• Beyond the Camps: Beijing’s Long-Term Scheme of Coercive Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in #Xinjiang

    After recruiting a hundred or more thousand police forces, installing massive surveillance systems, and interning vast numbers of predominantly Turkic minority population members, many have been wondering about Beijing’s next step in its so-called “war on Terror” in Xinjiang. Since the second half of 2018, limited but apparently growing numbers of detainees have been released into different forms of forced labor. In this report it is argued based on government documents that the state’s long-term stability maintenance strategy in Xinjiang is predicated upon a perverse and extremely intrusive combination of forced or at least involuntary training and labor, intergenerational separation and social control over family units. Much of this is being implemented under the heading and guise of “poverty alleviation”.

    Below, the author identifies three distinct flow schemes by which the state seeks to place the vast majority of adult Uyghurs and other minority populations, both men and women, into different forms of coercive or at least involuntary, labor-intensive factory work. This is achieved through a combination of internment camp workshops, large industrial parks, and village-based satellite factories. While the parents are being herded into full-time work, their children are put into full-time (at least full day-time) education and training settings. This includes children below preschool age (infants and toddlers), so that ethnic minority women are being “liberated” and “freed” to engage in full-time wage labor. Notably, both factory and educational settings are essentially state-controlled environments that facilitate ongoing political indoctrination while barring religious practices. As a result, the dissolution of traditional, religious and family life is only a matter of time. The targeted use of village work teams and village-based satellite factories means that these “poverty alleviation” and social re-engineering projects amount to a grand scheme that penetrates every corner of ethnic minority society with unprecedented pervasiveness.

    Consequently, it is argued that Beijing’s grand scheme of forced education, training and labor in Xinjiang simultaneously achieves at least five main goals in this core region of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): maintain the minority population in state-controlled environments, inhibit intergenerational cultural transmission, achieve national poverty reduction goals, promote economic growth along the BRI, and bring glory to the Party by achieving all of these four aims in a way that is ideologically consistent with the core tenets of Communist thought – using labor to transform religious minority groups towards a predominantly materialist worldview, akin to the Reform Through Labor (劳改) program. Government documents outline that the transformation of rural populations from farming to wage labor should involve not just the acquisition of new skills, but also a thorough identity and worldview change in line with Party ideology. In this context, labor is hailed as a strategic means to eradicate “extremist” ideologies.

    The domestic and global implications of this grand scheme, where internment camps form only one component of a society-wide coercive social re-engineering strategy, are dramatic. Government documents blatantly boast about the fact that the labor supply from the vast internment camp network has been attracting many Chinese companies to set up production in Xinjiang, supporting the economic growth goals of the BRI.

    Through the mutual pairing assistance program, 19 cities and provinces from the nation’s most developed regions are pouring billions of Chinese Yuan (RMB) into the establishment of factories in minority regions. Some of them directly involve the use of internment camp labor, while others use Uyghur women who must then leave their children in educational or day care facilities in order to engage in full time factory labor. Another aspect of Beijing’s labor schemes in the region involve the essentially mandatory relocation of large numbers of minority workers from Xinjiang to participating companies in eastern China.

    Soon, many or most products made in China that rely at least in part on low-skilled, labor-intensive manufacturing, may contain elements of involuntary ethnic minority labor from Xinjiang.

    The findings presented below call for nothing less than a global investigation of supply chains involving Chinese products or product components, and for a greatly increased scrutiny of trade flows along China’s Belt and Road. They also warrant a strong response from not only the international community in regards to China’s intrusive coerced social re-engineering practices among its northwestern Turkic minorities, but from China’s own civil society that should not want to see such totalitarian labor and family systems extended to all of China.

    https://www.jpolrisk.com/beyond-the-camps-beijings-long-term-scheme-of-coercive-labor-poverty-allev
    #contrôle_social #travail_forcé #Chine #camps #minorités #pauvreté #Ouïghours #rééducation #Nouvelle_route_de_la_soie #Reform_Through_Labor (#劳改) #camps_d'internement

    ping @reka @simplicissimus

    • How the world learned of China’s mass internment camps
      A paradox characterizes China’s mass internment camps in Xinjiang.

