• The killings behind the gate, by Estaco Valoi - ZAM
    https://www.zammagazine.com/investigations/2045-mozambique-the-killings-behind-the-gate

    In October 2025, MRM Gemfields once again participated in the World Jewellery Confederation’s annual conference, held this year in Paris, France. In addition to hosting a gala dinner, the world’s jewellery giants discussed various aspects of gemstone mining, including a workshop titled “Focus on Africa.” At the same time, back in Montepuez, villagers were recounting the killings.

    #rubis #extractivisme #Mozambique

  • Enlevés par Al-Shabab

    Comme si les conflits armés n’étaient pas déjà suffisamment horribles à vivre pour les enfants, de nombreux groupes armés continuent de les utiliser comme instruments dans les conflits.

    C’est malheureusement le cas dans la province de Cabo Delgado, au nord du Mozambique. La situation humanitaire continue de s’y détériorer sous les attaques d’un groupe lié à l’Etat islamique (EI), connu localement sous le nom d’Al-Shabab.

    Les enfants figurent parmi les premières victimes du conflit à Cabo Delgado. L’éducation y est fortement perturbée, les groupes armés ayant attaqué des écoles tandis que l’armée mozambicaine continue à utiliser les écoles comme bases militaires et dépôts de munitions.

    https://entreleslignesentrelesmots.wordpress.com/2024/11/09/solidarite-avec-le-peuple-du-mozambique-en-cette-periode-de-troubles-politiques/#comment-67639

    #international #mozambique

  • La Marche mondiale des femmes est solidaire du Mozambique en ce moment critique

    Les crises dans le monde se multiplient, de la Palestine au Liban en passant par le Soudan et la République démocratique du Congo …. La liste est interminable. La Marche mondiale des femmes aurait aimé continuer à nous saluer tous avec la phrase habituelle du début de chaque année, mais ce n’est pas une année heureuse, car il y a tant de guerres et si peu de paix dans le monde.

    Le Mozambique est actuellement en proie à des troubles politiques à la suite des élections présidentielles contestées qui se sont tenues le 9 octobre 2024. Le parti au pouvoir, le Frelimo, a proclamé la victoire de Daniel Chapo en tant que président élu, un résultat que les groupes d’opposition ont dénoncé comme étant une fraude électorale.

    https://entreleslignesentrelesmots.wordpress.com/2024/11/09/solidarite-avec-le-peuple-du-mozambique-en-cette-periode-de-troubles-politiques/#comment-64339

    ##international #mozambique #mmf

  • Afrique du Sud : 4 500 mineurs illégaux coincés sous terre et assiégés par la police
    https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/11/14/afrique-du-sud-4-500-mineurs-illegaux-coinces-sous-terre-et-assieges-par-la-

    Afrique du Sud : 4 500 mineurs illégaux coincés sous terre et assiégés par la police
    La police sud-africaine encercle une mine dans laquelle sont coincés des milliers de travailleurs clandestins. « On ne leur enverra pas d’aide », a assuré la ministre déléguée à la présidence, qui attend que les assiégés, très affaiblis, sortent pour être arrêtés.
    Par Mathilde Boussion (Johannesburg, correspondance)
    C’est un face-à-face suffoquant. D’après les habitants de Stilfontein, dans la province du Nord-Ouest, en Afrique du Sud, plus de 4 000 mineurs illégaux seraient « coincés » sous terre, encerclés par la police, qui leur a coupé les vivres pour les forcer à remonter et les arrêter. Jeudi 14 novembre, un corps sans vie a été remonté à la surface par des volontaires alors que les forces de l’ordre refusent de se risquer à descendre dans la mine désaffectée.
    La manœuvre s’inscrit dans le cadre d’une vaste opération coup de poing lancée par les autorités sud-africaines en décembre 2023 contre l’exploitation illégale des quelque 6 000 mines désaffectées qui parsèment le territoire. L’opération Vala Umgodi (« Boucher les trous », en langue nguni) a connu un coup d’accélérateur ces dernières semaines dans la province du Nord-Ouest.
    Depuis le 18 octobre, 1 000 mineurs illégaux ont été contraints de refaire surface avant d’être « cueillis » par les forces de l’ordre qui quadrillent la campagne pour couper les chaînes d’approvisionnement nécessaires à ces hommes, qui restent parfois des mois sous terre. Le 2 novembre, dans un communiqué, la police se félicitait ainsi de la reddition de plus de 200 mineurs, « conséquence de la faim et de la soif ».
    Une dureté assumée par le gouvernement. Interrogée au cours d’une conférence de presse, mercredi 13 novembre, la ministre déléguée à la présidence, Khumbudzo Ntshavheni, a éclaté de rire en réponse à la question d’un journaliste qui lui demandait si les autorités envisageaient d’envoyer de l’aide aux mineurs cernés à Stilfontein. « Vous voulez qu’on envoie de l’aide à des criminels, honnêtement ? On ne leur enverra pas d’aide. Nous allons les asphyxier, ils vont remonter. Les criminels ne doivent pas recevoir d’aide, ils doivent être persécutés », a asséné Mme Ntshavheni.
    La veille, les autorités avaient finalement accepté de laisser des volontaires descendre de l’eau et de la nourriture au compte-goutte après avoir été alertées de la précarité de la situation au fond de la mine par un habitant envoyé en « mission de reconnaissance ». « Il est revenu en expliquant qu’il y avait plus de 4 000 personnes sous terre et plusieurs corps. Il nous a dit que les gens étaient si faibles qu’ils ne pouvaient pas se hisser à l’extérieur à l’aide de cordes comme ils le font d’ordinaire. Pour cette raison, nous avons décidé d’autoriser [des volontaires] à leur donner un peu d’aide, pour qu’ils reprennent des forces et qu’ils puissent sortir, rien de plus », explique le brigadier Sabata Mokgwabone, porte-parole de la police pour la province du Nord-Ouest.
    Depuis que des volontaires sont autorisés à échanger avec les mineurs, cinq hommes ont accepté d’être remontés à la surface. Très faibles, ils ont été pris en charge par des équipes médicales. D’après les médias locaux, les mineurs, qui refusaient de remonter face à la perspective d’être arrêtés, exigeraient désormais que les plus faibles soient secourus et que les corps des personnes mortes soient remontés avant de consentir à se rendre.
    Jeudi 14 novembre, le porte-parole de la police du Nord-Ouest n’était pas en mesure de confirmer cette revendication, mais Khumbudzo Ntshavheni a déjà fait savoir que les forces de l’ordre n’iront chercher personne, mort ou vivant. « Ce n’est pas notre travail de ramener les corps de criminels », a froidement expliqué la ministre déléguée à la présidence.
    Des propos « inhumains et irresponsables », selon Phillip Mankge, le secrétaire général adjoint de la National Union of Mineworkers, un syndicat de mineurs. « Notre position, c’est que l’exploitation minière artisanale doit être régulée afin que les mineurs illégaux puissent travailler légalement et payer des taxes, détaille au Monde le porte-parole du syndicat, Livhuwani Mammburu. Ce qui nous inquiète, c’est que les autorités semblent prendre pour cible des mineurs noirs pauvres alors que des Chinois organisent l’exploitation illégale de certaines mines de chrome sans être inquiétés. »
    Interrogé par la chaîne de télévision sud-africaine Newzroom Afrika, le président d’un autre syndicat, l’Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union, Joseph Mathunjwa, a dressé un parallèle entre la situation actuelle et le drame de Marikana, en 2012, au cours duquel trente-quatre mineurs avaient été tués par la police, qui avait ouvert le feu sur des centaines de grévistes dans la même province du Nord-Ouest. Tous les Sud-Africains ne partagent pas ce point de vue. Beaucoup sont hostiles à ces mineurs illégaux, souvent des migrants clandestins venus du Lesotho ou du Mozambique voisins, qu’ils accusent de piller le sous-sol sud-africain et de terroriser les communautés locales.

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#afriquedusud#lesotho#mozambique#economie#secteurminier#violence#sante#migrationirreguliere

  • Solidarité avec le peuple du Mozambique en cette période de troubles politiques

    La Marche mondiale des femmes fait preuve d’une solidarité inébranlable avec la MMF du Mozambique en cette période d’agitation et de troubles politiques. Nous apportons notre soutien à toutes les femmes mozambicaines, aux communautés paysannes et aux mouvements populaires qui continuent à lutter pour la justice, la paix et la dignité.

