• #CIVIPOL au #Soudan

    L’Union européenne a suspendu ses programmes liés au #contrôle_migratoire au Soudan, en raison de la situation politique. CIVIPOL était en charge des programmes coordonnés par la #France. Présentation.

    CIVIPOL est défini comme "l’opérateur de #coopération_technique_internationale du ministère de l’Intérieur". C’est une #société_anonyme dont 40% du capital son détenus par l’État et 60% par des acteurs privés comme #Airbus, #Safran, #Thalès et d’autres, ainsi que #Défense_Conseil_International, qui est la société privée équivalente de CIVIPOL pour le ministère de la défense.

    CIVIPOL a une action d’#expertise, de #conseil, de #formation. Elle est "financée quasi exclusivement par les bailleurs internationaux". Elle a aussi comme savoir-faire le "soutien à la filière des #industries_de_sécurité" : "Civipol soutient les acteurs de la filière des industries de sécurité. À travers le réseau international des salons #Milipol, Civipol permet aux États partenaires d’identifier, avec les industriels, les #solutions_technologiques les plus adaptées à leurs impératifs de protection. En proposant des offres intégrées issues de la filière européenne des industries de sécurité, Civipol contribue à la mise en place de #systèmes_opérationnels_interopérables au sein des États partenaires et, le cas échéant, avec les systèmes homologues européens."

    #CIVIPOL_Conseil, la société anonyme, est en effet associée dans #CIVIPOL_Groupe au Groupement d’Intérêt Économique Milipol, qui organise des #salons "de la sûreté et de la sécurité intérieure des États" à Paris, au Qatar et dans la zone Asie - Pacifique (on peut découvrir ici le message adressé par le ministre français de l’intérieur à l’ouverture du dernier salon).

    CIVIPOL a aussi racheté en 2016 la société #Transtec, qui a des activités de soutien, accompagnement, conseil, expertise, dans le domaine de la #gouvernance. Elle a par exemple mené deux programmes au Soudan, l’un « #Soutien_à_l'Analyse_Economique_et_à_la Planification_Sectorielle_à_l’Appui_de_la_République_du_Soudan » « afin de permettre à la délégation de l’UE au Soudan de mieux comprendre la situation économique du pays et de contribuer à une approche plus cohérente de la programmation de l’UE dans chaque secteur d’intervention » ; l’autre « #Programme_de_renforcement_des_capacités_des_organisations_de_la_société_civile_soudanaise », dont « l’objectif consistait à renforcer les capacités des bénéficiaires des #OSC locales dans le cadre du programme de l’#Instrument_Européen_pour_la_Démocratie_et_les_Droits_de_l'Homme (#IEDDH) afin d’améliorer leur gestion administrative et financière des projets financés par l’UE » (il ne s’agit donc pas de développer la démocratie, mais de permettre aux OSC – Organisations de la Société Civile – soudanaises de s’inscrire dans les programmes de financement de l’Union européenne.

    CIVIPOL intervient dans quatre programmes au Soudan, financés par l’Union européenne. L’un concernant le #terrorisme, « Lutte contre le blanchiment d’argent et le financement du terrorisme dans la grande Corne de l’Afrique (https://static.mediapart.fr/files/2019/07/26/lutte-contre-le-blanchiment-dargent-et-le-financement-du-terrorisme) », l’autre concernant l’application de la loi, « #Regional_law_enforcement_in_the_Greater_Horn_of_Africa_and_Yemen (https://static.mediapart.fr/files/2019/07/26/regional-law-enforcement-in-the-greater-horn-of-africa-and-yemen-rl) ». Notons que ces deux programmes concernent aussi le #Yémen, pays en proie à une guerre civile, et une intervention militaire extérieure par une coalition menée par l’Arabie saoudite, pays allié de la France et en partie armée par elle, coalition à laquelle participe plusieurs milliers de membres des #Forces_d’Action_Rapide soudanaises, ancienne milice de Janjawid, aussi reconvertie en garde-frontière dans le cadre de la politique de contrôle migratoire mise en place par le Soudan à la demande de l’Union européenne, Forces d’Action Rapide dont le chef est l’homme fort actuel de la junte militaire qui a succédé au dictateur Omar El-Béchir. CIVIPOL agit dans cette complexité.

