• Status agreement with Senegal : #Frontex might operate in Africa for the first time

    The border agency in Warsaw could deploy drones, vessels and personnel. It would be the first mission in a country that does not directly border the EU. Mauretania might be next.

    As a „priority third state“ in West Africa, Senegal has long been a partner for migration-related security cooperation with the EU. The government in Dakar is one of the addressees of the „#North_Africa_Operational_Partnership“; it also receives technical equipment and advice for border police upgrading from EU development aid funds. Now Brussels is pushing for a Frontex mission in Senegal. To this end, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen travelled personally to the capital Dakar last week. She was accompanied by the Commissioner for Home Affairs, Ylva Johansson, who said that a contract with Senegal might be finalised until summer. For the matter, Johansson met with Senegal’s armed-forces minister and foreign minister.

    For operations outside the EU, Frontex needs a so-called status agreement with the country concerned. It regulates, for example, the use of coercive police measures, the deployment of weapons or immunity from criminal and civil prosecution. The Commission will be entrusted with the negotiations for such an agreement with Senegal after the Council has given the mandate. The basis would be a „model status agreement“ drafted by the Commission on the basis of Frontex missions in the Western Balkans. Frontex launched its first mission in a third country in 2019 in Albania, followed by Montenegro in 2020 and Serbia in 2021.

    New EU Steering Group on migration issues

    The deployment to Senegal would be the first time the Border Agency would be stationed outside Europe with operational competences. Johansson also offered „#surveillance equipment such as #drones and vessels“. This would take the already established cooperation to a new level.

    Frontex is already active in the country, but without uniformed and armed police personnel. Of the only four liaison officers Frontex has seconded to third countries, one is based at the premises of the EU delegation in #Dakar. His tasks include communicating with the authorities responsible for border management and assisting with deportations from EU member states. Since 2019, Senegal has been a member of Frontex’s so-called AFIC network. In this „Risk Analysis Cell“, the agency joins forces with African police forces and secret services for exchanges on imminent migration movements. For this purpose, Frontex has negotiated a working agreement with the Senegalese police and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

    The new talks with Senegal are coordinated in the recently created „Operational Coordination Mechanism for the External Dimension of Migration“ (MOCADEM). It is an initiative of EU member states to better manage their politics in countries of particular interest. These include Niger or Iraq, whose government recently organised return flights for its own nationals from Minsk after Belarus‘ „instrumentalisation of refugees“ at the EU’s insistence. If the countries continue to help with EU migration control, they will receive concessions for visa issuance or for labour migration.

    Senegal also demands something in return for allowing a Frontex mission. The government wants financial support for the weakened economy after the COVID pandemic. Possibilities for legal migration to the EU were also on the agenda at the meetings with the Commission. Negotiations are also likely to take place on a deportation agreement; the Senegalese authorities are to „take back“ not only their own nationals but also those of other countries if they can prove that they have travelled through the country to the EU and have received an exit order there.

    Deployment in territorial waters

    Senegal is surrounded by more than 2,600 kilometres of external border; like the neighbouring countries of Mali, Gambia, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, the government has joined the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Similar to the Schengen area, the agreement also regulates the free movement of people and goods in a total of 15 countries. Only at the border with Mauritania, which left ECOWAS in 2001, are border security measures being stepped up.

    It is therefore possible that a Frontex operation in Senegal will not focus on securing the land borders as in the Western Balkans, but on monitoring the maritime border. After the „Canary Islands crisis“ in 2006 with an increase in the number of refugee crossings, Frontex coordinated the Joint Operation „Hera“ off the islands in the Atlantic; it was the first border surveillance mission after Frontex was founded. Departures towards the Canary Islands are mostly from the coast north of Senegal’s capital Dakar, and many of the people in the boats come from neighbouring countries.

    The host country of „Hera“ has always been Spain, which itself has bilateral migration control agreements with Senegal. Authorities there participate in the communication network „Seahorse Atlantic“, with which the Spanish gendarmerie wants to improve surveillance in the Atlantic. Within the framework of „Seahorse“, the Guardia Civil is also allowed to conduct joint patrols in the territorial waters of Senegal, Mauritania and Cape Verde. The units in „Hera“ were also the only Frontex mission allowed to navigate the countries‘ twelve-mile zone with their vessels. Within the framework of „Hera“, however, it was not possible for Frontex ships to dock on the coasts of Senegal or to disembark intercepted refugees there.