    Face à l’instabilité croissante, à la violence et aux difficultés économiques, nous reconnaissons la force et la résilience des femmes qui sont en première ligne pour réclamer la démocratie, les droits de l’homme et la fin de l’exploitation et de la fraude électorale. Nous sommes particulièrement attristés par les assassinats politiques en cours, notamment la mort prématurée de l’avocat de l’opposition Venancio Mondlane, qui a été brutalement exécuté de 25 balles, et par de nombreux autres décès non signalés. Nous sommes profondément préoccupés par l’impact de cette agitation politique qui a conduit à la fermeture totale du pays, car les secteurs les plus vulnérables de la société, en particulier les femmes et les enfants, continuent d’en subir les conséquences. Nous condamnons avec la plus grande fermeté toute forme de répression ou de violence à l’encontre de ces communautés.

    https://entreleslignesentrelesmots.wordpress.com/2024/11/09/solidarite-avec-le-peuple-du-mozambique-en-cet

    #international #mozambique

  • "Tous doivent être décapités" : Révélations sur les #atrocités commises dans le bastion africain de #TotalEnergies

    Les villageois de la péninsule d’#Afungi, dans le nord du Mozambique, connaissaient bien ces conteneurs : une douzaine de boîtes en acier collées les unes contre les autres pour former un mur, avec une barrière au milieu. Ils servaient de portail de fortune pour un site de production de #gaz_naturel en cours de construction par TotalEnergies, dans une région isolée en proie à une violente insurrection islamiste.

    Ces mêmes villageois avaient été pris entre les feux croisés de l’#armée_mozambicaine et des combattants affiliés à l’#Etat_islamique. Après avoir fui leurs maisons, ils étaient allés chercher la protection des soldats du gouvernement. Au lieu de cela, ils ont trouvé la violence.

    Les soldats ont accusé les villageois d’avoir participé à l’#insurrection. Ils ont séparé les hommes — un groupe de 180 à 250 personnes — de leurs femmes et de leurs enfants. Puis ils les ont entassés dans les deux conteneurs situés de part et d’autre de l’entrée, les frappant à coups de pied et de crosse.

    Les soldats ont détenus ces hommes pendant trois mois. Ils les ont battus, affamés, torturés puis finalement exécutés. Finalement, seuls 26 prisonniers ont survécu.

    En discutant avec des survivants et des témoins et en faisant du porte-à-porte, j’ai pu reconstituer un récit détaillé des #atrocités perpétrées au cours de l’été 2021 par un #commando_mozambicain, dirigé par un officier qui disait avoir pour mission de protéger “le projet de Total”.

    La nouvelle du massacre ne peut qu’ajouter aux airs de désastre qui entourent désormais un projet qui — avec le développement d’un second #champ_gazier par #ExxonMobil — a été présenté comme le plus gros investissement privé jamais réalisé en Afrique, avec un coût total de près de 50 milliards de dollars.

    La construction de la #concession_gazière est interrompue depuis 2021, date à laquelle les rebelles islamistes ont envahi la région, massacrant plus de 1000 personnes. La justice française a déjà ouvert une enquête sur la gestion de TotalEnergies à la suite de la mort de sous-traitants lors de cette attaque.

    Ce second #bain_de_sang, que nous révélons, a été perpétré non pas par des islamistes mais par une unité militaire mozambicaine opérant à partir de la guérite de TotalEnergies.

    L’alliance de la major pétrolière avec l’armée mozambicaine soulève inévitablement des questions sur la gestion de #Patrick_Pouyanné, PDG de TotalEnergies.

    Il avait prévu de faire du mégaprojet mozambicain la vitrine de ses ambitions pour un avenir à faible émission de carbone. Au lieu de cela, sa stratégie d’investissements risqués dans des régions instables du monde risque désormais de se heurter aux efforts juridiques croissants visant à traduire les #multinationales devant la justice internationale.

    Pour évaluer à quel point l’entreprise est exposée, deux questions sont primordiales : TotalEnergies savait-elle qu’elle travaillait avec des tortionnaires et des tueurs ? Savait-elle — ou aurait-elle dû savoir — que des atrocités avaient été commises dans ses conteneurs ?

    En réponse à un résumé détaillé de cet article, #Maxime_Rabilloud, directeur général de #Mozambique_LNG, la filiale de TotalEnergies dans le pays, a déclaré que son entreprise n’avait “aucune connaissance des événements présumés décrits” ni “aucune information indiquant que de tels événements ont eu lieu”.

    Il a également déclaré que la société n’était pas présente sur le terrain au moment des #meurtres, ayant confié le site aux forces de sécurité mozambicaines. “Néanmoins, étant donné la gravité des allégations, nous prenons votre message très au sérieux”, a-t-il ajouté.

    https://www.politico.eu/article/totalenergies-mozambique-patrick-pouyanne-atrocites-afungi-palma-cabo-delga
    #Afrique #Françafrique #Mozambique #viols #violence #torture #massacre

    • L’explosion de Deepwater Horizon en 2010 — qui a tué onze travailleurs de la plate-forme et dont la marée noire a dévasté des centaines de kilomètres de côtes du golfe du Mexique, au large des Etats-Unis — a été un moment charnière pour le secteur des combustibles fossiles, a déclaré Patrick Pouyanné lors d’une conférence à Londres en 2017.

      Les pénalités financières “absolument énormes” de 62 à 142 milliards de dollars (selon le calcul utilisé) imposées au géant pétrolier britannique BP ont annoncé l’arrivée de ce que Patrick Pouyanné a appelé un nouveau “risque juridique” interdisant d’opérer dans les pays où de telles amendes pourraient être prononcées.

      La solution de Patrick Pouyanné a consisté à chercher des territoires moins réglementés au Moyen-Orient, où l’entreprise a débuté, et en Afrique, berceau d’Elf Aquitaine, le producteur de pétrole absorbé par Total en 1999.

      Opérer dans ces régions comporte souvent un risque politique plus élevé — corruption, instabilité, insurrection — reconnaît Patrick Pouyanné. Mais c’est le genre de risque face auquel Total, l’une des plus grandes entreprises du monde (cotée à 150 milliards d’euros), est bien équipée. La taille de l’entreprise lui a également permis de diversifier ses investissements dans le monde entier, en veillant à ce qu’aucun projet ne soit suffisamment important pour faire couler l’ensemble de l’entreprise.

      C’est ainsi qu’en mai 2019, Patrick Pouyanné a annoncé la pièce maîtresse de sa nouvelle stratégie : l’achat d’une participation de 26,5% et le rôle d’opérateur principal dans un champ gazier géant situé dans une zone de guerre à l’autre bout de la planète. “Nous aimons le risque, c’est pourquoi nous avons décidé de nous lancer dans l’aventure du Mozambique”, a-t-il déclaré une semaine plus tard à l’Atlantic Council de Washington.

      “L’avantage d’être une grande entreprise avec un portefeuille très important est que nous pouvons absorber ce type de risque…” Mentionnant la Papouasie-Nouvelle-Guinée comme “un autre bel endroit” dans lequel Total investit, il a ajouté : “[Ni l’un ni l’autre], même s’il y a un effondrement, ne mettront Total en danger.”

  • “Così le multinazionali occidentali non pagano le tasse in Mozambico”

    Le grandi società estrattive approfitterebbero dei trattati firmati da Maputo con paradisi fiscali come Mauritius o Emirati Arabi Uniti. Il centro di ricerca indipendente SOMO stima che cinque compagnie -inclusa Eni- eviteranno di pagare imposte per un valore compreso tra 1,4 e due miliardi di dollari. A proposito di “Piano Mattei”

    Per via dei trattati fiscali siglati dal Mozambico con diversi Paesi stranieri diverse multinazionali -tra cui le società fossili TotalEnergies ed Eni- eviteranno di versare circa due miliardi di dollari di tasse al governo di Maputo: una cifra superiore a quanto spende il Paese africano per la sanità in un anno intero. Nello specifico, le due aziende europee “non pagano la loro giusta quota dal momento che fanno transitare i propri investimenti attraverso società di comodo negli Emirati Arabi Uniti”, come denuncia il report “The treaty trap: tax avoidance in Mozambique’s extractive industries” (La trappola del trattato: l’elusione fiscale nell’industria estrattiva in Mozambico) pubblicato il 21 luglio dal Centro di ricerca olandese sulle multinazionali SOMO.

    Il meccanismo che permette alle società di gas e petrolio (ma non solo) di arricchirsi a dismisura era già stato al centro di un dettagliato rapporto “How Mozambique’s tax treaties enable tax avoidance“, pubblicato lo scorso marzo sempre da SOMO e dal Centro mozambicano per la democrazia e lo sviluppo (Cdd) e del quale avevamo già scritto. Il report denuncia come la rete di trattati fiscali siglati dal Mozambico stia privando il Paese di centinaia di milioni di dollari di entrate ogni anno, a causa degli accordi stretti con paradisi fiscali come Mauritius ed Emirati Arabi Uniti. Secondo le stime delle due organizzazioni, solo nel 2021 il Paese africano avrebbe perso circa 390 milioni di dollari in mancato gettito fiscale.

