operatingsystem:isis

  • #stuxnet files

    W32.Stuxnet Dossier
    v1.4, February 2011, Symantec

    https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf
    (Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, and Eric Chien)

    In order to achieve this goal the creators amassed a vast array of components to increase their chances of success. This includes 4 zero-day exploits, a Windows rootkit, the first ever PLC [Programmable Logic Controller] rootkit, [compromise 2 digital certificates] antivirus evasion techniques, complex process injection and hooking code, network infection routines, peer-to-peer updates, and a command and control interface. We take a look at each of the different components of Stuxnet to understand how the threat works in detail while keeping in mind that the ultimate goal of the threat is the most interesting and relevant part of the threat.

    [...]

    Stuxnet contains many features such as:
    • Self-replicates through removable drives exploiting a vulnerability allowing auto-execution. "Microsoft Windows Shortcut ‘LNK/PIF’ Files Automatic File Execution Vulnerability (BID 41732) CVE-2010-2568"
    • Spreads in a LAN through a vulnerability in the Windows Print Spooler. "Microsoft Windows Print Spooler Service Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (BID 43073) CVE-2010-2729"
    • Spreads through SMB by exploiting the Microsoft Windows Server Service RPC Handling Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (BID 31874), CVE-2008-4250
    • Copies and executes itself on remote computers through network shares.
    • Copies and executes itself on remote computers running a WinCC database server.
    • Copies itself into Step 7 projects [ Siemens SIMATIC Step 7 industrial control software] in such a way that it automatically executes when the Step 7 project is loaded.
    • Updates itself through a peer-to-peer mechanism within a LAN.
    • Exploits a total of four unpatched Microsoft vulnerabilities, two of which are previously mentioned vulnerabilities for self-replication and the other two are escalation of privilege vulnerabilities that have yet to be disclosed.
    • Contacts a command and control server that allows the hacker to download and execute code, including updated versions.
    • Contains a Windows rootkit that hide its binaries.
    • Attempts to bypass security products.
    • Fingerprints a specific industrial control system (ICS) and modifies code on the Siemens PLCs to potentially sabotage the system.
    • Hides modified code on PLCs, essentially a rootkit for PLCs.

    Stuxnet Malware and Natanz: Update of ISIS December 22, 2010 Report - update Feb 15, 2011

    http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/stuxnet_update_15Feb2011.pdf
    (David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Christina Walrond)

    In the December 22, 2010 ISIS [Institute for Science and International Security] report on Stuxnet, ISIS found that this malware contained important evidence indicating that its target was the IR-1 centrifuges at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz. ISIS focused on the attack sequences generated by a Siemens S7-315 programmable logic controller (PLC) connected to frequency converters of a particular type. The ISIS analysis centered on the rotational frequencies listed in these detailed attack sequences. These frequencies matched, in two cases identically, key frequencies characteristic of the IR-1 centrifuge at the FEP.

    A further analysis of another attack sequence has revealed that this code contains a description of what appears to be an exact copy of the IR-1 cascade at the FEP. The attack is titled “Sequence C” by Symantec, the computer security company that has conducted the most thorough and reliable open analysis of the malware’s code, or “417 code” after the advanced Siemens S7-417 programmable logic controller that Stuxnet targets. However, the 417 code is not activated and thus unable to launch an attack. Moreover, key data is missing from the code available to Symantec that would define exactly what is affected or sabotaged. Symantec has assessed that the 417 code is likely unfinished, perhaps a work in progress.

    Additional analysis also lends more support to the conclusion that the Stuxnet malware is aimed principally at centrifuges, not manipulating parameters of the centrifuge cascades so as to lower the production low enriched uranium (LEU) on a sustained basis. To date, Stuxnet is known to have had at least one attack. It is increasingly accepted that, in late 2009 or early 2010, Stuxnet destroyed about 1,000 IR-1 centrifuges out of about 9,000 deployed at the site. The effect of this attack was significant. It rattled the Iranians, who were unlikely to know what caused the breakage, delayed the expected expansion of the plant, and further consumed a limited supply of centrifuges to replace those destroyed. Nonetheless, Iran took steps in the aftermath of the attack that likely reduced further damage by Stuxnet, principally shutting down many centrifuge cascades for months. The shutdown lasted long enough for the malware to be discovered publicly, which time Iran could have found Stuxnet on the Natanz control systems.

    [...]

