organization:druze

  • Israel’s Relations with the Syrian Rebels: An Assessment :: Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
    http://www.aymennjawad.org/20017/israel-relations-with-the-syrian-rebels

    With this overview of the dynamics in these border areas, it remains to be asked what exactly are the Israeli goals and interests here. Much of the recent analysis has used the terminology of a “buffer zone” in relation to Israel’s border policies, meaning that the goal is to create an area of allied or “friendly” forces that will keep elements considered active threats to Israel away from the borders.[61] In this regard, the main threats are thought to be Iran and allied militias such as Lebanon’s Hizballah, the concern being that were the regime to regain full control over Quneitra governorate, Iran and its allies would have free access to this territory to build a Golan “resistance” front against Israel, which would at minimum entail the threat of small-scale attacks to harangue Israeli forces in the Golan and “test the waters,” so to speak, and at worst a full-scale invasion of Israeli territory.

    It may in fact not be necessary for Iran to station its own personnel or members of foreign client forces in Quneitra in the future: It could well realize aspirations to build a “resistance” front in the area by “native proxy” through the multiple Syrian Hizballah groups that have arisen in the course of the civil war. Broadly speaking, Syrian Hizballah groups can be divided into two types: larger movements like Liwa al-Baqir, which claims 4,000 fighters[62] and has developed considerable networks within Aleppo province, and small-scale “special operation” groups that deploy to a number of different fronts depending on military needs and a sense of crisis. Some of these small Syrian Hizballah outfits have deployed to the Quneitra front,[63] though there is no evidence that they have done so to prepare for an imminent attack on Israel. In a future scenario of the development of a broader “resistance” along the Golan, these smaller groups may well be a key actor to threaten Israel.

    A related source of concern has centered on the Druze village of Hadr, in that Samir al-Quntar–a Hizballah commander of Druze origin–and Farhan al-Sha’alan–an NDF commander originally from the Druze village of Ein Qiniyya in the Golan Heights–were trying to build a “resistance” movement in Hadr in order to target Israel.[64] Both men were killed in a suspected Israeli airstrike in December 2015. No hints have emerged since of the revival of such a project.

    Yet the case of Hadr actually shows that the “buffer zone” narrative, while seemingly convincing in its simplicity, does not fully account for Israel’s approach towards these border areas. On the general level, it is certainly true that in a choice between regime and rebel control over towns like Jubatha al-Khashab, the preference is that rebel forces should control them. With Hadr, however, Israel’s concern is that the village should not fall into rebel hands, despite concerns about Hizballah using it as a base for recruitment of personnel to target Israel. This position has arisen in deference to the sentiments of the Druze community in Israel and the Golan Heights, who understandably fear the fate of their co-religionists should the village ever fall to the rebels. Muru Hawran demonstrated an awareness of this lack of Israeli willingness to see Hadr fall, elaborating, “All that is happening is an international game at the expense of Syrian blood: settling of accounts.”[65] In a similar vein, he was clear that he still considered Israel to be an enemy state, but justified Fursan al-Jawlan’s acceptance of aid through Israel on the grounds that it is better to do so than to “destroy oneself.”[66]

  • Youth reject ″sectarian″ recruitment to the Israeli army
    https://en.qantara.de/content/druze-conscription-youth-reject-sectarian-recruitment-to-the-israeli-army

    Although they are not the first Druze organisation against conscription – the Druze Initiative committee was created in 1972 and works to this day – members say they are the only movement that includes Christians and Muslims, and that doesn′t operate within the framework of a political party.

    ″What brought us together is the belief that we are all Palestinians, and one of the methods that Israel used to separate us was imposing compulsory military service on Druze men,″ Hadiya Kayoof, 24, the group′s counselling network co-ordinator, told Qantara.de.

    In a report issued last October, the NGO Baladna, which works to empower Arab Palestinian youth living in Israel, similarly argues that Israel′s army recruitment strategies have been promoting intra-Palestinian sectarianism amongst the population that remained within Israel′s borders in 1948.

  • Seeing through the darkness - Israel News, Ynetnews
    http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4701111,00.html

    Intéressant voyage dans la mentalité d’assiégés de nombres d’Israéliens. L’ennemi est partout et terrible (surtout quand il est chiite). Morcaux choisis.

    In contrast to Assad regime’s dream of capturing the Golan, the Iranian players – Soleimani and Khamenei – dream of destroying Israel through a long and daunting war of attrition, a campaign consisting of unrelenting terror attacks and missile fire that will physically and psychologically exhaust Israel’s citizens, causing them to flee to Europe or America.

    Alongside the Iranian threat we have that posed by radical Sunni Islam, which also aims to destroy Israel through a continuous campaign, but has postponed the campaign until they can claim victory over their Shi’ite rivals and secular Arab rulers.

    The IDF is preparing for exactly these scenarios.

