• Jichang Lulu: State-managed Buddhism and Chinese-Mongolian relations (article du 23/06/2017)
    https://jichanglulu.tumblr.com/sinified

    No matter what the 14th Dalai Lama says or does, he cannot deny the Central Government’s right to recognise reincarnations,” says Norbu Döndrup ནོར་བུ་དོན་གྲུབ 罗布顿珠, one of the highest-ranking Tibetan officials in the Autonomous Region’s government. Zhu Weiqun 朱维群, former deputy head of the United Front Work Department who now chairs the ethnic and religious affairs committee of the People’s Political Consultative Conference, famously stated that Dalai Lama reincarnations “have never been a purely religious matter;” historical precedent makes the state’s prerogative to manage reincarnations “an important manifestation of the Central Government’s sovereignty over Tibet.” The state clearly cares about reincarnations, and not only when the Dalai Lama is involved. The PRC has now spent decades regulating, codifying and “standardising” the identification and training of increasing numbers of reincarnating lamas, who often are given positions in state administration. The respect they command among many Tibetans makes gaining the “initiative, leadership and control” over reincarnation management a tool for maintaining social stability in Tibetan areas. Extensive research has been devoted to the design of reincarnation policies. The TAR and central governments take reincarnate lamas on trips and training sessions around the country, including visits to Maoist sites. Interviewed during one such educational trip, the Jedrung རྗེ་དྲུང 吉仲 Rinpoche of Dzodzi མཛོ་རྫི 佐孜 monastery in Chamdo, himself installed as such a ‘living Buddha’ by the relevant local authorities in 2000, talks of his and other religious figures’ duty to “develop the good Tibetan Buddhist tradition of love of country and religion (爱国爱教),” contributing to the “mutual adaptation of religion and socialism.” The training seems to be working: the Rinpoche was repeating, verbatim, Party slogans that go back to the Jiang Zemin era.

    • A description of the role of Tibetan Buddhism within the Belt and Road Initiative, elaborating on Xi Jinping’s statements at the Beijing forum, was delivered at a recent meeting by Wang Changyu 王长鱼, Party secretary at the High-level Tibetan Academy of Buddhism (中国藏语系高级佛学院). The Academy’s experience training Tibetan Buddhist monks and its well-developed system of scholarly degrees, says Wang, creates an advantageous position allowing to “help countries and territories along the ‘Belt and Road’ satisfy their demand for religious specialists and scriptures.” Such exchanges can serve two goals: to showcase “the results of our Party and country’s ethnic and religious policies, displaying the healthy heritage and development of Tibetan Buddhism” in China, while reducing “the Dalai clique’s space of activity, upholding national sovereignty.

      #bouddhisme tibétain et #Nouvelles_Routes_de_la_Soie
      #OBOR #One_Belt_One_Road

    • Plus spécifiquement sur la #Mongolie, article du 20/03/2017

      Jichang Lulu: Thinking outside the Urn: China and the reincarnation of Mongolia’s highest lama
      https://jichanglulu.tumblr.com/urn

      The Chinese government’s prerogative to manage the rebirths of incarnate lamas is being tested in Mongolia. One of the highest lineages covered by the Qing’s ‘ #Golden_Urn ’ system at the basis of PRC reincarnation law is passing to its next holder, with the Dalai Lama’s involvement. Despite clear signs that China cares, no public position has emerged so far. To determine what China’s approach to the reincarnation issue might be, we have to go through some Mongolian history and a bit of leaf-reading. The very relevance of state management of rebirths to China’s foreign relations indicates to what extent Qing imperial thought permeates PRC policy. Reincarnation diplomacy is real and has an impact on Chinese policies towards its closest neighbours.

  • Pakistan : des insurgés baloutches visent les intérêts chinois à #Gwadar
    https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2019/05/13/pakistan-des-insurges-baloutches-visent-les-interets-chinois-a-gwadar_546151


    Des forces de sécurité pakistanaises patrouillent dans le port de Gwadar, à 700 km à l’ouest de Karachi, le 13 novembre 2016. La cité portuaire doit devenir le point d’ancrage sur la mer du Corridor économique Chine-Pakistan (CPEC).
    AAMIR QURESHI / AFP

    L’attaque, samedi 11 mai, contre le seul hôtel de luxe de la petite ville portuaire de Gwadar, aux confins de la province du Baloutchistan, symbole de la présence chinoise au Pakistan, a fait cinq morts, dont quatre employés de l’établissement et un soldat. Les forces de sécurité sont parvenues à reprendre le contrôle des lieux, dimanche, après avoir tué les trois assaillants qui s’y étaient repliés. L’opération a été revendiquée par l’Armée de libération du Baloutchistan (ALB) qui visait « les Chinois et autres investisseurs étrangers ».

