race exists,” they wrote, “all movements against racism are doomed to fail.” What was necessary, in their view, was for the people called “white” – people like them – to forcefully reject that identification and the racial privileges that came with it. Whiteness, they suggested, was a fragile, unstable thing, such that even a small number of determined attacks – objecting to racist educational programmes at a school board meeting, say, or capturing racist police behaviour on video – ought to be able to unsettle the whole edifice.

    But while whiteness studies produced much work that still makes for bracing, illuminating reading, it was soon mocked as one more instance of the very privilege it meant to oppose. “The whole enterprise gives whites a kind of standing in the multicultural paradigm they have never before enjoyed,” Margaret Talbot wrote in the New York Times in 1997. “And it involves them, inevitably, in a journey of self-discovery in which white people’s thoughts about their own whiteness acquire a portentous new legitimacy.” Even Ignatiev would later say he “wanted nothing to do with” it.

    By the mid-2000s, the “colour-blind” ideological system had become so successful that it managed to shield even the more obvious operations of whiteness – the overwhelming numbers of white people in corporate boardrooms, for instance, or in the media and tech industries – from much censure. In the US, when racial disparities could not be ignored, it was often suggested that time was the only reliable remedy: as the numerical proportion of whites dwindled, so too would their political and economic power diminish. (Never mind that whiteness had managed to escape predictions of demographic doom before, by integrating groups it had previously kept on its margins.)

    Meanwhile, younger white liberals, the sort of people who might have read Bell or Crenshaw or Ignatiev at university, tended to duck the subject of their own racial identity with a shuffling awkwardness. Growing up white in the decades after the civil rights movement was a little like having a rich but disreputable cousin: you never knew quite what to make of him, or the extravagant gifts he bought for your birthday, and so you found it easier, in general, just not to say anything.

    The absence of talk about whiteness was so pervasive that it became possible to convince yourself that it constituted one of the central obstacles to racial progress. When I was in graduate school during the early 00s, toward the end of the whiteness-studies boomlet, I often heard – including from my own mouth – the argument that the real problem was that white people weren’t talking enough about their racial identity. If you could get people to acknowledge their whiteness, we told ourselves, then it might be possible to get them to acknowledge the unfair ways in which whiteness had helped them.

    The trouble with this notion would become clear soon enough, when the presidency of Barack Obama offered the surest test to date of the proposition that whiteness had separated itself from its supremacist past. Though Obama’s election was initially hailed by some as proof that the US was entering a new post-racial phase, it took just a few months for the Tea party, a conservative movement ostensibly in favour of small government, to suggest that the opposite was closer to the truth.

    In September 2009, Jimmy Carter caused a stir by suggesting that the Tea party’s opposition was something other than a principled reaction to government spending. “I think an overwhelming portion of the intensely demonstrated animosity toward President Barack Obama is based on the fact that he is a black man,” Carter said. (Carter’s speculation was later backed up by research: the political scientist Ashley Jardina, for instance, found that “more racially resentful whites are far more likely to say they support the Tea party and rate it more positively.”)

    The white backlash to Obama’s presidency continued throughout his two terms, helped along by Rupert Murdoch’s media empire and the Republican party, which won majorities in both houses of Congress by promising to obstruct anything Obama tried to accomplish. Neither project kept Obama from a second term, but this does not mean that they were without effect: though Obama lost white voters by 12% in 2008, four years later he would lose them by 20%, the worst showing among white voters for a successful candidate in US history.

    At the same time, Obama’s victory suggested to some observers the vindication of the demographic argument: the changing racial composition of the US appeared to have successfully neutralised the preferences of the white electorate, at least as far as the presidency was concerned. (“There just are not enough middle-aged white guys that we can scrape together to win,” said one Republican after Obama’s victory.)

    What’s more, the first wave of Black Lives Matter protests, which attracted international attention in the summer of 2014, prompted a torrent of demonstrative introspection among white people, especially online. As the critic Hua Hsu would write, half-teasingly, in 2015, “it feels as though we are living in the moment when white people, on a generational scale, have become self-aware”.

    Not for the first time, however, what was visible on Twitter was a poor indicator of deeper social trends. As we now know, the ways in which whiteness was becoming most salient at mid-decade were largely not the ways that prompted recent university graduates to announce their support for Rhodes Must Fall on Instagram. Far more momentous was the version of white identity politics that appreciated the advantages of whiteness and worried about them slipping away; that saw in immigration an existential threat; and that wanted, more than anything, to “Take Back Control” and to “Make America Great Again”.

    It was this version of whiteness that helped to power the twin shocks of 2016: first Brexit and then Trump. The latter, especially – not just the fact of Trump’s presidency but the tone of it, the unrestrained vengeance and vituperation that animated it – put paid to any lingering questions about whether whiteness had renounced its superiority complex. Ta-Nehisi Coates, who more than any other single person had been responsible for making the bumbling stereotype of whiteness offered up by Stuff White People Like seem hopelessly myopic, understood what was happening immediately. “Trump truly is something new – the first president whose entire political existence hinges on the fact of a black president,” Coates wrote in the autumn of 2017. “His ideology is white supremacy, in all its truculent and sanctimonious power.”

    In 1860, a man who called himself “Ethiop” published an essay in The Anglo-African Magazine, which has been called the first Black literary journal in the US. The author behind the pseudonym was William J Wilson, a former bootmaker who later served as the principal of Brooklyn’s first public school for Black children. Wilson’s essay bore the headline, What Shall We Do with the White People?

    The article was meant in part meant to mock the white authors and statesmen who had endlessly asked themselves a similar question about Black people in the US. But it was not only a spoof. In a tone that mimicked the smug paternalism of his targets, he laid out a comprehensive indictment of white rule in the country: the plunder and murder of the “Aborigines”; the theft and enslavement of Africans; the hypocrisy embodied by the American constitution, government and white churches. At the root of all this, he wrote, was “a long continued, extensive and almost complete system of wrongdoing” that made the men and women who enabled it into “restless, grasping” marauders. “In view of the existing state of things around us,” Wilson proposed at the end, “let our constant thought be, what for the best good of all shall we do with the White people?”

    Much has changed since Wilson’s time, but a century and a half on, his question remains no less pertinent. For some people, such as the political scientist Eric Kaufmann, whiteness is what it has always pretended to be. Though he acknowledges that races are not genetically defined, Kaufmann nevertheless sees them as defensible divisions of humanity that have some natural basis: they emerge, he suggests, “through a blend of unconscious colour-processing and slowly evolved cultural conventions”. In his 2019 book Whiteshift, Kaufmann argues that the history of oppression by white people is “real, but moot”, and he advocates for something he calls “symmetrical multiculturalism”, in which “identifying as white, or with a white tradition of nationhood, is no more racist than identifying as black”. What shall we do with the white people? Kaufmann thinks we should encourage them to take pride in being white, lest they turn to more violent means: “Freezing out legitimate expressions of white identity allows the far right to own it, and acts as a recruiting sergeant for their wilder ideas.”

