• Xinjiang’s System of Militarized Vocational Training Comes to #Tibet

    Introduction and Summary

    In 2019 and 2020, the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) introduced new policies to promote the systematic, centralized, and large-scale training and transfer of “rural surplus laborers” to other parts of the TAR, as well as to other provinces of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the first 7 months of 2020, the region had trained over half a million rural surplus laborers through this policy. This scheme encompasses Tibetans of all ages, covers the entire region, and is distinct from the coercive vocational training of secondary students and young adults reported by exile Tibetans (RFA, October 29, 2019).

    The labor transfer policy mandates that pastoralists and farmers are to be subjected to centralized “military-style” (军旅式, junlüshi) vocational training, which aims to reform “backward thinking” and includes training in “work discipline,” law, and the Chinese language. Examples from the TAR’s Chamdo region indicate that the militarized training regimen is supervised by People’s Armed Police drill sergeants, and training photos published by state media show Tibetan trainees dressed in military fatigues (see accompanying images).

    Poverty alleviation reports bluntly say that the state must “stop raising up lazy people.” Documents state that the “strict military-style management” of the vocational training process “strengthens [the Tibetans’] weak work discipline” and reforms their “backward thinking.” Tibetans are to be transformed from “[being] unwilling to move” to becoming willing to participate, a process that requires “diluting the negative influence of religion.” This is aided by a worrisome new scheme that “encourages” Tibetans to hand over their land and herds to government-run cooperatives, turning them into wage laborers.

    An order-oriented, batch-style matching and training mechanism trains laborers based on company needs. Training, matching and delivery of workers to their work destination takes place in a centralized fashion. Recruitments rely, among other things, on village-based work teams, an intrusive social control mechanism pioneered in the TAR by Chen Quanguo (陈全国), and later used in Xinjiang to identify Uyghurs who should be sent to internment camps (China Brief, September 21, 2017). Key policy documents state that cadres who fail to achieve the mandated quotas are subject to “strict rewards and punishments” (严格奖惩措施, yange jiangcheng cuoshi). The goal of the scheme is to achieve Xi Jinping’s signature goal of eradicating absolute poverty by increasing rural disposable incomes. This means that Tibetan nomads and farmers must change their livelihoods so that they earn a measurable cash income, and can therefore be declared “poverty-free.”

    This draconian scheme shows a disturbing number of close similarities to the system of coercive vocational training and labor transfer established in Xinjiang. The fact that Tibet and Xinjiang share many of the same social control and securitization mechanisms—in each case introduced under administrations directed by Chen Quanguo—renders the adaptation of one region’s scheme to the other particularly straightforward.

    Historical Context

    As early as 2005, the TAR had a small-scale rural surplus labor training and employment initiative for pastoralists and farmers in Lhasa (Sina, May 13, 2005). The 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) then specified that this type of training and labor transfer was to be conducted throughout the TAR (PRC Government, February 8, 2006). From 2012, the Chamdo region initiated a “military-style training for surplus labor force transfer for pastoral and agricultural regions” (农牧区富余劳动力转移就业军旅式培训, nongmuqu fuyu laodongli zhuanyi jiuye junlüshi peixun) (Tibet’s Chamdo, October 8, 2014). Chamdo’s scheme was formally established in the region’s 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020), with the goal of training 65,000 laborers (including urban unemployed persons) during that time (Chamdo Government, December 29, 2015).

    By 2016, Chamdo had established 45 related vocational training bases (TAR Government, November 17, 2016). Starting in 2016, the TAR’s Shannan region likewise implemented vocational training with “semi-military-style management” (半军事化管理, ban junshihua guanli) (Tibet Shannan Net, April 5, 2017). Several different sources indicate that Chamdo’s military-style training management was conducted by People’s Armed Police drill sergeants.[1]

    Policies of the 2019-2020 Militarized Vocational Training and Labor Transfer Action Plan

    In March 2019, the TAR issued the 2019-2020 Farmer and Pastoralist Training and Labor Transfer Action Plan (西藏自治区2019-2020年农牧民培训和转移就业行动方案, Xizang Zizhiqu 2019-2020 Nian Nongmumin Peixun he Zhuanyi Jiuye Xingdong Fang’an) which mandates the “vigorous promotion of military-style…[vocational] training,” adopting the model pioneered in Chamdo and mandating it throughout the region. [2] The vocational training process must include “work discipline, Chinese language and work ethics,” aiming to “enhance laborers’ sense of discipline to comply with national laws and regulations and work unit rules and regulations.”

    Surplus labor training is to follow the “order-oriented” (订单定向式, dingdan dingxiangshi) or “need-driven” (以需定培, yi xu dingpei) method, [3] whereby the job is arranged first, and the training is based on the pre-arranged job placement. In 2020, at least 40 percent of job placements were to follow this method, with this share mandated to exceed 60 percent by the year 2024 (see [2], also below). Companies that employ a minimum number of laborers can obtain financial rewards of up to 500,000 renminbi ($73,900 U.S. dollars). Local labor brokers receive 300 ($44) or 500 ($74) renminbi per arranged labor transfer, depending whether it is within the TAR or without. [4] Detailed quotas not only mandate how many surplus laborers each county must train, but also how many are to be trained in each vocational specialty (Ngari Government, July 31, 2019).

    The similarities to Xinjiang’s coercive training scheme are abundant: both schemes have the same target group (“rural surplus laborers”—农牧区富余劳动者, nongmuqu fuyu laodongzhe); a high-powered focus on mobilizing a “reticent” minority group to change their traditional livelihood mode; employ military drill and military-style training management to produce discipline and obedience; emphasize the need to “transform” laborers’ thinking and identity, and to reform their “backwardness;” teach law and Chinese; aim to weaken the perceived negative influence of religion; prescribe detailed quotas; and put great pressure on officials to achieve program goals. [5]

    Labor Transfers to Other Provinces in 2020

    In 2020, the TAR introduced a related region-wide labor transfer policy that established mechanisms and target quotas for the transfer of trained rural surplus laborers both within (55,000) and without (5,000) the TAR (TAR Human Resources Department, July 17). The terminology is akin to that used in relation to Xinjiang’s labor transfers, employing phrases such as: “supra-regional employment transfer” (跨区域转移就业, kuaquyu zhuanyi jiuye) and “labor export” (劳务输出, laowu shuchu). Both the 2019-2020 Training and Labor Transfer Action Plan and the TAR’s 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) only mention transfers outside the TAR in passing, without outlining a detailed related policy or the use of terminology akin to that found in related documents from Xinjiang. [6]

    In the first 7 months of 2020, the TAR trained 543,000 rural surplus laborers, accomplishing 90.5% of its annual goal by July. Of these, 49,900 were transferred to other parts of the TAR, and 3,109 to other parts of China (TAR Government, August 12). Each region is assigned a transfer quota. By the end of 2020, this transfer scheme must cover the entire TAR.

    Specific examples of such labor transfers identified by the author to other regions within the TAR include job placements in road construction, cleaning, mining, cooking and driving. [7] Transfers to labor placements outside the TAR include employment at the COFCO Group, China’s largest state-owned food-processing company (Hebei News, September 18, 2020).