    Le commando armé, habillé en militaires, s’était introduit à l’intérieur de l’hôtel, construit sur une colline faisant face à la mer. Souvent peu occupé, voire quasi désert, le Pearl Continental accueille généralement des officiels pakistanais de passage ou des étrangers, surtout des cadres chinois, travaillant à la construction d’un port en eau profonde qui doit être l’un des maillons des « nouvelles routes de la soie » promues par Pékin. Le premier ministre pakistanais, Imran Khan, a condamné l’attaque, considérant qu’elle voulait « saboter [les] projets économiques et [la] prospérité » du pays.

    Le symbole est fort. Gwadar doit devenir le point d’ancrage sur la mer du Corridor économique Chine-Pakistan (CPEC), dans lequel Pékin a prévu d’investir 55 milliards d’euros pour relier la province occidentale chinoise du Xinjiang et la mer d’Arabie. En 2018, le responsable du développement portuaire de Gwadar, Dostain Jamaldini, indiquait au Monde « qu’en 2014, la ville n’était encore qu’un village de pêcheurs mais en 2020-23, nous disposerons de 2,6 kilomètres de quais capables de recevoir cinq cargos, et dans vingt ans, ce sera l’un des principaux ports du monde ».

    Pour l’heure, en dépit de l’inauguration, au printemps 2018, par le premier ministre pakistanais d’alors, de plusieurs bâtiments construits par les Chinois dans la zone franche qui longe le port, l’activité demeure très faible.

    #OBOR #One_Belt_One_Road

  • La Cina e il nuovo ordine euro-asiatico

    Sin dal 2013, quando il Presidente cinese #Xi_Jinping ne delineò gli obiettivi, l’iniziativa ormai nota come “Nuova Via della Seta” o “#One_Belt_One_Road” (OBOR) è rapidamente divenuta fulcro della politica estera della Cina in Eurasia e a livello globale e simbolo dell’inedito attivismo di Pechino sulla scena internazionale. Dopo cinque anni, l’iniziativa mantiene il suo appeal, nonostante i rischi intrinseci ad un così vasto progetto, le difficoltà interne ed esterne alla Cina e lo scetticismo di molti paesi coinvolti.

    L’idea cinese di “riconnessione infrastrutturale e logistica” di uno spazio geografico ma anche politico enorme e variegato com l’Eurasia, in effetti, sembra essere l’unica “grande visione” apparentemente in grado di offrire nuovo slancio all’economia globale in tempi di nazionalismo economico-politico, ripresa incerta e crisi diffuse. Si tratta non soltanto di un ambizioso progetto infrastrutturale, ma in effetti di una strategia transregionale di co-sviluppo industriale ed economico: la regione interessata si estende dalle frontiere continentali della Cina fino alle economie in via di sviluppo della cintura afro-asiatica. Ad oggi, questa macro-area rappresenta (insieme ad alcune regioni interne dell’Africa) l’ultimo grande spazio “disconnesso” dell’economia globale; al contempo, però, è territorialmente contiguo ai grandi poli di crescita economica e demografica dell’Asia costiera.

    L’iniziativa è dichiaratamente non egemonica e aperta a tutti i paesi interessati. Pechino ha finora impegnato intorno ai 500 miliardi di dollari nella OBOR, suddivisi fra isituzioni nazionali come il Silk Road Fund e la China Export-Import Bank, nuove istituzioni multilaterali regionali come la Banca Asiatica di Investimenti nelle Infrastrutture (AIIB) e linee di credito delle banche cinesi.

    La OBOR e le istituzioni ad essa legate non rappresentano, tuttavia, né un nuovo piano Marshall, né tantomeno un coerente disegno di graduale assunzione, da parte della Cina, dei compiti di garante di un ordine economico mondiale liberale. Un ordine aperto – e perciò contrario a chiusure nazionalistiche e protezionistiche – come alcuni teorici dell’ordine liberale sembrano sperare, e altri sembrano temere. Essa si iscrive, a converso, nel vasto piano di “ringiovanimento nazionale” che il Presidente Xi ha posto, come in altri suoi interventi, al centro del suo discorso al 19° Congresso del Partito, in ottobre.