    Les deux autres programmes concerne la politique de #contrôle_migratoire. L’un, sous l’intitulé de « #Meilleure_Gestion_des_Migrations (https://static.mediapart.fr/files/2019/07/26/better-migration-management-bmm.pdf) », implique différents intervenants pour le compte de plusieurs États membres de l’Union européenne et des agences de l’ONU, sous coordination allemande, l’#Allemagne cofinançant ce programme. « Dans cette contribution, CIVIPOL fournit des formations pour les unités spécialisés en charge de la lutte contre le trafic d’êtres humains, forme les agents de police dans les #zones_frontalières et aide les autorités chargées de la formation de la #police ». Compte-tenu du rôle des Forces d’Action Rapide, il semble difficile que CIVIPOL ne les ait pas croisées. Ce programme a été suspendu en mars 2019, l’Union européenne ayant donné une explication quelque peu sybilline : « because they require the involvement of government counterparts to be carried out » (« parce que leur mise en œuvre exige l’implication d’interlocuteurs gouvernementaux d’un niveau équivalent »).

    L’autre, mis en œuvre par CIVIPOL, est le #ROCK (#Centre_opérationnel_régional_d'appui_au_processus_de_Khartoum et à l’Initiative de la Corne de l’Afrique de l’Union africaine (https://static.mediapart.fr/files/2019/07/26/regional-operational-center-in-khartoum-in-support-of-the-khartoum-) – en anglais #Regional_Operational_Centre_in_Khartoum etc.) La stratégie du projet ROCK est de faciliter l’#échange_d'informations entre les services de police compétents. Ainsi, le projet consiste à mettre en place une plate-forme à Khartoum, le centre régional "ROCK", afin de rassembler les #officiers_de_liaison des pays bénéficiaires en un seul endroit pour échanger efficacement des #informations_policières. » Il a été suspendu en juin « until the political/security situation is cleared » (« jusqu’à ce que la situation politique/sécurtiaire soit clarifiée ») selon l’Union européenne.

    D’après la présentation qu’on peut télécharger sur le site de CIVIPOL, le premier « programme intervient en réponse aux besoins identifiés par les pays africains du #processus_Khartoum », tandis que le second a été « lancé dans le cadre du processus de Khartoum à la demande des pays de la #Corne_de_l'Afrique ». Il ne faut donc surtout pas penser qu’il puisse s’agir d’une forme d’externalisation des politiques migratoires européennes.

    Ces deux programmes concernent neuf pays africains. L’un d’eux est l’#Érythrée. Il n’est pas interdit de penser que les liens tissés ont pu faciliter la coopération entre autorités françaises et érythréennes qui a permis l’expulsion d’un demandeur d’asile érythréen de France en Érythrée le 6 juin dernier.

    https://blogs.mediapart.fr/philippe-wannesson/blog/260719/civipol-au-soudan
    #complexe_militaro-industriel #externalisation #contrôles_frontaliers #migrations #asile #réfugiés #suspension #Erythrée

  • Report to the EU Parliament on #Frontex cooperation with third countries in 2017

    A recent report by Frontex, the EU’s border agency, highlights the ongoing expansion of its activities with non-EU states.

    The report covers the agency’s cooperation with non-EU states ("third countries") in 2017, although it was only published this month.

    See: Report to the European Parliament on Frontex cooperation with third countries in 2017: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-report-ep-third-countries-coop-2017.pdf (pdf)

    It notes the adoption by Frontex of an #International_Cooperation_Strategy 2018-2020, “an integral part of our multi-annual programme” which:

    “guides the Agency’s interactions with third countries and international organisations… The Strategy identified the following priority regions with which Frontex strives for closer cooperation: the Western Balkans, Turkey, North and West Africa, Sub-Saharan countries and the Horn of Africa.”

    The Strategy can be found in Annex XIII to the 2018-20 Programming Document: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf (pdf).

    The 2017 report on cooperation with third countries further notes that Frontex is in dialogue with Senegal, #Niger and Guinea with the aim of signing Working Agreements at some point in the future.

    The agency deployed three Frontex #Liaison_Officers in 2017 - to Niger, Serbia and Turkey - while there was also a #European_Return_Liaison_Officer deployed to #Ghana in 2018.

    The report boasts of assisting the Commission in implementing informal agreements on return (as opposed to democratically-approved readmission agreements):

    "For instance, we contributed to the development of the Standard Operating Procedures with #Bangladesh and the “Good Practices for the Implementation of Return-Related Activities with the Republic of Guinea”, all forming important elements of the EU return policy that was being developed and consolidated throughout 2017."