    The central terminology employed for the labor transfer process is identical with language used in Xinjiang: “unified matching, unified organizing, unified management, unified sending off” (统一对接、统一组织、统一管理、统一输送 / tongyi duijie, tongyi zuzhi, tongyi guanli, tongyi shusong). [8] Workers are transferred to their destination in a centralized, “group-style” (组团式, zutuanshi), “point-to-point” (点对点, dianduidian) fashion. The policy document sets group sizes at 30 persons, divided into subgroups of 10, both to be headed by (sub-)group leaders (TAR Human Resources Department, July 17). In one instance, this transport method was described as “nanny-style point-to-point service” (“点对点”“保姆式”服务 / “dianduidian” “baomu shi” fuwu) (Chinatibet.net, June 21). As in Xinjiang, these labor transfers to other provinces are arranged and supported through the Mutual Pairing Assistance [or “assist Tibet” (援藏, Yuan Zang)] mechanism, albeit not exclusively. [9] The transferred laborers’ “left-behind” children, wives and elderly family members are to receive the state’s “loving care.” [10]

    Again, the similarities to Xinjiang’s inter-provincial transfer scheme are significant: unified processing, batch-style transfers, strong government involvement, financial incentives for middlemen and for participating companies, and state-mandated quotas. However, for the TAR’s labor transfer scheme, there is so far no evidence of accompanying cadres or security personnel, of cadres stationed in factories, or of workers being kept in closed, securitized environments at their final work destination. It is possible that the transfer of Tibetan laborers is not as securitized as that of Uyghur workers. There is also currently no evidence of TAR labor training and transfer schemes being linked to extrajudicial internment. The full range of TAR vocational training and job assignment mechanisms can take various forms and has a range of focus groups; not all of them involve centralized transfers or the military-style training and transfer of nomads and farmers.

    The Coercive Nature of the Labor Training and Transfer System

    Even so, there are clear elements of coercion during recruitment, training and job matching, as well as a centralized and strongly state-administered and supervised transfer process. While some documents assert that the scheme is predicated on voluntary participation, the overall evidence indicates the systemic presence of numerous coercive elements.

    As in Xinjiang, TAR government documents make it clear that poverty alleviation is a “battlefield,” with such work to be organized under a military-like “command” structure (脱贫攻坚指挥部, tuopin gongjian zhihuibu) (TAR Government, October 29, 2019; Xinhua, October 7, 2018). In mid-2019, the battle against poverty in the TAR was said to have “entered the decisive phase,” given the goal to eradicate absolute poverty by the end of 2020 (Tibet.cn, June 11, 2019). Since poverty is measured by income levels, and labor transfer is the primary means to increase incomes—and hence to “lift” people out of poverty—the pressure for local governments to round up poor populations and feed them into the scheme is extremely high.

    The Training and Labor Transfer Action Plan cited above establishes strict administrative procedures, and mandates the establishment of dedicated work groups as well as the involvement of top leadership cadres, to “ensure that the target tasks are completed on schedule” (see [2]). Each administrative level is to pass on the “pressure [to achieve the targets] to the next [lower] level.” Local government units are to “establish a task progress list [and] those who lag behind their work schedule… are to be reported and to be held accountable according to regulations.” The version adopted by the region governed under Shannan City is even more draconian: training and labor transfer achievements are directly weighed in cadres’ annual assessment scores, complemented by a system of “strict rewards and punishments.” [11] Specific threats of “strict rewards and punishments” in relation to achieving labor training and transfer targets are also found elsewhere, such as in official reports from the region governed under Ngari City, which mandate “weekly, monthly and quarterly” reporting mechanisms (TAR Government, December 18, 2018).

    As with the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, overcoming Tibetans’ resistance to labor transfer is an integral part of the entire mechanism. Documents state that the “strict military-style management” of the vocational training process causes the “masses to comply with discipline,” “continuously strengthens their patriotic awareness,” and reforms their “backward thinking.” [12] This may also involve the presence of local cadres to “make the training discipline stricter.” [13]

    Because the military-style vocational training process produces discipline and transforms “backward employment views,” it is said to “promote labor transfer.” [14] Rural laborers are to be transformed from “[being] unwilling to move” to becoming willing to participate, a process that requires “diluting the negative influence of religion,” which is said to induce passivity (TAR Commerce Department, June 10). The poverty alleviation and training process is therefore coupled with an all-out propaganda effort that aims to use “thought education” to “educate and guide the unemployed to change their closed, conservative and traditional employment mindset” (Tibet’s Chamdo, July 8, 2016). [15] One document notes that the poverty alleviation and labor transfer process is part of an effort to “stop raising up lazy people” (TAR Government, December 18, 2018).

    A 2018 account from Chamdo of post-training follow-up shows the tight procedures employed by the authorities:

    Strictly follow up and ask for effectiveness. Before the end of each training course, trainees are required to fill in the “Employment Willingness Questionnaire.” Establish a database…to grasp the employment…status of trainees after the training. For those who cannot be employed in time after training, follow up and visit regularly, and actively recommend employment…. [16]

    These “strict” follow-up procedures are increasingly unnecessary, because the mandated “order-oriented” process means that locals are matched with future jobs prior to the training.

    “Grid Management” and the “Double-Linked Household” System

    Coercive elements play an important role during the recruitment process. Village-based work teams, an intrusive social control mechanism pioneered by Chen Quanguo, go from door to door to “help transform the thinking and views of poor households.” [17] The descriptions of these processes, and the extensive government resources invested to ensure their operation, overlap to a high degree with those that are commonly practiced in Xinjiang (The China Quarterly, July 12, 2019). As is the case in Xinjiang, poverty-alleviation work in the TAR is tightly linked to social control mechanisms and key aspects of the security apparatus. To quote one government document, “By combining grid management and the ‘double-linked household’ management model, [we must] organize, educate, and guide the people to participate and to support the fine-grained poverty alleviation … work.” [18]

    Grid management (网格化管理, wanggehua guanli) is a highly intrusive social control mechanism, through which neighborhoods and communities are subdivided into smaller units of surveillance and control. Besides dedicated administrative and security staff, this turns substantial numbers of locals into “volunteers,” enhancing the surveillance powers of the state. [19] Grid management later became the backbone of social control and surveillance in Xinjiang. For poverty alleviation, it involves detailed databases that list every single person “in poverty,” along with indicators and countermeasures, and may include a “combat visualization” (图表化作战, tubiaohua zuozhan) feature whereby progress in the “war on poverty” is visualized through maps and charts (TAR Government, November 10, 2016). Purang County in Ngari spent 1.58 million renminbi ($233,588 dollars) on a “Smart Poverty Alleviation Big Data Management Platform,” which can display poverty alleviation progress on a large screen in real time (TAR Government, February 20, 2019).

    Similarly, the “double-linked household” (双联户, shuang lian hu) system corrals regular citizens into the state’s extensive surveillance apparatus by making sets of 10 “double-linked” households report on each other. Between 2012 and 2016, the TAR established 81,140 double-linked household entities, covering over three million residents, and therefore virtually the region’s entire population (South China Morning Post, December 12, 2016). An August 2020 article on poverty alleviation in Ngari notes that it was the head of a “double-linked” household unit who led his “entire village” to hand over their grassland and herds to a local husbandry cooperative (Hunan Government, August 20).

