• Saudi Arabia accused of hacking London-based dissident
    https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/28/saudi-arabia-accused-of-hacking-london-based-dissident-ghanem-almasarir

    Kingdom targeted satirist Ghanem Almasarir with Israeli malware, letter of claim alleges Saudi Arabia has been accused of launching a sophisticated hacking attack against a prominent dissident in London who is allegedly living under police protection, according to a letter of claim that has been sent to the kingdom and seen by the Guardian. The letter of claim, which was delivered to the Saudi embassy in London on Tuesday, was sent on behalf of the Saudi satirist Ghanem Almasarir, and (...)

    #NSO #WhatsApp #Pegasus #spyware #activisme #écoutes #surveillance

    https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/92cc4b3a33ee8e265d9e3c8eafe51323645dbae3/0_103_3000_1800/master/3000.jpg

  • Une faille de sécurité de WhatsApp utilisée pour installer un logiciel espion israélien
    https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2019/05/14/une-faille-de-securite-de-whatsapp-utilisee-pour-installer-un-logiciel-espio

    WhatsApp a annoncé avoir corrigé la faille, et plusieurs ONG veulent porter plainte contre l’éditeur du logiciel, NSO group. Une importante faille de sécurité touchant la fonction « appel téléphonique » de WhatsApp a été corrigée lundi 13 mai, a annoncé l’entreprise, propriété de Facebook. La faille pouvait permettre d’installer, à l’insu de l’utilisateur, un logiciel espion sur son téléphone, si l’utilisateur ne décrochait pas lorsqu’il recevait l’appel « infecté ». Difficile à détecter, la faille de (...)

    #NSO #WhatsApp #Pegasus #spyware #géolocalisation #activisme #écoutes #sécuritaire #surveillance #CitizenLab (...)

    ##Amnesty

  • NSA : des hackers chinois ont exploité l’un de ses outils d’espionnage un an avant les Shadow Brokers
    https://cyberguerre.numerama.com/1323-nsa-des-hackers-chinois-ont-exploite-lun-de-ses-outils-de

    Un groupe de hackers chinois répondant au nom de Buckeye aurait exploité l’un des logiciels malveillants de la National Security Agency (NSA) un an avant l’affaire des Shadow Brokers. Bien que l’outil d’exécution utilisé soit différent de celui des Américains. La réputation de la National Security Agency (NSA), célèbre agence de renseignements américaine, prend un nouveau coup. Fin 2017, le groupe de hackers Shadow Brokers levait le voile sur plusieurs outils d’espionnage appartenant à l’Equation Group, (...)

    #NSA #malware #hacking

    //c0.lestechnophiles.com/cyberguerre.numerama.com//content/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/adi-constantin-65004-unsplash.jpg

  • #Huawei serait financé par l’appareil sécuritaire de l’Etat chinois selon la CIA
    https://www.latribune.fr/technos-medias/telecoms/huawei-serait-finance-par-l-appareil-securitaire-de-l-etat-chinois-selon-l

    Selon The Times, l’agence centrale du renseignement aux Etats-Unis, affirme que le groupe chinois est financé par l’Armée populaire de libération, de la Commission de la sécurité nationale et d’une troisième branche de l’appareil chinois du renseignement.

  • How Do #neural Style Transfers Work
    https://hackernoon.com/how-do-neural-style-transfers-work-6cd9f31bb09e?source=rss----3a8144eabf

    How Do Neural Style Transfers Work?Deep Learning made it possible to capture the content of one image and combine it with the style of another image. This technique is called Neural Style Transfer. But, how Neural Style Transfer works? In this blog post, we are going to look into the underlying mechanism of Neural Style Transfer (NST).High-Level IntuitionNeural Style Transfer OverviewAs we can see, the generated image is having the content of the Content image and style of the style image. It can be seen that the above result cannot be obtained simply by overlapping the images. Now, the million-dollar question remains, how we make sure that the generated image has the content of content image and style of style image? How we capture the content and style of respective images?In order to (...)

    #neural-style-transfer #neural-style #nst #machine-learning

  • Interview with CEO of NSO Group – Israeli spyware-maker – on fighting terror, Khashoggi murder, and Saudi Arabia - 60 Minutes - CBS News
    https://www.cbsnews.com/news/interview-with-ceo-of-nso-group-israeli-spyware-maker-on-fighting-terror-kh

    Tonight we’ll take you inside the growing, shadowy global market of cyber espionage. We looked specifically at a controversial Israeli company called the NSO Group, valued at nearly a billion dollars, that says it developed a hacking tool that can break into just about any smartphone on Earth.

    NSO licenses this software, called Pegasus, to intelligence and law enforcement agencies worldwide, so they can infiltrate the encrypted phones and apps of criminals and terrorists. Problem is this same tool can also be deployed by a government to crush dissent. And so it is that Pegasus has been linked to human rights abuses, unethical surveillance, and even to the notoriously brutal murder of the Saudi Arabian critic Jamal Khashoggi.

    Headquartered in the Israeli city of Herzliya, NSO Group operates in strict secrecy. But co-founder and CEO, Shalev Hulio, has been forced out of the shadows and not into a good light, accused of selling Pegasus to Saudi Arabia despite its abysmal record on human rights.

    Lesley Stahl: And the word is that you sold Pegasus to them, and then they turned it around to get Khashoggi.

    Shalev Hulio: Khashoggi murder is horrible. Really horrible. And therefore, when I first heard there are accusations that our technology been used on Jamal Khashoggi or on his relatives, I started an immediate check about it. And I can tell you very clear, we had nothing to do with this horrible murder.

    #NSO organise sa défense dans l’affaire #kashoggi ?