    In effetti, la logica della OBOR appare complessa e si muove su piani molteplici: deve essere essenzialmente definita come una risposta proattiva della leadership cinese a cambiamenti strutturali di breve e di lungo periodo, interni ed esterni al Paese. Vi sono almeno tre dimensioni: domestico/macro-economica, geo-economico/geopolitica continentale, e sistemico/globale. Le tre dimensioni sono legate e si rafforzano reciprocamente.

    In termini domestici e macroeconomici, vengono spesso identificate questi fattori chiave nel lancio della OBOR: la Cina, grazie alle misure di stimolo all’economia approvate dopo il crack di Lehman Brothers (all’inizio della crisi), ha generato sovraccapacità nell’industria pesante, sopratuttto dell´acciaio e del cemento; di conseguenza, le banche hanno accumulato enorme liquidità, mentre a livello interno i consumi interni crescevano d’importanza fino a diventare determinanti nell’economia nazionale. Dunque, l’iniziativa sarebbe strumento funzionale a canalizzare sovraccapacità produttive verso i mercati esteri e l’eccesso di liquidità in un grande progetto infrastrutturale.

    Se questa spiegazione aiuta a cogliere la logica contingente della OBOR non ne spiega, tuttavia, le origini strutturali. Esse sono da ricercarsi nell´impulso dato sin dall´inizio degli anni 2000 ad una graduale ma sostenuta trasformazione nel sistema produttivo del paese. Si è deciso di cambiare la geografia economica cinese per ridurre il gap di sviluppo regionale e per combattere i rischi di destabilizzazione nella regione orientale di confine dello Xijninang. Tale sforzo di trasformazione ha creato poli di crescita e produzione nelle regioni centrali e centro-occidentali, in città come Chengdu, Chongqing e più recentemente Urumqi e Kashgar, ed è stato accompagnato dallo sviluppo massiccio della rete stradale e ferroviaria necessaria a collegare questi centri con le coste e con il resto del Paese.

    Allargando lo sguardo all’intero spazio euro-asiatico, il mutamento nella geografia economica del paese ha anche prodotto conseguenze geopolitiche e geoeconomiche profonde. Pechino è oggi è in grado di pianificare la creazione non solo di vie di trasporto continentali ma di una serie di corridoi multimodali terra-mare alternativi alle sole vie marittime, che finora restano sotto il controllo stringente della marina americana. L’Europa diventa così raggiungibile per nuove rotte che sostituiscono parzialmente o totalmente le vecchie. Inoltre, si allarga il ventaglio dei partner commerciali: Pechino si garantisce non solo una diversificazione delle forniture energetiche ma soprattutto l´accesso ai futuri mercati collocati lungo la cintura meridionale dell´Eurasia, dal Sud-Est asiatico e dall’India a Turchia, Iran e Medio Oriente, sino al Corno d´Africa e al Nordafrica

    Infine, le trasformazioni innescate dalla OBOR all’interno dei confini cinesi e nel continente asiatico, e le nuove opportunità geopolitiche apertesi per Pechino hanno prodotto effetti sistemici: per la dimensione stessa dello spazio interessato e per il peso economico, demografico e geografico della Cina, l’iniziativa è di fatto il primo organico passo verso un ordine globale post-Occidentale. A questo passo, tuttavia, la stessa Cina sembra non ancora pronta.

    In effetti, ciascuna delle tre dimensioni presenta rischi per Pechino, che aumentano proporzionalmente al crescere e al concretizzarsi del progetto OBOR.

    A livello interno, un ulteriore rallentamento della crescita, una crisi del sistema bancario o un crollo dei prezzi dei terreni rappresentato tutti elementi che potrebbero seriamente mettere a rischio la stabilità e la nuova dottirna della “crescita normale” sulla quale si basa la legittimità della leadership cinese. Un simile scenario avrebbe ripercussioni dirette sulla OBOR.

    In termini geopolitici, la Cina è dipendente dalle relazioni con una vasta rete di paesi e aree che hanno, in diversa forma e grado, ragioni di temere o di guardare con sospetto l’iniziativa cinese: tra questi c’è l’Europa, e naturalmente anche gli Stati Uniti – osservatori esterni interessati.