    New Finding: Evidence of Targeting Natanz in Sequence C or 417 Code
    Soon after the publication of the ISIS December 22 report, Ralph Langner, a German security expert, contacted ISIS after noticing that each of the Natanz centrifuge cascades contained 164 centrifuges. He said that the 417 code, or sequence C, is grouped in six arrays of 164 units each, perhaps representing six cascades, each with 164 centrifuges.
    Based on Symantec’s analysis of this array, ISIS discovered that this array is identical to an IR-1 centrifuge cascade at the FEP. This evidence is perhaps the strongest evidence that Stuxnet is aimed at Natanz.

    [...]
    But with key data missing, one can only speculate about what the 417 code aims to sabotage. According to Symantec, the data sent to the cascades appear more aimed at flipping a series of on/off values rather than sending a packet of commands like the 315 code sends to frequency converters.

  • Salafism in #Nigeria. Islam, Preaching, and Politics

    The spectre of #Boko_Haram and its activities in Nigeria dominates both media and academic analysis of Islam in the region. But, as Alexander Thurston argues here, beyond the sensational headlines this group generates, the dynamics of Muslim life in northern Nigeria remain poorly understood. Drawing on interviews with leading Salafis in Nigeria as well as on a rereading of the history of the global Salafi movement, this volume explores how a canon of classical and contemporary texts defines Salafism. Examining how these texts are interpreted and - crucially - who it is that has the authority to do so, Thurston offers a systematic analysis of curricula taught in Saudi Arabia and how they shape religious scholars’ approach to religion and education once they return to Africa. Essential for scholars of religion and politics, this unique text explores how the canon of Salafism has been used and refined, from Nigeria’s return to democracy to the jihadist movement Boko Haram.


    http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/african-government-politics-and-policy/salafism-nigeria-islam-preaching-and-politics?format=HB

    #livre #salafisme #islam #ISIS #EI #Etat_islamique #Arabie_Saoudite #djihadisme

  • Les soucis (et l’implacable logique) des sionistes du genre Andrew Tabler du Washington Institute for Near East Policy (#WINEP) : il faut bombarder la #Syrie pour éviter la venue de #migrants en #Europe
    http://www.npr.org/2016/12/17/505996757/why-the-fall-of-aleppo-marks-a-turning-point-in-syrias-war?sc=tw

    ... to people like in the hometown that I’m from in Pennsylvania, the two things that really are going to continue driving this home and showing that President Obama’s policy was a failure is the combined threat of terrorism and that of migrants that are coming out of this fragmented and broken country.

    And when these two streams crossed, they came to loosen up and to damage the societies throughout Europe that had been allies with the United States since the Second World War, brought Russia to the fore in the Middle East and even inspired, in the case of ISIS, a number of lone wolf attacks in the United States.

  • Lire absolument: Louis Allday, “Controlling the Narrative on Syria”
    http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2016/allday131216.html

    One of the many fallacies that predominate in this prevailing narrative is that the West has not intervened in the conflict in Syria. For instance, Amnesty International has recently described the UK as “sit[ting] on the sidelines” of the conflict. This fundamentally false position ignores several years of the West and its regional allies (primarily Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar) arming, funding and training rebel groups, the crippling economic sanctions imposed against the Syrian Government, ongoing airstrikes, special forces operations, and a host of other diplomatic, military and economic measures that have been taken. Not only has the West (primarily the US) intervened, it has done so on a very large scale. For instance, in June 2015, it was revealed that the CIA’s involvement in Syria had become “one of the agency’s largest covert operations” in which it was spending roughly $1bn a year (about $1 for every $15 in the CIA’s announced budget). At that time, this operation based out of Jordan had already “trained and equipped nearly 10,000 fighters sent into Syria over the past several years”. As Patrick Higgins has remarked, “[i]n other words, the United States launched a full-scale war against Syria, and few Americans actually noticed”. It is vital to place this aggression in the context of long-standing US animosity to the Syrian Government. As diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks have revealed, since at least 2006, the US has consistently sought to undermine it “by any available means”, utilising a variety of techniques including an effort — in co-ordination with Saudi Arabia — to encourage Islamic fundamentalism and sectarianism in the country by playing on fears of Iranian influence. Indeed, although it is rarely mentioned, a senior US intelligence official is on record in a televised interview with Mehdi Hasan confirming that facilitating the rise of ISIS and other Islamic extremist groups in Syria and Iraq was a “wilful decision” on behalf of the Obama administration. The BBC has recently reported that ISIS use ammunition bought legally in Eastern Europe by the US and Saudi Governments that is then transported via Turkey into Syria and Iraq, “sometimes only two months from leaving the factory”.