  • Entre Pékin et Huawei, l’itinérance des données ?
    https://cyberguerre.numerama.com/525-entre-pekin-et-huawei-litinerance-des-donnees.html

    Où sont les preuves ? Les agences de renseignement peinent à prouver que Huawei espionne pour le compte de Pékin. Huawei est un dragon médiatique que l’Occident aurait trop longtemps pris pour un tigre de papier. Que ce soit à la lumière de la détention de la numéro deux de la firme au Canada, de la méfiance à l’encontre de ses équipements ou bien encore à la lumière de sa fulgurante progression commerciale, Huawei est de toutes les colonnes, recevant et rendant les coups. Après une année 2018 qui l’a (...)

    #Huawei #spyware #concurrence #surveillance #NSA

    //c2.lestechnophiles.com/cyberguerre.numerama.com//content/uploads/sites/2/2019/01/will-huawei-be-the-next-failure.jpg

  • La #NSA publie sous licence libre son outil de #rétro-ingénierie
    https://www.linformaticien.com/actualites/id/51548/la-nsa-publie-sous-licence-libre-son-outil-de-retro-ingenierie.aspx

    Profitant de la conférence RSA, la NSA a publié sous licence libre #Ghidra, son outil de reverse engineering. Disponible uniquement au téléchargement sur le site dédié de l’agence de renseignement américaine, son code source doit prochainement être publié sur GitHub (sans doute après en avoir effacé toute trace de backdoor, pour reprendre le calembour très en vogue sur les forums).

    Cet outil, développé en Java et fonctionnant sous Windows, Linux et Mac OS, a reçu un accueil enthousiaste de la communauté des chercheurs en cybersécurité. Gratuitement mis à disposition, Ghidra vient fournir une suite d’outils (#décompilateur, #désassembleur) généralement vendus au prix fort par des sociétés telles que HexRay avec IDA Pro. Quoique Ghidra ne comprenne pas (pour le moment) d’outil de débogage.

    Ghidra est disponible en téléchargement et prend la forme d’un ZIP à décompresser directement sur le disque. Aucune installation n’est requise, seul OpenJDK 11 ou ultérieur st nécessaire pour faire fonctionner le programme. En outre, la documentation fournie par la NSA, notamment sous forme de wiki, est particulièrement abondante, de l’installation du programme à l’utilisation d’extension.

    Ce n’est pas la première fois que la NSA publie ses outils sous licence libre. Une trentaine de projets sont ainsi listés sur le site de l’agence. Laquelle obtient en retour de la communauté l’amélioration et la correction des bugs sur ses produits. Déjà au moins une faille, permettant une exécution de code à distance, a été découverte sur Ghidra… alors même que son code source n’a pas été publié.

  • Glenn Greenwald sur Twitter : “The very first NSA program we revealed from Snowden documents - the mass domestic spying program of Americans’ phone records, which James Clapper lied about; Obama insisted was vital to national security - has been shut down” / Twitter
    https://twitter.com/ggreenwald/status/1102741757035462662

    https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/04/us/politics/nsa-phone-records-program-shut-down.html

    (Non) #vital

  • #Quebec : Stockage de données : les colporteurs se frottent les mains - Jean-Marc Lambert - 8 Février 2018 - Le Devoir _
    https://www.ledevoir.com/opinion/libre-opinion/547428/stockage-de-donnees-les-colporteurs-se-frottent-les-mains

    Nous apprenions cette semaine que Québec voulait confier au privé le stockage de ses données. Saluons l’efficacité des vendeurs de technologies qui en quatre mois ont su se positionner comme des partenaires fiables et sérieux aux yeux du gouvernement de la CAQ. Ils ont sauté sur un tout nouveau gouvernement, inexpérimenté, voulant faire différemment et encore apte à croire aux beaux mirages qu’on lui crée. Parce qu’à l’usage, on s’aperçoit qu’une fois les doigts dedans, les attentes ont été gonflées. Tout à coup, les choses sont plus compliquées, ça demande plus d’analyse, et tout ça, ça se paye. Ça devient rapidement politiquement gênant d’avoir été si naïf, donc personne ne tire trop fort la sonnette d’alarme, et on se retrouve avec un système Phoenix (IBM), un registre des armes (« mauvaise gestion des contrats », selon la vérificatrice générale) ou des tableaux blancs intelligents qui servent essentiellement à diffuser YouTube dans nos écoles. Du gaspillage de ressources.


    Photo : iStock « Non, je ne crois pas que ces compagnies vont systématiquement faire ce qui est mieux pour tous », affirme l’auteur.

    Ne pensez pas que je préférerais un retour à la plume et au boulier afin de gérer l’État québécois. Ce qui me désespère, c’est de voir les bénéfices potentiels de ces outils détournés au profit d’acteurs privés ne priorisant pas le #bien_commun.
    Non, je ne crois pas que ces compagnies vont systématiquement faire ce qui est mieux pour tous. Et je ne crois pas non plus que l’État ait la compétence et la puissance pour faire respecter nos intérêts. Le gouvernement reconnaît lui-même que c’est pour ça qu’il fait appel aux « Gros Nébuleux » de Californie . Il aurait pu choisir de fidéliser ses ressources et construire l’expertise en interne, quitte à y aller plus doucement. Dans 10 ans, qui va mener le jeu ? Qui déterminera le coût des nouvelles fonctionnalités ? Qui dira ce qu’il est possible de faire ? Qui aura la documentation à jour ? Et surtout, qui dictera la facture de sortie ?