      Advanced technology has allowed Chinese authorities to construct a total surveillance and mass detention regime, of which other architects of internment camps, such as the Nazis and the Soviets, could only dream.

      But technological advancements are a double-edged sword. Whereas it was years or even decades before the world knew the extent of the Nazi concentration camps and the Soviet gulag, it took only months to learn the scope and scale of what the Chinese Communist Party has been doing in Xinjiang. Why? Satellite images shared on the internet.

      The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists’ China Cables investigation gave us a unique glimpse at how the Chinese government runs this mass detention and “re-education” program and how they’ve deployed surveillance techniques to track an entire ethnic minority population. The leaked documents build substantially – and in the government’s own words – on our understanding of the situation in Xinjiang.

      But a leak from inside the Chinese government is exceedingly rare. So how have journalists used technology, advanced reporting methods, and sheer perseverance to extract information out of this remote and closely-guarded region in China’s northwest? And at what cost?

      The earliest English-language reports mentioning large internment facilities came in September 2017.

      On Sept. 10, Human Rights Watch published a report saying that the Chinese government had detained “thousands” of people in “political education facilities” since April 2017. The report cited interviews with three people whose relatives had been detained, as well as Chinese-language media reports from local Xinjiang outlets that mentioned “counter extremism training centers” and “education and transformation training centers.”

      On Sept. 11, Radio Free Asia became the first major English-language news organization to state that there were “re-education camps” in Xinjiang. The outlet’s team of Uighur-speaking reporters learned details about the camps by calling numerous local officials and police officers in Xinjiang.

      These reports raised awareness of the issue among China watchers already concerned about the situation in Xinjiang, but did not make waves among the wider public. The basic claims made in these initial reports – that many Uighurs were being put into special indoctrination facilities simply for being religious or having relatives abroad – were later corroborated. In late 2017, the number of camps and sheer scale of the detentions were still unknown; the highest estimate of the number of people detained was in the thousands.

      It was the subsequent work of two independent researchers that unveiled the true scope of China’s mass internment drive and brought the issue to the national and international spotlight. Adrian Zenz, a German researcher based at the time in Korntal, Germany, dug through obscure corners of the Chinese internet, using government procurement documents, construction bids, and public recruitment notices to calculate the first rough estimate of the number of people held in the camps. He put it somewhere between several hundred thousand and one million, in an article published in May 2018 for Jamestown Foundation. After further research, he later revised his estimate to around 1.5 million.

      Meanwhile, Shawn Zhang, a graduate student in Canada, used satellite images obtained through Google Maps to locate dozens of facilities, most newly built, that he believed were detention camps; he posted his findings in a May 2018 blog post. Zhang has now assisted many news outlets in the use of satellite imagery to locate and verify camps. The dozens upon dozens of potential sites he unearthed corroborated Zenz’s finding that the camps’ population reached the hundreds of thousands, if not more.

      In late 2017 and early 2018, several journalists from foreign media outlets were able to travel to Xinjiang and observe the expanding security state there firsthand. Megha Rajagapalan’s October 2017 dispatch for Buzzfeed painted a dark picture of the high-tech surveillance, or what she called a “21st century police state,” that had begun to blanket the city of Kashgar, in Xinjiang’s more restive southern region. The Wall Street Journal and the Associated Press both ran a series of dispatches and investigations into the camps, and Agence France-Presse revealed how local governments in Xinjiang had spent a small fortune buying surveillance technology and riot gear as the security state grew.

      There remain many unknowns. Exactly how many people are or have been detained in the camps? How many people have died while interned there? Does China plan to make detention facilities a permanent fixture of life in Xinjiang?

      These questions are not easy to answer. In addition to the sheer logistical challenge of gaining unfettered access to the region, the Chinese government has also sought to silence and punish those who have helped reveal its activities in Xinjiang. Authorities have detained the relatives of Radio Free Asia’s team of Uighur journalists. In 2018, Rajagapalan’s journalist visa was not renewed, effectively expelling her from the country. Chinese authorities have threatened Uighurs abroad who have spoken out about the camps.