    When US intervention in Syria is acknowledged, it is regularly portrayed as having been small-scale and insufficient. Professor Gilbert Achcar of SOAS has remarked that “Washington’s support to the opposition is more the stuff of jokes than anything serious”. Given that Achcar made this observation six months after the revelations concerning the enormous scale of the CIA’s Syria operation, it is hard to imagine exactly what level of military support would be required in order to be considered more than a ’joke’. This misleading narrative of non-existent or inadequate US intervention, coupled with a propensity to defend it with insults, is extremely common, including among commentators who write for ostensibly left-leaning publications. Some pundits such as Murtaza Hussain of The Intercept have recently even gone so far as to claim that the US is in fact intervening in Syria, but “in favor of Assad”, an absurd argument that Glenn Greenwald has also expressed.

  • Deen Sharp on the “story” of the soon collapsing Mosul dam
    https://www.facebook.com/deensharp?hc_ref=NEWSFEED

    Has any other dam received as much attention over such a long time span about its immenant collapse as the Mosul dam?

    And it took me - in 2014! - a few google searches to find that this document likely does not exist but yet it STILL gets cited by journalists!: A report by the US Corps, in 2006, warned that the conditions of the dam were extremely precarious. “In terms of internal erosion potential of the foundation, Mosul Dam is the most dangerous dam in the world,” said the Corps.

    I blogged about this here when I was bored one evening, come on people!:

    So, I looked for the 2006 report by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) that called, according to Malas and numerous other journalists, the Mosul Dam “the most dangerous dam in the world”. And I searched and I searched. It was conceivable that the report was not in the public domain despite the fact that the US government and USACE have put a cache of documents on the Mosul Dam online. But then I found US Embassy comments on the document Relief and Reconstruction Funded Work at Mosul Dam, Mosul, Iraq that notes: “ITAO [The Iraq Transition Assistance Office] is not aware of the September report that declares Mosul to be the most dangerous dam in the world” and also warned that such a claim is “inflammatory and almost certainly disprovable”. Indeed, I had no idea how dangerous and frequent Dam failures are – the Mosul dam has significant competition. (https://deensharp.wordpress.com/2014/08/25/dam-debt)

    #barrage #dam #ISIS

  • Un long et très intéressant article sur le blog de Joshua Landis pour démonter la thèse «Assad a fabriqué ISIS»: Is Assad the Author of ISIS? Did Iran Blow Up Assef Shawkat? And Other Tall Tales
    http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/assad-author-isis-iran-blow-assef-sawkat-tall-tales-ehsani2

    As the events in Daraa unfolded, the President invited key figures from the town to see what can be done to calm the demonstrations. One such figure was cleric Sayasneh. One of the consistent demands of such meetings was the release of prisoners. It was no different when Douma joined the uprising. Foreign Embassies were also pushing the Syrian State to release what it called political prisoners. People like Zahran Alloush were sentenced to seven years in prison when he was arrested with a group of 40 people on the charge of promoting Wahhabi ideology and gun possession. They had not killed anyone or even fired a shot. Yet, they were sent to prisons like Sednaya and kept there beyond the end of their sentence on the whim of one of the security agencies. It was in this context when the residents of Douma demanded the release of prisoners from their districts. The Syrian leadership was under intense pressure to calm the crisis. The people of Douma promised to do their job at calming their own streets if some of those prisoners were released. Zahran and many others like him were released under this rationale. This is not too dissimilar to the way the American prisons in Iraq worked. Zarqawi, Baghdadi and Golani were all released from those prisons either when their terms ended or when the local populations demanded their release. Just like in Syrian prisons, the prisoners in American jails were also indoctrinated with jihadist ideology. Syria erred by releasing Alloush and Abboud who would go on to form Jeish al Islam and Ahrar just like the U.S. erred when it released Baghdadi who would go on to form ISIS.