    Le gouvernement a choisi : ce seront des compagnies américaines, l’expertise est là-bas. Il investit des millions pour l’intelligence artificielle à Montréal, mais il devra compter sur les Gros Nébuleux pour exploiter cette technologie, sans jamais comprendre vraiment comment se prennent les décisions. Secret commercial oblige. Les biais et les erreurs apparaîtront doucement. Beaucoup seront si subtils qu’ils s’intégreront à nos structures sociales, sans regard critique, ni bienfaisance, ni responsabilité politique.

    Les Gros Nébuleux , lorsque les performances sont décevantes, pourront analyser ce qui coince et suggérer des modifications. Comme ce sont eux qui connaissent le mieux leurs systèmes, et à moyen terme, les bases de données du gouvernement, qui sera mieux placé pour modifier et gérer les applications du gouvernement ? Une suite de contrats à appel d’offres acquis d’avance pour des générations. Voilà du récurrent aussi fiable que de l’asphaltage. Il y a peu de secteurs aussi fiables et rentables que le pillage d’un État.

    Amazon est considéré comme partenaire. Soyez assuré qu’il va faire un bon prix de départ au gouvernement. Saviez-vous qu’il s’est lancé dans l’assurance ? Ils auront accès à votre dossier de la SAQ, à celui de RAMQ, à votre dossier médical, sûrement aussi à celui de la SQ. De combien d’années auront-ils besoin pour écumer les clients payants et laisser les autres aux petites compagnies d’assurances ? « Oh non, nous allons mettre en place des garde-fous et du cryptage », va-t-on nous répondre. Ces compagnies auront quand même accès aux données. Au nom du secret commercial, il sera impossible de valider l’étanchéité des accès aux couches supérieures, et je suis assuré qu’il va toujours y avoir, contractuellement, des portes ouvertes à des fins de diagnostic et d’optimisation.

    De toute façon, les Gros Nébuleux sont tenus par le gouvernement américain de permettre l’accès aux données hébergées sur son territoire, aux fins d’enquête. Ce qui veut dire que celui-ci pourra fouiller allègrement dans les données des ministères pour étayer ses poursuites ou favoriser ses entreprises. Il faut être bien naïf pour encore voir les États-Unis comme un partenaire bienveillant et équitable.

    Tous ces cadeaux sont offerts allègrement par un gouvernement bon enfant, valorisant la fierté d’être des Québécois, guilleret d’être géré par des puissances sur lesquelles il n’a plus de contrôle.

     #cloud #mirage #surveillance #google #nsa #IBM #microsoft #facebook #informatique #données #gafa #vie_privée #données_personnelles #privacy #capitalisme

  • Québec confiera le stockage de ses données informatiques au privé Jocelyne Richer - La Presse canadienne à Québec - 5 Février 2019 - Le Devoir
    https://www.ledevoir.com/politique/quebec/547082/quebec-confiera-le-stockage-de-ses-donnees-informatiques-au-prive

    Actuellement assuré par 457 centres au Québec, le traitement des données informatiques gouvernementales sera bientôt confié, pour l’essentiel, au secteur privé.

    D’ici trois ans, au moins 80 % des informations numériques stockées dans tout l’appareil gouvernemental seront transférées dans des serveurs gérés par des sous-traitants du secteur privé, comme IBM ou Amazon.

    Le reste, soit moins de 20 % du total des informations, sera bientôt stocké dans seulement deux centres de traitement des données.

    Ainsi, à terme, l’accès aux données gouvernementales sera assuré par l’intermédiaire de l’infonuagique (cloud computing).


    Photo : iStock L’État québécois dépense annuellement quelque 4,5 milliards de dollars pour ses ressources informatiques.

    L’annonce a été faite en conférence de presse, lundi, par le président du Conseil du trésor, Christian Dubé, et le ministre responsable de la Transformation numérique, Éric Caire, qui justifient leur geste par une recherche d’efficacité et de sécurité accrue.

    Le coût de la transformation est évalué à 150 millions de dollars, mais le gouvernement est convaincu que le changement annoncé permettra de faire d’importantes économies à plus long terme.

    En campagne électorale, le cadre financier de la Coalition avenir Québec (CAQ) prévoyait des économies de plus de 200 millions de dollars dans la gestion des données informatiques.

    « On parlait d’économies générales en gestion des ressources informationnelles de 210 millions. Le programme qu’on annonce aujourd’hui devrait nous permettre d’aller en chercher une centaine [de millions] », a calculé le ministre Caire.

    L’État québécois dépense annuellement quelque 4,5 milliards de dollars pour ses ressources informatiques.

    « On est en train de dire que, sur quatre ans, on va économiser 210 millions sur 4,5 milliards », a expliqué le ministre Christian Dubé, en ajoutant que d’autres annonces en ce domaine suivront à l’occasion de la présentation du prochain budget du Québec, à la fin du mois de mars. . . . . . . . . . . . .

     #cloud #surveillance #google #nsa #microsoft #facebook #informatique #données #gafa #vie_privée #données_personnelles #privacy #capitalisme

  • Undercover agents target cybersecurity watchdog who detailed Israeli firm NSO’s link to #Khashoggi scandal
    Haaretz.Com
    https://www.haaretz.com/misc/article-print-page/.premium-undercover-agents-target-watchdog-who-detailed-israeli-firm-nso-s-

    Operatives with fake identities are pursuing members of #Citizen_Lab, the group that uncovered the connection between Jamal Khashoggi’s murder and Israel’s surveillance company #NSO
    The Associated Press | Jan. 26, 2019 | 4:19 PM

    The researchers who reported that Israeli software was used to spy on Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi’s inner circle before his gruesome death are being targeted in turn by international undercover operatives, The Associated Press has found.

