• Communiqué de presse du Conseil « Justice et affaires intérieures » (#JAI) de l’Union européenne :

    Migration policy : Council reaches agreement on key asylum and migration laws

    The Council today took a decisive step towards a modernisation of the EU’s rulebook for asylum and migration. It agreed on a negotiating position on the asylum procedure regulation and on the asylum and migration management regulation. This position will form the basis of negotiations by the Council presidency with the European Parliament.

    “No member state can deal with the challenges of migration alone. Frontline countries need our solidarity. And all member states must be able to rely on the responsible adherence to the agreed rule. I am very glad that on this basis we agreed on our negotiating position.”
    Maria Malmer Stenergard, Swedish minister for migration
    Streamlining of asylum procedure

    The asylum procedure regulation (APR) establishes a common procedure across the EU that member states need to follow when people seek international protection. It streamlines the procedural arrangements (e.g. the duration of the procedure) and sets standards for the rights of the asylum seeker (e.g. being provided with the service of an interpreter or having the right to legal assistance and representation).

    The regulation also aims to prevent abuse of the system by setting out clear obligations for applicants to cooperate with the authorities throughout the procedure.
    Border procedures

    The APR also introduces mandatory border procedures, with the purpose to quickly assess at the EU’s external borders whether applications are unfounded or inadmissible. Persons subject to the asylum border procedure are not authorised to enter the member state’s territory.

    The border procedure would apply when an asylum seeker makes an application at an external border crossing point, following apprehension in connection with an illegal border crossing and following disembarkation after a search and rescue operation. The procedure is mandatory for member states if the applicant is a danger to national security or public order, he/she has misled the authorities with false information or by withholding information and if the applicant has a nationality with a recognition rate below 20%.

    The total duration of the asylum and return border procedure should be not more than 6 months.
    Adequate capacity

    In order to carry out border procedures, member states need to establish an adequate capacity, in terms of reception and human resources, required to examine at any given moment an identified number of applications and to enforce return decisions.

    At EU level this adequate capacity is 30 000. The adequate capacity of each member state will be established on the basis of a formula which takes account of the number of irregular border crossings and refusals of entry over a three-year period.
    Modification of Dublin rules

    The asylum and migration management regulation (AMMR) should replace, once agreed, the current Dublin regulation. Dublin sets out rules determining which member state is responsible for the examination of an asylum application. The AMMR will streamline these rules and shorten time limits. For example, the current complex take back procedure aimed at transferring an applicant back to the member state responsible for his or her application will be replaced by a simple take back notification
    New solidarity mechanism

    To balance the current system whereby a few member states are responsible for the vast majority of asylum applications, a new solidarity mechanism is being proposed that is simple, predictable and workable. The new rules combine mandatory solidarity with flexibility for member states as regards the choice of the individual contributions. These contributions include relocation, financial contributions or alternative solidarity measures such as deployment of personnel or measures focusing on capacity building. Member states have full discretion as to the type of solidarity they contribute. No member state will ever be obliged to carry out relocations.

    There will be a minimum annual number for relocations from member states where most persons enter the EU to member states less exposed to such arrivals. This number is set at 30 000, while the minimum annual number for financial contributions will be fixed at €20 000 per relocation. These figures can be increased where necessary and situations where no need for solidarity is foreseen in a given year will also be taken into account.

    In order to compensate for a possibly insufficient number of pledged relocations, responsibility offsets will be available as a second-level solidarity measure, in favour of the member states benefitting from solidarity. This will mean that the contributing member state will take responsibility for the examination of an asylum claim by persons who would under normal circumstances be subject to a transfer to the member state responsible (benefitting member state). This scheme will become mandatory if relocation pledges fall short of 60% of total needs identified by the Council for the given year or do not reach the number set in the regulation (30 000).
    Preventing abuse and secondary movements

    The AMMR also contains measures aimed at preventing abuse by the asylum seeker and avoiding secondary movements (when a migrant moves from the country in which they first arrived to seek protection or permanent resettlement elsewhere). The regulation for instance sets obligations for asylum seekers to apply in the member states of first entry or legal stay. It discourages secondary movements by limiting the possibilities for the cessation or shift of responsibility between member states and thus reduces the possibilities for the applicant to chose the member state where they submit their claim.

    While the new regulation should preserve the main rules on determination of responsibility, the agreed measures include modified time limits for its duration:

    - the member state of first entry will be responsible for the asylum application for a duration of two years
    - when a country wants to transfer a person to the member state which is actually responsible for the migrant and this person absconds (e.g. when the migrant goes into hiding to evade a transfer) responsibility will shift to the transferring member state after three years
    - if a member state rejects an applicant in the border procedure, its responsibility for that person will end after 15 months (in case of a renewed application)

    https://nsl.consilium.europa.eu/104100/Newsletter/axgy5g4bs3zixsx3bkhgg2epeiecucjvrcybx7b6shr3lt7za5b4x3vrbmpevnc

    #conseil_de_l'Europe #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Dublin #règlement_Dublin #accord #8_juin_2023 #UE #Union_européenne #EU #asylum_procedure_regulation (#APR) #procédure_d'asile #frontières #procédure_accélérée #inadmissibilité #procédure_de_frontière #frontières_extérieures #capacité_adéquate #asylum_and_migration_management_regulation (#AMMR) #mécanisme_de_solidarité #solidarité #relocalisation #contribution_financière #compensation #responsibility_offsets #mouvements_secondaires #abus

    –—

    ajouté à la métaliste sur le pacte :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/1019088

    • Analyse de #Fulvio_Vassallo_Paleologo:

      Paesi terzi “sicuri”, sicurezza delle persone migranti e propaganda di Stato

      1.Le conclusioni del Consiglio dei ministri dell’interno dell’Unione Europea riuniti a Lussembugo lo scorso 8 giugno sono state propagandate come una vittoria della linea tenuta dal governo Meloni fino alle ultime ore di una convulsa trattativa, che si è conclusa con una spaccatura che avrà certamente ripercussioni sulla prossima fase di codecisione sulle politiche migratorie e sulle procedure di asilo, nella quale analoghe divisioni si potrebbero riprodurre all’interno del Parlamento europeo.

      La materia sulla quale i ministri del’interno dei diversi paesi europei hanno alla fine trovato una soluzione di compromesso, su cui il ministro Piantedosi ha espresso soddisfazione, riguarda buona parte della vigente legislazione europea in materia di imigrazione ed asilo, sia per quanto riguarda la cd. dimensione esterna, con riferimento ai paesi terzi di origine e transito, che per quanto concerne i cd. meccanismi di solidarietà, in materia di rimpatri forzati e al fine di contrastare i cd. movimenti secondari, con una sostanziale rivisitazione del vigente Regolamento Dublino III del 2013. A tale riguardo si prevede espressamente che “Gli Stati membri hanno piena discrezionalità quanto al tipo di solidarietà cui contribuiscono. Nessuno Stato membro sarà mai obbligato a effettuare ricollocazioni”. Una sconfitta che il governo italiano non può nascondere dietro i propositi di espellere o respingere i richiedenti asilo denegati nei paesi di transito.

      I ministri dell’interno dei diversi paesi dell’Unione Europea hanno così trovato a maggioranza una intesa che però appare come una scatola vuota, se si pensa alla mole delle normative (dal Regolamento frontiere Schengen alla Direttiva 2008/115/ CE sui rimpatri) che dovrebbero essere modificate per approvare definitivamente quanto si è deciso a Lussemburgo, ed all’esiguo tempo che manca in vista delle prosime elezioni europee, dopo tre anni di stallo seguiti alla prima versione del Patto sull’immigrazione e l’asilo adottata dalla Commissione nel 2020. Inoltre la spaccatura tra i paesi di Visegrad Ungheria e Polonia, ed i conservatori del gruppo della Meloni, non lasciano presagire risultati definitivi nel breve periodo.

      2. La proposta di regolamento sulla procedura di asilo (Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on asylum and migration management and amending Council Directive (EC) 2003/109 and the proposed Regulation (EU) XXX/XXX [Asylum and Migration Fund] tenta di stabilire una procedura comune in tutta l’UE che gli Stati membri devono seguire quando le persone fanno richiesta di protezione internazionale. Si snelliscono le disposizioni procedurali (ad esempio la durata della procedura) e si stabiliscono norme per i diritti del richiedente asilo (ad esempio, la fornitura del servizio di un interprete o il diritto all’assistenza e alla rappresentanza legali). La procedura di frontiera si applicherebbe quando un richiedente asilo presenta domanda a un valico di frontiera esterna, a seguito di arresto in relazione a un attraversamento illegale della frontiera e in seguito allo sbarco dopo un’operazione di ricerca e soccorso. Ma anche quando proviene da un paese terzo ritenuto sicuro. La procedura è obbligatoria per gli Stati membri se il richiedente rappresenta un pericolo per la sicurezza nazionale o l’ordine pubblico, ha ingannato le autorità con informazioni false o nascondendo informazioni e se il richiedente ha una nazionalità di un paese con un tasso di riconoscimento delle richieste di asilo inferiore al 20%.

      Il punto sul quale in Italia il governo Meloni ed il ministro dell’interno Piantedosi hanno insistito di più, a livello di comunicazione, ma anche come base per una intensa attività diplomatica che conducono da mesi senza risultati effettivi, riguardava la possibilità di rinviare nei paesi di transito i richiedenti asilo denegati dopo la procedura in frontiera, già prevista in modo più rigoroso dalla legge 50 del 2023 (ex Decreto Cutro). Una legge approvata senza il parere delle competenti Comissioni Affari costituzionali, che sta già facendo vitime, con espulsioni comminate dai prefetti “in automatico” a persone già inserite in Italia, che chiedono il rinnovo del permesso di soggiorno per protezione speciale, ma che ad oggi appare in contrasto non solo con importanti principi fondamentali del nostro ordinamento (come gli articoli 10, 13,24,32,113 della Costituzione), ma anche con molti dei principi di garanzia ribaditi con grande nettezza dalle proposte legislative adottate a Lussemburgo dal Consiglio dei ministri dell’interno dell’Unione Europea.

      Durante l’iter di conversione del decreto legge in Parlamento, l’Alto Commissariato delle Nazioni Unite per i rifugiati (ACNUR- UNHCR) aveva inviato una “Nota tecnica” al governo, nel tentativo di avviare un confronto su diversi punti “critici” che non rispettavano norme internazionali o Direttive dell’Unione Europea. Come ha dichiarato la rappresentante dell’UNHCR per l’Italia, “Avevamo rappresentato queste criticità, confidando che nel procedimento legislativo alcuni correttivi potessero essere apportati”.

      Nella sua ultima nota tecnica, l’UNHCR evidenzia innanzitutto come la nuova legge 50/2023 “ estende la preesistente procedura accelerata di frontiera ai richiedenti provenienti da Paesi di origine designati come sicuri e dispone il trattenimento per quei richiedenti, tra coloro che siano stati avviati a tale procedura, i quali non abbiano consegnato il “passaporto o altro documento equipollente” o non prestino “idonea garanzia finanziaria”. Il trattenimento avverrà nei punti di crisi (hotspot) esistenti presso i maggiori luoghi di sbarco, nelle strutture analoghe ai punti di crisi che verranno individuate o nei Centri di Permanenza per i Rimpatri (CPR) che si trovino in prossimità della frontiera. I minori e tutte le altre persone con esigenze particolari, come da disposizioni vigenti, sono esonerati da ogni forma di procedura accelerata”.

      L’ACNUR dopo una generale considerazione positiva delle procedure accelerate in frontiera, soprattuto nei casi in cui appare maggiormente probabile l’esito positivo della domanda di protezione, “Raccomanda, tuttavia, di incanalare in procedura di frontiera (con trattenimento) solo le domande di protezione internazionale che, in una fase iniziale di raccolta delle informazioni e registrazione, appaiano manifestamente infondate.
      In particolare, la domanda proposta dal richiedente proveniente da un Paese di origine sicuro non deve essere incanalata in tale iter quando lo stesso abbia invocato gravi motivi per ritenere che, nelle sue specifiche circostanze, il Paese non sia sicuro. Si sottolinea, a tal fine, la centralità di una fase iniziale di screening, volta a far emergere elementi utili alla categorizzazione delle domande (triaging) e alla conseguente individuazione della procedura più appropriata per ciascun caso.

      3. La nozione di Paese terzo sicuro è presente nella legislazione eurounitaria con la direttiva 2005/85/Ce del Consiglio del 1° dicembre 2005. L’art. 29 prevedeva che il Consiglio, deliberando a maggioranza qualificata su proposta della Commissione e previa consultazione del Parlamento europeo, potesse adottare un elenco comune minimo dei paesi terzi considerati dagli Stati membri paesi d’origine sicuri. Tale disposizione fu annullata dalla Corte di giustizia perché introduceva una riserva di competenza in favore del Consiglio, con semplice obbligo di consultazione del Parlamento europeo, che non poteva essere prevista da un atto derivato.

      Con la cd. direttiva procedure (dir. 2013/32/UE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 26 giugno 2013) la traccia è stata ripresa e ampliata.
      Gli articoli da 36 a 39 disciplinano infatti in termini molto dettagliati i contorni della nozione di Paese di origine sicuro e le conseguenze di tale nozione sulle procedure di valutazione delle domande.
      L’art. 36 detta le condizioni soggettive alle quali è subordinato il riconoscimento della natura di Paese sicuro di un determinato richiedente: questi deve essere cittadino del Paese di provenienza definito sicuro o apolide che in quel Paese soggiornasse abitualmente; inoltre, non deve avere invocato gravi motivi a lui riferibili, tesi a escludere che il Paese di origine sia sicuro.
      L’art. 37 fa rinvio all’allegato I della stessa direttiva, dove sono dettate le condizioni alle quali è possibile designare un Paese come sicuro. Il testo dell’Allegato I è il seguente: “Un paese è considerato paese di origine sicuro se, sulla base dello status giuridico, dell’applicazione della legge all’interno di un sistema democratico e della situazione politica generale, si può dimostrare che non ci sono generalmente e costantemente persecuzioni quali definite nell’articolo 9 della direttiva 2011/95/UE, né tortura o altre forme di pena o trattamento disumano o degradante, né pericolo a causa di violenza indiscriminata in situazioni di conflitto armato interno o internazionale.
      Per effettuare tale valutazione si tiene conto, tra l’altro, della misura in cui viene offerta
      protezione contro le persecuzioni ed i maltrattamenti mediante:
      a) le pertinenti disposizioni legislative e regolamentari del paese ed il modo in cui sono applicate;
      b) il rispetto dei diritti e delle libertà stabiliti nella Convenzione europea per la salvaguardia dei diritti dell’uomo e delle libertà fondamentali e/o nel Patto internazionale relativo ai diritti civili e sociali

      L’art. 38 della Direttiva atualmente in vigore, fino a quando non verrà espressamente abrogata, fornisce il: “Concetto di paese terzo sicuro”.

      1. Glic Stati membri possono applicare il oncetto di paese terzo sicuro solo se le autorità competenti hanno accertato che nel paese terzo in questione una persona richiedente protezione internazionale riceverà un trattamento conforme ai seguenti criteri:
      a) non sussistono minacce alla sua vita ed alla sua libertà per ragioni di razza, religione,
      nazionalità, opinioni politiche o appartenenza a un determinato gruppo sociale;
      b) non sussiste il rischio di danno grave definito nella direttiva 2011/95/UE;
      c) è rispettato il principio di «non-refoulement» conformemente alla convenzione di Ginevra;
      d) è osservato il divieto di allontanamento in violazione del diritto a non subire torture né
      trattamenti crudeli, disumani o degradanti, sancito dal diritto internazionale; e
      e) esiste la possibilità di chiedere lo status di rifugiato e, per chi è riconosciuto come rifugiato,
      ottenere protezione in conformità della convenzione di Ginevra.
      2. L’applicazione del concetto di paese terzo sicuro è subordinata alle norme stabilite dal diritto nazionale, comprese:
      a) norme che richiedono un legame tra il richiedente e il paese terzo in questione, secondo le quali sarebbe ragionevole per detta persona recarsi in tale paese;
      b) norme sul metodo mediante il quale le autorità̀ competenti accertano che il concetto di paese terzo sicuro può̀ essere applicato a un determinato paese o a un determinato richiedente. Tale metodo comprende l’esame caso per caso della sicurezza del paese per un determinato richiedente e/o la designazione nazionale dei paesi che possono essere considerati generalmente sicuri;
      c) norme conformi al diritto internazionale per accertare, con un esame individuale, se il paese terzo interessato sia sicuro per un determinato richiedente e che consentano almeno al richiedente di impugnare l’applicazione del concetto di paese terzo sicuro a motivo del fatto che quel paese terzo non è sicuro nel suo caso specifico. Al richiedente è altresì data la possibilità di contestare l’esistenza di un legame con il paese terzo ai sensi della lettera a)”

      4. Secondo la nuova proposta legislativa sulle procedure di asilo, approvata dal Consiglio dei ministri del’interno dell’Unione Europea a Lussemburgo, gli Stati membri dovrebbero avere la possibilità di applicare il concetto di terzo sicuro paese […] come motivo di inammissibilità ove esista la possibilità per il richiedente[…] di chiedere e, se ne ricorrono i presupposti, di ricevere effettivo protezione in un paese terzo, dove la sua vita e la sua libertà non sono minacciate conto di razza, religione, nazionalità, appartenenza a un particolare gruppo sociale o opinione politica, dove lui o lei non è soggetto a persecuzione né affronta un rischio reale di danno grave come definito nel regolamento (UE) n. XXX/XXX [Nuovo Regolamento sulle Qualifiche ancora da approvare] ed è tutelato contro il respingimento e contro l’allontanamento, o contro le violazioni del diritto alla protezione dalla tortura e da trattamenti crudeli, inumani o degradanti prevista dal diritto internazionale.
      Si aggiungono poi nuove condizioni per considerare inammissibile una domanda di asilo.
      Si prevede in particolare che Il concetto di un paese terzo sicuro può essere applicato solo se esiste […] un collegamento tra il richiedente e […] il paese terzo in base al quale sarebbe […] ragionevole[…] che il richiedente […] si rechi in quel paese […], compreso il fatto che […] ha transitato […] in quel paese terzo. La connessione in particolare tra il richiedente e il paese terzo sicuro potrebbe essere considerata stabilita dove i membri della famiglia del richiedente siano presenti in quel paese o dove il richiedente si è stabilito o ha soggiornato in quel paese. Nella fase convulsa di ricerca del compromesso finale, nella notte dei ministri del’interno a Lussemburgo, è saltata la previsione sostenuta dall’Italia che anche un transito temporaneo avrebbe potuto comportare l’acertamento di questa “commessione” e dunque comportare l’inammissibilità della domanda di protezione già nella procedura in frontiera e la possibilità di respingimento o espulsione con immediato accompagnamento forzato. La posizione dei cittadini di paesi terzi “in transito” rimane comunque molto a rischio e sarà sicuramente oggetto di trattative in sede di rinegoziazione degli accordi bilaterali già esistenti.

      Al Considerando 37b) si prevede comunque che, “Nel valutare se i criteri per una protezione effettiva come stabilito nel presente Regolamento sono soddisfatte da un paese terzo, l’accesso ai mezzi di sussistenza sufficienti a mantenere un tenore di vita adeguato dovrebbe essere inteso come comprensivo dell’accesso a vitto, vestiario, alloggio o alloggio e il diritto a svolgere un’attività lavorativa remunerata a condizioni non meno favorevoli di quelle previste per gli stranieri del Paese terzo generalmente nelle stesse circostanze”. Anche nella proposta di nuovo Regolamento oltre alla situazione dei transitanti nei paesi terzi ritenuti sicuri si deve aggiungere anche la considerazione della maggiore ampiezza operativa che si sta attribuento, anche a livello interno, alla categoria di paese di origine sicuro.

      Al Considerando (46) si aggiunge che […] Dovrebbe essere possibile designare un paese terzo come paese di origine sicuro con eccezioni per parti specifiche del suo territorio o categorie chiaramente identificabili di persone. Inoltre, il fatto che un paese terzo sia incluso in una lista di paesi di origine sicuri non può stabilire una garanzia assoluta di sicurezza per i cittadini di tale paese paese, anche per coloro che non appartengono a una categoria di persone per le quali tale è fatta eccezione, e quindi non dispensa dalla necessità di condurre un’adeguata esame individuale della domanda di protezione internazionale. Per sua stessa natura, la valutazione sottesa alla designazione non può che tener conto del carattere generale, civile, circostanze legali e politiche in quel paese e se autori di persecuzioni, torture o trattamenti o punizioni inumani o degradanti sono soggetti a sanzione quando ritenuti responsabili in quel paese. Per questo motivo, dove il richiedente può dimostrare elementi che giustificano il motivo per cui il concetto di paese di origine sicuro non è applicabile a lui, la designazione del paese come sicuro non può più essere considerata rilevante per lui o lei.

      5. Il governo italiano si vanta di avere costretto l’Unione europea a spostare l’attenzione dai problemi che interssano maggiormente agli Stati continentali, e dunque dai cd. “movimenti secondari” alla questione dei “movimenti primari”, con particolare riferimento alle frontiere esterne del Mediteraneo. La prospettiva che si persegue, magari in collaborazione con l’UNHCR, che però ha posizioni di garanzia molto precise sul punto, è di favorire la “deportazione” in questi paesi, ritenuti “sicuri”, di immigrati irregolari di diversa nazionalità, dopo il diniego sulla domanda di protezione, alla fine della “procedura in frontiera”. Sfugge evidentemente alla premier Meloni, o si preferisce nascondere, la situazione dei diritti umani nei paesi nordafricani di transito, come l’Egitto, la Libia, la Tunisia, l’Algeria, che pure ministri e sottosegretari italiani hanno intensamente frequentato in questi ultimi mesi. Con i risultati che sono sotto gli occhi di tutti. Adesso ci riproveranno a Tunisi, con la visita in programma per domenica 11 giugno in cui la Meloni sarà accompagnata adirittura da Ursula Von der Layen a nome della Commissione europea e dal premier olandese Rutte.

      Nella propaganda governativa si omette di ricordare che nessun accordo di riammissione stipulato con paesi terzi, anche quello tuttora vigente con la Tunisia, prevede deportazioni di cittadini provenienti da altri Stati e giunti irregolarmente nel nostro territorio, o che hanno ricevuto un diniego sulla richiesta di protezione internazionale. A parte la considerazione che l’ingresso per ragioni di soccorso non può essere equiparato all’ingresso clandestino. E questo lo chiarisce bene la Corte di Cassazione con la sentenza sul caso Rackete n.6626/2020. Si vedrà se la prossima missione della Meloni a Tunisi, in compagnia della Presidente della Commissione europea convincerà l’autocrate Saied che sta espellendo sistematicamente dal suo paese tutti i migranti subsahariani, ad accettare di riprendersi cittadini non tunisini sbarcati in Italia. Ed è pure abbastanza improbabile che aumenti la quota di cittadini tunisini che, in base agli accordi vigenti, vengono espulsi o respinti (respingimento differito) verso Tunisi, sulla base degli accordi bilaterali già vigenti con l’Italia. Due voli alla settimana, o poco più per circa sessanta persone. Difficile immaginare una intensificazione dei rimpatri con accompagnamento di polizia. In questi casi, come osserva il Garante nazionale per le persone private della libertà personale in un recente rapporto, “L’aspetto di maggiore criticità è che “le regole dell’attività di rimpatrio forzato da parte della Polizia di Stato sono in larga parte definite da semplici circolari e disposizioni interne e non da fonti normative di rango primario. Manca cioè un quadro legislativo che specifichi le regole operative e ciò ha inevitabili ricadute”. Per esempio, “la disciplina compiuta del possibile ricorso all’impiego della forza, al di là di principi generali, che definisca i possibili strumenti contenitivi, le modalità e la durata del loro impiego. Così come mancano disposizioni operative sui controlli di sicurezza, la cui attuazione talvolta si avvicina a una perquisizione personale, pratica eccezionale anche in contesti ben più problematici”. Ma anche in Tunisia la discrezionalità di polizia sconfina sempre più spesso nell’arbitrio.

      Come denuncia l’ASGI, “Alla luce dell’attuale trasformazione autoritaria dello Stato tunisino e dell’estrema violenza e persecuzione della popolazione nera, delle persone in movimento, degli oppositori politici e degli attori della società civile, noi, le organizzazioni firmatarie, rilasciamo questa dichiarazione per ricordare che la Tunisia non è né un paese di origine sicuro né un paese terzo sicuro e pertanto non può essere considerato un luogo sicuro di sbarco (Place of Safety, POS) per le persone soccorse in mare”.

      Come riferisce il sito Meltingpot, a margine di un diniego dopo la richiesta di protezione internazionale alla competente Commissione territoriale, il Tribunale di Cagliari ha accolto la richiesta di sospensiva di un cittadino tunisino. La situazione è peculiare e occorrerà attendere il merito per approfondirla ma il decreto è significativo perché, il Tribunale “smentisce” il fatto che la Tunisia sia un Paese Sicuro“. Si tratta naturalmente di decisioni che valgono per casi individuali, e sarà fondamentale provare la situazione di ciascuna persona che in frontiera, ma anche nei CPR, possa risultare destinataria di un provedimento di allontanbamento forzato verso la Tunisia.

      6. La seconda proposta legislativa su nuovi criteri di gestione in materia di immigrazione ed asilo di portata più ampia approvata a Lussemburgo lo scorso 8 giugno (Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on asylum and migration management and amending Council Directive (EC) 2003/109 and the proposed Regulation (EU) XXX/XXX [Asylum and Migration Fund] non prevede particolari impegni dell’Unione Europea per sostenere le politiche di rimpatrio forzato di citt che adini di paesi terzi verso gli Stati da cui sono transitati prima di entrare in territorio europeo. Materia che richiederebbe una modifica radicale della Direttiva rimpatri 2008/115/CE.

      Il nuovo regolamento sulla gestione della migrazione e dell’asilo dovrebbe sostituire, una volta concordato, l’attuale regolamento Dublino che stabilisce norme che determinano quale Stato membro è competente per l’esame di una domanda di protezione internazionale. Il nuovo Regolamento dovrebbe semplificare queste regole e ridurre i termini. Ad esempio, l’attuale complessa procedura di ripresa in carico finalizzata al trasferimento di un richiedente nello Stato membro responsabile della sua domanda sarà sostituita da una semplice notifica di ripresa in carico. Rimane comunque confermata la responsabilità primaria dei paesi di primo ingresso, quello che Salvini voleva evitare ricattando i paesi membri con la chiusura dei porti. Lo Stato membro di primo ingresso sarà competente per la domanda di asilo per una durata di due anni. Quando un paese vuole trasferire una persona nello stato membro che è effettivamente responsabile del migrante e questa persona fugge (ad esempio quando il migrante si nasconde per eludere un trasferimento) la responsabilità passerà allo stato membro di trasferimento solo dopo tre anni.

      La nuova proposta legislativa su immigrazione ed asilo, faticosamente elaborata a Lussemburgo, si limita, con l’art. 7 (Cooperazione con i paesi terzi per facilitare il rimpatrio e la riammissione), a prevedere che dove la Commissione e il Consiglio ritengano che un terzo paese non collabora sufficientemente alla riammissione di cittadini di paesi terzi il cui soggiorno è irregolare, la Commissione e il Consiglio, nell’ambito delle rispettive competenze, prendono in considerazione le azioni appropriate tenendo conto delle competenze dell’Unione e delle relazioni generali degli Stati membri con il paese terzo.
      In particolare, in questi casi, 1. […] La Commissione può, sulla base dell’analisi effettuata a norma dell’articolo 25 bis, paragrafi 2 o 4, del regolamento (UE) n. 810/2009 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio e di qualsiasi altra informazione disponibile dagli Stati membri, nonché dall’Unione istituzioni, organi e organismi, […] presentare al Consiglio una relazione comprendente, se del caso, l’identificazione di eventuali misure che potrebbero essere adottate per migliorare la cooperazione di tale paese terzo in materia di riammissione, tenendo conto dell’Unione e delle relazioni generali degli Stati membri con il paese terzo.

      7. Al di là delle perplessità sui tempi di attuazione delle proposte varate dal Consiglio dei ministri dell’interno dell’Unione europea e della loro dubbia compatibilità con il vigente diritto eurounitario e con il diritto internazionale umanitario e dei rifugiati, si deve rimarcare come il governo italiano, con un decreto interministeriale approvato lo scorso marzo, abbia ulteriormente ampliato la lista di paesi terzi sicuri che preclude di fatto sia l’esame approfondito delle domande di protezione nelle procedure in frontiera, che il rinnovo della maggior parte dei permessi di soggiorno finora concessi per protezione speciale. Con questo ultimo aggiornamento di marzo 2023 vengono ritenuti paesi terzi sicuri: Albania, Algeria, Bosnia-Erzegovina, Capo Verde, Costa d’Avorio, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Kosovo, Macedonia del Nord, Marocco, Montenegro, Nigeria, Senegal, Serbia e Tunisia.

      La categoria di “paese terzo sicuro” esisteva da anni nella legislazione italiana e nella normativa europea, ma è stato con il Decreto sicurezza Salvini n.113 del 2018 che se ne è estesa la portata e assieme ad altre modifiche legislative, ha ridotto di molto la portata effettiva del diritto di asilo riconosciuto dall’art. 10 della Costituzione italiana.

      L’art. 7-bis del dl 4 ottobre 2018, n. 113 (cd. decreto sicurezza), introdotto in sede di conversione dall’art. 1 della l. 1°dicembre 2018, n. 132, ha inserito nel d.lgs 28 gennaio 2008, n. 25 l’art. 2-bis, intitolato «Paesi di origine sicuri». E’ dunque chiaro che nell’ordinamenro italiano non esiste al momento alcuna categoria di paese di transito “sicuro” e dunque questo criterio, ancora allo stato di proposta legislativa da parte del Conisglio dei ministri dell’interno dell’Unione Europea NON potrà avere nell’immediato alcuna portata normativa, almeno fino a quando, al termine della procedura di codecisione, un nuovo Regolamento che lo preveda non venga pubblicato nella Gazzetta Ufficiale europea.