    • Angry Arab revient lui aussi sur cette théorie, mais en réponse à un billet de Qifa Nabki : Elias Muhanna ("Qifanabki") on ISIS and the Syrian regime
      http://angryarab.blogspot.fr/2016/12/elias-muhanna-qifanabki-on-isis-and.html

      So Elias commented on the lousy (really trashy, journalistically speaking) series about ISIS and the Syrian regime in Daily Beast.
      https://qifanabki.com/2016/12/07/assad-and-isis
      This is not about politics but about methodology, journalistic standards and about the dominant political paradigm about Syria and beyond. Basically, in this piece, Eias reveals himself as fully March 14, while he used to be more careful in his analysis before. This piece reads like the talking points of March 14 really. But away from generalizations let us talk specifics (my responses to his words are in red):

      1) His opening sentence set the stage: "Gutman’s articles have been championed by opposition supporters and critiqued by regime loyalists." So here he tells readers that anyone who is critical of the piece is a regime supporters. Look at this demagogic method. So end of story. Let us go home. If you dare disagree with the non-expert Gutman (who research basically constituted spending long hours in cafes in Istanbul). There is really no need to continue when he says that, but I will continue.

      2) He then informs the readers this: "The most astute observers of the conflict have long recognized the alignment of certain interests between the regime and the most radical elements in the Islamist opposition." Here, you are to believe that if you are astute you have to agree with the premise of Gutman and Western media and government, otherwise you are not astute. No evidence is necessary.

      3) Look at this line (and notice that Elias, like all other cheerleaders of the armed Jihadi groups in Syria) still insist that there was this really secular/feminist/democratic spectrum of secular armed groups, and then the regime came and produced those Islamists and then, voila, the secular armed groups suddenly disappeared in order for Bashshar to claim that his enemies are not the real Voltaire Battalions but the various Islamist Jihadi battalions: "The rise of ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra has been disastrous for the secular political opposition".

      4) Elias then proceeds to yet again complains that the fact that Gutman piece is short on data and research (unless sitting in cafes in Istanbul counts as solid research) is bad not from a journalistic standpoint but because it helps the opponents of his beloved Syrian rebels (former Voltaire battalions who were transformed by trickery by the regime to Jihadi battalions): "That’s unfortunate, because they have given regime apologists more ammunition for the claim that the Syrian uprising is nothing but a foreign conspiracy fueled by fake news and Gulf-funded think tanks." But I am not sure what he means by the side reference to Gulf-funded think tanks? Does he mean that those are valuable academic assets who should not be criticized or does he mean that their punditry should be respected and not maligned and ridiculed. Not sure here but he seems defensive about them.

      5) Here he produces his theory (same as Gutman theory and same as the various theories about the Jihadi rebels from DAY ONE): "When the Assad regime released many of its Islamist prisoners from Sednaya Prison in 2011 — including individuals like Zahran Alloush, Yahia al-Hamawi, Hassan Abboud, and others who would go on to positions of leadership in Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, and ISIS — it did so in full knowledge that the Islamists spelled trouble for the nascent uprising." So the evidence marshaled by Elias is that since the regime released them from jail, it means it controls them and even controls them when they bomb the regime sites and when they kill regime supporters, etc. But here is what curious: if this is the evidence in itself, how come Elias never wrote that US is responsible for the Jihadi in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan as the US release scores of Jihadi fighters INCLUDING BAGHDADI HIMSELF? And does this argument not apply to Jordan, Saudi, Pakistani, Afghani, and Moroccan regime? The Jordanian regime is most culpable among them all as it started to manipulate Jihadis long before any of those regimes. So if the evidence is the release from jail, then it can’t be true in the case of Syrian regime and not true in the case of all those other regimes including the US government and its occupation authorities in the region.

      6) Then Elias produces another conspiracy theory more fascinating than the first one: "The intelligence services guessed correctly that the peaceful secular demonstrations would be overrun by violent former inmates". Here, what does overrun mean? I mean, if the rebels were mostly secular, why would the release of Jihadi “overrun” them? What would that happen if the majority are active in the Voltaire Battalions? Why did not the more popular (according to Elias and all other mainstream journalists) secular forces overrun the others?