    Converting Property to Shares Through Government Cooperatives

    A particularly troubling aspect of the Training and Labor Transfer Action Plan is the directive to promote a “poverty alleviation industry” (扶贫产业, fupin chanye) scheme by which local nomads and farmers are asked to hand over their land and herds to large-scale, state-run cooperatives (农牧民专业合作社, nongmumin zhuanye hezuoshe). [20] In that way, “nomads become shareholders” as they convert their usage rights into shares. This scheme, which harks back to the forced collectivization era of the 1950s, increases the disposable incomes of nomads and farmers through share dividends and by turning them into wage laborers. They are then either employed by these cooperatives or are now “free” to participate in the wider labor transfer scheme. [21] In Nagqu, this is referred to as the “one township one cooperative, one village one cooperative ” (“一乡一社”“一村一合” / “yixiang yishe” “yicun yihe”) scheme, indicating its universal coverage. [22] One account describes the land transfer as prodding Tibetans to “put down the whip, walk out of the pasture, and enter the [labor] market” (People.cn, July 27, 2020).

    Clearly, such a radical transformation of traditional livelihoods is not achieved without overcoming local resistance. A government report from Shuanghu County (Nagqu) in July 2020 notes that:

    In the early stages, … most herders were not enthusiastic about participating. [Then], the county government…organized…county-level cadres to deeply penetrate township and village households, convening village meetings to mobilize people, insisted on transforming the [prevailing attitude of] “I am wanted to get rid of poverty” to “I want to get rid of poverty” as the starting point for the formation of a cooperative… [and] comprehensively promoted the policy… Presently… the participation rate of registered poor herders is at 100 percent, [that] of other herders at 97 percent. [23]

    Importantly, the phrase “transforming [attitudes of] ‘I am wanted to get rid of poverty’ to ‘I want to get rid of poverty’” is found in this exact form in accounts of poverty alleviation through labor transfer in Xinjiang. [24]

    Given that this scheme severs the long-standing connection between Tibetans and their traditional livelihood bases, its explicit inclusion in the militarized vocational training and labor transfer policy context is of great concern.

    Militarized Vocational Training: Examining a Training Base in Chamdo

    The Chamdo Golden Sunshine Vocational Training School (昌都市金色阳光职业培训学校, Changdushi Jinse Yangguang Zhiye Peixun Xuexiao) operates a vocational training base within Chamdo’s Vocational and Technical School, located in Eluo Town, Karuo District. The facility conducts “military-style training” (军旅式培训, junlüshi peixun) of rural surplus laborers for the purpose of achieving labor transfer; photos of the complex show a rudimentary facility with rural Tibetan trainees of various ages, mostly dressed in military fatigues. [25]

    Satellite imagery (see accompanying images) shows that after a smaller initial setup in 2016, [26] the facility was expanded in the year 2018 to its current state. [27] The compound is fully enclosed, surrounded by a tall perimeter wall and fence, and bisected by a tall internal wire mesh fence that separates the three main northern buildings from the three main southern ones (building numbers 4 and 5 and parts of the surrounding wall are shown in the accompanying Figure 4). The internal fence might be used to separate dormitories from teaching and administrative buildings. Independent experts in satellite analysis contacted by the author estimated the height of the internal fence at approximately 3 meters. The neighboring vocational school does not feature any such security measures.


    In both Xinjiang and Tibet, state-mandated poverty alleviation consists of a top-down scheme that extends the government’s social control deep into family units. The state’s preferred method to increase the disposable incomes of rural surplus laborers in these restive minority regions is through vocational training and labor transfer. Both regions have by now implemented a comprehensive scheme that relies heavily on centralized administrative mechanisms; quota fulfilment; job matching prior to training; and a militarized training process that involves thought transformation, patriotic and legal education, and Chinese language teaching.

    Important differences remain between Beijing’s approaches in Xinjiang and Tibet. Presently, there is no evidence that the TAR’s scheme is linked to extrajudicial internment, and aspects of its labor transfer mechanisms are potentially less coercive. However, in a system where the transition between securitization and poverty alleviation is seamless, there is no telling where coercion stops and where genuinely voluntary local agency begins. While some Tibetans may voluntarily participate in some or all aspects of the scheme, and while their incomes may indeed increase as a result, the systemic presence of clear indicators of coercion and indoctrination, coupled with profound and potentially permanent change in modes of livelihood, is highly problematic. In the context of Beijing’s increasingly assimilatory ethnic minority policy, it is likely that these policies will promote a long-term loss of linguistic, cultural and spiritual heritage.

    Adrian Zenz is a Senior Fellow in China Studies at the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, Washington, D.C. (non-resident), and supervises PhD students at the European School of Culture and Theology, Korntal, Germany. His research focus is on China’s ethnic policy, public recruitment in Tibet and Xinjiang, Beijing’s internment campaign in Xinjiang, and China’s domestic security budgets. Dr. Zenz is the author of Tibetanness under Threat and co-editor of Mapping Amdo: Dynamics of Change. He has played a leading role in the analysis of leaked Chinese government documents, to include the “China Cables” and the “Karakax List.” Dr. Zenz is an advisor to the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, and a frequent contributor to the international media.


    [1] See for example https://archive.is/wip/4ItV6 or http://archive.is/RVJRK. State media articles from September 2020 indicate that this type of training is ongoing https://archive.is/e1XqL.

    [2] Chinese: 大力推广军旅式…培训 (dali tuiguang junlüshi…peixun). See https://bit.ly/3mmiQk7 (pp.12-17). See local implementation documents of this directive from Shannan City (https://bit.ly/32uVlO5, pp.15-24), Xigatse (https://archive.is/7oJ7p) and Ngari (https://archive.is/wip/R3Mpw).

    [3] See also https://archive.is/wip/eQMGa.

    [4] Provided that the person was employed for at least 6 months in a given year. Source: https://archive.is/KE1Vd.

    [5] See the author’s main work on this in section 6 of: “Beyond the Camps: Beijing’s Long-Term Scheme of Coercive Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang,” Journal of Political Risk (Vol. 7, No. 12), December 2019. https://www.jpolrisk.com/beyond-the-camps-beijings-long-term-scheme-of-coercive-labor-poverty-allev.

    [6] See https://archive.is/wip/Dyapm.

    [7] See https://archive.is/wip/XiZfl, https://archive.is/RdnvS, https://archive.is/w1kfx, https://archive.is/wip/NehA6, https://archive.is/wip/KMaUo, https://archive.is/wip/XiZfl, https://archive.is/RdnvS, https://archive.is/w1kfx.

    [8] See https://archive.is/KE1Vd and https://archive.is/wip/8afPF.

    [9] See https://archive.is/KE1Vd and https://archive.is/wip/8afPF.

    [10] See https://archive.is/KE1Vd.

    [11] See https://bit.ly/32uVlO5, p.24.

    [12] See https://archive.is/wip/fN9hz and https://archive.is/NYMwi, compare https://archive.is/wip/iiF7h and http://archive.is/Nh7tT.

    [13] See https://archive.is/wip/kQVnX. A state media account of Tibetan waiters at a tourism-oriented restaurant in Xiexong Township (Chamdo) notes that these are all from “poverty-alleviation households,” and have all gone through “centralized, military-style training.” Consequently, per this account, they have developed a “service attitude of being willing to suffer [or: work hard]”, as is evident from their “vigorous pace and their [constant] shuttling back and forth” as they serve their customers. https://archive.is/wip/Nfxnx (account from 2016); compare https://archive.is/wip/dTLku.

