• Par le sol et par le sang. Le droit de la nationalité dans le monde

    Quels pays facilitent, quels pays entravent l’acquisition de la nationalité pour les enfants d’immigrés ? Cet essai dresse un état des lieux contrasté, selon l’application du droit du sol ou du sang, avec des conditions ou discriminations particulières.


    https://laviedesidees.fr/Par-le-sol-et-par-le-sang.html
    #ius_soli #jus_sanguinis #nationalité #monde #droit #citoyenneté #droit_du_sang #droit_du_sol #cartographie #visualisation

    ping @karine4

  • En #Inde, près de deux millions de citoyens, la plupart #musulmans, déchus de leur #nationalité

    La Cour suprême exclut de nombreux citoyens des registres d’état civil de l’#Etat_de_l’Assam.


    https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2019/08/31/en-inde-pres-de-deux-millions-de-citoyens-la-plupart-musulmans-dechus-de-leu
    #citoyenneté #apatridie #Assam #apatrides

    –---------

    En 2018, le Courrier international titrait :
    Inde. Quatre millions d’habitants de l’Assam considérés comme apatrides
    https://seenthis.net/messages/712102

    • India builds detention camps for up to 1.9m people ‘stripped of citizenship’ in Assam

      Ten centres ‘planned’ across northeastern state after national register published
      The Indian government is building mass detention camps after almost two million people were told they could be effectively stripped of citizenship.

      Around 1.9m people in the north-eastern state of Assam were excluded when India published the state’s final National Register of Citizens (NRC) list in August.

      Those excluded from the register will have to appeal to prove they are citizens. The UN and other international rights groups have expressed concern that many could be rendered stateless.

      The citizenship list is part of a drive to detect illegal immigrants in Assam.

      The Indian government claims that the migrants have arrived from neighbouring Muslim-majority Bangladesh.

      Critics say that the register has upended the lives of Muslims who have lived legally in the state for decades.

      Record keeping in parts of rural India is poor and many, including those building the camps, have been caught out by the NRC’s stringent requirements.

      “We don’t have birth certificates,” Malati Hajong, one of the labourers working at a site near the village of Goalpara, told the Reuters news agency.

      The Goalpara camp is one of at least 10 planned detention centres, according to local media reports.

      It is around the size of seven football pitches and designed to hold 3,000 people.

      Officials plan to have a school and hospital at the centre, as well as a high boundary wall and watchtowers for the security forces.

      Critics have accused the Modi administration of using the NRC to target Assam’s large Muslim community.

      But the government says it is simply complying with an order from India’s Supreme Court, which said the NRC had been delayed for too long and set a strict deadline for its completion.

      Government sources say those excluded from the list retain their rights and have 120 days to appeal at local “Foreigners Tribunals”. If that fails, they can take their cases to the High Court of Assam and ultimately the Supreme Court. What happens to those who fail at all levels of appeal is yet to be decided, they said.

      Last month the local chapter of India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party expressed dismay after it became apparent that many Hindus had also been excluded from the list.

      Officials said the government may pass legislation to protect legitimate citizens.

      The government is already in the process of bringing legislation to grant citizenship to Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist immigrants from neighbouring countries.

      Muslim immigrants are not included in the law.

      The nationalist, hardline Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) group also called for genuine citizens to be included in the list after it emerged that Hindus had been affected. The RSS and BJP are closely affiliated.

      https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/assam-india-detention-camps-bangladesh-nrc-list-a9099251.html

      #camps_de_détention #détention

  • Interior minister says 92,000 Syrians granted Turkish citizenship

    A total of 92,280 Syrians have been naturalized in Turkey, according to a statement from Turkish Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu.

    The minister, who spoke to representatives from Turkish media outlets at the ministry on Friday, said 47,000 of the naturalized Syrians are adults while 45,280 of them are children.

    According to a statement from Soylu in February, 3,644,342 Syrians had fled to Turkey since the start of the civil war in the neighboring country.

    During Friday’s meeting the minister said most Syrians want to return to Syria the moment the country becomes a safe place to live.

    “Some 65 to 70 percent of Syrians, according to surveys, say they will return to Syria if the country becomes safe again. This shows that they will return. For those who want to stay in Turkey, I don’t think there will be a problems for them,” said Soylu.

    In recent weeks Turkish media have reported that some Syrian refugees in the country are being deported even if they are registered. These Syrians are allegedly being forced sign a document saying they are leaving Turkey of their own accord.

    In a move that unsettled Syrian refugees, the İstanbul Governor’s Office on July 22 directed Syrians who are not registered in İstanbul to leave the city by Aug. 20 and return to the cities where they registered and gained temporary protection status.

    The governor’s office said those who do not leave İstanbul by Aug. 20 will be sent back to the cities of their registration in line with an order from the Interior Ministry.

    On Wednesday, Abdullah Ayaz, who heads the Turkish Interior Ministry’s migration management department, denied reports about the deportation of some Syrians from Turkey, saying that such an act would be legally impossible.

    The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) government is said to have tightened its policy on Syrian refugees following its loss of İstanbul in the mayoral election held in June to an opposition candidate. Many say the public’s unease with the Syrian refugees is one of the reasons for the AKP’s election loss in İstanbul and some other major cities.

    https://www.turkishminute.com/2019/08/02/interior-minister-says-92000-syrians-granted-turkish-citizenship
    #asile #migrations #réfugiés_syriens #nationalité #Turquie #citoyenneté

    v. aussi les annonces de Erdogan à partir de 2016 sur ce sujet :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/505950
    https://seenthis.net/messages/508084

    Et à mettre en lien avec les renvois de Syriens en Syrie :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/617415

  • La guerre de l’État contre les étrangers. Un extrait du livre de Karine Parrot
    https://www.contretemps.eu/guerre-etat-migrants

    À la rubrique des mécanismes déloyaux déployés contre les pauvres qui arrivent jusqu’en Europe, le «  système #Dublin  » est sans doute un des plus féroces et des plus élaborés. Il montre jusqu’où peut aller le fantasme gestionnaire des gouvernants, cette idée qu’il serait possible de traiter certaines personnes exactement comme des flux, alimentant des stocks à transférer, à se répartir, à tarir. À aucun moment dans le mécanisme Dublin, les personnes ne sont véritablement prises en considération, si ce n’est au prisme de leur volonté présumée de contourner les règles.

    #migration #Union_européenne

    • Carte blanche. L’Etat contre les étrangers

      L’actualité la plus récente a donné à voir une #fracture au sein de la gauche et des forces d’émancipation : on parle d’un côté des « no border », accusés d’angélisme face à la « pression migratoire », et d’un autre côté il y a les « souverainistes », attachés aux #frontières et partisans d’une « gestion humaine des flux migratoires ». Ce débat se résume bien souvent à des principes humanistes d’une part (avec pour argument qu’il n’y a pas de crise migratoire mais une crise de l’accueil des migrants) opposés à un principe de « réalité » (qui se prévaut d’une légitimité soi-disant « populaire », selon laquelle l’accueil ne peut que détériorer le niveau de vie, les salaires, les lieux de vie des habitants du pays). Dans ce cinglant essai, Karine Parrot, juriste et membre du GISTI (Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigrés), met en lumière un aspect souvent ignoré de ce débat : à quoi servent au juste les frontières ? qu’est-ce que la nationalité ? Sur la base du droit, Karine Parrot montre que la frontière et la restriction des circulations humaines, sont indissociables d’une #hiérarchie_sociale des peuples à l’échelle mondiale. La #frontière signifie aux plus aisés que, pour eux, aucune frontière n’est infranchissable, tandis qu’elle dit aux autres que, pauvres, hommes, femmes, enfants devront voyager au péril de leur vie, de leur santé, de leur dignité. De l’invention de la #nationalité comme mode de gestion et de #criminalisation des populations (et notamment des pauvres, des « indigents », des vagabonds) jusqu’à la facilitation de la #rétention, en passant par le durcissement des conditions d’#asile et de séjour, ou encore les noyades de masse orchestrées par les gouvernements, l’Union européenne et leur officine semi-privée et militarisée (#Frontex), Karine Parrot révèle qu’il n’y a aucune raison vertueuse ou conforme au « #bien_commun » qui justifie les frontières actuelles des États. Le droit de l’immigration ne vise qu’à entériner la loi du plus fort entre le Nord et le Sud ; il n’a d’autre fin que conditionner, incarcérer, asservir et mettre à mort les populations surnuméraires que la « #mondialisation_armée » n’a de cesse reproduire à l’échelle du monde.


      https://lafabrique.fr/carte-blanche
      #Karine_Parrot #livre #migrations #frontières_nationales
      ping @karine4

  • Taire la nationalité des prévenus ?

    Afin d’éviter les amalgames, une majorité du parlement est favorable à interdire à la #police genevoise de communiquer à la presse la nationalité des délinquants présumés.

    La #motion, soutenue par la majorité des partis, a de grandes chances d’être adoptée par le parlement cantonal. Elle vise à modifier la pratique de la police genevoise lorsqu’elle communique avec la presse sur des délits commis à Genève ou sur des interpellations.

    A l’avenir, la nationalité des délinquants présumés pourrait ne plus du tout être mentionnée. L’auteure de la motion, la députée verte Delphine Klopfenstein Broggini, entend ainsi lutter contre les amalgames xénophobes.

    Le texte est aussi soutenu par Ensemble à gauche, le PS et le PDC, et doit encore être voté en séance plénière. « La nationalité n’apporte pas d’informations pertinentes sur la question du délit », a justifié Delphine Klopfenstein Broggini en commission.

    Elle cite une étude, menée par le professeur en criminologie André Kuhn, qui montre que des facteurs comme l’âge, le niveau socio-économique, le sexe ou encore le niveau de formation sont les plus déterminants. « La mention de la nationalité ne fait qu’attiser la haine », poursuit l’élue écologiste. Elle estime que ces données peuvent être instrumentalisées par certains groupes à des fins politiques.
    La pratique actuelle

    La motion s’inspire de la pratique mise en place dans les villes de Zurich et de Berne. Elle prévoit des exceptions « si cette information est pertinente dans une situation spécifique ». Delphine Klopfenstein Broggini précise que la police genevoise serait tenue de taire la nationalité, non seulement dans ses communiqués, mais également si des journalistes questionnent son service de presse. « Il faut avoir un cadre strict. »

    Actuellement, la publication de la nationalité des prévenus dans les communiqués de la police est la norme, suivant les recommandations de la Conférence des commandants des polices cantonales de Suisse. Il mentionne aussi l’année de naissance et le sexe des personnes. « Sur demande, il est possible de confirmer une origine étrangère », précise aussi le Service de presse de la police genevoise.

    Toutefois, ce dernier ne communique de loin pas sur toutes les affaires. Dans son bulletin journalier, il fournit des informations sur les cas « de moindre importance », le plus souvent en rapport avec des vols, des infractions à la loi sur les stupéfiants ou au code de la route.

    La police s’abstient lorsqu’il s’agit de délits plus graves, comme les homicides, ou des affaires qui se déroulent dans la sphère privée ou qui concernent des mineurs. Cette communication partielle n’est pas anodine : dans certains domaines, comme celui du trafic de drogues, la part des infractions répertoriées impliquant des étrangers est plus élevée.
    Une proposition « contre-productive »

    La proposition des Verts ne fait pas l’unanimité au Grand Conseil. En commission, les groupes de l’UDC, du MCG et du PLR s’y sont opposés. Pour le député UDC Marc Fuhrmann, dont le parti est connu pour pointer le lien entre populations étrangères et criminalité, « il s’agit d’une obstruction à la liberté de la presse ».