    Inoltre, la riconnessione dell’Eurasia è un processo che precede e trascende i piani cinesi. Essa trova la sua origine nelle trasformazioni che negli ultimi quindici anni hanno visto moltiplicare i legami commeraciali all’interno dell’Asia ed emergere nuovi e autonomi centri di potenza economica. Gli attori principali dell´Eurasia – dalla Russia alle medie potenze turca e iraniana, dagli stati centro-asiatici, abili a bilanciare gli interessi concorrenti delle grandi potenze, all’India, sino all’insulare Giappone – si stanno riposizionando e attrezzando per affrontare la sfida lanciata da Pechino. Questi paesi non negano la validità del concetto di una riconnessione continentale, ma lo concepiscono attraverso proprie strategie, contromisure e nuovi assi, come quello tra Giappone e India o quello all’interno del Sud-Est asiatico (paesi ASEAN).

    Dagli altri player continentali non solo dipende il successo dei programmi infrastrutturali, ma anche l’emergere di un distinto ordine euro-asiatico. Le istituzioni liberali occidentali sono chiaramente insufficienti a “coprire” la portata del cambiamento in corso, ma ad esso manca anche – per il momento – una cornice alternativa definita, politica e di regole condivise.

    In questo quadro, l’iniziativa #OBOR (e le istituzioni create quale suo corollario) colgono la natura diffusa, interconnessa, fluida, non istiuzionalizzata, al contempo competitiva e cooperativa, del nuovo sistema globale. Ne individua e ne coglie correttamente strumenti e palcoscenico d’azione: commercio, sviluppo economico e connettività anche fra aree sino ad ora ai margini del sistema economico globale. In tal modo, la OBOR posiziona la Cina al centro dei nuovi assetti, con i suoi interessi, la sua forza e le sue chiare priorità nazionali. Tuttavia, per questa stessa ragione, non è ancora in grado di offrire la prospettiva di un ordine – concetto ancora più complesso rispetto a un sistema – accettato e condiviso da tutti gli attori co-protagonisti dei processi in atto. E’ questa la sfida più grande per Pechino negli anni a venire.

    https://www.aspeniaonline.it/la-cina-e-il-nuovo-ordine-euro-asiatico

    #Chine #cartographie #visualisation #nouvelle_route_de_la_soie #route_de_la_soie
    ping @simplicissimus @reka

  • Commentary: The U.S. risks losing an Arctic Cold War
    https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apps-arctic-commentary/commentary-the-u-s-risks-losing-an-arctic-cold-war-idUSKBN1FJ2DM

    Last August, a Russian tanker sailed direct from Norway to South Korea through the Arctic Ocean, the first time such a ship had done so without an icebreaker escort. It was a defining moment in the opening up of previously frozen northern trade routes – and it looks to have supercharged an already intensifying arms race and jostle for influence on the roof of the world.

    It’s a dynamic that brings particular challenge for the United States. In part because Washington has never regarded the High North as a major strategic priority, the area has been seen as falling within Russia’s sphere of influence. Now China too is stepping up its plans to become a major player in the region.

    Last week, China issued its first white paper on its national Arctic strategy, pledging to work more closely with Moscow in particular to create an Arctic maritime counterpart – a “#Polar_silk_road” – to its “#one_belt_one_road” overland trade route to Europe. Both the Kremlin and Beijing have repeatedly stated that their ambitions are primarily commercial and environmental, not military.

    Washington, however, is increasingly suspicious and – aware it risks falling behind – the Pentagon has been reviewing its Arctic strategy.

    Speaking to Congress in May, the commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, Admiral Paul Zukunft, revealed that Washington was considering fitting anti-ship cruise missiles to its latest generation of icebreakers, a major departure from these vessels’ primary research and rescue role.

    Géostratégie de l’#Arctique

    ABOUT THE AUTHOR
    Peter Apps is Reuters global affairs columnist, writing on international affairs, globalization, conflict and other issues. He is founder and executive director of the Project for Study of the 21st Century; PS21, a non-national, non-partisan, non-ideological think tank in London, New York and Washington. Before that, he spent 12 years as a reporter for Reuters covering defense, political risk and emerging markets. Since 2016, he has been a member of the British Army Reserve and the UK Labour Party. @pete_apps

  • China unveils plan for ’Polar Silk Road’ across the Arctic | The Independent
    http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-polar-silk-road-arctic-xi-jinping-shipping-global-warming-a8178

    China has outlined its ambitions to extend President Xi Jinping’s signature Belt and Road Initiative to the Arctic by developing shipping lanes opened up by global warming.