    [14] See https://archive.is/wip/faIeL and https://archive.is/wip/18CXh.

    [15] See https://archive.is/iiF7h.

    [16] See https://archive.is/wip/ETmNe

    [17] See https://archive.is/wip/iEV7P, see also e.g. https://archive.is/wip/1p6lV.

    [18] See https://archive.is/e45fJ.

    [19] See https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/securitizing-xinjiang-police-recruitment-informal-policing-and-ethnic-minority-cooptation/FEEC613414AA33A0353949F9B791E733 and https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/03/20/china-alarming-new-surveillance-security-tibet.

    [20] E.g. https://archive.is/R3Mpw. This scheme was also mentioned in the TAR’s 13th 5-Year-Plan (2016-2020) (https://archive.is/wip/S3buo). See also similar accounts, e.g. https://archive.is/IJUyl.

    [21] Note e.g. the sequence of the description of these cooperatives followed by an account of labor transfer (https://archive.is/gIw3f).

    [22] See https://archive.is/wip/gIw3f or https://archive.is/wip/z5Tor or https://archive.is/wip/PR7lh.

    [23] See https://archive.is/wip/85zXB.

    [24] See the author’s related work on this in section 2.2 of: “Beyond the Camps: Beijing’s Long-Term Scheme of Coercive Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang,” Journal of Political Risk (Vol. 7, No. 12), December 2019. https://www.jpolrisk.com/beyond-the-camps-beijings-long-term-scheme-of-coercive-labor-poverty-allev.

    [25] Located as part of the 昌都市卡若区俄洛镇昌都市职业技术学校 campus. See https://bit.ly/2Rr6Ekc; compare https://archive.is/wip/uUTCp and https://archive.is/wip/lKnbe.

    [26] See https://archive.is/wip/WZsvQ.

    [27] Coordinates: 31.187035, 97.091817. Website: https://bit.ly/2Rr6Ekc. The timeframe for construction is indicated by historical satellite imagery and by the year 2018 featured on a red banner on the bottom-most photo of the website.


    #Chine #transfert_de_population #déplacement #rural_surplus_laborers #formaation_professionnelle #armée #travail #agriculture #discipline #discipline_de_travail #Chamdo #préjugés #terres #salariés #travailleurs_salariés #Chen_Quanguo #Xinjiang #Oïghours #camps #pauvreté #contrôle_social #pastoralisme #Farmer_and_Pastoralist_Training_and_Labor_Transfer_Action_Plan #minorités #obédience #discipline #identité #langue #religion #COFCO_Group #mots #terminologie #vocabulaire #Mutual_Pairing_Assistance #pauvreté #Shannan_City #Ngari_City #surveillance #poverty_alleviation #coopératives #salaire #Nagqu #Chamdo_Golden_Sunshine_Vocational_Training_School #Eluo_Town

  • Congo Vision : Interview de 2005 de Ngandu Nkashama

    Professeur #Ngandu_Nkashama : Il faudrait noter que je suis passé par de nombreuses Institutions d’Europe ou des Amériques, et j’ai enseigné dans différentes Universités de l’Afrique francophone. Après huit années en Algérie (1982-1990), j’ai passé dix années difficiles et exaltantes aussi en France, à Limoges, ensuite à Paris III-Sorbonne Nouvelle où j’ai été titularisé pour la chaire de Littératures francophones. Par rapport à ces institutions d’enseignement, la pratique pédagogique des États-Unis semble totalement décalée des objectifs théoriques qui sont répandus dans le monde francophone. La littérature apparaît plutôt comme un espace de liberté à partir duquel les Peuples tentent de donner un sens concret à leur expérience en tant que communauté. Paradoxalement, les instances de décision aux U.S.A. prennent les productions fictionnelles tellement au sérieux qu’elles leur confèrent un coefficient de crédibilité plus conséquent par rapport aux autres études dites “scientifiques”. Dans ces derniers domaines concernant les économies, les systèmes politiques, les données climatiques, géologiques ou minéralogiques, ils se réfèrent exclusivement à leurs propres compétences. Mais quand il s’agit d’une compréhension probable des références anthropologiques, culturelles ou simplement historiques, ils privilégient les textes des écrivains de ces pays, et ils leur témoignent de la considération. Pensez que les ténors des Écrivains africains ont été engagés dans les Universités américaines les plus valables, et ils bénéficient des postes prestigieux. Et ceci ne se réduit pas aux seuls Africains, car ils proviennent de tous les horizons et de tous les pays, y compris les meilleurs Écrivains de France. Nos pays n’ont pas encore compris cette logique, et le vide intellectuel ainsi produit joue certainement sur l’évolution des régimes qui gouvernent en Afrique. Le monde de ce millénaire appartient aux Nations qui auront réussi à rassembler autour d’elles des Intellectuels de haut niveau dans tous les domaines, et plus particulièrement en sciences humaines. Les technologies les plus performantes peuvent s’acquérir avec des capacités financières colossales. À l’étape actuelle de la science, n’importe quelle Nation motivée peut se doter de l’arme nucléaire ou de tout autre potentiel atomique si elle s’en donne les moyens et la volonté de réussir. Mais aucun Peuple ne peut emprunter un univers culturel même commercialisé par des logiciels s’il refuse de reconnaître son propre imaginaire. L’époque des infantilismes et des amateurismes politiques est révolue, et ceux qui persistent à tolérer des individus peu crédibles au niveau de l’intelligence des actes et des événements contribuent à la destruction des valeurs et donc au désastre permanent de notre pays.

    Dans toute l’histoire de la linguistique, les langues évoluent selon leur propre logique qu’aucune loi ni aucune condescendance des hommes ne peut arrêter. Nul ne peut décréter arbitrairement que telle langue va dominer et telle autre disparaître. Il convient d’observer par ailleurs que les concepts de “langue tribale” sont totalement dépassés, car il n’est pas possible d’imaginer que les sept à huit millions de Bakongo (plus de quinze millions s’il faut compter les régions périphériques) constituent une tribu ou que les dix millions de Baluba restent inféodés à une identité tribale. La question a toujours hanté les imaginations, car le danois parlé par cinq millions de locuteurs est décrit dans les manuels comme une langue, alors que le swahili avec ses trente millions de locuteurs reste classé parmi les dialectes. L’aberration totale !

    (cité dans PIUS NGANDU NKASHAMA, Trajectoires d’un discours de Célestin Monga)

    voir https://seenthis.net/messages/876582
    (l’ocr arrive même si il manque malheureusement les 20 premières pages)

  • Longtemps, des ethnologues occidentaux ont observé et raconté les Africains. Pius Ngandu Nkashama, qui fête ses 74 ans, a retourné le miroir : il s’est fait anthropologue en France. “Je vous souhaite comme moi le saisissement d’être vus”.

    CMonga_la-strategie-du-miroir.pdf | Bereitgestellt von Box

  • Mobilisation contre la #continuité_pédagogique en #Allemagne

    Le réseau des initiatives des précaires dans l’#ESR allemand, le #Netzwerk_für_Gute_Arbeit_in_der_Wissenschaft (#NgAWiss), mobilise en ce moment contre la #rentrée du deuxième semestre (qui se fait à la mi-avril outre-Rhin). Les arguments pour la soi-disant „continuité pédagogique" avancés par les président.e.s des #facs sont aussi hallucinants qu’en France - avec la différence notable que 11.000 travailleur.e.s de l’ESR allemand, dont une grande partie de titulaires (et notamment de PU), ont signé une lettre ouverte demandant l’#annulation du prochain semestre : https://www.nichtsemester.de/cbxpetition/offener-brief

    Les arguments sont les mêmes que celles qu’on mobilise en France : la #précarité_étudiante, notamment des étranger.e.s, la précarité des #non-titulaires, les responsabilités du #care que les unes et les autres assurent à la maison, etc.