    From another perspective – my own, most days – whiteness means something different from other racial and ethnic identities because it has had a different history than other racial and ethnic identities. Across three-and-a-half centuries, whiteness has been wielded as a weapon on a global scale; Blackness, by contrast, has often been used as a shield. (As Du Bois put it, what made whiteness new and different was “the imperial width of the thing – the heaven-defying audacity.”) Nor is there much reason to believe that whiteness will ever be content to seek “legitimate expressions”, whatever those might look like. The religion of whiteness had 50 years to reform itself along non-supremacist lines, to prove that it was fit for innocuous coexistence. Instead, it gave us Donald Trump.

    Yet even this does not fully answer Wilson’s question. For if it’s easy enough to agree in theory that the only reasonable moral response to the long and very much non-moot history of white supremacy is the abolitionist stance advocated in the pages of Race Traitor – ie, to make whiteness meaningless as a group identity, to shove it into obsolescence alongside “Prussian” and “Etruscan” – it seems equally apparent that whiteness is not nearly so fragile as Ignatiev and Garvey had imagined. Late in his life, James Baldwin described whiteness as “a moral choice”, as a way of emphasising that it was not a natural fact. But whiteness is more than a moral choice: it is a dense network of moral choices, the vast majority of which have been made for us, often in times and places very distant from our own. In this way whiteness is a problem like climate change or economic inequality: it is so thoroughly imbricated in the structure of our everyday lives that it makes the idea of moral choices look quaint.

    As with climate change, however, the only thing more difficult than such an effort would be trying to live with the alternative. Whiteness may seem inevitable and implacable, and Toni Morrison surely had it right when she said that the world “will not become unracialised by assertion”. (To wake up tomorrow and decide I am no longer white would help no one.) Even so, after 350 years, it remains the case, as Nell Irvin Painter argues, that whiteness “is an idea, not a fact”. Not alone, and not without much work to repair the damage done in its name, it still must be possible to change our minds.

    https://www.theguardian.com/news/2021/apr/20/the-invention-of-whiteness-long-history-dangerous-idea
    #blanchité #races #invention #histoire #race_blanche #modernité

    ping @cede @karine4

  • La sociologue et l’ourson

    De septembre 2012 à mai 2013 la #France s’enflamme autour du projet de loi sur le mariage pour tous. Tout le pays en parle. Quoi ? Juste pour quelques unions ? Non, non, non, le débat s’avère complexe et ouvre de nombreuses questions. Durant ces neuf mois Etienne Chaillou et Mathias Théry ont enregistré les conversations téléphoniques entre la sociologue de la #famille #Irène_Théry et son fils Mathias. De ces enregistrements ils ont fait leur cinéma : un cinéma d’ours en peluches, de jouets, de bouts de cartons... et d’humains. Portrait intime et feuilleton national, ce film nous fait redécouvrir ce que nous pensions tous connaître parfaitement : la Famille.

    https://lcp.fr/programmes/la-sociologue-et-l-ourson-60971

    #famille #mariage_pour_tous #mariage #homosexualité #homoparentalité #manif_pour_tous #code_civil #lien_de_couple #insémination_artificielle #PMA #fécondation_in_vitro #gestation_pour_autrui #adoption #modèles_familiaux #modèle_familial #mystère_de_paternité #présomption_de_paternité #lien_de_sang
    #documentaire #film #film_documentaire (en partie #film_d'animation)

  • La fabrique européenne de la race (17e-20e siècles)

    Dans quelle galère sommes-nous allé•es pointer notre nez en nous lançant dans ces réflexions sur la race ? Complaisance à l’air du temps saturé de références au racisme, à la #racialisation des lectures du social, diront certain•es. Nécessaire effort épistémologique pour contribuer à donner du champ pour penser et déconstruire les représentations qui sous-tendent les violences racistes, pensons-nous.

    Moment saturé, on ne peut guère penser mieux… ou pire. Évidemment, nous n’avions pas anticipé l’ampleur des mobilisations contre les #violences_racistes de cet été aux États-Unis, mais nous connaissons leur enracinement dans la longue durée, l’acuité récente des mobilisations, que ce soit « #black_lives_matter » aux États-Unis ou les #mobilisations contre les #violences_policières qui accablent les plus vulnérables en France. L’enracinement aussi des #représentations_racialisées, structurant les fonctionnements sociaux à l’échelle du globe aujourd’hui, d’une façon qui apparaît de plus en plus insupportable en regard des proclamations solennelles d’#égalité_universelle du genre humain. Nous connaissons aussi l’extrême #violence qui cherche à discréditer les #protestations et la #révolte de celles et ceux qui s’expriment comme #minorité victime en tant que telle de #discriminations de races, accusé•es ici de « #terrorisme », là de « #communautarisme », de « #séparatisme », de vouloir dans tous les cas de figure mettre à mal « la » république1. Nous connaissons, associé à cet #antiracisme, l’accusation de #complot dit « #décolonial » ou « postcolonial », qui tente de faire des spécialistes des #colonisations, des #décolonisations et des #rapports_sociaux_racisés des vecteurs de menaces pour l’#unité_nationale, armant le mécontentement des militant•es2. Les propos haineux de celles et ceux qui dénoncent la #haine ne sont plus à lister : chaque jour apporte son lot de jugements aussi méprisants que menaçants. Nous ne donnerons pas de noms. Ils ont suffisamment de porte-voix. Jusqu’à la présidence de la République.

    3L’histoire vise à prendre du champ. Elle n’est pas hors sol, ni hors temps, nous savons cela aussi et tout dossier que nous construisons nous rappelle que nous faisons l’histoire d’une histoire.

