organization:bric

  • The Geopolitical Economy of the Global Internet Infrastructure on JSTOR
    https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/jinfopoli.7.2017.0228

    Article très intéressant qui repositionne les Etats dans la gestion de l’infrastructure globale de l’internet. En fait, une infrastructure globale pour le déploiement du capital (une autre approche de la géopolitique, issue de David Harvey).

    According to many observers, economic globalization and the liberalization of telecoms/internet policy have remade the world in the image of the United States. The dominant roles of Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google have also led to charges of US internet imperialism. This article, however, argues that while these internet giants dominate some of the most popular internet services, the ownership and control of core elements of the internet infrastructure—submarine cables, internet exchange points, autonomous system numbers, datacenters, and so on—are tilting increasingly toward the EU and BRICS (i.e., Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) countries and the rest of the world, complicating views of hegemonic US control of the internet and what Susan Strange calls the knowledge structure.

    This article takes a different tack. It argues that while US-based internet giants do dominate some of the middle and top layers of the internet—for example, operating systems (iOS, Windows, Android), search engines (Google), social networks (Facebook), online retailing (Amazon), over-the-top TV (Netflix), browsers (Google Chrome, Apple Safari, Microsoft Explorer), and domain names (ICANN)—they do not rule the hardware, or material infrastructure, upon which the internet and daily life, business, governments, society, and war increasingly depend. In fact, as the article shows, ownership and control of many core elements of the global internet infrastructure—for example, fiber optic submarine cables, content delivery networks (CDNs), autonomous system numbers (ASN), and internet exchange points (IXPs)—are tilting toward the rest of the world, especially Europe and the BRICS (i.e., Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). This reflects the fact that the United States’ standing in the world is slipping while an ever more multipolar world is arising.

    International internet backbone providers, internet content companies, and CDNs interconnect with local ISPs and at one or more of the nearly 2000 IXPs around the world. The largest IXPs are in New York, London, Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Seattle, Chicago, Moscow, Sao Paulo, Tokyo, and Hong Kong. They are core elements of the internet that switch traffic between all the various networks that comprise the internet system, and help to establish accessible, affordable, fast, and secure internet service.

    In developed markets, internet companies such as Google, Baidu, Facebook, Netflix, Youku, and Yandex use IXPs to interconnect with local ISPs such as Deutsche Telecoms in Germany, BT or Virgin Media in Britain, or Comcast in the United States to gain last-mile access to their customers—and vice versa, back up the chain. Indeed, 99 percent of internet traffic handled by peering arrangements among such parties occurs without any money changing hands or a formal contract.50 Where IXPs do not exist or are rare, as in Africa, or run poorly, as in India, the cost of bandwidth is far more expensive. This is a key factor that helps to explain why internet service is so expensive in areas of the world that can least afford it. It is also why the OECD and EU encourage developing countries to make IXPs a cornerstone of economic development and telecoms policy work.

    The network of networks that make up the internet constitute a sprawling, general purpose platform upon which financial markets, business, and trade, as well as diplomacy, spying, national security, and war depend. The world’s largest electronic payments system operator, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications’ (SWIFT) secure messaging network carries over 25 million messages a day involving payments that are believed to be worth over $7 trillion USD.59 Likewise, the world’s biggest foreign currency settlement system, the CLS Bank, executes upward of a million trades a day worth between $1.5 and $2.5 trillion over the global cable systems—although that is down by half from its high point in 2008.60 As Stephen Malphrus, former chief of staff to the US Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, observed, when “communications networks go down, the financial services sector does not grind to a halt, rather it snaps to a halt.”61

    Governments and militaries also account for a significant portion of internet traffic. Indeed, 90 to 95 percent of US government traffic, including sensitive diplomatic and military orders, travels over privately owned cables to reach officials in the field.62 “A major portion of DoD data traveling on undersea cables is unmanned aerial vehicle video,” notes a study done for the Department of Homeland Security by MIT scholar Michael Sechrist.63 Indeed, the Department of Defense’s entire Global Information Grid shares space in these cables with the general public internet.64