    Dans son communiqué, le NgAWiss souligne également l’#absurdité de maintenir les #financements_par_projet pour la #recherche urgente sur le coronavirus (l’agence qui correspond à l’ANR outre-Rhin, la DFG, joue le même jeu) : https://www.mittelbau.net/stellungnahme-solidarisch-durch-die-krise-prekaere-wissenschaft-in-der-pa

    Le syndicat unter_bau de l’université de Francfort sur le Main appelle de son côté à résister à la transformation néolibérale de l’#université allemande qui risque de s’accélérer avec la crise (#digitalisation, suppression d’instances de décision démocratique, etc.) et a développé un catalogue de revendications très ciblées : https://unterbau.org/2020/03/30/gegen-unsicherheit-in-der-corona-krise

    Je suis frappé par la similitude des revendications avec les nôtres. C’est à garder en mémoire quand on ressortira pour reconstruire notre mouvement, approfondir son internationalisation et en finir avec „les connards qui nous gouvernent“ (Lordon) des deux côtés du Rhin et au delà.

    Message reçu via la mailing list Facs et labos en lutte, le 03.04.2020

    #université #enseignement_supérieur

    • German academics revolt over ‘business as usual’ plans

      More than 10,000 signatories want summer exams made optional and teaching loads cut, raising the question: how productive can academics really be during a pandemic?

      German university leaders are at loggerheads with more than 10,000 academics and students over whether to press ahead with mandatory exams in the upcoming summer semester – and over the wider question of how productive academics are expected to be in the middle of a pandemic.

      Delaying exams would mean overloaded courses and student housing in the winter semester later this year, university leaders fear.

      “It has to continue; this is our general conviction. It’s important to have a semester that is mandatory for all,” said Peter-André Alt, president of the German Rectors’ Conference.

      This debate, which is playing out in the pages of Germany’s national newspapers, has exposed inequalities between the country’s tenured professors and younger scholars stuck on fixed-term contracts.

      More than 10,000 academics and students have signed a petition calling for the summer term, which normally starts in mid-April, to not be “business as usual”. They want students not to be penalised if they cannot work or take exams as normal, fixed-term contracts extended and teaching loads cut as lecturers struggle to shift teaching online.

      “There are the students who have to generate an income, have visa issues, have care duties now. We all are home schooling now,” said Paula-Irene Villa, professor of sociology and gender studies at LMU Munich, and one of the authors of the petition.

      Institutional responses need to be based on the “real, actual, factual, empirical situation that universities find themselves in” and “not as if universities were all run by people like me” − that is, senior, financially secure, tenured professors, she said.

      Switching to online teaching “takes more than just saying: let’s all go to Slack or Zoom”, she said.

      But Professor Alt believes that while moving teaching online will be a “high burden” for academics, less time will be spent on activities such as class discussion. “In the end, I don’t think it’s more [work]” for academics, he said.

      In reality, university leaders and petitioners do agree on some things, such as the need for a blanket extension of temporary contracts. Additionally, subjects such as lab-based disciplines and engineering that require physical teaching might have their semesters extended to June or July, Professor Alt said.

      But the clash is as much about tone as about practical policies. During the pandemic, can academics be expected to be as productive as ever?

      Professor Alt, an expert on German literature, recalled a period early in his career when the university library unexpectedly had to close – just as he was writing his second book.

      “But I was very productive in those two months,” he said. “This was one of the most productive periods of my whole life.” He did acknowledge, however, many scholars are now working amid the “turmoil of children” at home. “There are problems,” he said. But “if scientists can’t be creative [in response], who can be?”

      “Sure, for some this is going to be a very creative period,” responded Professor Villa. “I should be honest, for me, it’s amazing. I have months without conference travel...I can read much more than I could otherwise.”

      But for many academics and students in more precarious situations, the pandemic has sent their lives into a tailspin, she said. One colleague’s father-in-law was dying of coronavirus in Madrid, she revealed, while some of her students do not know how they will pay their rent. “That’s also the normal,” she said.


  • „Precarious Internationale : solidarity network meeting“ of the Network for Decent Labour in Academia, Berlin, June 5, 2020

    Dear all,

    many of us have made and continue to make disenchanting experiences, to say the least, in the German academic system. While it markets itself as a world of excellence, liberal egalitarianism, cosmopolitanism, freedom and generosity towards scholars at risk, the reality of its structural labour conditions and culture of ignorance betray this image to be a grotesque misrepresentation. German academia is characterised by an ingrained and almost cultivated lack of consciousness towards multiple forms of discrimination (based on race, class, gender, age, etc.) and by related modalities of exclusion as well as paternalistic and infantilizing norms and practices particularly vis-à-vis international and non-naturalized scholars and students. As a system that has never been as much as confronted with a debate on quotas or human rights, German academia expects everybody to ‘integrate’ into what is essentially a structure normatively built around the ‘white male’ and organised according to steep hierarchies around disciplinary chairs. The consequences are direct dependencies of various kinds and precarious, fixed-term employment structures unparalleled by international comparison.

    Many who came here with hopes and expectations have meanwhile withdrawn, tending to pressing political issues in other ways. While very much understandable, this inadvertently strengthens the fragmentation and division among the large class of underprivileged and precarious scholars that the system relies upon. The Network for #Decent_Labour_in_Academia (#Netzwerk_für_Gute_Arbeit_in_der_Wissenschaft, #NGAWiss) has been working for the past three years to publicise and scandalise the miserable employment conditions in German academia and to advocate for structural reforms. Its working group ‘Precarious Internationale’ aims to make intersectional discrimination a central issue of the network’s activism.

    As a part of this effort, this workshop wants to bring together scholars, unionists and activists with different histories of mobility and migration to discuss and reflect on the intersection between precarious labour conditions and different forms of discrimination in the German academic system. We want to come together and learn from each other in order to come to a better analysis of the different problems and challenges faced by differently positioned scholars and activists, but also to exchange experiences and knowledges over struggles for academic freedoms and labour conditions in different contexts. The aim is both to position the question of labour in academia within broader societal struggles in Germany and to link it up to related struggles in other countries.

    We propose to frame the workshop along two lines of debate and exchange. However, we are very much open to alter and adapt this proposal according to what participants consider urgent and relevant to be discussed!

    Critical diversity: As against a neoliberal depoliticised celebration of diversity that follows a calculative logic of added value while blanking out structural inequalities, we want to engage in a critical discussion on the realities of diversity in German academia.Possible questions to be discussed include: what are the effects, limitations and problems of current discourse and practices of diversity? Is it possible – and acceptable – to speak of ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ in the European and especially German context? When does it make sense to speak of ‘migration backgrounds’ to address the issue of underrepresentation of scholars in high academic positions? What are the concrete problems and challenges faced by people with a variety of different migration/mobility histories? What about forms of discrimination affecting people who do not master the German language? And how do these issues intersect with other vectors of discrimination, such as class, age, gender or disability?