    Chaque dossier d’une revue a aussi son histoire, plus ou moins longue, plus ou moins collective. Dans ce Mot de la rédaction, en septembre 2020, introduction d’un numéro polarisé sur « l’invention de la race », nous nous autorisons un peu d’auto-histoire. Les Cahiers cheminent depuis des années avec le souci de croiser l’analyse des différentes formes de domination et des outils théoriques comme politiques qui permettent leur mise en œuvre. Avant que le terme d’« #intersectionnalité » ne fasse vraiment sa place dans les études historiennes en France, l’#histoire_critique a signifié pour le collectif de rédaction des Cahiers la nécessité d’aborder les questions de l’#exploitation, de la #domination dans toutes leurs dimensions socio-économiques, symboliques, dont celles enracinées dans les appartenances de sexe, de genre, dans les #appartenances_de_race. Une recherche dans les numéros mis en ligne montre que le mot « race » apparaît dans plus d’une centaine de publications des Cahiers depuis 2000, exprimant le travail de #visibilisation de cet invisible de la #pensée_universaliste. Les dossiers ont traité d’esclavage, d’histoire coloniale, d’histoire de l’Afrique, d’histoire des États-Unis, de l’importance aussi des corps comme marqueurs d’identité : de multiples façons, nous avons fait lire une histoire dans laquelle le racisme, plus ou moins construit politiquement, légitimé idéologiquement, est un des moteurs des fonctionnements sociaux3. Pourtant, le terme d’ « intersectionnalité » apparaît peu et tard dans les Cahiers. Pour un concept proposé par Kimberlé Crenshaw dans les années 1990, nous mesurons aujourd’hui les distances réelles entre des cultures historiennes, et plus globalement sociopolitiques, entre monde anglophone et francophone, pour dire vite4. Effet d’écarts réels des fonctionnements sociaux, effets de la rareté des échanges, des voyages, des traductions comme le rappelait Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch dans un entretien récent à propos des travaux des africanistes5, effet aussi des constructions idéologiques marquées profondément par un contexte de guerre froide, qui mettent à distance la société des États-Unis comme un autre irréductible. Nous mesurons le décalage entre nos usages des concepts et leur élaboration, souvent dans les luttes de 1968 et des années qui ont suivi. Aux États-Unis, mais aussi en France6. Ce n’est pas le lieu d’évoquer la formidable énergie de la pensée des années 1970, mais la créativité conceptuelle de ces années, notamment à travers l’anthropologie et la sociologie, est progressivement réinvestie dans les travaux historiens au fur et à mesure que les origines socioculturelles des historiens et historiennes se diversifient. L’internationalisation de nos références aux Cahiers s’est développée aussi, pas seulement du côté de l’Afrique, mais du chaudron étatsunien aussi. En 2005, nous avons pris l’initiative d’un dossier sur « L’Histoire de #France vue des États-Unis », dans lequel nous avons traduit et publié un auteur, trop rare en français, Tyler Stovall, alors professeur à l’université de Berkeley : bon connaisseur de l’histoire de France, il développait une analyse de l’historiographie française et de son difficile rapport à la race7. Ce regard extérieur, venant des États-Unis et critique de la tradition universaliste française, avait fait discuter. Le présent dossier s’inscrit donc dans un cheminement, qui est aussi celui de la société française, et dans une cohérence. Ce n’était pas un hasard si en 2017, nous avions répondu à l’interpellation des organisateurs des Rendez-vous de l’histoire de Blois, « Eurêka, inventer, découvrir, innover » en proposant une table ronde intitulée « Inventer la race ». Coordonnée par les deux responsables du présent dossier, David Hamelin et Sébastien Jahan, déjà auteurs de dossiers sur la question coloniale, cette table ronde avait fait salle comble, ce qui nous avait d’emblée convaincus de l’utilité de répondre une attente en préparant un dossier spécifique8. Le présent dossier est le fruit d’un travail qui, au cours de trois années, s’est avéré plus complexe que nous ne l’avions envisagé. Le propos a été précisé, se polarisant sur ce que nous avions voulu montrer dès la table-ronde de 2017 : le racisme tel que nous l’entendons aujourd’hui, basé sur des caractéristiques physiologiques, notamment la couleur de l’épiderme, n’a pas toujours existé. Il s’agit bien d’une « #invention », associée à l’expansion des Européens à travers le monde à l’époque moderne, par laquelle ils justifient leur #domination, mais associée aussi à une conception en termes de #développement, de #progrès de l’histoire humaine. Les historien•nes rassemblée•es ici montrent bien comment le racisme est enkysté dans la #modernité, notamment dans le développement des sciences du 19e siècle, et sa passion pour les #classifications. Histoire relativement courte donc, que celle de ce processus de #racialisation qui advient avec la grande idée neuve de l’égalité naturelle des humains. Pensées entées l’une dans l’autre et en même temps immédiatement en conflit, comme en témoignent des écrits dès le 17e siècle et, parmi d’autres actes, les créations des « #sociétés_des_amis_des_noirs » au 18e siècle. Conflit en cours encore aujourd’hui, avec une acuité renouvelée qui doit moins surprendre que la persistance des réalités de l’#inégalité.

    5Ce numéro 146 tisse de bien d’autres manières ce socle de notre présent. En proposant une synthèse documentée et ambitieuse des travaux en cours sur les renouvellements du projet social portés pour son temps et pour le nôtre par la révolution de 1848, conçue par Jérôme Lamy. En publiant une défense de l’#écriture_inclusive par Éliane Viennot et la présentation de son inscription dans le long combat des femmes par Héloïse Morel9. En suivant les analyses de la nouveauté des aspirations politiques qui s’expriment dans les « #têtes_de_cortège » étudiées par Hugo Melchior. En rappelant à travers expositions, films, romans de l’actualité, les violences de l’exploitation capitaliste du travail, les répressions féroces des forces socialistes, socialisantes, taxées de communistes en contexte de guerre froide, dans « les Cahiers recommandent ». En retrouvant Jack London et ses si suggestives évocations des appartenances de classes à travers le film « Martin Eden » de Pietro Marcello, et bien d’autres évocations, à travers livres, films, expositions, de ce social agi, modelé, remodelé par les luttes, les contradictions, plus ou moins explicites ou sourdes, plus ou moins violentes, qui font pour nous l’histoire vivante. Nouvelle étape de l’exploration du neuf inépuisable des configurations sociales (de) chaque numéro. Le prochain sera consacré à la fois à la puissance de l’Église catholique et aux normes sexuelles. Le suivant à un retour sur l’histoire du Parti communiste dans les moments où il fut neuf, il y a cent ans. À la suite, dans les méandres de ce social toujours en tension, inépuisable source de distance et de volonté de savoir. Pour tenter ensemble de maîtriser les fantômes du passé.

    https://journals.openedition.org/chrhc/14393

    #histoire #race #Europe #revue #racisme

    ping @cede @karine4

  • La Face cachée des #énergies_vertes

    Voitures électriques, éoliennes, panneaux solaires… La transition énergétique laisse entrevoir la promesse d’un monde plus prospère et pacifique, enfin libéré du pétrole, de la pollution et des pénuries. Mais cette thèse officielle s’avère être un mythe : en nous libérant des combustibles fossiles, nous nous préparons à une nouvelle dépendance à l’égard des métaux rares. De graves problèmes écologiques et économiques pour l’approvisionnement de ces ressources stratégiques ont déjà commencé. Et si le « monde vert » qui nous attend se révélait être un nouveau cauchemar ?

    http://www.film-documentaire.fr/4DACTION/w_fiche_film/61421_1

    #film #film_documentaire #documentaire

    #COP21 #COP_21 #transition_énergétique #technologie #technologies_vertes #voiture_électrique #énergies_propres #extractivisme #mines #green-washing #greenwashing #délocalisation_de_la_pollution #pétrole #métaux_rares #néodyme #cobalt #graphite #lithium #photovoltaïque #énergie_solaire #énergie_éolienne #éolienne #solaire #dépendance #RDC #République_démocratique_du_Congo #Australie #Chili #Bolivie #Indonésie #Chine #industrie_minière #Mongolie #Terres_rares #eaux_usées #radioactivité #réfugiés_des_technologies_vertes #eau #IDPs #déplacés_internes #cuivre #santé #Chuquicamata #cancer #Aliro_Boladas #centrales_à_charbon #modèle_économique_extractiviste #énergies_renouvelables #engie #Norvège #charbon #hypocrisie #green_tech #zéro_émissions #changement_climatique #Jean-Louis_Borloo #ADEME #Renault #bornes_électriques #Rapport_Syrota #Jean_Sirota #BYD #EDF #Photowatt #Péchiney_métallurgie #magnésium #nationalisme_des_ressources #Bolivie #recyclage #déchets #décharges_sauvages #Neocomp #fausse_transition #sobriété #progrès_technologique #décroissance #énergies_renouvelables