      Nevertheless, reporting continues. And there remains a resolute community of journalists and activists working to bring more transparency and international scrutiny to the region.

      https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/how-the-world-learned-of-chinas-mass-internment-camps
      #technologie

  • GRAIN — The Belt and Road Initiative: Chinese agribusiness going global
    https://www.grain.org/article/entries/6133-the-belt-and-road-initiative-chinese-agribusiness-going-global

    One of the world’s biggest e-commerce companies, Beijing-based JD.com, says it will soon be able to deliver fruit from anywhere in the world to the doorsteps of Chinese consumers within 48 hours. It takes highly integrated global infrastructure—connecting farms to warehouses to transportation to consumers—to achieve a goal like this. China’s new mega-infrastructure plan, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), will help make JD.com’s vision a reality. It will also increase the concentration of global food production and distribution, potentially pushing small-scale farmers, fisherfolk, forest peoples and rural communities further to the margins. There are also serious concerns that BRI could worsen land grabs, human rights abuses, indebtedness, and environmental and health impacts in target countries.

    Pas encore regardé #obor #BRI #Chine #commerce #agroindustrie #route_de_la_soie #nouvelle_route_de_la_soie

  • La Cina e il nuovo ordine euro-asiatico

    Sin dal 2013, quando il Presidente cinese #Xi_Jinping ne delineò gli obiettivi, l’iniziativa ormai nota come “Nuova Via della Seta” o “#One_Belt_One_Road” (OBOR) è rapidamente divenuta fulcro della politica estera della Cina in Eurasia e a livello globale e simbolo dell’inedito attivismo di Pechino sulla scena internazionale. Dopo cinque anni, l’iniziativa mantiene il suo appeal, nonostante i rischi intrinseci ad un così vasto progetto, le difficoltà interne ed esterne alla Cina e lo scetticismo di molti paesi coinvolti.

    L’idea cinese di “riconnessione infrastrutturale e logistica” di uno spazio geografico ma anche politico enorme e variegato com l’Eurasia, in effetti, sembra essere l’unica “grande visione” apparentemente in grado di offrire nuovo slancio all’economia globale in tempi di nazionalismo economico-politico, ripresa incerta e crisi diffuse. Si tratta non soltanto di un ambizioso progetto infrastrutturale, ma in effetti di una strategia transregionale di co-sviluppo industriale ed economico: la regione interessata si estende dalle frontiere continentali della Cina fino alle economie in via di sviluppo della cintura afro-asiatica. Ad oggi, questa macro-area rappresenta (insieme ad alcune regioni interne dell’Africa) l’ultimo grande spazio “disconnesso” dell’economia globale; al contempo, però, è territorialmente contiguo ai grandi poli di crescita economica e demografica dell’Asia costiera.

    L’iniziativa è dichiaratamente non egemonica e aperta a tutti i paesi interessati. Pechino ha finora impegnato intorno ai 500 miliardi di dollari nella OBOR, suddivisi fra isituzioni nazionali come il Silk Road Fund e la China Export-Import Bank, nuove istituzioni multilaterali regionali come la Banca Asiatica di Investimenti nelle Infrastrutture (AIIB) e linee di credito delle banche cinesi.

    La OBOR e le istituzioni ad essa legate non rappresentano, tuttavia, né un nuovo piano Marshall, né tantomeno un coerente disegno di graduale assunzione, da parte della Cina, dei compiti di garante di un ordine economico mondiale liberale. Un ordine aperto – e perciò contrario a chiusure nazionalistiche e protezionistiche – come alcuni teorici dell’ordine liberale sembrano sperare, e altri sembrano temere. Essa si iscrive, a converso, nel vasto piano di “ringiovanimento nazionale” che il Presidente Xi ha posto, come in altri suoi interventi, al centro del suo discorso al 19° Congresso del Partito, in ottobre.