    Spain wants to lead Frontex mission

    Two years ago, the government in Madrid terminated the joint maritime mission in the Atlantic. According to the daily newspaper „El Pais“, relations between Spain and Frontex were at a low point after the border agency demanded more control over the resources deployed in „Hera“. Spain was also said to be unhappy with Frontex’s role in the Canary Islands. The agency had seconded two dozen officers to the Canary Islands to fingerprint and check identity documents after a sharp increase in crossings from Senegal and Mauritania in 2020. According to the International Organization for Migration, at least 1,200 people died or went missing when the crossing in 2021. The news agency AFP quotes the Spanish NGO Caminando Fronteras which puts this number at over 4,400 people. Also the Commissioner Johansson said that 1,200 were likely underestimated.

    The new situation on the Canary Islands is said to have prompted Frontex and the government in Madrid to advocate the envisaged launch of the joint operation in Senegal. With a status agreement, Frontex would be able to hand over refugees taken on board to Senegalese authorities or bring them back to the country itself by ship. The Guardia Civil wants to take over the leadership of such an operation, writes El Pais with reference to Spanish government circles. The government in Dakar is also said to have already informed the EU of its readiness for such an effort.

    The idea for an operational Frontex deployment in Senegal is at least three years old. Every year, Frontex Director Fabrice Leggeri assesses in a report on the implementation of the EU’s External Maritime Borders Regulation whether refugees rescued in its missions could disembark in the respective eligible third countries. In the annual report for 2018, Leggeri attested to the government in Senegal’s compliance with basic fundamental and human rights. While Frontex did not even consider disembarking refugees in Libya, Tunisia or Morocco, the director believes this would be possible with Senegal – as well as Turkey.

    Currently, the EU and its agencies have no concrete plans to conclude status agreements with other African countries, but Mauritania is also under discussion. Frontex is furthermore planning working (not status) arrangements with other governments in North and East Africa. Libya is of particular interest; after such a contract, Frontex could also complete Libya’s long-planned connection to the surveillance network EUROSUR. With a working agreement, the border agency would be able to regularly pass on information from its aerial reconnaissance in the Mediterranean to the Libyan coast guard, even outside of measures to counter distress situations at sea.


    #Sénégal #asile #migrations #réfugiés #externalisation #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #Afrique #Mauritanie #Afrique_de_l'Ouest #renvois #expulsions #AFIC #Risk_Analysis_Cell #services_secrets #police #coopération #accord #MOCADEM #Operational_Coordination_Mechanism_for_the_External_Dimension_of_Migration #accords_de_réadmission #accord_de_réadmission #frontières_maritimes #Atlantique #Seahorse_Atlantic #Hera

    ajouté à la métaliste sur l’externalisation des contrôles frontaliers :
    et plus précisément ici :

    ping @isskein @reka @karine4

    • L’Union européenne veut déployer Frontex au large des côtes sénégalaises

      À l’occasion de la visite au Sénégal de cinq commissaires européennes, l’UE propose au gouvernement le déploiement de Frontex, l’agence européenne de garde-côtes et de gardes-frontières. La Commission européenne envisagerait un déploiement d’ici à l’été en cas d’accord avec les autorités sénégalaises.

      C’est pour l’instant une proposition faite par Ylva Johansson. La commissaire chargée des Affaires intérieures a évoqué la question avec les ministres des Affaires étrangères, des forces armées et de l’Intérieur ce vendredi à Dakar.

      Pour l’Union européenne, l’intérêt immédiat est de contrôler le trafic d’êtres humains avec les embarcations qui partent des côtes sénégalaises vers l’archipel espagnol des Canaries. Mais le principe serait aussi de surveiller les mouvements migratoires vers l’Europe via la Mauritanie ou bien la route plus longue via l’Algérie et la Libye.

      L’idée est une collaboration opérationnelle des garde-côtes et gardes-frontières de l’agence Frontex avec la gendarmerie nationale sénégalaise et sous sa direction. L’UE envisage le déploiement de navires, de personnel et de matériel. La commissaire européenne aux Affaires intérieures a évoqué par exemple des drones.

      L’agence Frontex de surveillance des frontières extérieures de l’Union est en train de monter en puissance : son effectif devrait s’élever à 10 000 gardes-côtes et gardes-frontières dans quatre ans, soit dix fois plus qu’en 2018. Elle n’a jamais été déployée hors d’Europe et cette proposition faite au Sénégal illustre à l’avance la priorité que va mettre l’Europe sur les questions migratoires lors du sommet avec l’Union africaine dans une semaine.