    –-

    déjà signalé par @odilon sur seenthis :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/888273

    • « La face positive des énergies vertes »

      Le documentaire « La face cachée des énergies vertes » est passé fin novembre sur Arte. Truffé d’erreurs et d’arguments partisans, allant jusqu’à comparer le problème des pales d’éoliennes, soit disant non recyclables, à celui posé par les déchets nucléaires !

      Autre exemple : ce documentaire assène que les énergies vertes et que les batteries nécessitent obligatoirement l’utilisation de terres rares. Ce n’est pourtant pas du tout l’avis de l’Ademe. D’autre part, le photovoltaïque n’utilise jamais de terres rares. Et pour l’éolien et les voitures électriques, leur utilisation dans les moteurs à aimants permanents permet de gagner en performances, mais cet usage n’est ni systématique, ni indispensable.

      Cet article présente :

      – La quinzaine d’erreurs grossières parmi les très nombreuses qui émaillent ce documentaire.
      – Le cercle vertueux du photovoltaïque et de l’éolien : plus on en installe, plus on réduit les émissions de gaz carbonique.
      – Que nos voitures contiennent davantage de terres rares que les voitures électriques sans moteurs à aimants permanents.
      – Pour qui roule le journaliste Guillaume Pitron, à l’origine de ce documentaire.

      En se fondant sur les avis qui se colportent, principalement sur la production des terres rares utilisées dans les énergies vertes, Guillaume Pitron, qui a enquêté dans une douzaine de pays, nous fait visiter quelques sites d’exploitation qui portent atteinte à l’environnement et à la santé des travailleurs.

      Hélas ce documentaire est gâché autant par sa partialité, que par de très nombreuses erreurs grossières.

      https://www.passerelleco.info/article.php?id_article=2390
      https://seenthis.net/messages/894307

    • Geologic and anthropogenic sources of contamination in settled dust of a historic mining port city in northern Chile: health risk implications

      Chile is the leading producer of copper worldwide and its richest mineral deposits are found in the Antofagasta Region of northern Chile. Mining activities have significantly increased income and employment in the region; however, there has been little assessment of the resulting environmental impacts to residents. The port of Antofagasta, located 1,430 km north of Santiago, the capital of Chile, functioned as mineral stockpile until 1998 and has served as a copper concentrate stockpile since 2014. Samples were collected in 2014 and 2016 that show elevated concentrations of As, Cu, Pb, and Zn in street dust and in residents’ blood (Pb) and urine (As) samples. To interpret and analyze the spatial variability and likely sources of contamination, existent data of basement rocks and soil geochemistry in the city as well as public-domain airborne dust were studied. Additionally, a bioaccessibility assay of airborne dust was conducted and the chemical daily intake and hazard index were calculated to provide a preliminary health risk assessment in the vicinity of the port. The main conclusions indicate that the concentrations of Ba, Co, Cr, Mn, Ni, and V recorded from Antofagasta dust likely originate from intrusive, volcanic, metamorphic rocks, dikes, or soil within the city. However, the elevated concentrations of As, Cd, Cu, Mo, Pb, and Zn do not originate from these geologic outcrops, and are thus considered anthropogenic contaminants. The average concentrations of As, Cu, and Zn are possibly the highest in recorded street dust worldwide at 239, 10,821, and 11,869 mg kg−1, respectively. Furthermore, the contaminants As, Pb, and Cu exhibit the highest bioaccessibilities and preliminary health risk indices show that As and Cu contribute to elevated health risks in exposed children and adults chronically exposed to dust in Antofagasta, whereas Pb is considered harmful at any concentration. Therefore, an increased environmental awareness and greater protective measures are necessary in Antofagasta and possibly other similar mining port cities in developing countries.

      https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5922233

      #santé #mines

    • L’association #Vernunftkraft

      Aufgeklärte und deshalb zu Recht besorgte Bürger dieses Landes (https://www.vernunftkraft.de/bundesinitiative) erkennen hinsichtlich der Rationalität energiepolitischer Entscheidungen nicht hinnehmbare Defizite.

      Die Zerstörung von Wäldern zwecks Ansiedlung von volkswirtschaftlich sinnlosen Windindustrieanlagen ist dabei die Spitze des Eisbergs.

      Zentrale Elemente der gegenwärtigen Energiepolitik sind extrem unvernünftig.

      Daher möchten wir der Vernunft Kraft geben.
      https://www.vernunftkraft.de

    • La guerre des métaux rares. La face cachée de la transition énergétique et numérique

      En nous émancipant des énergies fossiles, nous sombrons en réalité dans une nouvelle dépendance : celle aux métaux rares. Graphite, cobalt, indium, platinoïdes, tungstène, terres rares… ces ressources sont devenues indispensables à notre nouvelle société écologique (voitures électriques, éoliennes, panneaux solaires) et numérique (elles se nichent dans nos smartphones, nos ordinateurs, tablettes et autre objets connectés de notre quotidien). Or les coûts environnementaux, économiques et géopolitiques de cette dépendance pourraient se révéler encore plus dramatiques que ceux qui nous lient au pétrole.

      Dès lors, c’est une contre-histoire de la transition énergétique que ce livre raconte – le récit clandestin d’une odyssée technologique qui a tant promis, et les coulisses d’une quête généreuse, ambitieuse, qui a jusqu’à maintenant charrié des périls aussi colossaux que ceux qu’elle s’était donné pour mission de résoudre.

      http://www.editionslesliensquiliberent.fr/livre-La_guerre_des_m%C3%A9taux_rares-9791020905741-1-1-

      #livre #Guillaume_Pitron

    • Rapport ADEME 2012 :

      Énergie et patrimoine communal : enquête 2012

      L’enquête « Énergie et patrimoine communal » est menée tous les cinq ans depuis 1990. Elle porte sur les consommations d’énergie et les dépenses payées directement par les communes sur trois cibles principales : le patrimoine bâti, l’éclairage public et les carburants des véhicules.

      https://www.ademe.fr/energie-patrimoine-communal-enquete-2012

      –—

      Rapport ADEME 2015 :


      Scénarios 2030-2050 : une vision énergétique volontariste

      Quel mix énergétique pour les années 2030-2050 ? L’ADEME actualise son scénario Énergie Climat et propose des mesures pour contribuer à la déclinaison du plan CLIMAT.