      L’art. 2-bis del d. lgs n. 25 del 2008, modificato dal decreto sicurezza del 2018, era articolato in cinque commi:

      «Art. 2-bis (Paesi di origine sicuri). – 1. Con decreto del Ministro degli affari esteri e della cooperazione internazionale, di concerto con i Ministri dell’interno e della giustizia, è adottato l’elenco dei Paesi di origine sicuri sulla base dei criteri di cui al comma 2. L’elenco dei Paesi di origine sicuri è aggiornato periodicamente ed è notificato alla Commissione europea.

      2. Uno Stato non appartenente all’Unione europea può essere considerato Paese di origine sicuro se, sulla base del suo ordinamento giuridico, dell’applicazione della legge all’interno di un sistema democratico e della situazione politica generale, si può dimostrare che, in via generale e costante, non sussistono atti di persecuzione quali definiti dall’articolo 7 del decreto legislativo 19 novembre 2007, n. 251, né tortura o altre forme di pena o trattamento inumano o degradante, né pericolo a causa di violenza indiscriminata in situazioni di conflitto armato interno o internazionale. La designazione di un Paese di origine sicuro può essere fatta con l’eccezione di parti del territorio o di categorie di persone.

      3. Ai fini della valutazione di cui al comma 2 si tiene conto, tra l’altro, della misura in cui è offerta protezione contro le persecuzioni ed i maltrattamenti mediante: a) le pertinenti disposizioni legislative e regolamentari del Paese ed il modo in cui sono applicate; b) il rispetto dei diritti e delle libertà stabiliti nella Convenzione europea per la salvaguardia dei diritti dell’uomo e delle libertà fondamentali del 4 novembre 1950, ratificata ai sensi della legge 4 agosto 1955, n. 848, nel Patto internazionale relativo ai diritti civili e politici, aperto alla firma il 19 dicembre 1966, ratificato ai sensi della legge 25 ottobre 1977, n. 881, e nella Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite contro la tortura del 10 dicembre 1984, in particolare dei diritti ai quali non si può derogare a norma dell’articolo 15, paragrafo 2, della predetta Convenzione europea; c) il rispetto del principio di cui all’articolo 33 della Convenzione di Ginevra; d) un sistema di ricorsi effettivi contro le violazioni di tali diritti e libertà.

      4. La valutazione volta ad accertare che uno Stato non appartenente all’Unione europea è un Paese di origine sicuro si basa sulle informazioni fornite dalla Commissione nazionale per il diritto di asilo, che si avvale anche delle notizie elaborate dal centro di documentazione di cui all’articolo 5, comma 1, nonché su altre fonti di informazione, comprese in particolare quelle fornite da altri Stati membri dell’Unione europea, dall’EASO, dall’UNHCR, dal Consiglio d’Europa e da altre organizzazioni internazionali competenti.

      5. Un Paese designato di origine sicuro ai sensi del presente articolo può essere considerato Paese di origine sicuro per il richiedente solo se questi ha la cittadinanza di quel Paese o è un apolide che in precedenza soggiornava abitualmente in quel Paese e non ha invocato gravi motivi per ritenere che quel Paese non è sicuro per la situazione particolare in cui lo stesso richiedente si trova».

      8. Adesso si sta tentando di estendere la nozione di paese terzo sicuro non solo ai cittadini di quel paese, ma anche a coloro che provengono da altri paesi e sono transitati nel paese terzo “sicuro”. Anche per queste persone, con la sola eccezione di MSNA (minori non accompagnati) e di altri soggetti vulnerabili, si prevedono procedure accelerate in frontiera e un numero più ampio di casi di trattenimento amministrativo, per facilitare respingimenti ed espulsioni al termine delle procedure in frontiera, in modo forse da dissuadere le partenze verso l’Italia e l’Europa, aspirazione di vari governi, che comunque, nel corso degli anni, è stata sistematicamente smentita dai fatti. Non si vede peraltro con quali mezzi, risorse umane e luoghi di detenzione amministrativa, si potrà attuare il trattenimento dei richiedenti asilo nelle procedure in frontiera, subito dopo gli sbarchi. Le norme al riguardo, tra l’altro, non saranno operative per 90 giorni dall’entrata in vigore della legge n.50/2023, in assenza del decreto interministeriale che dovrebbe fissare l’entità delle risorse economiche che il richiedente asilo dovrebbe dimostrare per evitare il trattenimento nella prima fase di esame della sua richiesta di protezione. Per tutta l’estate, dunque, la situazione nei punti di sbarco, ma anche nei centri di prima accoglienza, resterà caotica, e sarà affidata esclusivamente ai provvedimenti delle autorità amministrative, prefetti e questori, senza una chiara cornice legislativa.

      Su questo sarà battaglia legale, e solidarietà verso chi chiede comunque protezione, soprattutto nei territori più vicini alle frontiere esterne, sempre che sia possibile esercitare i diritti di difesa, e che le misure di accompagnamento forzato non vengano eseguite prima del riesame da parte della giurisdizione, dato l’abbattimento dei casi di effetto sospensivo del ricorso, ed i precedenti purtroppo non sono molti. La sentenza della Cassazione (Sez. 1, 18 novembre 2019, n. 29914) ha cassato una precedente decisione di merito che aveva rigettato la domanda di protezione internazionale, facendo leva sul principio, già più volte enunciato, secondo cui “nei giudizi di protezione internazionale, a fronte del dovere del richiedente di allegare, produrre o dedurre tutti gli elementi e la documentazione necessari a motivare la domanda, la valutazione delle condizioni socio-politiche del Paese d’origine del richiedente deve avvenire, mediante integrazione istruttoria officiosa, tramite l’apprezzamento di tutte le informazioni, generali e specifiche di cui si dispone pertinenti al caso, aggiornate al momento dell’adozione della decisione, sicché il giudice del merito non può limitarsi a valutazioni solo generiche ovvero omettere di individuare le specifiche fonti informative da cui vengono tratte le conclusioni assunte, potendo incorrere in tale ipotesi, la pronuncia, ove impugnata, nel vizio di motivazione apparente”. Rimane quindi alto il rischio che la categoria dei paesi terzi sicuri, o dei paesi di transito sicuri, considerate anche le nuove procedure in frontiera introdotte dalla legge n.50 del 2023, riducano fortemente la portata effettiva del diritto di asilo costituzionale.

      Il Diritto di asilo previsto nelle sue diverse forme dall’art. 10 della Costituzione italiana, e ribadito nelle Direttive europee e nei Regolamenti fin qui vigenti, ha natura individuale e costituisce un dirito fondamentale della persona. La ratio fondante di tutta la disciplina in materia di protezione internazionale consiste proprio nella protezione dei singoli da condotte gravemente lesive dei loro diritti umani. Ciò è confermato con grande apertura e
      chiarezza dalla nostra Costituzione, all’art. 10, co. 3 che ha una portata molto più ampia della formulazione dello stesso diritto nella Convenzione di Ginevra del 1951 e nelle Direttive europee. Al contrario, la nozione di «Paesi di origine sicuri» si fonda su una valutazione di «safety for the majority» che difficilmente si concilia con la dimensione individuale del diritto di asilo, fortemente sminuendo «the role of individual case by case assessment»”previsto dalle Convenzioni internazionali. In Italia la legge vigente prevede soltanto una presunzione relativa di sicurezza rispetto al Paese di origine, ma senza alcun riferimento automatico alla situazione in questo paese o al transito in un altro paese terzo ritenuto sicuro. Il richiedente e la Commissione teritoriale, e poi il giudice in caso di ricorso giurisdizionale, sono tenuti a cooperare per fare emergere i necesari elementi probatori per affermare o escludere un diritto alla protezione. Ma non ci può essere alcun automatismo nel diniego di uno status di protezione nei confronti di chi provenga o sia transitato da un paese terzo sicuro.

      Si deve ricordare a tale proposito la sentenza della Corte Europea dei diritti dell’Uomo del 21 novembre 2019, Ilias and Ahmed c. Ungheria, che ha accertato la violazione dell’art. 3 della CEDU da parte dell’Ungheria, le cui autorità avevano rigettato la domanda di protezione di due cittadini bengalesi espulsi verso la Serbia, sul semplice presupposto che tale Stato era stato incluso in un elenco governativo sui Paesi sicuri, senza compiere una
      valutazione seria e approfondita del caso specifico e senza preoccuparsi degli effetti di
      un respingimento a catena verso altri Stati.

      9. La pressione dei governi europei, e del governo italiano in particolare, sulle procedure in frontiera e sulla possibilità di ricorrere alle categorie di paese terzo di origine o di transito “sicuro” apre scenari inquietanti, soprattutto dopo che con la legge n.50/2023 si sono introdotte norme procedurali che intaccano i diritti di difesa dei richiedenti asilo giunti in frontiera, sia pure a seguito di operazioni di soccorso in mare. Toccherà operare un attento monotoraggio sul riconoscimento effettivo dei diritti fondamentali, a partire dai diritti all’informazione ed alla comprensione linguistica, e dal diritto di accesso effettivo ad una procedura di asilo, in tutti i luoghi di frontiera soprattutto in quelli che sono definiti “punti di fontiera esterna”. Ocorrerà vigilare sulla attuazione degli accordi con i paesi di transito e origine che possano essere ritenuti “sicuri”, ma solo sulla carta, dalle autorità amministrative. Bisogna impedire che attraverso l’esecuzione immediata di misure di allontanamento forzato, adottate magari con modalità sostanzialmente uniformi e collettive, senza riguardo alla situazione individuale delle singole persone, o delle loro condizioni psico-fisiche, possano ripetersi quelle violazioni dei diritti umani che hanno già portato a pesanti condanne dell’Italia da parte dei Tribunali internazionali, come nei tre fondamentali casi Hirsi, Sharifi e Khlaifia.

      https://www.a-dif.org/2023/06/09/paesi-terzi-sicuri-sicurezza-delle-persone-migranti-e-propaganda-di-stato

    • Editorial : Migration Pact Agreement Point by Point

      What was agreed? What are the consequences? Where are we now?

      ECRE will analyse the detailed texts of the General Approach, when they are available. In the meantime, 48 points can already be made on the agreement reached yesterday among the EU Member States on the Pact on Migration and Asylum to reform EU asylum law.

      - The EU Member States have reached an agreement on key pillars of the EU asylum system, responsibility, solidarity and procedural rules. The agreement has been under discussion throughout the Swedish Presidency.
      - This is not the final word – the Council will negotiate with the Parliament on the basis of this agreement and the Parliament’s respective agreement in order to reach a common position which will become law. However, it is to be expected that Parliament will concede – and these are more or less the positions likely to be adopted.
      - The agreement reduces protection standards in Europe, which is kind of the point. Whether it will meet its other objectives of deterring arrivals, rapid returns or reducing so-called secondary movement remains to be seen.
      – Two countries opposed the agreement: Hungary and Poland, primarily on the basis that they don’t believe that Europe should have an asylum system. Four countries abstained: Bulgaria, Malta, Lithuania and Slovakia, for different reasons in each case.

      The headlines

      - Overall, states have agreed on labyrinth of procedural rules, byzantine in their complexity and based on trying to limit the number of people who are granted international protection in Europe.
      - They fail to address the major the dysfunction of the system, the Dublin rules, which escape largely intact.
      - An underlying objective is to transfer responsibility to countries outside Europe, even though 85% of the world’s refugees are hosted outside Europe, mainly in desperately poor countries. The targets are the countries of the Western Balkans and North Africa, through the use of legal tools such as the “safe third country” concept. Nonetheless, the reforms do nothing to increase the likelihood that these countries agree to host people returned from the EU.
      - Within Europe, the reforms increase the focus at the borders.
      - As such, the reforms go in the opposite direction to the successful response to displacement from Ukraine, which demonstrated the value of light procedures, rapid access to a protection status, allowing people to work as soon as possible so they can contribute, and freedom of movement which allows family unity and a fairer distribution of responsibility across Europe.

      Procedural changes

      – Instead, new elements include expanded use of border procedures, inadmissibility procedures, and accelerated procedures, and the Pact deploys legal concepts to deflect responsibility to other countries, such as the safe third country concept. More people will be stuck at the borders in situations akin to the Greek island model.
      - There will be an expanded use of the border procedure with it becoming mandatory for people from countries where the protection rate is 20% or below.
      - Countries in the centre and north insisted on this change before agreeing to solidarity because their primary concern is ending so-called “secondary movement”. Safeguards such as access to legal assistance or to an appeal are reduced. There will be almost no exemptions for vulnerable people, families or children, and more procedures will be managed in detention.

      No new responsibility rules

      - The rules on responsibility remain the same as now under Dublin, with the principle of first entry still in place.
      - The period of responsibility of the country of arrival for an applicant is extended. It will be two years for people who enter at the external border, but reduced to 15 months after a rejection in the border procedure (to give states an incentive to use the border procedure), and reduced to 12 months for those rescued at sea (to give states an incentive to stop watching people drown).
      – The improvements to the rules on responsibility (compared to Dublin) proposed by the Commission have been rejected, including a wider family definition to allow family unification with siblings.

      A new solidarity mechanism

      - To compensate for the effects of the rules, a solidarity mechanism is introduced to compensate the countries at the borders in situations of “migratory pressure”. A separate mechanism for situations of search and rescue has been rejected.
      – Solidarity is mandatory but flexible, meaning that all countries have to contribute but that they can chose what to offer: relocation and assuming responsibility for people; capacity-building and other support; or a financial contribution.

      The numbers

      – The states have agreed on a minimum of 30,000 people to have their applications processed in a border procedure every year. There will also be a “cap”, a maximum set several times this number which increases over the first three years.
      – Member States’ individual adequate capacity (minimum number or target for border procedures) will be set using a formula based on the overall adequate capacity and the number of a “irregular” entries (i.e. people arriving to seek protection).
      – Member States can cease to use the border procedure when they approach their target with a notification to the Commission.
      – At the same time, the target for relocations is also set at 30,000.
      – There is an incentive to provide relocations (rather than other solidarity) in the form of “offsets” (reductions of solidarity contributions for those offering relocation).
      - The financial equivalent of a relocation is set at EUR 20,000. Money will also be provided from EU funding for reception capacity to manage the border procedure.

      The good news

      - This is the beginning of the end of the reforms.
      - There is a solidarity mechanism, to be codified in EU law.

      The bad news

      – Expanded use of the border procedure equals more people in detention centres at the external border, subject to sub-standard asylum procedures.
      – With the increase in responsibility for countries at the border, and given how controversial centres are for local communities, there is a risk that they chose pushbacks instead. If Italy’s share of the 30,000 annual border procedure cases is 5000, for example, are they likely to go ahead with detention centres or to deny entry?
      – Setting a numerical target for the use of the border procedure – which will almost always take place in detention – creates the risk of arbitrariness in its application.
      - The rules on responsibility remain as per Dublin. The Commission’s improvements have been removed so the incentives to avoid compliance, for instance on reception conditions, remain.
      – There is strong encouragement of the use of “safe third concept” as a basis for denying people access to an in-merits asylum procedure or to protection in Europe.
      - The definition of a safe third country has been eroded as Member States will decide which countries meet the definition. A country needs to meet certain protection criteria and there needs to be a connection between the person and the country, as per international law. However, what constitutes a connection is determined by national law. Examples in the text are family links and previous residence, but a MS could decide that pure transit is a sufficient connection.
      - Solidarity is flexible. If Member States can choose, how many will choose relocation? Relocation of people across the EU would lead to a fairer division of responsibility instead of too much being required of the countries at the external border.
      - The procedural rules appear complex to the point of unworkability.

      Uncertain as yet

      – What has been agreed on offsets – solidarity obligation offsets (reductions in a country’s solidarity obligations to others) in the case of offering relocation places and solidarity benefit offsets (reductions in solidarity entitlements of a country under pressure) in the case of failure to accept Dublin transfers.
      - Definition of migratory pressure and whether and how it incorporates “instrumentalisation” and SAR.

      What will change in practice?

      – More of the people arriving to seek protection in Europe will be subject to a border procedure, rather than having their case heard in a regular asylum procedure.
      – People will still arrive seeking protection in Europe but they will face a harsher system.
      - Responsibilities of the countries at the external borders are increased, which continues to provide an incentive to deny access to territory and to keep standards – on reception or inclusion, for example – low.
      - There could now be greater focus on implementation and management of asylum systems. However, the only concrete references to compliance are in relation to achieving the set number of border procedures and in ensuring Dublin transfers happen.
      – Onward (“secondary”) movement is still likely, and smugglers will continue to adapt, offering more to take people to countries away from the external borders.

      The winners

      – The Commission, which has invested everything on getting the Pact passed. “Trust and cooperation is back in the Council,” according to the Commissioner.
      – France, the Netherlands and the other hardliners, who have largely got what they wanted.
      - The Swedish Presidency, which has brokered a deal and one that suits them – as a less than honest broker. The Minister’s presentation at the press conference underlined secondary movement and enforcement of Dublin.
      – Smugglers, who will be able to charge more for the more complex and longer journeys that people will have to take.

      The losers

      - Refugees, for whom access to a fair asylum procedure will be harder. Risk of detention is higher. Risk of pushbacks is increased. Length and complexity of procedures is increased.
      - Non-EU countries at the borders who will deal with more pushed back people and who will be under pressure to build asylum systems to be safe enough to be “safe” third countries.
      - The Med5+ who have conceded on every major point and gained very little. They will have to manage the border procedures and, while solidarity is mandatory, it is flexible, meaning that relocation is not prioritised. It all begs the question: what have they really been offered in return?
      - Germany, which refused to stand firm and defend the even minor improvements that the government coalition agreement required, and on which it had the support of a small progressive alliance, and potential alliances with the south. For example, on exemptions to the border procedure. Given the desperation to reach a deal more could and should have been demanded.

      https://ecre.org/editorial-migration-pact-agreement-point-by-point

    • Décryptage – Pacte UE migration et asile : une approche répressive et sécuritaire au mépris des droits humains

      Le #8_juin_2023, les Etats membres de l’UE réunis en #Conseil_Justice_et_Affaires_Intérieures sont parvenus à un #accord sur deux des #règlements du #pacte_européen_sur_la_migration_et_l’asile. Alors que les négociations entre le Parlement et le Conseil se poursuivent, La Cimade décrypte les principaux enjeux des réformes européennes en cours d’adoption en matière de migration et d’asile et rend publique ses analyses et propositions.

      Le 23 septembre 2020, la Commission européenne dévoilait sa proposition de « pacte euro­péen sur la migration et l’asile » comme une « une nouvelle approche en matière de migration » visant à « instaurer un climat de confiance et un nouvel équilibre entre responsabi­lité et solidarité ».

      Sur la forme, ce pacte se traduit par un éventail de mesures législatives et opérationnelles pour la mise en œuvre de cette « nouvelle » politique migra­toire. À ce jour, la plupart de ces propositions n’ont pas encore été adoptées et font encore l’objet d’intenses négociations entre le Conseil et le Parlement européen.

      Sur le fond, les mesures proposées s’inscrivent dans la continuité des logiques déjà largement éprouvées. Elles sont fondées sur une approche répressive et sécuritaire au service de l’endiguement des migrations et de l’encouragement des expulsions, solutions qui ont prouvé leur inefficacité, et surtout qui coutent des vies humaines.

      La Cimade appelle l’UE et ses Etats membres à engager un véritable changement de paradigme, pour une Europe qui se fonde sur le respect des droits humains et les solidarités internationales, afin d’assurer la protection des personnes et non leur exclusion. La Cimade continuera à se mobiliser avec d’autres pour défendre les droits des personnes en exil tout au long des parcours migratoires.

      A travers ce document de décryptage, La Cimade souhaite contribuer à la compréhension des principaux enjeux des réformes européennes en cours d’adoption en matière de migration et d’asile et rendre publique ses analyses ainsi que ses propositions.

      https://www.lacimade.org/decryptage-pacte-ue-migration-et-asile-une-approche-repressive-et-securita
      #pacte #pacte_migration_et_asile #pacte_migration_asile

    • L’Europe se ferme un peu plus aux réfugiés

      Au moment où le Haut-Commissariat aux réfugiés des Nations unies (UNHCR) annonce, dans son rapport annuel, que le nombre de réfugiés et de déplacés dans le monde n’a jamais été aussi élevé qu’en 2022, le Conseil de l’Union européenne (UE) se félicite qu’après trois ans de négociation, les Etats membres se sont mis enfin mis d’accord sur un projet de réforme du droit d’asile.

      Ce pourrait être une bonne nouvelle. Car le rapport de l’ONU indique que les pays riches, dont font partie la plupart des Etats européens, sont loin de prendre leur part de cet exode. Ils n’accueillent que 24 % de l’ensemble des réfugiés, la grande majorité de ceux-ci se trouvant dans des Etats à revenu faible ou intermédiaire.

      En témoigne la liste des cinq pays qui accueillent le plus de réfugiés : si l’on excepte l’Allemagne, qui occupe la quatrième place, il s’agit de la Turquie (3,6 millions), de l’Iran (3,4 millions), du Pakistan (1,7 million) et de l’Ouganda (1,5 million).

      Et si l’on rapporte le nombre de personnes accueillies à la population, c’est l’île caribéenne d’Aruba (un réfugié pour six habitants) et le Liban (un réfugié pour sept habitants) qui viennent en tête du classement. A titre de comparaison, on compte en France un réfugié pour 110 habitants.
      Un partage plus équitable

      L’Europe aurait-elle décidé de corriger ce déséquilibre, pour répondre à l’appel de Filippo Gandi, le Haut-Commissaire pour les réfugiés, qui réclame « un partage plus équitable des responsabilités, en particulier avec les pays qui accueillent la majorité des personnes déracinées dans le monde » ?

      S’il s’agissait de cela, quelques moyens simples pourraient être mis en œuvre. En premier lieu, on pourrait ouvrir des voies légales permettant aux personnes en besoin de protection de gagner l’Europe sans être confrontées aux refus de visas qui leur sont quasi systématiquement opposés.

      On pourrait ensuite mettre en place une politique d’accueil adaptée, à l’instar de celle que les pays européens ont su mettre en place pour faire face à l’arrivée de plusieurs millions d’Ukrainiens en 2022.

      A la lecture du communiqué du Conseil de l’UE du 8 juin, on comprend que la réforme ne vise ni à faciliter les arrivées, ni à offrir de bonnes conditions d’accueil. Il y est certes question d’un « besoin de solidarité », mais l’objectif n’est pas de soulager ces pays qui accueillent la majorité des déracinés : il s’agit d’aider les Etats membres « en première ligne » à faire face aux « défis posés par la migration ».

      Autrement dit, de faire baisser la pression qui pèse sur les pays qui forment la frontière méditerranéenne de l’UE (principalement l’Italie, la Grèce et Malte) du fait des arrivées d’exilés par la voie maritime.

      Non que leur nombre soit démesuré – il était de l’ordre de 160 000 personnes en 2022 –, mais parce que la loi européenne prévoit que le pays responsable d’une demande d’asile est celui par lequel le demandeur a pénétré en premier dans l’espace européen.

      En vertu de ce règlement dit « Dublin », ce sont donc les pays où débarquent les boat people qui doivent les prendre en charge, et ces derniers sont censés y demeurer, même si leur projet était de se rendre ailleurs en Europe.

      L’accord conclu le 8 juin, qui doit encore être approuvé par le Parlement européen, ne remet pas en cause ce principe profondément inéquitable, qui n’est réaménagé qu’à la marge. Il porte sur deux propositions de règlements.

      La première réforme la procédure d’asile applicable à la frontière, avec notamment une phase de « screening » impliquant l’obligation de placer en détention la plupart des personnes qui demandent l’asile à la suite d’un débarquement, le temps de procéder au tri entre celles dont les demandes seront jugées irrecevables – pour pouvoir procéder à leur éloignement rapide – et celles dont les demandes seront examinées.

      Un dispositif contraire aux recommandations du Haut-Commissariat aux réfugiés qui rappelle, dans ses lignes directrices sur la détention, que « déposer une demande d’asile n’est pas un acte criminel ».

      La seconde met en place un « mécanisme de solidarité », particulièrement complexe, destiné à organiser la « relocalisation » des exilés admis à déposer une demande d’asile dans un autre Etat membre que celui dans lequel ils ont débarqué.
      Un goût de réchauffé

      Ces deux « innovations », dont le Conseil de l’UE prétend qu’elles marquent « une étape décisive sur la voie d’une modernisation du processus en matière d’asile et d’immigration », ont pourtant un goût de réchauffé.

      En 2015, en réaction aux arrivées en grand nombre de boat people sur les côtes grecques et italiennes, essentiellement dues à l’exil massif de Syriens fuyant la guerre civile – épisode qui fut alors qualifié de « crise migratoire majeure » – , le Conseil de l’UE avait mis en place l’« approche hotspot », destinée à assister les pays dont les frontières extérieures sont soumises à une « pression migratoire démesurée ».

      Ce dispositif, incluant déjà une procédure de filtrage pour distinguer les potentiels réfugiés des migrants présumés « irréguliers », visait à organiser l’expulsion de ces derniers dans des délais rapides et à répartir les autres ailleurs en Europe.

      A cette fin, le Conseil avait adopté un programme de « relocalisation », en vue de transférer 160 000 personnes reconnues éligibles à demander l’asile depuis l’Italie et la Grèce vers d’autres Etats membres de l’UE.

      On le voit, les innovations de 2023 présentent de grandes similitudes avec le plan d’action de 2015. Qu’est-il advenu de celui-ci ? Loin de permettre la prise en charge rapide des exilés ayant surmonté la traversée de la Méditerranée, l’approche hotspot a entraîné la création, dans cinq îles grecques de la mer Egée, de gigantesques prisons à ciel ouvert où des milliers de personnes ont été entassées sans possibilité de rejoindre le continent, parfois pendant plusieurs années, dans un déni généralisé des droits humains (surpopulation, insécurité, manque d’hygiène, violences sexuelles, atteintes aux droits de l’enfant et au droit d’asile). Un désastre régulièrement documenté, à partir de 2016, tant par les ONG que par les agences onusiennes et européennes, et qui perdure.

      La principale raison de cet échec tient à l’absence de solidarité des autres Etats de l’UE à l’égard de la Grèce et, dans une moindre mesure, de l’Italie. Car les promesses de « relocalisation » n’ont pas été tenues : sur les 160 000 demandeurs d’asile qui auraient dû être transférés en 2015, 30 000 seulement ont bénéficié de ce programme.

      La France, qui s’était engagée pour 30 000, en a accueilli moins du tiers. Un signe, s’il en était besoin, que les pays européens répugnent à remplir leurs obligations internationales à l’égard des réfugiés, malgré le nombre dérisoire de ceux qui frappent à leur porte, au regard des désordres du monde.

      On se souvient de l’affaire d’Etat qu’a suscitée l’arrivée à Toulon, au mois de novembre 2022, de l’Ocean Viking, ce bateau humanitaire qui a débarqué quelque 230 boat people sauvés du naufrage, immédiatement placés en détention.

      Emboîtant le pas d’une partie de la classe politique qui s’est empressée de crier à l’invasion, le ministre de l’Intérieur avait annoncé que la plupart seraient expulsés – avant que la justice ordonne leur mise en liberté.
      Quelle efficacité ?

      On peine à croire, dans ce contexte, que les promesses de 2023 seront mieux tenues que celles de 2015. Si le nouveau « mécanisme de solidarité » est présenté comme « obligatoire », le communiqué du Conseil de l’UE ajoute qu’il sera « flexible », et qu’« aucun Etat membre ne sera obligé de procéder à des relocalisations » !

      Une façon de prévenir l’opposition frontale de quelques pays, comme la Pologne ou la Hongrie, dont le Premier ministre a déjà fait savoir que le programme de relocalisation imposé par Bruxelles était « inacceptable ». Sur cette base, le système de compensation financière imaginé pour mettre au pas les récalcitrants n’a guère plus de chances de fonctionner.

      De nombreux commentateurs ont salué l’accord conclu le 8 juin comme l’étape inespérée d’un processus qui paraissait enlisé depuis plusieurs années. Ils voient surtout dans ce texte de compromis un espoir de voir la réforme de l’asile adoptée avant le renouvellement, en 2024, du Parlement européen, pour éviter que ces questions ne phagocytent la campagne électorale.

      C’est une analyse à courte vue. Car il y a tout lieu de craindre que cette réforme, qui s’inscrit dans la continuité d’une politique européenne de rejet des exilés, ne fera qu’intensifier le déséquilibre constaté par les Nations unies dans la répartition mondiale des réfugiés. Et poussera toujours davantage ceux-ci vers les routes migratoires qui font de l’Europe la destination la plus dangereuse du monde.

      https://www.alternatives-economiques.fr/claire-rodier/leurope-se-ferme-un-plus-aux-refugies/00107291

      #Claire_Rodier

    • Pacte européen sur la migration et l’asile : repartir sur d’autres bases

      La présidence belge de l’UE qui aura lieu en 2024 ambitionne de faire adopter le nouveau pacte européen sur la migration et l’asile. L’approche qui domine est essentiellement répressive et contraire aux droits fondamentaux. Elle ne répond pas aux enjeux des migrations internationales. A ce stade, le pacte ne semble plus pouvoir apporter une amélioration à la situation des personnes exilées. Il faut donc y mettre fin et redémarrer les discussions sur base d’une approche radicalement différente.
      Le nouveau pacte UE : le phénix de Moria ?

      En septembre 2020, à la suite de l’incendie meurtrier du hotspot grec surpeuplé et insalubre de Moria (centre d’enregistrement et de tri mis en place lors de la crise de l’accueil de 2015), la Commission européenne a présenté son projet de pacte sur la migration et l’asile. Celui-ci est censé répondre au « plus jamais ça » et offrir « un modèle de gestion prévisible et stable des migrations internationales ». Il est décrit par Margarítis Schinás, vice-président de la Commission, chargé des Migrations et de la promotion du mode de vie européen, comme une maison commune dont les fondations sont l’externalisation, les étages sont les contrôles aux frontières, et le grenier est l’accueil.

      Mais le nouvel « air frais » annoncé n’est en réalité qu’un air vicié. Ce pacte présente en effet les mêmes solutions inefficaces, couteuses et violatrices des droits qui dès lors continueront de produire inévitablement les mêmes crises structurelles de l’accueil et l’aggravation des situations humanitaires et meurtrières le long des routes de l’exil. De nombreuses études documentées, depuis plus d’une vingtaine d’années, analysent l’impact d’une politique migratoire basée sur l’externalisation des frontières ainsi qu’une vision restrictive de l’accueil, et montrent ses dérives et son inefficacité

      .
      Un pacte contre les migrations : détenir, trier, expulser

      Le projet de Pacte repose sur cinq règlements législatifs et quelques recommandations et lignes directrices. Ceux-ci concernent respectivement : les procédures et contrôles aux frontières (APR et Filtrage), le Règlement de Dublin (AMMR), la gestion des crises aux frontières, l’enregistrement, ainsi que le partage des données numériques des personnes exilées (EURODAC)

      .