    • EU seeks to deploy border agency to Senegal

      European Commissioner Ylva Johansson on Friday offered to deploy the EU’s border agency to Senegal to help combat migrant smuggling, following a surge in perilous crossings to Spain’s Canary Islands.

      At a news conference in the Senegalese capital Dakar, Johansson said the arrangement would mark the first time that the EU border agency Frontex would operate outside Europe.

      Should the Senegalese government agree, the commissioner added, the EU could send surveillance equipment such as drones and vessels, as well as Frontex personnel.

      Deployed alongside local forces, the agents would “work together to fight the smugglers,” she said.

      “This is my offer and I hope that Senegal’s government is interested in this unique opportunity,” said Johansson, the EU’s home affairs commissioner.

      The announcement comes amid a sharp jump in attempts to reach the Canary Islands — a gateway to the EU — as authorities have clamped down on crossings to Europe from Libya.

      The Spanish archipelago lies just over 100 kilometres (60 miles) from the coast of Africa at its closest point.

      But the conditions in the open Atlantic are often dangerous, and would-be migrants often brave the trip in rickety wooden canoes known as pirogues.

      About 1,200 people died or went missing attempting the crossing in 2021, according to the UN’s International Organization for Migration (IOM).

      Spanish NGO Caminando Fronteras last month put the figure at over 4,400 people.

      Johansson also said on Friday that the 1,200-person figure was likely an underestimate.

      She added that she had discussed her Frontex proposal with Senegal’s armed-forces minister and foreign minister, and was due to continue talks with the interior minister on Friday.

      An agreement that would see Frontex agents deployed in Senegal could be finalised by the summer, she said.

      EU Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager, who was also at the news conference, said a Frontex mission in Senegal could also help tackle illegal fishing.

      Several top European Commission officials, including President Ursula von der Leyen, arrived in Senegal this week to prepare for a summit between the EU and the African Union on February 17-18.


    • EU: Tracking the Pact: Plan for Frontex to deploy “vessels, surveillance equipment, and carry out operational tasks” in Senegal and Mauritania

      The EU’s border agency is also due to open a “risk analysis cell” in Nouakchott, Mauritania, in autumn this year, according to documents obtained by Statewatch and published here. The two “action files” put heavy emphasis on the “prevention of irregular departures” towards the Canary Islands and increased cooperation on border management and anti-smuggling activities. Earlier this month, the Council authorised the opening of negotiations on status agreements that would allow Frontex to operate in both countries.

      Senegal: Fiche Action - Sénégal - Renforcement de la coopération avec l’agence Frontex (WK 7990/2022 INIT, LIMITE, 7 June 2022, pdf)

      Action 1: Jointly pursue contacts with the Senegalese authorities - and in particular the Ministry of the Interior, as well as other relevant authorities - at political and diplomatic level to achieve progress on the commitments made during the visit of President von der Leyen and Commissioners on 9-11 February 2022, in particular with regard to the fight against irregular immigration, and Frontex cooperation, as part of a comprehensive EU-Senegal partnership on migration and mobility. Take stock of Senegal’s political context (i.a. Casamance) and suggestions in order to agree on next steps and a calendar.

      Action 2: Taking up the elements of the previous negotiations with the relevant Senegalese authorities, and in the framework of the new working arrangement model, propose a working arrangement with Frontex in the short term, depending on the will and the interest of the Senegalese authorities to conclude such an arrangement.

      Action 3: Depending on the response from the Senegalese authorities, initiate steps towards the negotiation and, in the medium term, the conclusion of a status agreement allowing direct operational support from Frontex to Senegal, particularly in terms of prevention of crime and irregular migration, including in the fight against migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings.

      Action 4 Give substance to the messages expressed by the Senegalese authorities in the framework of policy exchanges and work on joint programming (Joint Strategy Paper - JSP). Identify support and cooperation measures of major interest to the Senegalese authorities (e.g. explore with Senegal the interest in concluding a Talent Partnership with voluntary Member States, if progress is made in other aspects of migration cooperation; propose an anti-smuggling operational partnership and explore possibilities to strengthen cooperation and exchange of information with Europol). Make use of the Team Europe Initiative (TEI) on the Western Mediterranean and Atlantic route to frame cooperation projects on migration issues. Promote cooperation with Frontex on border management also in the broader framework of cooperation and exchanges with the Senegalese authorities.