    Twice in the past two months, men masquerading as socially conscious investors have lured members of the Citizen Lab internet watchdog group to meetings at luxury hotels to quiz them for hours about their work exposing Israeli surveillance and the details of their personal lives. In both cases, the researchers believe they were secretly recorded.

    Citizen Lab Director Ron Deibert described the stunts as “a new low.”

    “We condemn these sinister, underhanded activities in the strongest possible terms,” he said in a statement Friday. “Such a deceitful attack on an academic group like the Citizen Lab is an attack on academic freedom everywhere.”

    Who these operatives are working for remains a riddle, but their tactics recall those of private investigators who assume elaborate false identities to gather intelligence or compromising material on critics of powerful figures in government or business.

    Citizen Lab, based out of the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto, has for years played a leading role in exposing state-backed hackers operating in places as far afield as Tibet , Ethiopia and Syria . Lately the group has drawn attention for its repeated exposés of an Israeli surveillance software vendor called the NSO Group, a firm whose wares have been used by governments to target journalists in Mexico , opposition figures in Panama and human rights activists in the Middle East .

    In October, Citizen Lab reported that an iPhone belonging to one of Khashoggi’s confidantes had been infected by the NSO’s signature spy software only months before Khashoggi’s grisly murder. The friend, Saudi dissident Omar Abdulaziz, would later claim that the hacking had exposed Khashoggi’s private criticisms of the Saudi royal family to the Arab kingdom’s spies and thus “played a major role” in his death.

    In a statement, NSO denied having anything to do with the undercover operations targeting Citizen Lab, “either directly or indirectly” and said it had neither hired nor asked anyone to hire private investigators to pursue the Canadian organization. “Any suggestion to the contrary is factually incorrect and nothing more than baseless speculation,” NSO said.

    NSO has long denied that its software was used to target Khashoggi, although it has refused to comment when asked whether it has sold its software to the Saudi government more generally.

    The first message reached Bahr Abdul Razzak, a Syrian refugee who works as a Citizen Lab researcher, Dec. 6, when a man calling himself Gary Bowman got in touch via LinkedIn. The man described himself as a South African financial technology executive based in Madrid.

    “I came across your profile and think that the work you’ve done helping Syrian refugees and your extensive technical background could be a great fit for our new initiative,” Bowman wrote.

    Abdul Razzak said he thought the proposal was a bit odd, but he eventually agreed to meet the man at Toronto’s swanky Shangri-La Hotel on the morning of Dec. 18.

    The conversation got weird very quickly, Abdul Razzak said.

    Instead of talking about refugees, Abdul Razzak said, Bowman grilled him about his work for Citizen Lab and its investigations into the use of NSO’s software. Abdul Razzak said Bowman appeared to be reading off cue cards, asking him if he was earning enough money and throwing out pointed questions about Israel, the war in Syria and Abdul Razzak’s religiosity.

    “Do you pray?” Abdul Razzak recalled Bowman asking. “Why do you write only about NSO?” ’’Do you write about it because it’s an Israeli company?" ’’Do you hate #Israel?"

    Abdul Razzak said he emerged from the meeting feeling shaken. He alerted his Citizen Lab colleagues, who quickly determined that the breakfast get-together had been a ruse. Bowman’s supposed Madrid-based company, FlameTech, had no web presence beyond a LinkedIn page, a handful of social media profiles and an entry in the business information platform Crunchbase. A reverse image search revealed that the profile picture of the man listed as FlameTech’s chief executive, Mauricio Alonso, was a stock photograph.

    “My immediate gut feeling was: ’This is a fake,’” said John Scott-Railton, one of Abdul Razzak’s colleagues.

    Scott-Railton flagged the incident to the AP, which confirmed that FlameTech was a digital facade.

    Searches of the Orbis database of corporate records, which has data on some 300 million global companies, turned up no evidence of a Spanish firm called FlameTech or Flame Tech or any company anywhere in the world matching its description. Similarly, the AP found no record of FlameTech in Madrid’s official registry or of a Gary Bowman in the city’s telephone listings. An Orbis search for Alonso, the supposed chief executive, also drew a blank. When an AP reporter visited Madrid’s Crystal Tower high-rise, where FlameTech claimed to have 250 sq. meters (2,700 sq. feet) of office space, he could find no trace of the firm and calls to the number listed on its website went unanswered.

    The AP was about to publish a story about the curious company when, on Jan. 9, Scott-Railton received an intriguing message of his own.

    This time the contact came not from Bowman of FlameTech but from someone who identified himself as Michel Lambert, a director at the Paris-based agricultural technology firm CPW-Consulting.

    Lambert had done his homework. In his introductory email , he referred to Scott-Railton’s early doctoral research on kite aerial photography — a mapping technique using kite-mounted cameras — and said he was “quite impressed.

    We have a few projects and clients coming up that could significantly benefit from implementing Kite Aerial Photography,” he said.

    Like FlameTech, CPW-Consulting was a fiction. Searches of Orbis and the French commercial court registry Infogreffe turned up no trace of the supposedly Paris-based company or indeed of any Paris-based company bearing the acronym CPW. And when the AP visited CPW’s alleged office there was no evidence of the company; the address was home to a mainly residential apartment building. Residents and the building’s caretaker said they had never heard of the firm.

    Whoever dreamed up CPW had taken steps to ensure the illusion survived a casual web search, but even those efforts didn’t bear much scrutiny. The company had issued a help wanted ad, for example, seeking a digital mapping specialist for their Paris office, but Scott-Railton discovered that the language had been lifted almost word-for-word from an ad from an unrelated company seeking a mapping specialist in London. A blog post touted CPW as a major player in Africa, but an examination of the author’s profile suggests the article was the only one the blogger had ever written.