    Il estime que la population a le droit, au nom de la transparence, de connaître ce type d’informations. « Cette motion veut manipuler le public afin de le détourner de la réalité », écrit le député. Il relève notamment que les prisons suisses sont occupées majoritairement par des détenus étrangers. Un constat qui doit être expliqué en prenant en compte d’autres critères (comme l’âge, le sexe, ou la situation socio-économique), rétorque Delphine Klopfenstein Broggini.

    Pour beaucoup d’opposants, le fait de taire l’information de la nationalité serait contre-productif. Une partie du public pourrait avoir l’impression qu’on lui cache quelque chose, ce qui renforcerait des sentiments xénophobes. « Notre culture du fait divers est à revoir, répond Delphine Klopfenstein Broggini. Si une partie de la population recherche ces informations, c’est aussi que les médias les ont fournies pendant longtemps. C’est pour cette raison que la pratique doit changer et que les mentalités doivent évoluer. »

    https://lecourrier.ch/2019/06/18/taire-la-nationalite-des-prevenus
    #nationalité #presse #criminalité #médias #Genève

    Et Le Courrier met quoi comme image ? Photo d’un homme noir...

  • Immigration Checks Used In Schools To De-Prioritise Children Of Undocumented Migrants

    Children in a line, outside the classroom door with their passport in hand, waiting one by one to be checked and let in. Teachers checking pupils’ passports, one by one, wondering when the right to free education started being determined by nationality and place of birth.

    This is not the start to a dystopian novel. This was the original vision of the Home Secretary in 2015, as revealed in leaked cabinet letters, for teachers to conduct immigration checks in the classroom.

    As part of the #hostile_environment master plan, immigration checks in schools were to be deployed to de-prioritise the children of undocumented migrants for school places.

    As this first plan didn’t gain sufficient consensus, the government folded and opted for a simpler and less ‘in the open’ option: collecting pupils’ nationality and country of birth data via the school census.

    https://rightsinfo.org/immigration-checks-in-schools-deployed-to-de-prioritise-children-of-undo
    #écoles #frontières_mobiles #migrations #enfants #enfance #sans-papiers #contrôles_frontaliers #UK #Angleterre #it_has_begun #nationalité

  • New Iraqi citizenship law stirs controversy
    https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/new-iraqi-citizenship-law-stirs-controversy-1.1552822828380

    Dubai - As soon as the Iraqi parliament passed a bill to amend the Nationality Law last week, many Iraqis have taken to social media to express their anger.

    The new law states that any person who enters the country legally — and resides in it for a year legally — can get the Iraqi passport.

    Iraqis saw it as a new “disaster” for their country.

    Iraq, they said, had already suffered so much from the scourge of war and corruption.

    Some see it as a way to change the demography and population of Iraq.

    Others see that the Iraqi identity, which is already suffering from years of war, is being jeoprodised.

    Most of the comments on social media accuses the government of passing the law because of the Iranian influence.

    Le commentaire est écrit à Dubaï... Mais cet autre (https://www.raialyoum.com/index.php/%d9%87%d9%84-%d9%8a%d8%aa%d8%b3%d8%a7%d9%87%d9%84-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d9%9), en arabe et depuis Amman, va dans le même sens .

    #irak #nationalité #croissant_chiite #iran

  • Acquisitions de nationalité dans l’UE – Les États membres de l’UE ont octroyé la nationalité à plus de 800 000 personnes en 2017 – Les Marocains, les Albanais et les Indiens en ont été les principaux bénéficiaires

    En 2017, quelque 825 000 personnes ont acquis la nationalité d’un État membre de l’Union européenne (UE), un chiffre en baisse par rapport à 2016 (où il s’établissait à 995 000) et à 2015 (841 000). Si, parmi les personnes devenues citoyens de l’un des États membres de l’UE en 2017, 17% étaient auparavant citoyens d’un autre État membre de l’UE, la majorité était des ressortissants de pays tiers ou des apatrides.


    https://migrationsansfrontieres.com/2019/03/17/acquisitions-de-nationalite-dans-lue-les-etats-membres-de-l
    #Europe #citoyenneté #nationalité #naturalisation #statistiques #chiffres #Eurostat

    v. communiqué Eurostat :
    https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/9641781/3-06032019-AP-EN.pdf/2236b272-24b1-4b59-ade4-748361331b18

  • À #Mayotte, près d’un habitant sur deux est de nationalité étrangère - Insee Première - 1737
    https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/3713016

    En 2017, 256 500 personnes vivent à Mayotte. Depuis 2012, la croissance de la population est particulièrement dynamique et s’est renforcée (+ 3,8 % par an en moyenne après + 2,7 % sur la période 2007-2012). Elle est principalement portée par un fort excédent des naissances sur les décès (+ 7 700 personnes par an en moyenne). Avec 5,0 enfants par femme à Mayotte, la fécondité augmente et dépasse toujours largement la moyenne métropolitaine (1,9 enfant par femme).

    L’excédent migratoire, redevenu positif, contribue également à l’augmentation de la population (+ 1 100 personnes par an entre 2012 et 2017). D’un côté, de nombreux adultes et leurs enfants arrivent des Comores. De l’autre, de nombreux jeunes de 15 à 24 ans, natifs de Mayotte, partent vers le reste de la France, essentiellement en métropole.

    Du fait de ces flux importants, et en augmentation, la population de nationalité étrangère progresse fortement : près de la moitié de la population de Mayotte ne possède pas la #nationalité française, mais un tiers des étrangers sont nés à Mayotte. Dans les communes du Nord-Est de Mayotte autour de Mamoudzou, la croissance démographique est particulièrement élevée, avec l’arrivée de nombreux habitants originaires des #Comores. La population de Mayotte reste jeune : la moitié des habitants ont moins de 18 ans.

    Le confort global des #logements a moins progressé qu’entre 2007 et 2012 : quatre ménages sur dix vivent encore à Mayotte dans un logement en tôle ou en végétal, et trois sur dix n’ont pas l’eau courante.

    #démographie

  • #Shamima_Begum: Isis Briton faces move to revoke citizenship

    The Guardian understands the home secretary thinks section 40(2) of the British Nationality Act 1981 gives him the power to strip Begum of her UK citizenship.

    He wrote to her family informing them he had made such an order, believing the fact her parents are of Bangladeshi heritage means she can apply for citizenship of that country – though Begum says she has never visited it.

    This is crucial because, while the law bars him from making a person stateless, it allows him to remove citizenship if he can show Begum has behaved “in a manner which is seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the UK” and he has “reasonable grounds for believing that the person is able, under the law of a country or territory outside the UK, to become a national of such a country or territory”.


    https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/19/isis-briton-shamima-begum-to-have-uk-citizenship-revoked?CMP=Share_Andr
    #citoyenneté #UK #Angleterre #apatridie #révocation #terrorisme #ISIS #EI #Etat_islamique #nationalité #déchéance_de_nationalité

    • What do we know about citizenship stripping?

      The Bureau began investigating the Government’s powers to deprive individuals of their British citizenship two years ago.

      The project has involved countless hours spent in court, deep and detailed use of the freedom of information act and the input of respected academics, lawyers and politicians.

      The Counter-Terrorism Bill was presented to Parliament two weeks ago. New powers to remove passports from terror suspects and temporarily exclude suspected jihadists from the UK have focused attention on the Government’s citizenship stripping powers, which have been part of the government’s counter-terrorism tools for nearly a decade.

      A deprivation order can be made where the home secretary believes that it is ‘not conducive’ to the public good for the individual to remain in the country, or where citizenship is believed to have been obtained fraudulently. The Bureau focuses on cases based on ‘not conducive’ grounds, which are related to national security and suspected terrorist activity.

      Until earlier this year, the Government was only able to remove the citizenship of British nationals where doing so wouldn’t leave them stateless. However, in July an amendment to the British Nationality Act (BNA) came into force and powers to deprive a person of their citizenship were expanded. Foreign-born, naturalised individuals can now be stripped of their UK citizenship on national security grounds even if it renders them stateless, a practice described by a former director of public prosecutions as being “beloved of the world’s worst regimes during the 20th century”.

      So what do we know about how these powers are used?
      The numbers

      53 people have been stripped of their British citizenship since 2002 – this includes both people who were considered to have gained their citizenship fraudulently, as well as those who have lost it for national security reasons.
      48 of these were under the Coalition government.
      Since 2006, 27 people have lost their citizenship on national security grounds; 24 of these were under the current Coalition government.
      In 2013, home secretary Theresa May stripped 20 individuals of their British citizenship – more than in all the preceding years of the Coalition put together.
      The Bureau has identified 18 of the 53 cases, 17 of which were deprived of their citizenship on national security grounds.
      15 of the individuals identified by the Bureau who lost their citizenship on national security grounds were abroad at the time of the deprivation order.
      At least five of those who have lost their nationality were born in the UK.
      The previous Labour government used deprivation orders just five times in four years.
      Hilal Al-Jedda was the first individual whose deprivation of citizenship case made it to the Supreme Court. The home secretary lost her appeal as the Supreme Court justices unanimously ruled her deprivation order against Al-Jedda had made him illegally stateless. Instead of returning his passport, just three weeks later the home secretary issued a second deprivation order against him.
      This was one of two deprivation of citizenship cases to have made it to the Supreme Court, Britain’s uppermost court, to date.
      In November 2014 deprivation of citizenship case number two reached the Supreme Court, with the appellant, Minh Pham, also arguing that the deprivation order against him made him unlawfully stateless.
      Two of those stripped of their British citizenship by Theresa May in 2010, London-born Mohamed Sakr and his childhood friend Bilal al Berjawi, were later killed by US drone strikes in Somalia.
      One of the individuals identified by the Bureau, Mahdi Hashi, was the subject of rendition to the US, where he was held in secret for over a month and now faces terror charges.
      Only one individual, Iraqi-born Hilal al-Jedda, is currently known to have been stripped of his British citizenship twice.
      Number of Bureau Q&As on deprivation of citizenship: one.

      https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2014-12-10/what-do-we-know-about-citizenship-stripping
      #statistiques #chiffres

    • ‘My British citizenship was everything to me. Now I am nobody’ – A former British citizen speaks out

      When a British man took a holiday to visit relatives in Pakistan in January 2012 he had every reason to look forward to returning home. He worked full time at the mobile phone shop beneath his flat in southeast London, he had a busy social life and preparations for his family’s visit to the UK were in full flow.

      Two years later, the man, who cannot be named for legal reasons, is stranded in Pakistan, and claims he is under threat from the Taliban and unable to find work to support his wife and three children.

      He is one of 27 British nationals since 2006 who have had their citizenship removed under secretive government orders on the grounds that their presence in the UK is ‘not conducive to the public good’. He is the first to speak publicly about his ordeal.

      ‘My British citizenship was everything to me. I could travel around the world freely,’ he told the Bureau. ‘That was my identity but now I am nobody.’

      Under current legislation, the Home Secretary, Theresa May, has the power to strip dual nationals of their British citizenship if she deems their presence in the UK ‘not conducive to the public good’, or if their nationality was gained on fraudulent grounds. May recently won a Commons vote paving the way to allow her to strip the citizenship of foreign-born or naturalised UK nationals even if it rendered them stateless. Amendments to the Immigration Bill – including the controversial Article 60 concerning statelessness – are being tabled this week in the House of Lords.

      A Bureau investigation in December 2013 revealed 20 British nationals were stripped of their citizenship last year – more than in all previous years under the Coalition combined. Twelve of these were later revealed to have been cases where an individual had gained citizenship by fraud; the remaining eight are on ‘conducive’ grounds.