    In questo nuovo rapporto SOMO evidenzia come TotalEnergies ed Eni abbiano approfittato del trattato fiscale siglato dal governo di Maputo con Abu Dhabi, creando società di comodo negli Emirati Arabi Uniti. “Gli investimenti sono sostenuti da prestiti di banche d’investimento pubbliche, agenzie di credito all’esportazione e banche commerciali di tutto il mondo. Se i prestiti per questi megaprogetti non fossero passati attraverso gli Emirati Arabi Uniti, il Mozambico avrebbe potuto applicare una ritenuta fiscale del 20% su quasi tutti i pagamenti degli interessi, per un importo che oscilla tra 1,3 e due miliardi di dollari”, osservano i ricercatori di SOMO.

    Accuse a cui la società italiana guidata da Claudio Descalzi ha risposto dichiarando che “come contribuente, Eni opera nel pieno rispetto del quadro legislativo e fiscale locale e internazionale. I progetti di Eni nei Paesi in cui è presente generano benefici economici e sociali a livello locale in termini di tasse, occupazione, formazione e progetti sociali, formazione e progetti sociali -si legge nella nota pubblicata nel report di SOMO-. Inoltre, le Linee guida fiscali di Eni assicurano una corretta interpretazione della normativa fiscale con il divieto di intraprendere operazioni fiscalmente aggressive. Il Mozambico, a seguito dei progetti a cui Eni partecipa, sta diventando un importante attore globale nel settore del Gas ‘naturale’ liquefatto (Gnl)”.

    I giacimenti di gas interessati dalle operazioni dei due colossi europei si trovano al largo della provincia di Cabo Delgado, nel Nord del Paese: un’area economicamente emarginata e impoverita, dove gli investimenti miliardari per lo sfruttamento dei combustibili fossili non hanno portato alcun beneficio alla popolazione locale, alimentando invece le disuguaglianze. Dopo la scoperta dei primi giacimenti (tra il 2010 e il 2014) migliaia di persone hanno dovuto abbandonare i propri villaggi a causa delle operazioni industriali. La situazione è ulteriormente peggiorata a causa di una violenta insurrezione di matrice jihadista che dal 2017 ha provocato migliaia di morti e costretto milioni di persone alla fuga.

    Ma non ci sono solo le società del settore degli idrocarburi al centro dell’attenzione. SOMO ha infatti analizzato le pratiche fiscali di alcune aziende minerarie come la britannica Gemfields, che estrae rubini nel distretto di Montepuez (sempre nella provincia di Cabo Delgado), e l’irlandese Kenmare Resources, che opera in una miniera di titano a Moma (nel Nord-Est del Paese). Entrambe controllano le loro operazioni in Mozambico dalle Mauritius, approfittando di un trattato fiscale che gli avrebbe permesso di evitare circa 20 milioni di dollari di ritenute sui dividendi tra il 2017 e il 2022.

    Infine c’è la gestione del corridoio logistico di Nacala: una rete ferroviaria lunga 912 chilometri utilizzata per il trasporto di carbone delle miniere nella provincia di Tete (nel Mozambico occidentale) fino al porto di Nacala, affacciato sull’oceano Indiano, sulla costa orientale. L’infrastruttura è controllata al 50% dalla compagnia mineraria brasiliana Vale e dalla società elettrica giapponese Mitsui & Co. SOMO ritiene che le due aziende abbiano evitato di versare nelle casse del governo di Maputo circa 96,9 milioni di dollari tra il 2016 e il 2020: “Ciò è stato possibile reindirizzando i prestiti attraverso società di intermediazione con sede negli Emirati Arabi Uniti per trarre vantaggio dal trattato fiscale tra gli Emirati Arabi Uniti e il Mozambico, che riduce dal 20% a zero l’aliquota applicabile per la ritenuta alla fonte sugli interessi in Mozambico”, si legge nel report.

    Il sottosuolo del Mozambico è ricco di minerali che possono svolgere un ruolo fondamentale nella transizione energetica. E, nel contesto dell’esplosione della domanda globale di queste materie prime, è fondamentale affrontare tempestivamente il tema dell’evasione fiscale -avverte SOMO- per evitare che anche in questo ambito si ripeta quello che è successo con i combustibili fossili. “È indispensabile che il Mozambico abbandoni questi trattati fiscali iniqui, ponendo un freno all’elusione fiscale delle imprese e salvaguardando gli interessi della popolazione -ha spiegato Nelsa Langa, assistente di ricerca presso il Centro mozambicano per la democrazia e lo sviluppo-. Dovrebbe liberarsi da questi trattati fiscali obsoleti, che costano molto al Paese e forniscono pochi benefici”.

    Il ricercatore di SOMO Vincent Kiezebrink aggiunge che “le multinazionali devono smettere di abusare di questi trattati fiscali per evitare di pagare le tasse in uno dei Paesi più vulnerabili del mondo. E i governi dei paradisi fiscali come gli Emirati Arabi Uniti e le Mauritius devono permettere al Mozambico di rinegoziarli”. L’esperienza di Paesi come Senegal, Kenya, Lesotho e Ruanda -che hanno rinegoziato o cancellato con successo gli accordi fiscali con le Mauritius- dimostra che è possibile cambiare questa situazione.

    https://altreconomia.it/cosi-le-multinazionali-occidentali-non-pagano-le-tasse-in-mozambico
    #multinationales #pétrole #évasion_fiscale #fisc #Eni #industrie_pétrolière #Mozambique #île_Maurice #TotalEnergies #total #Emirats_arabes_unis #Abu_Dhabi #gaz #énergie #extractivisme

    • Oil and gas multinationals avoid up to $2 billion in taxes in Mozambique

      TotalEnergies and ENI are set to avoid up to $2 billion in withholding taxes in Mozambique – more than the country’s annual healthcare spending – research by SOMO and CDD reveals. The oil and gas giants fail to pay their fair share of taxes in the African country because they rout their investments through letterbox companies in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Mozambique could prevent these practices by cancelling or renegotiating its outdated tax treaties with tax havens like the UAE and Mauritius. Several other African countries have successfully done so already.

      TotalEnergies (France) and ENI (Italy) lead two megaprojects in Mozambique to exploit gas reserves in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, constituting the biggest investments in Africa to date. Both multinationals established letterbox companies in the UAE to channel their consortium’s multi-billion-dollar investments, taking advantage of the 0 % interest withholding tax rate in its tax treaty with Mozambique. The investments are backed by loans from public investment banks, export credit agencies and commercial banks worldwide. If the loans for these megaprojects had not been routed through the UAE, Mozambique could have charged a 20 per cent withholding tax on nearly all related interest payments, which amounts to $1.3 – $2 billion.
      publication cover - The treaty trap: tax avoidance in Mozambique’s extractive industries
      Publication / July 21, 2023
      The treaty trap: tax avoidance in Mozambique’s extractive industries
      The miners

      The backdrop for these gas projects is Mozambique’s northernmost province of Cabo Delgado, an economically marginalised region where a violent insurgency has wreaked havoc since 2017. The discovery of gas and the resulting increase in inequality in the area has been a key driver behind the conflict.

      Treaty shopping using complex corporate structures
      The use of UAE-based letterbox companies by TotalEnergies and ENI are just two examples of treaty shopping, depriving Mozambique of much-needed tax revenue. SOMO found similar tax avoidance structures by mining companies Vale, Kenmare and Gemfields, which are estimated to have avoided an $117 million in Mozambican taxes between 2017 and 2022. The tax treaties with the UAE and Mauritius are estimated to have cost Mozambique $315 million in 2021 alone, SOMO calculated in a March 2023 report.

      Following these revelations, SOMO delved into the details by studying the tax practices of specific companies in the Mozambican gas and mining sectors. Besides the gas projects, case studies include Gemfields, a UK miner extracting rubies in Montepuez and the Irish mining company Kenmare Resources, which operates the Moma titanium mine. On paper, both companies control their operations in Mozambique from Mauritius, taking advantage of a tax treaty that allowed them to avoid approximately $20 million in dividend withholding taxes between 2017 and 2022. Finally, there is the case of Vale and Mitsui & Co., who avoided approximately $96.9 million in interest withholding taxes associated with their Nacala Logistics Corridor between 2016 and 2020 through a financing structure routed via the UAE.

      Unfair and outdated tax treaties
      It is imperative that Mozambique steps out of these unfair tax treaties, curbing corporate tax avoidance and safeguarding its people’s interests. Nelsa Langa (Research Assistant at CDD): “Mozambique should free itself from these outdated tax treaties, which cost the country dearly while providing little benefit. Senegal, Kenya, Lesotho and Rwanda have all successfully renegotiated or cancelled tax treaties with tax havens Mauritius.”

      Mozambique is rich in natural resources, with vast deposits not only of fossil fuels but also minerals that are of key importance for the energy transition. Amidst the exploding demand for these minerals, it is crucial to address tax avoidance promptly to prevent replication.

      Vincent Kiezebrink (Researcher at SOMO): “Multinational companies need to stop abusing Mozambique’s tax treaties to avoid taxes in one of the world’s most vulnerable countries, and tax haven governments such as the UAE and Mauritius need to allow Mozambique to renegotiate these harmful tax treaties.”