    When Lambert suggested an in-person meeting in New York during a Jan. 19 phone call , Scott-Railton felt certain that Lambert was trying to set him up.

    But Scott-Railton agreed to the meeting. He planned to lay a trap of his own.

    Anyone watching Scott-Railton and Lambert laughing over wagyu beef and lobster bisque at the Peninsula Hotel’s upscale restaurant on Thursday afternoon might have mistaken the pair for friends.

    In fact, the lunch was Spy vs. Spy. Scott-Railton had spent the night before trying to secret a homemade camera into his tie, he later told AP, eventually settling for a GoPro action camera and several recording devices hidden about his person. On the table, Lambert had placed a large pen in which Scott-Railton said he spotted a tiny camera lens peeking out from an opening in the top.

    Lambert didn’t seem to be alone. At the beginning of the meal, a man sat behind him, holding up his phone as if to take pictures and then abruptly left the restaurant, having eaten nothing. Later, two or three men materialized at the bar and appeared to be monitoring proceedings.

    Scott-Railton wasn’t alone either. A few tables away, two Associated Press journalists were making small talk as they waited for a signal from Scott-Railton, who had invited the reporters to observe the lunch from nearby and then interview Lambert near the end of the meal.

    The conversation began with a discussion of kites, gossip about African politicians, and a detour through Scott-Railton’s family background. But Lambert, just like Bowman, eventually steered the talk to Citizen Lab and NSO.

    “Work drama? Tell me, I like drama!” Lambert said at one point, according to Scott-Railton’s recording of the conversation. “Is there a big competition between the people inside Citizen Lab?” he asked later.

    Like Bowman, Lambert appeared to be working off cue cards and occasionally made awkward conversational gambits. At one point he repeated a racist French expression, insisting it wasn’t offensive. He also asked Scott-Railton questions about the Holocaust, anti-Semitism and whether he grew up with any Jewish friends. At another point he asked whether there might not be a “racist element” to Citizen Lab’s interest in Israeli spyware.

    After dessert arrived, the AP reporters approached Lambert at his table and asked him why his company didn’t seem to exist.
    He seemed to stiffen.

    “I know what I’m doing,” Lambert said, as he put his files — and his pen — into a bag. Then he stood up, bumped into a chair and walked off, saying “Ciao” and waving his hand, before returning because he had neglected to pay the bill.

    As he paced around the restaurant waiting for the check, Lambert refused to answer questions about who he worked for or why no trace of his firm could be found.

    “I don’t have to give you any explanation,” he said. He eventually retreated to a back room and closed the door.

    Who Lambert and Bowman really are isn’t clear. Neither men returned emails, LinkedIn messages or phone calls. And despite their keen focus on NSO the AP has found no evidence of any link to the Israeli spyware merchant, which is adamant that it wasn’t involved.

    The kind of aggressive investigative tactics used by the mystery men who targeted Citizen Lab have come under fire in the wake of the Harvey Weinstein sexual abuse scandal. Black Cube, an Israeli private investigation firm apologized after The New Yorker and other media outlets revealed that the company’s operatives had used subterfuge and dirty tricks to help the Hollywood mogul suppress allegations of rape and sexual assault.

    Scott-Railton and Abdul Razzak said they didn’t want to speculate about who was involved. But both said they believed they were being steered toward making controversial comments that could be used to blacken Citizen Lab’s reputation.

    “It could be they wanted me to say, ’Yes, I hate Israel,’ or ’Yes, Citizen Lab is against NSO because it’s Israeli,’” said Abdul Razzak.
    Scott-Railton said the elaborate, multinational operation was gratifying, in a way.

    “People were paid to fly to a city to sit you down to an expensive meal and try to convince you to say bad things about your work, your colleagues and your employer,” he said.

    “That means that your work is important.”

  • Des milliers de correspondances confidentielles de diplomates européens ont été piratées
    https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2018/12/19/des-milliers-de-correspondances-confidentielles-de-diplomates-europeens-ont-

    Les pirates, soupçonnés d’avoir été employés par la Chine, ont eu accès au système pendant au moins trois ans, a révélé le « New York Times ». Des pirates informatiques ont infiltré pendant au moins trois ans le réseau de communication diplomatique de l’Union européenne (UE) et ont téléchargé des milliers de câbles (des correspondances entre diplomates censées rester confidentielles) échangés entre les ambassades et les représentants des pays de l’UE. Des courriers dans lesquels ils décrivent et commentent les (...)

    #NSA #malware #spyware #écoutes #hacking

  • Hacked European Cables Reveal a World of Anxiety About Trump, Russia and Iran
    https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/us/politics/european-diplomats-cables-hacked.html

    Hackers infiltrated the European Union’s diplomatic communications network for years, downloading thousands of cables that reveal concerns about an unpredictable Trump administration and struggles to deal with Russia and China and the risk that Iran would revive its nuclear program. In one cable, European diplomats described a meeting between President Trump and President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia in Helsinki, Finland, as “successful (at least for Putin).” Another cable, written after a (...)

    #NSA #spyware #écoutes #hacking

  • China’s hacking against U.S. on the rise : U.S. intelligence official
    https://www.reuters.com/article/us-czech-huawei/czech-cyber-watchdog-calls-huawei-zte-products-a-security-threat-idUSKBN1OG

    A senior U.S. intelligence official said on Tuesday that Chinese cyber activity in the United States had risen in recent months, targeting critical infrastructure in what may be attempts to lay the groundwork for future disruptive attacks. “You worry they are prepositioning against critical infrastructure and trying to be able to do the types of disruptive operations that would be the most concern,” National Security Agency official Rob Joyce said at a Wall Street Journal cybersecurity (...)