    In effetti, la logica della OBOR appare complessa e si muove su piani molteplici: deve essere essenzialmente definita come una risposta proattiva della leadership cinese a cambiamenti strutturali di breve e di lungo periodo, interni ed esterni al Paese. Vi sono almeno tre dimensioni: domestico/macro-economica, geo-economico/geopolitica continentale, e sistemico/globale. Le tre dimensioni sono legate e si rafforzano reciprocamente.

    In termini domestici e macroeconomici, vengono spesso identificate questi fattori chiave nel lancio della OBOR: la Cina, grazie alle misure di stimolo all’economia approvate dopo il crack di Lehman Brothers (all’inizio della crisi), ha generato sovraccapacità nell’industria pesante, sopratuttto dell´acciaio e del cemento; di conseguenza, le banche hanno accumulato enorme liquidità, mentre a livello interno i consumi interni crescevano d’importanza fino a diventare determinanti nell’economia nazionale. Dunque, l’iniziativa sarebbe strumento funzionale a canalizzare sovraccapacità produttive verso i mercati esteri e l’eccesso di liquidità in un grande progetto infrastrutturale.

    Se questa spiegazione aiuta a cogliere la logica contingente della OBOR non ne spiega, tuttavia, le origini strutturali. Esse sono da ricercarsi nell´impulso dato sin dall´inizio degli anni 2000 ad una graduale ma sostenuta trasformazione nel sistema produttivo del paese. Si è deciso di cambiare la geografia economica cinese per ridurre il gap di sviluppo regionale e per combattere i rischi di destabilizzazione nella regione orientale di confine dello Xijninang. Tale sforzo di trasformazione ha creato poli di crescita e produzione nelle regioni centrali e centro-occidentali, in città come Chengdu, Chongqing e più recentemente Urumqi e Kashgar, ed è stato accompagnato dallo sviluppo massiccio della rete stradale e ferroviaria necessaria a collegare questi centri con le coste e con il resto del Paese.

    Allargando lo sguardo all’intero spazio euro-asiatico, il mutamento nella geografia economica del paese ha anche prodotto conseguenze geopolitiche e geoeconomiche profonde. Pechino è oggi è in grado di pianificare la creazione non solo di vie di trasporto continentali ma di una serie di corridoi multimodali terra-mare alternativi alle sole vie marittime, che finora restano sotto il controllo stringente della marina americana. L’Europa diventa così raggiungibile per nuove rotte che sostituiscono parzialmente o totalmente le vecchie. Inoltre, si allarga il ventaglio dei partner commerciali: Pechino si garantisce non solo una diversificazione delle forniture energetiche ma soprattutto l´accesso ai futuri mercati collocati lungo la cintura meridionale dell´Eurasia, dal Sud-Est asiatico e dall’India a Turchia, Iran e Medio Oriente, sino al Corno d´Africa e al Nordafrica

    Infine, le trasformazioni innescate dalla OBOR all’interno dei confini cinesi e nel continente asiatico, e le nuove opportunità geopolitiche apertesi per Pechino hanno prodotto effetti sistemici: per la dimensione stessa dello spazio interessato e per il peso economico, demografico e geografico della Cina, l’iniziativa è di fatto il primo organico passo verso un ordine globale post-Occidentale. A questo passo, tuttavia, la stessa Cina sembra non ancora pronta.

    In effetti, ciascuna delle tre dimensioni presenta rischi per Pechino, che aumentano proporzionalmente al crescere e al concretizzarsi del progetto OBOR.

    A livello interno, un ulteriore rallentamento della crescita, una crisi del sistema bancario o un crollo dei prezzi dei terreni rappresentato tutti elementi che potrebbero seriamente mettere a rischio la stabilità e la nuova dottirna della “crescita normale” sulla quale si basa la legittimità della leadership cinese. Un simile scenario avrebbe ripercussioni dirette sulla OBOR.