      Les objectifs ambitieux du Plan Climat lancé par Nicolas Hulot, ministre de la Transition écologique et solidaire, confirment la stratégie volontariste de la France pour la transition énergétique. Dans le contexte actuel de mise à jour de la Stratégie nationale bas carbone (SNBC) et de la Programmation pluriannuelle de l’énergie (PPE), l’actualisation du scénario énergie-climat de l’ADEME vient contribuer aux réflexions pour mettre en oeuvre ces objectifs.

      Cette contribution est double : d’une part, l’actualisation des « Visions énergétiques » de l’ADEME, qui souligne l’enjeu que représente l’atteinte des objectifs ambitieux inscrits dans la loi, et d’autre part, l’étude « Propositions de mesures de politiques publiques pour un scénario bas carbone », qui propose une liste de mesures concrètes à mettre en oeuvre.

      https://www.ademe.fr/recherche-innovation/construire-visions-prospectives/scenarios-2030-2050-vision-energetique-volontariste

    • En #Géorgie, la révolte de la “capitale du #manganèse” contre une exploitation hors de contrôle

      Le développement de technologies comme les voitures électriques a fait grimper la demande de manganèse. À #Tchiatoura, où cette ressource est abondante, on en paie les conséquences : excavations à tout-va, paysage saccagé, maisons qui s’effondrent, et main-d’œuvre mal payée.

      La grogne sociale monte depuis 2019 dans le district de Tchiatoura, ancienne “capitale” soviétique de la production de manganèse. Depuis trois mois, 3 500 mineurs sont en #grève pour réclamer la hausse de leurs salaires (qui ne dépassent pas 250 euros) et une meilleure assurance maladie. À la mi-mai, quelques mineurs du village de #Choukrouti, près de Tchiatoura, se sont cousus la bouche et ont entamé une #grève_de_la_faim, rapporte le site géorgien Ambebi.

      Face au silence des autorités locales et nationales, depuis le 31 mai, dix familles font un sit-in devant l’ambassade des États-Unis (la puissance occidentale la plus influente en Géorgie), à Tbilissi, la capitale. “Les gens réclament des compensations pour leur maison et demandent l’aide des diplomates étrangers”, pour rappeler à l’ordre la compagnie privée #Georgian_Manganese, filiale géorgienne de la société britannique #Stemcor, explique le site Ekho Kavkaza.

      Les habitants protestent contre les dégâts écologiques, économiques et culturels causés par une extraction intensive à ciel ouvert du manganèse. Utilisé dans la fabrication de l’acier, la demande pour ce métal est en forte croissance, notamment pour les besoins de l’industrie des véhicules électriques, des piles, des batteries et circuits électroniques.

      #paywall

      https://www.courrierinternational.com/article/degats-en-georgie-la-revolte-de-la-capitale-du-manganese-cont

    • En #Géorgie, la révolte de la “capitale du #manganèse” contre une exploitation hors de contrôle

      Le développement de technologies comme les voitures électriques a fait grimper la demande de manganèse. À #Tchiatoura, où cette ressource est abondante, on en paie les conséquences : excavations à tout-va, paysage saccagé, maisons qui s’effondrent, et main-d’œuvre mal payée.

      La grogne sociale monte depuis 2019 dans le district de Tchiatoura, ancienne “capitale” soviétique de la production de manganèse. Depuis trois mois, 3 500 mineurs sont en #grève pour réclamer la hausse de leurs salaires (qui ne dépassent pas 250 euros) et une meilleure assurance maladie. À la mi-mai, quelques mineurs du village de #Choukrouti, près de Tchiatoura, se sont cousus la bouche et ont entamé une #grève_de_la_faim, rapporte le site géorgien Ambebi.

      Face au silence des autorités locales et nationales, depuis le 31 mai, dix familles font un sit-in devant l’ambassade des États-Unis (la puissance occidentale la plus influente en Géorgie), à Tbilissi, la capitale. “Les gens réclament des compensations pour leur maison et demandent l’aide des diplomates étrangers”, pour rappeler à l’ordre la compagnie privée #Georgian_Manganese, filiale géorgienne de la société britannique #Stemcor, explique le site Ekho Kavkaza.

      Les habitants protestent contre les dégâts écologiques, économiques et culturels causés par une extraction intensive à ciel ouvert du manganèse. Utilisé dans la fabrication de l’acier, la demande pour ce métal est en forte croissance, notamment pour les besoins de l’industrie des véhicules électriques, des piles, des batteries et circuits électroniques.

      #paywall

      https://www.courrierinternational.com/article/degats-en-georgie-la-revolte-de-la-capitale-du-manganese-cont

  • Berlin Alexanderplatz: Sozialistische Supermoderne und Lieblingskulisse der Mode
    https://www.berliner-zeitung.de/wochenende/berlin-alexanderplatz-sozialistische-supermoderne-und-lieblingskuli


    Bild von Hedi Slimane / Celine, 2019

    10.4.2021 von Sabine Röthig - Am Alexanderplatz zeigt sich die sozialistische Supermoderne in ihrer ganzen brachialen Schönheit. Das inspiriert die Modefotografie, von damals bis heute.

    Die Aura des Alexanderplatzes war immer eine kühle. Mit einer Fläche von mehr als 80.000 zugigen Quadratmetern ist dieser Ort im Osten der Stadt die Antithese zur deutschen Gemütlichkeit. Der Platz wurde nach der sowjetischen Direktive, die für die DDR eine industrielle Plattenbauweise im Sinne einer „offenen, durchgrünten und autogerechten Stadt“ vorgab, geplant – und in den 60er- und 70er-Jahren erbaut. Organisch gewachsen ist hier nichts, auch wenn sich nach der Wende vieles verändert hat.

    Doch auch wenn man hier (noch?) nicht wohnen möchte, geht doch eine unglaubliche Faszination von diesem Areal aus und man spürt sie immer noch: die Hoffnung auf einen Neubeginn, die Ambitionen und die Träume von einer besseren Welt. Auch viele details an den Gebäuden erzählen vom Aufbruch und von der Neuerfindung eines Staates, wie der berühmte Fassadenfries am Haus des Lehrers. In diesen Bildern ist sie noch lebendig, die Idee der sozialistischen Supermoderne.

    Bereits zu DDR-Zeiten war der Alexanderplatz beliebte Kulisse für Modeshootings. Daran hat sich nichts geändert. Mehr noch – es ist heute ja noch viel offensichtlicher, dieses Unwirkliche, Futuristische, das mit dem wahren Leben irgendwie nicht in Einklang zu bringen war. Genau diese seltsam entrückte Attitüde der DDR-Prachtarchitektur prägt bis heute das Bild von Berlin in der ganzen Welt entscheidend mit. Der Alexanderplatz wurde in den vergangenen Jahren deswegen von zwei großen Modedesignern als Kampagnenmotiv gewählt. 2016 fotografierte Matt Lambert die Givenchy Pre-Fall-Kollektion für Riccardo Tisci rund um den Platz.