    #NSA #USDepartmentOfDefense #hacking

    https://s2.reutersmedia.net/resources/r

  • Algocratie : L’inégalité programmée - #DATAGUEULE 84
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oJHfUv9RIY0

    Ils sont partout autour de nous et pourtant on s’arrête rarement pour les regarder vraiment : les algorithmes. Puissants outils de calcul, ces lignes de code sont aujourd’hui principalement utilisées pour tenter d’optimiser le monde qui nous entoure. Mais que produit cette optimisation ? Quels sont ses effets sur notre perception de la réalité quand il s’agit de trier des infos ? Et que produisent les algorithmes quand ils deviennent des leviers de décisions incontestables ? Prenons le temps de (...)

    #algorithme #domination #criminalité #prédictif #prédiction #santé #solutionnisme #discrimination #NSA #Skynet #Alibaba #Google #Microsoft #Tencent #Apple #Alibaba.com #Baidu #Facebook #BATX (...)

    ##criminalité ##santé ##GAFAM

  • Litigation and Other Formal Complaints Concerning Targeted Digital Surveillance and the Digital Surveillance Industry
    https://citizenlab.ca/2018/12/litigation-and-other-formal-complaints-concerning-targeted-digital-survei

    This is a living resource document providing links and descriptions to litigation and other formal complaints concerning digital surveillance and the digital surveillance industry. If you have additional resources to add to this document, please send to Siena Anstis : siena [at] citizen lab [dot] ca. This document was last updated on December 12, 2018.

    #NSO #spyware #sécuritaire #activisme #web #surveillance #écoutes #CitizenLab #Gamma #FinFisher #FinSpy #AMESys #RSF #Amnesty #PrivacyInternational #Qosmos #Deep_Packet_Inspection_(DPI) #FIDH #LDH

    ##Deep_Packet_Inspection__DPI_

  • Israeli cyber firm negotiated advanced attack capabilities sale with Saudis, Haaretz reveals

    Just months before crown prince launched a purge against his opponents, NSO offered Saudi intelligence officials a system to hack into cellular phones ■ NSO: We abide the law, our products are used to combat crime and terrorism

    https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israeli-company-negotiated-to-sell-advanced-cybertech-to-the-saudi

    The Israeli company NSO Group Technologies offered Saudi Arabia a system that hacks cellphones, a few months before Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman began his purge of regime opponents, according to a complaint to the Israel Police now under investigation.
    But NSO, whose development headquarters is in Herzliya, says that it has acted according to the law and its products are used in the fight against crime and terror.
    To really understand Israel and the Middle East - subscribe to Haaretz
    Either way, a Haaretz investigation based on testimony and photos, as well as travel and legal documents, reveals the Saudis’ behind-the-scenes attempts to buy Israeli technology.
    In June 2017, a diverse group gathered in a hotel room in Vienna, a city between East and West that for decades has been a center for espionage, defense-procurement contacts and unofficial diplomatic meetings.
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    Arriving at the hotel were Abdullah al-Malihi, a close associate of Prince Turki al-Faisal – a former head of Saudi Arabia’s intelligence services – and another senior Saudi official, Nasser al-Qahtani, who presented himself as the deputy of the current intelligence chief. Their interlocutors were two Israeli businessmen, representatives of NSO, who presented to the Saudis highly advanced technology.

    >> Israel’s cyber-spy industry helps world dictators hunt dissidents and gays | Revealed
    In 2017, NSO was avidly promoting its new technology, its Pegasus 3 software, an espionage tool so sophisticated that it does not depend on the victim clicking on a link before the phone is breached.
    During the June 2017 meeting, NSO officials showed a PowerPoint presentation of the system’s capabilities. To demonstrate it, they asked Qahtani to go to a nearby mall, buy an iPhone and give them its number. During that meeting they showed how this was enough to hack into the new phone and record and photograph the participants in the meeting.
    The meeting in Vienna wasn’t the first one between the two sides. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has recently expressed pride in the tightening ties with Gulf states, with Israel’s strength its technology. The message is clear: Israel is willing to sell these countries security-related technologies, and they forge closer ties with Israel in the strategic battle against Iran.
    >> $6 billion of Iranian money: Why Israeli firm Black Cube really went after Obama’s team
    According to the complaint, the affair began with a phone call received by a man identified as a European businessman with connections in the Gulf states. On the line was W., an Israeli dealing in defense-related technologies and who operates through Cyprus-based companies. (Many defense-related companies do business in Cyprus because of its favorable tax laws.) W. asked his European interlocutor to help him do business in the Gulf.

    FILE Photo: Two of the founders of NSO, Shalev Julio and Omri Lavi.
    Among the European businessman’s acquaintances were the two senior Saudi officials, Malihi and Qahtani.
    On February 1, 2017, W. and the businessman met for the first time. The main topic was the marketing of cyberattack software. Unlike ordinary weapons systems, the price depends only on a customer’s eagerness to buy the system.
    The following month, the European businessman traveled to a weapons exhibition in the United Arab Emirates, where a friend introduced him to Malihi, the Saudi businessman.
    In April 2017, a meeting was arranged in Vienna between Malihi, Qahtani and representatives of Israeli companies. Two more meetings subsequently took place with officials of Israeli companies in which other Israelis were present. These meetings took place at the Four Seasons Hotel in Limassol, Cyprus, where Israeli cybercompanies often meet with foreign clients.
    >> Snowden: Israeli firm’s spyware was used to track Khashoggi
    The meetings were attended by W. and his son. They were apparently friendly: In photographs documenting one of them, W. and Qahtani are shown after a hunting trip, with the Saudi aiming a rifle at a dead animal.
    In the Vienna meeting of April 2017, the Saudis presented a list of 23 systems they sought to acquire. Their main interest was cybersystems. For a few dozens of millions of dollars, they would be able to hack into the phones of regime opponents in Saudi Arabia and around the world and collect classified information about them.
    According to the European businessman, the Saudis, already at the first meeting, passed along to the representatives of one of the companies details of a Twitter account of a person who had tweeted against the regime. They wanted to know who was behind the account, but the Israeli company refused to say.

