organization:european union

  • Accelerated remittances growth to low- and middle-income countries in 2018

    Remittances to low- and middle-income countries grew rapidly and are projected to reach a new record in 2018, says the latest edition of the World Bank’s Migration and Development Brief, released today.

    The Bank estimates that officially recorded remittances to developing countries will increase by 10.8 percent to reach $528 billion in 2018. This new record level follows robust growth of 7.8 percent in 2017. Global remittances, which include flows to high-income countries, are projected to grow by 10.3 percent to $689 billion.

    Remittance flows rose in all regions, most notably in Europe and Central Asia (20 percent) and South Asia (13.5 percent), followed by Sub-Saharan Africa (9.8 percent), Latin America and the Caribbean (9.3 percent), the Middle East and North Africa (9.1 percent), and East Asia and the Pacific (6.6 percent). Growth was driven by a stronger economy and employment situation in the United States and a rebound in outward flows from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and the Russian Federation.

    Among major remittance recipients, India retains its top spot, with remittances expected to total $80 billion this year, followed by China ($67 billion), Mexico and the Philippines ($34 billion each), and Egypt ($26 billion).

    As global growth is projected to moderate, future remittances to low- and middle-income countries are expected to grow moderately by 4 percent to reach $549 billion in 2019. Global remittances are expected to grow 3.7 percent to $715 billion in 2019.

    The Brief notes that the global average cost of sending $200 remains high at 6.9 percent in the third quarter of 2018. Reducing remittance costs to 3 percent by 2030 is a global target under #Sustainable_Development_Goals (SDG) 10.7. Increasing the volume of remittances is also a global goal under the proposals for raising financing for the SDGs.

    https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/12/08/accelerated-remittances-growth-to-low-and-middle-income-countries-in-2018

    #remittances #migrations #statistiques #chiffres #2018 #coût #SDGs

    • #Rapport : Migration and Remittances

      This Migration and Development Brief reports global trends in migration and remittance flows. It highlights developments connected to migration-related Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) indicators for which the World Bank is a custodian: increasing the volume of remittances as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) (SDG indicator 17.3.2), reducing remittance costs (SDG indicator 10.c.1), and reducing recruitment costs for migrant workers (SDG indicator 10.7.1). This Brief also presents recent developments on the Global Compact on Migration (GCM) and proposes an implementation and review mechanism.


      https://www.knomad.org/publication/migration-and-development-brief-30

      Pour télécharger le rapport :
      https://www.knomad.org/sites/default/files/2018-12/Migration%20and%20Development%20Brief%2030%20advance%20copy.pdf

    • International Remittances Headline ACP-EU-IOM Discussions in #Ghana

      In Sub-Saharan Africa, the flow of remittances is on the rise, but the cost to transfer these funds is far higher than the global average, making the region the most expensive place in the world to send money.

      The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and partners focused on improving the use of migrant remittances, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa at a three-day regional thematic meeting starting today (19/02) in Accra, Ghana.

      International remittances have been taking on increasing weight in the global policy agenda in recent years according to Jeffrey Labovitz, IOM Regional Director for East and Horn of Africa, who is speaking at the event.

      “This in part reflects the growing understanding that improving and harnessing the flow of remittances can have a substantial impact on development,” he said.

      Remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa grew from USD 34 billion in 2016 to USD 38 billion in 2017, an increase of over 11 per cent. Despite this increase – a trend which is expected to continue through 2019 – Sub-Saharan Africa remains the most expensive place in the world to send money with an average cost of 9.4 per cent of the transfer amount, a figure that was 29 per cent above the world average in 2017. This is far short of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) target 10.C.3 to reduce the transaction costs of migrant remittances to less than 3 per cent by 2030.

      “Almost 75 per cent of remittances are spent on consumption which greatly benefit the receiving households and communities,” said Claudia Natali, Regional Specialist on Labour Mobility and Development at the IOM Regional Office for West and Central Africa.

      “But more could be done to maximize the remaining 25 per cent. Fostering financial inclusion and promoting initiatives that help people manage the funds can go a long way to harness development impacts of remittances,” she added.

      The meeting, which runs through Thursday (21/02), is providing a platform for communication, exchange and learning for 80 participants involved in IOM’s “ACP-EU Migration Action", including migration experts and representatives from African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) governments, regional organizations, the European Union (EU), UN agencies and NGOs working in remittances and diaspora mobilization.