      The Mozambican government has the tools to stop this widespread tax avoidance. By renegotiating or terminating its tax treaties with Mauritius and the UAE, it could limit companies’ opportunities for tax avoidance.

      https://www.somo.nl/oil-and-gas-multinationals-avoid-up-to-2-billion-in-taxes-in-mozambique

  • Mozambique : « Les paysannes sont des femmes » et la lutte contre les violences faites aux femmes rurales en Afrique du sud et de l’est

    L’UNAC et La Via Campesina Southern and Eastern Africa (LVC SEAf) ont procédé le vendredi matin 17 mars 2023, au Centre culturel Brésil-Mozambique de Maputo, au lancement de la publication « Les Paysannes sont des Femmes : Comprendre la violence contre les femmes rurales en Afrique orientale et australe », un document qui traite de la violence dont les femmes paysannes ont été victimes dans les régions de l’Afrique du sud et de l’est.

    L’événement a rassemblé 93 personnes, principalement des femmes, parmi lesquelles des paysannes, des représentants d’organisations de la société civile, des activistes, des communicateurs et d’autres personnes intéressées par le thème de l’événement au Mozambique. La réunion a été marquée par plusieurs moments d’émotion et de célébration. Avec des chants évoquant les luttes des femmes paysannes et populaires et le féminisme paysan en Afrique, le lancement de la publication a été officialisé et un espace a également été accordé aux témoignages de femmes paysannes de différents pays d’Afrique, mettant en lumière leurs réalités, leurs luttes et leurs réussites.

    https://entreleslignesentrelesmots.wordpress.com/2023/04/22/mozambique-les-paysannes-sont-des-femmes-et-la

    #international #féminisme #mozambique

  • Pendant ce temps-là, la #malaria - #paludisme pour son nom français - est en progression.

    L’an dernier, 247 millions de personnes ont été infectées, contre 245 millions en 2020 et 232 millions en 2019, selon le dernier rapport de l’Organisation mondiale de la santé (#OMS).

    Si la maladie est rarement mortelle, les enfants de moins de 5 ans représentent 80 % des 619.000 décès recensés l’an dernier. « Pendant les deux ans de pic de la pandémie [2020 et 2021], les perturbations liées au Covid ont conduit à 13 millions de cas supplémentaires de malaria et 63.000 décès additionnels », estime l’OMS. Le paludisme est dû à un #parasite transmis par les moustiques infectés. Il a officiellement disparu d’Europe depuis 2014 et de Chine depuis l’an dernier. L’Inde concentre toujours 79 % des 5,4 millions de cas enregistrés en Asie du Sud-Est, où la maladie a progressé l’an dernier (+400.000 en un an).

    Mais c’est l’#Afrique qui représente 95 % des cas et 96 % des décès. Quatre pays concentrent près de la moitié des cas au monde : le #Nigeria, 26,6 % (31,3 % des décès, 38,4 % pour ceux des enfants de moins de 5 ans), la #République_démocratique_du_Congo (12,3 % des cas), l’#Ouganda (5,1 %) et le #Mozambique (4,1 %). L’Afrique reste très loin des objectifs de la Stratégie mondiale 2016-2030 de lutte contre le paludisme. L’OMS espérait y réduire le taux de mortalité et l’incidence de la maladie de 40 % en 2020 comparé à 2015, et l’an dernier, le continent était « en deçà des objectifs, de 45 % et 47 % respectivement », reconnaît l’organisation.

    (Les Echos)

  • Sajid Javid clears England’s travel red list as Omicron takes hold | Transport policy | The Guardian
    https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/dec/14/englands-travel-red-list-to-be-cleared-again-as-omicron-takes-hold
    https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/0bb5c74d6e582ccd553dae044f23b34285936e8b/0_0_6278_3767/master/6278.jpg?width=1200&height=630&quality=85&auto=format&fit=crop&overlay-ali

    Sajid Javid clears England’s travel red list as Omicron takes hold
    All 11 countries to be removed from list as concerns about importing variant diminish
    All 11 countries on England’s travel red list are to be taken off it from 4am on Wednesday, amid diminishing concern about Omicron cases being imported into the country.Given that the variant has already taken hold in the UK – making up a third of new infections in London – the health secretary, Sajid Javid, announced that mandatory hotel quarantine for those arriving from some southern African countries was set to end.Instead, all travellers arriving in England will be able to isolate at home. If double-vaccinated, they can be released with a negative PCR test taken within two days of arrival. If not they must stay at home for 10 days and get a test before day two and another on day eight or later.The red list was cleared at the end of October, but after the discovery of the Omicron variant in South Africa, 11 countries were put back on it. They were: Angola, Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe.Omicron’s spread through the UK has been swift. The UK Health Security Agency said on Monday that the number of confirmed cases of the variant was 4,700, but estimated daily infections were about 200,000.Javid announced in parliament on Tuesday that the red list was being emptied, saying it had become “less effective in slowing the incursion of Omicron from abroad”. He said the requirement to get tested before departure would remain in place.He had hinted at the move in a statement to the Commons last week. Under pressure from Tory MPs who raised concerns about the aviation and tourism sectors, Javid said that because Omicron cases would probably spread quickly in the UK, there would be “less need to have any kind of travel restrictions at all”.As health restrictions are devolved, it will be up to the administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland whether to follow suit.Last week, EU leaders discussed easing similar curbs. Reuters reported a senior official as saying the travel ban was “a time-limited measure” but there were no immediate plans to lift it.The US has kept up its own travel ban, with the White House’s chief medical adviser saying action was taken when the country was “in the dark” about the variant, to give time to assess its threat.Some political leaders in southern Africa said the restrictions were unfair. Cyril Ramaphosa, the president of South Africa, said he was “deeply disappointed” by the action. According to the BBC, he said: “The only thing the prohibition on travel will do is to further damage the economies of the affected countries and undermine their ability to respond to, and recover from, the pandemic.”Akinwumi Adesina, the president of the African Development Bank Group, tweeted last week: “Now that Omicron has been found in many non-African and developed countries, why are travels from those countries not banned? Singling out African countries is very unfair, non-scientific and discriminatory.”

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#grandebretagne#omicron#sante#angola#botswana#eswantini#lesotho#malawi#mozambique#namibie#nigeria#africadusud#zambie#zimbabwe#frontiere#circulation#santepublique#restrictionsanitaire

  • Coronavirus: UK lifts Omicron travel ban for 11 African nations | South China Morning Post
    https://www.scmp.com/news/world/europe/article/3159718/coronavirus-uk-lifts-omicron-travel-ban-11-african-nations

    Coronavirus: UK lifts Omicron travel ban for 11 African nations
    Countries on the UK’s travel red list include South Africa, Zambia and Botswana. Health Secretary Sajid Javid said the measure is less effective in slowing the incursion of Omicron from abroad as the new variant has already taken hold in Britain
    Britain will remove all 11 countries from its Covid-19 travel red list from Wednesday because there is now community transmission of Omicron, Health Secretary Sajid Javid told parliament.The British government added the southern African countries to its red list in late November, meaning that entry was only allowed to UK citizens or residents who then must quarantine in a hotel, in a bid to slow the spread of the new variant.“Now that there is community transmission of Omicron in the UK and Omicron has spread so widely across the world, the travel red list is now less effective in slowing the incursion of Omicron from abroad,” Javid said.
    UK’s PM Boris Johnson accused of ‘culture of disregard’ for Covid-19 rules
    13 Dec 2021“Whilst we will maintain our temporary testing measures for international travel we will be removing all 11 countries from the travel red list effective from 4am tomorrow morning.”Britain requires all inbound travellers to take either a PCR or a rapid lateral flow test a maximum of 48 hours before departure.Transport Secretary Grant Shapps said these testing measures would be reviewed in the first week of January.
    What do we know about the new coronavirus variant Omicron?“As always, we keep all our travel measures under review and we may impose new restrictions should there be a need to do so to protect public health,” he said on Twitter.The 11 countries which will be removed from the list are Angola, Botswana, Eswantini, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#grandebretagne#omicron#sante#angola#botswana#eswantini#lesotho#malawi#mozambique#namibie#nigeria#africadusud#zambie#zimbabwe#frontiere#circulation#santepublique#restrictionsanitaire

  • Covid-19 : la France impose un test négatif obligatoire à tous les voyageurs, vaccinés ou non, arrivant de pays situés en dehors de l’UE
    https://www.lemonde.fr/planete/article/2021/12/01/covid-19-la-france-prolonge-jusqu-a-samedi-la-suspension-des-vols-depuis-l-a