      A ce jour, les négociations autour du nouveau pacte européen sur la migration et l’asile sont au stade ultime du trilogue

      . La Présidence belge de l’Union européenne, qui aura lieu au premier semestre 2024, ambitionne d’aboutir à son adoption. Les positions de la Commission (septembre 2020), du Parlement (mars 2023) et du Conseil (juin 2023) sont, malgré des nuances, globalement similaires.

      L’orientation répressive et sélective des personnes exilées tout comme l’externalisation des questions migratoires dominent le contenu du pacte. Il est donc inéluctable, qu’une fois le trilogue terminé et le pacte en voie d’être adopté, la mise en œuvre par les Etats membres de ces cinq règlements occasionnera pour les personnes exilées :

      – une pérennisation des entraves, contrôles et criminalisation de leurs départs avec des risques de refoulements en chaîne, y compris vers des pays aussi dangereux que la Lybie et la Syrie ;
      - une procédure de filtrage ou tri avec une fiction de non entrée, à savoir que les droits et devoirs garantis sur le territoire européen ne leur sont pas applicables, malgré leur présence sur ce territoire ;
      - une mise en détention quasi systématique aux frontières y compris pour les enfants dès douze ans avec la possibilité de prolongation en cas de situation dite de crise ;
      – une procédure express d’analyse des demandes de protection qui est incompatible avec une réelle prise en compte des vulnérabilités notamment chez les mineurs, les femmes et les personnes LGBTQI+ ;
      – des décisions rapides d’expulsions sur base du concept de pays tiers « sûrs » avec un recours non suspensif ;
      – la récolte obligatoire, l’enregistrement et le partage des données personnelles entre agences européennes (Frontex, Europol, EASO etc.) et ce, dès l’âge de 6 ans ;
      - un système d’accueil à la carte est envisagé par le Conseil où les 27 auront le choix entre la relocalisation ou la participation financière à un pot commun européen en vue de financer notamment la dimension externe du pacte. Il s’agit du seul progrès par rapport à la situation actuelle, mais la Hongrie et la Pologne, malgré la position prise à la majorité qualifiée au Conseil de juin 2023, ont déjà annoncé leur refus d’y participer.

      Il est clair qu’avec ce type de mesures, le droit d’asile est en danger, les violences et le nombre de décès sur les routes de l’exil (faute de voies légales accessibles et de refoulements systématiques) vont augmenter et que les crises structurelles de l’accueil ne pourront être résolues.
      Le respect des droits des personnes exilées est résiduel

      La situation actuelle des migrations internationales exige des solutions immédiates et durables vu l’étendue du non-respect des droits fondamentaux des personnes exilées et du droit international.
      Selon l’ONU, près de 300 enfants sont morts depuis le début de l’année 2023

      en essayant de traverser la Méditerranée pour atteindre l’Europe. « Ce chiffre est deux fois plus important que celui des six premiers mois de l’année 2022. Nous estimons qu’au cours des six premiers mois de 2023, 11 600 enfants ont effectué la traversée, soit également le double par rapport à la même période de 2022. Ces décès sont absolument évitables », a souligné la responsable aux migrations et aux déplacés à l’Unicef, Verena Knaus. Les chiffres réels sont probablement plus élevés car de nombreux naufrages ne sont pas enregistrés.

      Le racisme et la répression contre les personnes exilées augmentent en Europe et dans les pays du Maghreb, entrainant à leur tour des refoulements systématiques impunis parfois même sous la surveillance de Frontex. Le récent naufrage de Pylos
      au large des côtes grecques et les refoulements effectués depuis la Tunisie dans le désert aux frontières algériennes et libyennes en sont les dramatiques illustrations.
      Quant au volet de l’accueil, il fait l’objet de profonds désaccords. Premièrement, les pays du « MED5 » (Italie, Espagne, Grèce, Malte et Chypre) se disent toujours seuls à assumer la responsabilité de l’accueil sur le sol européen. D’autres pays comme la Belgique se disent également victimes des mouvements secondaires. Face à eux, les pays du groupe de Visegrad (Pologne, Hongrie, Tchéquie, Slovaquie) bloquent tout mécanisme de répartition solidaire. Au niveau européen, la Commission promeut, comme elle l’a fait en juillet 2023 avec la Tunisie, l’adoption de protocoles d’entente avec des Etats peu respectueux des droits humains comme le Maroc et l’Egypte. Cela en vue de limiter la mobilité vers et en Europe. Ces partenariats ont un objectif essentiellement sécuritaire (matériel et formations des garde-côtes aux services du contrôle des frontières et des retours) et n’abordent pas les questions de protection et intégration des personnes migrantes dans les pays du Sud et du Nord

      .
      La solution : suspendre les négociations en repartant sur d’autres bases

      Ni la vision générale du Pacte, ni le contenu de ses cinq règlements législatifs ne répondent aux nombreux défis et opportunités que représentent les migrations internationales. Comme l’a démontré Alice Chatté dans son analyse Regard juridique sur les cinq volets législatifs du pacte européen sur la migration et l’asile

      , « les cinq instruments législatifs proposés dans le pacte, qu’ils soient nouveaux ou réformés, ne sont en réalité que la transcription en instruments légaux des pratiques actuelles des Etats membres, qui ont hélas montré leurs faiblesses et dysfonctionnements. Cela se traduit par des procédures, dorénavant légales, qui autorisent le tri et le recours à la détention systématique à l’ensemble des frontières européennes ainsi que l’examen accéléré des demandes de protection internationale sur base du concept de pays « sûrs » favorisant de facto les pratiques de refoulement et le non-accueil au bénéfice du retour forcé ». Elle ajoute que « le projet du pacte, ainsi que les cinq règlements qui le traduisent juridiquement, ne respectent pas les droits fondamentaux des personnes exilées. Il est en l’état incompatible avec le respect du droit international et européen, ainsi qu’avec le Pacte mondial sur les migrations des Nations Unies ».

      A ce stade final du trilogue, les positions des trois Institutions (Commission, Parlement, et Conseil) ne divergent pas fondamentalement entre elles. Les quelques améliorations défendues par le Parlement (dont un monitoring des droits fondamentaux aux frontières et une réforme des critères du Règlement Dublin), sont insuffisantes pour constituer une base de négociation et risquent de ne pas survivre aux négociations ardues du trilogue

      . Puisque le Pacte ne peut plus suffisamment être réformé pour apporter une amélioration immédiate et durable à la situation des personnes exilées, il faut donc se résoudre à mettre fin aux négociations en cours pour repartir sur de nouvelles bases, respectueuses des droits humains et des principes des Pactes mondiaux sur les migrations et sur les réfugiés.
      La Présidence belge de l’UE doit promouvoir la justice migratoire

      Face aux dérives constatées dans de nombreux Etats membres, y compris la Belgique, condamnée à de nombreuses reprises par la justice pour son manque de respect des droits fondamentaux des personnes en demande d’asile, une approche européenne s’impose. Celle-ci doit être basée sur une approche multilatérale, cohérente et positive des migrations internationales, guidée par le respect des droits fondamentaux des personnes exilées et par la solidarité. Le Pacte mondial des migrations des Nations unies adopté en 2018 et la gestion de l’accueil en 2022 d’une partie de la population ukrainienne sont des sources d’inspiration pour refonder les politiques migratoires de l’Union européenne. Plutôt que de chercher à faire aboutir un pacte qui institutionnalise des pratiques de violation des droits humains, la future Présidence belge de l’UE devrait promouvoir une telle vision, afin de promouvoir le respect du droit d’asile et, plus largement, la #justice_migratoire.

      https://www.cncd.be/Pacte-europeen-sur-la-migration-et

  • Première étape dans la mise en œuvre graduelle du #Pacte_européen_sur_la_migration_et_l’asile : mode opératoire d’un mécanisme de #solidarité_volontaire

    Nous, les ministres chargés des questions migratoires d’Allemagne, de Belgique, de Bulgarie, de Chypre, de Croatie, d’Espagne, de Finlande, de France, de Grèce, d’Irlande, d’Italie, de Lituanie, du Luxembourg, de Malte, des Pays-Bas, du Portugal, de République tchèque, de Roumanie, de Norvège de Suisse et du Liechtenstein, en présence de la Commission européenne :

    conscients de la nécessité de mettre en place, dans le cadre de la première étape de la mise en œuvre graduelle du Pacte européen sur la migration et l’asile et parallèlement à l’adoption d’approches générales ou de mandats de négociations sur les règlements « filtrage » et « Eurodac », un mécanisme temporaire de solidarité visant à apporter une réponse concrète aux difficultés migratoires que rencontrent les États membres de première entrée du bassin méditerranéen ;

    conscients du fait que les défis migratoires auxquels fait face l’UE ont été exacerbés par l’agression de la Russie contre l’Ukraine qui a provoqué, ces derniers mois, un afflux massif de populations sur le territoire de l’Union, justifiant la mise en place d’une solidarité européenne sans précédent ;

    admettant que certains États membres signataires puissent estimer qu’ils ne sont temporairement pas en capacité de contribuer audit mécanisme en raison de la pression disproportionnée à laquelle ils sont soumis ;

    soulignant que ce mécanisme, quoique temporaire et non-législatif, peut apporter des enseignements utiles à l’établissement du mécanisme permanent prévu par le règlement sur la gestion de l’asile et de la migration proposé par la Commission européenne, et que les leçons ainsi tirées seront prises en compte dans les négociations en cours sur cet instrument ;

    pleinement conscients de la place centrale du principe de solidarité dans le projet européen et, en particulier, dans la politique commune en matière d’asile, d’immigration et de contrôle des frontières extérieures, dont l’application du règlement de Dublin fait partie ;

    nous engageons à mettre en œuvre un mécanisme de solidarité volontaire, simple et prévisible destiné à fournir aux États membres les plus touchés par les flux migratoires du bassin méditerranéen et les plus sous pression, y compris sur la route atlantique occidentale, une assistance adaptée à leurs besoins provenant d’autres États membres en complément du soutien européen, en proposant des relocalisations (méthode privilégiée de solidarité) et des contributions financières sans préjudice du droit de l’Union et en particulier du règlement n° 604/2013 ;

    soulignons, tout en reconnaissant que le caractère volontaire de ce mécanisme permet aux États membres d’émettre des préférences quant à la nature et au montant de leurs contributions, par exemple en ce qui concerne les populations admissibles aux relocalisations (nationalité, vulnérabilité, etc.) ou les États membres bénéficiant de leur solidarité, que les critères communs suivants devront être respectés afin de garantir la prévisibilité du mécanisme :

    – les relocalisations doivent s’appliquer en priorité aux États membres confrontés aux débarquements de migrants consécutifs à des opérations de recherche et de sauvetage en mer sur la route méditerranéenne et atlantique occidentale, ainsi qu’à d’autres situations pour prendre en compte la situation actuelle de Chypre ou d’éventuelles évolutions dans les îles grecques ;
    – les relocalisations doivent être proposées en priorité aux personnes en besoin de protection internationale, à commencer par les plus vulnérables ;
    - un volume de relocalisations annuel total sera défini afin de garantir la prévisibilité du mécanisme ;
    – chaque État membre contributeur devrait présenter un engagement en matière de relocalisation avec une cible indicative de relocalisations établi sur la base de sa population et de son PIB[1], tout en conservant la possibilité de dépasser cette part ;
    – en cas de pression disproportionnée sur un État membre et son système d’accueil résultant de flux secondaires, compte tenu de la coopération prévue par le système de Dublin, cet État membre devrait pouvoir invoquer cette situation pour revoir temporairement son engagement en matière de relocalisation ;

    nous engageons, lorsqu’un État membre fait volontairement le choix de participer à la solidarité collective non par une relocalisation mais par une contribution financière à un État membre bénéficiaire ou à des projets dans des pays tiers pouvant avoir une incidence directe sur les flux aux frontières extérieures de l’UE, à respecter les modalités suivantes :

    – les principes énoncés ci-dessus, concernant le calcul de la contribution indicative de chaque État membre ainsi que la possibilité de revoir temporairement celle-ci en cas de pression migratoire disproportionnée, devraient s’appliquer ;
    – une contribution indicative minimale sera prévue pour chaque État membre participant, afin que la contribution totale cible ne soit pas excessivement réduite si un petit nombre d’États membres participent à la relocalisation, et pour affirmer la priorité de la relocalisation sur les contributions financières dans le cadre de ce mécanisme de solidarité ;
    - des transferts financiers directs seront réalisés entre États membres, par souci de simplicité budgétaire ;
    - la Commission sera appelée, après consultation des États membres contributeurs et bénéficiaires, à déterminer les États membres qui devraient recevoir cette aide financière ;

    appelons la Commission européenne, en collaboration étroite avec les États membres et avec le soutien des agences, à garantir la bonne coordination du mécanisme et à veiller au respect des engagements pris par les parties signataires ; ce rôle de coordination implique également la réalisation d’un recensement complet des besoins des États membres de première entrée, y compris les besoins de financement de projets dans des pays tiers ; la Commission évaluera les transferts financiers à réaliser afin de répondre à ces besoins et contrôlera leur utilisation ;

    convenons que, sur la base des besoins exprimés par les États membres de première entrée, les États membres qui souhaitent participer peuvent leur fournir des aides en matière de services, de personnel, d’infrastructures (dans des domaines comme l’accueil, la surveillance des frontières, le contrôle, la rétention et le retour) ; cette solidarité matérielle sera comptabilisée comme une solidarité financière, conformément aux besoins évalués par la Commission ;

    précisons que l’ensemble du mécanisme de solidarité est ouvert aux États associés ;

    convenons que le mécanisme de solidarité sera applicable à compter de la signature de la présente déclaration, mais que les contributions de solidarité commenceront, sous réserve que le recensement des besoins ait été réalisé par la Commission, dès le moment où le Conseil aura convenu de mandats de négociations ou d’approches générales sur les propositions de règlements « filtrage » et « Eurodac » ; néanmoins, des personnes arrivées sur le territoire de l’UE avant cette date pourraient être relocalisées, et des personnes arrivées après cette date pourraient faire l’objet d’un engagement de relocalisation ; les relocalisations devraient bénéficier d’un financement de l’UE et de l’assistance de l’AUEA, conformément au mandat de cette dernière, sur demande des États membres concernés ;

    convenons d’évaluer la mise en œuvre de ces engagements avant l’expiration du mécanisme, un an après son entrée en vigueur, afin de décider de son éventuelle prolongation, en tenant compte des avancées réalisées dans l’adoption et la mise en œuvre des règlements « filtrage » et « Eurodac », de l’évolution des flux migratoires primaires et de l’efficacité de la prévention des flux secondaires (notamment par le règlement de Dublin) ; un examen préliminaire sera réalisé six mois après l’adoption des approches générales de ces règlements et le début des opérations de solidarité ; les répercussions possibles de ce mécanisme sur les flux migratoires seront étudiées, et l’extension de la portée du mécanisme sera envisagée ;

    nous engageons à renforcer la coopération autant que possible pour ralentir les flux migratoires secondaires en accélérant les transferts organisés en vertu du règlement de Dublin, tout en reconnaissant qu’il est primordial de veiller à ce que les personnes bénéficiant d’une protection internationale disposent d’une mobilité légale entre États membres et que les dispositions pertinentes du Pacte devraient être examinées dans ce contexte ;

    affirmons notre volonté de conclure rapidement cette première étape de la négociation du Pacte européen sur la migration et l’asile, dont la présente déclaration constitue un élément essentiel, et de poursuivre dès que possible les négociations relatives à tous les éléments du Pacte, au sein du Conseil et avec le Parlement, afin de doter l’Union du cadre législatif stable dont elle a besoin pour répondre aux défis futurs en matière d’asile et de migration.

    [1]. Cette part est calculée en multipliant le nombre total de relocalisations pour l’État membre par la moyenne de son PIB par rapport au PIB total des États membres de relocalisation et de sa population par rapport à la population totale des États membres de relocalisation.

    https://presidence-francaise.consilium.europa.eu/fr/actualites/premiere-etape-dans-la-mise-en-oeuvre-progress

    –---

    Pour rappel, la relocalisation version #2015 (un #échec) :
    Relocalisation : des annonces à la réalité, une comptabilité en trompe-l’œil

    Dans un euphémisme dont les fonctionnaires européens ont le secret, le douzième rapport de la Commission européenne sur les relocalisations publié le 16 mai souligne que la « tendance positive » se poursuit. Concrètement, cela signifie que 2078 opérations supplémentaires ont eu lieu depuis le rapport du 12 avril, portant à 18’418 le nombre total de personnes relocalisées depuis septembre 2015 (5711 pour l’Italie et 12’707 pour la Grèce).

    –-> pour rappel, l’UE avait promis 160’000 relocalisations dans le cadre de ce mécanisme...

    https://asile.ch/2017/06/10/aedh-relocalisation-annonces-a-realite-comptabilite-trompe-loeil

    #asile #migrations #réfugiés #relocalisations #relocalisation (#relocalisation_bis) #EU #Europe #UE #filtrage #eurodac #pression #mécanisme #Dublin #règlement_Dublin #mécanisme_de_solidarité_volontaire #assistance #contributions_financières #tri #catégorisation #vulnérabilité #flux_secondaires #mouvements_secondaires #pacte_européen #2022 #Europe #EU #UE #demandeurs_d'asile #voluntary_solidarity_mechanism

    –-
    ajouté à la métaliste sur le pacte :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/1019088

    ping @karine4 @isskein

    • Croatia announced that it would receive about 60 refugees through relocations from Greece, Italy and Cyprus initiated by France
      Hrvatska pomaže u preseljenju, prihvatit će oko 60 azilanata

      Ova inicijativa o relokaciji azilanata dolazi baš iz Francuske, koja do kraja mjeseca predsjeda Vijećem EU, i potpuno je na dobrovoljnoj bazi, s ciljem da se privremeno odterete najpogođenije države.

      Tek nekoliko europskih država ponudilo je pomoć za relokaciju tražitelja azila koji stižu na obale Mediterana, prije svega u Italiju, Grčku i na Cipar. Hrvatska je jedna od tih država i prihvatit će 60-ak azilanata, doznajemo. Ostale države koje su im ponudile mjesta su Francuska, Njemačka, Portugal i Irska.

      Dobrovoljne prijave za relokaciju tražitelja azila još traju, a one su pravi znak da proklamirana solidarnost unutar EU izgleda na djelu – rubne države, i prije početka migrantske krize, trpe najveći migrantski pritisak i cilj i ove inicijative jest da se podijeli teret. Hrvatska, osim te važne komponente solidarnosti, ovim podržava i Francusku i njezinu širu inicijativu reformiranja sustava azila, o kojem se pregovara, što opet ide u korist hrvatskom cilju – ulasku u Schengen. Ta deklaracija o pomoći državama i tražiteljima azila usvojena je na zadnjem sastanku ministara unutarnjih poslova u Luxembourgu.

      Prihvat ili novčana pomoć Ova inicijativa o relokaciji azilanata dolazi baš iz Francuske, koja do kraja mjeseca predsjeda Vijećem EU, i potpuno je na dobrovoljnoj bazi, s ciljem da se privremeno odterete najpogođenije države. Ni jedna ponuda ne znači obvezu. EU države imaju opciju preuzeti migrante ili dati financijsku pomoć, o čemu je postignut dogovor na nedavnom sastanku ministara unutarnjih poslova u Luxembourgu. Ta usvojena politička deklaracija, kako se i pretpostavljalo, podijelila je europske države na dva dijela: one koje nikako ne žele migrante i platit će da ih ne uzmu, i one koje se solidariziraju s državama koje su najviše na udaru migrantske krize. Do sad je, prema zadnjim aplikacijama, iz EU država došlo između 7000 i 8000 potvrda da bi preuzeli migrante. U tomu prednjače Njemačka i Francuska s njih oko 3000, dok ostale države nude primiti gotovo simboličan broj ljudi. Privremeni plan je godišnje razmjestiti 10.000 ljudi, sve do stvaranje stalnog europskog sustava relokacije. Ovo nije prvi put da se europska proklamirana solidarnost stavlja na stol i da države dobrovoljno preuzimaju teret. Hrvatska je jedna od država koja su se do sada pokazale solidarnima. U ožujku 2020. odlučila je odgovoriti na poziv Grčke te prihvatiti djecu bez pratnje – djecu koja su sama, bez roditelja, rođaka ili skrbnika – iz izbjegličkih kampova na grčkim otocima, koji su zadnjih tih dana bili zasuti dolaskom migranata. Djeca su najranjivija skupina u svakom sukobu, posebice ona koja su iz nekog razloga sama u izbjeglištvu, bilo da su im roditelji stradali ili nestali, bilo da su žrtve krijumčara ljudi pa je pomoć njima ponajprije humanitarno i civilizacijsko pitanje. I tada je samo 14 država odlučilo učiniti isto. Hrvatska je trebala preuzeti 12 djevojčica i jedno novorođenče, obavljene su sve pripreme, djeca su prošla i sigurnosnu provjeru, pripremljeni su kapaciteti i sustav psihosocijalne pomoći da bi se naposljetku dogodio obrat te su djevojčice, pred sam polazak s grčkih otoka, odbile doći u Hrvatsku i odabrale zapadnu Europu. Tada se špekuliralo da su na to bile nagovorene.

      Istovremeno, Hrvatska i dalje štiti vanjsku granicu EU. Pritisak ilegalnih migracija na vanjske granice Europske unije ne staje, a najteža je situacija na tzv. zapadnobalkanskoj ruti, koja vodi i do Hrvatske. Uz najveći broj pokušaja ilegalnog prijelaza EU granica, posebnost na toj ruti je ta što migranti, jednom kad stignu, ostaju u području uz granicu tako da se njihov broj više nego udvostručio u odnosu na lani i sada njih 12.088 blizu Hrvatske čeka da nekako uđe u EU. Za razliku od drugih ruta, migranti na ovoj ruti neprestano pokušavaju prijeći granicu. Budu li vraćeni, jednostavno će pokušati ponovno, kažu iz Agencije za europsku graničnu i obalnu stražu (Frontex). Pomoć na terenu Napredak u reformi migracijske politike i schengenskog zakonika pomoći će Hrvatskoj, kako na terenu, tako i za ulazak u Schengen, jer je riječ o dva procesa koji idu zajedno. Posebice je važno što je impuls za konačan dogovor, o potrebi kojeg se govori godinama, došao iz Francuske te je i toj državi važno imati podršku od članica EU, što ima od Hrvatske. S druge strane, politička pomoć Francuske za ulazak u Schengen među ključnim je momentima procesa. Na zadnjem sastanku ministara unutarnjih poslova postignut je napredak kad je usvojeno zajedničko pregovaračko stajalište o prijedlozima uredbi o registriranju migranata i Eurodacu, europskom sustavu za usporedbu otisaka prstiju podnositelja zahtjeva za azil te uspostavi mehanizma solidarnosti za rasterećivanje država članica na vanjskim granicama koje su najviše pod pritiskom migranata s Mediterana.

      https://m.vecernji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska-pomaze-u-preseljenju-prihvatit-ce-oko-60-azilanata-1596400

      #Croatie

    • First asylum seekers relocated from Italy to France via new EU mechanism

      A group of 38 asylum seekers left Italy for #France last week. They are the first to be relocated under the EU’s new ’voluntary solidarity mechanism.’

      The asylum seekers left Italy for France on Thursday (August 25), according to the Italian interior ministry. France and Italy are among the countries that agreed to take in migrants and refugees from European countries that experience a large number of arrivals. France agreed to take in 3,000 people per year through the EU’s new ’solidarity mechanism’, according to reports from news agency ANSA.

      Before the 38 asylum seekers could leave for France, Italian authorities carried out identification and health checks. The EU asylum agency also registered their international protection applications, while French authorities analyzed individual files, and interviewed asylum seekers. French officials had visited a center for asylum seekers in Bari, southern Italy between July 28 and August 2.

      The EU and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) reportedly helped in organizing the transfers.
      What is the ’voluntary solidarity mechanism’?

      In June, 21 European countries agreed to take part in a ’voluntary solidarity mechanism’ at a meeting of the European Home Affairs Council in Luxembourg.

      The mechanism seeks to provide EU members states “most affected by migratory flows” with help from other states through the relocation of refugees and financial contributions. The states set to benefit from the agreement are primarily southern European countries bordering on the Mediterranean (like Italy and Greece) and on the Atlantic (namely Spain).
      Italian officials: 10,000 refugees relocated per year

      Through the mechanism, 10,000 people are supposed to be relocated every year, according to Italian officials. The people selected for relocation should primarily be “persons in need of international protection, giving priority to the most vulnerable ones,” the agreement reached by the countries’ interior ministers reads.

      The countries which agreed to participate in the mechanism are:

      - 18 of the 27 member states of the European Union (namely Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Spain, Finland, France, Croatia, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania)
      - Three countries not part of the EU but part of the Schengen Area — a mostly border control free area in Europe (Norway, Switzerland, Liechtenstein).

      Germany to take in 3,500 asylum seekers per year

      Germany — the most populous EU country — has agreed to take in the largest number of refugees, followed by France. A total 3,500 people per year will be relocated to Germany, according to the German interior ministry. A delegation of German officials is expected to be visiting Italy in late August to carry out checks on a group of people slated to be relocated to Germany.

      Italy — located across the Central Mediterranean from Libya and Tunisia — is the main destination for migrants and refugees hoping to reach Europe from Africa. Last week, well over 1,000 of people arrived on Italy’s shores. In 2021, more than 67,000 people arrived in the country via sea alone.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/42929/first-asylum-seekers-relocated-from-italy-to-france-via-new-eu-mechani

      #Italie

  • Schengen borders code: Council adopts its general approach

    As part of the work carried out under the French presidency to reform and strengthen the Schengen area in the face of new challenges, the Council today adopted its general approach on the reform of the Schengen borders code.

    This reform: (i) provides new tools to combat the instrumentalisation of migrant flows; (ii) establishes a new legal framework for external border measures in the event of a health crisis, drawing on the lessons learned from the experience with COVID-19; (iii) updates the legal framework for reintroducing internal border controls in order to safeguard the principle of free movement while responding to persistent threats; (iv) introduces alternative measures to these controls.

    The general approach now enables the Council to start negotiations with the European Parliament, once the Parliament has adopted its own position.
    The fight against the instrumentalisation of migration flows

    The text defines the instrumentalisation of migrants as a situation in which a third country or non-state actor encourages or facilitates the movement of third-country nationals towards the EU’s external borders or to a member state in order to destabilise the EU or a member state. It introduces new measures to combat this phenomenon, including limiting the number of crossing points at the external border or limiting their opening hours, and intensifying border surveillance.
    External border measures in the event of a health crisis

    The text provides for the possible swift adoption of binding minimum rules on temporary travel restrictions at the external borders in the event of a threat to public health. This will strengthen the currently available tools applied during the COVID-19 pandemic, which have been based on non-binding recommendations.

    The binding implementing regulation to be adopted by the Council in such situations will include minimum restrictions, with the possibility for member states to apply stricter restrictions if the conditions so require. It will also include a list of essential travellers to be exempted from certain measures, which will be decided on a case by case basis.
    Reintroduction of internal border controls

    The text sets out more structured procedures for the reintroduction of internal border controls, with stronger safeguards. It takes into account a recent judgment by the European Court of Justice, which confirmed the principle of freedom of movement within the Schengen area, while specifying the conditions for the reintroduction of internal border controls. In this regard, it offers possible responses to persistent threats to public policy and internal security.

    If a continued need for internal border controls is confirmed beyond two years and six months, the member state concerned will need to notify the Commission of its intention to further prolong internal border controls, providing justification for doing so and specifying the date on which it expects to lift controls. The Commission will then issue a recommendation, also relating to that date, and with regard to the principles of necessity and proportionality, to be taken into account by the member state.
    Promotion of alternative measures

    The text updates the Schengen borders code by providing for alternative measures to internal border controls, in particular by proposing a more effective framework for police checks in member states’ border regions.

    The text introduces a new procedure to address unauthorised movements of irregular migrants within the EU. In the context of a bilateral cooperation framework based on voluntary action by the member states concerned, this mechanism will allow a member state to transfer third-country nationals apprehended in the border area and illegally staying in its territory to the member state from which they arrived, in the context of operational cross-border police cooperation.

    https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/06/10/schengen-area-council-adopts-negotiating-mandate-reform-schengen-bo

    en français:
    https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/press/press-releases/2022/06/10/schengen-area-council-adopts-negotiating-mandate-reform-schengen-bo

    #Schegen #code_frontières_Schengen #frontières #frontières_extérieures #frontières_intérieures #frontières_internes #migrations #asile #réfugiés #réforme #menaces #liberté_de_circulation #surveillance_frontalière #instrumentalisation #contrôles_frontaliers #mouvements_secondaires #coopération_policière_opérationnelle_transfrontière

    • Joint Civil Society statement on the Schengen Borders Code

      The undersigned civil society organisations would like to express their concerns with regard to several aspects of the Commission’s proposal amending the Schengen Borders Code.

      Overall, the proposal embraces a very harmful narrative which assumes that people crossing borders irregularly are a threat to the EU and proposes to address it by increasing policing and curtailing safeguards. At the same time, the proposal fails to recognise the lack of regular pathways for asylum seekers, who are often forced to turn to irregular border crossings in order to seek international protection within the EU, and further complicates access to asylum. The measures put forward by the Commission would have a detrimental impact on the right to freedom of movement within the EU, the principle of non-discrimination, access to asylum and the harmonisation of procedures under EU law. Furthermore, the proposal would increase the use of monitoring and surveillance technologies, without any adequate safeguards.

      Freedom of movement within the EU and violation of the principle of non-discrimination

      Several provisions of the proposed amended Schengen Borders Code would encroach the right to freedom of movement within the EU (art. 3(2) TEU, art. 21 and 77 TFEU) by expanding the possibility to reintroduce internal border controls and facilitating the application of so-called “alternative measures” which in practice amount to discriminatory border controls. The discretionary nature of these border checks is very likely to disproportionately target racialised communities, and practically legitimise ethnic and racial profiling and expose people to institutional and police abuse.