    Offices of Israeli NSO Group company in Herzliya, Israel, Aug. 25, 2016Daniella Cheslow/AP
    In the June 2017 meeting, the Saudis expressed interest in NSO’s technology.
    According to the European businessman, in July 2017 another meeting was held between the parties, the first at W.’s home in Cyprus. W. proposed selling Pegasus 3 software to the Saudis for $208 million.
    Malihi subsequently contacted W. and invited him to Riyadh to present the software to members of the royal family. The department that oversees defense exports in Israel’s Defense Ministry and the ministry’s department for defense assistance, responsible for encouraging exports, refused to approve W.’s trip.
    Using the initials for the defense assistance department, W. reportedly said “screw the D.A.” and chartered a small plane, taking with him NSO’s founder, Shalev Hulio, to the meetings in the Gulf. According to the European businessman, the pair were there for three days, beginning on July 18, 2017.
    At these meetings, the European businessman said, an agreement was made to sell the Pegasus 3 to the Saudis for $55 million.
    According to the European businessman, the details of the deal became known to him only through his contacts in the defense assistance department. He said he had agreed orally with W. that his commission in the deal would be 5 percent – $2.75 million.
    But W. and his son stopped answering the European businessman’s phone calls. Later, the businessman told the police, he received an email from W.’s lawyer that contained a fake contract in which the company would agree to pay only his expenses and to consider whether to pay him a bonus if the deal went through.
    The European businessman, assisted by an Israeli lawyer, filed a complaint in April 2018. He was questioned by the police’s national fraud squad and was told that the affair had been transferred to another unit specializing in such matters. Since then he has been contacted by the income tax authorities, who are apparently checking whether there has been any unreported income from the deal.
    The European businessman’s claims seem to be substantiated by correspondence Haaretz has obtained between Cem Koksal, a Turkish businessman living in the UAE, and W.’s lawyers in Israel. The European businessman said in his complaint that Koksal was involved in mediating the deal.
    In a letter sent by Koksal’s lawyer in February of this year, he demanded his portion from W. In a response letter, sent in early March, W.’s attorney denied the existence of the deal. The deal had not been signed, the letter claimed, due to Koksal’s negligence, therefore he was due no commission or compensation of any kind.
    These issues have a wider context. From the claims by the European businessman and Koksal’s letter, it emerges that the deal was signed in the summer of 2017, a few months before Crown Prince Mohammed began his purge of regime opponents. During that purge, the Saudi regime arrested and tortured members of the royal family and Saudi businessmen accused of corruption. The Saudis also held Lebanese Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri for a few days in a Riyadh hotel.
    In the following months the Saudis continued their hunt for regime opponents living abroad, which raised international attention only when the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul came to light in October.
    It has recently been claimed that NSO helped the Saudi regime surveil its opponents. According to an article in Forbes magazine and reports from the Canadian cyber-related think tank Citizen Lab, among the surveillance targets were the satirist Ghanem Almasrir and human rights activist Yahya Asiri, who live in London, and Omar Abdulaziz, who lives in exile in Canada.
    These three men were in contact with Khashoggi. Last month, Edward Snowden, who uncovered the classified surveillance program of the U.S. National Security Agency, claimed that Pegasus had been used by the Saudi authorities to surveil Khashoggi.
    “They are the worst of the worst,” Snowden said of NSO, whose people he accused of aiding and abetting human rights violations.
    NSO’s founders and chief executives are Omri Lavie and Shalev Hulio. The company is registered in Cyprus but its development headquarters is in Herzliya. In 2014 the company was sold to private equity firm Francisco Partners based on a valuation of $250 million.
    Francisco Partners did not respond to Haaretz’s request for comment.
    In May, Verint Systems offered to buy NSO for $1 billion, but the offer was rejected. The company is awash in cash. Earlier this month all its employees went on vacation in Phuket, Thailand. Netta Barzilai, Lior Suchard, the Ma Kashur Trio and the band Infected Mushroom were also flown there to entertain them.
    The Pegasus system developed by NSO was a “one-click system,” meaning that the victim had to press on a link sent to him through phishing. The new system no longer requires this. Only the number of the SIM card is needed to hack into the phone. It’s unknown how Pegasus does this.
    Technology sources believe that the technology either exploits breaches in the cellphone’s modem, the part that receives messages from the antenna, or security breaches in the apps installed on a phone. As soon as a phone is hacked, the speaker and camera can be used for recording conversations. Even encoded apps such as WhatsApp can be monitored.
    NSO’s operations are extremely profitable.
    The company, which conceals its client list, has been linked to countries that violate human rights. NSO says its products are used in the fight against crime and terror, but in certain countries the authorities identify anti-regime activists and journalists as terrorists and subject them to surveillance.
    In 2012, NSO sold an earlier version of Pegasus to Mexico to help it combat the drug cartel in that country. According to the company, all its contracts include a clause specifically permitting the use of its software only to “investigate and prevent crime or acts of terror.” But The New York Times reported in 2016 that the Mexican authorities also surveilled journalists and lawyers.
    Following that report, Mexican victims of the surveillance filed a lawsuit in Israel against NSO last September. This year, The New York Times reported that the software had been sold to the UAE, where it helped the authorities track leaders of neighboring countries as well as a London newspaper editor.
    In response to these reports, NSO said it “operated and operates solely in compliance with defense export laws and under the guidelines and close oversight of all elements of the defense establishment, including all matters relating to export policies and licenses.
    “The information presented by Haaretz about the company and its products and their use is wrong, based on partial rumors and gossip. The presentation distorts reality.
    “The company has an independent, external ethics committee such as no other company like it has. It includes experts in legal affairs and international relations. The committee examines every deal so that the use of the system will take place only according to permitted objectives of investigating and preventing terror and crime.
    “The company’s products assist law enforcement agencies in protecting people around the world from terror attacks, drug cartels, child kidnappers for ransom, pedophiles, and other criminals and terrorists.
    “In contrast to newspaper reports, the company does not sell its products or allow their use in many countries. Moreover, the company greatly limits the extent to which its customers use its products and is not involved in the operation of the systems by customers.”
    A statement on W.’s behalf said: “This is a false and completely baseless complaint, leverage for an act of extortion by the complainants, knowing that there is no basis for their claims and that if they would turn to the relevant courts they would be immediately rejected.”