      7) Then Elias proceeds to make a Lebanon analogy: "That group was widely seen as a tool of Syrian intelligence". Widely seen? It was only “widely seen” by the Hariri family and the rest of the Saudi-run March 14 Movement. There was never any evidence presented about that. The only evidence is that its leader once spent time in Syrian regime jail, just as Baghdadi once spent time in US military jails in Iraq. And many of those Jihadi groups are openly and blatantly opposed to the Syrian regime on sectarian grounds and in fact the regime fought against them in Lebanon during the Syrian political domination of Lebanon. But it gets worse:

      8) Elias then says: "Longtime Syria-watchers will recall that Hizbullah was adamantly opposed to the Lebanese Army’s assault on the camp". I consider myself “a long time Syria-watcher” — and an occasional bird-watcher — and I dont recall that. This is absolutely and totally untrue, and even Elias friends in March 14 would not mischaracterize the stance of Hizbullah as such. Hizbullah was NOT opposed to the assault on the camp: Nasrallah specifically said that entry into the camp “is the red line”. He meant that the civilian population of the camp should be spared and that the assault on Fath Al-Islam should have sparred the lives of civilians But unfortunatley, once the Lebanese Amy began the assault on the camp, Hizbullah never complained AS IT SHOULD HAVE. More than 45 Palestinian civilians were massacred by the Lebanese Army assault. I was and still am of the position that the Lebanese Army should not have assaulted the camp (I call on Elias to visit what is left of the camp to see for himself) in order to get rid of a small armed gang, especially that negotiations were going on. In fact, the lousy Syrian regime Army supported and helped and the lousy Lebanese regime Army in the assault of the camp. And unfortunately Hizbullhah provided intelligence and military support for the Army during the assault. So if my position against Army assault make me an accomplice with Fath Al-Islam, be my guest. But it was really incredible how Elias—desperate to find evidence of any kind—decided to distort the position of Hizbullah.

      9) Finally, Elias concludes with his last evidence, that the Syrian regime had “infiltrated” those groups: "given the regime’s successful infiltration of these groups". Wait. Infiltration of groups means control and creation of those groups? Do you remember after Sep. 11 when George Tenet testified before US Congress that CIA had infiltrated Al-Qa`idah? Syrian, Jordanian, Saudi, and other Arab and Western and Israeli intelligence services had all infiltrated those groups, but why do you go from here to decide that only the Syrian regime is guilty of infiltration? Are you that desperate to validate a lousy piece of journalism by Roy Gutman? Finally, here is what I find interesting: Gutman built up his case on coffee shop chatter by Syrians in Istanbul, but usually Westerners mock unsubstanitated conspiracy theories by Middle Easterners. Yet, only in the case of Syria are those conspiracy theories believed and peddled and only because they serve the propaganda interests of of Western governments.

      PS Do you notice that when people cite the lousy piece by Roy Gutman they always say: the award-winning Roy Gutman. I remember when people cited Judith Miller about WMDs of Iraq before 2003, they also always said: award-winning journalist, Judith Miller.

      PPS Elias Responds here.
      https://qifanabki.com/2016/12/07/assad-and-isis/comment-page-1/#comment-127286

    • Sinon, c’est la même #théorie_du_complot, explicitée cette fois par Michel Touma de l’Orient-Le Jour, reprise de manière extrêmement fainéante par Courrier international :
      http://www.courrierinternational.com/article/lettre-ouverte-du-liban-pourquoi-francois-fillon-tout-faux-su

      (alors qu’il y aurait beaucoup à dire sur le fait de baser une politique étrangère française sur la prétendue et forcément catastrophique « protection des Chrétiens d’Orient »)

  • This is why everything you’ve read about the wars in Syria and Iraq could be wrong - Patrick Cockburn
    http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/syria-aleppo-iraq-mosul-isis-middle-east-conflict-assad-war-everythin

    The Iraqi army, backed by US-led airstrikes, is trying to capture east Mosul at the same time as the Syrian army and its Shia paramilitary allies are fighting their way into east Aleppo. An estimated 300 civilians have been killed in Aleppo by government artillery and bombing in the last fortnight, and in Mosul there are reportedly some 600 civilian dead over a month.

    Despite these similarities, the reporting by the international media of these two sieges is radically different.

    In Mosul, civilian loss of life is blamed on Isis, with its indiscriminate use of mortars and suicide bombers, while the Iraqi army and their air support are largely given a free pass. Isis is accused of preventing civilians from leaving the city so they can be used as human shields.

    Contrast this with Western media descriptions of the inhuman savagery of President Assad’s forces indiscriminately slaughtering civilians regardless of whether they stay or try to flee. The UN chief of humanitarian affairs, Stephen O’Brien, suggested this week that the rebels in east Aleppo were stopping civilians departing – but unlike Mosul, the issue gets little coverage.