      While the amended Schengen Borders Code reiterates that internal border controls are prohibited in the Schengen area, it also introduces the possibility to carry out police checks in the internal border areas with the explicit aim to prevent irregular migration, when these are based on “general information and experience of the competent authorities” (rec. 18 and 21 and art. 23). In addition, the proposal clarifies the meaning of “serious threat” which justifies the temporary reintroduction of border controls (which was already possible under art. 25 of the 2016 SBC). Problematically, the proposed definition of “serious threat” also includes “a situation characterised by large scale unauthorised movements of third country nationals between member states, putting at risk the overall functioning of the area without internal border control” (art. 25).[1]

      Such provisions, together with the new procedure set by article 23a and analysed below, will in practice legalise systematic border controls which target people based on their racial, ethnic, national, or religious characteristics. This practice is in clear violation of European and international anti-discrimination law and a breach to migrants’ fundamental rights.

      Research from the EU Fundamental Rights Agency in 2021 shows that people from an ‘ethnic minority, Muslim, or not heterosexual’ are disproportionately affected by police stops, both when they are walking and when in a vehicle. In addition, another study from 2014 showed that 79% of surveyed border guards at airports rated ethnicity as a helpful indicator to identify people attempting to enter the country in an irregular manner before speaking to them.

      The new provisions introduced in the amended Schengen Borders Code are likely to further increase the discriminatory and illegal practice of ethnic and racial profiling and put migrant communities at risk of institutional violence, which undermines the right to non-discrimination and stands at odds with the European Commission’s commitments under the recent Anti-Racism Action Plan.

      Lack of individual assessment and increased detention

      The proposed revisions to the Schengen Borders Code set a new procedure to “transfer people apprehended at the internal borders”. According to the proposed new rules, if a third country national without a residence permit or right to remain crosses the internal borders in an irregular way (e.g., from Germany to Belgium, or from Italy to France) and if they are apprehended “in the vicinity of the border area,” they could be directly transferred back to the competent authorities in the EU country where it is assumed they just came from, without undergoing an individual assessment (art. 23a and Annex XII). This provision is very broad and can potentially include people apprehended at train or bus stations, or even in cities close to the internal borders, if they are apprehended as part of cross-border police cooperation (e.g. joint police patrols) and if there is an indication that they have just crossed the border (for instance through documents they may carry on themselves, their own statements, or information taken from migration or other databases).

      The person will be then transferred within 24 hours.[2] During these 24 hours, Annex XII sets that the authorities might “take appropriate measures” to prevent the person from entering on the territory – which constitutes, in practice, a blanket detention provision, without any safeguards nor judicial overview. While the transfer decision could be subject to appeal, this would not have a suspensive effect. The Return Directive would also be amended, by introducing an obligation for the receiving member state to issue a return decision without the exceptions currently listed in article 6 (e.g., the possibility to issue a residence permit for humanitarian or compassionate reasons). As a consequence, transferred people would be automatically caught up in arbitrary and lengthy detention and return procedures.[3]

      Courts in Italy, Slovenia and Austria have recently ruled against readmissions taking place under informal or formal agreements, recognising them as systematic human rights violations with the potential to trigger so-called chain pushbacks. The courts found the plaintiffs were routinely returned from Italy or Austria through Slovenia to Croatia, from where they had been illegally pushed back to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

      In practice, this provision would legalise the extremely violent practice of “internal pushbacks” which have been broadly criticised by civil society organisations across the EU and condemned by higher courts. The new procedure, including the possibility to detain people for up to 24 hours, would also apply to children, even though this has been deemed illegal by courts and despite international consensus that child detention constitutes a human rights violation.

      Access to asylum

      The new Code introduces measures which member states can apply in cases of “instrumentalisation of migrants”, which is defined as “a situation where a third country instigates irregular migratory flows into the Union by actively encouraging or facilitating the movement of third country nationals to the external borders” (art. 2). In such cases, member states can limit the number of border crossing points and their opening hours, and intensify border surveillance including through drones, motion sensors and border patrols (art. 5(4) and 13(5)). The definition of instrumentalisation of migrants should also be read in conjunction with the Commission’s proposal for a Regulation addressing situations of instrumentalisation in the field of migration and asylum, which provides member states with numerous derogations to the asylum acquis.

      These measures unjustifiably penalise asylum seekers by limiting access to the territory and de facto undermining art. 31 of the Refugee Convention which prohibits States from imposing penalties on refugees on account of their entry or presence in their territory without authorization, and are therefore in violation of international law.

      Harmonisation of procedures under EU law and asylum acquis

      The proposal lifts the standstill clause introduced by the 2008 Return Directive (art. 6(3)) which prohibits member states from negotiating new bilateral readmission agreements. When negotiating the 2008 Return Directive, both the Commission and the European Parliament had clarified that bilateral readmission agreements should remain an exception, as they undermine the objective of harmonising procedures under EU law.

      By incentivising states to adopt new bilateral agreements, and proposing a new internal transfer procedure, the Commission’s proposal promotes the proliferation of exceptional procedures, which are outside the framework set by the Return Directive and the asylum acquis, and circumvents the procedural safeguards included in the Dublin Regulation.

      The proposed provisions undermine the substantive and procedural guarantees for third country nationals, such as the right to request asylum, the respect of the principle of non-refoulement, and the right to an effective remedy.

      As mentioned above, several national-level courts have ruled on the unlawfulness of readmissions carried out under formal and informal agreements, which often led to instances of chain-refoulement. There is a serious risk that readmission agreements, if they remain a part of the current legislative proposal, could be further abused to perpetrate chain refoulement and collective expulsions, which are in violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 19 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

      Use of monitoring and surveillance technologies

      Lastly, the proposal also facilitates a more extensive use of monitoring and surveillance technologies, by clarifying that these are part of member states’ responsibility to patrol borders (art. 2). In addition, article 23, analysed above, clarifies that internal checks, including to prevent irregular migration, can be carried out “where appropriate, on the basis of monitoring and surveillance technologies generally used in the territory”.

      By removing obstacles for a more extensive use of monitoring and surveillance technologies, these provisions would create a loophole to introduce technologies which would otherwise be discouraged by pre-existing EU legislation such as the General Data Protection Regulation.[4]

      Artificial Intelligence (AI) and other automated decision-making systems, including profiling, are increasingly used in border control and management for generalised and indiscriminate surveillance. Insofar as such systems are used to ‘detect human presence’ for the purpose of ‘combating irregular migration’, there is serious concern that such systems can facilitate illegal interdiction, violence at border crossings, and further limit access to asylum and other forms of protection.

      Furthermore, these technologies disproportionately target racialised people, thus further exacerbating the risks of increased racial and ethnic profiling. Indeed, monitoring and surveillance technologies which make use of artificial intelligence by nature violate the right to non-discrimination insofar as they are trained on past data and decision-making, and therefore codify assumptions on the basis of nationality and other personal characteristics, which is prohibited by international racial discrimination law.[5]

      Recommendations

      In light of the concerns discussed above, the undersigned civil society organisations:

      – Express their concerns on the harmful impact of narratives which consider people crossing borders irregularly as a threat, and recommend the European Parliament and the Council to delete such references from recital 29, article 23 and article 25(1)(c);
      – Call on the EU institutions to uphold the right to freedom of movement and the principle of non-discrimination, including by prohibiting the use of technologies which make use of artificial intelligence and other automated decision-making systems. In this regard, we recommend the European Parliament and the Council to amend article 23, paragraph (a) by deleting the reference to “combat irregular residence or stay, linked to irregular migration” in point (ii) and deleting point (iv) on monitoring and surveillance technologies;
      – Urge the EU institutions to uphold the right to apply for asylum, and recommend deleting the definition of ‘instrumentalisation of migration’ in article 2, paragraph 27 and all the ensuing provisions which would apply in this circumstance;
      – Condemn the proliferation of exceptional procedures which undermine the right to an individual assessment, and recommend deleting article 23a, annex XII, and the proposed amendment to art. 6(3) of the Return Directive;
      – Express their concerns at the glaring inconsistency between some of the proposed provisions and the European Commission’s commitments under the EU Action Plan against Racism, i.e. with respect to ending racial profiling, and call on the EU institutions to uphold their commitment to address and to combat structural and institutional discrimination and include explicit references to the Action Plan against Racism in the text of the Schengen Borders Code.

      https://picum.org/joint-civil-society-statement-schengen-borders-code

      #discrimination #non-discrimination #détention #rétention #détention_administrative #réadmission

  • Le #Conseil_d'Etat saisi du #contrôle_aux_frontières rétabli par la #France depuis 2015

    Des associations s’appuient sur un arrêt de la #Cour_de_justice de l’Union européenne du 26 avril pour dénoncer le renouvellement illégal de cette #dérogation à la #libre_circulation des personnes.

    Dans la nuit du 13 au 14 novembre 2015, alors que l’assaut des forces d’intervention n’avait pas encore été donné au Bataclan, François Hollande, alors président de la République, avait annoncé la proclamation de l’#état_d'urgence et la #fermeture_des_frontières pour un mois. Ce #rétablissement_des_contrôles aux #frontières_intérieures par un pays membre de l’#Union_européenne (#UE) est autorisé, mais de façon exceptionnelle et #temporaire. La France le maintient de façon interrompue depuis plus de six ans. Elle a notifié à quinze reprises à la Commission européenne le #renouvellement de cette #dérogation_temporaire au « #code_frontières_Schengen ».

    Quatre associations ont décidé, selon nos informations, de saisir le Conseil d’Etat mardi 10 mai d’une demande de #suspension_en_référé de la dernière prolongation, du 1er mai au 31 octobre 2022, notifiée par Paris. L’Association nationale d’assistance aux frontières pour les étrangers (Anafé), le Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigrés (Gisti), le Comité inter-mouvement auprès des évacués (Cimade) et la Ligue des droits de l’homme (LDH) n’en sont pas à leur première tentative devant la haute juridiction administrative. Mais elles ont cette fois un atout maître avec une toute récente décision de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne.

    Le 26 avril, la cour de Luxembourg a dit, en réponse à une question d’interprétation des textes européens posée par la #justice autrichienne, que la réintroduction des contrôles aux frontières décidée par un Etat en raison de #menaces_graves pour son #ordre_public ou sa #sécurité_intérieure « ne peut pas dépasser une durée totale maximale de six mois » , y compris ses prolongations éventuelles. L’arrêt des juges européens précise que l’apparition d’une nouvelle menace peut autoriser à réintroduire ce contrôle au-delà des six mois initiaux, mais dans ce cas elle doit être « distincte de celle initialement identifiée » . Il s’agit de protéger la libre circulation des personnes, « une des principales réalisations de l’Union européenne » , soulignent les juges.

    Or, selon le relevé de la Commission européenne, les dernières notifications de Paris pour justifier cette entorse au principe de libre circulation listent invariablement les trois mêmes « menaces » : la #menace_terroriste persistante, les #mouvements_secondaires de migrants, l’épidémie de #Covid-19. Rien de très nouveau en effet. Pour Patrice Spinosi, l’avocat des associations, le dernier renouvellement décidé « en dépit de la clarification apportée » par l’arrêt de la cour européenne constitue « une flagrante violation » de l’article 25 du code frontières Schengen.

    Hausse « considérable » des #refus_d'entrée

    Au ministère de l’intérieur, on indique en réaction à l’arrêt du 26 avril que la question du renouvellement répété de cette dérogation « est traitée par la réforme en cours du code des frontières Schengen » . On précise que le sujet sera évoqué les 9 et 10 juin, lors du prochain conseil des ministres « justice et affaires intérieures » de l’UE. Mais, d’une part, ces nouvelles règles ne sont pas encore définies, et d’autre part, la Commission européenne avait précisé en ouvrant ce chantier le 14 décembre 2021 que « l’actualisation des règles vise à faire en sorte que la réintroduction des contrôles aux frontières intérieures demeure une mesure de dernier recours. »

    Derrière les arguments sur l’ordre public et la sécurité intérieure, les associations dénoncent des pratiques illégales de contrôle migratoire. Elles ont publié le 29 avril, avec d’autres associations comme Médecins du Monde et Amnesty International, un communiqué appelant « les autorités françaises à mettre un terme à la prolongation des contrôles aux frontières intérieures et à cesser ainsi les atteintes quotidiennes aux #droits_fondamentaux des personnes exilées qui s’y présentent (violences, contrôles aux faciès, non-respect du droit d’asile et des droits de l’enfant, enfermement) ».

    Ces contrôles au sein de l’espace Schengen se traduisent par des « refus d’entrée » opposés en nombre, dénoncent les associations qui y voient des pratiques discriminatoires. « Les statistiques révèlent une augmentation considérable des refus d’entrée aux frontières intérieures depuis le 13 novembre 2015 » , de 5 000 en 2015 à 48 000 pour les huit premiers mois de 2020, écrivent-elles dans leur requête au Conseil d’Etat. Il se trouve que ce dernier a adressé le 24 février une question préjudicielle à la Cour de Luxembourg pour vérifier si le fait d’opposer un « refus d’entrée » à un #poste_frontière, même en cas de rétablissement des contrôles aux frontières, est conforme au droit de l’UE.

    Par deux fois, en décembre 2017 et octobre 2017, le Conseil d’Etat avait rejeté des requêtes émanant des mêmes associations contre le renouvellement des contrôles aux frontières, estimant qu’une « #nouvelle_menace » ou une « #menace_renouvelée » pouvait justifier une nouvelle dérogation de six mois à la #libre_circulation_des_personnes. Ce nouveau référé devrait être examiné en audience sous un mois, à moins que la juridiction considère que l’affaire mérite d’être jugée au fond, ce qui pourrait prendre quelques semaines de plus.

    https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2022/05/10/le-conseil-d-etat-saisi-du-controle-aux-frontieres-retabli-par-la-france-dep
    #justice

    avec un effet clair sur les #frontières_sud-Alpines, dont il est pas mal question sur seenthis ;-)
    #frontière_sud-alpine #Alpes

    ping @isskein @karine4

  • La #France crée une « #impulsion_politique » sur la gestion des frontières de l’Union

    Un #Conseil_des_ministres dédié à l’#espace_Schengen sera créé.

    « Nous devons avoir une #vision_politique de l’espace de #libre_circulation Schengen » et l’adapter « à la situation géopolitique actuelle », a plaidé jeudi Gérald Darmanin, ministre français de l’Intérieur, lors de son arrivée à une réunion informelle avec ses homologues européens à Lille. Ceux-ci ont endossé l’idée, proposée par la France, de créer une structure politique dédiée au pilotage de cet espace de 26 pays sans frontières intérieures, « joyau de la couronne » européenne, selon les mots du vice-président de la Commission Margaritis Schinas, mais malmené par les réactions politiques, parfois désordonnées, des États face à la migration, aux attaques terroristes ou à la pandémie de Covid-19.

    Cet accord constitue une première réussite pour la présidence française du Conseil de l’UE (PFUE), qui a commencé le 1er janvier 2022 et qui a fait du contrôle des #frontières_extérieures de l’Union une priorité. Même si le grand défi sera surtout d’obtenir des avancées sur la réforme de l’espace Schengen et la politique d’asile européenne.

    Le premier « Conseil des ministres de l’Intérieur de l’espace Schengen » aura lieu le 3 mars prochain. L’objectif est d’en faire un « rendez-vous politique » qui se tiendrait quatre fois par an ou plus, en cas de crise aux frontières de l’Union européenne. Y seront conviés tous les États de l’UE, même ceux qui ne font pas partie de l’espace Schengen (Croatie, Irlande, Roumanie, Bulgarie et Chypre). Ainsi que la Suisse, la Norvège, le Liechtenstein et l’Islande, membres de l’espace Schengen mais pas de l’Union.

    Pour alimenter les discussions, la France propose d’établir un « #baromètre_Schengen » avec des #indicateurs sur la #pression_migratoire aux frontières extérieures de l’UE, les #mouvements_secondaires des demandeurs d’asile en son sein et la #situation_sanitaire - autant d’éléments qui ont déjà poussé certains pays à rétablir des contrôles à leurs frontières et donc à mettre en suspens la libre circulation des personnes.

    « Ce Conseil, ce n’est pas une révolution institutionnelle et ce n’est pas le but. La plus-value sera d’anticiper les crises et de donner des réponses politiques aux défis qui se situent à nos portes », explique une source française. Fin novembre, la Biélorussie a fait venir sur son territoire des migrants, avant de les pousser vers les pays baltes et la Pologne, afin d’exercer une pression sur l’Union européenne. De manière générale, l’espace « Schengen a été créé dans les années 1990, au moment où il n’y avait pas la déstabilisation qu’on observe en Libye, en Syrie, en Afghanistan ou encore les grands mouvements migratoires que nous connaissons », a souligné M. Darmanin.

    Accord pour essayer la méthode française

    Mais, pour répondre à ces défis, l’enjeu fondamental sera surtout de faire progresser les négociations sur les réformes de l’espace Schengen proposées par la Commission l’année dernière, ainsi que celles sur le Pacte sur l’asile et la migration.

    Sur ce dernier point, le ministre s’est réjoui de l’#accord « unanime » des États membres pour s’essayer à la méthode française afin de tenter de dépasser leurs divisions quant à la gestion de la migration. Paris a invité les Vingt-sept à construire la #politique_d'asile commune étape par étape, en commençant par le renforcement du #contrôle (identité, sécurité, santé…) et du #filtrage des migrants aux frontières de l’UE. Puisque cela représente une charge considérable pour les États membres qui s’y trouvent, les Français mettront sur la table le 3 mars des « formes concrètes » de #solidarité_européenne. Dont notamment une liste d’États « volontaires » - une douzaine selon nos informations - prêts à relocaliser des migrants sur leur sol.

    Ces idées françaises n’ont rien de révolutionnaire par rapport à ce qui a déjà été imaginé, par la Commission ou par d’autres États membres, pour déminer le dossier migratoire. Mais la paralysie européenne face à ce sujet clivant et éminemment politique est telle que relancer les discussions entre les Vingt-sept est déjà une victoire en soi. « J’attendais beaucoup de la présidence française et aujourd’hui vous avez répondu à mes attentes », a carrément déclaré jeudi Ylva Johansson, commissaire européenne aux Affaires intérieures, lors d’une conférence de presse aux côtés de Gérald Darmanin.

    Le risque est cependant que ce dialogue finisse encore dans une impasse. « Il y a toujours l’envie d’aboutir à un compromis », (se) rassurait une source française jeudi, tout en reconnaissant que « chacun des États membres garde ses lignes rouges et ses demandes »

    https://www.lalibre.be/international/europe/2022/02/03/la-france-cree-une-impulsion-politique-sur-la-gestion-des-frontieres-de-luni

    #frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Schengen #relocalisation #Union_européenne #UE #EU

  • Greece proposes Frontex be allowed to operate beyond EU borders

    Returning unapproved asylum seekers to their home countries could become an easier task if European border patrol agency Frontex could operate outside of European borders, Greek Migration Minister #Notis_Mitarakis said on Wednesday.

    Speaking virtually with German Deputy Minister for Migration Stephan Mayer, #Mitarakis added that bilateral agreements with other partner countries would be required for this.

    The Minister underlined that collaborating with third countries to prevent migrants’ departures from Turkey is also key, as is a strong presence of Frontex in relevant regions.

    Mayer called on Greek authorities to intensify efforts for improving the hospitality and welfare system for asylum seekers or recognized refugees in Greece, in view of reducing the attraction factor for irregular secondary migration influx.

    According to data he cited, some 13,000 people have sought asylum in Germany since the summer of 2020, but they had already received international protection status in Greece.

    He also said the two countries should work together on mutual guarantees so that more relocations to Greece are possible from Germany.

    https://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2021/05/13/greece-frontex-eu-borders-operation

    #Frontex #proposition #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #accords_bilatéraux #mouvements_secondaires #Allemagne #Grèce #relocalisations

    –—

    Intéressant:

    Mayer called on Greek authorities to intensify efforts for improving the hospitality and welfare system for asylum seekers or recognized refugees in Greece, in view of reducing the attraction factor for irregular secondary migration influx.

    #attraction #dissuasion #hospitalité #accueil

    • EU: Frontex splashes out: millions of euros for new technology and equipment (19.06.2020)

      The approval of the new #Frontex_Regulation in November 2019 implied an increase of competences, budget and capabilities for the EU’s border agency, which is now equipping itself with increased means to monitor events and developments at the borders and beyond, as well as renewing its IT systems to improve the management of the reams of data to which it will have access.

      In 2020 Frontex’s #budget grew to €420.6 million, an increase of over 34% compared to 2019. The European Commission has proposed that in the next EU budget (formally known as the Multiannual Financial Framework or MFF, covering 2021-27) €11 billion will be made available to the agency, although legal negotiations are ongoing and have hit significant stumbling blocks due to Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic and political disagreements.

      Nevertheless, the increase for this year has clearly provided a number of opportunities for Frontex. For instance, it has already agreed contracts worth €28 million for the acquisition of dozens of vehicles equipped with thermal and day cameras, surveillance radar and sensors.

      According to the contract for the provision of Mobile Surveillance Systems, these new tools will be used “for detection, identification and recognising of objects of interest e.g. human beings and/or groups of people, vehicles moving across the border (land and sea), as well as vessels sailing within the coastal areas, and other objects identified as objects of interest”. [1]

      Frontex has also published a call for tenders for Maritime Analysis Tools, worth a total of up to €2.6 million. With this, Frontex seeks to improve access to “big data” for maritime analysis. [2] The objective of deploying these tools is to enhance Frontex’s operational support to EU border, coast guard and law enforcement authorities in “suppressing and preventing, among others, illegal migration and cross-border crime in the maritime domain”.

      Moreover, the system should be capable of delivering analysis and identification of high-risk threats following the collection and storage of “big data”. It is not clear how much human input and monitoring there will be of the identification of risks. The call for tenders says the winning bidder should have been announced in May, but there is no public information on the chosen company so far.

      As part of a 12-month pilot project to examine how maritime analysis tools could “support multipurpose operational response,” Frontex previously engaged the services of the Tel Aviv-based company Windward Ltd, which claims to fuse “maritime data and artificial intelligence… to provide the right insights, with the right context, at the right time.” [3] Windward, whose current chairman is John Browne, the former CEO of the multinational oil company BP, received €783,000 for its work. [4]

      As the agency’s gathering and processing of data increases, it also aims to improve and develop its own internal IT systems, through a two-year project worth €34 million. This will establish a set of “framework contracts”. Through these, each time the agency seeks a new IT service or system, companies selected to participate in the framework contracts will submit bids for the work. [5]

      The agency is also seeking a ’Software Solution for EBCG [European Border and Coast Guard] Team Members to Access to Schengen Information System’, through a contract worth up to €5 million. [6] The Schengen Information System (SIS) is the EU’s largest database, enabling cooperation between authorities working in the fields of police, border control and customs of all the Schengen states (26 EU member states plus Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland) and its legal bases were recently reformed to include new types of alert and categories of data. [7]

      This software will give Frontex officials direct access to certain data within the SIS. Currently, they have to request access via national border guards in the country in which they are operating. This would give complete autonomy to Frontex officials to consult the SIS whilst undertaking operations, shortening the length of the procedure. [8]

      With the legal basis for increasing Frontex’s powers in place, the process to build up its personnel, material and surveillance capacities continues, with significant financial implications.

      https://www.statewatch.org/news/2020/june/eu-frontex-splashes-out-millions-of-euros-for-new-technology-and-equipme

      #technologie #équipement #Multiannual_Financial_Framework #MFF #surveillance #Mobile_Surveillance_Systems #Maritime_Analysis_Tools #données #big_data #mer #Windward_Ltd #Israël #John_Browne #BP #complexe_militaro-industriel #Software_Solution_for_EBCG_Team_Members_to_Access_to_Schengen_Information_System #SIS #Schengen_Information_System

    • EU : Guns, guards and guidelines : reinforcement of Frontex runs into problems (26.05.2020)

      An internal report circulated by Frontex to EU government delegations highlights a series of issues in implementing the agency’s new legislation. Despite the Covid-19 pandemic, the agency is urging swift action to implement the mandate and is pressing ahead with the recruitment of its new ‘standing corps’. However, there are legal problems with the acquisition, registration, storage and transport of weapons. The agency is also calling for derogations from EU rules on staff disciplinary measures in relation to the use of force; and wants an extended set of privileges and immunities. Furthermore, it is assisting with “voluntary return” despite this activity appearing to fall outside of its legal mandate.

      State-of-play report

      At the end of April 2020, Frontex circulated a report to EU government delegations in the Council outlining the state of play of the implementation of its new Regulation (“EBCG 2.0 Regulation”, in the agency and Commission’s words), especially relating to “current challenges”.[1] Presumably, this refers to the outbreak of a pandemic, though the report also acknowledges challenges created by the legal ambiguities contained in the Regulation itself, in particular with regard to the acquisition of weapons, supervisory and disciplinary mechanisms, legal privileges and immunities and involvement in “voluntary return” operations.

      The path set out in the report is that the “operational autonomy of the agency will gradually increase towards 2027” until it is a “fully-fledged and reliable partner” to EU and Schengen states. It acknowledges the impacts of unforeseen world events on the EU’s forthcoming budget (Multi-annual Financial Framework, MFF) for 2021-27, and hints at the impact this will have on Frontex’s own budget and objectives. Nevertheless, the agency is still determined to “continue increasing the capabilities” of the agency, including its acquisition of new equipment and employment of new staff for its standing corps.

      The main issues covered by the report are: Frontex’s new standing corps of staff, executive powers and the use of force, fundamental rights and data protection, and the integration into Frontex of EUROSUR, the European Border Surveillance System.

      The new standing corps

      Recruitment

      A new standing corps of 10,000 Frontex staff by 2024 is to be, in the words of the agency, its “biggest game changer”.[2] The report notes that the establishment of the standing corps has been heavily affected by the outbreak of Covid-19. According to the report, 7,238 individuals had applied to join the standing corps before the outbreak of the pandemic. 5,482 of these – over 75% – were assessed by the agency as eligible, with a final 304 passing the entire selection process to be on the “reserve lists”.[3]

      Despite interruptions to the recruitment procedure following worldwide lockdown measures, interviews for Category 1 staff – permanent Frontex staff members to be deployed on operations – were resumed via video by the end of April. 80 candidates were shortlisted for the first week, and Frontex aims to interview 1,000 people in total. Despite this adaptation, successful candidates will have to wait for Frontex’s contractor to re-open in order to carry out medical tests, an obligatory requirement for the standing corps.[4]

      In 2020, Frontex joined the European Defence Agency’s Satellite Communications (SatCom) and Communications and Information System (CIS) services in order to ensure ICT support for the standing corps in operation as of 2021.[5] The EDA describes SatCom and CIS as “fundamental for Communication, Command and Control in military operations… [enabling] EU Commanders to connect forces in remote areas with HQs and capitals and to manage the forces missions and tasks”.[6]

      Training

      The basic training programme, endorsed by the management board in October 2019, is designed for Category 1 staff. It includes specific training in interoperability and “harmonisation with member states”. The actual syllabus, content and materials for this basic training were developed by March 2020; Statewatch has made a request for access to these documents, which is currently pending with the Frontex Transparency Office. This process has also been affected by the novel coronavirus, though the report insists that “no delay is foreseen in the availability of the specialised profile related training of the standing corps”.

      Use of force

      The state-of-play-report acknowledges a number of legal ambiguities surrounding some of the more controversial powers outlined in Frontex’s 2019 Regulation, highlighting perhaps that political ambition, rather than serious consideration and assessment, propelled the legislation, overtaking adequate procedure and oversight. The incentive to enact the legislation within a short timeframe is cited as a reason that no impact assessment was carried out on the proposed recast to the agency’s mandate. This draft was rushed through negotiations and approved in an unprecedented six-month period, and the details lost in its wake are now coming to light.

      Article 82 of the 2019 Regulation refers to the use of force and carriage of weapons by Frontex staff, while a supervisory mechanism for the use of force by statutory staff is established by Article 55. This says:

      “On the basis of a proposal from the executive director, the management board shall: (a) establish an appropriate supervisory mechanism to monitor the application of the provisions on use of force by statutory staff, including rules on reporting and specific measures, such as those of a disciplinary nature, with regard to the use of force during deployments”[7]

      The agency’s management board is expected to make a decision about this supervisory mechanism, including specific measures and reporting, by the end of June 2020.

      The state-of-play report posits that the legal terms of Article 55 are inconsistent with the standard rules on administrative enquiries and disciplinary measures concerning EU staff.[8] These outline, inter alia, that a dedicated disciplinary board will be established in each institution including at least one member from outside the institution, that this board must be independent and its proceedings secret. Frontex insists that its staff will be a special case as the “first uniformed service of the EU”, and will therefore require “special arrangements or derogations to the Staff Regulations” to comply with the “totally different nature of tasks and risks associated with their deployments”.[9]

      What is particularly astounding about Frontex demanding special treatment for oversight, particularly on use of force and weapons is that, as the report acknowledges, the agency cannot yet legally store or transport any weapons it acquires.

      Regarding service weapons and “non-lethal equipment”,[10] legal analysis by “external experts and a regulatory law firm” concluded that the 2019 Regulation does not provide a legal basis for acquiring, registering, storing or transporting weapons in Poland, where the agency’s headquarters is located. Frontex has applied to the Commission for clarity on how to proceed, says the report. Frontex declined to comment on the status of this consultation and any indications of the next steps the agency will take. A Commission spokesperson stated only that it had recently received the agency’s enquiry and “is analysing the request and the applicable legal framework in the view of replying to the EBCGA”, without expanding further.

      Until Frontex has the legal basis to do so, it cannot launch a tender for firearms and “non-lethal equipment” (which includes batons, pepper spray and handcuffs). However, the report implies the agency is ready to do so as soon as it receives the green light. Technical specifications are currently being finalised for “non-lethal equipment” and Frontex still plans to complete acquisition by the end of the year.

      Privileges and immunities

      The agency is also seeking special treatment with regard to the legal privileges and immunities it and its officials enjoy. Article 96 of the 2019 Regulation outlines the privileges and immunities of Frontex officers, stating:

      “Protocol No 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union annexed to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to the TFEU shall apply to the Agency and its statutory staff.” [11]

      However, Frontex notes that the Protocol does not apply to non-EU states, nor does it “offer a full protection, or take into account a need for the inviolability of assets owned by Frontex (service vehicles, vessels, aircraft)”.[12] Frontex is increasingly involved in operations taking place on non-EU territory. For instance, the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states, primarily in the Western Balkans, concerning Frontex activities in those countries. To launch operations under these agreements, Frontex will (or, in the case of Albania, already has) agree on operational plans with each state, under which Frontex staff can use executive powers.[13] The agency therefore seeks an “EU-level status of forces agreement… to account for the partial absence of rules”.