      Since 2006 when the current laws entered force, 27 orders have been made on ‘conducive’ grounds, issued in practice against individuals suspected of involvement in extremist activities. The Home Secretary often makes her decision when the individual concerned is outside the UK, and, in at least one case, deliberately waited for a British national to go on holiday before revoking his citizenship.

      The only legal recourse to these decisions, which are taken without judicial approval, is for the individual affected to submit a formal appeal to the Special Immigration and Asylum Committee (Siac), where evidence can be heard in secret, within 28 days of the order being given. These appeals can take years to conclude, leaving individuals – the vast majority of whom have never been charged with an offence – stranded abroad.

      The process has been compared to ‘medieval exile’ by leading human rights lawyer Gareth Peirce.

      The man, who is referred to in court documents as E2, was born in Afghanistan and still holds Afghan citizenship. He claimed asylum in Britain in 1999 after fleeing the Taliban regime in Kabul, and was granted indefinite leave to remain. In 2009 he became a British citizen.

      While his immediate family remained in Pakistan, E2 came to London, where he worked and integrated in the local community. Although this interview was conducted in his native Pashto, E2 can speak some English.

      ‘I worked and I learned English,’ he says. ‘Even now I see myself as a British. If anyone asks me, I tell them that I am British.’

      But, as of March 28 2012, E2 is no longer a British citizen. After E2 boarded a flight to Kabul in January 2012 to visit relatives in Afghanistan and his wife and children in Pakistan, a letter containing May’s signature was sent to his southeast London address from the UK Border Agency, stating he had been deprived of his British nationality. In evidence that remains secret even from him, E2 was accused of involvement in ‘Islamist extremism’ and deemed a national security threat. He denies the allegation and says he has never participated in extremist activity.

      In the letter the Home Secretary wrote: ‘My decision has been taken in part reliance on information which, in my opinion should not be made public in the interest of national security and because disclosure would be contrary to the public interest.’

      E2 says he had no way of knowing his citizenship had been removed and that the first he heard of the decision was when he was met by a British embassy official at Dubai airport on May 25 2012, when he was on his way back to the UK and well after his appeal window shut.

      E2’s lawyer appealed anyway, and submitted to Siac that: ‘Save for written correspondence to the Appellant’s last known address in the UK expressly stating that he has 28 days to appeal, i.e. acknowledging that he was not in the UK, no steps were taken to contact the Appellant by email, telephone or in person until an official from the British Embassy met him at Dubai airport and took his passport from him.’

      The submission noted that ‘it is clear from this [decision] that the [Home Secretary] knew that the Appellant [E2] is out of the country as the deadline referred to is 28 days.’

      The Home Office disputed that E2 was unaware of the order against him, and a judge ruled that he was satisfied ‘on the balance of probabilities’ that E2 did know about the removal of his citizenship. ‘[W]e do not believe his statement,’ the judge added.

      His British passport was confiscated and, after spending 18 hours in an airport cell, E2 was made to board a flight back to Kabul. He has remained in Afghanistan and Pakistan ever since. It is from Pakistan that he agreed to speak to the Bureau last month.

      Daniel Carey, who is representing E2 in a fresh appeal to Siac, says: ‘The practice of waiting until a citizen leaves the UK before depriving them of citizenship, and then opposing them when they appeal out of time, is an intentional attack on citizens’ due process rights.

      ‘By bending an unfair system to its will the government is getting worryingly close to a system of citizenship by executive fiat.’

      While rules governing hearings at Siac mean some evidence against E2 cannot be disclosed on grounds of national security, the Bureau has been able to corroborate key aspects of E2’s version of events, including his best guess as to why his citizenship was stripped. His story revolves around an incident that occurred thousands of miles away from his London home and several years before he saw it for the last time.

      In November 2008, Afghan national Zia ul-Haq Ahadi was kidnapped as he left the home of his infirmed mother in Peshawar, Pakistan. The event might have gone unnoticed were he not the brother of Afghanistan’s then finance minister and former presidential hopeful Anwar ul-Haq Ahadi. Anwar intervened, and after 13 months of tortuous negotiations with the kidnappers, a ransom was paid and Zia was released. E2 claims to have been the man who drove a key negotiator to Zia’s kidnappers.

      While the Bureau has not yet been able to confirm whether E2 had played the role he claimed in the release, a source with detailed knowledge of the kidnapping told the Bureau he was ‘willing to give [E2] some benefit of the doubt because there are elements of truth [in his version of events].’

      The source confirmed a man matching E2’s description was involved in the negotiations.

      ‘We didn’t know officially who the group was, but they were the kidnappers. I didn’t know whether they were with the Pakistani or Afghan Taliban,’ E2 says. ‘After releasing the abducted person I came back to London.’

      E2 guesses – since not even his lawyers have seen specific evidence against him – that it was this activity that brought him to the attention of British intelligence services. After this point, he was repeatedly stopped as he travelled to and from London and Afghanistan and Pakistan to visit relatives four times between the end of 2009 and the beginning of 2012.

      ‘MI5 questioned me for three or four hours each time I came to London at Heathrow airport,’ he says. ‘They said people like me [Pashtun Afghans] go to Waziristan and from there you start fighting with British and US soldiers.

      ‘The very last time [I was questioned] was years after the [kidnapping]. I was asked to a Metropolitan Police station in London. They showed me pictures of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar [former Afghan prime minister and militant with links to the Pakistani Taliban (TTP)] along with other leaders and Taliban commanders. They said: ‘You know these guys.’

      He claims he was shown a photo of his wife – a highly intrusive action in conservative Pashtun culture – as well as one of someone he was told was Sirajuddin Haqqani, commander of the Haqqani Network, one of the most lethal TTP-allied groups.

      ‘They said I met him, that I was talking to him and I have connections with him. I said that’s wrong. I told [my interrogator] that you can call [Anwar al-Ahady] and he will explain that he sent me to Waziristan and that I found and released his brother,’ E2 says.

      ‘I don’t know Sirajuddin Haqqani and I didn’t meet him.’

      The Haqqani Network, which operates in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas and across the border in Afghanistan, was designated as a terrorist organisation by the United States in September 2012. It has claimed responsibility for a score of attacks against Afghan, Pakistani and NATO security forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The UN accuses Sirajuddin Haqqani of being ‘actively involved in the planning and execution of attacks targeting International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), Afghan officials and civilians.’

      E2 says he has no idea whether Haqqani was involved in Zia’s kidnapping, but he believes the security services may have started investigating him when he met the imam of a mosque he visited in North Waziristan.

      ‘The imam had lunch with us and he was with me while I was waiting for my father-in-law. I didn’t take his number but I gave him mine. That imam often called me on my shop’s BT telephone line [in London]. These calls put me in trouble,’ he says.

      If E2’s version of events is accurate, it would mean he gained his British citizenship while he was negotiating Zia’s release. He lost it less than three years later.

      The Home Office offered a boilerplate response to the Bureau’s questions: ‘The Home Secretary will remove British citizenship from individuals where she feels it is conducive to the public good to do so.’

      When challenged specifically on allegations made by E2, the spokesman said the Home Office does not comment on individual cases.

      E2 says he now lives in fear for his safety in Pakistan. Since word has spread that he lost his UK nationality, locals assume he is guilty, which he says puts him at risk of attack from the Pakistani security forces. In addition, he says his family has received threats from the Taliban for his interaction with MI5.

      ‘People back in Afghanistan know that my British passport was revoked because I was accused of working with the Taliban. I can’t visit my relatives and I am an easy target to others,’ he said. ‘Without the British passport here, whether [by] the government or Taliban, we can be executed easily.’

      E2 is not alone in fearing for his life after being exiled from Britain. Two British nationals stripped of their citizenship in 2010 were killed a year later by a US drone strike in Somalia. A third Briton, Mahdi Hashi, disappeared from east Africa after having his citizenship revoked in June 2012 only to appear in a US court after being rendered from Djibouti.

      E2 says if the government was so certain of his involvement in extremism they should allow him to stand trial in a criminal court.

      ‘When somebody’s citizenship is revoked if he is criminal he should be put in jail, otherwise he should be free and should have his passport returned,’ he says.

      ‘My message [to Theresa May] is that my citizenship was revoked illegally. It’s wrong that only by sending a letter that your citizenship is revoked. What kind of democracy is it that?’

      https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2014-03-17/my-british-citizenship-was-everything-to-me-now-i-am-nobody-a

  • Data Doubles: Wie Regierungen und Firmen mit unseren digitalen Doppelgängern umgehen
    https://berlinergazette.de/data-doubles-wie-regierungen-und-firmen-mit-unseren-digitalen-doppel

    Algorithmische Staatsbürgerschaft und digitale Staatenlosigkeit: Zum Projekt “Citizen Ex”
    https://berlinergazette.de/algorithmische-staatsbuergerschaft-und-digitale-staatenlosigkeit

    Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht ist eigenartig und komplex, mit einer Reihe von Ausnahmen und Auslassungen, die die gemeinhin gültige Ansicht, dass eine Staatsbürgerschaft im Globalen Norden etwas Stabiles und Absolutes ist, untergräbt. So ist zum Beispiel im Vereinten Königreich die Staatsbürgerschaft erst seit dem frühen 20. Jahrhundert juristisch definiert, und die Geschichte ihrer Definition ist in erster Linie eine des Ausschlusses und der Aberkennung. Denn zunächst trachtete der britische Staat danach, seine Grenzen zu stärken. Danach wurden die früheren (und nun nicht mehr britischen) Untertanen vom Festland vertrieben. Und schließlich “entledigte” man sich jener Menschen, deren scheinbar abscheuliches Verhalten dazu führte, ihnen rechtsstaatliche Verfahren zu versagen. Wie Hannah Arendt in einem berühmt gewordenen Satz sagte: Staatsbürgerschaft sei “das Recht, Rechte zu haben”. Eine Garantie, auf der alle anderen Schutzmaßnahmen beruhen. Daher lohnt es sich, das Staatsbürgerschaftsrecht und seine Anwendungen genauer zu betrachten – als Lackmutest für demokratische Freiheiten.

    Neue Formen der Staatsbürgerschaft im Netz

    Heute gerät das Konzept der Staatsbürgerschaft zunehmend unter Druck. Einer der Orte, an denen man das besonders gut beobachten kann, ist das Internet. Im Netz mit seinen scheinbar grenzenlosen Weiten, fließen Information und Daten fast ohne Einschränkungen über die Grenzen hinweg, von Staat zu Staat. Als Staatsbürger werden unsere Rechte und Absicherungen immer weniger unseren physischen Körpern zugeordnet, sondern unseren digitalen Profilen. Also jenen Datensätzen, die unsere Stellvertreter geworden sind hinsichtlich unserer Beziehungen zu Staaten, Banken und Firmen. Somit entstehen an transnationalen, digitalen Knotenpunkten neue Formen der Staatsbürgerschaft.

    “Ius algoritmi” ist ein Begriff, den John Cheney-Lippold prägte, um damit eine neue, vom Überwachungsstaat hervorgebrachte, Staatsbürgerschaft zu beschreiben.