    Covid-19 : la France impose un test négatif obligatoire à tous les voyageurs, vaccinés ou non, arrivant de pays situés en dehors de l’UE
    Les autorités sanitaires françaises ont recensé treize cas suspects de contamination par le variant Omicron du coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 sur l’ensemble du territoire français, a par ailleurs annoncé Gabriel Attal, mercredi, après le conseil des ministres.
    Face à la propagation du variant Omicron du nouveau coronavirus, Gabriel Attal, porte-parole du gouvernement, a annoncé un renforcement du protocole sanitaire pour les voyageurs internationaux, mercredi 1er décembre. Paris va imposer un test de dépistage négatif au coronavirus pour tout voyageur, vacciné ou non vacciné, provenant de pays extérieurs à l’Union européenne (UE), a-t-il dit. Ce test devra être de moins de quarante-huit heures pour les personnes vaccinées et de moins de vingt-quatre heures pour celles qui ne sont pas vaccinées, a-t-il déclaré à l’issue du conseil des ministres.Les autorités sanitaires françaises ont recensé treize cas suspects de contamination par le variant Omicron du SARS-CoV-2 sur l’ensemble du territoire français, a annoncé par ailleurs Gabriel Attal, lors du compte rendu du conseil des ministres. Selon lui, il est donc fort probable que des cas d’infection par ce nouveau variant identifié en Afrique du Sud soient déjà présents en France et identifiés dans les heures ou jours à venir.
    Le porte-parole du gouvernement a également expliqué mercredi que les vols avec dix pays de l’Afrique australe reprendront à partir de samedi avec un encadrement « drastique » qui ne permettra de voyager qu’aux Français, aux ressortissants de l’UE, aux diplomates et aux navigants. Ces dix pays sont l’Afrique du Sud, le Lesotho, le Botswana, le Zimbabwe, le Mozambique, la Namibie, l’Eswatini, le Malawi, la Zambie et l’île Maurice.
    Ces voyageurs subiront en outre un test de détection du SARS-CoV-2 à leur arrivée en France, suivi d’un isolement de sept jours en cas de résultat négatif et de dix jours si le résultat est positif. Dans les deux cas, l’isolement « sera surveillé par des forces de sécurité intérieure, et, en cas de non-respect de l’isolement, une amende de 1 000 à 1 500 euros » sera infligée, a ajouté M. Attal. Plus tôt dans la matinée, le secrétaire d’Etat aux affaires européennes, Clément Beaune, avait détaillé sur RTL un protocole européen « extrêmement renforcé », faisant actuellement l’objet de discussions entre les Vingt-Sept. Il devrait comprendre des restrictions déjà prises à l’encontre des pays « en liste rouge » lors des précédentes vagues de propagation du Covid-19 (« test à l’arrivée, test au départ et isolement »). « Nous irons sans doute encore plus loin », avait alors ajouté le secrétaire d’Etat, expliquant déjà que mêmes les personnes vaccinées devraient probablement se soumettre à un test pour voyager entre la France et ces pays d’Afrique australe.

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#afriquedusud#sante#france#lesotho#botswana#zimbabwe#mozambique#namibie#eswatini#malawi#zambie#ilemaurice#test#frontiere#circulation#vaccination

  • Covid-19 : la France suspend les vols en provenance d’Afrique australe après la découverte d’un nouveau variant
    https://www.lemonde.fr/planete/article/2021/11/26/covid-19-un-nouveau-variant-inquiete-plusieurs-pays-europeens-interdisent-l-

    Covid-19 : la France suspend les vols en provenance d’Afrique australe après la découverte d’un nouveau variant
    L’OMS a voulu apporter de la nuance, estimant qu’il faudra encore des semaines pour comprendre le niveau transmissibilité du variant. Elle déconseille, pour l’instant, de prendre des mesures de restriction aux voyages.La France a devancé l’avis des autorités européennes, ainsi que celui de l’Organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS) : Matignon a annoncé, vendredi 26 novembre, suspendre immédiatement les arrivées en provenance de sept pays d’Afrique australe, dont l’Afrique du Sud, en raison de « la découverte d’un nouveau variant du coronavirus particulièrement préoccupant ».Cette mesure, appliquée « pour une durée minimale de quarante-huit heures », concerne également les voyageurs venant du Lesotho, du Botswana, du Zimbabwe, de Mozambique, de Namibie et d’Eswatini. « Les personnes ayant voyagé au cours des quatorze derniers jours dans l’un de ces pays sont invitées à se signaler aux autorités et à réaliser dans les meilleurs délais un test de dépistage RT-PCR », ajoute également Matignon.La Commission européenne avait proposé peu avant de suspendre les vols en provenance d’Afrique australe. L’exécutif européen doit faire une proposition aux représentants de tous les Etats membres lors d’une réunion prévue ce vendredi.Ce sera ensuite au Conseil (institution représentant les Vingt-Sept) d’adopter une telle recommandation. « La situation est en train d’évoluer très vite ; nous voulons nous assurer de faire le maximum pour ralentir la diffusion de ce variant » B.1.1.529, a déclaré un porte-parole de la Commission.
    L’OMS a voulu apporter de la nuance, vendredi, estimant qu’il faudrait encore quelques semaines pour comprendre le niveau transmissibilité et de virulence du nouveau variant B.1.1.529, en déconseillant aux pays de prendre des mesures de restriction aux voyages.Des experts chargés de suivre les évolutions du virus Covid se réunissent toutefois déjà aujourd’hui pour déterminer si le variant doit être classifié comme « préoccupant » ou « à suivre », a expliqué Christian Lindmeier, lors d’un point de presse régulier des agences de l’Organisation des Nations unies (ONU). Des scientifiques sud-africains ont annoncé jeudi qu’un nouveau variant du Covid-19 présentant un nombre « extrêmement élevé » de mutations et avec un « potentiel de propagation très rapide », avait été détecté dans le pays.
    Lire aussi Covid-19 : visualisez la part des variants du SARS-CoV-2 qui circulent en FranceAprès cette annonce, plusieurs pays ont fait savoir qu’ils allaient interdire l’entrée aux voyageurs en provenance des pays d’Afrique australe. Interrogé sur ces mesures, M. Lindmeier a rappelé quelle était la position officielle de l’OMS à ce sujet.« L’OMS recommande aux pays de continuer à appliquer une approche scientifique et fondée sur les risques lors de la mise en œuvre des mesures relatives aux voyages, conformément aux recommandations temporaires du comité d’urgence (…). A ce stade, encore une fois, la mise en œuvre de mesures de restrictions aux voyages est déconseillée », a-t-il dit.Pour faciliter les débats publics sur les variants, l’OMS nomme les variants à l’aide du nom des lettres de l’alphabet grec (alpha, bêta, gamma, delta…), plus accessible à un public non scientifique et qui permet d’éviter de stigmatiser le pays où ce variant est initialement découvert. L’OMS n’a toutefois pas encore donné de noms au nouveau variant, étant donné que ses experts ne l’ont pas encore classifié.

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#UE#OMS#Afriquedusud#lesotho#botswana#zimbabwe#mozambique#namibie#eswatin#variant#circulation#frontiere

  • Construire le féminisme et la sexualité libre au Mozambique

    Maira Domingos apporte des réflexions sur la maternité obligatoire, le conservatisme et les relations patriarcales dans le mariage.

    « La réalité des conflits armés renforce, dans la maternité,
    la fonction d’alimentation de la guerre elle-même. »

    La maternité et la sexualité sont des questions sur lesquelles les femmes mozambicaines trouvent peu d’espace pour partager et réfléchir collectivement. Au Mozambique, il est très courant que les femmes aient de nombreux enfants par obligation, même s’ils ne reflètent pas un désir et un sentiment agréable d’être mère. La réalité des conflits armés renforce dans la maternité la fonction de nourrir la guerre elle-même. Le grand problème de la malnutrition ravage le corps des femmes qui, même lorsqu’elles ont faim, doivent trouver la force de nourrir leur bébé. Ce ne sont là que quelques exemples qui montrent que la maternité est une question qui concerne l’ensemble de l’organisation sociale et économique, et pas seulement la vie privée de chaque femme.

    https://entreleslignesentrelesmots.blog/2021/05/19/construire-le-feminisme-et-la-sexualite-libre-au-mozamb

    #féminisme #afrique #mozambique

  • L’exposition « Refuser la guerre coloniale, une histoire portugaise »

    A la maison du Portugal de la Cité universitaire internationale de Paris a lieu une exposition sur l’engagement des années 1960 et 1970 contre les guerres coloniales menées par le Portugal en #Guinée-Bissau, #Angola et #Mozambique. Elle traite de l’exil parisien des 200’000 Portugais #déserteurs et insoumis à cette guerre.

    https://histoirecoloniale.net/L-exposition-Refuser-la-guerre-coloniale-une-histoire-portugaise-

    #résistance #désobéissance_civile #colonisation #guerre_coloniale #histoire #Portugal #exposition #France #exil

    ping @isskein

  • The strange case of Portugal’s returnees

    White settler returnees to Portugal in #1975, and the history of decolonization, can help us understand the complicated category of refugee.