      Mauretania: Fiche Action - Mauritanie - Renforcement de la coopération avec l’agence Frontex (WK 7989/2022 INIT, LIMITE, 7 June 2022, pdf):

      Action 1: On the basis of the exchanges initiated and the cooperation undertaken with the Mauritanian authorities, identify the main priorities of the migration relationship. Determine the support and cooperation measures of major interest (e.g. support for the implementation of the National Migration Management Strategy, continuation of maritime strategy actions, protection of refugees and asylum seekers, support for reintegration, fight against smuggling networks, deployment of an additional surveillance and intervention unit of the “GAR-SI” type, creation of jobs for young people, involvement of the diaspora in the development of the country, etc.). Use the Team Europe Initiative (TEI) on the Western Mediterranean and Atlantic route to coordinate cooperation projects on migration issues, including on root causes.

      Action 2: Propose to the Mauritanian authorities the holding of an informal migration dialogue between the EU and Mauritania, focusing notably on the fight against migrant smuggling and border management, in order to best determine their needs in this area and identify the possibilities for Frontex support.

      Action 3: On the basis of the exchanges that took place between Frontex and the Mauritanian authorities in the first semester of 2022, finalise the exchanges on a working arrangement with Frontex, depending on their interest to conclude it.

      Action 4: Depending on the interest shown by the Mauritanian authorities, initiate diplomatic steps to propose the negotiation and conclusion of a status agreement allowing direct operational support from Frontex at Mauritania’s borders, in particular in the area of prevention of irregular departures, but also in the fight against migrant smuggling and other areas of interest to Mauritania, in the framework of the Frontex mandate.

      #Mauritanie #surveillance

  • Publication: The Geography of Conflict in North and West Africa


    African governments are increasingly confronted with new forms of political violence. The situation is particularly worrying in the Sahara-Sahel where violence is on the rise. This degrading security situation has prompted African countries and their partners to intervene militarily to stabilise the region and to prevent the spread of extremism and violence against civilians. However, these initiatives face many obstacles due to the transnational nature and geography of violence. Tensions regionalise across state borders when armed groups, defeated by counter-insurgency efforts, relocate to other countries. This study maps the evolution of violence across North and West Africa, with a particular focus on Mali, Lake Chad and Libya. In the regions experiencing the highest levels of political insecurity, it identifies whether and how conflicts tend to cluster or spread, potentially across national borders. The work is based on a new spatial indicator of political violence designed to assess the long-term evolution of conflicts and provide policy options.

    #Geography_of_conflict #Géographie_des_conflits #North_Africa #West_Africa #Afrique_du_Nord #Afrique_de_l_Ouest #Geography #Conflicts #Géographie #Conflits

  • I circuiti dell’umanitario-finanziario tra il filo spinato di Moria

    In particolare, la Grecia è diventato il primo paese UE in cui si sta sperimentando un progetto europeo di finanziarizzazione delle misure di supporto ai richiedenti asilo in cooperazione con UNHCR. #Refugee_cash_assistance programme è il nome della piattaforma unica con cui vengono distribuite carte di debito ai richiedenti asilo dallo scorso aprile; progetto in cui sono state incluse tutte le ONG che operano nei campi di rifugiati o negli hotspot in Grecia. Per parlarne parto dalle gabbie di Moria, l’hotspot più narrato dai media europei e anche quello maggiormente sotto accusa per il sovraffollamento costante e la permanenza forzata di migranti al suo interno, in attesa che le domande di asilo vengano processate. L’ hotspot di Moria, in cui al momento sono bloccate circa 3200 persone, costituisce punto nevralgico delle politiche migratorie europee e, al contempo, lente attraverso cui guardare l’ Europa, è un luogo di confinamento noto per i livelli concentrici di filo spinato, ben visibili anche dall’esterno, che dividono in modo gerarchico i migranti all’interno, in base alla nazionalità. Dall’esterno tuttavia non si riesce a cogliere molto più che questo, oltre ad osservare la complessa economia del campo, che sconfina rispetto al muro esterno dell’hotspot, in particolare da quando ai migranti è stato concesso di uscire durante il giorno.