      Law enforcement

      To implement its enhanced functions regarding cross-border crime, Frontex will continue to participate in Europol’s four-year policy cycle addressing “serious international and organised crime”.[14] The agency is also developing a pilot project, “Investigation Support Activities- Cross Border Crime” (ISA-CBC), addressing drug trafficking and terrorism.

      Fundamental rights and data protection

      The ‘EBCG 2.0 Regulation’ requires several changes to fundamental rights measures by the agency, which, aside from some vague “legal analyses” seem to be undergoing development with only internal oversight.

      Firstly, to facilitate adequate independence of the Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO), special rules have to be established. The FRO was introduced under Frontex’s 2016 Regulation, but has since then been understaffed and underfunded by the agency.[15] The 2019 Regulation obliges the agency to ensure “sufficient and adequate human and financial resources” for the office, as well as 40 fundamental rights monitors.[16] These standing corps staff members will be responsible for monitoring compliance with fundamental rights standards, providing advice and assistance on the agency’s plans and activities, and will visit and evaluate operations, including acting as forced return monitors.[17]

      During negotiations over the proposed Regulation 2.0, MEPs introduced extended powers for the Fundamental Rights Officer themselves. The FRO was previously responsible for contributing to Frontex’s fundamental rights strategy and monitoring its compliance with and promotion of fundamental rights. Now, they will be able to monitor compliance by conducting investigations; offering advice where deemed necessary or upon request of the agency; providing opinions on operational plans, pilot projects and technical assistance; and carrying out on-the-spot visits. The executive director is now obliged to respond “as to how concerns regarding possible violations of fundamental rights… have been addressed,” and the management board “shall ensure that action is taken with regard to recommendations of the fundamental rights officer.” [18] The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation.

      The state-of-play report says that “legal analyses and exchanges” are ongoing, and will inform an eventual management board decision, but no timeline for this is offered. [19] The agency will also need to adapt its much criticised individual complaints mechanism to fit the requirements of the 2019 Regulation; executive director Fabrice Leggeri’s first-draft decision on this process is currently undergoing internal consultations. Even the explicit requirement set out in the 2019 Regulation for an “independent and effective” complaints mechanism,[20] does not meet minimum standards to qualify as an effective remedy, which include institutional independence, accessibility in practice, and capacity to carry out thorough and prompt investigations.[21]

      Frontex has entered into a service level agreement (SLA) with the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) for support in establishing and training the team of fundamental rights monitors introduced by the 2019 Regulation. These monitors are to be statutory staff of the agency and will assess fundamental rights compliance of operational activities, advising, assisting and contributing to “the promotion of fundamental rights”.[22] The scope and objectives for this team were finalised at the end of March this year, and the agency will establish the team by the end of the year. Statewatch has requested clarification as to what is to be included in the team’s scope and objectives, pending with the Frontex Transparency Office.

      Regarding data protection, the agency plans a package of implementing rules (covering issues ranging from the position of data protection officer to the restriction of rights for returnees and restrictions under administrative data processing) to be implemented throughout 2020.[23] The management board will review a first draft of the implementing rules on the data protection officer in the second quarter of 2020.

      Returns

      The European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN) – a network of 15 European states and the Commission facilitating cooperation over return operations “as part of the EU efforts to manage migration” – is to be handed over to Frontex. [24] A handover plan is currently under the final stage of review; it reportedly outlines the scoping of activities and details of “which groups of returnees will be eligible for Frontex assistance in the future”.[25] A request from Statewatch to Frontex for comment on what assistance will be provided by the agency to such returnees was unanswered at the time of publication.

      Since the entry into force of its new mandate, Frontex has also been providing technical assistance for so-called voluntary returns, with the first two such operations carried out on scheduled flights (as opposed to charter flights) in February 2020. A total of 28 people were returned by mid-April, despite the fact that there is no legal clarity over what the definition “voluntary return” actually refers to, as the state-of-play report also explains:

      “The terminology of voluntary return was introduced in the Regulation without providing any definition thereof. This terminology (voluntary departure vs voluntary return) is moreover not in line with the terminology used in the Return Directive (EBCG 2.0 refers to the definition of returns provided for in the Return Directive. The Return Directive, however, does not cover voluntary returns; a voluntary return is not a return within the meaning of the Return Directive). Further elaboration is needed.”[26]

      On top of requiring “further clarification”, if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate. Statewatch has launched an investigation into the agency’s activities relating to voluntary returns, to outline the number of such operations to date, their country of return and country of destination.

      Frontex is currently developing a module dedicated to voluntary returns by charter flight for its FAR (Frontex Application for Returns) platform (part of its return case management system). On top of the technical support delivered by the agency, Frontex also foresees the provision of on-the-ground support from Frontex representatives or a “return counsellor”, who will form part of the dedicated return teams planned for the standing corps from 2021.[27]

      Frontex has updated its return case management system (RECAMAS), an online platform for member state authorities and Frontex to communicate and plan return operations, to manage an increased scope. The state-of-play report implies that this includes detail on post-return activities in a new “post-return module”, indicating that Frontex is acting on commitments to expand its activity in this area. According to the agency’s roadmap on implementing the 2019 Regulation, an action plan on how the agency will provide post-return support to people (Article 48(1), 2019 Regulation) will be written by the third quarter of 2020.[28]

      In its closing paragraph, related to the budgetary impact of COVID-19 regarding return operations, the agency notes that although activities will resume once aerial transportation restrictions are eased, “the agency will not be able to provide what has been initially intended, undermining the concept of the EBCG as a whole”.[29]

      EUROSUR

      The Commission is leading progress on adopting the implementing act for the integration of EUROSUR into Frontex, which will define the implementation of new aerial surveillance,[30] expected by the end of the year.[31] Frontex is discussing new working arrangements with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL). The development by Frontex of the surveillance project’s communications network will require significant budgetary investment, as the agency plans to maintain the current system ahead of its planned replacement in 2025.[32] This investment is projected despite the agency’s recognition of the economic impact of Covid-19 on member states, and the consequent adjustments to the MFF 2021-27.

      Summary

      Drafted and published as the world responds to an unprecedented pandemic, the “current challenges” referred to in the report appear, on first read, to refer to the budgetary and staffing implications of global shut down. However, the report maintains throughout that the agency’s determination to expand, in terms of powers as well as staffing, will not be stalled despite delays and budgeting adjustments. Indeed, it is implied more than once that the “current challenges” necessitate more than ever that these powers be assumed. The true challenges, from the agency’s point of view, stem from the fact that its current mandate was rushed through negotiations in six months, leading to legal ambiguities that leave it unable to acquire or transport weapons and in a tricky relationship with the EU protocol on privileges and immunities when operating in third countries. Given the violence that so frequently accompanies border control operations in the EU, it will come as a relief to many that Frontex is having difficulties acquiring its own weaponry. However, it is far from reassuring that the introduction of new measures on fundamental rights and accountability are being carried out internally and remain unavailable for public scrutiny.

      Jane Kilpatrick

      Note: this article was updated on 26 May 2020 to include the European Commission’s response to Statewatch’s enquiries.

      It was updated on 1 July with some minor corrections:

      “the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states... under which” replaces “the agency has entered into working agreements with Balkan states, under which”
      “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in any detail in the Regulation beyond monitoring the agency’s ’compliance with fundamental rights, including by conducting investigations’” replaces “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation”
      “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it further exposes the haste with which legislation written to deny entry into the EU and facilitate expulsions was drafted” replaces “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate”

      Endnotes

      [1] Frontex, ‘State of play of the implementation of the EBCG 2.0 Regulation in view of current challenges’, 27 April 2020, contained in Council document 7607/20, LIMITE, 20 April 2020, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/may/eu-council-frontex-ECBG-state-of-play-7607-20.pdf

      [2] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

      [3] Section 1.1, state of play report

      [4] Jane Kilpatrick, ‘Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards’, Statewatch Analysis, March 2020, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-355-frontex-recruitment-standing-corps.pdf

      [5] Section 7.1, state of play report

      [6] EDA, ‘EU SatCom Market’, https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/eu-satcom-market

      [7] Article 55(5)(a), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex 2019 Regulation), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [8] Pursuant to Annex IX of the EU Staff Regulations, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:01962R0031-20140501

      [9] Chapter III, state of play report

      [10] Section 2.5, state of play report

      [11] Protocol (No 7), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2016.202.01.0001.01.ENG#d1e3363-201-1

      [12] Chapter III, state of play report

      [13] ‘Border externalisation: Agreements on Frontex operations in Serbia and Montenegro heading for parliamentary approval’, Statewatch News, 11 March 2020, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/frontex-status-agreements.htm

      [14] Europol, ‘EU policy cycle – EMPACT’, https://www.europol.europa.eu/empact

      [15] ‘NGOs, EU and international agencies sound the alarm over Frontex’s respect for fundamental rights’, Statewatch News, 5 March 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/mar/fx-consultative-forum-rep.htm; ‘Frontex condemned by its own fundamental rights body for failing to live up to obligations’, Statewatch News, 21 May 2018, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/may/eu-frontex-fr-rep.htm

      [16] Article 110(6), Article 109, 2019 Regulation

      [17] Article 110, 2019 Regulation

      [18] Article 109, 2019 Regulation

      [19] Section 8, state of play report

      [20] Article 111(1), 2019 Regulation

      [21] Sergio Carrera and Marco Stefan, ‘Complaint Mechanisms in Border Management and Expulsion Operations in Europe: Effective Remedies for Victims of Human Rights Violations?’, CEPS, 2018, https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Complaint%20Mechanisms_A4.pdf

      [22] Article 110(1), 2019 Regulation

      [23] Section 9, state of play report

      [24] ERRIN, https://returnnetwork.eu

      [25] Section 3.2, state of play report

      [26] Chapter III, state of play report

      [27] Section 3.2, state of play report

      [28] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

      [29] State of play report, p. 19

      [30] Matthias Monroy, ‘Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders’, Statewatch Analysis, February 2020, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-354-frontex-drones.pdf

      [31] Section 4, state of play report

      [32] Section 7.2, state of play report
      Next article >

      Mediterranean: As the fiction of a Libyan search and rescue zone begins to crumble, EU states use the coronavirus pandemic to declare themselves unsafe

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/eu-guns-guards-and-guidelines-reinforcement-of-frontex-runs-into-problem

      #EBCG_2.0_Regulation #European_Defence_Agency’s_Satellite_Communications (#SatCom) #Communications_and_Information_System (#CIS) #immunité #droits_fondamentaux #droits_humains #Fundamental_Rights_Officer (#FRO) #European_Return_and_Reintegration_Network (#ERRIN) #renvois #expulsions #réintégration #Directive_Retour #FAR (#Frontex_Application_for_Returns) #RECAMAS #EUROSUR #European_Aviation_Safety_Agency (#EASA) #European_Organisation_for_the_Safety_of_Air_Navigation (#EUROCONTROL)

    • Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards

      On 4 January 2020 the Management Board of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) adopted a decision on the profiles of the staff required for the new “standing corps”, which is ultimately supposed to be staffed by 10,000 officials. [1] The decision ushers in a new wave of recruitment for the agency. Applicants will be put through six months of training before deployment, after rigorous medical testing.

      What is the standing corps?

      The European Border and Coast Guard standing corps is the new, and according to Frontex, first ever, EU uniformed service, available “at any time…to support Member States facing challenges at their external borders”.[2] Frontex’s Programming Document for the 2018-2020 period describes the standing corps as the agency’s “biggest game changer”, requiring “an unprecedented scale of staff recruitment”.[3]

      The standing corps will be made up of four categories of Frontex operational staff:

      Frontex statutory staff deployed in operational areas and staff responsible for the functioning of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) Central Unit[4];
      Long-term staff seconded from member states;
      Staff from member states who can be immediately deployed on short-term secondment to Frontex; and

      A reserve of staff from member states for rapid border interventions.

      These border guards will be “trained by the best and equipped with the latest technology has to offer”.[5] As well as wearing EU uniforms, they will be authorised to carry weapons and will have executive powers: they will be able to verify individuals’ identity and nationality and permit or refuse entry into the EU.

      The decision made this January is limited to the definition of profiles and requirements for the operational staff that are to be recruited. The Management Board (MB) will have to adopt a new decision by March this year to set out the numbers of staff needed per profile, the requirements for individuals holding those positions, and the number of staff needed for the following year based on expected operational needs. This process will be repeated annually.[6] The MB can then further specify how many staff each member state should contribute to these profiles, and establish multi-annual plans for member state contributions and recruitment for Frontex statutory staff. Projections for these contributions are made in Annexes II – IV of the 2019 Regulation, though a September Mission Statement by new European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen urges the recruitment of 10,000 border guards by 2024, indicating that member states might be meeting their contribution commitments much sooner than 2027.[7]

      The standing corps of Frontex staff will have an array of executive powers and responsibilities. As well as being able to verify identity and nationality and refuse or permit entry into the EU, they will be able to consult various EU databases to fulfil operational aims, and may also be authorised by host states to consult national databases. According to the MB Decision, “all members of the Standing Corps are to be able to identify persons in need of international protection and persons in a vulnerable situation, including unaccompanied minors, and refer them to the competent authorities”. Training on international and EU law on fundamental rights and international protection, as well as guidelines on the identification and referral of persons in need of international protection, will be mandatory for all standing corps staff members.

      The size of the standing corps

      The following table, taken from the 2019 Regulation, outlines the ambitions for growth of Frontex’s standing corps. However, as noted, the political ambition is to reach the 10,000 total by 2024.

      –-> voir le tableau sur le site de statewatch!

      Category 2 staff – those on long term secondment from member states – will join Frontex from 2021, according to the 2019 Regulation.[8] It is foreseen that Germany will contribute the most staff, with 61 expected in 2021, increasing year-by-year to 225 by 2027. Other high contributors are France and Italy (170 and 125 by 2027, respectively).

      The lowest contributors will be Iceland (expected to contribute between one and two people a year from 2021 to 2027), Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg. Liechtenstein is not contributing personnel but will contribute “through proportional financial support”.

      For short-term secondments from member states, projections follow a very similar pattern. Germany will contribute 540 staff in 2021, increasing to 827 in 2027; Italy’s contribution will increase from 300 in 2021 to 458 in 2027; and France’s from 408 in 2021 to 624 in 2027. Most states will be making less than 100 staff available for short-term secondment in 2021.

      What are the profiles?

      The MB Decision outlines 12 profiles to be made available to Frontex, ranging from Border Guard Officer and Crew Member, to Cross Border Crime Detection Officer and Return Specialist. A full list is contained in the Decision.[9] All profiles will be fulfilled by an official of the competent authority of a member state (MS) or Schengen Associated Country (SAC), or by a member of Frontex’s own statutory staff.

      Tasks to be carried out by these officials include:

      border checks and surveillance;
      interviewing, debriefing* and screening arrivals and registering fingerprints;
      supporting the collection, assessment, analysis and distribution of information with EU member and non-member states;
      verifying travel documents;
      escorting individuals being deported on Frontex return operations;
      operating data systems and platforms; and
      offering cultural mediation

      *Debriefing consists of informal interviews with migrants to collect information for risk analyses on irregular migration and other cross-border crime and the profiling of irregular migrants to identify “modus operandi and migration trends used by irregular migrants and facilitators/criminal networks”. Guidelines written by Frontex in 2012 instructed border guards to target vulnerable individuals for “debriefing”, not in order to streamline safeguarding or protection measures, but for intelligence-gathering - “such people are often more willing to talk about their experiences,” said an internal document.[10] It is unknown whether those instructions are still in place.

      Recruitment for the profiles

      Certain profiles are expected to “apply self-safety and security practice”, and to have “the capacity to work under pressure and face emotional events with composure”. Relevant profiles (e.g. crew member) are required to be able to perform search and rescue activities in distress situations at sea borders.

      Frontex published a call for tender on 27 December for the provision of medical services for pre-recruitment examinations, in line with the plan to start recruiting operational staff in early 2020. The documents accompanying the tender reveal additional criteria for officials that will be granted executive powers (Frontex category “A2”) compared to those staff stationed primarily at the agency’s Warsaw headquarters (“A1”). Those criteria come in the form of more stringent medical testing.

      The differences in medical screening for category A1 and A2 staff lie primarily in additional toxicology screening and psychiatric and psychological consultations. [11] The additional psychiatric attention allotted for operational staff “is performed to check the predisposition for people to work in arduous, hazardous conditions, exposed to stress, conflict situations, changing rapidly environment, coping with people being in dramatic, injure or death exposed situations”.[12]

      Both A1 and A2 category provisional recruits will be asked to disclose if they have ever suffered from a sexually transmitted disease or “genital organ disease”, as well as depression, nervous or mental disorders, among a long list of other ailments. As well as disclosing any medication they take, recruits must also state if they are taking oral contraceptives (though there is no question about hormonal contraceptives that are not taken orally). Women are also asked to give the date of their last period on the pre-appointment questionnaire.

      “Never touch yourself with gloves”

      Frontex training materials on forced return operations obtained by Statewatch in 2019 acknowledge the likelihood of psychological stress among staff, among other health risks. (One recommendation contained in the documents is to “never touch yourself with gloves”). Citing “dissonance within the team, long hours with no rest, group dynamic, improvisation and different languages” among factors behind psychological stress, the training materials on medical precautionary measures for deportation escort officers also refer to post-traumatic stress disorder, the lack of an area to retreat to and body clock disruption as exacerbating risks. The document suggests a high likelihood that Frontex return escorts will witness poverty, “agony”, “chaos”, violence, boredom, and will have to deal with vulnerable persons.[13]

      For fundamental rights monitors (officials deployed to monitor fundamental rights compliance during deportations, who can be either Frontex staff or national officials), the training materials obtained by Statewatch focus on the self-control of emotions, rather than emotional care. Strategies recommended include talking to somebody, seeking professional help, and “informing yourself of any other option offered”. The documents suggest that it is an individual’s responsibility to prevent emotional responses to stressful situations having an impact on operations, and to organise their own supervision and professional help. There is no obvious focus on how traumatic responses of Frontex staff could affect those coming into contact with them at an external border or during a deportation. [14]

      The materials obtained by Statewatch also give some indication of the fundamental rights training imparted to those acting as deportation ‘escorts’ and fundamental rights monitors. The intended outcomes for a training session in Athens that took place in March 2019 included “adapt FR [fundamental rights] in a readmission operation (explain it with examples)” and “should be able to describe Non Refoulement principle” (in the document, ‘Session Fundamental rights’ is followed by ‘Session Velcro handcuffs’).[15] The content of the fundamental rights training that will be offered to Frontex’s new recruits is currently unknown.

      Fit for service?

      The agency anticipates that most staff will be recruited from March to June 2020, involving the medical examination of up to 700 applicants in this period. According to Frontex’s website, the agency has already received over 7,000 applications for the 700 new European Border Guard Officer positions.[16] Successful candidates will undergo six months of training before deployment in 2021. Apparently then, the posts are a popular career option, despite the seemingly invasive medical tests (especially for sexually active women). Why, for instance, is it important to Frontex to know about oral hormonal contraception, or about sexually transmitted infections?

      When asked by Statewatch if Frontex provides in-house psychological and emotional support, an agency press officer stated: “When it comes to psychological and emotional support, Frontex is increasing awareness and personal resilience of the officers taking part in our operations through education and training activities.” A ‘Frontex Mental Health Strategy’ from 2018 proposed the establishment of “a network of experts-psychologists” to act as an advisory body, as well as creating “online self-care tools”, a “psychological hot-line”, and a space for peer support with participation of psychologists (according to risk assessment) during operations.[17]

      One year later, Frontex, EASO and Europol jointly produced a brochure for staff deployed on operations, entitled ‘Occupational Health and Safety – Deployment Information’, which offers a series of recommendations to staff, placing the responsibility to “come to the deployment in good mental shape” and “learn how to manage stress and how to deal with anger” more firmly on the individual than the agency.[18] According to this document, officers who need additional support must disclose this by requesting it from their supervisor, while “a helpline or psychologist on-site may be available, depending on location”.

      Frontex anticipates this recruitment drive to be “game changing”. Indeed, the Commission is relying upon it to reach its ambitions for the agency’s independence and efficiency. The inclusion of mandatory training in fundamental rights in the six-month introductory education is obviously a welcome step. Whether lessons learned in a classroom will be the first thing that comes to the minds of officials deployed on border control or deportation operations remains to be seen.

      Unmanaged responses to emotional stress can include burnout, compassion-fatigue and indirect trauma, which can in turn decrease a person’s ability to cope with adverse circumstance, and increase the risk of violence.[19] Therefore, aside from the agency’s responsibility as an employer to safeguard the health of its staff, its approach to internal psychological care will affect not only the border guards themselves, but the people that they routinely come into contact with at borders and during return operations, many of whom themselves will have experienced trauma.

      Jane Kilpatrick

      Endnotes

      [1] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

      [2] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [3] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

      [4] The ETIAS Central Unit will be responsible for processing the majority of applications for ‘travel authorisations’ received when the European Travel Information and Authorisation System comes into use, in theory in late 2022. Citizens who do not require a visa to travel to the Schengen area will have to apply for authorisation to travel to the Schengen area.

      [5] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [6] Article 54(4), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [7] ‘European Commission 2020 Work Programme: An ambitious roadmap for a Union that strives for more’, 29 January 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_124; “Mission letter” from Ursula von der Leyen to Ylva Johnsson, 10 September 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/mission-letter-ylva-johansson_en.pdf

      [8] Annex II, 2019 Regulation

      [9] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

      [10] ‘Press release: EU border agency targeted “isolated or mistreated” individuals for questioning’, Statewatch News, 16 February 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/feb/eu-frontex-op-hera-debriefing-pr.htm

      [11] ‘Provision of Medical Services – Pre-Recruitment Examination’, https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-documents.html?cftId=5841

      [12] ‘Provision of medical services – pre-recruitment examination, Terms of Reference - Annex II to invitation to tender no Frontex/OP/1491/2019/KM’, https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-document.html?docId=65398

      [13] Frontex training presentation, ‘Medical precautionary measures for escort officers’, undated, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-presentation-medical-precautionary-measures-deportation-escor

      [14] Ibid.

      [15] Frontex, document listing course learning outcomes from deportation escorts’ training, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-deportation-escorts-training-course-learning-outcomes.pdf

      [16] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [17] Frontex, ‘Frontex mental health strategy’, 20 February 2018, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/89c168fe-e14b-11e7-9749-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

      [18] EASO, Europol and Frontex, ‘Occupational health and safety’, 12 August 2019, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/17cc07e0-bd88-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-103142015

      [19] Trauma Treatment International, ‘A different approach for victims of trauma’, https://www.tt-intl.org/#our-work-section

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/frontex-launches-game-changing-recruitment-drive-for-standing-corps-of-b
      #gardes_frontières #staff #corps_des_gardes-frontières

    • Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders (27.02.2020)

      Instead of providing sea rescue capabilities in the Mediterranean, the EU is expanding air surveillance. Refugees are observed with drones developed for the military. In addition to numerous EU states, countries such as Libya could also use the information obtained.

      It is not easy to obtain majorities for legislation in the European Union in the area of migration - unless it is a matter of upgrading the EU’s external borders. While the reform of a common EU asylum system has been on hold for years, the European Commission, Parliament and Council agreed to reshape the border agency Frontex with unusual haste shortly before last year’s parliamentary elections. A new Regulation has been in force since December 2019,[1] under which Frontex intends to build up a “standing corps” of 10,000 uniformed officials by 2027. They can be deployed not just at the EU’s external borders, but in ‘third countries’ as well.

      In this way, Frontex will become a “European border police force” with powers that were previously reserved for the member states alone. The core of the new Regulation includes the procurement of the agency’s own equipment. The Multiannual Financial Framework, in which the EU determines the distribution of its financial resources from 2021 until 2027, has not yet been decided. According to current plans, however, at least €6 billion are reserved for Frontex in the seven-year budget. The intention is for Frontex to spend a large part of the money, over €2 billion, on aircraft, ships and vehicles.[2]

      Frontex seeks company for drone flights

      The upgrade plans include the stationing of large drones in the central and eastern Mediterranean. For this purpose, Frontex is looking for a private partner to operate flights off Malta, Italy or Greece. A corresponding tender ended in December[3] and the selection process is currently underway. The unmanned missions could then begin already in spring. Frontex estimates the total cost of these missions at €50 million. The contract has a term of two years and can be extended twice for one year at a time.

      Frontex wants drones of the so-called MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) class. Their flight duration should be at least 20 hours. The requirements include the ability to fly in all weather conditions and at day and night. It is also planned to operate in airspace where civil aircraft are in service. For surveillance missions, the drones should carry electro-optical cameras, thermal imaging cameras and so-called “daylight spotter” systems that independently detect moving targets and keep them in focus. Other equipment includes systems for locating mobile and satellite telephones. The drones will also be able to receive signals from emergency call transmitters sewn into modern life jackets.

      However, the Frontex drones will not be used primarily for sea rescue operations, but to improve capacities against unwanted migration. This assumption is also confirmed by the German non-governmental organisation Sea-Watch, which has been providing assistance in the central Mediterranean with various ships since 2015. “Frontex is not concerned with saving lives,” says Ruben Neugebauer of Sea-Watch. “While air surveillance is being expanded with aircraft and drones, ships urgently needed for rescue operations have been withdrawn”. Sea-Watch demands that situation pictures of EU drones are also made available to private organisations for sea rescue.

      Aircraft from arms companies

      Frontex has very specific ideas for its own drones, which is why there are only a few suppliers worldwide that can be called into question. The Israel Aerospace Industries Heron 1, which Frontex tested for several months on the Greek island of Crete[4] and which is also flown by the German Bundeswehr, is one of them. As set out by Frontex in its invitation to tender, the Heron 1, with a payload of around 250 kilograms, can carry all the surveillance equipment that the agency intends to deploy over the Mediterranean. Also amongst those likely to be interested in the Frontex contract is the US company General Atomics, which has been building drones of the Predator series for 20 years. Recently, it presented a new Predator model in Greece under the name SeaGuardian, for maritime observation.[5] It is equipped with a maritime surveillance radar and a system for receiving position data from larger ships, thus fulfilling one of Frontex’s essential requirements.

      General Atomics may have a competitive advantage, as its Predator drones have several years’ operational experience in the Mediterranean. In addition to Frontex, the European Union has been active in the central Mediterranean with EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia. In March 2019, Italy’s then-interior minister Matteo Salvini pushed through the decision to operate the EU mission from the air alone. Since then, two unarmed Predator drones operated by the Italian military have been flying for EUNAVFOR MED for 60 hours per month. Officially, the drones are to observe from the air whether the training of the Libyan coast guard has been successful and whether these navy personnel use their knowledge accordingly. Presumably, however, the Predators are primarily pursuing the mission’s goal to “combat human smuggling” by spying on the Libyan coast. It is likely that the new Operation EU Active Surveillance, which will use military assets from EU member states to try to enforce the UN arms embargo placed on Libya,[6] will continue to patrol with Italian drones off the coast in North Africa.

      Three EU maritime surveillance agencies

      In addition to Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) are also investing in maritime surveillance using drones. Together, the three agencies coordinate some 300 civil and military authorities in EU member states.[7] Their tasks include border, fisheries and customs control, law enforcement and environmental protection.

      In 2017, Frontex and EMSA signed an agreement to benefit from joint reconnaissance capabilities, with EFCA also involved.[8] At the time, EMSA conducted tests with drones of various sizes, but now the drones’ flights are part of its regular services. The offer is not only open to EU Member States, as Iceland was the first to take advantage of it. Since summer 2019, a long-range Hermes 900 drone built by the Israeli company Elbit Systems has been flying from Iceland’s Egilsstaðir airport. The flights are intended to cover more than half of the island state’s exclusive economic zone and to detect “suspicious activities and potential hazards”.[9]

      The Hermes 900 was also developed for the military; the Israeli army first deployed it in the Gaza Strip in 2014. The Times of Israel puts the cost of the operating contract with EMSA at €59 million,[10] with a term of two years, which can be extended for another two years. The agency did not conclude the contract directly with the Israeli arms company, but through the Portuguese firm CeiiA. The contract covers the stationing, control and mission control of the drones.

      New interested parties for drone flights

      At the request of the German MEP Özlem Demirel (from the party Die Linke), the European Commission has published a list of countries that also want to use EMSA drones.[11] According to this list, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal and also Greece have requested unmanned flights for pollution monitoring this year, while Bulgaria and Spain want to use them for general maritime surveillance. Until Frontex has its own drones, EMSA is flying its drones for the border agency on Crete. As in Iceland, this is the long-range drone Hermes 900, but according to Greek media reports it crashed on 8 January during take-off.[12] Possible causes are a malfunction of the propulsion system or human error. The aircraft is said to have been considerably damaged.

      Authorities from France and Great Britain have also ordered unmanned maritime surveillance from EMSA. Nothing is yet known about the exact intended location, but it is presumably the English Channel. There, the British coast guard is already observing border traffic with larger drones built by the Tekever arms company from Portugal.[13] The government in London wants to prevent migrants from crossing the Channel. The drones take off from the airport in the small town of Lydd and monitor the approximately 50-kilometre-long and 30-kilometre-wide Strait of Dover. Great Britain has also delivered several quadcopters to France to try to detect potential migrants in French territorial waters. According to the prefecture of Pas-de-Calais, eight gendarmes have been trained to control the small drones[14].

      Information to non-EU countries

      The images taken by EMSA drones are evaluated by the competent national coastguards. A livestream also sends them to Frontex headquarters in Warsaw.[15] There they are fed into the EUROSUR border surveillance system. This is operated by Frontex and networks the surveillance installations of all EU member states that have an external border. The data from EUROSUR and the national border control centres form the ‘Common Pre-frontier Intelligence Picture’,[16] referring to the area of interest of Frontex, which extends far into the African continent. Surveillance data is used to detect and prevent migration movements at an early stage.