      Given that remittances are at the heart of the joint ACP Group of States and European Union Dialogue’s recommendations on migration, discussions also aim to generate thematic recommendations for the Sub-Saharan region and establish links between the outcomes of the ACP-EU Migration Action programme, and processes relevant to the ACP-EU Dialogue on Migration and Development at the regional and global levels.

      The meeting is organized by IOM’s country office for Ghana and the IOM Regional Office in Brussels in partnership with the African Institute for Remittances (AIR) and Making Finance Work for Africa Partnership (MFW4A).

      IOM’s ACP-EU Migration Action, launched in June 2014, provides tailored technical support on migration to ACP countries and regional organizations. To date it has received 74 technical assistance requests from 67 ACP governments and 7 regional organizations, a third of which directly concern remittances.

      The programme is financed by the 10th European Development Fund (EDF) and supported by the ACP Secretariat and the EU. For more information on the ACP-EU Migration Action, go to: www.acpeumigrationaction.iom.int.

      https://www.iom.int/news/international-remittances-headline-acp-eu-iom-discussions-ghana

    • The cost of cross-border payments needs to drop

      FOR MOST of human history, sending money across borders has cost the earth. Thankfully for globetrotters and e-shoppers in the rich world, that has changed in the past decade. A shift from cash and travellers’ cheques towards digital payments has cut the cost of moving funds around. And a new generation of fintech firms has broken the stranglehold that big banks used to have on money transfers (see article). As a result, fees have fallen. The cost of a transfer between consumers or small firms who are both in G7 countries can now cost 2% or less. This year some $10trn will pass across borders. As prices fall further, the sums will grow.


      https://amp.economist.com/leaders/2019/04/13/the-cost-of-cross-border-payments-needs-to-drop
      #paywall

  • Clingendeal | L’impact des politiques migratoires européennes sur les routes du Sahara central
    https://asile.ch/2018/12/07/clingendeal-limpact-des-politiques-migratoires-europeennes-sur-les-routes-du-s

    Trois chercheurs se sont intéressés aux retombées des politiques d’externalisation des frontières européennes sur certains pays africains, et plus spécifiquement sur les routes migratoires à travers le Sahara central. Alors que le nombre de demandes d’asile baisse aux frontières de l’Europe, les mouvements migratoires eux ne se sont pas arrêtés. L’Europe demande à certains pays […]

    • Visit to the Niger: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants (A/HRC/41/38/Add.1)

      The Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, Felipe González Morales, visited the Niger from 1 to 8 October 2018 to assess the laws, policies, practices and agreements adopted and implemented by the Niger with respect to migration and their impact on the human rights of migrant women, children and men. In the report, the Special Rapporteur takes note of the multiple internal and external challenges faced by the Niger in the management of migration and observes that, in recent years, it has adopted a series of measures led primarily by security concerns and as a result of agreements with destination countries. These measures have led to the criminalization of irregular migration and the strengthening of border control to curb and prevent migration to the north, in violation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) principle of freedom of movement as well as international human rights norms and standards, including in the context of readmission agreements and the return of migrants to their countries of origin.
      Among his recommendations, the Special Rapporteur calls on the Niger to adopt a comprehensive strategy for safe, orderly and regular migration that ensures implementation of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and that places the human rights of migrants at its centre. In that process, collaboration with key actors, such as neighbouring countries, ECOWAS, the European Union and the United Nations, will be essential.


      https://reliefweb.int/report/niger/visit-niger-report-special-rapporteur-human-rights-migrants-ahrc4138add1
      #rapport
      signalé par @pascaline

  • L’Union européenne renforce son soutien au développement du #Sahel

    La nouvelle enveloppe comprend :

    – Une contribution de 70 millions d’euros, visant à renforcer les conditions de vie des populations dans les espaces transfrontaliers, grâce à l’amélioration de la qualité des services de base et au renforcement de la résilience. Ce programme sera mis en œuvre par plusieurs partenaires de l’#Alliance_Sahel.

    – D’autres actions pour un montant de 55 millions d’euros viseront à renforcer les capacités des institutions des pays du G5 Sahel en matière de #justice, de #sécurité et de défense des #droits_de_l'homme, ainsi qu’à lutter contre le trafic d’êtres humains et à améliorer la représentation de la #jeunesse dans le débat public.

    Ces fonds supplémentaires s’ajoutent à une enveloppe de 672,7 millions d’euros d’actions en cours qui s’inscrivent également dans les priorités identifiées par le #G5_Sahel. Au total, la #coopération_au_développement de l’Union européenne et ses États membres avec les pays du G5 Sahel s’élève à 8 milliards d’euros sur la période 2014-2020.

    http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6667_fr.htm

    On parle de lutter contre le #trafic_d'êtres_humains... mais il faudrait voir dans le détail ce qui se cache derrière, car, très probablement, comme toujours, il s’agit d’augmenter les #contrôles_frontaliers et lutter contre les #migrations tout court...