    Network of solidarity: We want to learn from each other’s struggles and experiences, think through concrete possibilities for solidarity and envision common political actions.How can we connect the activities of scholars, unionists, and activists struggling against precarious labour and different forms of inequality and discrimination in different academic settings? What are the larger political struggles in which these activities are involved? How and what can we learn from each other? What kinds of concrete steps towards mutual assistance could be developed and what common political actions could be envisioned?

    Please let us know (alice.bieberstein@hu-berlin.de) by FEBRUARY, 15 2020 whether (1) you would like to participate in this workshop! In your answer, please indicate (2) whether there is a topic or issue of special INTEREST of URGENCY to you that you would want to see addressed in the workshop. Please also let us know (3) whether you would want to join with a specific contribution of any kind (presentation, film, artistic intervention, etc.). We absolutely want to make sure that lack of personal funds does not stand in the way of your participating. Private accommodation can be provided, and we are looking into options of supporting travel expenses. Please do let us know your needs and we’ll get back to you with possibilities.


    Dr. Alice von Bieberstein
    Institut für Europäische Ethnologie
    Centre for Anthropological Research on Museums and Heritage
    Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin


    #Allemagne #université #universités #résistance #précarisation #précarité #excellence #scholars_at_risk #discriminations #paternalisme #exclusion #travail #conditions_de_travail


    Ajouté à la métaliste sur les résistances dans le monde universitaire, et au-delà de la France :

  • #Australie : les #aborigènes spoliés pourront être indemnisés

    La Haute Cour d’Australie a jugé mercredi que les aborigènes spoliés de leurs terres devaient être indemnisés en particulier pour la « #perte_culturelle » et la « #souffrance_spirituelle » endurées, une décision qui pourrait déclencher une série de procès dans le pays. La Haute Cour a jugé que les peuples #ngaliwurru et #nungali, du #Territoire_du_Nord, avaient le droit d’être indemnisés après avoir été privés de leurs #terres par le gouvernement régional qui y a bâti, notamment, des infrastructures. Elle a également rejeté un appel du gouvernement contre un précédent jugement, qui avait déterminé que les aborigènes devaient être indemnisés non seulement pour la valeur des terres perdues, mais également pour « la perte culturelle ».

    #indemnisation #justice #spoliation #peuples_autochtones

  • La Chiesa anglicana neozelandese si scusa con i Maori

    Durante l’era coloniale la #Church_Missionary_Society sottrasse forzatamente le terre al popolo Maori di #Tauranga.

    La Chiesa Anglicana della Nuova Zelanda si è scusata con il popolo Maori di Tauranga per la sottrazione forzata delle terre avvenuta nel 1800.

    Gli abitanti originari, i clan #Ngati_Tapu e #Ngai_Tamarawaho, avevano affidato circa 1333 acri della loro terra alla Church Missionary Society, la quale li consegnò nel 1866 alla Corona.

    La rivista della Chiesa anglicana della Nuova Zelanda, Anglican Taonga, riporta che durante un culto speciale, celebrato ad inizio dicembre, il vescovo Pihopa Ngarahu Katene e l’arcivescovo Philip Richardson – due delle figure più alte della Chiesa – hanno letto un documento contenente le scuse.

    In particolare l’arcivescovo Richardson ha letto il testo in inglese mentre Pihopa Katene lo ha letto nella lingua maori.

    Richardson poi si è inginocchiato e ha consegnato il documento, sigillato con il sigillo dei Primati, agli anziani dei clan Ngati Tapu e Ngai Tamarawaho.

    Il Vescovo di Waiapu, Rt Rev Andrew Hedge, ha affermato che i membri della Chiesa anglicana della Nuova Zelanda che hanno partecipato al culto «portano fino ad oggi il dolore rappresentativo di una nazione intera composta da vescovi, clero e da laici anglicani».

    «Riconosciamo con solenne tristezza che gli eventi del passato hanno gettato un’ombra così lunga sulle generazioni seguenti, lasciando un’eredità di ingiustizia e controversie», ha affermato.

    «Ci aspettiamo che questo atto di pentimento possa contribuire a far brillare una luce di riconciliazione in questa whenua (terra)».

    Le scuse ufficiali sono state concordate in occasione di un incontro del Sinodo Generale nel maggio 2018, in cui il vescovo Hedge aveva affermato di non aver mai «provato in modo così palpabile un tale schiacciante dolore».


    #Eglise #colonialisme #Maori #christianisme #histoire #excuses #colonisation #Nouvelle_Zélande #terres

  • Vandalism forces New Zealand council to remove Captain Cook statue

    A year ahead of 250th anniversary of explorer’s arrival, monument will be replaced by ‘cultural designs’

    A statue of Captain Cook in New Zealand that has been repeatedly defaced and daubed with graffiti is to be removed by the council a year out from the 250-year anniversary of his arrival in the country.

    The statue of Cook in Gisborne has been repeatedly targeted by vandals amid a heated debate about the portrayal of the town’s complex colonial history.

    The Cook statue has had red paint smeared on its face and coat, and a bikini and a pair of thongs have also been painted on.

    With the 250th anniversary of Cook’s landing in New Zealand only a year away, tensions are high in the city which lies 350km south-east of Auckland.

    Many residents have posted on social media describing Cook as a “murderer” and “crooked Cook”.

    Cook and the crew of the Endeavour landed in Gisborne’s Poverty Bay in 1769 and the first significant meetings of Europeans and Māori took place nearby.

    Nick Tupara, spokesman for the #Ngati_Oneone tribe, said according to historical records, Cook’s crew shot nine #Maori men of his tribe, including Tupara’s ancestors. Six of the men are believed to have died.

    Ngati Oneone has long opposed having the controversial statue of Cook placed on the sacred mountain of #Titirangi, and on Monday the #Gisborne district council said it would be moved to the Tairawhiti Museum instead.

    The council said the mountain would now be adorned with “iwi [tribal] stories and cultural design elements can be shared from this significant location”.

    The council would also consult with the local community regarding the renaming of the Cook Plaza on top of Titirangi, as well as various walking tracks and sites on the mountain.

    Meredith Akuhata-Brown, a local councillor, told Maori Television the removal of the statue would allow a more nuanced and “honest” story about New Zealand’s history to emerge.

    Discussions are under way in the Gisborne region for Poverty Bay – so named by Cook in 1769 – to be replaced by its Māori name, or given a dual name.

    Akuhata described the name of Poverty Bay as “horrendous” and said it was particularly painful as the region had numerous social and economical challenges it was working to overcome.

    #mémoire #Cook #Nouvelle_Zélande #post-colonialisme #vandalisme #histoire #colonialisme #James_Cook #musée #espace_public #toponymie (même si je ne sais pas si la place s’appelle Cook, mais c’est pour retrouver l’article) #peuples_autochtones
    ping @reka

    • Il faudrait que je retrouve le nom d’un film superbe (australien je crois) qui mets en scène aborigènes et communautés allochtones, et dans lequel une actrice aborigène lance l’insulte suprême « Tu n’es qu’un fils batard du capitaine Cook ! »

  • Après la Guinée Bissau, nouvelle extension d’APC dans le palmier à huile au Congo | Commodafrica

    L’américain African Palm Corp (APC) a ajouté 3 millions d’hectares supplémentaires de palmier à l’huile en Afrique de l’Ouest à son portefeuille avec la signature d’un accord avec la Société et les représentants de Ngalipomi, groupe local basé au Congo. Cet accord conférera à APC un accès à trois millions d’hectares supplémentaires de palmiers en Afrique de l’Ouest, en #Guinée_Bissau et au #Congo.