    The year is 1975, and the footage comes from the Portuguese Red Cross. The ambivalence is there from the start. Who, or maybe what, are these people? The clip title calls them “returnees from Angola.” (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wzd9_gh646U

    ) At Lisbon airport, they descend the gangway of a US-operated civil airplane called “Freedom.” Clothes, sunglasses, hairstyles, and sideburns: no doubt, these are the 1970s. The plane carries the inscription “holiday liner,” but these people are not on vacation. A man clings tight to his transistor radio, a prized possession brought from far away Luanda. Inside the terminal, hundreds of returnees stand in groups, sit on their luggage, or camp on the floor. White people, black people, brown people. Men, women, children, all ages. We see them filing paperwork, we see volunteers handing them sandwiches and donated clothes, we see a message board through which those who have lost track of their loved ones try to reunite. These people look like refugees (http://tracosdememoria.letras.ulisboa.pt/pt/arquivo/documentos-escritos/retornados-no-aeroporto-de-lisboa-1975). Or maybe they don’t?

    Returnees or retornados is the term commonly assigned to more than half-a-million people, the vast majority of them white settlers from Angola and Mozambique, most of whom arrived in Lisbon during the course of 1975, the year that these colonies acquired their independence from Portugal. The returnees often hastily fled the colonies they had called home because they disapproved of the one party, black majority state after independence, and resented the threat to their racial and social privilege; because they dreaded the generalized violence of civil war and the breakdown of basic infrastructures and services in the newly independent states; because they feared specific threats to their property, livelihood, and personal safety; or because their lifeworld was waning before their eyes as everyone else from their communities left in what often resembled a fit of collective panic.

    Challenged by this influx from the colonies at a time of extreme political instability and economic turmoil in Portugal, the authorities created the legal category of returnees for those migrants who held Portuguese citizenship and seemed unable to “integrate” by their own means into Portuguese society. Whoever qualified as a returnee before the law was entitled to the help of the newly created state agency, Institute for the Support of the Return of the Nationals (IARN). As the main character of an excellent 2011 novel by Dulce Maria Cardoso on the returnees states:

    In almost every answer there was one word we had never heard before, the I.A.R.N., the I.A.R.N., the I.A.R.N. The I.A.R.N. had paid our air fares, the I.A.R.N. would put us up in hotels, the I.A.R.N. would pay for the transport to the hotels, the I.A.R.N. would give us food, the I.A.R.N. would give us money, the I.A.R.N. would help us, the I.A.R.N. would advise us, the I.A.R.N. would give us further information. I had never heard a single word repeated so many times, the I.A.R.N. seemed to be more important and generous than God.

    The legal category “returnee” policed the access to this manna-from-welfare heaven, but the label also had a more symbolic dimension: calling those arriving from Angola and Mozambique “returnees” implied an orderly movement, and possibly a voluntary migration; it also suggested that they came back to a place where they naturally fit, to the core of a Portuguese nation that they had always been a part of. In this sense, the term was also meant to appeal to the solidarity of the resident population with the newcomers: in times of dire public finances, the government hoped to legitimize its considerable spending on behalf of these “brothers” from the nation’s (former) overseas territories.

    Many migrants, however, rebutted the label attached to them. While they were happy to receive the aid offered by state bureaucracies and NGOs like the Portuguese Red Cross, they insisted that they were refugees (refugiados), not returnees. One in three of them, as they pointed out, had been born in Africa. Far from returning to Portugal, they were coming for the first time, and often did not feel welcome there. Most felt that they had not freely decided to leave, that their departure had been chaotic, that they had had no choice but to give up their prosperous and happy lives in the tropics. (At the time, they never publicly reflected on the fact that theirs was the happiness of a settler minority, and that prosperity was premised on the exploitation of the colonized.) Many were convinced they would return to their homelands one day, and many of them proudly identified as “Angolans” or “Africans” rather than as Portuguese. All in all, they claimed that they had been forcibly uprooted, and that now they were discriminated against and living precariously in the receiving society—in short, that they shared the predicaments we typically associate with the condition of the refugee.

    Some of them wrote to the UNHCR, demanding the agency should help them as refugees. The UNHCR, however, declined. In 1976, High Commissioner Prince Aga Khan referred to the 1951 Refugee Convention, explaining that his mandate applied “only to persons outside the country of their nationality,” and that since “the repatriated individuals, in their majority, hold Portuguese nationality, [they] do not fall under my mandate.” The UNHCR thus supported the returnee label the Portuguese authorities had created, although high-ranking officials within the organization were in fact critical of this decision—in the transitory moment of decolonization, when the old imperial borders gave way to the new borders of African nation-states, it was not always easy to see who would count as a refugee even by the terms of the 1951 Convention.

    In short, the strange case of Portugal’s returnees—much like that of the pieds-noirs, French settlers “repatriated” from Algeria—points to the ambiguities of the “refugee.” In refugee studies and migration history, the term defines certain groups of people we study. In international law, the category bestows certain rights on specific individuals. As a claim-making concept, finally, “the refugee” is a tool that various actors—migrants, governments, international organizations, NGOs—use to voice demands and to mobilize, to justify their politics, or to interpret their experiences. What are we to make of this overlap? While practitioners of the refugee regime will have different priorities, I think that migration scholars should treat the “refugee” historically. We need to critically analyze who is using the term in which ways in any given situation. As an actor’s category, “refugee” is not an abstract concept detached from time and place, context, and motivations. Rather, it is historically specific, as its meanings change over time; it is relational, because it is defined against the backdrop of other terms and phenomena; and it is strategic, because it is supposed to do something for the people who use the term. The refugee concept is thus intrinsically political.

    Does analyzing “the refugee” as an actor’s category mean that we must abandon it as an analytical tool altogether? Certainly not. We should continue to research “refugees” as a historically contested category of people. While there will always be a tension between the normative and analytical dimensions, historicizing claims to being a “refugee” can actually strengthen the concept’s analytical purchase: it can complicate our understanding of forced migrations and open our eyes to the wide range of degrees of voluntariness or force involved in any migration decision. It can help us to think the state of being a refugee not as an absolute, but as a gradual, relational, and contextualized category. In the case of the returnees, and independently from what either the migrants or the Portuguese government or the UNHCR argued, such an approach will allow us to analyze the migrants as “privileged refugees.”

    Let me explain: For all the pressures that pushed some of them to leave their homes, for all the losses they endured, and for all the hardships that marked their integration into Portuguese society, the returnees, a privileged minority in a settler colony, also had a relatively privileged experience of (forced) migration and reintegration when colonialism ended. This becomes clear when comparing their experience to the roughly 20,000 Africans that, at the same time as the returnees, made it to Portugal but who, unlike them, were neither accepted as citizens nor entitled to comprehensive welfare—regardless of the fact that they had grown up being told that they were an integral part of a multi-continental Portuguese nation, and despite the fact that they were fleeing the same collapsing empire as the returnees were. Furthermore, we must bear in mind that in Angola and Mozambique, hundreds of thousands of Africans were forcibly displaced first by Portugal’s brutal colonial wars (1961-1974), then during the civil wars after independence (1975-2002 in Angola, 1977-1992 in Mozambique). Unlike the returnees, most of these forced migrants never had the opportunity to seek refuge in the safe haven of Portugal. Ultimately, the returnees’ experience can therefore only be fully understood when it is put into the broader context of these African refugee flows, induced as they were by the violent demise of settler colonialism in the process of decolonization.

    So, what were these people in the YouTube clip, then? Returnees? Or African refugees? I hope that by now you will agree that … well … it’s complicated.

    https://africasacountry.com/2020/12/the-strange-case-of-portugals-returnees

    #Portugal #colonialisme #catégorisation #réfugiés #asile #décolonisation #Angola #réfugiés_portugais #histoire #rapatriés #rapatriés_portugais #Mozambique #indépendance #nationalisme #retour_volontaire #discriminations #retour_forcé #retour #nationalité

    Et un nouveau mot pour la liste de @sinehebdo :
    #retornados
    #terminologie #vocabulaire #mots

    ping @isskein @karine4

  • Mocimboa da Praia : Key Mozambique port ’seized by IS’ - BBC News
    https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53756692

    C’est passé sous les radars apparemment, mais la situation au Mozambique se dégrade et devient très préoccupante

    https://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/1632/idt2/idt2/f0df8b16-d8df-480d-89d5-f23f1d740e73/image/816

    Militants linked to the Islamic State group have seized a heavily-defended port in Mozambique after days of fighting, according to reports.

    Local media say government forces that were in the far northern town of Mocimboa da Praia fled, many by boat, after Islamists stormed the port.

    The town is near the site of natural gas projects worth $60bn (£46bn).

    In recent months militants have taken a number of northern towns, displacing tens of thousands of people.

    –-----------

    Avec les décapitations de villages, l’État islamique intensifie les attaques au Mozambique - News 24

    https://news-24.fr/avec-les-decapitations-de-villages-letat-islamique-intensifie-les-attaques-a

    NAIROBI, Kenya – Les militants de l’État islamique, selon plusieurs témoignages, ont frappé la petite communauté agricole sur un plateau dans le nord du Mozambique lors d’un rite d’initiation pour amener les adolescents à devenir virils.