      Once the providing company has been selected, the new Frontex drones are also to fly for EUROSUR. According to the invitation to tender, they are to operate in the eastern and central Mediterranean within a radius of up to 250 nautical miles (463 kilometres). This would enable them to carry out reconnaissance in the “pre-frontier” area off Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Within the framework of EUROSUR, Frontex shares the recorded data with other European users via a ‘Remote Information Portal’, as the call for tender explains. The border agency has long been able to cooperate with third countries and the information collected can therefore also be made available to authorities in North Africa. However, in order to share general information on surveillance of the Mediterranean Sea with a non-EU state, Frontex must first conclude a working agreement with the corresponding government.[17]

      It is already possible, however, to provide countries such as Libya with the coordinates of refugee boats. For example, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates that the nearest Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) must be informed of actual or suspected emergencies. With EU funding, Italy has been building such a centre in Tripoli for the last two years.[18] It is operated by the military coast guard, but so far has no significant equipment of its own.

      The EU military mission “EUNAVFOR MED” was cooperating more extensively with the Libyan coast guard. For communication with European naval authorities, Libya is the first third country to be connected to European surveillance systems via the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network[19]. Information handed over to the Libyan authorities might also include information that was collected with the Italian military ‘Predator’ drones.

      Reconnaissance generated with unmanned aerial surveillance is also given to the MRCC in Turkey. This was seen in a pilot project last summer, when the border agency tested an unmanned aerostat with the Greek coast guard off the island of Samos.[20] Attached to a 1,000 metre-long cable, the airship was used in the Frontex operation ‘Poseidon’ in the eastern Mediterranean. The 35-meter-long zeppelin comes from the French manufacturer A-NSE.[21] The company specializes in civil and military aerial observation. According to the Greek Marine Ministry, the equipment included a radar, a thermal imaging camera and an Automatic Identification System (AIS) for the tracking of larger ships. The recorded videos were received and evaluated by a situation centre supplied by the Portuguese National Guard. If a detected refugee boat was still in Turkish territorial waters, the Greek coast guard informed the Turkish authorities. This pilot project in the Aegean Sea was the first use of an airship by Frontex. The participants deployed comparatively large numbers of personnel for the short mission. Pictures taken by the Greek coastguard show more than 40 people.

      Drones enable ‘pull-backs’

      Human rights organisations accuse EUNAVFOR MED and Frontex of passing on information to neighbouring countries leading to rejections (so-called ‘push-backs’) in violation of international law. People must not be returned to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Frontex does not itself return refugees in distress who were discovered at sea via aerial surveillance, but leaves the task to the Libyan or Turkish authorities. Regarding Libya, the Agency since 2017 provided notice of at least 42 vessels in distress to Libyan authorities.[22]

      Private rescue organisations therefore speak of so-called ‘pull-backs’, but these are also prohibited, as the Israeli human rights lawyer Omer Shatz argues: “Communicating the location of civilians fleeing war to a consortium of militias and instructing them to intercept and forcibly transfer them back to the place they fled from, trigger both state responsibility of all EU members and individual criminal liability of hundreds involved.” Together with his colleague Juan Branco, Shatz is suing those responsible for the European Union and its agencies before the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Soon they intend to publish individual cases and the names of the people accused.

      Matthias Monroy

      An earlier version of this article first appeared in the German edition of Le Monde Diplomatique: ‘Drohnen für Frontex Statt sich auf die Rettung von Bootsflüchtlingen im Mittelmeer zu konzentrieren, baut die EU die Luftüberwachung’.

      Note: this article was corrected on 6 March to clarify a point regarding cooperation between Frontex and non-EU states.

      Endnotes

      [1] Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-33-2019-INIT/en/pdf

      [2] European Commission, ‘A strengthened and fully equipped European Border and Coast Guard’, 12 September 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-factsheet-coast-guard_en.pdf

      [3] ‘Poland-Warsaw: Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) for Medium Altitude Long Endurance Maritime Aerial Surveillance’, https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:490010-2019:TEXT:EN:HTML&tabId=1

      [4] IAI, ‘IAI AND AIRBUS MARITIME HERON UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM (UAS) SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED 200 FLIGHT HOURS IN CIVILIAN EUROPEAN AIRSPACE FOR FRONTEX’, 24 October 2018, https://www.iai.co.il/iai-and-airbus-maritime-heron-unmanned-aerial-system-uas-successfully-complet

      [5] ‘ European Maritime Flight Demonstrations’, General Atomics, http://www.ga-asi.com/european-maritime-demo

      [6] ‘EU agrees to deploy warships to enforce Libya arms embargo’, The Guardian, 17 February 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/17/eu-agrees-deploy-warships-enforce-libya-arms-embargo

      [7] EMSA, ‘Heads of EMSA and Frontex meet to discuss cooperation on European coast guard functions’, 3 April 2019, http://www.emsa.europa.eu/news-a-press-centre/external-news/item/3499-heads-of-emsa-and-frontex-meet-to-discuss-cooperation-on-european-c

      [8] Frontex, ‘Frontex, EMSA and EFCA strengthen cooperation on coast guard functions’, 23 March 2017, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-emsa-and-efca-strengthen-cooperation-on-coast-guard-functions

      [9] Elbit Systems, ‘Elbit Systems Commenced the Operation of the Maritime UAS Patrol Service to European Union Countries’, 18 June 2019, https://elbitsystems.com/pr-new/elbit-systems-commenced-the-operation-of-the-maritime-uas-patrol-servi

      [10] ‘Elbit wins drone contract for up to $68m to help monitor Europe coast’, The Times of Israel, 1 November 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/elbit-wins-drone-contract-for-up-to-68m-to-help-monitor-europe-coast

      [11] ‘Answer given by Ms Bulc on behalf of the European Commission’, https://netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/2019/12/E-2946_191_Finalised_reply_Annex1_EN_V1.pdf

      [12] ‘Το drone της FRONTEX έπεσε, οι μετανάστες έρχονται’, Proto Thema, 27 January 2020, https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/968869/to-drone-tis-frontex-epese-oi-metanastes-erhodai

      [13] Morgan Meaker, ‘Here’s proof the UK is using drones to patrol the English Channel’, Wired, 10 January 2020, https://www.wired.co.uk/article/uk-drones-migrants-english-channel

      [14] ‘Littoral: Les drones pour lutter contre les traversées de migrants sont opérationnels’, La Voix du Nord, 26 March 2019, https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/557951/article/2019-03-26/les-drones-pour-lutter-contre-les-traversees-de-migrants-sont-operation

      [15] ‘Frontex report on the functioning of Eurosur – Part I’, Council document 6215/18, 15 February 2018, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6215-2018-INIT/en/pdf

      [16] European Commission, ‘Eurosur’, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/border-crossing/eurosur_en

      [17] Legal reforms have also given Frontex the power to operate on the territory of non-EU states, subject to the conclusion of a status agreement between the EU and the country in question. The 2016 Frontex Regulation allowed such cooperation with states that share a border with the EU; the 2019 Frontex Regulation extends this to any non-EU state.

      [18] ‘Helping the Libyan Coast Guard to establish a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre’, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-000547_EN.html

      [19] Matthias Monroy, ‘EU funds the sacking of rescue ships in the Mediterranean’, 7 July 2018, https://digit.site36.net/2018/07/03/eu-funds-the-sacking-of-rescue-ships-in-the-mediterranean

      [20] Frontex, ‘Frontex begins testing use of aerostat for border surveillance’, 31 July 2019, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-begins-testing-use-of-aerostat-for-border-surveillance-ur33N8

      [21] ‘Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission’, 7 January 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002529-ASW_EN.html

      [22] ‘Answer given by Vice-President Borrell on behalf of the European Commission’, 8 January 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002654-ASW_EN.html

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/drones-for-frontex-unmanned-migration-control-at-europe-s-borders

      #drones

    • Monitoring “secondary movements” and “hotspots”: Frontex is now an internal surveillance agency (16.12.2019)

      The EU’s border agency, Frontex, now has powers to gather data on “secondary movements” and the “hotspots” within the EU. The intention is to ensure “situational awareness” and produce risk analyses on the migratory situation within the EU, in order to inform possible operational action by national authorities. This brings with it increased risks for the fundamental rights of both non-EU nationals and ethnic minority EU citizens.

      The establishment of a new ’standing corps’ of 10,000 border guards to be commanded by EU border agency Frontex has generated significant public and press attention in recent months. However, the new rules governing Frontex[1] include a number of other significant developments - including a mandate for the surveillance of migratory movements and migration “hotspots” within the EU.

      Previously, the agency’s surveillance role has been restricted to the external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or “selected third-country ports.”[2] New legal provisions mean it will now be able to gather data on the movement of people within the EU. While this is only supposed to deal with “trends, volumes and routes,” rather than personal data, it is intended to inform operational activity within the EU.

      This may mean an increase in operations against ‘unauthorised’ migrants, bringing with it risks for fundamental rights such as the possibility of racial profiling, detention, violence and the denial of access to asylum procedures. At the same time, in a context where internal borders have been reintroduced by numerous Schengen states over the last five years due to increased migration, it may be that he agency’s new role contributes to a further prolongation of internal border controls.

      From external to internal surveillance

      Frontex was initially established with the primary goals of assisting in the surveillance and control of the external borders of the EU. Over the years it has obtained increasing powers to conduct surveillance of those borders in order to identify potential ’threats’.

      The European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) has a key role in this task, taking data from a variety of sources, including satellites, sensors, drones, ships, vehicles and other means operated both by national authorities and the agency itself. EUROSUR was formally established by legislation approved in 2013, although the system was developed and in use long before it was subject to a legal framework.[3]

      The new Frontex Regulation incorporates and updates the provisions of the 2013 EUROSUR Regulation. It maintains existing requirements for the agency to establish a “situational picture” of the EU’s external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or the ports of non-EU states – which is then distributed to the EU’s member states in order to inform operational activities.[4]

      The new rules also provide a mandate for reporting on “unauthorised secondary movements” and goings-on in the “hotspots”. The Commission’s proposal for the new Frontex Regulation was not accompanied by an impact assessment, which would have set out the reasoning and justifications for these new powers. The proposal merely pointed out that the new rules would “evolve” the scope of EUROSUR, to make it possible to “prevent secondary movements”.[5] As the European Data Protection Supervisor remarked, the lack of an impact assessment made it impossible: “to fully assess and verify its attended benefits and impact, notably on fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to privacy and to the protection of personal data.”[6]

      The term “secondary movements” is not defined in the Regulation, but is generally used to refer to journeys between EU member states undertaken without permission, in particular by undocumented migrants and applicants for internal protection. Regarding the “hotspots” – established and operated by EU and national authorities in Italy and Greece – the Regulation provides a definition,[7] but little clarity on precisely what information will be gathered.

      Legal provisions

      A quick glance at Section 3 of the new Regulation, dealing with EUROSUR, gives little indication that the system will now be used for internal surveillance. The formal scope of EUROSUR is concerned with the external borders and border crossing points:

      “EUROSUR shall be used for border checks at authorised border crossing points and for external land, sea and air border surveillance, including the monitoring, detection, identification, tracking, prevention and interception of unauthorised border crossings for the purpose of detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime and contributing to ensuring the protection and saving the lives of migrants.”

      However, the subsequent section of the Regulation (on ‘situational awareness’) makes clear the agency’s new internal role. Article 24 sets out the components of the “situational pictures” that will be visible in EUROSUR. There are three types – national situational pictures, the European situational picture and specific situational pictures. All of these should consist of an events layer, an operational layer and an analysis layer. The first of these layers should contain (emphasis added in all quotes):

      “…events and incidents related to unauthorised border crossings and cross-border crime and, where available, information on unauthorised secondary movements, for the purpose of understanding migratory trends, volume and routes.”

      Article 26, dealing with the European situational picture, states:

      “The Agency shall establish and maintain a European situational picture in order to provide the national coordination centres and the Commission with effective, accurate and timely information and analysis, covering the external borders, the pre-frontier area and unauthorised secondary movements.”

      The events layer of that picture should include “information relating to… incidents in the operational area of a joint operation or rapid intervention coordinated by the Agency, or in a hotspot.”[8] In a similar vein:

      “The operational layer of the European situational picture shall contain information on the joint operations and rapid interventions coordinated by the Agency and on hotspots, and shall include the mission statements, locations, status, duration, information on the Member States and other actors involved, daily and weekly situational reports, statistical data and information packages for the media.”[9]

      Article 28, dealing with ‘EUROSUR Fusion Services’, says that Frontex will provide national authorities with information on the external borders and pre-frontier area that may be derived from, amongst other things, the monitoring of “migratory flows towards and within the Union in terms of trends, volume and routes.”

      Sources of data

      The “situational pictures” compiled by Frontex and distributed via EUROSUR are made up of data gathered from a host of different sources. For the national situational picture, these are:

      national border surveillance systems;
      stationary and mobile sensors operated by national border agencies;
      border surveillance patrols and “other monitoring missions”;
      local, regional and other coordination centres;
      other national authorities and systems, such as immigration liaison officers, operational centres and contact points;
      border checks;
      Frontex;
      other member states’ national coordination centres;
      third countries’ authorities;
      ship reporting systems;
      other relevant European and international organisations; and
      other sources.[10]

      For the European situational picture, the sources of data are:

      national coordination centres;
      national situational pictures;
      immigration liaison officers;
      Frontex, including reports form its liaison officers;
      Union delegations and EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions;
      other relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies and international organisations; and
      third countries’ authorities.[11]

      The EUROSUR handbook – which will presumably be redrafted to take into account the new legislation – provides more detail about what each of these categories may include.[12]

      Exactly how this melange of different data will be used to report on secondary movements is currently unknown. However, in accordance with Article 24 of the new Regulation:

      “The Commission shall adopt an implementing act laying down the details of the information layers of the situational pictures and the rules for the establishment of specific situational pictures. The implementing act shall specify the type of information to be provided, the entities responsible for collecting, processing, archiving and transmitting specific information, the maximum time limits for reporting, the data security and data protection rules and related quality control mechanisms.” [13]

      This implementing act will specify precisely how EUROSUR will report on “secondary movements”.[14] According to a ‘roadmap’ setting out plans for the implementation of the new Regulation, this implementing act should have been drawn up in the last quarter of 2020 by a newly-established European Border and Coast Guard Committee sitting within the Commission. However, that Committee does not yet appear to have held any meetings.[15]

      Operational activities at the internal borders

      Boosting Frontex’s operational role is one of the major purposes of the new Regulation, although it makes clear that the internal surveillance role “should not lead to operational activities of the Agency at the internal borders of the Member States.” Rather, internal surveillance should “contribute to the monitoring by the Agency of migratory flows towards and within the Union for the purpose of risk analysis and situational awareness.” The purpose is to inform operational activity by national authorities.

      In recent years Schengen member states have reintroduced border controls for significant periods in the name of ensuring internal security and combating irregular migration. An article in Deutsche Welle recently highlighted:

      “When increasing numbers of refugees started arriving in the European Union in 2015, Austria, Germany, Slovenia and Hungary quickly reintroduced controls, citing a “continuous big influx of persons seeking international protection.” This was the first time that migration had been mentioned as a reason for reintroducing border controls.

      Soon after, six Schengen members reintroduced controls for extended periods. Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway cited migration as a reason. France, as the sixth country, first introduced border checks after the November 2015 attacks in Paris, citing terrorist threats. Now, four years later, all six countries still have controls in place. On November 12, they are scheduled to extend them for another six months.”[16]

      These long-term extensions of internal border controls are illegal (the upper limit is supposed to be two years; discussions on changes to the rules governing the reintroduction of internal border controls in the Schengen area are ongoing).[17] A European Parliament resolution from May 2018 stated that “many of the prolongations are not in line with the existing rules as to their extensions, necessity or proportionality and are therefore unlawful.”[18] Yves Pascou, a researcher for the European Policy Centre, told Deutsche Welle that: “"We are in an entirely political situation now, not a legal one, and not one grounded in facts.”

      A European Parliament study published in 2016 highlighted that:

      “there has been a noticeable lack of detail and evidence given by the concerned EU Member States [those which reintroduced internal border controls]. For example, there have been no statistics on the numbers of people crossing borders and seeking asylum, or assessment of the extent to which reintroducing border checks complies with the principles of proportionality and necessity.”[19]

      One purpose of Frontex’s new internal surveillance powers is to provide such evidence (albeit in the ideologically-skewed form of ‘risk analysis’) on the situation within the EU. Whether the information provided will be of interest to national authorities is another question. Nevertheless, it would be a significant irony if the provision of that information were to contribute to the further maintenance of internal borders in the Schengen area.

      At the same time, there is a more pressing concern related to these new powers. Many discussions on the reintroduction of internal borders revolve around the fact that it is contrary to the idea, spirit (and in these cases, the law) of the Schengen area. What appears to have been totally overlooked is the effect the reintroduction of internal borders may have on non-EU nationals or ethnic minority citizens of the EU. One does not have to cross an internal Schengen frontier too many times to notice patterns in the appearance of the people who are hauled off trains and buses by border guards, but personal anecdotes are not the same thing as empirical investigation. If Frontex’s new powers are intended to inform operational activity by the member states at the internal borders of the EU, then the potential effects on fundamental rights must be taken into consideration and should be the subject of investigation by journalists, officials, politicians and researchers.

      Chris Jones

      Endnotes

      [1] The new Regulation was published in the Official Journal of the EU in mid-November: Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [2] Article 12, ‘Common application of surveillance tools’, Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013R1052

      [3] According to Frontex, the Eurosur Network first came into use in December 2011 and in March 2012 was first used to “exchange operational information”. The Regulation governing the system came into force in October 2013 (see footnote 2). See: Charles Heller and Chris Jones, ‘Eurosur: saving lives or reinforcing deadly borders?’, Statewatch Journal, vol. 23 no. 3/4, February 2014, http://database.statewatch.org/article.asp?aid=33156

      [4] Recital 34, 2019 Regulation: “EUROSUR should provide an exhaustive situational picture not only at the external borders but also within the Schengen area and in the pre-frontier area. It should cover land, sea and air border surveillance and border checks.”

      [5] European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action no 98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) no 1052/2013 and Regulation (EU) no 2016/1624’, COM(2018) 631 final, 12 September 2018, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/sep/eu-com-frontex-proposal-regulation-com-18-631.pdf

      [6] EDPS, ‘Formal comments on the Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard’, 30 November 2018, p. p.2, https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-11-30_comments_proposal_regulation_european_border_coast_guard_en.pdf

      [7] Article 2(23): “‘hotspot area’ means an area created at the request of the host Member State in which the host Member State, the Commission, relevant Union agencies and participating Member States cooperate, with the aim of managing an existing or potential disproportionate migratory challenge characterised by a significant increase in the number of migrants arriving at the external borders”

      [8] Article 26(3)(c), 2019 Regulation

      [9] Article 26(4), 2019 Regulation

      [10] Article 25, 2019 Regulation

      [11] Article 26, 2019 Regulation

      [12] European Commission, ‘Commission Recommendation adopting the Practical Handbook for implementing and managing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)’, C(2015) 9206 final, 15 December 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-borders/legal-documents/docs/eurosur_handbook_annex_en.pdf

      [13] Article 24(3), 2019 Regulation

      [14] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

      [15] Documents related to meetings of committees operating under the auspices of the European Commission can be found in the Comitology Register: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=Search.Search&NewSearch=1

      [16] Kira Schacht, ‘Border checks in EU countries challenge Schengen Agreement’, DW, 12 November 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/border-checks-in-eu-countries-challenge-schengen-agreement/a-51033603

      [17] European Parliament, ‘Temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders’, https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2017/0245(COD)&l=en

      [18] ‘Report on the annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area’, 3 May 2018, para.9, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0160_EN.html

      [19] Elpseth Guild et al, ‘Internal border controls in the Schengen area: is Schengen crisis-proof?’, European Parliament, June 2016, p.9, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571356/IPOL_STU(2016)571356_EN.pdf

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2019/monitoring-secondary-movements-and-hotspots-frontex-is-now-an-internal-s

      #mouvements_secondaires #hotspot #hotspots

  • Trapped in Dublin

    ECRE’s study (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/842813/EPRS_STU(2020)842813_EN.pdf) on the implementation of the Dublin Regulation III, has just been published by the Europpean Parliament Research Service which commissioned it.

    Drawing largely on statistics from the Asylum Information Database (AIDA) database, managed by ECRE and fed by national experts from across Europe, and on ongoing Dublin-related litigation, the study uses the European Commission’s own Better Regulation toolbox. The Better Regulation framework is designed to evaluate any piece of Regulation against the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, coherence and EU added value.

    There are no surprises:

    Assessing the data shows that Dublin III is not effective legislation as it does not meet its own objectives of allowing rapid access to the procedure and ending multiple applications. The hierarchy of criteria it lays down is not fully respected. It appears inefficient – financial costs are significant and probably disproportionate. Notable are the large investments in transfers that do not happen and the inefficient sending of different people in different directions. The human costs of the system are considerable – people left in limbo, people forcibly transferred, the use of detention. The relevance and EU added value of the Regulation in its current form should be questioned. The coherence of the Dublin Regulation is weak in three ways: internal coherence is lacking due to the differing interpretations of key articles across the Member States+; coherence with the rest of the asylum acquis is not perfect; and coherence with fundamental rights is weak due to flaws in drafting and implementation.

    So far, so already well known.

    None of this is news: everybody knows that Dublin is flawed. Indeed, in this week’s hearing at the European Parliament, speaker after speaker stood up to condemn Dublin, including all the Member States present. Even the Member States that drove the Dublin system and whose interests it is supposed to serve (loosely known as the northern Member States), now condemn it openly: it is important to hear Germany argue in a public event that the responsibility sharing rules are unfair and that both trust among states and compliance across the Common European Asylum System is not possible without a fundamental reform of Dublin.

    More disturbing is the view from the persons subject to Dublin, with Shaza Alrihawi from the Global Refugee-led Network describing the depression and despair resulting from being left in limbo while EU countries use Dublin to divest themselves of responsibility. One of the main objectives of Dublin is to give rapid access to an asylum procedure but here was yet another case of someone ready to contribute and to move on with their life who was delayed by Dublin. It is no surprise that “to Dublin” has become a verb in many European languages – “dubliner” or “dublinare”, and a noun: “I Dublinati” – in all cases with a strong negative connotation, reflecting the fear that people understandably have of being “dublinated”.

    With this picture indicating an unsatisfactory situation, what happens now?

    Probably not much. While there is agreement that Dublin III is flawed there is profound disagreement on what should replace it. But the perpetual debate on alternatives to Dublin needs to continue. Dysfunctional legislation which fails the Commission’s own Better Regulation assessment on every score cannot be allowed to sit and fester.

    All jurisdictions have redundant and dysfunctional legislation on their statute books; within the EU legal order, Dublin III is not the only example. Nonetheless, the damage it does is profound so it requires attention. ECRE’s study concludes that the problems exist at the levels of design and implementation. As well as the unfair underlying principles, the design leaves too much room for policy choices on implementation – precisely the problem that regulations as legal instruments are supposed to avoid. Member States’ policy choices on implementation are currently (and perhaps forever) shaped by efforts to minimise responsibility. This means that a focus on implementation alone is not the answer; changes should cover design and implementation.

    The starting point for reform has to be a fundamental overhaul, tackling the responsibility allocation principles. While the original Dublin IV proposal did not do this, there are multiple alternatives, including the European Parliament’s response to Dublin IV and the Commission’s own alternatives developed but not launched in 2016 and before.

    Of course, Dublin IV also had the other flaws, including introducing inadmissibility procedures pre-Dublin and reduction of standards in other ways. Moving forward now means it is necessary to de-link procedural changes and the responsibility-sharing piece.

    Unfortunately, the negotiations, especially between the Member States, are currently stuck in a cul-de-sac that focuses on exactly this kind of unwelcome deal. The discussion can be over-simplified as follows: “WE will offer you some ‘solidarity’ – possibly even a reform of Dublin – but only if, in exchange, YOU agree to manage mandatory or expanded border procedures of some description”. These might be expanded use of current optional asylum procedures at the border; it might be other types of rapid procedures or processes to make decisions about people arriving at or transferred to borders. In any case, the effect on the access to asylum and people’s rights will be highly detrimental, as ECRE has described at length. But they also won’t be acceptable to the “you” in this scenario, the Member States at the external borders.

    There is no logical or legal reason to link the procedural piece and responsibility allocation so closely. And why link responsibility allocation and procedures and not responsibility allocation and reception, for instance? Or responsibility allocation and national/EU resources? This derives from the intrusion of a different agenda: the disproportionate focus on onward movement, also known as (the) “secondary” movement (obsession).

    If responsibility allocation is unfair, then it should be reformed in and of itself, not in exchange for something. The cry will then go out that it is not fair because the MS perceived to “benefit” from the reform will get something for nothing. Well no: any reform could – and should – be accompanied with strict insistence on compliance with the rest of the asylum acquis. The well-documented implementation gaps at the levels of reception, registration, decision-making and procedural guarantees should be priority.

    Recent remarks by Commissioner Schinas (https://euobserver.com/migration/147511) present nothing new and among many uncertainties concerning the fate of the 2016 reforms is whether or not a “package approach” will be maintained by either or both the co-legislators – and whether indeed that is desirable. One bad scenario is that everything is reformed except Dublin. There are provisional inter-institutional agreements on five files, with the Commission suggesting that they move forward. ECRE’s view is that the changes contained in the agreements on these files would reduce protection standards and not add value; other assessments are that protection standards have been improved. Either way, there are strong voices in both the EP and among the MS who don’t want to go ahead without an agreement on Dublin. Which is not wrong – allocation of responsibility is essential in a partially harmonised system: with common legal provisions but without centralised decision-making, responsibility allocation is the gateway to access rights and obligations flowing from the other pieces of legislation. Thus, to pass other reforms without tackling Dublin seems rather pointless.

    While certainly not the best option, the best bet (if one had to place money on something) would be that nothing changes for the core legislation of the CEAS. For that reason, ECRE’s study also lists extensive recommendations for rights-based compliance with Dublin III.

    For example, effectiveness would be improved through better respect for the hierarchy of responsibility criteria, the letter of the law: prioritise family unity through policy choices, better practice on evidential standards, and greater use of Articles 16 and 17. Minimise the focus on transfers based on take-back requests, especially when they are doomed to fail. To know from the start that a transfer is doomed to fail yet to persist with it is an example of a particularly inhumane political dysfunction. Effectiveness also requires better reporting to deal with the multiple information gaps identified, and clarity on key provisions, including through guidance from the Commission.

    Solidarity among Member States could be fostered through use of Article 33 in challenging situations, which allows for preventive actions by the Commission and by Member States, and along with the Temporary Protection Directive, provides better options than some of the new contingency plans under discussion. The use of Article 17, 1 and 2, provides a legal basis for the temporary responsibility-sharing mechanisms which are needed in the absence of deeper reform.

    In perhaps the most crucial area, fundamental rights compliance could be significantly improved: avoid coercive transfers; implement CJEU and ECtHR jurisprudence on reasons for suspension of transfers – there is no need to show systemic deficiencies (CK, Jawo); make a policy decision to suspend transfers to the EU countries where conditions are not adequate and human rights violations are commonplace, rather than waiting for the courts to block the transfer. Resources and political attention could focus on the rights currently neglected: the right to family life, the best interests of the child, right to information, alternatives to detention. Evaluating implementation should be done against the Charter of Fundamental Rights and should always include the people directly affected.

    Even with flawed legislation, there are decisions on policy and resource allocation to be made that could make for better compliance and, in this case, compliance in a way that generates less suffering.

    https://www.ecre.org/weekly-editorial-trapped-in-dublin

    #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Dublin #Dublin_III #Better_Regulation #efficacité #demandes_multiples (le fameux #shopping_de_l'asile) #accélération_des_procédures #coût #transferts_Dublin #renvois_Dublin #coûts_humains #rétention #limbe #détention_administrative #renvois_forcés #cohérence #droits_humains #dépression #désespoir #santé_mentale #responsabilité #Dublin_IV #procédure_d'asile #frontières #frontière #mouvements_secondaires #unité_familiale #inhumanité #solidarité #Temporary_Protection_Directive #protection_temporaire #droits #intérêt_supérieur_de_l'enfant

    –—

    Commentaire de Aldo Brina à qui je fais aveuglement confiance :

    Les éditos de #Catherine_Woollard, secrétaire générale de l’#ECRE, sont souvent bons… mais celui-ci, qui porte sur Dublin, gagne à être lu et largement diffusé

    ping @karine4 @isskein

    • #Résolution du Parlement européen du 17 décembre 2020 sur la mise en œuvre du règlement #Dublin_III (2019/2206(INI))

      Extrait :

      Les procédures de transfert ont fortement augmenté en 2016-2017 et génèrent des coûts humains, matériels et financiers considérables ; déplore toutefois que les transferts n’aient été effectués que dans 11 % des cas, ce qui aggrave encore la surcharge souvent importante des régimes d’asile et confirme le manque d’efficacité du règlement ; juge essentiels les efforts visant à garantir l’accès à l’information et des procédures rapides pour le regroupement familial et les transferts de demandeurs d’asile

      https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2020-0361_FR.html

      #statistiques #chiffres

  • Monitoring « secondary movements » and « hotspots » : Frontex is now an internal surveillance agency

    The EU’s border agency, Frontex, now has powers to gather data on “secondary movements” and the “hotspots” within the EU. The intention is to ensure “#situational_awareness” and produce risk analyses on the migratory situation within the EU, in order to inform possible operational action by national authorities. This brings with it increased risks for the fundamental rights of both non-EU nationals and ethnic minority EU citizens.

    http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/dec/eu-frontex-int-surv.htm
    #surveillance #mouvements_secondaires #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #Frontex #hotspot #hotspots #risques #analyse_de_risques

    –---------

    Dans ce rapport de Statewatch, on peut lire :

    Previously, the agency’s surveillance role has been restricted to the external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or “selected third-country ports.”2 New legal provisions mean it will now be able to gather data on the movement of people within the EU.