    « C’est le deuxième accord que nous concluons en seulement quelques mois, et nous sommes ravis d’inclure le Congo dans notre nouvelle phase d’exploitation. Ceci renforce notre vision consistant à créer un modèle d’affaires durable, capable d’autonomiser économiquement les communautés locales africaines via la culture de fruits de palmier », a expliqué Oscar A. Faria, président et PDG d’African Palm Corp. En avril dernier le groupe américain a annoncé le lancement de ses activités en Guinée Bissau sur 1,5 million d’hectares (cf. nos informations ).


  • Francis Ngannou, pieds et poings déliés - Libération

    Venu du Cameroun, échappé à la rue, formé à Paris, le colosse du MMA combat pour le titre poids lourds, ce samedi à Boston .

    Francis Ngannou se souvient d’un exercice de logique au collège qui consistait à agencer le mieux possible des immeubles à l’intérieur d’une surface restreinte. Le professeur l’a soupçonné de triche. Son rendu paraissait trop carré pour être honnête. La lumière, dit-il, a jailli dans la foulée : au tableau, il a expliqué ses conclusions avec tellement d’aisance qu’il récolta un bonus : + 2. « Mais j’avais déjà reçu 19/20. » 21, donc. Il raconte la séquence avec une voix posée et rythmée, comme dans un documentaire nocturne sur les nuages ou les mouflons. Dans une autre vie, il se serait bien vu architecte.

    « Le Prédateur », son surnom, a réalisé son dernier gros coup le 2 décembre, aux Etats-Unis. Une minute et des poussières de spectacle, le temps de jauger, puis d’allonger un Néerlandais en mondovision. Uppercut du gauche, KO, dodo. Hourra. Francis Ngannou fait du MMA, mélange d’une demi-douzaine de sports de combat (pieds, poings, prises au sol), machine à cash et grenier d’histoires qui remplirait des bouquins de mille pages.

    La sienne oblige à écouter sans couper : des parents divorcés alors qu’il a 6 ans, une enfance pauvre et solitaire au Cameroun et une carrière scolaire terminée adolescent. Gamin, il fait déjà des boulots d’adulte au pied du mur. Tailleur de pierre, entre autres. En 2013, il émigre en France sans un rond, avec l’ambition de percer en boxe anglaise. Aucun palmarès, si ce n’est une petite expérience au pays. « Je m’étais mis une pression énorme sur les épaules : je voulais vraiment être un champion. » A Paris, il trouve rapidement une salle où mettre les gants. Son gabarit de menhir (1,95 m, 117 kilos) et ses facilités en « un contre un » fascinent. Des tauliers du lieu l’aident à se sortir de la rue - il est SDF. Didier Carmont, l’un d’eux : « On a fait ce que nous avions à faire, naturellement. Est-ce vraiment important d’entrer dans les détails ? Quand il est arrivé chez nous la première fois, il ne se lamentait pas, et très vite, il s’est senti à la maison. C’est un ami, j’ai l’impression de l’avoir toujours connu. » Puis : « C’est vrai qu’il a un physique. Mais il ne faudrait pas tomber dans le cliché de l’Africain naturellement puissant. On ne se sort pas de sa situation, on ne progresse pas aussi vite, sans intelligence. » Au fil des semaines, ses bienfaiteurs les plus au fait du milieu lui expliquent que le noble art est une impasse à court terme (une vieille bâtisse dont les coulisses sont des labyrinthes), mais que le MMA est un building illuminé, doté d’un ascenseur tout neuf (une multinationale en expansion). Il ne sait pas ce que c’est, mais se met au boulot. En quatre ans de pratique, le voilà presque tout en haut. Samedi, le Camerounais, 31 ans, combattra pour le titre des poids lourds face à l’Américain Stipe Miocic, actuel détenteur de la couronne.

    Christian M’Pumbu, son ami et compagnon d’entraînement, indique le coin de son œil avec l’index : à cet endroit précis, il a pris le panard du colosse, large comme un hors-bord. Un an plus tard, l’ancien champion de MMA, qui en a donc vu d’autres, en parle comme d’une séance de spiritisme. Pour le reste, il glisse deux précisions : « Avec ce qu’il a vécu, il y a des moments où il faut le laisser seul, où il ne veut pas trop parler. A vrai dire, ce n’est pas un grand bavard. » Et : « Je l’ai vu sur des photos aux Etats-Unis. Il avait des jumelles autour du cou… un vrai touriste. » Francis Ngannou vit en ce moment à Las Vegas. Ce qu’il en dit ? Pas grand-chose. « Je m’entraîne. Et sur mon temps libre ? Je m’entraîne encore. C’est mon travail à plein temps ! » En fonction des questions, c’est tout ou rien, soit le récit ou bien les trois petits points. Le Camerounais est un texte à trous, triste, nerveux et joli à la fois.

    A Paris, il a d’abord dormi dans un parking. « On m’a parlé du 115… De foyers et de chambres à partager avec d’autres. Des alcooliques, des gens dépressifs. Je ne voulais pas. Je n’étais pas là pour accepter la situation. Je voulais m’écarter de tout ce qui était négatif. » Les conseils ici et là le mènent à la MMA Factory, dans le XIIe arrondissement. Le lieu est géré par Fernand Lopez, l’entraîneur français le plus réputé, ingénieur de formation et, surtout, habile entrepreneur. Les qualités du petit nouveau lui sautent aux yeux. Il le prend en main et le façonne. Depuis, il ne le lâche plus.

    Parfois, « le Prédateur » décortique son sport en termes bibliques : « David peut battre Goliath. Le MMA comporte un nombre incalculable de techniques. Tu domines et là, ton adversaire te saisit la cheville, puis te fait une clé. C’est beau quand David peut gagner. » Et parfois, il le ramène sobrement à de la survie : « Si tu ne mets pas des coups, c’est ton adversaire qui le fera. »

    Le MMA : baston indécente dans une cage octogonale pour les uns, spectacle très technique pratiqué par des bonshommes surentraînés pour les autres. En France, les compétitions sont encore interdites (une exception), mais les entraînements et les streamings (l’Hexagone est dans le top 10 des consommateurs à l’échelle du monde) font des cartons. Hypocrisie.