    Digitale Schnitte: Warum und auf welche Art wir uns von unseren Data-Doubles trennen sollten
    https://berlinergazette.de/warum-wir-uns-von-unseren-data-doubles-trennen-sollten

    Digitale Schnitte können Data Doubles und Datenschatten von verkörperten Subjekten abtrennen oder Schnitte oder Teilungen innerhalb von Data Doubles vollziehen und sie in Datenflüsse verwandeln. Mit dem Konzept der digitalen Schnitte lassen sich sowohl Phänomene beschreiben, in denen diese Aufspaltungen willentlich und wissentlich vonstatten gehen, als auch solche wie die Einspeisung biometrischer Information in Datenbanken der Migrationskontrolle, bei denen von Freiwilligkeit keine Rede sein kann.

    Digitale Schnitte können von menschlichen und nicht-menschlichen AkteurInnen (wie künstlichen Intelligenzen) durchgeführt werden. Mithilfe der Schnitte können Fleisch-Technologie-Informations-Amalgame verschiedenen rechtlichen, technologischen oder biopolitischen Regimen untergeordnet und in deren jeweiligen Logiken weiterverarbeitet werden. Neben landläufigen Akzentuierungen von Hybridität oder Amalgamierung gilt es ebenso zu untersuchen, wo und mit welchen Konsequenzen diese Kopplungen wieder aufgebrochen werden: In manchen Fällen, wie z. B. den quer durch Europa reisenden biometrischen Daten in Hotspots festsitzender MigrantInnen, bleibt mit dem Schnitt eine Referenz auf ein konkretes Individuum erhalten, in anderen, wenn z.B. Potenzialitäten verhandelt werden, ist die Loslösung von konkreten Subjekten programmatisch.

    Antiterrorbekämpfung mittels „risk alerts“ kann hierfür als Beispiel gelten: In deren Rahmen können spezifische Nachnamen, die Religionszugehörigkeit, Sprachkenntnisse oder Reiserouten etc. zu Risikopotenzialen werden. Es sind daher nicht konkrete Individuen, die im Namen von Sicherheit fokussiert werden, sondern fragmentierte Elemente eines angeblichen Risikos. Das potenziell gefährliche, dividuierte Subjekt wird also aus einem Amalgam von Teilelementen anderer Subjekte und Objekte zusammengesetzt, wie Louise Amoore betont.

    In einigen Situationen erweisen sich die Schnittstellen zwischen verkörpertem Subjekt und Data Double gleichzeitig auch als Schnitt-Stelle, als Instanz, die Schnitte durchführt, in anderen – z. B. bei der geheimdienstlichen Überwachung oder der Social-Network-Analyse der Drohnenkriege – haben Interfaces wie soziale Medien selbst wenig mit den Schnitten zu tun. Teilweise liegen agentische Schnitte in der Eigenlogik der jeweiligen Technologien begründet, z. B. entstehen die von Bridle beschriebenen algorithmischen StaatsbürgerInnenschaften aus der Logik des Routings heraus. Ihre Auswirkungen reichen von existenzbedrohenden Einschnitten in die Gestaltbarkeit des einzelnen Lebens bis hin zur banalen Film- oder Produktempfehlung auf Netflix oder Amazon.

    #politique #internet #état #nationalité

  • Cigarettes et bas nylon

    Fin 1944, en Normandie, Jeannette, Marie-Thérèse et Mireille, trois jeunes Françaises mariées à des soldats américains, arrivent dans un « camp cigarettes ». Là, elles se voient offrir cigarettes et bas nylon avant de recevoir une formation pour devenir de bonnes épouses américaines. Dans ce cantonnement qui porte le nom d’un manufacturier de tabac américain, ces dernières se lient d’amitié...


    https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cigarettes_et_bas_nylon

    #film #conjointes_étrangères #USA #histoire #Etats-Unis #femmes #épouses #France #mariage #nationalité #citoyenneté #épouses_françaises #migrations #exil #guerre #armée

  • #Les_Mohamed

    #Jérôme_Ruillier nous fait (re)découvrir l’#histoire de l’#immigration maghrébine à travers des témoignages poignants (en trois parties : les pères, les mères, les enfants), qui rendent compte de la quête d’identité et des effets au quotidien du racisme.

    – Comme il y a un après Maus d’Art Spiegelman qui a révolutionné les consciences, il y aura désormais un après Les Mohamed
    – Une réflexion sur la France d’aujourd’hui, ses évolutions, son métissage, ses peurs, ses nouvelles revendications d’égalité et de justice sociale
    – Un regard d’auteur courageux dans lequel Ruillier n’hésite pas à se mettre en scène avec ses propres doutes, ses interrogations


    http://editions-sarbacane.com/les-mohamed
    #BD #livre #migrations #Algérie #guerre_d'Algérie #France #accords_d'Evian #travailleurs_immigrés #enracinement #contingents #OS #ouvriers_spécialisés #boucs_émissaires #colonialisme #colonialisme #regroupement_familial #solitude #Renault #industrie_automobile #île_Seguin #chaîne_de_montage #syndicat #alphabétisation #analphabétisme #indifférence #retraite #aide_au_retour #nationalité #citoyenneté #second@s #Algérie #Maroc #Douai #Houillère #extractivisme #charbon #mines #Sagenorpa #logement #baraquements #baraques #travail #accidents_de_travail #souffrance #solitude #Givors #guerre_d'Algérie #loi_Stoléru #identité #ZUP #foyer #foyer_de_célibataires #Montfermeil #violence_domestique #sexualité #liberté #arabophobie #discriminations #racisme #xénophobie #mariage_forcé #alphabétisation #cours_d'alphabétisation #cité_de_transit #barbelé #frontières_urbaines #frontières_intra-urbaines #brigade_spéciale #HLM #Nanterre #bidonville #voile #aide_au_retour #17_octobre #police #violences_policières #marche_des_beurs #résistance

  • Israël et ses expatriés : un rapport difficile
    22 septembre 2018 Par La rédaction de Mediapart
    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/220918/israel-et-ses-expatries-un-rapport-difficile?onglet=full

    Plus de 15 000 Israéliens ont quitté l’État hébreu en 2017. C’est près de 6 300 de plus que d’Israéliens revenant dans le pays. Ce déficit tend certes à s’affaiblir, mais dans un pays qui se veut le refuge des Juifs du monde entier, ces expatriés soulèvent bien des questions en Israël. Le quotidien suisse Neue Zürcher Zeitung publie une enquête sur ce phénomène. Les raisons de partir sont nombreuses : elles peuvent être économiques, liées à la formation ou plus politiques, par rejet de la politique gouvernementale ou par désespoir de voir un jour la paix régner dans la région.

    Beaucoup en Israël estiment que ces départs nuisent à l’image d’un pays qui se veut performant sur le plan économique et à la pointe de la technologie. D’autres critiquent une forme de trahison vis-à-vis du seul État juif, d’autres encore redoutent la fuite des cerveaux. Mais les réactions de la société israélienne face aux expatriés sont complexes et paradoxales. Ainsi, la droite souhaitait accorder le droit de vote aux Israéliens de l’étranger sur leur lieu de résidence, pensant que ces derniers soutiendraient plutôt la politique de Benjamin Netanyahou. La gauche s’y opposait, estimant qu’il était injuste de donner le droit de vote à ceux qui ne subissent pas directement cette politique. Puis, la droite a fait marche arrière devant la crainte de voir les Juifs de gauche étasuniens, par exemple, faire un aliya par correspondance en demandant un passeport sans jamais résider en Israël, et en votant… à gauche.

    En lire plus dans la NZZ : https://www.nzz.ch/international/der-kampf-um-die-abgestiegenen-seelen-ld.1422166

    • nzz.ch, siehe oben

      [...]

      (Die) Bemerkungen lösten in Israel eine riesige Debatte aus. Und starker Tobak ist es fürwahr – auch hippe Israeli in Berlin werden nicht gerne pauschal beschuldigt, ihr Land «wegzuwerfen». Lapid wurde heftig angegriffen, aber in den sozialen Netzwerken ergriffen auch viele Partei für ihn und warfen den Expats Fahnenflucht, mangelnden Patriotismus und Schlimmeres vor. Die Linke schlug zurück und diagnostizierte einen andauernden Exodus, der Ausdruck von Verdruss und Verzweiflung über die dominierende Politik der Rechten sei. Joseph Chamie und Barry Mirkin, zwei amerikanische Wissenschafter, schrieben 2011 in der Zeitschrift «Foreign Policy» einen Artikel mit dem Titel «The Million Missing Israelis» und behaupteten, bis zu eine Million Israeli lebten im Ausland. Das seien rund 13 Prozent, ein für OECD-Länder hoher Wert. 1980 hätten lediglich 270 000 Israeli im Ausland gelebt.

      [...]

      ... das Wesentliche, die Begründung der Auswanderung. Für ... war es nicht nur das, was weglockte, die angeblich bessere Bildung im Ausland, die bessere Lebensqualität, das Einkommen und die tollen Berufschancen. Nein, sie fanden auch Faktoren, die die Menschen wegtrieben. Die Politik der Regierung. Der offene Rassismus in breiten Volksschichten. Die fehlenden Friedensaussichten. Die allgemeine Niedergeschlagenheit. «The question is not why we left, but why it took us so long to do so.» Und ahnungsvoll wurde festgestellt, dass viele Expats bereits Doppelbürger waren oder es werden wollten. Rund 100 000 Israeli hätten bereits den deutschen Pass, in den USA gebe es denselben Trend. Die Israeli im Ausland seien tendenziell gescheiter, gebildeter, wohlhabender, säkularer als der Durchschnitt, hiess es weiter. Angesichts dieses Exodus werde die Lage in Israel langsam schwierig. Die Emigration stärke die Ultraorthodoxen und die Araber. Damit gefährde sie das zionistische Projekt.

      [...]

    • The million missing Israelis | Foreign Policy 2011

      https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/07/05/the-million-missing-israelis

      [...]

      At the lower end is the official estimate of 750,000 Israeli emigrants — 10 percent of the population — issued by the Israeli Ministry of Immigrant Absorption, which is about the same as that for Mexico, Morocco, and Sri Lanka. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government places the current number of Israeli citizens living abroad in the range of 800,000 to 1 million, representing up to 13 percent of the population, which is relatively high among OECD countries. Consistent with this latter figure is the estimated 1 million Israelis in the Diaspora reported at the first-ever global conference of Israelis living abroad, held in this January.

      Current estimates of Israelis living abroad are substantially higher than those for the past. During Israel’s first decade, some 100,000 Jews are believed to have emigrated from Israel. By 1980, Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics estimated some 270,000 Israelis living abroad for more than a year, or 7 percent of the population. Several decades later, the number of Israeli emigrants had swelled to about 550,000 — or almost double the proportion at the end of the 1950s.

      Of the Israelis currently residing abroad, roughly 60 percent are believed to have settled in North America, a quarter in Europe, and 15 percent distributed across the rest of the world. It is estimated that about 45 percent of the adult Israeli expatriates have completed at least a university degree, in contrast to 22 percent of the Israeli population. The Israeli emigrants are deemed to be disproportionately secular, liberal, and cosmopolitan. Furthermore, the emigrants are generally younger than the immigrants to Israel, especially those from the former Soviet Union, hastening the aging of Israel’s population.

      The often-cited reasons for Israeli emigration center on seeking better living and financial conditions, employment and professional opportunities, and higher education, as well as pessimism regarding prospects for peace. Consistent with these motives, one of the most frequently given explanations for leaving Israel is: “The question is not why we left, but why it took us so long to do so.” And recent opinion polls find that almost half of Israeli youth would prefer to live somewhere else if they had the chance. Again, the most often-cited reason to emigrate is because the situation in Israel is viewed as “not good.”