    The 3.6 billion people as of early 2016 who use the internet to communicate, share music, ideas and knowledge, browse, upload videos, tweet, blog, organize social events and political protests, watch pornography, read sacred texts, and sell stuff are having the greatest influence on the current phase of internet infrastructure development. Video currently makes up an estimated two-thirds of all internet traffic, and is expected to grow to 80 percent in the next five years,69 with US firms leading the way. Netflix single-handedly accounts for a third of all internet traffic. YouTube is the second largest source of internet traffic on fixed and mobile networks alike the world over. Altogether, the big five internet giants account for roughly half of all “prime-time” internet traffic, a phrasing that deliberately reflects the fact that internet usage swells and peaks at the same time as the classic prime-time television period, that is, 7 p.m. to 11 p.m.

    Importance des investissements des compagnies de l’internet dans les projets de câbles.

    Several things stand out from this analysis. First, in less than a decade, Google has carved out a very large place for itself through its ownership role in four of the six projects (the SJC, Faster, Unity, and Pacific Cable Light initiatives), while Facebook has stakes in two of them (APG and PLCN) and Microsoft in the PLCN project. This is a relatively new trend and one that should be watched in the years ahead.

    A preliminary view based on the publicly available information is that the US internet companies are important but subordinate players in consortia dominated by state-owned national carriers and a few relatively new competitors. Keen to wrest control of core elements of the internet infrastructure that they perceive to have been excessively dominated by United States interests in the past, Asian governments and private investors have joined forces to change things in their favor. In terms of the geopolitical economy of the internet, there is both a shift toward the Asia-Pacific region and an increased role for national governments.

    Return of the State as Regulator of Concentrated Markets

    In addition to the expanded role of the state as market builder, regulator, and information infrastructure policy maker, many regulators have also rediscovered the reality of significant market concentration in the telecom-internet and media industries. Indeed, the US government has rejected several high-profile telecoms mergers in recent years, such as AT&T’s proposal to take over T-Mobile in 2011, T-Mobile’s bid for Sprint in 2014, and Comcast’s attempt to acquire Time Warner Cable last year. Even the approval of Comcast’s blockbuster takeover of NBC Universal in 2011, and Charter Communications acquisition of Time Warner Cable last year, respectively, came with important strings attached and ongoing conduct regulation designed to constrain the companies’ ability to abuse their dominant market power.87 The FCC’s landmark 2016 ruling to reclassify broadband internet access as a common carrier further indicated that US regulators have been alert to the realities of market concentration and telecoms-internet access providers’ capacity to abuse that power, and the need to maintain a vigilant eye to ensure that their practices do not swamp people’s rights to freely express themselves, maintain control over the collection, retention, use, and disclosure of their personal information, and to access a diverse range of services over the internet.88 The 28 members of the European Union, along with Norway, India, and Chile, have adopted similar “common carriage/network neutrality/open network”89 rules to offset the reality that concentration in core elements of these industries is “astonishingly high”90 on the basis of commonly used indicators (e.g., concentration ratios and the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index).

    These developments indicate a new phase in internet governance and control. In the first phase, circa the 1990s, technical experts and organizations such as the Internet Engineers Task Force played a large role, while the state sat relatively passively on the sidelines. In the second phase, circa the early to mid-2000s, commercial forces surged to the fore, while internet governance revolved around the ICANN and the multi-stakeholder model. Finally, the revelations of mass internet surveillance by many states and ongoing disputes over the multi-stakeholder, “internet freedom” agenda on the one side, versus the national sovereignty, multilateral model where the ITU and UN system would play a larger role in internet governance all indicate that significant moves are afoot where the relationship between states and markets is now in a heightened state of flux.

    Such claims, however, are overdrawn. They rely too heavily on the same old “realist,” “struggle for control” model where conflict between nation-states has loomed large and business interests and communication technologies served mainly as “weapons of politics” and the handmaidens of national interests from the telegraph in the nineteenth century to the internet today. Yet, nation-states and private business interests, then and now, not only compete with one another but also cooperate extensively to cultivate a common global space of economic accumulation. Communication technologies and business interests, moreover, often act independent of the nation-state and via “private structures of cooperation,” that is, cartels and consortia, as the history and contemporary state of the undersea cable networks illustrate. In fact, the internet infrastructure of the twenty-first century, much like that of the industrial information infrastructure of the past 150 years, is still primarily financed, owned, and operated by many multinational consortia, although more than a few submarine communications cables are now owned by a relatively new roster of competitive players, such as Tata, Level 3, Global Cloud Xchange, and so forth. They have arisen mostly in the last 20 years and from new quarters, such as India in the case of Tata, for example.