    L’hotspot, luogo ad accesso ristretto per eccellenza, ha tuttavia i suoi canali di ingresso possibili, in particolare quando si riesce a vestire una casacca di una ONG, che ho indossato per un giorno, con l’obiettivo di assistere alla distribuzione mensile delle #debit_cards ai migranti effettuata dall’organizzazione americana #Mercy_Corps. Appena varcato il cancello principale, l’economia spaziale dell’hotspot è visibilmente scandita dalle gabbie concentriche e dal filo spinato che avvolge ogni settore del campo. Le zone A, B e C, sono destinate ai “soggetti vulnerabili” in maggioranza famiglie siriane, e a donne sole. L’etichetta “vulnerabili” comporta che al cancello di ognuna di queste gabbie-settori vi sia un volontario, dell’ONG #Eurorelief che impedisce ai rifugiati degli altri settori del campo di entrare, e, in nome della protezione, respinge con forza all’interno un minore che prova ad uscire nel cortile antistante. Vulnerabilità che tuttavia, come spiegano gli operatori di MSF, spesso non viene riconosciuta da UNHCR quando resta non-visibile, come nel caso di torture e violenze sessuali subite dalle e dai migranti.

    Oltre ai settori “protetti” anche le altre zone dell’hotspot sono ad accesso limitato: per accedervi, ogni residente dell’hotspot deve mostrare un braccialetto che accerta la propria apparenza a quell’area di tende o containers. I nomi di queste zone del campo – “#Pakistani_sector” e “#African_compound” e “#North_African_sector” – indicano di fatto i criteri di diniego, ovvero di chi, tra gli abitanti di Moria, ha quasi la certezza di non ricevere lo status di rifugiato. Come si può evincere, a giocare un ruolo determinante nelle “selezioni” effettuate dallo European Asylum Support Office (EASO), sono le nazionalità: i cittadini di nazionalità pakistana sono tra i più soggetti alle deportazioni verso la Turchia, e l’aumento visibile di migranti algerini a Lesvos ha significato per loro un tasso diniego pressoché totale Il filo spinato avvolge anche l’ area in cui si trovano i containers di EASO e UNHCR: un filo di protezione, lo definisce il poliziotto che sorveglia la lunga fila di migranti fuori dall’ufficio di #EASO, in seguito alle numerose rivolte avvenute nell’hotspot a fronte delle attese infinite prima che le domande di asilo vengano processate, o addirittura per depositare la domanda di asilo.

    Con l’implementazione dello EU-Turkey Deal, chi viene dichiarato “inammissibile”, e dunque preventivamente escluso dai canali dell’asilo, così come chi riceve il diniego della protezione internazionale, viene trasferito nel #pre-removal_center interno a #Moria, in attesa di essere deportato in Turchia. Una prigione nella prigione, dove si perdono le tracce di chi entra: non ci sono numeri ufficiali sulle persone detenute: richiedenti asilo che venivano seguiti per assistenza medica o che ricevevano la ricarica mensile della carta di debito, improvvisamente spariscono.

    Tuttavia, in parallelo ai circuiti di filo spinato che delimitano i gradi di esclusione differenziale dai canali dell’asilo, vi sono altri circuiti non-visibili e immateriali che convergono negli hotspots e nei centri di accoglienza in Grecia. Questi sono circuiti di dati e informazioni che prendono forma a partire da una presa umanitario-finanziaria sulle vite dei e delle migranti, e in particolare su ciò che UNHCR stesso definisce le “popolazioni transnazionali in transito”. Gli stessi migranti che sono bloccati a Moria da un anno o più e a cui sarà molto probabilmente negata la protezione internazionale e dunque il diritto di restare in Europa, sono al contempo oggetto di misure di estrazione di valore dal loro stesso permanere in quel luogo. Non mi riferisco qui a ciò che in letteratura è stata definita la “migration industry”, ovvero l’economia che ruota attorno alla gestione dei centri di detenzione e di accoglienza, né al profitto ricavato dalle grandi corporation che producono nuove tecnologie per rafforzare i confini o identificare i migranti. I circuiti di cui parlo sono piuttosto l’esito dell’introduzione di nuovi modi di digitalizzazione e finanziarizzazione delle forme di intervento umanitario e di supporto monetario nei confronti dei richiedenti asilo. Questo si concretizza nell’erogazione di carte di debito Mastercard, con il logo di UNHCR e di ECHO, a tutti coloro che all’interno degli hotspots e dei campi greci vengono dichiarati da UNHCR “people of concern”. L’attore finanziario coinvolto è #Pre-Paid_Financial_Services con sede a Londra. Per ogni carta rilasciata, UNHCR paga una commissione di 6 euro a Pre-Paid Financial Services, e una tassa è prevista anche ogni transazione effettuata da ciascun richiedente asilo, cosi come per ogni ricarica mensile. Solo sulle isole, ogni mese vengono rilasciate circa 500 nuove carte, e a Lesvos si ricaricano circa 2500 carte ogni volta.