    Releasing its first official Arctic policy white paper, China said it would encourage enterprises to build infrastructure and conduct commercial trial voyages, paving the way for Arctic shipping routes that would form a “#Polar_Silk_Road”.

    China hopes to work with all parties to build a ’Polar Silk Road’ through developing the Arctic shipping routes,” the paper, issued by the State Council Information Office, said.

    China, despite being a non-Arctic state, is increasingly active in the polar region and became an observer member of the Arctic Council in 2013.
    […]
    China’s increasing prominence in the region has prompted concerns from Arctic states over its long-term strategic objectives, including possible military deployment.

    Some people may have misgivings over our participation in the development of the Arctic, worried we may have other intentions, or that we may plunder resources or damage the environment,” Vice-Foreign Minister Kong Xuanyou said at a briefing.

    I believe these kinds of concerns are absolutely unnecessary.

    #One_Belt_One_Road #OBOR
    #Route_de_la_soie_polaire

  • China signs 99-year lease on Sri Lanka’s #Hambantota port

    Sri Lanka has formally handed over its southern port of Hambantota to China on a 99-year lease, which government critics have denounced as an erosion of the country’s sovereignty.

    The $1.3bn port was opened seven years ago using debt from Chinese state-controlled entities. But it has since struggled under heavy losses, making it impossible for Colombo to repay its debts.

    In 2016, Sri Lankan ministers struck a deal to sell an 80 per cent stake in the port to the state-controlled China Merchants Port Holdings.


    https://www.ft.com/content/e150ef0c-de37-11e7-a8a4-0a1e63a52f9c
    #Chine #port #transport_maritime #Sri_Lanka #One_Belt_One_Road

  • Pékin patine sur ses « nouvelles routes de la soie »
    http://www.lemonde.fr/asie-pacifique/article/2017/11/28/pekin-patine-sur-ses-nouvelles-routes-de-la-soie_5221371_3216.html

    Les « nouvelles routes de la soie » chinoises n’avancent pas comme sur du velours. La grande initiative diplomatique du président Xi Jinping se traduit essentiellement par des projets d’infrastructures construits et souvent financés par la Chine dans des pays amis. L’objectif est pour Pékin à la fois d’étendre son influence et d’écouler ses surplus industriels, notamment d’acier et de ciment. Mais, coup sur coup, le Népal et le Pakistan ont annulé des projets chinois de barrages sur leur territoire.

    Ce double revers démontre que les méthodes de Pékin suscitent des résistances. C’est sur son compte Twitter que le vice-premier ministre népalais, Kamal Thapa, a annoncé, lundi 13 novembre, que son gouvernement abandonnait un projet de barrage à 2,5 milliards de dollars que devait construire un groupe chinois : « Lors du conseil des ministres, il a été conclu que l’accord passé avec le Gezhouba Group pour le projet hydroélectrique de Budhi Gandaki avait été adopté sans réflexion, et comportait des irrégularités. Il a été rejeté sur les recommandations d’une commission parlementaire. » Cette commission a notamment critiqué le manque de transparence lors de l’attribution du marché. Il n’y avait pas eu d’appel d’offres. Situé à 80 kilomètres de Katmandou, le barrage devait fournir 1 200 mégawatts d’électricité à un pays où les coupures de courant sont monnaie courante.

    Dans le cas du Pakistan, la mesure est moins radicale. Le pays a décidé de poursuivre le projet de barrage de Diamer-Bhasha, de 4 500 mégawatts, qui sera bien construit par une entreprise chinoise. Mais Islamabad se passera de la Chine pour le financer, prenant en charge les 14 milliards de dollars nécessaires. Le Pakistan a demandé à la Chine d’exclure le barrage du « corridor économique sino-pakistanais », la déclinaison locale des « nouvelles routes de la soie ».

    #route_de_la_soie #One_Belt_One_Road #OBOR

  • Sri Lanka signs $1.1 billion China port deal amid local, foreign concerns
    http://www.reuters.com/article/us-sri-lanka-china-ports-idUSKBN1AE0CN

    Sri Lanka signed a long delayed $1.1 billion deal on Saturday to lease its southern Hambantota port to China ignoring an appeal by opposition parties to debate the pact in parliament.