    #Economie_numérique #Géopolitique #Câbles_sous_marins

  • Belgique : Action de Greenpeace dans les Brico contre l’utilisation du glyphosate 28 Mai, Belga
    Environ 2000 militants de Greenpeace se sont rendus samedi dans les magasins Brico du pays pour réclamer la suppression de tous les produits contenant du glyphosate des rayons de l’enseigne, annonce l’association dans un communiqué.
    "Pesticides : pas dans mon magasin"

    L’action visait à couvrir les bouteilles de produits contenant ces substances avec des autocollants portant l’inscription "Pesticides : pas dans mon magasin" et "No to pesticides, Yes to nature". "De nombreuses alternatives écologiques existent, comme la brosse métallique, le brûleur vapeur ou le brûleur thermique. Ce sont eux que l’on devrait trouver dans les rayons de nos magasins et non de toxiques pesticides", souligne Muriel de Pauw, chargée de la campagne Agriculture chez Greenpeace.

    Le personnel de certains magasins a appelé la police
     « Greenpeace encourage Brico à montrer l’exemple aux autres acteurs du marché belge. D’autant que la société mère de Brico, Maxeda, possède aussi une chaîne de magasins de bricolage néerlandais, Praxis, qui a déjà banni ces pesticides. » Greenpeace déplore cependant que le personnel de certains magasins ait appelé la police à l’arrivée des militants samedi. Pour l’association, Brico n’a "pas compris" le sens de l’action "pacifique", "alors même que la chaîne refuse depuis des mois de discuter avec Greenpeace de la vente" de ces produits.

    Plusieurs lettres avaient déjà été envoyée à Brico ainsi qu’une pétition. Une première action avait par ailleurs été initiée en octobre autour de la même thématique.
    #glyphosate #Greenpeace #Belgique

  • Face aux merdias occidentaux, les BRICS vont créer une coalition médiatique
    http://www.brujitafr.fr/2015/12/face-aux-merdias-occidentaux-les-brics-vont-creer-une-coalition-mediatique

    Les dirigeants de 25 groupes médiatiques des pays membres des BRICS (Brésil, Russie, Inde, Chine et Afrique du Sud) doivent se réunir le 1er décembre à Beijing pour un événement sans précédent consacré à la promotion de la coopération des médias de ces...

  • Les USA se font piétiner par les BRICS en Amérique du Sud | LE SAKER FRANCOPHONE | Par Pepe Escobar – Le 23 mai 2015 – Source : Russia Today | Traduit par Daniel, relu par jj pour Le Saker francophone
    http://lesakerfrancophone.net/les-usa-se-font-pietiner-par-les-brics-en-amerique-du-sud

    Tout a commencé en avril par une pluie d’accords entre l’Argentine et la Russie lors de la visite de la présidente Cristina Kirchner à Moscou.

    Puis un ambitieux plan d’investissement de $53 Mds a été scellé lors de la visite du premier ministre chinois Li Keqiang au Brésil, premier arrêt d’une nouvelle offensive commerciale de la Chine en Amérique du Sud, qui comprenait une belle métaphore : Li voyageant à bord d’une rame de métro fabriquée en Chine qui circulera sur la nouvelle ligne qui sera inaugurée à Rio de Janeiro à la veille des jeux Olympiques de 2016.

    Où se situent les USA dans tout cela ? Nulle part. Peu à peu, mais inexorablement, les membres des BRICS que sont la Chine et, dans une moindre mesure, la Russie, sont parvenus à restructurer les échanges commerciaux et les projets d’infrastructure dans l’ensemble de l’Amérique latine.