    2019 folgte ihm Celine-Kreativdirektor Hedi Slimane mit einer Fotostrecke. Seine Models lehnten lässig an Brüstungen und Mauern, im Hintergrund ist der Fernsehturm zu sehen. Slimane fotografierte selbst, in dem für ihn typischen, lakonischen Schwarz-Weiß. Die Modefotos zeigen besonders schöne Blickwinkel, in denen das Potenzial des Alexanderplatzes als Motiv absolut überzeugt. Steht man selbst auf dem Platz, muss man jedoch nach solchen Ecken suchen.

    Vielleicht probieren Sie es selbst einmal – die Lücke zwischen Kaufhaus und Forumhotel ist zumindest zu empfehlen. Dreht man dem Hotelhochhaus den Rücken zu, erhebt sich frontal der Fernsehturm in all seiner monumentalen Größe. Was für ein Bild!


    Foto: Archiv Klaus Fischer / Sorge DDR-Sommermode 1972, fotografiert am Centrum Warenhaus. Im Hintergrund zu sehen: der Brunnen der Völkerfreundschaft, das Haus des Lehrers und rechts das Haus des Reisens.

    #Berlin #Mitte #Alexanderplatz #Mode #Stadtentwicklung

  • #Melania_Trump, cet obscur objet du pouvoir

    La #First_Lady, chantre des valeurs familiales, assure-t-elle le rôle de femme-objet ou influence-t-elle #Donald_Trump dans ses choix politiques, ainsi qu’une partie de l’électorat américain – surtout féminin  ? Pour répondre à cette interrogation, Laurence Haïm, ancienne correspondante à Washington, a arpenté l’Amérique conservatrice dont Melania est devenue l’icône, dressant en creux le portrait de la Première dame la plus mystérieuse de toute l’histoire des États-Unis.

    https://boutique.arte.tv/detail/melania-trump-cet-obscur-objet-du-pouvoi

    #film #film_documentaire #documentaire
    #Trump #Sevnica #Slovénie #mannequin #mode #femme-trophée #femme-objet #USA #Etats-Unis

  • Dialectique, approches et questionnements

    Louis de Colmar

    https://lavoiedujaguar.net/Dialectique-approches-et-questionnements

    Qu’est-ce que la dialectique ? Je ne dirais pas que c’est la capacité de penser deux choses opposées et de décider : ce serait, au contraire, décider que la façon particulière qui permet d’appréhender une problématique, une réalité, etc. à travers une opposition donnée et historiquement constituée est devenu une impasse. Précisément donc, la question dialectique se pose lorsque les termes d’une opposition qui permettaient jusqu’alors de comprendre une problématique, une réalité, etc. deviennent non significatifs, non opérationnels, non manipulables, et conduisent à des impasses, quelles que soient les manières de tricoter et détricoter les éléments contradictoires.

    La question dialectique intervient lorsque qu’une logique donnée, construite, établie, instituée, ne rend plus compte du réel (alors qu’elle a effectivement été en mesure de le faire jusque-là), et qu’il faille changer de logique pour rétablir un lien avec une réalité reconstruite sur des bases nouvelles (bases nouvelles qui ne sont pas visibles, pas perceptibles, pas rationalisables, etc., dans le contexte de cette première logique, rationalité, etc.). Cette question dialectique est ainsi relativement bien illustrée par le concept de changement de paradigme dans l’approche de Kuhn, ou encore à travers la problématique des structures dissipatives de Prigogine.

    Il ne peut pas y avoir de dialectique dans un processus si ce dernier ne comporte pas un imprévu, une non-linéarité, un non-nécessaire, un illogisme, une non-continuité, etc. (...)

    #dialectique #question #Hegel #Marx #langues #cosmogonies #modernité #civilisations

  • #COVID-19 : Faut-il ouvrir la #vaccination à d’autres publics prioritaires ? | santé log
    https://www.santelog.com/actualites/covid-19-faut-il-ouvrir-la-vaccination-dautres-publics-prioritaires

    - sur la priorisation entre plus âgés et travailleurs de première ligne, les modélisateurs concluent que les travailleurs de première ligne devraient être un groupe prioritaire au même titre ou tout juste après les personnes âgées. Les stratégies qui ont ciblé simultanément l’âge et le statut de travailleur essentiel ont largement surpassé celles qui n’ont ouvert la vaccination que sur la base de critères d’âge ;

    –accorder une priorité pour la vaccination aux travailleurs essentiels par rapport aux personnes âgées dépend du contexte : si l’épidémie est sous contrôle, il devient alors préférable de cibler d’abord les travailleurs essentiels pour réduire la propagation globale. Si l’approvisionnement en vaccins reste limité et que les cas et les décès continuent à augmenter, cibler directement les personnes âgées et les plus vulnérables apparaît, selon le modèle, la meilleure des stratégies.
     
    Une stratégie de priorisation donnée ne doit pas rester figée au fil du temps. C’est probablement le message principal de cette #modélisation qui jette les bases de l’évolution des priorités au fur et à mesure que les conditions changent, par exemple lorsque certains groupes sont majoritairement vaccinés : « Une fois qu’une grande proportion des personnes les plus vulnérables ou les plus susceptibles d’être exposées ont été vaccinées, la politique de vaccination peut être élargie".

    Source :
    Dynamic prioritization of COVID-19 vaccines when social distancing is limited for essential workers | PNAS
    https://www.pnas.org/content/118/16/e2025786118

    #travailleurs_essentiels #ciblage #vaccination

  • Susanne Erichsen
    https://de.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Susanne_Erichsen

    Susanne Erichsen geborene Firle (* 30. Dezember 1925 in Berlin-Steglitz; † 13. Januar 2002 in Berlin) war eine deutsche Schönheitskönigin sowie Mannequin, Fotomodell und Unternehmerin.

    https://m.tagesspiegel.de/mode/west-berliner-stilikonen-modevorbilder-in-der-mauerstadt/8583552.html


    Susanne Erichsen : Winter 1953.

    Sie war die erste deutsche Schönheitskönigin aus Berlin. Susanne Erichsen wurde 1952 in Baden-Baden zur Miss Germany gewählt. Ihr Aussehen war eher streng als lieblich – aber so hatten Mannequins damals auszusehen – aristrokatisch und ladylike. So präsentierte sie die Kleider der Berliner Couturiers wie Uli Richter und Heinz Oestergaard. In die USA flog sie als Modebotschafterin und wurde flugs als „Fräuleinwunder“ berühmt. In den USA verdiente sie als Model mehr als 100 Dollar in der Stunde – eine astronomische Summe. Zurück in Berlin gründete sie ihre eigene Modefirma „Susanne Erichsen Teenager Modelle GmbH“. 1967 wollte sie dann nicht nur mit Kleidern sondern guten Tipps ihre Umgebung verschönern und eröffnete eine Modelschule. Aber auch das schien ihren missionarischen Eifer noch nicht gestillt zu haben, oder sie fühlte einfach, dass es in West-Berlin einen dringenden Bedarf an Schönheitspflege gab: Für alle war die „Schule in Sachen Schönheit. Gewusst wie“.