      Another important factor contributing to the outflow of Jewish Israelis is previous emigration experience. As 40 percent of Jewish Israelis are foreign-born, emigration is nothing new for many in the country. Moreover, as Israeli emigrants cannot yet vote from abroad, they are likely to feel marginalized from mainstream Israeli society, further contributing to their decision to remain abroad as well as attracting others to do the same. Whether the Netanyahu government’s effort in the Knesset to approve a bill granting voting rights to Israelis living abroad will slow the trend is uncertain.

      Adding to emigration pressures, many Israelis have already taken preliminary steps to eventually leaving. One survey found close to 60 percent of Israelis had approached or were intending to approach a foreign embassy to ask for citizenship and a passport. An estimated 100,000 Israelis have German passports, while more are applying for passports based on their German ancestry. And a large number of Israelis have dual nationality, including an estimated 500,000 Israelis holding U.S. passports (with close to a quarter-million pending applications).

      [...]

  • Le projet de passeport autrichien pour ses germanophones fâche l’Italie Belga - 7 Septembre 2018 - RTBF
    https://www.rtbf.be/info/monde/detail_le-projet-de-passeport-autrichien-pour-ses-germanophones-fache-l-italie?

    Le ministère italien des Affaires étrangères a dénoncé vendredi soir la poursuite du projet de Vienne d’offrir un passeport autrichien aux habitants germanophones de la province de Bolzano, dans le nord-est de la péninsule.

    Le ministère a annoncé avoir appris l’existence à Vienne d’une commission gouvernementale chargée de préparer un projet de loi pour sur l’instauration de cette double nationalité.

    « Cette initiative est inopportune en raison de sa portée potentiellement perturbatrice », a insisté le ministère.



    « Il est surtout singulier que le gouvernement assurant la présidence tournante de l’Union européenne, plutôt que de se concentrer sur des actions qui unissent et favorisent la concorde réciproque entre les pays, cultive des projets de loi susceptibles de fomenter la discorde », a-t-il ajouté.

    « Une telle initiative est de plus vraiment curieuse si l’on considère que pour unir les citoyens des différents pays membres de l’UE, il existe déjà la citoyenneté européenne, comme le stipulent les passeports délivrés par chaque Etat » membre, a poursuivi le ministère.

    Province autonome
    La province de #Bolzano, une région montagneuse appelée Alto Adige (Haut-Adige) en italien et Südtirol en allemand, a été principalement autrichienne pendant des siècles, avant d’être intégrée après la Première guerre mondiale à l’Italie, où elle bénéficie d’un régime d’autonomie particulier.

    Au dernier recensement en 2011, 70% de ses habitants s’y sont déclarés germanophones, 26% italophones et 4% ladinophones, une langue rare locale d’origine romane. Le programme du gouvernement autrichien prévoit de proposer un passeport aux germanophones et aux ladinophones.

    Lors de l’annonce du projet fin 2017, les responsables de la province autonome de Bolzano s’étaient réjouis de cette opportunité tout en réaffirmant leur ancrage européen, tandis que leurs voisins également germanophones du Trentin avaient regretté de ne pas figurer dans les plans de Vienne.

    #nationalité #citoyenneté #identité #Sudètes #germanophones #frontières #minorités #nationalisme #UE #union_européenne #Autriche #Italie #passeport #patrie

  • Lessons from Tanzania’s Historic Bid to Turn Refugees to Citizens

    Tanzania was lauded for offering citizenship to 200,000 Burundians, the largest-ever mass naturalization of refugees. But a political stalemate emerged between humanitarians and the government, leaving refugees stuck in the middle, explains researcher Amelia Kuch.

    During Europe’s so-called migrant crisis of 2015, the Tanzanian government gave over 200,000 Burundian refugees a choice between repatriation – returning to Burundi – and naturalization – obtaining Tanzanian citizenship.

    Given the choice, 79 percent of the refugees – 171,600 people – opted for Tanzanian citizenship. It is understood to be the first time in history any state has naturalized such a large group of refugees under the protection of the U.N. refugee agency (UNHCR) in a single move.

    This group of refugees had fled Burundi following ethnic violence and killings in 1972 and now live in three rural settlements in Tanzania: Katumba, Mishamo and Ulyankulu. Since the 1970s, these settlements had transformed into towns: People made improvements to their homes, electricity poles were laid out and the local markets began to expand.

    Research has shown that access to citizenship is an important means of resolving long-term displacement. Yet in most countries, granting citizenship to refugees is still politically unthinkable.

    Tanzania has long been held up as a safe haven for refugees in the region, giving shelter to some 315,000 mainly Burundian and Congolese refugees. The naturalization of Burundian refugees was hailed as a model for progressive solutions to displacement. Yet it has led to a political stalemate between humanitarian organizations and the government, with the “refugees-turned-citizens” stuck in the middle.

    Last month, the Tanzanian government halted the naturalization of another group of more recently arrived Burundian refugees and has since pulled out of the U.N.’s Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, citing lack of international funding.

    During my research in the former Burundian refugee camps in Western Tanzania since 2014, I have spoken with many former refugees about the naturalization process, as well as NGO employees and government officials.

    The difficulties in Tanzania are important to understanding the challenges of mass naturalization. It is not easy to turn a camp of refugees into a settlement of citizens. They also demonstrate how important it is for refugees to be able to hold both governments and humanitarian organizations accountable when things go wrong.
    A Progressive Solution is Born

    Negotiations around Tanzania’s naturalization policy began in 2007. They resulted in the Tanzania Comprehensive Solution Strategy (TANCOSS), which was adopted that year by the governments of Tanzania and Burundi in partnership with UNHCR. The agreement had three pillars: repatriation to Burundi, granting citizenship to those who opted to pursue naturalization and relocation of naturalized refugees from the settlements to other regions of Tanzania.

    Major investments were promised to facilitate the process. Some $103 million was earmarked for relocation and integration of naturalized refugees in the 2011-15 United Nations Development Assistant Plan (UNDAP).

    Eventually, the resettlement pillar was abandoned because of logistical problems and local resistance to resettling refugees. As a result, the new citizens were permitted to remain in the areas of the settlements in which they had lived for the past four decades. They can now vote in national elections and join political parties.

    “Obtaining citizenship and being allowed to stay here brought peace into my heart. Before I lived in fear,” said one former refugee named Daniel.
    Left in Limbo

    Yet the initial TANCOSS agreement did not include any detailed plans for the refugee settlements after the naturalization of their residents. As a consequence, today the area remains in a governance limbo.

    Every refugee camp had a settlement officer who represented the Ministry of Home Affairs and was responsible for governing the area. Settlement officers remain in power in all three settlements, and they continue to act as the highest authority and arbiters of conflicts.

    “Naturalization certificates are important because they allow us to move, but opening of this space is crucial and still needs to happen,” said one church leader in Ulyankulu, referring to the full integration of the settlements. “As long as we still have a settlement officer and a closed space, the process is not complete.”

    It remains unclear when and how a transition to local governance will take place and what rights to the land the new citizens have. The Tanzania Strategy for Local Integration Program for the New Citizens (TANSPLI), drafted in 2016, stipulates the creation of a master land use plan for the settlements and the surrounding areas, followed by the registration of villages in each settlement and provision of documentation for land rights.

    However, the timeline for implementation is unclear. It “hinges on the availability of funding for the planned development projects,” according to Suleiman Mziray, who is assistant director of refugee services at Ministry of Home Affairs.

    “People here don’t have ownership, you can be taken off your land at any time,” said one elderly man from Kaswa village in Ulyankulu settlement. “It’s like a marriage with no certificate.”
    Lack of Accountability

    Some of these challenges have led to a political stalemate between humanitarian organizations and the government, with each claiming the other has not kept its promises. Meanwhile, residents of the settlements suffer the consequences, as they wait for citizenship documents and investment in infrastructure like access to clean water.

    Due to major delays in the distribution of citizenship certificates by the government, international funding for the promised development projects was redirected to other emergencies. Some of the aid was initially meant for resettlement, so once the refugees were allowed to stay in the former camps, funds were reallocated. Now that they are no longer refugees but citizens, they fall into a responsibility gap. “We have done our part,” a UNHCR official told me on condition of anonymity.

    On the other side is the Tanzanian government: frustrated and disillusioned. They say they were promised that major investments will follow the distribution of citizenship but they never arrived. “We kept our part of the deal and distributed citizenship. But none of the promises materialized,” said an official at the Ministry of Home Affairs.

    The government says it does not intend to invest in the settlements for now, as they are still hoping that international funding might come through eventually.

    Earlier agreements left it ambiguous who would be responsible for implementing the administrative, developmental and social programs that were designed to turn former refugee settlements into properly integrated towns and villages. Without accountability mechanisms, it is hard for former refugees to hold humanitarian organizations or the government to their initial promises.
    Three Lessons from Tanzania

    Clearly, the design and implementation of the naturalization policy was far from perfect. The experience of Tanzania offers a few important lessons.

    First, if similar mass naturalization policies are to be implemented elsewhere, it is key that they are drafted as binding documents, where the parties dedicated to the process (both national governments and international organizations) can be held accountable if they do not deliver on the promises and commitments made within an agreed timeline.

    Second, such policies should be more carefully drafted, incorporating provisions on post-naturalization arrangements regarding local governance and land ownership.

    Finally, despite the pitfalls and unforeseen challenges, my interviews with former refugees shows that naturalization is very important to them. They are acutely aware that citizenship is not a panacea, but firmly maintain that access to legal status provides them with a sense of security and the right to remain in the country, allaying fears of forced repatriation and deportation.

    https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/community/2018/02/22/lessons-from-tanzanias-historic-bid-to-turn-refugees-to-citizens?platfor
    #naturalisation #citoyenneté #nationalité #modèle_tanzanien #Tanzanie #asile #migrations #réfugiés #réfugiés_burundais

    v. aussi le #modèle_ougandais qui donne un lopin de terre aux réfugiés

    • Un bon article de #Matteo_Villa qui résume ces questions, paru en septembre 2018 :

      Outsourcing European Border Control : Recent Trends in Departures, Deaths and Search and Rescue Activities in the Central Mediterranean

      In our previous blog post ‘Border Deaths in the Mediterranean: what we can learn from the latest data?’ on Border Criminologies (March 2017) we discussed the existing data sources on Mediterranean Sea migration and provided an analysis of key patterns and trends. We found that Search and Rescue (SAR) has little or no effect on the number of arrivals, and it is rather the absence of SAR that leads to more deaths. These results, which are in line with other research, were covered by various European media outlets and also resulted in a peer reviewed publication in Sociology (also available as a free preprint).

      These findings covered the period until December 2016. Since then, however, the context of European border policy has changed considerably:

      Through a mix of political pressure, financial incentives and military assistance, the EU has tried to induce transit countries in the Sahel to close their borders to Europe-bound migrants. According to European parliament president Tajani, this resulted in a 95% drop in crossings through Niger, a key transition point for migrants on the way to Libya, although it cannot be excluded that migrants are taking different, more dangerous routes in order to reach Northern African countries (either via Niger or through Algeria).
      From the beginning of 2017 onwards, the Italian government backed by the EU has increasingly cooperated with Libyan authorities to block depatures in exchange for financial and logistical support. The UN-backed government in Libya in turn, has allegedly forged deals with a number of militias.
      Increased European support for the Libyan Coast Guard (LCG), resulting in an increase in interceptions and the declaration of a Libyan SAR zone.
      Increasing legal and political attacks on NGOs engaged in SAR have culminated in Italy’s decision to declare its ports to be “closed” to NGO vessels and (temporarily) to EU rescue ships in June 2018.