    At the same time:

    “The implementation of 341 Frontex coordinated and co-financed return operations by charter flights and returning 14 189 third-country nationals meant an increase in the number of return operations by 47% and increase of third-country nationals returned by 33% compared to 2016.”

    Those return operations included Frontex’s:

    “first joint return operation to #Afghanistan. The operation was organised by Hungary, with Belgium and Slovenia as participating Member States, and returned a total of 22 third country nationals to Afghanistan. In order to make this operation a success, the participating Member States and Frontex needed a coordinated support of the European Commission as well as the EU Delegation and the European Return Liaison Officers Network in Afghanistan.”

    http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-report-third-countries.htm
    #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers
    #Balkans #Turquie #Afrique_de_l'Ouest #Afrique_du_Nord #Afrique_sub-saharienne #Corne_de_l'Afrique #Guinée #Sénégal #Serbie #officiers_de_liaison #renvois #expulsions #accords_de_réadmission #machine_à_expulsion #Hongrie #Belgique #Slovénie #réfugiés_afghans

    • EP civil liberties committee against proposal to give Frontex powers to assist non-EU states with deportations

      The European Parliament’s civil liberties committee (LIBE) has agreed its position for negotiations with the Council on the new Frontex Regulation, and amongst other things it hopes to deny the border agency the possibility of assisting non-EU states with deportations.

      The position agreed by the LIBE committee removes Article 54(2) of the Commission’s proposal, which says:

      “The Agency may also launch return interventions in third countries, based on the directions set out in the multiannual strategic policy cycle, where such third country requires additional technical and operational assistance with regard to its return activities. Such intervention may consist of the deployment of return teams for the purpose of providing technical and operational assistance to return activities of the third country.”

      The report was adopted by the committee with 35 votes in favour, nine against and eight abstentions.

      When the Council reaches its position on the proposal, the two institutions will enter into secret ’trilogue’ negotiations, along with the Commission.

      Although the proposal to reinforce Frontex was only published last September, the intention is to agree a text before the European Parliament elections in May.

      The explanatory statement in the LIBE committee’s report (see below) says:

      “The Rapporteur proposes a number of amendments that should enable the Agency to better achieve its enhanced objectives. It is crucial that the Agency has the necessary border guards and equipment at its disposal whenever this is needed and especially that it is able to deploy them within a short timeframe when necessary.”

      European Parliament: Stronger European Border and Coast Guard to secure EU’s borders: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190211IPR25771/stronger-european-border-and-coast-guard-to-secure-eu-s-borders (Press release, link):

      “- A new standing corps of 10 000 operational staff to be gradually rolled out
      - More efficient return procedures of irregular migrants
      - Strengthened cooperation with non-EU countries

      New measures to strengthen the European Border and Coast Guard to better address migratory and security challenges were backed by the Civil Liberties Committee.”

      See: REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action n°98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) n° 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EU) n° 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/ep-libe-report-frontex.pdf (pdf)

      The Commission’s proposal and its annexes can be found here: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/sep/eu-soteu-jha-proposals.htm

      http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/ep-new-frontex-libe.htm

  • The Administrative Arrangement between Greece and Germany

    The Administrative Arrangement between Ministry of migration Policy of the Hellenic Republic and the Federal Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Germany has been implemented already to four known cases. It has been the product of bilateral negotiations that occurred after German Chancellor Merkel faced another political crisis at home regarding the handling of the refugee issue.

    The document which has been the product of undisclosed negotiations and has not been made public upon its conclusion is a brief description of the cooperation of Greek and German authorities in cases of refusal of entry to persons seeking protection in the context of temporary checks at the internal German-Austrian border, as defined in its title. It essentially is a fast track implementation of return procedures in cases for which Dublin Regulation already lays down specific rules and procedures. The procedures provided in the ‘Arrangement’ skip all legal safeguards and guarantees of European Legislation.

    RSA and PRO ASYL have decided to publicize the document of the Arrangement for the purpose of serving public interest and transparency. The considerable secrecy that the two member states kept on a document of such importance is a scandal itself. There are two first underlying observations which incur/ result from studying the document. First, the Arrangement has the same institutional (or by institutional) features with the EU-Turkey deal, it is the product of negotiations which intend to regulate EU policy procedures without having been the product of an EU level institutional procedure. It circumvents European law (the Dublin regulation) in order to serve the interests of a group of particular member states. As a result its status within the legal apparatus of the EU and international law is obscure.