    Ce qui n’est pas sans rappeler la carte de @reka sur les 3 frontières européennes :
    #pré-frontière
    #frontière
    #post-frontière


    https://visionscarto.net/la-mediterranee-plus-loin

    Pour une version plus récente de cette carte...


    https://asile.ch/2016/12/13/regard-dune-geographe-murs-frontieres-fantasme-controle-migratoire

    ping @etraces @karine4 @reka @isskein

  • Asile, #relocalisation et #retour des migrants : il est temps de renforcer la lutte contre les disparités entre les objectifs et les résultats

    Dans le cadre de l’audit objet du présent rapport, nous avons cherché à déterminer si le soutien en faveur de la Grèce et de l’Italie financé par l’UE a permis à cette dernière d’atteindre ses objectifs et si les procédures d’asile et de retour étaient efficaces et rapides. Nous avons également vérifié si les valeurs cibles et les objectifs des programmes temporaires de #relocalisation d’urgence avaient été atteints. Nous concluons qu’il existe des disparités entre les objectifs du soutien de l’UE et les résultats obtenus. Les valeurs cibles des programmes de #relocalisation_d'urgence n’ont pas été atteintes. Bien que les capacités des autorités grecques et italiennes aient augmenté, la mise en oeuvre des procédures d’asile continue à pâtir de longs délais de traitement et à présenter des goulets d’étranglement. Comme pour le reste de l’UE, les retours de migrants effectués depuis la Grèce et l’Italie sont peu nombreux pour les raisons que nous exposons dans le présent rapport.

    https://www.eca.europa.eu/fr/Pages/DocItem.aspx?did=51988
    #audit #cour_des_comptes #asile #migrations #réfugiés #EU #UE #Grèce #Italie #aide_financière #procédure_d'asile #expulsions #renvois ##cour_des_comptes_européenne #argent #budget

    Dans le rapport il y a plein de graphiques intéressants...

    Grèce :

    Italie :

    ping @isskein

    • La Cour des comptes de l’UE critique les disparités en matière de gestion des migrations en Grèce et en Italie

      Le 13 novembre 2019, la Cour des comptes de l’Union européenne (UE) publiait son rapport d’audit « Asile, relocalisation et retour des migrants : il est temps de renforcer la lutte contre les disparités entre les objectifs et les résultats ». Ce #rapport examine le soutien financier et opérationnel de l’UE en faveur de la Grèce et de l’Italie. Il évalue dans quelles mesures les objectifs ont été atteints et si les procédures d’asile et de retour étaient efficaces et rapides. Le rapport couvre la période 2015-2018. La Cour des comptes s’est intéressée à l’#accueil des requérants d’asile, à la procédure d’asile, au système #EURODAC et au fonctionnement du système #Dublin, aux #relocalisations des requérants d’asile vers d’autres pays de l’UE et enfin à l’efficacité des renvois vers les pays d’origine. Le rapport est truffé de recommandations qui vont inévitablement influencer les décisions des autorités suisses.

      Diminuer la pression sur la Grèce et l’Italie

      Selon les auditeurs, les mesures de l’UE visant à diminuer la pression migratoire sur la Grèce et l’Italie doivent être améliorées et intensifiées. Ils déplorent la lenteur excessive des procédures d’asile. En Italie, les demandes d’asile déposées en 2015 ont pris en moyenne quatre ans pour parvenir au stade du recours final, tandis que les demandeurs d’asile arrivant sur les îles grecques fin 2018 se voyaient attribuer une date limite pour les entretiens jusqu’en 2023.

      Parallèlement à l’accélération des procédures d’asile, les auditeurs recommandent d’améliorer les logements sur les #îles grecques, en particulier pour les nombreux requérants mineurs non accompagnés qui logent dans des conditions abominables. A ce sujet la Cour des comptes précisent ce qui suit :

      “À #Samos, nous avons visité la section du centre (#hotspot) réservée aux mineurs, qui consiste en sept conteneurs, abritant chacun une salle de bain et deux salles de séjour. Certains conteneurs n’avaient ni portes, ni fenêtres et n’étaient équipés ni de lits ni d’appareils de conditionnement de l’air. Chaque conteneur pouvait officiellement accueillir huit à dix mineurs, mais en hébergeait environ 16 non accompagnés, dont certains étaient même obligés de dormir par terre. Seuls des garçons séjournaient dans la section pour mineurs. Soixante-dix-huit mineurs non accompagnés étaient hébergés sous tente ou dans des maisons abandonnées situées à l’extérieur du point d’accès et devenues des annexes officieuses de celui-ci. Neuf filles non accompagnées dormaient au sol dans un conteneur de 10 m2 situé à côté du bureau de police, sans toilette ni douche.“

      Au moment de la publication du rapport, le maire de l’île de Samos Georgios Stantzos mentionnait l’audit et mettait en garde les autorités grecques contre les conséquences des conditions de vie « primitives » imposées aux réfugiés sur l’île.

      Trop de mouvements secondaires dans l’UE

      Concernant l’enregistrement des empreintes digitales dans le système EURODAC, la situation s’est beaucoup améliorée dans les centres hotspots en Italie et en Grèce. Cependant, entre 2015 et 2018, la Cour a remarqué un volume élevé de mouvements secondaires dans l’UE ce qui a rendu l’application du mécanisme de Dublin difficile. Les données EUROSTAT traduisent aussi de faibles taux de transferts Dublin qui s’expliquent selon les auditeurs, par la fuite ou la disparition des personnes concernées, des raisons humanitaires, des décisions de justice en suspens et des cas de regroupement familial (1).
      Les réinstallations très insatisfaisantes

      Les États membres de l’UE se sont juridiquement engagés à réinstaller 98 256 migrants, sur un objectif initial fixé à 160 000. Or seuls 34 705 ont été effectivement réinstallés (21 999 depuis la Grèce et 12 706 depuis l’Italie). Selon les auditeurs, la performance insuffisante de ces programmes s’explique surtout par le faible nombre de requérants potentiellement éligibles enregistrés en vue d’une relocalisation, surtout parce que les autorités grecques et italiennes ont eu de la peine à ‘identifier les candidats. Une fois les migrants enregistrés en vue d’une relocalisation, la solidarité à leur égard a mieux fonctionné. Les auditeurs ont cependant relevé un certain nombre de faiblesses opérationnelles dans le processus de relocalisation (2).

      Augmentation des renvois vers les pays d’origines

      Pour la Cour des comptes, le fossé entre le nombre de décisions négatives et le nombre de renvois exécutés depuis la Grèce, l’Italie ou le reste de l’UE, est trop important. Le taux de renvois des ressortissants de pays tiers ayant reçu l’ordre de quitter l’UE était d’environ 40 % en 2018 et de 20 % en Grèce et en Italie. En s’inspirant de certains centres de renvois destinés aux personnes qui acceptent volontairement de rentrer vers leurs pays d’origine, la Cour des comptes recommande différentes mesures qui permettront de faciliter les renvois dont l’ouverture de nouveaux centres de détention et l’offre plus systématique de programmes de réintégration dans les pays d’origine.

      Conclusion

      Le rapport de la Cour des comptes de l’UE est une mine d’information pour comprendre le fonctionnement des centres hotspots en Grèce et en Italie. Globalement, sa lecture donne le sentiment que l’UE se dirige à grands pas vers une prolifération de centre hotspots, un raccourcissement des procédures d’asile et une armada de mesures facilitant l’exécution des renvois vers les pays d’origine.

      https://blogs.letemps.ch/jasmine-caye/2019/11/19/la-cour-des-comptes-de-lue-critique-les-disparites-en-matiere-de-gesti
      #mineurs_non_accompagnés #MNA #hotspots #empreintes_digitales #mouvements_secondaires

    • Migrants relocation: EU states fail on sharing refugees

      A mandatory 2015 scheme to dispatch people seeking international protection from Greece and Italy across the European Union did not deliver promised results, say EU auditors.

      Although member states took in some 35,000 people from both countries, the EU auditors say at least 445,000 Eritreans, Iraqis and Syrians may have been potentially eligible in Greece alone.

      The lead author of the report, Leo Brincat, told reporters in Brussels on Wednesday (13 November) that another 36,000 could have also been possibly relocated from Italy.

      “But when it boils down to the total migrants relocated, you will find 21,999 in the case of Greece and 12,706 in the case of Italy,” he said.

      The EU auditors say the migrants relocated at the time represented only around four percent of all the asylum seekers in Italy and around 22 percent in Greece.

      Despite being repeatedly billed as a success by the European Commission, the two-year scheme had also caused massive rifts with some member states – leading to EU court battles in Luxembourg.

      When it was first launched among interior ministers in late 2015, the mandatory nature of the proposal was forced through by a vote, overturning objections from the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia.

      Only last month, the advocate-general at the EU court in Luxembourg had declared the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland likely broke EU law for refusing to take in refugees from the 2015 scheme. While the Czech Republic took 12 people, both Hungary and Poland refused to host anyone at all.

      Similar battles have for years played out behind closed doors as legislators grapple with deadlocked internal EU asylum reforms.

      The concepts of sharing out asylum seekers, also known as relocation, are at the core of that deadlock.

      Politics aside, Brincat’s report honed in on the so-called “temporary emergency relocation scheme” whereby EU states had agreed to take in some 160,000 people from Greece and Italy over a period spanning from September 2015 to September 2017.

      Large numbers of people at the time were coming up through the Western Balkans into Hungary and onto Germany, while others were crossing from Turkey onto the Greek islands.

      After the EU cut a deal with Turkey early 2016, the set legal target of 160,000 had been reduced to just over 98,000.

      When the scheme finally ended in September 2017, only around 35,000 people had been relocated to member states along with Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.

      “In our view, relocation was really a demonstration of European solidarity and with almost a 100 percent of eligible candidates in Greece and in Italy having been successfully relocated,” a European Commission spokeswoman said on Wednesday.
      Bottlenecks and other problems

      The EU auditors present a different view. They point out Greek and Italian authorities lacked the staff to properly identify people who could have been relocated, resulting in low registrations.

      They also say EU states only took in people from Greece who arrived before the deal was cut with Turkey in March 2016.

      Another issue was member states had vastly different asylum-recognition rates. For instance, asylum-recognition rates for Afghanis varied from six percent to 98 percent, depending on the member state. Iraqis had similarly variable rates.

      Some migrants also simply didn’t trust relocation concept. Others likely baulked at the idea being sent to a country where they had no cultural, language or family ties.

      Almost all of the 332 people sent to Lithuania, for example, packed up and left.

      EU Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker had even poked fun of it in late 2016. He had said asylum seekers from Greece and Italy were hard pressed to relocate to his home country of Luxembourg.

      “We found 53 after explaining to them that it was close to Germany. They are no longer there [Luxembourg],” he said.

      https://voxeurop.eu/en/2019/migration-5124053

  • Info sur la refonte de la #Directive_Retour et les futurs projets de réforme du #régime_d'asile_européen_commun

    info sur la prochaine étape européenne en matière de politique migratoire. Plus précisément sur la refonte de la Directive Retour qui va passer au vote en #LIBE et aussi des infos sur l’évolution du Régime d’Asile Européen Commun (#RAEC), histoire d’informer de ce vers quoi l’on tend probablement pour la prochaine législature (donc le prochain mandat).

    Dans un effort pour réformer le Régime d’Asile Européen Commun (RAEC) et tendre vers une #uniformisation du droit d’asile au niveau européen, les directives sont revues une à une depuis quelques années (Directive Accueil, Procédure, Qualification et Retour + le règlement Dublin qui est au point mort depuis 2017 à cause du Conseil Européen).
    Ces #révisions rentrent dans le cadre de l’#agenda_européen_pour_les_migrations qui a été élaboré en 2015 par la Commission sous ordre du Conseil Européen.

    Le package est en état d’avancement prochain et l’étape la plus proche semble concerner la refonte de la Directive Retour.
    Néanmoins, il y a également un nombre assez important de dispositifs prévus dont il est peut-être pas inintéressant d’évoquer dans le sillage de l’analyse sur cette Directive.

    Il y a donc deux parties dans ce mail d’info : la première sur le Régime d’Asile Européen Commun (RAEC) et ce qu’il préfigure ; la seconde sur le texte de la Directive Retour plus précisément.

    Le Régime d’Asile Européen Commun :

    Il y a de nombreux discours actuellement autour de la mise en place d’un droit d’asile "harmonisé" au niveau européen.

    C’est une obsession de Macron depuis son élection. Il a réaffirmé, lors de la restitution du Grand Débat, sa volonté d’une Europe au régime d’asile commun : "c’est aussi une Europe qui tient ses frontières, qui les protège. C’est une Europe qui a un droit d’asile refondé et commun et où la #responsabilité va avec la #solidarité."
    https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/04/25/conference-de-presse-grand-debat-national

    La confusion est telle que les journalistes ne semblent pas toujours comprendre si ce régime d’asile commun existe ou non.

    Sur france inter par exemple :
    "Cela fait plusieurs années que l’on parle de la mise en place d’un régime d’asile européen commun. Nous en sommes encore très loin mais plusieurs textes sont actuellement en discussion, sur les procédures, sur l’accueil, les qualifications, les réinstallations, la création d’une agence européenne pour l’asile "
    https://www.franceinter.fr/emissions/cafe-europe/cafe-europe-24-fevrier-2018

    Et non... ça ne fait pas plusieurs années qu’on en parle... ça fait plusieurs années qu’il existe !

    Historique :

    En vérité, cette tentative d’harmonisation des législations est ancienne et date à peu près du Conseil Européen de #Tampere en 1999 qui donna les premières impulsions pour la mise en place du Régime d’Asile Européen Commun avec tout ce que l’on connait maintenant à savoir par exemple, le #règlement_Dublin.
    Ici le résumé des orientations du Conseil sont claires :
    "il faut, pour les domaines distincts, mais étroitement liés, de l’#asile et des #migrations, élaborer une politique européenne commune (...) Il est convenu de travailler à la mise en place d’un régime d’asile européen commun, fondé sur l’application intégrale et globale de la Convention de Genève. (...) Ce régime devrait comporter, à court terme, une méthode claire et opérationnelle pour déterminer l’Etat responsable de l’examen d’une demande d’asile, des normes communes pour une procédure d’asile équitable et efficace, des conditions communes minimales d’#accueil des demandeurs d’asile, et le rapprochement des règles sur la reconnaissance et le contenu du statut de réfugié."
    http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_fr.htm#a

    Vous avez ici les bases du RAEC et notamment du règlement Dublin qui vise justement à la détermination de l’#Etat_responsable de l’asile afin de lutter contre le "#shopping_de_l'asile", un """"fléau""""" qui avait déjà touché l’Europe durant les années 90 avec la crise des Balkans (en 1992, 700 000 personnes environ ont demandé l’asile en Europe, ce qui signifie par ailleurs que non... 2015 n’est pas une situation si inédite. La situation s’est stabilisée après 1993 où 500 000 personnes ont demandé l’asile, puis 300 000 dans les années qui ont suivi, mais pas au point de ne pas "forcer" les pays à réagir au niveau européen).
    https://www.persee.fr/doc/homig_1142-852x_1996_num_1198_1_2686

    Cet acte fondateur du #Conseil_de_Tampere est corroboré par plusieurs documents et on peut en trouver aussi confirmation par exemple dans le rapport sur la #politique_européenne_de_Retour (rédigé tous les trois ans) qui commence par :
    "L’Union européenne s’efforce depuis 1999 de mettre au point une approche globale sur la question des migrations, qui couvre l’#harmonisation des conditions d’admission, les droits des ressortissants de pays tiers en séjour régulier ainsi que l’élaboration de mesures juridiques et le renforcement d’une coopération pratique en matière de prévention des flux migratoires irréguliers."
    https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=celex:52014DC0199

    Bref, à partir de 1999 et donc du Conseil de Tampere, la direction est prise de mener une politique migratoire à l’échelle européenne pour renforcer le contrôle des frontières extérieures.

    Les Textes du RAEC, l’échec de l’harmonisation et les règlements qui nous attendent en conséquence :

    Le Conseil (donc les États) ordonné à Tampere et donc la Commission exécute en proposant plusieurs textes qui vont dessiner le paysage actuel du droit d’asile européen commun.

    Un ensemble de textes est donc créé et adopté :

    Le règlement Dublin succède donc à la convention de Dublin en 2003
    https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/R%C3%A8glement_Dublin_II
    Avec son frère le règlement #Eurodac qui permet la mise en oeuvre de #Dublin aussi en 2003 (logique) :
    https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurodac

    #Frontex est lancé en 2004 :
    https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agence_europ%C3%A9enne_pour_la_gestion_de_la_coop%C3%A9ration_op%C3%A9

    Et les directives qui constituent le coeur du Régime d’Asile Européen Commun avec le règlement Dublin sont lancées dans la foulée :

    La #Directive_Accueil en 2003 (puis réformée en 2013)
    https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013L0033

    La #Directive_Procédure en 2005 (réformée aussi en 2013)
    https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/public/Procedures-FR.pdf

    La #Directive_Qualification en 2004 (réformée en 2011)
    https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32011L0095

    La Directive Retour en 2008 (qui va être réformée maintenant)
    https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Ajl0014

    L’ensemble de ces textes avait pour but d’harmoniser les législations nationales européennes (pour le meilleur et pour le pire d’ailleurs).
    Le problème concerne donc, non pas l’absence de législations européennes communes, mais plutôt les marges de manoeuvres des Etats dans l’interprétation des Directives et leur transposition dans les législations nationales. Cette marge de manoeuvre est telle qu’elle permet aux Etats de retenir ce qui les arrange dans tel ou tel texte, de sorte que toute tentative d’harmonisation est impossible.

    Dès lors, la diversité des procédures est toujours la norme d’un pays à l’autre ; un pays comme les Pays-Bas donne 4 ans de protection subsidiaire, tandis que la France avant la loi Asile n’en donnait qu’une ; la liste des pays sûrs n’est pas la même selon les Etats .... etc etc etc

    Les Etats ont tellement la main que finalement, on peut assez facilement conclure à l’#échec total des tentatives d’harmonisation et donc du RAEC, tant les Etats ont, du début à la fin, fait un peu près ce qu’ils voulaient avec les textes.
    (voir également Sarah Lamort : https://www.amazon.fr/Europe-terre-dasile-Sarah-Lamort/dp/2130734669)

    La Commission a elle-même très bien compris ces faiblesses.

    Exaspérée elle déclare en 2016 que malgré ses efforts pour la mise en place effective du RAEC : " il existe encore des différences notables entre les États membres dans les types de procédures utilisés, les conditions d’accueil offertes aux demandeurs, les #taux_de_reconnaissance et le type de protection octroyé aux bénéficiaires d’une protection internationale. Ces #divergences contribuent à des #mouvements_secondaires et à une course à l’asile (« #asylum_shopping »), créent des facteurs d’attraction et conduisent en définitive à une répartition inégale entre les États membres de la responsabilité d’offrir une protection à ceux qui en ont besoin.(...) Ces #disparités résultent en partie des dispositions souvent discrétionnaires qui figurent dans la version actuelle de la directive relative aux procédures d’asile et de celle relative aux conditions d’accueil." et de toutes les autres en vérité pouvons-nous ajouter...
    L’objectif est donc de "renforcer et harmoniser davantage les règles du régime d’asile européen commun, de façon à assurer une plus grande égalité de traitement dans l’ensemble de l’Union et à réduire les facteurs d’attraction injustifiés qui encouragent les départs vers l’UE" (les facteurs d’attraction étant le "shopping de l’asile")

    Et pour cela la Commission propose de transformer quasiment toutes les Directives citées plus haut en Règlement... :
    " la Commission proposera un nouveau règlement instituant une procédure d’asile commune unique dans l’Union et remplaçant la directive relative aux procédures d’asile ; un nouveau règlement relatif aux conditions que doivent remplir les demandeurs d’asile remplaçant l’actuelle directive du même nom, et des modifications ciblées de la directive relative aux conditions d’accueil."
    https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/FR/1-2016-197-FR-F1-1.PDF

    La différence entre la Directive et le Règlement étant que justement la Directive est soumise à une interprétation des Etats dans la transposition au sein des législations nationales de la dite Directive (dont on voit qu’elle est large), tandis qu’un Règlement est contraignant et s’applique sans interprétation, ni marge de manoeuvre whatsoever à tous les Etats (comme le règlement Dublin).
    Ici par exemple, la Commission propose de changer la Directive Procédure en un Règlement, histoire par exemple, que tous les pays aient la même liste de pays d’origine sûrs une bonne fois pour toute : https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016PC0467

    Ce processus d’abrogation des #directives pour en faire des #règlements est en cours et il est très important puisque cela signifie qu’il va falloir surveiller de très près les dispositions qui vont apparaitre dans ces nouveaux textes qui vont TOUS s’appliquer stricto sensu.
    Ce n’est pas forcément une bonne nouvelle.

    Reste que les Etats pourraient s’opposer à l’imposition de textes aussi coercitifs et d’ailleurs, ils ont eux-mêmes bloqué la révision du règlement Dublin. Cela pose la question de l’Etat d’avancement.

    Etat d’avancement :
    Depuis l’annonce de la transformation des Directives en Règlements en 2016, les dossiers ne semblent pas avoir tant avancés que cela pour autant que je sache sauf concernant quelques dossiers majeurs, notamment la Directive Retour.

    Concernant la mise en place des règlements, la Commission est très vague dans sa dernière communication sur l’état d’avancement de l’agenda européen matière de migrations de mars 2019 : https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2019:0126:FIN:FR:PDF
    En décembre 2017, elle disait :
    "Présentées il y a un an et demi, ces propositions en sont à des stades d’avancement différents dans le processus législatif. Certaines, comme la proposition concernant l’Agence de l’Union européenne pour l’asile et la réforme d’Eurodac, sont sur le point d’être adoptées. D’autres, à savoir le cadre de l’Union pour la réinstallation, le règlement relatif aux conditions que doivent remplir les demandeurs d’asile et la directive relative aux conditions d’accueil, progressent. En revanche, la proposition de règlement sur les procédures d’asile et, comme pierre angulaire, la proposition de révision du règlement de Dublin, nécessitent encore un travail considérable. Dans ce contexte, il convient aussi de progresser dans les travaux sur la notion de pays tiers sûr au sens de l’UE, en tenant compte des conclusions du Conseil européen de juin"
    https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/FR/COM-2017-820-F1-FR-MAIN-PART-1.PDF

    Il y a donc fort à parier qu’en à peine 1 an et demi, les choses n’aient pas beaucoup avancées concernant les règlements.
    Bref, comme il était assez attendu, ce qui ne contraint pas totalement les Etats avancent et le reste piétine pour le moment.

    Par contre, elles avancent concernant la politique des retours et donc la Directive Retour !

    Politique des retours et externalisation de l’asile :

    Après le Conseil de Tampere en 1999, vient la "crise des migrants" en 2015, qui ne fera qu’accélérer les constatations de l’échec du RAEC.

    Le Conseil européen lance donc une réunion spéciale en avril 2015 qui annonce un changement de stratégie vers l’extérieur avec notamment un renforcement de la coopération avec les pays tiers pour le "contrôle de l’immigration". Ordre est donné à la Commission de mobiliser tous les moyens nécessaires pour mettre cette nouvelle stratégie en oeuvre.
    Ce n’est pas le lancement officiel de l’externalisation de l’Asile puisque le processus de Khartoum et de Rabat sont antérieurs et déjà lancés.
    Néanmoins, il me parait assez évident personnellement qu’un coup d’accélérateur à la stratégie d’externalisation sera donné à partir de ce Conseil qui sera entièrement tourné vers la coopération internationale :
    https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/04/23/special-euco-statement

    Dans le prolongement logique des décisions prises lors du Conseil d’avril 2015 et de l’orientation stratégique vers l’extérieur, le Conseil Européen lancera le Sommet de la Valette en novembre où il invitera un nombre conséquent de pays africains.
    Ainsi le Sommet de la Valette, "fut l’occasion de reconnaître que la gestion des migrations relève de la responsabilité commune des pays d’origine, de transit et de destination. L’UE et l’Afrique ont travaillé dans un esprit de partenariat afin de trouver des solutions communes aux défis d’intérêt commun."
    https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/meetings/international-summit/2015/11/11-12

    C’est après ce Sommet que seront initiés le Fond Fiduciaire, les accords avec la Turquie, la Libye, les garde-côtes, la transformation de Frontex etc
    Bien que tout cela ait été préparé en amont.

    Après les ordres du Conseil, la Commission s’exécute avec l’Agenda Européen en Matière de Migrations et la focale sur les retours :
    Devant la stratégie d’orientation du Conseil qui demande des réformes fortes et des actions pour transformer la politique européenne d’asile, la Commission s’exécute en mai 2015 avec l’Agenda Européen des migrations :https://ec.europa.eu/france/node/859_fr

    Cet agenda met l’emphase sur un nombre impressionnant de points, mais une large part est également réservée aux retours page 11 et 12 (puisqu’il faudrait s’assurer que les retours soient efficaces et effectifs d’après la Commission).
    https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_fr.pdf

    Dans la foulée la Commission lance donc une réflexion sur la politique des retours qui culminera la même année en 2015 avec The Action Plan of Return.
    L’action plan partira d’un principe assez simple, si les migrants viennent, c’est parce qu’on ne les renvoie pas...
    "The European Agenda on Migration, adopted by the European Commission on 13 May 2015, highlighted that one of the incentives for irregular migration is the knowledge that the EU’s system to return irregular migrants is not sufficiently effective"
    https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52015DC0453

    Ce plan est censé résoudre ce problème.
    Mais il sera aussi un relatif échec, ce qui n’empêchera pas la Commission d’insister en lançant un nouveau plan en 2017, The Renewed Action Plan on return :
    "Despite this, the overall impact on the return track record across the European Union remained limited, showing that more resolute action is needed to bring measurable results in returning irregular migrants. "
    https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20170302_a_more_effective_return_policy_in_the_european_union_-_a_renewed_

    Toujours dans la foulée d’une politique d’expulsion efficace, il sera discuté plus tard (en mars 2019 sur l’évaluation de l’application de l’agenda européen) de la meilleure façon d’exécuter les retours en Europe. C’est là où nous en sommes.
    Pour la mise en place d’une politique de retour efficace, il y a donc deux stratégies :

    1) renforcer les accords de réadmission avec des accords bilatéraux ou par le biais des accords de Cotonou (qui vont être révisés et qui ont beaucoup tourné autour des migrations justement...on en reparlera un jour).
    "Concernant donc "les retours et la réadmission, l’UE continue d’œuvrer à la conclusion d’accords et d’arrangements en matière de réadmission avec les pays partenaires, 23 accords et arrangements ayant été conclus jusqu’à présent. Les États membres doivent maintenant tirer pleinement parti des accords existants."
    http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-1496_fr.htm

    2) renforcer les procédures de retour depuis l’Europe.
    La Commission espère en conséquence que "le Parlement européen et le Conseil devraient adopter rapidement la proposition de la Commission en matière de retour, qui vise à limiter les abus et la fuite des personnes faisant l’objet d’un retour au sein de l’Union"
    http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-1496_fr.htm

    C’est pourquoi la Commission propose de revoir la Directive Retour.

    La Directive Retour :
    La directive retour est donc la prochaine directive sur la liste des refontes.
    Ce sera un gros sujet a priori puisque la prochaine étape c’est le vote en Commission LIBE avant donc le vote en plénière.
    L’échéance est donc proche et les discussions bien avancées.

    Un texte problématique :

    Article 6 et 16
    En gros, les problèmes qui se posent avec ce texte ont surtout à voir avec l’article 6 qui décrit une liste de 16 critères de "risque de fuites", les derniers étant particulièrement dangereux puisqu’il semblerait que "résister aux procédures de retour" ou "refuser de donner ses empreintes" peuvent représenter des risques de fuites....
    Cet élargissement des critères est à mettre en lien avec l’article 18 qui permet la détention de toutes les personnes qui représentent un risque de fuite. Avec un élargissement pareil des critères de "fuites", je crains que l’on ne se donne le droit d’enfermer tout le monde.

    Article 7
    L’article 7 oblige les Etats tiers à coopérer dans les procédures de retour.
    L’application de cet article me semblait complexe mais le Brief du Parlement sur la Directive au paragraphe "Council" (donc sur les discussions au Conseil) ajoute que les Etats réfléchissent à la possibilité de sanctions pour les pays tiers en cas de non-respect de cette obligation de coopération.
    Et à ce moment-là j’ai compris.... Ma théorie c’est qu’un chantage quelconque pourra être mis en place pour établir une pression forçant les Etats tiers à coopérer.
    Tout le problème tient sur l’amplitude des sanctions possibles. Je n’en vois pas beaucoup, sauf à menacer de rompre des accords commerciaux ou de développement.

    C’est déjà plus ou moins le cas via le Fond Fiduciaire ou les fonds d’aide au dvp puisque l’on voit parfois que l’aide au dvp dépend de la mise en place d’accords de réadmission.
    Par exemple : l’UE et l’Afghanistan ont signé un accord de réadmission en Octobre 2016 : https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_afghanistan_joint_way_forward_on_migration_issues.pdf
    Et dans la foulée d’octobre, 5 milliards d’aide au dvp étaient débloqués pour la période 2016-2020 à la conférence de Bruxelles (https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu-afghanistan_march_2019.pdf).

    Avec une opération pareille, des soupçons de chantage à l’aide au dvp me paraissent tout à fait légitime.
    Cependant, ils existaient une séparation dans la forme. C’est-à-dire que même si les liens peuvent sembler évidents, les accords de réadmission n’établissaient pas directement de chantage entre l’un et l’autre. Il n’était pas écrit que des "sanctions" étaient possibles (du moins pas dans l’exemple de l’Afghanistan ni même dans l’accord de Cotonou - exception faite de ce qui concerne l’article 96 et le respect des droits—et dans aucun autre texte à ma connaissance).
    Ici le Conseil veut faire un pas de plus dans la direction d’une politique assumée de pressions via des sanctions et donc, indirectement semble-t-il, de chantage.

    Les Pays Tiers-Sûrs
    Un autre élément dangereux dans ce paragraphe sur le Conseil dans le Brief du Parlement : c’est que les Etats de leur côté réfléchissent aussi à la possibilité de renvoyer une personne dans un pays tiers considéré comme sûr qui ne soit pas le pays d’origine.
    En d’autres termes, renvoyer les soudanais par exemple, en Egypte par exemple légalement.

    Cela rejoint a priori les discussions sur la notion de pays tiers sûrs que la Commission et le Conseil continuent de vouloir développer depuis très longtemps malgré les oppositions franches des ONG (http://www.forumrefugies.org/s-informer/actualites/le-concept-de-pays-tiers-sur-une-remise-en-cause-profonde-de-l-acces-) ou même l’avis défavorable de la Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme en 2017 (https://www.cncdh.fr/sites/default/files/171219_avis_concept_pays_tiers_sur_5.pdf)
    On ferait ici un pas de plus au sein du creuset initié par la politique des "pays d’origine sûrs" et on s’offrirait le droit de renvoyer des personnes dans des pays qui n’auraient pas les conditions pour les accueillir dignement (tant matériellement que du point de vue du respect des droits...).