    The deal was signed between the two state firms — Sri LankaPorts Authority (SLPA) and China Merchants Port Holdings(0144.HK) to handle the commercial operations of the Chinese-built port on a 99-year lease.

    Chinese firm will hold 70 stake in a joint venture with SLPA to run the port, part of a plan to convert loans worth $6 billion that Sri Lanka owes China into equity.
    […]
    Hu Jianhua, the executive vice president of the ChinaMerchants Port said the port facilities belong to the citizens of Sri Lanka but will be a key part of China’s massive #One_Belt_One_Road initiative to build trade and transport links across Asia and beyond.
    […]
    Government and diplomatic sources told Reuters that the United States, India and Japan have raised concerns over possible military activities by China in Hambantota port.

    #OBOR

  • China seeks up to 85 percent stake in strategic #port in #Myanmar – gCaptain
    http://gcaptain.com/china-seeks-85-percent-stake-strategic-port-myanmar

    China is looking to take a stake of up to 85 percent in a strategically important sea port in Myanmar, according to documents reviewed by Reuters, in a move that could heighten tensions over China’s growing economic clout in the country.

    Beijing has been pushing for preferential access to the deep sea port of #Kyauk_Pyu on the Bay of Bengal, as part of its ambitious “#One_Belt_ One_Road” infrastructure investment plan to deepen its links with economies throughout Asia and beyond.
    […]
    Well-placed sources told Reuters last month that China had signaled it was willing to abandon the controversial $3.6 billion Myitsone dam project in Myanmar, but would be looking in return for concessions on other strategic opportunities in the Southeast Asian nation – including the Bay of Bengal port.

    Kyauk Pyu is important for China because the port is the entry point for a Chinese oil and gas pipeline which gives it an alternative route for energy imports from the Middle East that avoids the Malacca Straits, a shipping chokepoint.

    Pour le moment, le port en eau profonde à l’air plutôt embryonnaire…
    https://www.google.fr/maps/place/Kyaukpyu,+Myanmar+(Birmanie)/@19.4173657,93.5251327,8398m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m5!3m4!1s0x30ba0f3a71728015:0xcc8c0c1341c5be03!8m2!3d19.421202

    @aude_v
    #OBOR

  • En train, dix-huit jours pour relier la Grande-Bretagne à la Chine (INFOGRAPHIE) - La Libre
    http://www.lalibre.be/actu/international/en-train-dix-huit-jours-pour-relier-la-grande-bretagne-a-la-chine-infographi


    Le retour du #train ?

    Le premier train de marchandises reliant directement le Royaume-Uni à la Chine est parti de Londres lundi pour un long voyage à travers les continents, propre à rappeler l’ancestrale Route de la soie. Le train, long de 600 mètres et composé de 32 wagons, a quitté la capitale britannique pour la ville de Yiwu, située sur la côte est de la Chine.

  • 5 Upheavals To Expect Along The New Silk Road In 2017
    http://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/12/28/5-upheavals-to-expect-from-the-new-silk-road-in-2017

    The New Silk Road is a multifaceted, multinational initiative to establish a network of enhanced overland and maritime economic corridors extending between China and Europe, better integrating a region that consists of over 60 countries and 60% of the population, 75% of the energy resources, and 70% of GDP in the world. It’s potentially an earth-shaking, paradigm-breaking disruption that would more fluidly connect the economic giants of China, Russia, Iran, India, and Europe into a loosely affiliated geo-economic bloc that could shift the balance of global power.

    #bouleversements #route_de_la_soie

  • INFOGRAPHIC: China’s high-speed rail vision | South China Morning Post
    http://www.scmp.com/infographics/article/1605236/infographic-chinas-high-speed-rail-vision?comment-sort=recommended

    China is proposing five high-speed international railway networks that would ultimately connect the UK at one end, America at another and Singapore in the south, with China in the centre.

    #Chine #transport #rail #cartographie

  • What exactly is ’one belt, one road’? | Chatham House

    https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/twt/what-exactly-one-belt-one-road

    The phrase ‘one belt, one road’ has become a staple of discussions about China’s foreign policy and approach to the global economy. This is not least because the concept looks something like a signature foreign policy initiative of Chinese president Xi Jinping.

    But the challenge has been unpicking exactly what the ‘one belt, one road’ slogan means. In English the name is clunky and somewhat misleading, a literal translation from a typically concise Chinese phrase yi dai yi lu, which in turn condenses two related ideas.