  • How the Saudis may have spied on Jamal Khashoggi
    https://cpj.org/blog/2018/10/how-the-saudis-may-have-spied-on-jamal-khashoggi.php

    Omar Abdulaziz, a 27-year-old Saudi Arabian dissident, can still remember the time Jamal Khashoggi, the storied Saudi journalist, unfollowed him on Twitter. It was in 2015, and Khashoggi had been tapped to head a new TV network called Al-Arab, a partnership between a member of the royal family and Bloomberg. Abdulaziz started haranguing Khashoggi online, demanding that the network provide a platform for genuine critics of the Saudi regime. “He got so mad at me,” Abdulaziz recalled in a (...)

    #NSO #smartphone #spyware #écoutes #activisme #journalisme #surveillance #CitizenLab

  • How a Canadian permanent resident and Saudi Arabian dissident was targeted with powerful spyware on Canadian soil
    https://citizenlab.ca/2018/10/how-a-canadian-permanent-resident-and-saudi-arabian-dissident-was-targete

    Following a Citizen Lab report that identified the presence of NSO’s Pegasus spyware technology in Quebec, researchers contacted Omar Abdulaziz, a Saudi Arabian dissident and Canadian permanent resident who has long been critical of the regime in Riyadh. After an extensive investigation, they discovered that his phone had been targeted with this powerful spyware and the operators of the technology were linked to Saudi Arabia’s government and security (...)

    #NSO #smartphone #Pegasus #spyware #activisme #surveillance #écoutes

  • VeraCrypt — Wikipédia
    https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/VeraCrypt

    En raison des améliorations de sécurité, le format de stockage #VeraCrypt est incompatible avec celui de #TrueCrypt. L’équipe de développement du projet VeraCrypt estime que l’ancien format TrueCrypt est trop vulnérable à une attaque de la #NSA et il doit donc être abandonné.

  • Palantir, l’embarrassant poisson-pilote du big data
    https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2018/10/09/palantir-l-embarrassant-poisson-pilote-du-big-data_5366568_4408996.html

    L’entreprise américaine de visualisation de données travaille avec des dizaines de services de police ou de renseignement, dont la DGSI. Une liste de clients où figurent la National Security Agency (NSA) américaine et la police de Los Angeles. Un financement initial obtenu auprès de la CIA, les services extérieurs des Etats-Unis. Un cofondateur, Peter Thiel, qui siège au conseil d’administration de Facebook et a l’oreille du président américain Donald Trump, pour qui il avait publiquement pris (...)

    #Palantir #DGSI #CIA #NSA #Facebook #algorithme #backdoor #sécuritaire #surveillance #BigData (...)

    ##data-mining

  • HIDE AND SEEK Tracking NSO Group’s Pegasus Spyware to Operations in 45 Countries
    https://citizenlab.ca/2018/09/hide-and-seek-tracking-nso-groups-pegasus-spyware-to-operations-in-45-cou

    In this post, we develop new Internet scanning techniques to identify 45 countries in which operators of NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware may be conducting operations. 1. Executive Summary Israel-based “Cyber Warfare” vendor NSO Group produces and sells a mobile phone spyware suite called Pegasus. To monitor a target, a government operator of Pegasus must convince the target to click on a specially crafted exploit link, which, when clicked, delivers a chain of zero-day exploits to penetrate (...)

    #NSO #smartphone #Pegasus #spyware #écoutes #exportation #sécuritaire #activisme #web (...)

    ##surveillance

  • Palantir : livre-t-on nos secrets à nos alliés américains ?
    https://www.franceculture.fr/numerique/palantir-livre-t-nos-secrets-a-nos-allies-americains

    Une société américaine d’analyse de données, Palantir, travaille pour le compte des services antiterroristes français, et des entreprises stratégiques, comme Airbus. Existe-t-il des risques de fuites de données vers les États-Unis ? Enquête sur l’une des start-up les plus puissantes du monde. 23 mai 2018. Une cinquantaine de patrons de géants du numérique sont invités par le chef de l’État, Emmanuel Macron, lors d’une réunion baptisée Tech for good. Parmi eux, un homme aux cheveux en bataille : Alexander (...)

    #Airbus #CambridgeAnalytica #Boeing #Palantir #Facebook #Paypal #algorithme #Predpol #criminalité #écoutes #données #métadonnées #web #surveillance #BigData #NSA #CIA (...)

    ##criminalité ##FBI