    Armés de machettes, les assaillants ont décapité jusqu’à 20 garçons et hommes dans le village de 24 de Marco, selon un rapport des médias locaux qui confirmé mercredi par ACLED, un groupe américain de surveillance de la crise qui cartographie l’explosion de l’insurrection au Mozambique.

    –-----------------

    Mozambique - Escalation of conflict and violence drive massive displacements and increased humanitarian needs in Cabo Delgado | Digital Situation Reports
    https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/mozambique/card/qXCEhl8yNX
    https://images.ctfassets.net/ejsx83ka8ylz/Z9ojahmui2MxmPMagjmfA/5c75e52ed09bf8c5724c3553183c05a3/WhatsApp_Image_2020-10-26_at_18.53.21.jpeg?w=1024

    Escalation of conflict and violence drive massive displacements and increased humanitarian needs in Cabo Delgado

    The humanitarian situation in Cabo Delgado Province, in northern Mozambique, significantly deteriorated over the last 10 months. The ongoing conflict in the region has escalated in 2020, compounding a fragile situation marked by chronic underdevelopment, consecutive climatic shocks and recurrent disease outbreaks. The increasing number of attacks by non-state armed groups, particularly impacting the northern and eastern districts of the Province, are driving massive and multiple displacements, disrupting people’s livelihoods and access to basic services.

    –-----------------------

    Cabo Ligado Weekly : 2-8 November 2020 | ACLED
    https://acleddata.com/2020/11/10/cabo-ligado-weekly-2-8-november-2020

    The battle for the road between Palma and Mueda continued last week, starting with a 2 November insurgent attack on Pundanhar, Palma district. Several houses were burned in the attack, and five civilians were kidnapped.

    At the same time, insurgents were in the midst of a four-day occupation of Muatide, Muidumbe district. According to a Pinnacle News report, insurgents used Muatide as a base from which they carried out attacks against young men involved in initiation rites. Fifteen boys and five adults from the 24 de Marco village were reported decapitated, and their bodies brought to the soccer field at Muatide. Pinnacle also reported that another 24 youths and six adults from other areas of the district were beheaded during the occupation, and their bodies similarly gathered at Muatide. Pinnacle later reported that many other civilians had been killed at Muatide. There is no confirmed final death toll, and sources can only confirm the targeting of male initiation rites and the initial report of 20 deaths at 24 de Marco.

    #mozambique #is #état_islamique #daesh #djihadisme_international

  • Au Cabo Delgado, brouillard de guerre, tambours d’internationalisation
    https://www.cetri.be/Au-Cabo-Delgado-brouillard-de

    Des djihadistes se sont emparés de la ville portuaire de Mocimboa da Praia, au nord du #Mozambique, mercredi 12 août. Sous tension depuis déjà plusieurs années, cette région du Cabo Delgado abrite d’importantes installations gazières mises en place par plusieurs compagnies étrangères dont le français Total. Alors que le gouvernement et les pays voisins plaident pour un renforcement des forces armées pour lutter contre les djihadistes, des associations condamnent une militarisation aveugle qui exacerbe (...) #Le_Sud_en_mouvement

    / #Le_Sud_en_mouvement, Mozambique, #Corruption, #Extractivisme, #Néocolonialisme, Les blogs du (...)

    #Les_blogs_du_Diplo

  • Les #circulations en #santé : des #produits, des #savoirs, des #personnes en mouvement

    Les circulations en santé sont constituées d’une multitude de formes de mouvements et impliquent aussi bien des savoirs, des #normes_médicales, des produits de santé, des patients et des thérapeutes. L’objectif de ce dossier consiste ainsi à mieux saisir la manière dont les #corps, les #connaissances_médicales, les produits se transforment pendant et à l’issue des circulations. Ouvert sans limite de temps, ce dossier thématique se veut un espace pour documenter ces circulations plus ordinaires dans le champ de la santé.

    Sommaire :

    BLOUIN GENEST Gabriel, SHERROD Rebecca : Géographie virale et risques globaux : la circulation des risques sanitaires dans le contexte de la gouvernance globale de la santé.

    BROSSARD ANTONIELLI Alila : La production locale de #médicaments_génériques au #Mozambique à la croisée des circulations de #savoirs_pharmaceutiques.

    PETIT Véronique : Circulations et quêtes thérapeutiques en #santé_mentale au #Sénégal.

    TAREAU Marc-Alexandre, DEJOUHANET Lucie, PALISSE Marianne, ODONNE Guillaume : Circulations et échanges de plantes et de savoirs phyto-médicinaux sur la frontière franco-brésilienne.

    TISSERAND Chloé : Médecine à la frontière : le recours aux professionnels de santé afghans en contexte d’urgence humanitaire.

    #Calais #réfugiés_afghans #humanitaire #PASS #soins #accès_aux_soins

    https://rfst.hypotheses.org/les-circulations-en-sante-des-produits-des-savoirs-des-personnes-en
    #Brésil #humanitaire #Brésil #Guyane

    ping @fil

  • farmlandgrab.org | Is nationalisation and state custodianship of land a solution? The case of Mozambique
    https://www.farmlandgrab.org/post/view/29116

    FIRST, WE HAVE TO UNDERSTAND THE formation of a national capitalist class.
    In order to have access to Mozambican resources and markets, international capital needed a compliant domestic capitalist class. No such class existed, so there was a need to create it. “Privatisation” of the state was a necessary condition for the process of capital accumulation and the creation of local oligarchies. From generals to top politicians and lobbyists, a small number of individuals reaped benefits from the privatisation of state enterprises, banks and services. This was also true in the natural resources sector. Fertile farmlands and mines were appropriated, in most cases from the peasantry.

    In the whole economy more broadly, this has led to a kind of porousness. According to the economist Nuno Castel-Branco, there has been an inability, deliberate or not, to retain the uncommitted surplus that could be used for the reproduction of the economy as a whole. In other words, elites capture the state in order to generate surpluses. These surpluses are then financialised, either in domestic capital markets, or, more often, in international capital markets. Of course this also results in capital flight.

    #Mozambique #foncier #terres #privatisation #prolétarisation #capitalisme #agriculture

  • U.N. to probe sex-for-food aid allegations after ...
    http://news.trust.org/item/20190426133548-oe3xz

    The United Nations said on Friday it will investigate allegations that survivors of a deadly cyclone in Mozambique are being forced to have sex with community leaders for food.

    More than 1,000 people died and tens of thousands were forced from their homes when Cyclone Idai hammered Mozambique before moving inland to Malawi and Zimbabwe, in one of the worst climate-related disasters to hit the southern hemisphere.

    The U.N. pledge came a day after Human Rights Watch (HRW) published accounts of female survivors who said they were abused by local leaders and as a second powerful storm, Cyclone Kenneth, pounded the impoverished southeast African nation.

    “As with any report on sexual exploitation and abuse, we are acting swiftly to follow-up on these allegations, including with the relevant authorities,” the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) said in a statement.

    “The U.N. has a zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse. It is not, and never will be, acceptable for any person in a position of power to abuse the most vulnerable, let alone in their time of greatest need.”

    #abus_de_pouvoir #viols #abus_sexuels #Mozambique #catastrophe

    • et ce n’est pas tout #femmes #discrimination

      A local community leader in the town of Tica, Nhamatanda district, told Human Rights Watch that in some cases, where access by road is impossible, local community leaders are responsible for storing the food and distributing it to families on a weekly basis. She said that, “Because the food is not enough for everyone,” some local leaders have exploited the situation by charging people to include their names on the distribution lists.

      One aid worker said that the distribution list often contains only the names of male heads of households, and excludes families headed by women. “In some of the villages, women and their children have not seen any food for weeks,” she said. “They would do anything for food, including sleeping with men in charge of the food distribution.”

      Another aid worker said that her international organization had received reports of sexual abuse of women not only in their villages, but also in camps for internally displaced people. She said they were monitoring the situation and training people to raise awareness among women and to report any cases of sexual exploitation or abuse.

      https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/25/mozambique-cyclone-victims-forced-trade-sex-food

  • Le #Mozambique. Promesses de prospérité et instabilité – GeoStrategia
    https://www.geostrategia.fr/le-mozambique-promesses-de-prosperite-et-instabilite

    Cet article s’intéresse aux enjeux auxquels le Mozambique est confronté. La récente découverte de gisements d’hydrocarbures permet à ce pays d’envisager un développement économique rapide en devenant un champion énergétique du continent africain. Toutefois l’auteure nuance ce propos et rappelle que depuis 2013 une crise politico-militaire subsiste, marquée notamment par la déstabilisation islamiste au nord du pays.

  • #Pro-savana

    Vision

    Improve the livelihood of inhabitants of #Nacala_Corridor through inclusive and sustainable agricultural and regional development.

    Missions

    1. Improve and modernise agriculture to increase productivity and production, and diversify agricultural production.

    2. Create employment through agricultural investment and establishment of a supply chain.

    Objective

    Create new agricultural development models, taking into account the natural environment and socio-economic aspects, and seeking market-orientated agricultural/rural/regional development with a competitive edge.