    The first is the construction of a Silk Road economic belt spreading from western and inland China through Central Asia towards Europe, resonant of historical Eurasian ‘silk roads’ which reached their height during China’s Tang dynasty (618-906). Likewise, the second idea – a 21st century maritime Silk Road – is inspired by historical maritime trading routes from coastal China through the South China Sea and beyond. It will extend these routes to continents and countries where trade volumes are currently small, but growing, such as East Africa.

    #route_de_la_soie #one_belt_one_road

  • One Belt, One Road : A brilliant plan

    https://www.clsa.com/special/onebeltoneroad

    A brilliant plan One Belt, One Road

    Xi Jinping’s ambitious strategic initiative – an adaptation of the historical Silk Road – could sow the seeds for a new geopolitical era
    Head of China-HK strategy Francis Cheung and Head of China Industrial Research Alexious Lee provide an indepth analysis on what to expect in their Obor Silk Belt and Sea Road reports, available exclusively to CLSA clients.
    Thirty years of unprecedented growth

    In just 30 years, China has developed from a poor inward-looking agricultural country to a global manufacturing powerhouse. Its model of investing and producing at home and exporting to developed markets has elevated it to the world’s second-largest economy after the USA.

    Now faced with a slowing economy at home, China’s leadership is looking for new channels to sustain its appetite for growth at a time when developing neighbours are experiencing rapidly rising demand.

    #route_de_la_soie #one_belt_one_road

  • One Belt, One Road - The Economist Intelligence Unit
    http://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=OneBeltOneRoad

    Prospects and challenges on China’s ‘one belt, one road’: a risk assessment report

    Complete the registration form opposite to download a copy of Prospects and challenges on China’s ‘one belt, one road’: a risk assessment report

    In this report, The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) unpacks China’s “one belt, one road” plan and explores the risks that will face companies seeking opportunities in the OBOR territories. It has been indicated that up to 60 countries may be included in OBOR with stops across three different continents. In addition to political objectives, OBOR brings a strategic focus which encourages Chinese firms to go abroad in search of new markets or investment opportunities. Led from the highest levels of the government the OBOR push is backed by substantial financial firepower, with the government has launching a US$50bn Silk Road Fund that will directly support the OBOR mission. While the strategy promises opportunities for domestic companies, the route is unlikely to be an even one. The proposed countries range from Singapore to Syria. The companies involved could be heading into territories that may be strategically important for China’s foreign relations, but challenging to navigate.

    #route_de_la_soie #one_belt_one_road

  • Connecting the World Through “Belt & Road”CHINA US Focus | CHINA US Focus

    http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/the-belt-road-initiative-offers-new-model-of-cooperation-in-global-gov

    OBOR has been proposed as an innovative method of cooperation in global governance in the face of a worsening economic climate and simmering geopolitical problems worldwide. This solution follows eight years of slow recovery since the financial crisis of 2008, which arguably witnessed the failure of “neo-liberalism” and its infamous economic reform recipe enacted by the “Washington Consensus.” China’s economic growth might give the world its only hope, with an annual GDP increase of 7% that contributes over 30% to global economic growth.

    The dire prospects for global development and the re-emergence of geopolitical troubles in the Middle East, Ukraine and elsewhere are pressing for elusive answers. What should we do to promote global peace and common development in the age of fast-paced globalization?
    Given the reality of the world today, what is so innovative and trailblazing about OBOR? Can it really offer a way out of the quagmire in which the world finds itself? I will try to illustrate my points as follows.

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  • China’s rise as a regional and global power | Brookings Institution
    http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/07/china-regional-global-power-dollar
    http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/images/m/mf+mj/migrant%20worker%20and%20high%20rises/migrant%20worker%20and%20high%20rises_16x9.jpg

    CHINA has been growing extremely rapidly for a long time, but an important shift in its growth pattern occurred at the time of the global financial crisis.

    During the six years up to 2007 China’s GDP grew at an average rate of 11 percent, with investment equaling 41.5 percent of GDP. The current account surplus was rising in this period, reaching over 10 percent of GDP. In the six years since the global crisis, the external surplus has fallen sharply into the range of two to three percent of GDP, but the shortfall in demand was made up almost completely by an increase in investment, which has reached more than 50 percent of GDP in recent years.

    #route_de_la_soie #one_belt_one_road