    One factor making the sieges of east Aleppo and east Mosul so similar, and different, from past sieges in the Middle East, such as the Israeli siege of Beirut in 1982 or of Gaza in 2014, is that there are no independent foreign journalists present. They are not there for the very good reason that Isis imprisons and beheads foreigners while Jabhat al-Nusra, until recently the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, is only a shade less bloodthirsty and generally holds them for ransom. 

    These are the two groups that dominate the armed opposition in Syria as a whole. In Aleppo, though only about 20 per cent of the 10,000 fighters are Nusra, it is they – along with their allies in Ahrar al-Sham – who are leading the resistance.

    Unsurprisingly, foreign journalists covering developments in east Aleppo and rebel-held areas of Syria overwhelmingly do so from Lebanon or Turkey. A number of intrepid correspondents who tried to do eyewitness reporting from rebel-held areas swiftly found themselves tipped into the boots of cars or otherwise incarcerated.

    Experience shows that foreign reporters are quite right not to trust their lives even to the most moderate of the armed opposition inside Syria. But, strangely enough, the same media organisations continue to put their trust in the veracity of information coming out of areas under the control of these same potential kidnappers and hostage takers.

  • One by One, ISIS Social Media Experts Are Killed as Result of F.B.I. Program - The New York Times
    http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/24/world/middleeast/isis-recruiters-social-media.html

    Mr. Hussain, a 21-year-old from Birmingham, England, was a leader of a band of English-speaking computer specialists who had given a far-reaching megaphone to Islamic State propaganda and exhorted online followers to carry out attacks in the West. One by one, American and allied forces have killed the most important of roughly a dozen members of the cell, which the F.B.I. calls “the Legion,” as part of a secretive campaign

    pour faire plaisir @nidal

    #drones #isis#cyberguerre#community_management

  • Turkish warplanes strike ISIS targets in Syria’s al-Bab | News , Middle East | THE DAILY STAR
    https://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2016/Nov-25/382802-turkish-warplanes-strike-isis-targets-in-syrias-al-bab.ashx

    Turkish warplanes carried out air strikes on the Syrian city of al-Bab held by ISIS on Friday, the military said in a statement, after four Turkish soldiers were killed in the area over the past two days.

    The air strikes shortly before 8 a.m. (0500 GMT) destroyed buildings believed to be used by the radical militant group, the military said in a statement. The strikes were part of Turkey’s “Euphrates Shield” operation, launched in August to try to push ISIS and Kurdish militia fighters from the border.

    Prime Minister Binali Yildirim said on Thursday that Turkey would retaliate after three of its soldiers were killed in what the military said was a suspected Syrian air strike. Another soldier was later killed in clashes with ISIS, the military said earlier on Friday.

    C’est pourtant simple : on a le droit d’envahir ton pays et tu n’as pas le droit de nous bombarder…

  • Egyptian fighter jets arrive in Syria : report
    https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/egyptian-fighter-jets-arrive-syria-report

    DAMASCUS, SYRIA (2:20 P.M.) - Egyptian fighter jets landed for the first time at the Hama Military Airport this week, the Lebanon-based As-Safir newspaper reported on Wednesday morning.

    As-Safir claims that these Egyptian fighter jets will participate in the ongoing military operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS), while also providing logistical support to the Syrian Arab Air Force (SAAYF).

    Redistribution des cartes au Moyen-Orient.

  • Iraq: Militias Held, Beat Villagers. Recruited Children as Fighters From Camp for Displaced People

    (Erbil) – Iraqi government-backed Hashad al-Asha’ri militias detained and beat at least 22 men from two villages near Mosul. The militias also recruited at least 10 children in a camp for displaced people as fighters against the Islamic State, also known as ISIS.

    https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/styles/946w/public/multimedia_images_2016/hashad_abuses.jpg?itok=s1vK_AR6
    https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/20/iraq-militias-held-beat-villagers
    #enfants #enfance #enfants-soldats #ISIS #EI #Etat_islamique #Irak #camp_de_réfugiés #IDPs #Hasansham

  • The Lessons of Henry Kissinger: Trump [may] react to a terror attack in a way that suits their purposes
    http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/12/the-lessons-of-henry-kissinger/505868

    HK: But at some point, events will necessitate decision making once more. The only exception to this rule may be nonstate groups; they may have an incentive to provoke an American reaction that undermines our global position.

    JG: The threat from isis is more serious now?

    HK: Nonstate groups may make the assessment that Trump will react to a terror attack in a way that suits their purposes.

    C’est Jeffrey Goldberg qui explicite “ISIS”. Kissinger répète “nonstate groups”.