    In termini geopolitici, la Cina è dipendente dalle relazioni con una vasta rete di paesi e aree che hanno, in diversa forma e grado, ragioni di temere o di guardare con sospetto l’iniziativa cinese: tra questi c’è l’Europa, e naturalmente anche gli Stati Uniti – osservatori esterni interessati.

    Inoltre, la riconnessione dell’Eurasia è un processo che precede e trascende i piani cinesi. Essa trova la sua origine nelle trasformazioni che negli ultimi quindici anni hanno visto moltiplicare i legami commeraciali all’interno dell’Asia ed emergere nuovi e autonomi centri di potenza economica. Gli attori principali dell´Eurasia – dalla Russia alle medie potenze turca e iraniana, dagli stati centro-asiatici, abili a bilanciare gli interessi concorrenti delle grandi potenze, all’India, sino all’insulare Giappone – si stanno riposizionando e attrezzando per affrontare la sfida lanciata da Pechino. Questi paesi non negano la validità del concetto di una riconnessione continentale, ma lo concepiscono attraverso proprie strategie, contromisure e nuovi assi, come quello tra Giappone e India o quello all’interno del Sud-Est asiatico (paesi ASEAN).

    Dagli altri player continentali non solo dipende il successo dei programmi infrastrutturali, ma anche l’emergere di un distinto ordine euro-asiatico. Le istituzioni liberali occidentali sono chiaramente insufficienti a “coprire” la portata del cambiamento in corso, ma ad esso manca anche – per il momento – una cornice alternativa definita, politica e di regole condivise.

    In questo quadro, l’iniziativa #OBOR (e le istituzioni create quale suo corollario) colgono la natura diffusa, interconnessa, fluida, non istiuzionalizzata, al contempo competitiva e cooperativa, del nuovo sistema globale. Ne individua e ne coglie correttamente strumenti e palcoscenico d’azione: commercio, sviluppo economico e connettività anche fra aree sino ad ora ai margini del sistema economico globale. In tal modo, la OBOR posiziona la Cina al centro dei nuovi assetti, con i suoi interessi, la sua forza e le sue chiare priorità nazionali. Tuttavia, per questa stessa ragione, non è ancora in grado di offrire la prospettiva di un ordine – concetto ancora più complesso rispetto a un sistema – accettato e condiviso da tutti gli attori co-protagonisti dei processi in atto. E’ questa la sfida più grande per Pechino negli anni a venire.

    https://www.aspeniaonline.it/la-cina-e-il-nuovo-ordine-euro-asiatico

    #Chine #cartographie #visualisation #nouvelle_route_de_la_soie #route_de_la_soie
    ping @simplicissimus @reka

  • Le monde selon #Xi_Jinping

    Depuis 2012, le désormais « président à vie » Xi Jinping a concentré tous les pouvoirs sur sa personne, avec l’obsession de faire de la #Chine la superpuissance du XXIe siècle. Plongée au coeur de son « rêve chinois ».

    Derrière son apparente bonhomie se cache un chef redoutable, prêt à tout pour faire de la Chine la première puissance mondiale, d’ici au centenaire de la République populaire, en 2049. En mars dernier, à l’issue de vastes purges, Xi Jinping modifie la Constitution et s’intronise « président à vie ». Une concentration des pouvoirs sans précédent depuis la fin de l’ère maoïste. Né en 1953, ce fils d’un proche de Mao Zedong révoqué pour « complot antiparti » choisit à l’adolescence, en pleine tourmente de la Révolution culturelle, un exil volontaire à la campagne, comme pour racheter la déchéance paternelle. Revendiquant une fidélité aveugle au Parti, il gravira en apparatchik « plus rouge que rouge » tous les degrés du pouvoir.
    Depuis son accession au secrétariat général du Parti en 2012, puis à la présidence l’année suivante, les autocritiques d’opposants ont réapparu, par le biais de confessions télévisées. Et on met à l’essai un système de surveillance généralisée censé faire le tri entre les bons et les mauvais citoyens. Inflexible sur le plan intérieur, Xi Jinping s’est donné comme objectif de supplanter l’Occident à la tête d’un nouvel ordre mondial. Son projet des « routes de la soie » a ainsi considérablement étendu le réseau des infrastructures chinoises à l’échelle planétaire. Cet expansionnisme stratégique, jusque-là développé en silence, inquiète de plus en plus l’Europe et les États-Unis.