    Principles of ProSAVANA

    1. ProSAVANA will be aligned with the vision and objectives of the national agricultural development strategy of Mozambique, the “Strategy Plan for the Agricultural Sector Development – 2011 – 2020 (PEDSA)”,

    2. ProSAVANA supports Mozambican farmers in order to contribute to poverty-reduction, food security and nutrition,

    3. Activities of ProSAVANA, in particular those involving the private sector, will be designed and implemented in accordance with Principles of Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRAI) and Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests,

    4. Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security of Mozambique (MASA) and Local Government, in collaboration with Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), will strengthen dialogue and involvement of civil society and other appropriate parties,

    5. Appropriate consideration will be given for mitigation of the environmental and social impacts, which might be provided through the activities under ProSAVANA.

    Approaches of ProSAVANA

    1. Incorporate the results of relevant studies on the natural conditions and socio-economic situations, to support the establishment of appropriate agricultural development models,

    2. Increase agricultural productivity and production through appropriate measures, including improvement of farming systems, access to agricultural extension services including techniques and quality/quantity of inputs, value chain system and expansion of farmland,

    3. Promote diversification of agricultural production, based on research results to increase profitability,

    4. Provide opportunities to change from subsistence agriculture into a sustainable agriculture, with respect given to the farmers´ sovereignty,

    5. Strengthen the capacity and the competitiveness of farmers and farmers’ organisations,

    6. Enhance the enabling environment to promote responsible investments and activities, aiming to establish a win-win relationship between small-scale farmers and agribusiness firms,

    7. Promote and strengthen local leading farmers to disseminate and scale-up development impacts,

    8. Establish regional agricultural clusters and develop value chain systems,

    9. Promote public and private partnership as one of the driving forces for inclusive and sustainable agricultural development.

    http://www.prosavana.gov.mz
    #Pro_savana #land_grabbing #terres #Mozambique #accaparement_de_terres

    ping @odilon

    Apparemment, le programme a été arrêté avant d’être implémenté.
    Programme qui avait été promu par #Lula

    • What Happened to the Biggest Land Grab in Africa? Searching for #ProSavana in Mozambique

      What if you threw a lavish party for foreign investors, and no one came? By all accounts, that is what’s happening in Mozambique’s Nacala Corridor, the intended site for Africa’s largest agricultural development scheme – or land grab, depending on your perspective.

      The ProSavana project, a Brazilian-and-Japanese-led development project, was supposed to be turning Mozambique’s fertile savannah lands in the north into an export zone, replicating Brazil’s success taming its own savannah – the cerrado – and transforming it into industrial mega-farms of soybeans. The vision, hatched in 2009, but only revealed to Mozambicans in 2013, called for 35 million hectares (nearly 100 million acres) of “underutilized” land to be converted by Brazilian agribusiness into soybean plantations for cheaper export to China and Japan.

      In my two weeks in Mozambique, including one week in the Nacala Corridor, I had a hard time finding evidence of any such transformation. It was easy, though, to find outrage at a plan seen by many in the region as a secret land grab. That resistance, which has evolved into a tri-national campaign in Japan, Brazil, and Mozambique to stop ProSavana, is one of the reasons the project is a currently a dud.

      The new face of South-South investment?

      I came to look at ProSavana because, out of all the large-scale projects I studied over the course of the last year, this one sounded almost plausible. It wasn’t started by some fly-by-night venture capitalist, growing a biofuel crop he’d never produced commercially for a market that barely existed. That’s what I saw in Tanzania, and such failed land grabs litter the African landscape.

      ProSavana at least knew its investors: Brazil’s agribusiness giants. The planners also knew their technology: Brazil’s soybeans, which had adapted to the harsh tropical conditions of Brazil’s cerrado. And they knew their market: Japan’s and China’s hog farms and their insatiable appetite for feed, generally made with soybeans. That was already more than a lot of these grand schemes had going for them.

      I was also compelled by the sheer scale of the project. When first announced, ProSavana was to encompass 35 million hectares of land, an area the size of North Carolina. That would have made it the largest land acquisition in Africa.

      ProSavana also interested me because it was not the usual neo-colonial megaproject promoted by the Global North. It was a projection of Brazil’s agro-export prowess. This was South-South investment, the new wave of development in a multipolar world. Wouldn’t Brazil do this differently, I wondered, with the kind of strong developmental focus that had characterized the country’s ascendance under the leadership of the left-leaning Workers’ Party?

      ProSavana’s premise was that the soil and climate in the Nacala Corridor of Mozambique were similar to those found in the cerrado, so technology could be easily adapted to tame a region inhospitable to agriculture.

      Someone should have gone there before they issued the press releases.

      It turns out that the two regions differ dramatically. The cerrado had poor soils, which technology was able to address. That’s also why it had few farmers, and those that were there could be moved by Brazil’s then-military dictatorship. The Nacala Corridor, by contrast, has good soils, which is precisely why it is the most densely-populated part of rural Mozambique. (If there are good lands, you can bet civilization has discovered them and is farming them.)

      Mozambique also has a democratic government, forged in an independence movement rooted in peasant farmers’ struggle for land rights. So the country has one of the stronger land laws in Africa, which grants use rights to farmers who have been farming land for ten years or more.

      The disconnect between the claims ProSavana was making to its investors and the reality of the situation reached almost laughable proportions. Agriculture Minister Jose Pacheco led sales visits to Mozambique, organized by Brazil’s Getulio Vargas Foundation, which had put together the agribusiness-friendly draft “Master Plan” that was leaked to Mozambican civil society organizations in March 2013. Brazil’s biggest farmers came looking for thousands of hectares of land, only to find three disappointments: they couldn’t own land in Mozambique; what land they could lease was by no means empty; and it was far from the ports, with no decent roads to transport their soybeans. Brazil’s soybean mega-farmers packed up their giant combines and went back to the cerrado, where there are still millions of hectares of undeveloped land.

      A kinder, gentler ProSavana

      There are a few large soybean farms in Gurue, producing for the domestic poultry industry; but nothing like the export boom promised by ProSavana. According to Americo Uaciquete of ProSavana’s Nampula office, Brazilian farmers came expecting 40,000 hectares free and clear. He told me no investor could expect that in the Nacala Corridor. The only foreign investors who will farm there, he said, are those willing to take 2,000 hectares and involve local farmers.

      To me, that sounded like a very quick surrender on the ProSavana battlefield. Couldn’t the Mozambican government open larger swaths of land?

      “Not without a gun,” Uaciquete said, clearly rejecting that path. “We are not going to impose the Brazilian model here.” He went on to describe ProSavana as a support program for small-scale farmers, based on its two non-investment components: research into improved locally adapted seeds, and extension services to improve productivity.

      In Maputo, the ProSavana Directorate did its best to polish up the new, development-friendly ProSavana. Jusimere Mourao, of Japan’s cooperation agency, had it down best. She lamented that ProSavana was “poorly timed” because its “announcement” (a leak) “coincided” with international concerns about land grabbing. Hmmm….

      After taking civil society concerns into account, she said, the program had issued a new “concept note” and the Master Plan is under revision. “Small and medium producers are the main beneficiaries of ProSavana,” she said. “We have no intention of promoting the taking of their land. It would be a crime.” It’s not about promoting foreign investment, she assured me; that is up to the Mozambican government.

      The turnaround was stunning, and welcome, if not quite believable. It certainly had not quieted the coalition calling for an end to ProSavana until farmers and civil society groups are consulted on the agricultural development plan for the Nacala Corridor.

      Luis Sitoe, Economic Adviser to the Minister of Agriculture, smirked when I told him I’d been in the region researching ProSavana. “Did you find anything?” For him, ProSavana had failed.

      But lest I think anything profound had been learned from that experience, he reassured me that the Mozambican government remains firmly committed to relying on large-scale foreign investment to address its agricultural underdevelopment.

      He pulled out a two-inch-thick binder to show me he was serious. It was the project proposal for the Lurio River Valley Development Project, a 200,000-hectare irrigation scheme right there in the northern Nacala Corridor. Was it part of ProSavana? Absolutely not. Had the communities been consulted on this ambitious project along the heavily populated river valley?

      “Absolutely not,” said Vicente Adriano, research director at UNAC, Mozambique’s national farmers’ union, which had just presented its own agricultural development plan, based on the country’s three million family farmers.

      The ProSavana directorate is still promising a new Master Plan for the project in early 2015. So it would be a mistake to think that ProSavana is dead. Large-scale land deals certainly aren’t, however they are branded. Investors may just be waiting for the Mozambican government to bring more to the table than just promotional brochures. Things like land, which turns out to be rather important for a successful land grab. In the Nacala Corridor, that land is anything but unoccupied.

      https://foodtank.com/news/2014/12/what-happened-to-the-biggest-land-grab-in-africa-searching-for-prosavana-i