      Each of these developments can be seen as part of a broader strategy to close the European borders by externalizing border control to third countries, a practice that was tried earlier with Turkey, and to relax commitments enshrined in international law, such as search and rescue at sea and non refoulement.

      In view of these recent developments, we document estimated trends in arrivals, deaths, mortality rates and rescue activities covering the most recent period, between January 2016 and July 2018. In doing so, we strongly rely on detailed statistical analyses conducted by the Italian research institute ISPI. Our analyses are based on publicly available data from the IOM and the UNHCR for arrivals and interceptions, and IOM’s Missing Migrants Project for deaths. It is important to note that recorded deaths are a lower bound estimate of the actual death toll, because some deaths are likely to remain unreported. We provide an extensive discussion of data sources, data quality and challenges for their interpretation in our academic article on the issue. Since most of the above developments relate to the situation in Libya, we focus on migrants departing from that country. Libya is also the only Northern African country where interceptions at sea by the Coast Guard are independently monitored by both IOM and UNHCR personnel at disembarkation points.

      Although each of these individual developments have been reported elsewhere, together they paint a picture of Europe’s resolve to close its external borders and deter irregular migration, regardless of the (human) cost.

      Trend #1: A sharp drop in departures

      Figure 1 plots trends in the number of migrants departing irregularly from Libya by sea since January 2016. Until mid-2017, migrant departures show a remarkably regular seasonal pattern, with around 20,000 departures during the summer months. As of July 2017, however, the number of arrivals dropped dramatically, and it has stayed at comparatively low levels up to the present. The decrease in arrivals occurred after alleged ’deals’ between Libyan authorities and the militias in Western Libya that control the smuggling networks, and a few months after the signing of a memorandum of understanding between Italy and Libya. Convergent diplomatic action induced some militias to switch from smuggling to preventing departures. Other factors, such as the activity of the LCG, private and public SAR providers, or dynamics in the rate of dead and missing along the route, are relevant per se but appear to play no significant role in the decrease in arrivals to Europe. Europe’s efforts to block migrants passing though transit countries may have played a role as well, but evidence is still too sparse to be reliably assessed.

      Trend #2: An increased risk of interception by the Libyan Coast Guard

      The Libyan Coast Guard plays a pivotal role in Europe’s strategy of externalizing migration control to third countries. A report by Human Rights Watch suggests that in recent months “the Italian Maritime Rescue Coordination Center (IMRCC) has routinized a practice, tested since at least May 2017, of transferring responsibility to Libyan coast guard forces in international waters even when there are other, better-equipped vessels, including its own patrol boats or Italian navy vessels, closer to the scene.” This practice has been termed ’refoulement by proxy’ because the LCG is financed, equipped and instructed by the Italian and European authorities, as described in this recent investigative report. Migrants who are forcibly returned to Libya are imprisoned in detention centres for indefinite periods, and they face systematic violence—including torture and rape—as has been documented in numerous reports.

      The new Italian government intensified and formalized the policy of transferring responsibility to the LCG. Since June, it has instructed ships undertaking rescues in the Libyan SAR zone to refer all emergency calls to the Libyan authorities, who will then arrange their interception and pull-back to Libya. The declarations that Italian ports are “closed” to NGO ships are also part of this strategy, as their operations are considered to interfere with LCG interceptions. In late July, this practice resulted in the first instance of a non-Libyan vessel, the Asso Ventotto, being instructed to coordinate with the Tripoli Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre (JRCC). The ship ultimately disembarked the rescued persons on Libyan territory and thus effectively engaged in refoulement and collective expulsion of migrants.

      The practice of outsourcing European border control to the Libyan Coast Guard has brought about a sharp increase in its activity: by the end of July 2018, the LCG had intercepted 12,490 migrants at sea compared to 8,851 during the same period in the previous year, which amounts to a 41% increase. In combination with the drop in departures, this policy has resulted in a rapid increase in the risk of interception. To illustrate this fact, in July 2017 just 6% of migrants leaving Libya by sea ended up being caught and brought back, while almost 94% made it to Europe. In July 2018, instead, 71% of migrants leaving Libya’s shores were intercepted and brought back, while just 24% arrived safely in a European country (see Figure 2).

      Trend #3: An increase in the absolute and relative mortality rate between mid-June and July 2018

      In this section, we look at trends in absolute mortality (the number of dead and missing people at sea) and relative mortality (the risk of crossing) of migrants departing from Libya. In particular, we analyse the widely reported spike in deaths that occurred in late June 2018, after virtually all SAR NGOs had been prevented from operating as a result of policies introduced by the new Italian Minister of Interior Salvini from the far-right Lega and the continued denial by the Maltese authorities to offer Valetta as a port of entry. On June 10, Italy unilaterally decided to declare its ports to be “closed” to NGO rescue ships, as well as (temporarily) to commercial and EU vessels carrying rescued migrants. Also Malta tightened its position on rescue activities and cracked down on two SAR NGOs in early July. Since then, rescue operations close to the Libyan coast have been almost entirely delegated to the LCG.

      First, we look at trends in the absolute mortality rate. Figure 3 shows a reduction in the monthly number of deaths since July 2017, commensurate with the reduction in the number of departures described above. For example, 20 deaths were recorded in April 2018, and 11 in May (Figure 3). In June, however, an estimated 451 migrants died on their way from Libya to Europe—of which 370 between 16 and 30 June. It is important to note that these deaths occurred during a time when departures were comparatively low. As a result, the risk of crossing has increased from 2.8% in the previous months to a staggering 7% since mid-June 2018 (Figure 4). These findings are also robust to using different time frames for the pre-NGO absence period, including the entire period since the drop of arrivals in July 2017 until the NGO ban. Whereas relative mortality has fluctuated in recent years, 7% constitute an extraordinary spike.

      Figure 5 maps shipwreck events occurring between 16 June and 31 July 2018 with at least estimated 15 dead or missing persons, using geocoded data provided by IOM’s Missing Migrants Project. While the precise location of each shipwreck is only an estimate, as “precise locations are not often known” (as explained in the “Methodology” section of the Missing Migrants Project), such estimates do provide an indication of where such shipwrecks have taken place. In particular, IOM data shows that shipwrecks between 16 June and 31 July took place well within 50 nautical miles from Libya’s shores, an area which used to be patrolled by either the LCG or NGO vessels. Yet, during the time when deaths spiked, only two NGO vessels had been operating, and only discontinuously.

      These observations are reminiscent of what happened in 2015, when the withdrawal of competent SAR providers (the Italian mission Mare Nostrum) similarly created the conditions for avoidable loss of life. Although these findings are based on a relatively short time period, they are suggestive of the risk of leaving the Libyan SAR zone to the operations of the LCG alone. Continuous monitoring of the situation remains of utmost importance.

      Conclusion

      In combination, the three trends described above highlight the harsh realities of recent European migration policies, which seek to limit irregular migration regardless of the moral, legal and humanitarian consequences. The current European obsession with reducing migration at all costs is even less comprehensible when considering that arrivals decreased drastically prior to the most recent escalation of rhetoric and externalization of migration control. Arrivals to Italy in the first half of 2018 were down by 79% compared to the same time frame in 2017. Although increasingly inhumane policies are often cloaked in a rhetoric about reducing deaths at sea, it is important to remember that those who are prevented from crossing or forcibly returned are generally not safe but remain subject to precarious and often lethal conditions in countries of transit. Rather than providing a sustainable response to the complex challenges involved in irregular migration, Europe has outsourced the management of its migration ’problem’ to countries like Libya and Niger, where violence and death often remains hidden from the public view.

      https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2018/09/outsourcing

    • Arrivées en Europe via la Méditerranée :
      2018 :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/705781
      Arrivées en Europe toute frontière confondue :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/739902
      –-> attention, c’est les « crossings »... rappelez-vous de la question des doubles/triples contages des passages :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/705957

      Pour #2016 #2017 et #2018, chiffres de Matteo Villa :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/768142
      database : https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1ncHxOHIx4ptt4YFXgGi9TIbwd53HaR3oFbrfBm67ak4/edit#gid=0
      #base_de_données #database

    • Arrivées par la #Méditerranée en #2019 :
      Europe : plus de 21.000 migrants et réfugiés arrivés par la Méditerranée depuis janvier

      Selon l’Agence des Nations Unies pour les migrations (OIM ), les arrivées de migrants en Méditerranée ont dépassé le seuil des 21.000, ce qui constitue une baisse d’environ un tiers par rapport aux 32.070 arrivés au cours de la même période l’an dernier.

      Ce sont exactement 21.301 migrants et réfugiés qui sont entrés en Europe par voie maritime à la date du 29 mai. Les arrivées en Espagne et en Grèce représentent 85% du total des arrivées, le reste des migrants et réfugiés de cette année ont pris la direction de l’Italie, de Malte et de Chypre.

      La Grèce a désormais surpassé l’Espagne au titre de première destination des migrants et des réfugiés rejoignant l’Europe via la Méditerranée. Selon l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM), le nombre total d’arrivées par mer cette année est de 10.200 dont 2.483 arrivées signalées entre le 1er et le 29 mai dernier.

      Le Bureau de l’OIM en Grèce a indiqué mercredi dernier que les garde-côtes helléniques ont confirmé que pendant plus de 48 heures entre le 28 et le 29 mai, il y eu sept incidents nécessitant des opérations de recherche et sauvetage au large des îles de Lesbos, Leros, Samos, Symi Kos et le port d’Alexandroupolis. Ils ont ainsi sauvé 191 migrants qui ont été transférés par la suite dans les ports respectifs grecs.

      De plus, à la date du 30 avril, ce sont 3.497 migrants qui ont réussi à atteindre la Grèce via sa frontière terrestre avec la Turquie.
      519 décès de migrants, dont plus de la moitié sur la route de la Méditerranée centrale

      L’Espagne reste la deuxième porte d’entrée des réfugiés en Méditerranée, avec 7.876 arrivées dont 1.160 hommes, femmes et enfants pour le seul mois de mai. Sur la même période l’an dernier, Madrid a comptabilisé 8.150 migrants et réfugiés ayant réussi à franchir la route de la Méditerranée occidentale. En outre, plus de 2.100 ont atteint l’Espagne via sa frontière terrestre avec le Maroc.

      Par ailleurs, l’OIM rappelle que les arrivées ont considérablement baissé en Italie où seuls 1.561 migrants ont réussi à franchir les côtes siciliennes.

      Mais la route de la Méditerranée centrale (Italie et Malte) reste tout de même la plus meurtrière avec 321 décès, soit plus de la moitié du total de migrants et réfugiés ayant péri en tentant d’atteindre l’Europe. Les décès enregistrés sur les trois principales routes de la mer Méditerranée pendant près de cinq mois en 2019 s’élèvent à 519 personnes, soit un quart de moins que les 662 décès confirmés au cours de la même période en 2018.

      A cet égard, l’OIM rappelle que dans l’ouest de la Méditerranée, l’organisation non gouvernementale Alarme Phone a signalé qu’un jeune Camerounais avait disparu le 21 mai dernier. Selon les témoignages des huit survivants qui l’accompagnaient, il serait tombé en mer avant que leur navire ne soit intercepté par la marine marocaine. Son corps n’a pas été retrouvé.

      En Méditerranée centrale, des migrants interceptés et renvoyés en Libye le 23 mai ont également indiqué aux équipes de l’OIM que cinq hommes s’étaient noyés au cours de leur voyage. « Aucun autre détail concernant l’identité, le pays d’origine ou d’autres informations personnelles concernant les disparus n’est disponible », a souligné l’OIM dans une note à la presse.

      https://news.un.org/fr/story/2019/05/1044671

  • Magnifique ! Mais en #napolitain.
    Un petit texte d’un certain #Luca_Fiorentino, qui est juste tellement #logique, mais tellement rare dans ces temps dominés par le populisme...