    Impériale revanche
    Dans ce portrait très documenté du leader chinois, Sophie Lepault et Romain Franklin donnent un aperçu inédit de sa politique et montrent que l’itinéraire de Xi Jinping a façonné ses choix. De Pékin à Djibouti – l’ancienne colonie française est depuis 2017 la première base militaire chinoise à l’étranger – en passant par la mer de Chine méridionale et l’Australie, les réalisateurs passent au crible les projets et les stratégies d’influence du nouvel homme fort de la planète. Nourrie d’images d’archives et de témoignages (de nombreux experts et de dissidents, mais aussi d’un haut gradé proche du pouvoir), leur enquête montre comment Xi Jinping a donné à la reconquête nationaliste de la grandeur impériale chinoise, projet nourri dès l’origine par la République populaire, une spectaculaire ampleur.

    https://www.arte.tv/fr/videos/078193-000-A/le-monde-selon-xi-jinping
    #biographie #démocratie #trauma #traumatisme #Mao #révolution_culturelle #Terres_Jaunes #exil #Prince_Rouge #nationalisme #rêve_chinois #renaissance_nationale #histoire_nationale #totalitarisme #stabilité #idéologie #anti-corruption #lutte_contre_la_corruption #purge #dictature #investissements_à_l'étranger #prêts #dette #KUKA #ports #droits_humains #Australie #infiltration_chinoise #Nouvelle-Zélande #David_Cameron #Jean-Pierre_Raffarin #matières_premières #capitalisme_autoritaire #Ouïghours #arrestations #répression #censure #liberté_d'expression #défilés_militaires #armée #puissance_militaire #Mer_de_Chine_méridionale #îles_de_Spratleys #liberté_de_la_presse #prisonniers_politiques #Hong_Kong

    #Djibouti #base_militaire (de Djibouti)

    #Sri_Lanka —> Au Sri Lanka, le #port de #Hambantota est sous contrôle chinois, ceci pour au moins 99 ans (accord signé avec le Sri Lanka qui n’a pas pu rembourser le prêt que la Chine lui a accorder pour construire le port...)
    #dépendance
    v. aussi :
    Comment la Chine a fait main basse sur le Sri Lanka
    https://www.courrierinternational.com/article/comment-la-chine-fait-main-basse-sur-le-sri-lanka

    Histoire semblable pour le #Port_du_Pirée à #Athènes, en #Grèce ou l’#aéroport de #Toulouse, en #France.

    #Organisation_de_coopération_de_Shangaï :


    https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organisation_de_coop%C3%A9ration_de_Shanghai
    #Grande_unité_mondiale #enrichissement_pour_tous

    Quelques cartes et images tirées du #film #documentaire.

    La #nouvelle_route_de_la_soie et autres investissements chinois dans les infrastructures mondiales de #transport :

    La #Chinafrique :


    #Afrique
    Afrique où la Chine propose la « #solution_chinoise », programme de #développement basé sur le #développement_économique —> « #modèle_chinois de développement »

    Le programme de #surveillance_de_masse :

    Outre la surveillance, mise en place d’un programme appelé « #crédit_social » :

    Le #Système_de_crédit_social est un projet du gouvernement chinois visant à mettre en place d’ici 2020 un système national de #réputation_des_citoyens. Chacun d’entre eux se voit attribuer une note, échelonnée entre 350 et 950 points, dite « crédit social », fondée sur les données dont dispose le gouvernement à propos de leur statut économique et social. Le système repose sur un outil de surveillance de masse et utilise les technologies d’analyse du #big_data. Il est également utilisé pour noter les entreprises opérant sur le marché chinois.

    https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syst%C3%A8me_de_cr%C3%A9dit_social

    Voici ce que cela donne :


    #surveillance #contrôle_de_la_population #vidéosurveillance #reconnaissance_faciale #contrôle_social
    #cartographie #visualisation
    ping @etraces

    ping @reka

  • Les gangsters de la #finance

    Blanchiment, fraude fiscale, corruption, manipulation des cours... : depuis la crise de 2008, la banque HSBC est au coeur de tous les scandales. Cinq ans après leur film sur Goldman Sachs, Jérôme Fritel et Marc Roche passent au crible cet empire financier au-dessus des lois.