    #Allemagne #Berlin #Steglitz #mode #histoire #Frauleinwunder

  • Méprisant avec la population, à genoux devant le Big pharma !

    Editorial des bulletins d’entreprise LO du 29 mars 2021 https://www.lutte-ouvriere.org/editoriaux/meprisant-avec-la-population-genoux-devant-le-big-pharma-156390.html

    Avec plus de 45 000 nouveaux cas quotidiens, des #hôpitaux forcés de déprogrammer des opérations, ce qui est déjà une forme de tri des patients, l’épidémie flambe à nouveau. Mais cette fois, il n’y a pas de surprise, puisque cette #troisième_vague avait été annoncée par les prévisionnistes. La responsabilité immédiate de cette nouvelle catastrophe incombe au gouvernement #Macron.

    Sans avoir augmenté les places en réanimation et embauché le personnel nécessaire et sans même être capable de vacciner en masse, Macron s’est enorgueilli de ne pas reconfiner et de garder les écoles ouvertes. Il prétendait avoir trouvé un chemin qu’aucun autre gouvernement n’avait vu : il nous a menés au fond de l’impasse !

    Mais, pour Macron, il n’y a pas d’erreur, « aucun mea culpa à faire, aucun remords, aucun constat d’échec ». Et quand les enseignants ont envoyé des SOS parce que le nombre de cas explosait dans leurs établissements, #Blanquer, le ministre de l’Éducation, expliquait que « l’école c’est la santé ». Autrement dit, « circulez, il n’y a rien à voir » !

    C’est exactement ce qui se passe dans nombre d’entreprises où le patron fait semblant de ne pas voir les clusters. Car Macron, avec son côté hautain, est à l’image de toute la classe dominante. Il ne fait que refléter le fonctionnement hiérarchique d’une société basée sur la domination sociale.

    Il y a, en haut, ceux qui savent – les chefs, les dirigeants, les ministres – et en bas ceux qui doivent obéir – les travailleurs, la population. En haut, ceux qui décident des restrictions, des contraintes et des sanctions… pour ceux d’en bas ! Et les initiatives de la base n’ont pas lieu d’être : il faut se soumettre aux ordres même quand ils sont stupides et que les dirigeants mentent de façon éhontée.

    Le mépris social imprègne toute la société. C’est logiquement qu’il marque la gestion sanitaire. Il frappe les soignants qui se sont vu refuser toute embauche et réelle augmentation de salaire. Il frappe les premiers de corvée, les auxiliaires de vie, les employés de grande surface, juste bons à trimer au péril de leur santé, pour des bas salaires. Il frappe les commerçants forcés de refermer leurs portes en dépit de tout bon sens. Il frappe le personnel de l’Éducation à qui le ministre n’a de cesse de faire la leçon, et même les épidémiologistes qui, aux dires de Macron, se seraient souvent trompés !

    Mais, comme tous les gouvernants avant lui, Macron rampe devant ceux qui détiennent le vrai pouvoir, les capitalistes. C’est ce qui le rend impuissant à freiner l’épidémie et à vacciner massivement.

    Les #vaccins sont le nerf de la guerre, tout le monde le sait et… tout le monde attend. Imagine-t-on une guerre menée sans que l’État se charge de l’armement et en contrôle la production ? Imagine-t-on des officiers préparant des plans d’attaque sans savoir quand et combien d’avions, de canons et de munitions seront à leur disposition ? Eh bien, c’est ce qui se passe dans leur prétendue guerre contre le virus : les vaccins arriveront selon le bon vouloir du Big pharma !

    Mais l’intérêt des multinationales de la pharmacie n’a rien à voir avec l’intérêt général. #Pfizer, #AstraZeneca ou #Moderna ont intérêt à garder le monopole des brevets et l’exclusivité de la production, même quand ils n’arrivent pas à honorer leurs contrats. Ils ont intérêt à fournir au plus offrant pour encaisser le maximum de profits. En leur laissant le monopole, les gouvernements se résignent à la #pénurie et à la désorganisation.

    Et c’est sans parler du pillage des finances publiques ! Car les vaccins comme les millions de tests réalisés ont un coût. Un simple test salivaire coûte 60 €, un #test_antigénique 32 €. Tout cela, ajouté aux vaccins, va donner une facture salée !

    Tous les gouvernements savent réquisitionner. Dans cette crise, ils ont d’ailleurs réquisitionné des infirmières ou des étudiants en médecine. Il leur arrive même d’exproprier des petits propriétaires quand ils ont besoin de leur terrain. Mais, dès qu’il s’agit de toucher à un cheveu du grand capital et de remettre en cause les sacro-saintes lois du profit et du capitalisme, il n’y a plus personne.

    Alors, maintenant, les États en sont à se voler des doses, quitte à déclencher, comme le dit Macron, une « guerre mondiale d’un nouveau genre ». On est loin du cinéma sur la coopération et solidarité internationale, mais c’est ça la réalité du capitalisme : la concurrence et la guerre pour qu’une minorité s’enrichisse au détriment de l’intérêt collectif.

    Les bourgeois et leurs serviteurs politiques ont intérêt à ce que ce système perdure. Pour les travailleurs, pour l’ensemble de la société, c’est tout le contraire !

    #confinement #covid_19 #cynisme #capitalisme #propriété_privée #brevet #vaccination #réquisition

  • #Covid-19 : « Il n’est pas possible d’attendre 2022 pour qu’Emmanuel Macron et le gouvernement rendent des comptes », Barbara Serrano
    https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2021/03/29/covid-19-il-n-est-pas-possible-d-attendre-2022-pour-qu-emmanuel-macron-et-le

    Jugeant que leurs décisions ont permis à l’épidémie de s’intensifier, la sociologue Barbara Serrano appelle, dans une tribune au « Monde », les responsables politiques à justifier publiquement leurs choix par des données objectivables.

    Tribune. Il y a un an, le 17 mars 2020, la France était confinée pour faire face à la pandémie de Covid-19 devenue hors de contrôle. Fin janvier, le mot d’ordre du président de la République est désormais « Tout sauf le confinement ». Il rejette alors la proposition d’un confinement strict d’un mois défendue par le conseil scientifique.

    Seule cette mesure aurait permis de ramener la circulation du virus SARS-CoV-2 autour de 5 000 contaminations par jour – seuil fixé par Emmanuel Macron lui-même pour contrôler l’épidémie et déconfiner –, contre plus de 30 000 par jour actuellement. Elle nous aurait fait gagner du temps en reprenant la main sur le traçage des contaminations et en avançant la campagne de vaccination.