  • Vijay Prashad’s Book Explores Why ’You Cannot Build Democracy With a Gun’
    http://thewire.in/72317/vijay-prashad-death-of-a-nation-and-the-future-of-the-arab-revolution-review

    Prashad asserts that however real the Sunni-Shia divide is, it does not drive the political turmoil in the region. That narrative is authored by the geo-political rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, spurred by the machinations of the West and Israel. There was no inherent antipathy between the sultans of Arabia and the king of Iran. It was the Iranian Revolution of 1979 that posed issues which the Saudi monarchy saw as an existential challenge to itself and as an insidious influence on its neighbourhood. The fact that a Muslim king had been replaced by an Islamic form of republicanism, with the introduction of an elected parliament and the establishment of modern institutions which even allowed women to participate. Early on, the US had decided that its own preservation lay in protecting the Arab monarchs and their oil wealth. For its own interests, the US government deepened the sectarian divide by fanning Saudi fears about Iran.

    “Anti-Iran morphed rapidly into anti-Shia rhetoric and practice,” notes Prashad. “It is how Saudi proxies have operated in Syria and in Iraq and why Saudi Arabia began its endless war in Yemen.”

    Wahabism would have been unthinkable in the diverse and secular Iraq that existed before the US invasion in 2003. The occupation forces dug into fissures between the Shia and Sunni sects to smother any chance of reconstruction of Iraqi nationalism. The US occupation provided oxygen to al-Qaeda and its ilk, who the locals began to refer to as “the Saudis of Iraq”. Nothing in the soil of Iraq, says Prashad, suggested incipient sectarian brutality; under US sponsorship it developed and bloomed fully. The global war on terror declared by the US and its allies “did not erase the terrorists; it manufactured them”. ISIS dates its origin to the anti-US insurgency in Iraq. The danger of sectarian wars, he points out “is that they have no endgame. They will not end with a utopian outcome. They can end only where life becomes evil.”

    Prashad adds that in similar fashion “the West – and Israel – have been content to see Syria bleed and weaken. No outcome is desirable to them.” Since the Syrian government was incapable of fulfilling people’s aspirations, Arab money intervened – backed by the adventurism of Western powers – to play out their own respective agendas. From a political dispute, the Syrian stand-off plunged into a confounding war among a number of proxy armies from neighbouring countries, the al-Qaeda, ISIS, the Kurds and Assad’s forces, with overt and covert gimmicks of Russia, France and the US further poisoning the quagmire.

    The Death of the Nation maintains that the lessons from Iraq were not learned: they were repeated in Libya and again, calamitously, in Syria and Yemen. Was there an alternative to regime-change that might have saved these countries from devastation and chaos? If the West and its allies had not chased total victory, could a negotiated settlement have been fashioned to forestall the resultant catastrophe? Bear in mind that bodies like the African Union had offered to mediate; and Saddam Hussein, on his capture, begged to negotiate; while [Muammar] Gaddafi, before he was lynched, pleaded that he be allowed to surrender.

    The Arab Revolutions were the outcome of the inter-play of three forces, contends Prashad. First, ‘political Islam’ which had originated as an Islamic component of the anti-colonial struggle. Exemplified in the Muslim Brotherhood, this was also a modernising influence and therefore, distinct from Wahabism. While it remained largely in the shadows, political Islam incubated in mosques everywhere, touching the lives of large numbers and developing a mass base and strong cadre. Second, the “youth bulge” in the Arab demographic presented a phalanx of under-employed, educated young people frustrated at the lack of economic and social opportunity and at the stultifying political atmosphere. The third strand – and in Prashad’s view the most significant – comprised of the organised working class and migrant residents of urban slums, who came together on everyday issues to demonstrate and strike, and to provide the spark for insurrection.

    These forces combined to spur large sections of the population to rise against dispensations representing the security state on the one hand and neo-liberal policies on the other, triggering a revolution against economic deprivation and political suffocation. Prashad views the Arab Revolution as a “civilisational” uprising, but he does not offer anything more than anecdotal basis to support his wishful assertion that the memory of the popular upsurge “makes an irreversible slip backward impossible”.