    90 euro a persona, 340 per nucleo familiare: queste sono le cifre fissate da UNHCR in accordo con le autorità greche, della ricarica mensile delle carte di debito. La cifra sale da 90 a 150 in alcuni campi di rifugiati o centri di accoglienza dove, a differenza di Moria, non viene fornito cibo. Tuttavia, anche nell’hotspot di Moria questa sembra essere la prossima tappa: interrompere la distribuzione di cibo e vestiti e far si che i richiedenti asilo cucinino autonomamente.

    All’interno di Moria una signora siriana mostra la sua asylum card, per ottenere la ricarica mensile della carta di debito: sul suo documento non compare, per sua fortuna, il timbro rosso, che indica le restrizioni geografiche (“geographical restrictions” ) imposte dallo EU-Turkey Deal, secondo cui tutta la procedura di asilo deve essere svolta sulle isole. Per la maggioranza delle persone bloccate da mesi a Moria, quel timbro significa non solo immobilità ma anche alto rischio di trasferimento forzato in Turchia. Mentre procede la registrazione mensile delle carte, tra tende e containers, nella prigione interna all’hotspot 35 dei migranti accusati di aver partecipato alle proteste del 18 luglio contro la lentezza nell’esame delle domande di asilo scompaiono dalla lista di Mercy Corps. La #Fast_Track_Procedure, concepita per espellere più velocemente i migranti dalle isole greche, si scontra e si articola con altri confini temporali che producono contenimento a oltranza, sulle isole.

    #Moria #asile #migrations #hotspots #réfugiés #business #Lesbos #Grèce #camps_de_réfugiés #économie #vulnérabilité #accord_UE-Turquie #expulsions #renvois #migration_industry #argent #cartes_de_crédit #financial_inclusion #nourriture #geographical_restrictions #liberté_de_mouvement #liberté_de_circulation #restrictions_géographiques #confinement #îles

    cc @albertocampiphoto

  • White masks in #Tunisia

    Tunisia has a problem with its African roots. Racial discrimination and xenophobia is outrageously commonplace for black Tunisians and African immigrants and completely unrecognized and unaccounted for among public institutions and governmental parties. Despite the emphasis on the Islamic coda that prohibits discrimination against fellow black Muslims and Act 21 of the national constitution which […]

    #ESSAYS #blackness #Fanon #MENA #migration #North_Africa #race #sub-Saharan_Africa

  • The Maghrebi experience in Lyon, #France told through cassette tapes

    The three CD set Maghreb Lyon was released earlier this year on archival French record label Frémeux et Associés. It’s a marvelous collection of old cassette tapes from North African.....

    #MUSIC_PAGE #Algeria #Morocco #North_Africa #Tunisia

  • The “ISIS spring” in #North_Africa

    The Islamic State in Iraq and #syria (ISIS) (aka the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant [ISIL]) is expanding beyond the Levant. Establishing Wilyat Sinai (the Province of Sinai) was just the start, and now the group is determined to expand into all of North Africa. What happened in Sirte yesterday is just one episode in a series geared toward launching an “ISIS Spring” on the African continent.

    #Anwar_Sadat #Articles #Bashar_al-Assad #Boko_Haram #Cameroon #Chad #Egypt #ISIL #ISIS #Morocco #Niger #Nigeria #Mideast_&_North_Africa

  • Whose “New African Writing” ?

    Tweet The #Latest issue of the Journal of Postcolonial and Commonwealth Studies takes on “African writing in the twenty-first century” and presents views on topics as varied as South African theater, queer Kenyan bloggers, digital publishing, and the #Caine_Prize for African Writing. An edited version of Lindsey Green-Simms’s introduction to the issue appeared here on AIAC mid-June. But as varied (...)

    #BOOKS #FEATURED #African_Literature #Ahmad_Yamani #Arabic_Writing #Egypt #Facebook #Granta #Kamel_Riahi #Kwani #Libya #Literature #Miral_al-Tahawy #Mohammed_Rabie #Morocco #Nael_el-Toukhy #North_Africa #Tamazight #Tareq_Emam #Tunisia #Yasser_Abdellatif #Youssef_Rakha