    Du fait du « pari politique » d’Emmanuel Macron, l’épidémie s’est intensifiée et, comme avaient mis en garde les modélisateurs, plusieurs régions à forte densité, telles que l’Ile-de-France et les Hauts-de-France, puis aujourd’hui le Rhône, l’Aube et la Nièvre, ont largement dépassé les seuils d’alerte de 250 cas hebdomadaires pour 100 000 habitants, seuils déjà moins stricts que ceux fixés dans les pays voisins (par exemple, 100 pour 100 000 en Allemagne).

    Dispositions aberrantes

    Dès lors, plus d’autre choix pour l’exécutif que de se diriger à reculons vers un durcissement des mesures en vigueur. Jean Castex, le premier ministre, a présenté chaque jour passé sans avoir pris des mesures contraignantes comme une victoire, le gouvernement aurait ainsi préservé la population de mesures d’exception. Mais à quel prix, humain et matériel ? Avec quels résultats sur la dynamique de l’épidémie ? Surtout lorsque les nouvelles dispositions sont soit cosmétiques (fermeture des magasins non essentiels, par exemple), soit aberrantes (reprise des activités sportives en salle pour les établissements scolaires).

    Au rythme actuel, sans mesures fortes de distanciation sociale, la vaccination ne suffira pas à faire reculer l’épidémie assez vite. Tout cela entraîne d’ores et déjà le sacrifice de milliers de vies supplémentaires, alors que la France déplore déjà plus de 90 000 morts.

    En s’émancipant du conseil scientifique et en refusant de tenir compte des alertes lancées par les épidémiologistes, le président a fait un choix qui n’a été ni justifié par des données sérieuses, ni fondé sur la comparaison éclairée des différentes options posées sur la table. Et, bien sûr, sans débat sur la place publique. Sa décision a été prise et maintenue, y compris, semble-t-il, contre l’avis de certains ministres, sans être expliquée aux Français. Cette situation ne peut plus durer. Il n’est pas possible d’attendre 2022 pour que le président de la République comme le gouvernement rendent des comptes sur leur gestion de cette crise majeure.

    Ne nous méprenons pas, cet appel n’est en rien un désir de vengeance, ni une invocation de la « carence fautive » et, plus généralement, de la responsabilité pénale des gouvernants. Alors que nous entrons dans la deuxième année de cette pandémie, il s’agit simplement de rappeler un principe fondamental de l’exercice du pouvoir dans les démocraties évoluées : les gouvernants doivent rendre compte de leurs décisions devant la représentation nationale et les citoyens. Des citoyens à qui ils sont « redevables ».

    Long déni de Jean-Michel Blanquer

    Rendre des comptes signifie justifier ses choix et ses changements de cap par des données objectivables. Le gouvernement doit expliciter ce que furent et ce que sont désormais les objectifs à atteindre (empêcher la saturation des services de réanimation ? Préserver l’économie du pays et maintenir les écoles à tout prix ? Sauver un maximum de vies ?), énoncer les moyens mis en œuvre pour atteindre ces objectifs, donner au public les éléments d’information pour comprendre les choix opérés, comme les options qui ont été écartées…

    La place de l’expertise, de la science, la question de la transparence des données sont ici fondamentales. Comment justifier que le ministère de la santé garde sous le boisseau, parfois jusqu’à un mois après les avoir reçus, les avis du conseil scientifique censés être rendus publics « sans délai » ? Comment légitimer l’absence de transparence sur l’état sanitaire des écoles et des classes (nombre de tests antigéniques pratiqués, nombre d’enfants positifs) ?

    Comment expliquer ce long déni du ministre de l’éducation nationale, Jean-Michel Blanquer, concernant les contaminations dans ses établissements, à rebours de toutes les études épidémiologiques internationales, faisant de la France le seul pays où les enfants n’étaient pas contaminants ?

    Rendre des comptes est aux fondements de la responsabilité des gouvernants. Et c’est peut-être Olivier Beaud et un certain Jean-Michel Blanquer, à l’époque professeur de droit public à Lille, qui en parlent le mieux dans leur introduction au livre collectif La Responsabilité des gouvernants (Descartes et Cie, 1999) : « La responsabilité est le passif qui vient équilibrer l’actif de tout pouvoir. Le terme même de “responsabilité”, dans sa polysémie, indique que le phénomène du pouvoir a toujours une double dimension, proportionnelle l’une à l’autre : le droit d’agir, le devoir de rendre compte. »

    Barbara Serrano est sociologue et conseil en stratégie de concertation, maîtresse de conférences associée à Paris-Saclay, cofondatrice du collectif #Du_côté_de_la_science, ex-commissaire de la Commission nationale du débat public.

    #débat_public #santé_publique #modélisations #confinement

  • Violente paix. What is violent in urban narrative ?

    Auteurs et autrices : Equipe pédagogique et étudiants du master du Master « International Development Studies (IDS) », Institut d’urbanisme et de géographie alpine et « Création artistique », UFR LLASIC
    Type : Restitution d’atelier recherche-création

    Le quartier de la Presqu’île est stratégique dans la formation de Grenoble en tant que métropole de l’innovation et a intégré l’agenda de la transition écologique des projets urbains de la métropole.
    Le cours est construit sur un atelier immersif et expérimental pour questionner les espaces de la ville et le récit de la #transition, par la #performance. Le récit hégémonique de la transition est questionné par la composition immédiate en danse, par la cartographie à partir d’#exploration_urbaine (#dérive), par le débat sur les concepts de violence, #conflit et #paix, et le rôle qu’ils jouent dans la construction de l’#imaginaire_urbain et qui informe nos interactions quotidiennes dans l’espace. Ce questionnement conduit à proposer des #contre-récits.
    Nous évoquons les situations de violence invisibilisée, d’assignation à la violence de certaines catégories de la population, d’incorporation de normes, d’écriture du #récit national et du besoin de contre-récits de la transition, de la #modernité, de l’#innovation et de l’#espace_public.

    En 2019, l’édition de cet atelier a donné lieu à un livret qui présente la démarche de l’équipe pédagogique et les productions par les étudiant·es des Master in « International Development Studies (IDS) », Institut d’urbanisme et de géographie alpine et « Création artistique », UFR LLASIC

    https://www.modop.org/portfolio-item/violente-paix
    #violente_paix #Presqu'île #Grenoble #recherche-création #violence #paix #atelier_pédagogique #ressources_pédagogiques #villes #urban_matter #géographie_urbaine #urbanisme

  • Facebook’s A.I. Whiz Now Faces the Task of Cleaning It Up. Sometimes That Brings Him to Tears.
    https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/17/technology/facebook-ai-schroepfer.html

    Facebook has heralded artificial intelligence as a solution to its toxic content problems. Mike Schroepfer, its chief technology officer, says it won’t solve everything. MENLO PARK, Calif. — Mike Schroepfer, Facebook’s chief technology officer, was tearing up. For half an hour, we had been sitting in a conference room at Facebook’s headquarters, surrounded by whiteboards covered in blue and red marker, discussing the technical difficulties of removing toxic content from the social network. (...)

    #algorithme #manipulation #modération #addiction