  • ’Mapping Brooklyn,’ a Joint Exhibition of BRIC and the Brooklyn Historical Society, Explores the Complexities of the Borough - CityLab

    http://www.citylab.com/design/2015/03/brooklyn-all-over-the-maps/387661

    NYC’s 71-square-mile borough to the east has become such a strong cultural metaphor, so easily abstracted to explain other cities, that one can lose sight of the things that make it Brooklyn, not “Brooklyn.” Its tremendous demographic diversity, for example. Its politics. Its pre-colonial history. It’s Casper-the-Friendly-Ghost-shaped outline.

    In “Mapping Brooklyn,” a joint exhibition of BRIC House and the Brooklyn Historical Society, the manifold geographies of Brooklyn are on full display. Contemporary artworks that use cartography to examine the borough (and elsewhere) are shown side by side with maps from the historical society’s collections, adding up to a complex portrait of a complex place.

    #cartographie #new_york #brooklyn

  • Les grands pays émergents se dotent d’un outil financier à côté de la Banque mondiale et du FMI

    BRICS for a new bank - The Hindu
    http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/brics-for-a-new-bank/article6221912.ece?homepage=true

    What might have been dismissed as an impossibility just five years ago is now a reality. Defying sceptics and critics, five countries that between them account for 40 per cent of the world’s population and 20 per cent of its GDP have signed an agreement to create a development bank to provide financial assistance to developing countries and emerging market economies, mainly for infrastructure projects. As its name implies, the agreement for the New Development Bank, signed by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa at their sixth BRICS summit in Brazil, signals the start of a new global financial order that aims to be more inclusive than the Western-focussed International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The $100 billion bank will have an initial subscribed capital of $50 billion. The five members managed to iron out their differences to agree on an equal share for each in the bank, so no one member dominates the institution. India and South Africa both wanted to host the headquarters. The eventual decision to locate it in Shanghai was an acknowledgement that China’s is the biggest economy in the grouping. The Bank will also have an African Regional Centre in South Africa and India will assume the first presidency of the bank. First mooted at the fourth BRICS summit in New Delhi in 2012, the Bank will certainly have an impact on the existing arrangements put in place by the Bretton Woods institutions, and will give more say to smaller countries. But BRICS also appears to recognise that the NDB cannot replace the IMF, the World Bank or the regional development banks. Thus, the Fortaleza Declaration describes the NDB as a “supplement to the efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions for global development.”

    A second financial instrument, the Contingency Reserve Arrangement of $100 billion, has been set up to help developing economies tide over “short-term liquidity pressures, promote further BRICS cooperation, strengthen the global financial safety net and complement existing international arrangements.” In its sixth year, BRICS has a new confidence, and it was more than apparent at the summit. The only world grouping that is not region, security or trade-based, its members have come together with the determination to create a more multilateral global order. China and Russia have backed the other three BRICS members on the issue of UN reform and Security Council expansion. But the grouping needs to find a stronger political voice. The Declaration came in the midst of the bombardment, even if under grave provocation, of Gaza by Israel, but it is silent on this while calling for Israel and Palestine to resume negotiations towards a two-state solution.

  • World GDP | The Economist

    Le graphique est tout simple, tout classique, mais très impressionnant quand on y pense...

    http://www.economist.com/news/economic-and-financial-indicators/21574491-world-gdp?fsrc=scn/fb/wl/pe/worldgdp

    The five members of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) met in Durban this week to discuss their increasingly common interests.

    The now ubiquitous acronym was coined in 2001 by a strategist at Goldman Sachs. The group has since become a formal club of nations with South Africa, which wasn’t included in Goldman’s original collection, joining in 2010. Thanks largely to these big emerging economies, world GDP rose by 2.5% during the final quarter of 2012. The BRICS alone have been responsible for 55% of global growth since the end of 2009. Dragged down by debt and austerity, the 23 countries that make up the developed world contributed just 20% to that growth.

    • Je me suis fait la même remarque.

      Du point de vue mathématique les taux de croissance (variations relatives en %) ne s’additionnent pas, donc sémiologiquement les barres ne peuvent pas s’empiler.

      De plus, si l’objectif est de comparer les taux de croissance des 3 zones, l’empilement est inefficace.

      Du point de vue graphique, ça fonctionne quand même un petit peu du fait que les BRICS forment la première série de l’empilement.