    Une #ode à la #libre_circulation.

    ma fatemi capi na cosa.
    io non ne capisco assai di diritto.

    ma veramente è legittimo che na persona, nata in un preciso metro quadro di terra, poi cresce, e spinta da curiosità o da cazzi suoi, magari si vuole vedere un altro posto, e allo’ si mette in viaggio, cammina, e bell e buono lo possono bloccare e gli possono dire ueue ma arò vai, non vedi il recinto, le ferriate, il muro, qua non ci puoi entrare.

    cioè perché.

    ma scusate, ma sto fatto che la terra se la so’ divisa co righello e squadretta quando io ero ancora nelle palle di mio padre, ma perché io, o chiunque altro, dovremmo automaticamente sottostare alle spartenze di costoro.
    io non l’ho mai accettata, né sottoscritta, ’sta gestione.

    e se mio padre ha firmato qualche carta al comune, io non sono mica mio padre.

    tu puoi dire che ok, vengo da lui.
    e allo’ mio padre viene da suo padre, e suo padre da suo padre, fino ad adamo o chi per lui.
    siamo tutti matriosche del primo spaccimmino, nonché fratelli.

    e quindi, caro fratello briatore, fammi salire sullo yacht e fammi prendere una porchiacca dal tuo frigo, capì.

    e invece a quanto pare ci sarebbero zone della terra dove io posso entrare solo a tempo, o che non posso proprio vedere, a seconda della mia nazionalità.

    la nazionalità.
    sentirsi un’appartenenza forte ad altre persone, alle quali sarei legato da tradizioni storiche, lingua, costumi.

    le tradizioni si trasformano, tra cento anni il mac donald sarà tradizione.
    la lingua, un codice labilissimo che permette di fare inciuci e supercazzole, ma non di capirci.
    i costumi, che poi fossero i mocassini, i pinocchietti e i top fluo, sinceramente non mi appartengono.

    è vero, sono sbucato da una fessa in un posto preciso.
    ma non vedo perché ciò dovrebbe schedarmi.

    cioè che ho fatto io per sbucare da quella fessa, in quel buco di culo.
    a dicere ’a verità, proprio niente.

    e quindi forse sarebbe più giusto applicare il concetto dello zero.
    che tutti dovremmo partire da zero.

    e invece la fessa da cui sei sbucato è importante.
    così come quel metro quadro dove quella fessa ha sgravato.

    solo che lo sai che succede in questo modo.
    mo te lo dico io.
    succede che i tuoi diritti, i tuoi privilegi, o tutti i soprusi e le uallere in testa che subisci quotidianamente, essi dipendono solo da na cosa.
    e quella cosa, ’o ssai che rè.
    chella cosa è ’a fess ’e mammt.
    ciao.

    https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=10215981009185452&id=1454544772
    #ouverture_des_frontières #migrations #frontières #liberté_de_mouvement #nationalité #citoyenneté #hasard #traditions #culture #Etat-nation #lieu_de_naissance #injustice

    cc @albertocampiphoto

    • ’National day of shame’ : #David_Lammy criticises treatment of Windrush generation

      Labour MP says situation has come about because of the hostile environment that begun under Theresa May, as he blames a climate of far-right rhetoric. People who came to the UK in the 1950s and 60s are now concerned about whether they have a legal right to remain in the country. The government has admitted that some people from the Windrush generation had been deported in error, as Theresa May appeared to make a U-turn on the issue Some Windrush immigrants wrongly deported, UK admits.

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kfy1mDdNtEQ

    • Amber Rudd’s resignation letter in full and the Prime Minister’s response

      Amber Rudd has resigned as home secretary amid increasing pressure over the way the Home Office handled immigration policy.

      Her resignation came after leaked documents undermined her claims she was unaware of the deportation targets her officers were using.

      Downing Street confirmed Theresa May had accepted Ms Rudd’s resignation on Sunday night. She is the fifth cabinet minister to have left their position since the Prime Minister called the snap election in June 2017.

      https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/amber-rudd-resignation-letter-full-transcript-windrush-scandal-theres

    • Black history is still largely ignored, 70 years after Empire Windrush reached Britain

      Now, 70 years and three to four generations later, the legacy of those who arrived on the Windrush and the ships that followed is being rightly remembered – albeit in a way which calls into question how much their presence, sacrifices and contributions are valued in Britain.

      https://theconversation.com/black-history-is-still-largely-ignored-70-years-after-empire-windru
      #histoire #mémoire

    • Chased into ’self-deportation’: the most disturbing Windrush case so far

      As Amelia Gentleman reflects on reporting one of the UK’s worst immigration scandals, she reveals a new and tragic case.

      In the summer of 2013, the government launched the peculiarly named Operation Vaken, an initiative that saw vans drive around six London boroughs, carrying billboards that warned: “In the UK illegally? Go home or face arrest.” The billboards were decorated with pictures of handcuffs and the number of recent immigration arrests (“106 arrests last week in your area”). A line at the bottom adopted a softer tone: “We can help you to return home voluntarily without fear of arrest or detention.”

      The Conservatives’ 2010 manifesto promise to reduce migration to the tens of thousands had been going badly. It was time for ministers to develop new ways of scaring immigrants into leaving and for the government’s hostile environment policy to get teeth. More than 170,000 people, many of them living in this country legally, began receiving alarming texts, with warnings such as: “Message from the UK Border Agency: you are required to leave the UK as you no longer have the right to remain.”

      The hope was that the Home Office could get people to “self-deport”, frightening them into submission. In this, politicians appeared to have popular support: a YouGov poll at the time showed that 47% of the public approved of the “Go home” vans. The same year, Home Office vehicles began to be marked clearly with the words “Immigration Enforcement”, to alert people to the hovering presence of border guards.

      Operation Vaken ran for just one month, and its success was limited. A Home Office report later found that only 11 people left the country as a result; it also revealed that, of the 1,561 text messages sent to the government’s tip-off hotline, 1,034 were hoaxes – taking up 17 hours of staff time.

      Theresa May’s former adviser Nick Timothy later tried to argue that the vans had been opposed by the prime minister and were only approved while she was on holiday. But others who worked on the project insisted that May had seen the wording on the vans and requested that the language be toughened up. Meanwhile, the Immigration Enforcement vehicles stayed, with their yellow fluorescent stripes and black-and-white checks, a sinister presence circling areas of high migration. Gradually, the broader strategy of intimidation began to pay off. Some people were frightened into leaving.
      Guardian Today: the headlines, the analysis, the debate - sent direct to you
      Read more

      In my two years of reporting on what became known as the Windrush scandal, Joycelyn John’s experience was the most disturbing case I came across. Joycelyn arrived in London in 1963 at the age of four, travelling with her mother on a Grenadian passport as a British subject. She went to primary and secondary school in Hammersmith, west London, before working in hotels in the capital – including the Ritz and a Hilton.

      Some time around 2009, she lost her Grenadian passport, which contained the crucial stamp giving her indefinite leave to remain. She had trouble getting a new passport, because her mother had married and changed her daughter’s surname from Mitchell to John. Because she never registered the change, there was a discrepancy between Joycelyn’s birth certificate and the name she had used all her adult life. She spent several years attempting to sort out her papers, but by 2014, aged 55, she had been classified as living in Britain illegally. She lost her job and was unable to find new work. For a while, she lived in a homeless hostel, but she lost her bed, because the government does not normally fund places for people classified as illegal immigrants. She spent two years staying with relatives, sleeping on sofas or the floor.

      In that time, Joycelyn managed to gather 75 pages of evidence proving that she had spent a lifetime in the UK: bank statements, dentists’ records, medical files, tax records, letters from her primary school, letters from friends and family. But, inexplicably, this was not enough. Every letter she received from the Home Office warned her that she was liable to be deported to Grenada, a country she had left more than 50 years ago. She began to feel nervous about opening the door in case immigration officers were outside.

      A Home Office leaflet encouraging people to opt for a voluntary departure, illustrated with cheerful, brightly coloured planes and published about the same time as the “Go Home” vans were launched, said: “We know that many people living in the UK illegally want to go home, but feel scared of approaching the Home Office directly. They may fear being arrested and detained. For those returning voluntarily, there are these key benefits: they avoid being arrested and having to live in detention until a travel document can be obtained; they can leave the UK in a more dignified manner than if their removal is enforced.” This appeal to the desire for a dignified departure was a shrewd tactic; the idea of being forcibly taken away terrified Joycelyn, who saw the leaflets and knew of the vans. “There’s such stigma... I didn’t want to be taken off the plane in handcuffs,” she says. She was getting deeper into debt, borrowing money from a younger brother, and felt it was no longer fair to rely on him.

      When the hostile environment policy is working well, it exhausts people into submission. It piles up humiliations, stress and fear until people give up. In November 2016, Joycelyn finally decided that a “voluntary” departure would be easier than trying to survive inside the ever-tightening embrace of Home Office hostility. Officials booked her on a flight on Christmas Day; when she asked if she could spend a last Christmas with her brother and five sisters, staff rebooked her for Boxing Day. She was so desperate that she felt this was the best option. “I felt ground down,” she says. “I lost the will to go on fighting.”

      By that point, she estimated she must have attempted a dozen times to explain to Home Office staff – over the phone, in person, in writing – that they had made a mistake. “I don’t think they looked at the letters I wrote. I think they had a quota to fill – they needed to deport people.” She found it hard to understand why the government was prepared to pay for her expensive flight, but not to waive the application fee to regularise her status. A final letter told her: “You are a person who is liable to be detained... You must report with your baggage to Gatwick South Virgin Atlantic Airways check-in desk.” The letter resorted to the favoured Home Office technique of scaring people with capital letters, reminding her that in her last few weeks: “YOU MAY NOT ENTER EMPLOYMENT, PAID OR UNPAID, OR ENGAGE IN ANY BUSINESS OR PROFESSION.” It also informed her that her baggage allowance, after a lifetime in the UK, was 20kg – “and you will be expected to pay for any excess”.

      How do you pack for a journey to a country you left as a four-year-old? “I was on autopilot,” Joycelyn recalls. “I was feeling depressed, lonely and suicidal. I wasn’t able to think straight; at times, I was hysterical. I packed the morning I left, very last-minute. I’d been expecting a reprieve. I didn’t take a lot – just jeans and a few T-shirts, a toothbrush, some Colgate, a towel – it didn’t even fill the whole suitcase.” She had £60 to start a new life, given to her by an ex-boyfriend. She had decided not to tell her sisters she was going; she confided only in her brother. “I just didn’t want any fuss.” She didn’t expect she would ever be allowed to return to Britain.

      In Grenada, she found everything unfamiliar. She had to scrub her clothes by hand and struggled to cook with the local ingredients. “It’s just a completely different lifestyle. The culture is very different.” She was given no money to set her up and found getting work very difficult. “You’re very vulnerable if you’re a foreigner. There’s no support structure and no one wants to employ you. Once they hear an English accent – forget it. They’re suspicious. They think you must be a criminal if you’ve been deported.”

      Joycelyn recounts what happened to her in a very matter-of-fact way, only expressing her opinion about the Home Office’s consistent refusal to listen when I ask her to. But her analysis is succinct: “The way I was treated was disgusting.” I still find it hard to accept that the government threatened her until she felt she had no option but to relocate to an unfamiliar country 4,300 miles away. The outcome – a 57-year-old Londoner, jettisoned to an island off the coast of Venezuela, friendless and without money, trying to make a new life for herself – is as absurd as it is tragic.