    On his extensive travels, Prashad comes upon a cross-section of individuals dreaming of revitalised Arab nationalism “as a cord that binds people across the widened sectarian divides”: Iraqi women’s activist Yanar Mohammed challenges the Americans: “You cannot build democracy with a gun”; journalist and theatre person Hadi al-Mahdi laments: “I am sick of seeing our mothers beg in the streets”; a young al-Nusra militant in Lebanon confides: “If I had a job, I would not do jihad”; Omar Abdulaziz Hallaj, “a wise and distinguished architect from Aleppo” works quietly with others like him to build trust to bridge the sectarian divide and buttress Syrian diversity.

    #prashad #catastrophe_arabe

  • Assange: Clinton & ISIS funded by same money, Trump won’t be allowed to win (JOHN PILGER EXCLUSIVE)
    https://www.rt.com/news/365299-assange-pilger-saudi-clinton

    John Pilger: The Saudis, the Qataris, the Moroccans, the Bahrainis, particularly the first two, are giving all this money to the Clinton Foundation, while Hillary Clinton is secretary of state, and the State Department is approving massive arms sales, particularly Saudi Arabia.

    Julian Assange: Under Hillary Clinton – and the Clinton emails reveal a significant discussion of it – the biggest-ever arms deal in the world was made with Saudi Arabia: more than $80 billion. During her tenure, the total arms exports from the US doubled in dollar value.

    JP: Of course, the consequence of that is that this notorious jihadist group, called ISIL or ISIS, is created largely with money from people who are giving money to the Clinton Foundation?

    JA: Yes.

  • Les histoires macabres qui ont inspiré l’idée de Frankenstein à Bagdad
    The son of Baghdad who fathered Iraqi Frankenstein | Arts & Ent , Culture | THE DAILY STAR
    http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Arts-and-Ent/Culture/2016/Oct-01/374628-the-son-of-baghdad-who-fathered-iraqi-frankenstein.ashx
    #Ahmed_Saadawi

    The idea for his book is rooted in what has been Iraq’s grim reality for years. Saadawi recounted two specific incidents that shocked him and inspired him to write “Frankenstein in Baghdad.”

    One was in the city of Baqouba when Al-Qaeda in Iraq – nowadays Daesh (ISIS) – kidnapped a man, killed him, and chopped his body into pieces. “They dropped each piece in a different part of Baqouba ... When the city woke up, each neighborhood saw a different body part,” he said. “They made the whole city see the body simultaneously. What criminal genius!”

    The other moment that stuck with him was also at the height of last decade’s civil war, when hospitals were overwhelmed by the sheer volume of bodies being brought in after bombings.

    The fridges were overflowing and bodies simply lined the corridors. Saadawi told of how one exhausted forensic team “lost their humanity.”

    “One day someone came asking about his brother ... they told him that all the bodies had already been collected by their families, except for these pieces,” he said. “There were mismatched, unclaimed ... body parts and they told him to assemble a man from them and take it away.”

  • Camp #Bucca: The US prison that became the birthplace of Isis

    In March 2009, in a wind-swept sliver of Iraq, a sense of uncertainty befell the southern town of Garma, home to one of the Iraq War’s most notorious prisons. The sprawling detention center called Camp Bucca, which had detained some of the Iraq War’s most radical jihadists along the Kuwait border, had just freed hundreds of inhabitants. Families rejoiced, anxiously awaiting their sons, brothers and fathers who had been lost to Bucca for years. But a local official fretted.


    http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/camp-bucca-the-us-prison-that-became-the-birthplace-of-isis-9838905.h
    #prisons #USA #Etats-Unis #radicalisation #ISIS #EI #Etat_islamique #camp_bucca

  • Why ISIS Is Winning the Social Media War
    Brendan I. Koerner
    https://www.wired.com/2016/03/isis-winning-social-media-war-heres-beat

    Unlike al Qaeda, which has generally been methodical about organizing and controlling its terror cells, the more opportunistic Islamic State is content to crowdsource its social media activity—and its violence—out to individuals with whom it has no concrete ties. And the organization does not make this happen in the shadows; it does so openly in the West’s most beloved precincts of the Internet, co-opting the digital services that have become woven into our daily lives. As a result, the Islamic State’s brand has permeated our cultural atmosphere to an outsize degree.

  • Jihadism Transformed: #Al-Qaeda and Islamic State’s Global Battle of Ideas

    The contributors examine whether the challenge presented to al-Qaeda by Islamic State heralds a tectonic shift in international jihadism and how the former may respond to the threat of being usurped.


    http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/jihadism-transformed
    #livre #ISIS #Etat_islamique #djihadisme #Al-Qaïda