    Francis Ngannou est originaire de Batié, petite commune de l’ouest du Cameroun où il retourne pour les vacances. Il a trois frères et une sœur. Le récit : « Enfant, j’allais de maison en maison, je changeais d’école tout le temps. J’étais pauvre. » Les trois petits points : son cercle, sa routine, son parcours entre l’Afrique et la France. Gosse, il s’amusait avec d’autres à imiter les prises de Jean-Claude Van Damme. « Je n’ai pas eu d’amis d’enfance, parce que je n’avais pas le bon profil. Qu’avais-je à offrir ? Parfois, j’avais envie de parler, mais il n’y avait personne. Je n’allais pas me torturer avec ça. Alors je me suis dit qu’on pouvait vivre sans amis. »

    Il se lance sur le tard dans la boxe anglaise. A 22 ans. Il dit que son premier combat au pays est aussi une affaire de fulgurance. Alors que son vis-à-vis le malmène, il se rebelle en repensant à son rêve : une couronne mondiale. Victoire dans l’anonymat, après une journée de manutention. « L’arbitre m’a arraché mon adversaire d’entre les mains. » Le Camerounais signe son premier contrat avec l’Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC) en 2015. La Ligue américaine a la main sur le business du #MMA et l’image de ses combattants. A cette échelle, on parle d’un géant du divertissement qui vend des machines à coller des pains, des récits et des synopsis de biopic. Son rendez-vous de samedi, à Boston, lui assure d’office un chèque de 500 000 dollars. Didier Carmont : « Je suis certain qu’il a gardé la boxe dans un coin de sa tête. Un jour ou l’autre, il voudra y revenir. » Dans sa vie d’après, #Ngannou se verrait bien en hommes d’affaires. « J’impressionne souvent les gens en calcul mental. Enfant, à l’école, le prof demandait parfois combien faisait 5 moins 6.Tandis que tous les autres cherchaient, j’avais déjà trouvé. »
    Ramsès Kefi - photo : Laurent Troude pour Libération

    Francis Ngannou a été battu sur décision à Boston.
    #ufc #boxe #sports_de_combat

  • Kaolack : « Les Salins du Saloum » écume les terres des paysans avec la complicité des municipalités

    Après l’ire des paysans de la commune de Ndiaffate contre les « #Salins_du_Saloum » qui continuent à mettre main basse sur les #terres arables des pauvres paysans pour étendre ses champs de sel, c’est au tour de ceux de la commune de Dya, plus précisément les villages de Ngane Ndiogou et de Sagn Bambara de monter au créneau pour montrer leur désaccord.


  • The Multibillion-Dollar U.S. Spy Agency You Haven’t Heard of | Foreign Policy

    The #NGA is to pictures what the NSA is to voices. Its principal function is to analyze the billions of images and miles of video captured by drones in the Middle East and spy satellites circling the globe. But because it has largely kept its ultra-high-resolution cameras pointed away from the United States, according to a variety of studies, the agency has never been involved in domestic spy scandals like its two far more famous siblings, the CIA and the NSA. However, there’s reason to believe that this will change under President Donald Trump.

  • Voici la redoutable agence d’espionnage américaine dont personne n’a jamais entendu parler

    Comment une redoutable agence d’espionnage dont personne n’a jamais entendu parler pourrait être utilisée pour surveiller les Américains. À 25km au sud de Washington, sur une base militaire lourdement protégée, se trouve une agence d’espionnage dont peu de personnes connaissent l’existence. Barack Obama en personne semblait ne pas en reconnaître le nom après cinq mois de mandat. En mai 2009, alors qu’il se trouvait dans un fast-food de l’enseigne Five Guys, à Washington, pour un bain de foule, il (...)

    #algorithme #CCTV #drone #aérien #surveillance #NGA

  • The Google-Military-Surveillance Complex
    FireWorks via Pando Daily | By Yasha Levine on March 7, 2014

    It was a rowdy crowd, and there was a heavy police presence. Some people carried “State Surveillance No!” signs. A few had their faces covered in rags, and taunted and provoked city officials by jamming smartphones in their faces and snapping photos.

    Main item on the agenda that night: The “Domain Awareness Center” (DAC) — a federally funded project that, if built as planned, would link up real time audio and video feeds from thousands of sensors across the city — including CCTV cameras in public schools and public housing projects, as well as Oakland Police Department mobile license plate scanners — into one high-tech control hub, where analysts could pipe the data through face recognition software, surveil the city by location and enrich its intelligence with data coming in from local, state and federal government and law enforcement agencies.

    #ville #smart_city #surveillance

    The details of Google’s business relationships with the intelligence community — even the existence of these deals — are not always easy to come by. The earliest concrete example I could dig up goes back to 2003, when Google secured a $2.07-million gig to outfit the National Security Agency (NSA) with Google’s search tech.

    “The #NSA paid #Google for a search appliance capable of searching 15 million documents in twenty-four languages,” according to Consumer Watchdog, which obtained contract documents outlining the NSA-Google partnership.
    The contract was to last only a year and apparently was never renewed by the NSA, nonetheless Google kept providing its search services for two full years — free of charge.

    At exactly the same time that Google was trying to improve the NSA’s internal search capabilities, the company was in negotiations with two other intelligence agencies: the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), a close cousin of the NSA that primarily deals with geospatial/satellite intel for both combat and civilian operations.

    These negotiations had to do with Google’s purchase of Keyhole, a tiny tech startup that developed 3-D mapping technology. The company’s main product was an application called EarthViewer, which allowed users to fly and move around a virtual globe as if they were in a video game. Google purchased Keyhole in 2004 for an undisclosed sum, and folded its technology into what later became known as Google Earth.

    At the time, Google’s acquisition of Keyhole raised serious privacy concerns. The reason was simple: In 2003, just a year before Google bought Keyhole, the company was saved from bankruptcy by #In-Q-Tel

    #silicon_army #satellite

    2010 was a heady year for Google. Aside from its #NGA contract and close collaboration with the NSA, the company secured its first major non-intelligence/non-classified contract with the federal government.

    The General Service Administration awarded Google a five-year contract worth $6.7 million to provide the agency with “cloud-based” email services.

    Even more valuable than the contract was the fact that Google became the first “cloud-based” services provider to get federal security certification for non-classified data.

    With the certification, Google got the drop on its competition — mainly Microsoft and Salesforce — and now had a much needed stamp of approval that opened the door for Google to aggressively pursue other government contracts for hosting services for non-classified purposes.

    By the end of 2013, Google had racked up contracts to provide IT services to a long list of federal agencies.

    In February 2013, U.S. Naval Academy signed up for Google Apps…

    In October 2013, the U.S. Army tapped Google Apps for a pilot program involving 50,000 “Army and Department of Defense (DoD) personnel”…

    In 2012, Idaho’s nuclear lab went Google…

    In 2012, Department of the Interior awarded Google with a seven-year contract to provide email services for $35 million…

    In 2011, U.S. Coast Guard Academy went with Google, too…

    At same time, Google began racking up a good number of state and municipal governments, including law enforcement: Los Angeles, Lake Havasu Police Department, State of Wyoming, City of North Las Vegas, Boston and 40 other agencies went over to Google Apps as of this writing.

    Hell, it even launched a creepy Soviet-style “Government Transformers” page paying tribute to government heroes who’ve made the switch to Google.

  • Une puce GPS moins énergivore grâce au cloud computing

    Des chercheurs de Microsoft affirment réduire d’un facteur 2.000 l’énergie consommée par une puce GPS en diminuant drastiquement la quête et le traitement des informations émises par les satellites. Le reste des données nécessaires est collecté et traité sur des serveurs …

    Source : Futura-Sciences

    #GPS #cloud_computing #Microsoft #satellite #géolocalisation #smartphone #batterie #Cloud-Offloaded_GPS #CO-GPS #Nasa #Windows_Azure #NGS #National_Geodetic_Survey #National_Oceanic_and_Atmospheric_Administration #National_Geospatial-Intelligence_Agency #NGA #éphéméride #CLEO #Cultivating_the_Long_tail_in_Environmental_Observations #Maxim_MAX2769 #microcontrôleur #Texas_Instruments #WWVB