    From the Israeli point of view, there are three types of people on the other side of the fence in the Golan: True enemy actors, potential enemy actors, and potential partners.

    The true enemy actors are those who prescribe to radical Shia Islam, which is led by Iran: The Syrian Army, Hezbollah, Palestinian groups, Syrian militias – including every armed minority loyal to Assad.

    (...) The potential enemy actors are all the organizations and groups devoted to militant Sunni Islam, Salafist jihadism, or partake in the global jihad movement. Some of them are already present in the Syrian Golan, including the Nusra Front, which is a Syrian Al-Qaeda affiliate, and Shuhada Al Yarmouk, which acts on behalf of ISIS.

    (...) The third category – the potential partners – includes the uninvolved residents of the Syrian Golan, the secular rebels, the FSA, local militias, and members of the Druze, Christian and Circassian communities.

    (...)

    #israël #golan

    • Projection (psychanalyse)
      https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Projection_%28psychanalyse%29

      La projection désigne un mécanisme de défense introduit par Freud dans le langage de la psychanalyse. Le terme est devenu très général en psychologie et en psychiatrie. Il désigne l’opération mentale (généralement inconsciente) par laquelle une personne place sur quelqu’un d’autre ses propres sentiments, dans le but de se sortir d’une situation émotionnelle vécue comme intolérable par elle. La personne n’a généralement pas conscience d’appliquer ce mécanisme, justement car elle n’accepte pas les sentiments, ou sensations, qu’elle « projette » sur l’autre. Il s’agit donc généralement de sentiments négatifs, ou en tout cas, perçus comme tels

      Le discours politique de nombre d’israéliens est aisément traduisible avec, en tête, cette définition qui se résume aussi par le : « c’est sui qui l’dit qui y’est » des cours de l’école primaire.

  • Christians, Druze gather for #reconciliation at Mount #Lebanon village
    http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/christians-druze-gather-reconciliation-mount-lebanon-village

    Hundreds gathered in a Mount Lebanon village Tuesday for a ceremony marking reconciliation between Druze and Christians whose relations where battered during the 1975-1990 civil war. Christian residents, who at the time of the war overwhelmingly backed the fascist-styled Lebanese Forces militia, fled the Chouf town of #Brih after losing out to Druze fighters two decades ago. But Saturday’s ceremony was meant the bury the hatchet between the two as Christians reportedly began to return to their homes in the mixed Maronite - Druze village, located about 23 kilometers southeast of Beirut. read more

    #Top_News

  • Politics, Power, and Preventive Action » When America Attacked Syria
    http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2012/02/13/when-america-attacked-syria

    While the United States was supposed to have been a neutral entity in Lebanon as part of the MNF, by summer 1983 it had openly sided with the pro-Israeli Lebanese government. To support the Lebanese military, the U.S.S. New Jersey was authorized to shell the Druze militia and Syrian military forces in the mountains surrounding Beirut. As Colin Powell later described the response: “When the shells started falling on the Shiites, they assumed the American ‘referee’ had taken sides against them. And since they could not reach the battleship, they found a more vulnerable target: the exposed Marines at the airport.”

  • Là, tu apprends que les troupes françaises de la Finul au Liban abiment les routes et provoquent des embouteillages avec leurs chars Leclerc. Et ça énerve les gens.

    07BEIRUT60 / janvier 2007 / LEBANON : JUMBLATT SEES HIZBALLAH AS THREAT TO DRUZE ; TRIBUNAL IS INDISPENSABLE
    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/01/07BEIRUT60.html

    Masri also told Jumblatt that the January 8 press report of a clash between French troops of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and Hizballah operatives had arisen from growing tensions in the south between French troops and local residents in UNIFIL’s Area of Responsibility. French Leclerc tanks had created traffic disruptions and road damage and led to a popular backlash against them, and residents were made “nervous” by the French troops’ instructions to seize any arms found unconcealed.

    • The Saudis had come through with a USD 10 million cash injection to Jumblatt himself three months ago, he told us openly. Jumblatt, who employs a legion of retainers and security personnel and is obligated by his quasi-feudal position in Druze society not only to spread cash around but to outdo the patronage of his Druze rivals, had nearly run out of money in mid-late 2006. The new Saudi money, he said, would last him for “a couple of years only.” (Comment: The revelation that Jumblatt had just received a cash lifeline might explain a number of observations about his recent behavior. Not only had he seemed calmer and more confident in the last few months but bolder, assailing Hizballah in public with allegations of involvement in Rafiq Hariri’s assassination and the attempt on Marwan Hamadeh’s life. Jumblatt told us in earlier meetings that Rafiq Hariri used to give him about $3 million a year to keep Druse loyalty on his side. End Comment.) Jumblatt said that he would visit Saudi Arabia following the Prime Minister’s next visit.

      Cette information est reprise dans le câble 07BEIRUT291 de février 2007.