      *

      In April 2018, the leaders of 52 countries arrived in London for the Commonwealth heads of government meeting. The Mall was decorated with flags; caterers at Buckingham Palace prepared for tea parties and state dinners. In normal times, this summit would have been regarded as a routine diplomatic event, heavy with ceremony and light on substance. But, with Brexit looming, the occasion was seen as an important opportunity to woo the countries on which Britain expected to become increasingly reliant.

      A week before the event, however, the 12 Caribbean high commissioners had gathered to ask the British government to adopt a more compassionate approach to people who had arrived in the UK as children and were never formally naturalised. “I am dismayed that people who gave their all to Britain could be discarded so matter-of-factly,” said Guy Hewitt, the Barbados high commissioner. “Seventy years after Windrush, we are again facing a new wave of hostility.”

      Hewitt revealed that a formal request to meet May had been declined. The rebuff convinced the Caribbean leaders that the British government had either failed to appreciate the scale and seriousness of what was happening or, worse, was aware, but did not view it as a priority. It smacked of racism.

      By then, I had been covering cases such as Joycelyn’s for six months. I had written about Paulette Wilson, a 61-year-old grandmother who had been detained by the Home Office twice and threatened with deportation to Jamaica, a country she had left half a century earlier; about Anthony Bryan, who after 50 years in the UK was wrongly detained for five weeks; and about Sylvester Marshall, who was denied the NHS radiotherapy he needed for prostate cancer and told to pay £54,000 for treatment, despite paying taxes here for decades. Yet no one in the government had seemed concerned.

      I contacted Downing Street on 15 April to ask if they could explain the refusal to meet the Caribbean delegation. An official called back to confirm that a meeting had not been set up; there would be other opportunities to meet the prime minister and discuss this “important issue”, she said.

      It was a huge mistake. An article about the diplomatic snub went on the Guardian’s front page and the political response was instantaneous. Suddenly, ministers who had shown no interest were falling over themselves to express profound sorrow. The brazen speed of the official turnaround was distasteful to watch. Amber Rudd, then the home secretary, spoke in parliament to express her regret. The Home Office would establish a new team to help people gather evidence of their right to be here, she announced; fees would be waived. The prime minister decided that she did, after all, need to schedule a meeting with her Caribbean colleagues.

      There were a number of factors that forced this abrupt shift. The campaigner Patrick Vernon, whose parents emigrated from Jamaica in the 50s, had made a critical connection between the scandal and the upcoming 70th anniversary of the arrival of the Empire Windrush at Tilbury Docks. A fortnight earlier, he had launched a petition that triggered a parliamentary debate, calling for an immigration amnesty for those who had arrived as British subjects between 1948 and 1971. For months, I had been describing these people as “Caribbean-born, retirement-age, long-term British residents”, a clunky categorisation that was hard to put in a headline. But Vernon’s petition succinctly called them the “Windrush generation” – a phrase that evoked the emotional response that people feel towards the pioneers of migration who arrived on that ship. Although it was a bit of a misnomer (those affected were the children of the Windrush generation), that branding became incredibly potent.

      After months of very little coverage, the BBC and other media outlets began to report on the issue. On 16 April, the Guardian reprinted the photographs and stories of everyone we had interviewed to date. The accounts were undeniable evidence of profound and widespread human suffering. It unleashed political chaos.

      *

      It was exciting to see the turmoil caused by the relentless publication of articles on a subject that no one had previously wanted to think about. Everyone has moments of existential doubt about whether what they do serves a purpose, but, for two weeks last April, the government was held to account and forced to act, demonstrating the enormous power of journalism to trigger change.

      At the Guardian’s offices in London, a team of reporters was allocated to interview the huge number of emerging Windrush voices. Politicians were contacted by constituents who had previously been nervous about giving their details to officials; they also belatedly looked through their constituency casebooks to see if there were Windrush people among their immigration caseload; finally, they began to speak up about the huge difficulties individuals were facing as a result of Home Office policy.

      Editors put the story on the front page, day after day. Any hope the government might have had of the issue quickly exhausting itself was dashed repeatedly by damaging new revelations. For a while, I was unable to get through my inbox, because there were too many unhappy stories about the government’s cruel, bureaucratic mishandling of cases to be able to read and process. Caroline Bannock, a senior journalist who runs the Guardian’s community team, created a database to collect people’s stories, and made sure that everyone who emailed got an answer, with information on where to go for advice and how to contact the Windrush Taskforce, set up by Rudd.

      I found the scale of the misery devastating. One morning, I came into work to find 24 messages on my answerphone from desperate people, each convinced I could help. I wanted to cry at my desk when I opened a letter from the mother of a young woman who had arrived in Britain from Jamaica in 1974, aged one. In 2015, after being classified as an illegal immigrant and sent to Yarl’s Wood detention centre, she had taken an overdose and died. “Without the time she spent in Yarl’s Wood, which we understand was extremely unpleasant, and the threat of deportation, my daughter would be alive today,” she wrote. The government had been aiming to bring down immigration at any cost, she continued. “One of the costs, as far as I am concerned, was my daughter’s life.”

      Alongside these upsetting calls and letters, there were many from readers offering financial support to the people we interviewed, and from lawyers offering pro bono assistance. A reader sent a shoebox full of chocolate bars, writing that he wanted to help reporters keep their energy levels up. At a time when the reputation of journalism can feel low, it was rewarding to help demonstrate why independent media organisations are so important.

      If the scene at the office was a smooth-running model of professionalism, at home it was chaos. I wrote until 2am and got up at 5am to catch up on reading. I tapped out so many articles over two weeks that my right arm began to ache, making it hard to sleep. My dictaphone overheated from overuse and one of its batteries exploded. I had to retreat entirely from family life, to make sure I poured out every bit of information I had. Shoes went missing, homework was left undone, meals were uncooked. There was an unexpected heatwave and I was aware of the arrival of a plague of ants, flies and fleas (and possibly nits), but there was no time to deal with it.

      I am married to Jo Johnson, who at the time was a minister in May’s government. As a news reporter, I have to be politically independent; I let him get on with his job and he doesn’t interfere in mine. Life is busy and mostly we focus on the day-to-day issues that come with having two children. Clearly, there are areas of disagreement, but we try to step around anything too contentious for the sake of family harmony.

      But the fact did not go unnoticed. One Sunday morning, Jo had to go on television to defend Rudd, returning home at lunchtime to look after the children so I could talk on the radio about how badly the government had got it wrong. I can see why it looks weird from the outside; that weekend it felt very weird. I had only one brief exchange about the issue with his brother Boris, who was then the foreign secretary, at a noisy family birthday party later in the year. He said: “You really fucked the Commonwealth summit.”

      *

      On 25 April, Rudd appeared in front of the home affairs select committee. She told MPs she had been shocked by the Home Office’s treatment of Paulette and others. Not long into the session, Rudd was thrown off course by a question put to her by the committee’s chair, Yvette Cooper. “Targets for removals. When were they set?”

      “We don’t have targets for removals,” she replied with easy confidence. It was an answer that ended her career as home secretary.

      In an earlier session, Lucy Moreton, the head of the Immigration Service Union, had explained how the Home Office target to bring net migration below 100,000 a year had triggered challenging objectives; each region had a removal target to meet, she said. Rudd’s denial seemed to indicate either that she was incompetent and unaware of how her own department worked, or that she was being dishonest. Moreton later told me that, as Rudd was giving evidence, colleagues were sending her selfies taken in front of their office targets boards.

      Rudd was forced back to parliament the next day. This time, she admitted that the Home Office had set local targets, but insisted: “I have never agreed there should be specific removal targets and I would never support a policy that puts targets ahead of people.” But, on 29 April, the Guardian published a private memo from Rudd to May, sent in early 2017, that revealed she had set an “ambitious but deliverable” target for an increase in enforced deportations. Later that evening, she resigned.

      When I heard the news, I felt ambivalent; Rudd hadn’t handled the crisis well, but she wasn’t responsible for the mess. She seemed to be resigning on a technicality, rather than admitting she had been negligent and that her department had behaved atrociously on her watch. The Windrush people I spoke to that night told me Rudd’s departure only shifted attention from the person who was really responsible: Theresa May.

      *

      Joycelyn John was issued with a plane ticket from Grenada to England in July 2018. “A bit of me was ecstatic, a bit of me was angry that no one had listened to me in the first place,” she told me when we met at her still-bare flat in June this year. She had been rehoused in September, but the flat was outside London, far from her family and empty; council officials didn’t think to provide any furniture. Friends gave her a bed and some chairs, but it was months before she was able to get a fridge.

      In late 2018, she received a letter of apology from the then home secretary, Sajid Javid. “People of the Windrush generation who came to Britain from the Commonwealth, as my parents did, have helped make this country what it is today,” he wrote. “The experiences faced by you and others have been completely unacceptable.” The letter made her cry, but not with relief. “I thought: ‘What good is a letter of apology now?’ They ruined my life completely. I came back to nothing. I have had to start rebuilding my life from scratch at the age of 58.”

      She still has nightmares that she is back in Grenada. “I can feel the heat, I can smell the food, I can actually taste the fish in the dream – in a good way. But mostly they are bad memories.” The experience has upended her sense of who she is. “Before this I felt British – I just did. I’m the sort of person who would watch every royal wedding on television. I feel less British now. I feel I don’t belong here, and I don’t belong there.”

      While a government compensation scheme has been announced, Joycelyn, like most of the Windrush generation, has yet to receive any money. Since the government apologised for its “appalling” treatment, 6,000 people have been given documents confirming their right to live in the UK. Joycelyn is one of them. But, although her right to be here is now official, she hasn’t yet got a passport – because she can’t afford the fee. And she remains frightened. “I’m still looking over my shoulder all the time. I’m a nervous wreck.”

      https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/sep/14/scale-misery-devastating-inside-story-reporting-windrush-scandal?CMP=sh

  • #La_loi_c'est_la_loi

    Le village d’#Assola est curieusement découpé par les méandres de la frontière franco-italienne. Le douanier français Ferdinand Pastorelli fait respecter la loi tandis que son ami d’enfance, le contrebandier Giuseppe La Paglia, ne cesse de la violer. De plus leur intimité est liée au fait que Giuseppe a épousé Antonietta la première femme de Ferdinand, lequel a convolé en secondes noces avec Hélène.

    Lorsque Giuseppe découvre que la pièce où est né Ferdinand est en Italie, il le fait savoir, ce qui met le douanier dans une singulière et fâcheuse situation : cela remet en cause son état civil et sa nationalité française. Considéré tour à tour comme bigame, déserteur ou apatride, il est obligé de prendre le maquis. Mais comme les contrebandiers ont toujours besoin des douaniers, Giuseppe, lorsqu’il l’apprendra fera éclater la vérité pour réhabiliter son ami Ferdinand : la pièce où Pastorelli est né n’était pas en Italie à l’époque mais bien en France. Aussitôt libéré, Ferdinand se mettra à pourchasser de plus belle Giuseppe car italien ou français, « la loi, c’est la loi ».

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TS6Tfduz8oo


    #frontières #frontières_naturelles #frontières_artificielles #ressources_pédagogiques #contrebande #Alpes_maritimes #Italie #France #géographie_politique #film #gardes-frontière #bornes #nationalité #citoyenneté #identité #frontières_mobiles

    #frontière_mobile :