    Créée à Hongkong, il y a un siècle et demi, par des commerçants écossais liés au trafic d’opium, HSBC (Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation) n’a cessé de prospérer en marge de toute régulation. Aujourd’hui, la banque britannique à l’ADN pirate incarne à elle seule les excès et les dérives de la finance internationale. Blanchiment de l’argent du crime – celui des cartels de la drogue mexicains et colombiens –, évasion fiscale massive, corruption ou manipulation du cours des devises et des taux d’intérêt : depuis la crise de 2008, ce géant a été mêlé à de nombreux scandales avec régularité et en toute impunité. Car l’opaque HSBC, experte en sociétés-écrans, dont les coffres débordent d’argent liquide déposé par ses clients discrets et douteux, est devenue too big to jail, « trop grosse pour aller en prison ». La banque, riche de quelque 3 000 milliards de dollars, s’en tire chaque fois avec des amendes dérisoires. Trait d’union entre l’Orient et l’Occident, elle sert aussi désormais de pipeline pour les centaines de milliards d’euros de capitaux chinois partant à la conquête des marchés occidentaux : HSBC navigue aujourd’hui sous pavillon rouge.

    Nouvelles menaces
    Après Goldman Sachs – La banque qui dirige le monde, Jérôme Fritel et Marc Roche plongent dans les arcanes d’un empire tentaculaire qui se cache derrière sa vitrine de banque de détail britannique. De Hongkong aux États-Unis en passant par l’Europe, cette édifiante enquête révèle non seulement l’ampleur ahurissante des malversations commises par HSBC, mais éclaire aussi – avec une remarquable limpidité – les menaces qui se profilent sur la stabilité financière mondiale, dix ans après la crise des subprimes.


    https://www.arte.tv/fr/videos/069080-000-A/les-gangsters-de-la-finance
    #banque #HSBC #économie #blanchissement_d'argent #évasion_fiscale #drogue #impunité #Hong_Kong #argent_sale #film #documentaire #panama_papers #fraude_fiscale #paradis_fiscaux #sociétés-écran #guerre_de_l'opium #too_big_to_jail #bankster #mondialisation #globalisation #Angleterre #UK #George_Osborne #Stephen_Green #Chine #Suisse #opération_chocolat #Swiss_leaks #SwissLeaks #David_Cameron #Stuart_Gulliver #EDF #nucléaire #route_de_la_soie #nouvelle_route_de_la_soie #monnaie #city_of_london #Londres #Hinkley_Point

  • Le plus long voyage en #train de l’histoire
    http://www.ouest-france.fr/insolite-le-plus-long-voyage-en-train-de-lhistoire-3026449?55_source=Ou

    21 jours, c’est le temps que va mettre ce convoi exceptionnel pour relier la Chine à l’Espagne. Il passe par la France ce vendredi.

    10 000 km, c’est 1 000 de plus que le Transsibérien. Long de 600 mètres (30 wagons), le train Yuxinou est parti le 18 novembre du port industriel Chinois de Yiwu. Direction Madrid, où il est attendu lundi, après une escale technique, aujourd’hui, à Forbach (Moselle).

    À son bord, 82 containers remplis de produits de consommation courante. Il repartira en Chine avec des voitures et des produits de luxe.

    Pékin a consacré 30 milliards d’euros à l’amélioration des transports ferroviaires, une opération baptisée « #nouvelle_route_de_la_soie »

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3k8mMkOyzlo


    #transport