    Secondly, the ‘Arrangement’ introduces a grey zone (intentionally if not geographically) where a bilateral deal between two countries gains supremacy over European (Dublin regulation) and international legislation (Geneva convention). It is therefore an important document that should be critically and at length studied by all scholars and experts active in the field of refugee protection as it deprives asylum seekers of their rights and is a clear violation of EU law.

    Last but not least as Article 15-ii of the ‘Arrangement’ notes “This Administrative Arrangement will also discontinue upon entry into force of the revised Common European Asylum System”. Still as everyone in Brussels already admits the CEAS reform has been declared dead. So if nothing occurs to reconstitute the defunct CEAS policy and the arrangement remains as the only channel/form of cooperation between Greece and Germany in order to establish responsibility for asylum seekers arriving in Germany after coming through Greece, then could Greece and Germany, in their irregular bilateral efforts to circumvent the European process, have actually produced one of the first post EU legal arrangements?

    https://rsaegean.org/en/the-administrative-arrangement-between-greece-and-germany

    #accord #Allemagne #Grèce #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Dublin #Règlement_Dublin #renvois #expulsions #accord_bilatéral #regroupement_familial #liaison_officers #officiers_de_liaison #Eurodac #refus_d'entrée #renvois #expulsions #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #Autriche #réadmission #avion #vol

    ping @isskein

    • Germany – Magdeburg Court suspends return of beneficiary of international protection to Greece

      On 13 November 2018, the Administrative Court of Magdeburg granted an interim measure ordering the suspensive effect of the appeal against a deportation order of an international protection beneficiary to Greece.

      The case concerned a Syrian national who applied for international protection in Germany. The Federal Office of Migration and Refugees (BAMF) rejected the application based on the fact that the applicant had already been granted international protection in Greece and ordered his deportation there.

      The Administrative Court held that there were serious doubts regarding the conformity of the BAMF’s conclusion that there were no obstacles to the deportation of the applicant to Greece with national law, which provides that a foreign national cannot be deported if such deportation would be in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Court found that there are substantial grounds to believe that the applicant would face a real risk of inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 ECHR if returned to Greece.

      The Court based this conclusion, inter alia, on the recent reports highlighting that international protection beneficiaries in Greece had no practical access to accommodation, food distribution and sanitary facilities for extended periods of time after arrival. The Court further observed that access of international protection beneficiaries to education, health care, employment, accommodation and social benefits under the same conditions as Greek nationals is provided in domestic law but is not enforced. Consequently, the ensuing living conditions could not be considered adequate for the purposes of Article 3 ECHR.

      Finally, the Court found that the risk of destitution after return could be excluded in cases where individual assurances are given by the receiving authorities, clarifying, however, that any such guarantees should be specific to the individual concerned. In this respect, guarantees given by the Greek authorities that generally refer to the transposition of the Qualification Directive into Greek law, as a proof that recognised refugees enjoy the respective rights, could not be considered sufficient.

      https://mailchi.mp/ecre/elena-weekly-legal-update-08-february-2019#8

    • Germany Rejects 75% of Greek Requests for Family Reunification

      In 2019, the German Federal Office for Asylum and Migration (BAMF) rejected three quarters of requests for family reunification under the Dublin III regulation from Greece. The high rejection rate draws criticism from NGOs and MPs who say the BAMF imposes exceedingly harsh requirements.

      The government’s response to a parliamentary question by the German left party, Die Linke, revealed that from January until May 2019 the BAMF rejected 472 of 626 requests from Greece. Under the Dublin III Regulation, an EU Member State can file a “take-charge request” to ask another EU member state to process an asylum application, if the person concerned has family there. Data from the Greek Asylum Service shows that in 2018 less than 40% of “take-charge requests” were accepted, a stark proportional decrease from 2017, when over 90% of requests were accepted. The German government did not provide any reasons for the high rejection rate.

      Gökay Akbulut, an MP from Die Linke, noted that often family reunification failed because the BAMF imposes exceedingly strict requirements that have no basis in the regulation. At the same time people affected have limited access to legal advice needed to appeal illegitimate rejections of their requests. For people enduring inhuman conditions on Greek Islands family reunifications were often the last resort from misery, Akbulut commented.

      In 2018, 70% of all Dublin requests from Greece to other EU Member states related to family reunification cases. Germany has been the major country of destination for these request. An estimate of over 15,000 live in refugee camps on Greek islands with a capacity of 9000.

      https://www.ecre.org/germany-rejects-75-of-greek-requests-for-family-reunification