    Article 22
    L’article 22 est aussi très problématique puisque les dispositions aux frontières devraient changer :
    Les migrants en zone d’attente devraient recevoir une décision de retour simplifiée plutôt qu’une explication motivée.
    Il ne devrait plus y avoir aucune chance de départ volontaire, sauf si le migrant possède un document de voyage en cours de validité (remis aux autorités) et coopère pleinement (car s’il ne coopère pas, on l’a vu, il peut être déclaré en "tentative de fuite" ou en "fuite").
    Concernant les recours, les migrants ne disposeront que de 48 heures pour faire appel d’une décision de retour fondée sur un rejet de l’asile à la frontière, et l’effet suspensif ne s’appliquera qu’à la présentation de nouvelles conclusions importantes (type CNDA) ou qu’il n’y a pas déjà eu de contrôle juridictionnel effectif.

    Article 16
    D’ailleurs, les recours peuvent subir un changement relativement dramatique à cause de l’article 16. Selon le brief de la Commission :
    " Proposed Article 16(4) imposes a general obligation on Member States to establish ‘reasonable’ time limits. In relation to appeals lodged against return decisions adopted as a consequence of a decision rejecting an application for international protection, Member States would have to establish a time limit for lodging an appeal of a maximum of five days, but would be free to fix a shorter period."
    http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/637901/EPRS_BRI(2019)637901_EN.pdf
    Une manière de réduire encore plus les possibilités de recours.

    Article 13
    L’article 13 apporte aussi des changements aux refus d’entrée : " the proposal would allow Member States to impose an isolated entry ban, not accompanied by a corresponding return decision, if the irregularity of a stay is detected when the third-country national is exiting the territory of a Member State"
    http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/637901/EPRS_BRI(2019)637901_EN.pdf

    Néanmoins, j’ai pour le moment du mal à évaluer l’étendue de cette proposition à l’article 13 et il faudrait peut-être en discuter avec l’anafé par exemple.

    #procédure_d'asile #réforme

    Reçu par email via la mailing-list Migreurop, le 06.06.2019

    • New EU deportation law breaches fundamental rights standards and should be rejected

      A proposed new EU law governing standards and procedures for deportations would breach fundamental rights standards, massively expand the use of detention, limit appeal rights and undermine ’voluntary’ return initiatives. It should be rejected by the European Parliament and the Council, argues a new analysis published today by Statewatch. [1]

      The original Returns Directive was agreed in 2008, but a proposal for a ’recast’ version was published by the European Commission in September 2018 as one a number of measures aiming to crack down on “illegally staying third-country nationals” in the EU. [2]

      The proposal aims to increase the number of deportations from the EU by reducing or eliminating existing safeguards for those facing deportation proceedings - but even if such a method could be considered legitimate, there is no evidence to suggest that the proposed measures will have the intended effect.

      For example, the proposal introduces numerous new grounds for placing migrants in detention and would introduce a new ’minimum maximum’ period of detention of at least three months. [3]

      However, in 2017, Spain (with a maximum detention period of 60 days) had a ’return rate’ of 37%, while the return rate from countries with a detention limit of 18 months (the maximum period permitted under the current Returns Directive) differed significantly: 11% in the Czech Republic, 18% in Belgium, 40% in Greece and 46% in Germany. [4]

      The report urges EU lawmakers to discard the proposal and focus on alternative measures that would be less harmful to individuals. It includes an article-by-article analysis of the Commission’s proposal and the positions of the European Parliament and the Council, as they were prior to the EU institutions’ summer break.

      The European Parliament and the Council of the EU will begin discussing the proposal again in the coming weeks.

      Quotes

      Statewatch researcher Jane Kilpatrick said:

      “The proposed recast prioritises detention for more people and for longer durations - the physical and mental harms of which are well-known, especially for people with prior traumatic experiences - over any collaborative measures. The recast would remove the option for states to adopt measures more respectful of human rights and health. The fact that it hasn’t relied on any evidence that these will even work suggests it is a political exercise to appease anti-migrant rhetoric.”

      Chris Jones, a researcher at Statewatch, added:

      “The EU cannot claim to be a bastion of human rights at the same time as trying to undermine or eliminate existing safeguards for third-country nationals subject to deportation proceedings. Given that there is no evidence to suggest the proposed measures would actually work, it seems that lawmakers are dealing with a proposal that would be both harmful and ineffective. The previous MEP responsible for the proposal did a good job of trying to improve it - but it would be better to reject it altogether.”

      http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/sep/eu-returns-directive.htm

    • New EU deportation law breaches fundamental rights standards and should be rejected

      A proposed new EU law governing standards and procedures for deportations would breach fundamental rights standards, massively expand the use of detention, limit appeal rights and undermine ’voluntary’ return initiatives. It should be rejected by the European Parliament and the Council, argues a new analysis published today by Statewatch. [1]

      The original Returns Directive was agreed in 2008, but a proposal for a ’recast’ version was published by the European Commission in September 2018 as one a number of measures aiming to crack down on “illegally staying third-country nationals” in the EU. [2]

      The proposal aims to increase the number of deportations from the EU by reducing or eliminating existing safeguards for those facing deportation proceedings - but even if such a method could be considered legitimate, there is no evidence to suggest that the proposed measures will have the intended effect.

      For example, the proposal introduces numerous new grounds for placing migrants in detention and would introduce a new ’minimum maximum’ period of detention of at least three months. [3]

      However, in 2017, Spain (with a maximum detention period of 60 days) had a ’return rate’ of 37%, while the return rate from countries with a detention limit of 18 months (the maximum period permitted under the current Returns Directive) differed significantly: 11% in the Czech Republic, 18% in Belgium, 40% in Greece and 46% in Germany. [4]

      The report urges EU lawmakers to discard the proposal and focus on alternative measures that would be less harmful to individuals. It includes an article-by-article analysis of the Commission’s proposal and the positions of the European Parliament and the Council, as they were prior to the EU institutions’ summer break.

      The European Parliament and the Council of the EU will begin discussing the proposal again in the coming weeks.

      Quotes

      Statewatch researcher Jane Kilpatrick said:

      “The proposed recast prioritises detention for more people and for longer durations - the physical and mental harms of which are well-known, especially for people with prior traumatic experiences - over any collaborative measures. The recast would remove the option for states to adopt measures more respectful of human rights and health. The fact that it hasn’t relied on any evidence that these will even work suggests it is a political exercise to appease anti-migrant rhetoric.”

      Chris Jones, a researcher at Statewatch, added:

      “The EU cannot claim to be a bastion of human rights at the same time as trying to undermine or eliminate existing safeguards for third-country nationals subject to deportation proceedings. Given that there is no evidence to suggest the proposed measures would actually work, it seems that lawmakers are dealing with a proposal that would be both harmful and ineffective. The previous MEP responsible for the proposal did a good job of trying to improve it - but it would be better to reject it altogether.”

      http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/sep/eu-returns-directive.htm

  • Dimenticati ai confini d’Europa

    L’obiettivo della ricerca è dare voce alle esperienze dei migranti e dei rifugiati, per rendere chiaro il nesso tra quello che hanno vissuto e le politiche europee che i governi hanno adottato.
    Il report si basa su 117 interviste qualitative realizzate nell’enclave spagnola di Melilla, in Sicilia, a Malta, in Grecia, in Romania, in Croazia e in Serbia. Ciò che emerge chiaramente è che il momento dell’ingresso in Europa, sia che esso avvenga attraverso il mare o attraverso una foresta sul confine terrestre, non è che un frammento di un viaggio molto più lungo ed estremamente traumatico. Le rotte che dall’Africa occidentale e orientale portano fino alla Libia sono notoriamente pericolose, specialmente per le donne, spesso vittime di abusi sessuali o costrette a prostituirsi per pagare i trafficanti.

    Il report mostra che alle frontiere dell’Unione Europea, e talora anche a quelle interne, c’è una vera e propria emergenza dal punto di vista della tutela dei diritti umani. L’assenza di vie legali di accesso per le persone bisognose di protezione le costringe ad affidarsi ai trafficanti su rotte che si fanno sempre più lunghe e pericolose. I tentativi dell’UE e degli Stati Membri di chiudere le principali rotte non proteggono la vita delle persone, come a volte si sostiene, ma nella maggior parte dei casi riescono a far sì che la loro sofferenza abbia sempre meno testimoni.


    http://centroastalli.it/dimenticati-ai-confini-deuropa-2
    #Europe #frontières #asile #migrations #droits_humains #rapport #réfugiés #Sicile #Italie #Malte #Grèce #Roumanie #Croatie #Serbie #UE #EU #femmes #Libye #violence #violences_sexuelles #parcours_migratoires #abus_sexuels #viol #prostitution #voies_légales #invisibilisation #invisibilité #fermeture_des_frontières #refoulement #push-back #violent_borders #Dublin #règlement_dublin #accès_aux_droits #accueil #détention #mouvements_secondaires

    Pour télécharger le rapport :
    https://drive.google.com/file/d/1TT9vefCRv2SEqbfsaEyucSIle5U1dNxh/view

    ping @isskein

    • Migranti, il Centro Astalli: “È emergenza diritti umani alle frontiere d’Europa”

      Assenza di vie di accesso legale ai migranti forzati, respingimenti arbitrari, detenzioni, impossibilità di accedere al diritto d’asilo: è il quadro disegnato da una nuova ricerca della sede italiana del Servizio dei gesuiti per i rifugiati.

      S’intitola “Dimenticati ai confini d’Europa” il report messo a punto dal Centro Astalli, la sede italiana del Servizio dei gesuiti per i rifugiati, che descrive, attraverso le storie dei rifugiati, le sempre più numerose violazioni di diritti fondamentali che si susseguono lungo le frontiere di diversi Paesi europei. La ricerca, presentata oggi a Roma, si basa su 117 interviste qualitative realizzate nell’enclave spagnola di Melilla, in Sicilia, a Malta, in Grecia, in Romania, in Croazia e in Serbia.

      Il report, si spiega nella ricerca, «mostra che alle frontiere dell’Unione europea, e talora anche a quelle interne, c’è una vera e propria emergenza dal punto di vista della tutela dei diritti umani». Secondo padre Camillo Ripamonti, presidente del Centro Astalli, la ricerca mette bene in luce come l’incapacità di gestire il fenomeno migratorio solitamente attribuita all’Ue, nasca anche dalla «volontà di tanti singoli Stati che non vogliono assumersi le proprie responsabilità» di fronte all’arrivo di persone bisognose di protezione alle loro frontiere, al contrario è necessario che l’Europa torni ad essere «il continente dei diritti, non dobbiamo perdere il senso della nostra umanità». «Si tratta di una sfida importante - ha detto Ripamonti - anche in vista delle prossime elezioni europee».

      A sua volta, padre Jose Ignacio Garcia, direttore del Jesuit Refugee Service Europa, ha rilevato come «gli Stati membri dell’Ue continuano ad investire le loro energie e risorse nel cercare di impedire a migranti e rifugiati di raggiungere l’Europa o, nel migliore dei casi, vorrebbero confinarli in ‘centri controllati’ ai confini esterni». «La riforma della legislazione comune in materia d’asilo, molto probabilmente – ha aggiunto - non verrà realizzata prima delle prossime elezioni europee. I politici europei sembrano pensare che se impediamo ai rifugiati di raggiungere le nostre coste, non abbiamo bisogno di un sistema comune d’asilo in Europa».

      La fotografia delle frontiere europee che esce dalla ricerca è inquietante: violazioni di ogni sorta, violenze, detenzioni arbitrarie, respingimenti disumani, aggiramento delle leggi dei singoli Paesi e del diritto internazionale. Un quadro fosco che ha pesanti ricadute sulla vita dei rifugiati già provati da difficoltà a soprusi subiti nel lungo viaggio. «Il Greek Council for Refugees – spiega la ricerca - ha denunciato, nel febbraio del 2018, un numero rilevante di casi di respingimenti illegali dalla regione del fiume Evros, al confine terrestre con la Turchia. Secondo questa organizzazione, migranti vulnerabili come donne incinte, famiglie con bambini e vittime di tortura sono stati forzatamente rimandati in Turchia, stipati in sovraffollate barche attraverso il fiume Evros, dopo essere stati arbitrariamente detenuti in stazioni di polizia in condizioni igieniche precarie». Secondo le testimonianze raccolte in Croazia e Serbia, diversi sono stati gli episodi di violenze fisiche contro rifugiati e di respingimenti immediati da parte della polizia di frontiera.

      E in effetti nel nuovo rapporto del Centro Astalli, più dei soli dati numerici e dei carenti quadri normativi ben descritti, a colpire sono i racconti degli intervistati lungo le diverse frontiere d’Europa. Un ragazzo marocchino, in Sicilia, per esempio ha raccontato «di come i trafficanti gli abbiano rubato i soldi e il cellulare e lo abbiamo tenuto prigioniero in un edificio vuoto con altre centinaia di persone per mesi». «Durante il viaggio – è ancora la sua storia – i trafficanti corrompevano gli ufficiali di polizia e trattavano brutalmente i migranti». Nel corso di un tentativo di attraversamento del Mediterraneo ricorda poi di aver sentito un trafficante dire a un altro: «Qualsiasi cosa succeda non mi interessa, li puoi anche lasciar morire».

      Ancora, una ragazza somala di 19 anni, arrivata incinta in Libia, ha raccontato di come il trafficante la minacciasse di toglierle il bambino appena nato e venderlo perché non aveva la cifra richiesta per la traversata. Alla fine il trafficante ha costretto tutti i suoi compagni di viaggio a pagare per lei ma ci sono voluti comunque diversi mesi prima che riuscissero a mettere insieme la somma richiesta. Storie che sembrano provenire da un altro mondo e sono invece cronache quotidiane lungo i confini di diversi Paesi europei.

      Infine, padre Ripamonti, in merito allo sgombero del centro Baobab di Roma che ospitava diverse centinaia di migranti, ha osservato che «la politica degli sgomberi senza alternative è inaccettabile». Il Centro Astalli «esprime inoltre preoccupazione anche per le crescenti difficoltà di accesso alla protezione in Italia: in un momento in cui molti migranti restano intrappolati in Libia in condizioni disumane e il soccorso in mare è meno efficace rispetto al passato, il nostro Paese ha scelto di adottare nuove misure che rendono più difficile la presentazione della domanda di asilo in frontiera, introducono il trattenimento ai fini dell’identificazione, abbassano gli standard dei centri di prima accoglienza».

      https://www.lastampa.it/2018/11/13/vaticaninsider/immigrazione-il-centro-astalli-c-unemergenza-diritti-umani-alle-frontiere-deuropa-v3qbnNIYRSzCCQSfsPFBHM/pagina.html

  • L’Italie fermera ses #aéroports aux migrants

    Le ministre italien de l’Intérieur s’est opposé, dimanche, à tout renvoi de migrants de l’Allemagne vers son pays, sans accord préalable.

    L’Italie va fermer ses aéroports aux avions de ligne non autorisés transportant des migrants en provenance d’Allemagne, a annoncé dimanche le ministre italien de l’Intérieur Matteo Salvini. Une décision qui accentue les tensions entre Rome et Berlin.

    L’Allemagne et l’Italie travaillent à un #accord aux termes duquel des migrants résidant en Allemagne pourraient être renvoyés en Italie, pays où ils ont déposé une demande d’asile. L’accord n’a pas été signé pour le moment.

    Le quotidien La Repubblica rapportait samedi que l’office allemand pour les réfugiés avait adressé « des dizaines de lettres » à des migrants les informant d’un possible transfert vers l’Italie via des #vols_charters. Le premier vol est prévu mardi prochain.

    « Pas d’aéroports disponibles »

    « Si des gens pensent, à Berlin ou à Bruxelles, qu’ils vont pouvoir balancer des dizaines de migrants en Italie par des vols charter non autorisés, ils doivent savoir qu’il n’y a pas et n’y aura pas d’aéroports disponibles », a dit M. Salvini dans un communiqué. « Nous fermerons les aéroports comme nous avons fermé les #ports », a-t-il dit.

    Le ministre allemand de l’Intérieur Horst Seehofer affirmait en septembre qu’un accord avait été trouvé avec l’Italie et qu’il devait être signé prochainement. Matteo Salvini avait démenti le lendemain, exigeant de nouvelles concessions de la part de l’Allemagne. Le ministre italien avait alors expliqué qu’il avait reçu des assurances de la part de l’Allemagne que pour chaque migrant renvoyé en Italie les autorités allemandes accepteraient un demandeur d’asile en Italie. Matteo Salvini exigeait deux autres concessions - une révision du traité de Dublin sur la gestion des demandes d’asile dans le pays d’arrivée et la fin de la mission navale européenne Sophia qui porte secours aux migrants en Méditerranée.

    Sortir de l’impasse

    Horst Seehofer a appelé la chancelière allemande Angela Merkel et le président du Conseil italien Giuseppe Conte à intervenir pour sortir de l’impasse. « L’accord a été négocié et suit les mêmes principes que celui avec la Grèce »« , a dit M. Seehofer au Welt am Sonntag. »Nous renvoyons des réfugiés en Italie mais nous acceptons un même nombre de personnes sauvées en mer« .

     »Mais Salvini dit maintenant : je ne signerai que si l’Allemagne soutient la position de l’Italie sur le droit d’asile dans l’Union européenne". Rome demande une réforme du traité de Dublin afin que soit organisée une répartition des nouveaux arrivants dans l’ensemble de l’UE et non plus l’obligation de rester dans le pays où ils sont arrivés en Europe.

    https://www.tdg.ch/monde/L-Italie-fermera-ses-aeroports-aux-migrants/story/27268662

    Commentaire sur twitter :

    Charter deportation from Germany to Italy planned for Tuesday, but Salvini now saying that Italy is going to “close the airports” to “non-authorised charters”

    https://twitter.com/twentyone_miles/status/1049015499219263489

    Et comme dit Philippe sur twitter, l’Italie devient une #île :


    #péninsule

    #Italie #Salvini #fermeture #fermeture_des_aéroports #Dublin #renvois_Dublin #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Allemagne

    cc @isskein @reka

    • Quelques questions, car ce n’est pas du tout clair pour moi les termes de ce fantomatique accord :

      On peut lire :

      « Le ministre italien avait alors expliqué qu’il avait reçu des assurances de la part de l’Allemagne que pour chaque migrant renvoyé en Italie les autorités allemandes accepteraient un demandeur d’asile en Italie. »

      « L’accord a été négocié et suit les mêmes principes que celui avec la Grèce »« , a dit M. Seehofer au Welt am Sonntag. »Nous renvoyons des réfugiés en Italie mais nous acceptons un même nombre de personnes sauvées en mer« .

      --> Mais qui sont ces « migrants renvoyés en Italie », si ce n’est des dublinés ? Et qui sont ces « réfugiés renvoyés en Italie » ? Si c’est des réfugiés, donc des personnes avec un statut reconnu, ils ne peuvent pas être renvoyés en Italie, j’imagine...
      --> Et les « personnes sauvées en mer » ? Il s’agit d’un nombre de personne déterminé, qui n’ont pas déjà été catégorisés en « migrants » ou « demandeurs d’asile » ?

      Et puis :

      « L’Allemagne et l’Italie travaillent à un #accord aux termes duquel des migrants résidant en Allemagne pourraient être renvoyés en Italie, pays où ils ont déposé une demande d’asile. L’accord n’a pas été signé pour le moment. »

      --> ce n’est pas déjà Dublin, ça ? C’est quoi si ce n’est pas Dublin ?

      #accord_UE-Turquie (bis)

      ping @i_s_

    • v. aussi le fil de discussion sur twitter de Matteo Villa :

      Sui voli #charter dalla Germania all’Italia non bisogna fare confusione, né cedere alla disinformazione.
      (1) Si tratta di “dublinati”, persone che hanno fatto primo ingresso in ?? dall’Italia, non migranti fermati alla frontiera tedesca e rispediti in Italia in modi spicci. Finché non cambiamo Dublino, gli accordi sono questi.
      2) Non è certo qualcosa di eccezionale. Tra 2014 e 2017, la Germania ha fatto più di 50.000 richieste di trasferimento verso l’Italia applicando le regole Dublino.
      (3) Non è neanche mistero che il sistema Dublino non funzioni. Sulle oltre 50.000 richieste da parte tedesca dal 2014, l’Italia ha effettuato solo circa 12.000 trasferimenti. Meno di 1 su 4 alla fine torna in ??.
      (4) una volta effettuato il trasferimento verso l’Italia, il richiedente asilo non è detenuto. Può quindi tentare di spostarsi di nuovo verso il Paese che lo ha riportato indietro.
      (5) Utilizzare voli charter rispetto a voli di linea è uno strappo diplomatico? Dipende. Tecnicamente, senza il consenso dell’Italia l’aereo non potrebbe neppure partire.
      (6) Vogliamo fare tutto questo casino per 40/100 persone? Davvero?

      https://twitter.com/emmevilla/status/1048951274677460993

    • Migranti, la Germania riporta 40 profughi a Roma con volo charter

      L’arrivo del primo #charter dalla Germania, con a bordo 40 migranti cosiddetti «secondari» respinti dal governo tedesco, è previsto all’aeroporto di Fiumicino giovedì prossimo, l’11 ottobre. Nonostante le smentite ufficiali del Viminale, un’intesa è stata dunque raggiunta. Adesso che la notizia è pubblica, però, bisognerà vedere cosa succederà nelle prossime ore. «Non farò favori elettorali alla Merkel», aveva detto il mese scorso Matteo Salvini all’ultimo vertice europeo sull’immigrazione.

      Così, anche se formalmente il ministero dell’Interno non può opporsi, potrebbe essere la polizia di frontiera italiana, per motivi legati al piano di volo, a non autorizzare l’atterraggio o lo sbarco dei passeggeri. È la prima volta, infatti, che la Germania si serve di un charter per riportare in Italia i «dublinanti», cioè quei migranti che sbarcano e chiedono asilo da noi, ma poi se ne vanno da uomini liberi nel resto d’Europa. In base al Trattato di Dublino, però, quando vengono rintracciati possono essere rimandati indietro, perché le norme dell’accordo prevedono appunto che sia il Paese di primo approdo a valutarne la domanda d’asilo e quindi a farsi carico dello straniero fino all’esito della procedura.

      Finora, però, il rientro dei «dublinanti» in Italia si svolgeva con viaggi di singoli migranti su aerei di linea. Dalla Francia, per esempio, ne arrivano così una ventina ogni mese. E dalla Germania, fino a oggi, una media di 25: tutti selezionati dopo una lunga istruttoria, quindi accompagnati a bordo dalla polizia tedesca fino all’atterraggio in Italia, qui infine presi in consegna dalle nostre forze dell’ordine e portati in un centro d’accoglienza.

      Ma il governo tedesco ora ha deciso di accelerare le operazioni: l’Ufficio federale per l’immigrazione e i rifugiati ha già inviato decine di lettere ai migranti arrivati in Germania passando per l’Italia, avvisandoli che saranno riportati presto nel primo Paese d’ingresso in Europa.

      Un giro di vite deciso a prescindere dal patto sui migranti fra Italia e Germania da tempo in discussione e che il nostro ministro dell’Interno, Matteo Salvini, continua ad escludere di aver mai firmato. Da Berlino, però, lo danno già per stipulato e a condizioni precise: la Germania può rimandare in Italia i migranti che attraversano il confine, garantendo in cambio la sua disponibilità a rivedere i termini dei ricollocamenti. Nei giorni scorsi, però, lo stesso Salvini era stato chiaro, parlando di «accordo a saldo zero»: in cambio cioè del ritorno in Italia dei «dublinanti» il nostro Paese invierà a Berlino un analogo numero di profughi da accogliere. «Firmerò l’accordo quando sarà chiaro che non ci sarà un solo immigrato in più a nostro carico», aveva detto. E dal Viminale, infatti, continuano a dire che la firma del ministro non c’è.

      Ma ora l’intesa apparentemente trovata sul charter in arrivo l’11 ottobre infittisce il giallo. E l’opposizione attacca: «Biglietti già fatti — ha twittato il deputato del Pd Filippo Sensi — nei prossimi giorni la Germania riporterà in Italia molti profughi, quanti? Matteo Salvini aveva tuonato che l’accordo con il suo amico Seehofer non c’era. Chi mente?». E Alessia Morani, Pd, commenta su Fb: «L’amico tedesco di Salvini, il sovranista Seehofer, vuole rimandare in Italia i profughi coi voli charter. Queste sono le conseguenze dell’accordo di giugno del premier Conte e della politica isolazionista di Salvini: si apparenta con chi alza i muri contro di noi, invece che fare accordi per la redistribuzione dei richiedenti asilo in Europa. La ricetta sovranista sta complicando la gestione dei migranti. Stanno creando il caos e questa incapacità la pagheranno gli italiani».

      https://roma.corriere.it/notizie/cronaca/18_ottobre_06/primo-volo-charter-profughi-dublino-merkel-salvini-6c4cd2a8-c9a4-11e8-

      Quelques explications de plus dans cet article :

      È la prima volta, infatti, che la Germania si serve di un charter per riportare in Italia i «dublinanti» (...) Finora, però, il rientro dei «dublinanti» in Italia si svolgeva con viaggi di singoli migranti su aerei di linea.

      –-> donc, ce qui est nouveau c’est le fait que l’Allemagne renvoie les « dublinés » via charter, alors qu’avant ces renvois étaient effectués sur des vols de ligne.

      Le fameux accord, qui ressemble à celui entre la Turquie et l’UE, devrait prévoir ceci :

      la Germania può rimandare in Italia i migranti che attraversano il confine, garantendo in cambio la sua disponibilità a rivedere i termini dei ricollocamenti.

      –-> l’Allemagne peut renvoyer en Italie les migrants qui traversent la frontière, en garantissant, en échange, sa disponibilité à revoir les termes des #relocalisation

      Salvini sur ce point :

      Salvini era stato chiaro, parlando di «accordo a saldo zero»: in cambio cioè del ritorno in Italia dei «dublinanti» il nostro Paese invierà a Berlino un analogo numero di profughi da accogliere

      –-> Salvini demande un « accord avec un solde zéro » : en échange du retour des dublinés en Italie, l’Italie enverra à Berlin un nombre analogue de réfugiés à accueillir.

      Le journal rapporte les mots de Salvini qui dit ne pas avoir signé d’accord avec l’Allemagne :

      dal Viminale, infatti, continuano a dire che la firma del ministro non c’è.

      ... mais vu qu’il y a un charter qui devrait arriver à Rome le 11 octobre... et donc on se demande si cet accord a été signé...
      Du coup, c’est la polémique : qui ment ? Seehofer ou Salvini ?

      –------------------

      Nouveau terme, @sinehebdo :

      40 migranti cosiddetti «secondari»

      –-> « #migrants_secondaires », ça doit faire référence aux #mouvements_secondaires... que l’UE cherche par tout les moyens de combattre, mais qui, en réalité, avec ses politiques, les créent... les associations et quelques chercheurs/ses utilisent plutôt le terme #Migrerrants (#migrerrance)
      #terminologie #vocabulaire #mots

    • Berlin dément avoir le projet de renvoyer des migrants en Italie

      Les autorités allemandes ont démenti dimanche avoir le projet de renvoyer en Italie des migrants résidant en Allemagne comme le rapportait un quotidien italien, information qui avait provoqué un regain de tension entre Berlin et Rome.

      Le quotidien La Repubblica rapportait samedi que l’office allemand pour les réfugiés avait adressé « des dizaines de lettres » à des migrants les informant d’un possible transfert vers l’Italie via des vols charters. Le premier vol est prévu mardi prochain.

      Cette information a provoqué une vive réaction de la part du ministre italien de l’Intérieur Matteo Salvini qui a menacé de fermer tous les aéroports de son pays aux avions de ligne non autorisés transportant des migrants en provenance d’Allemagne.

      « Aucun vol de transfert n’est prévu vers l’Italie dans les prochains jours », a déclaré un porte-parole du ministère allemand de l’Intérieur dans un courrier électronique.

      L’Allemagne et l’Italie travaillent à un accord aux termes duquel des migrants résidant en Allemagne pourraient être renvoyés en Italie, pays où ils ont déposé une demande d’asile. L’accord n’a pas été signé pour le moment.

      « Si des gens pensent, à Berlin ou à Bruxelles, qu’ils vont pouvoir balancer des dizaines de migrants en Italie par des vols charters non autorisés, ils doivent savoir qu’il n’y a pas et n’y aura pas d’aéroports disponibles », a dit Salvini dans un communiqué.

      « Nous fermerons les aéroports comme nous avons fermé les ports », a-t-il dit.

      Le ministre allemand de l’Intérieur Horst Seehofer affirmait en septembre qu’un accord avait été trouvé avec l’Italie et qu’il devait être signé prochainement. Salvini avait démenti le lendemain, exigeant de nouvelles concessions de la part de l’Allemagne.

      Le ministre italien avait alors expliqué qu’il avait reçu des assurances de la part de l’Allemagne que pour chaque migrant renvoyé en Italie les autorités allemandes accepteraient un demandeur d’asile en Italie.

      Matteo Salvini exigeait deux autres concessions - une révision du traité de Dublin sur la gestion des demandes d’asile dans le pays d’arrivée et la fin de la mission navale européenne #Sophia qui porte secours aux migrants en Méditerranée.

      Seehofer a appelé la chancelière allemande Angela Merkel et le président du Conseil italien Giuseppe Conte à intervenir pour sortir de l’#impasse.

      « L’accord a été négocié et suit les mêmes principes que celui avec la Grèce », a dit Seehofer au Welt am Sonntag. « Nous renvoyons des réfugiés en Italie mais nous acceptons un même nombre de personnes sauvées en mer ».

      « Mais Salvini dit maintenant : je ne signerai que si l’Allemagne soutient la position de l’Italie sur le droit d’asile dans l’Union européenne », poursuit Seehofer.

      Rome demande une réforme du traité de Dublin afin que soit organisée une répartition des nouveaux arrivants dans l’ensemble de l’UE et non plus l’obligation de rester dans le pays où ils sont arrivés en Europe

      https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/071018/berlin-dement-avoir-le-projet-de-renvoyer-des-migrants-en-italie
      #opération_Sophia