    #aide_au_développement #développement #G5_Sahel #frontières #Europe #UE #EU

    v. aussi la métaliste :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/733358

  • #Fake_News : Bruxelles accuse la Russie de vouloir troubler les élections européennes
    https://www.latribune.fr/economie/union-europeenne/elections-europeennes-face-aux-menaces-d-ingerence-de-la-russie-l-ue-sonne

    La Commission européenne a lancé mercredi un plan d’action contre la désinformation en ligne à six mois des élections européennes, appelant Etats membres et acteurs d’internet comme Facebook, Twitter et Google à se mobiliser face à une menace dont la Russie serait la « source principale ». Objectif : tuer dans l’oeuf toutes les « tentatives coordonnées d’acteurs étrangers pour manipuler » les débats et « protéger nos démocraties ». Le budget de la cellule dédiée à cette lutte va être doublé.
    […]
    Système d’alerte rapide contre les campagnes de désinformation en cours
    L’exécutif européen a annoncé la mise en place d’un « système d’alerte rapide » entre les institutions européennes et les pays de l’UE pour partager leurs données « en temps réel » sur d’éventuelles « campagnes de désinformation » en cours, en amont du scrutin prévu fin mai 2019.
    […]
    La Commission a annoncé qu’elle allait « plus que doubler » en 2019 le budget d’une cellule spécialisée chargée de lutter contre la désinformation et de sensibiliser l’opinion, qui passerait à 5 millions d’euros. Les pays européens sont appelés à prendre eux aussi des mesures de ce type.

    Le « système d’alerte rapide », qui doit être mis en place d’ici le mois de mars, prendra la forme d’une plateforme numérique sécurisée. Les Etats membres et les institutions européennes pourront y partager des informations sur des « tentatives coordonnées d’acteurs étrangers pour manipuler » le débat démocratique, selon un document de la Commission.

  • L’arabie saoudite à l’ONU

    En avril 2018, l’Arabie saoudite prenait position au sein de trois organismes de l’ONU qui défendent les droits et intérêts des femmes...

    Saudis Win Seat on Third UN Women’s Rights Body - UN Watch

    https://www.unwatch.org/un-sells-3-womens-rights-bodies-oil-rich-saudi-arabia

    En Novembre 2018, le conseil des droits humains des Nations unies lançait son « Examen périodique universel », processus établit en 2006 par l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies :

    https://www.ohchr.org/fr/hrbodies/upr/pages/uprmain.aspx

    En gros, chaque état membre présente les mesures qu’il a prises pour les droits humains, et l’ensemble des membres examinent et commentent. Le 5 novembre, c’était le tour de l’Arabie saoudite d’être « examinée » :

    https://www.ohchr.org/FR/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/SAindex.aspx

    Voici ce qu’à dit la France :

    https://onu-geneve.delegfrance.org/Examen-periodique-universel-de-l-Arabie-Saoudite-Declaration

    La France adresse les recommandations suivantes à l’Arabie saoudite :

    1) Amender la législation applicable en matière de liberté d’expression et d’opinion, de liberté d’association et de réunion pacifique, tout particulièrement la loi sur la lutte contre la cybercriminalité et les lois sur la lutte contre le terrorisme, conformément aux normes internationales en la matière, et garantir la liberté de religion, de conscience et de conviction ;

    2) Garantir la sécurité des journalistes et des défenseurs des droits et faire cesser immédiatement les emprisonnements et les arrestations arbitraires dont ils sont victimes ;

    3) Déclarer un moratoire sur la peine de mort en vue de son abolition et interdire expressément la condamnation de mineurs à la peine de mort conformément à la Convention des droits de l’Enfant que l’Arabie saoudite a ratifiée ;

    4) Poursuivre les réformes visant à réduire l’écart de droits entre les femmes et les hommes, y compris en matière de citoyenneté ; abolir notamment le système de tutelle masculine ;

    5) Ratifier le Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques et le Pacte international relatif aux droits économiques, sociaux et culturels ;

    6) Assurer une prise en compte pleine et entière du droit international humanitaire.

    Mais selon UN Watch, qui asistait à la session « Arabie saoudite », il sembl que des pays comme le Venezuela, la Chine, le Pakistan, la palestine (observateur), la Jordanie aint loué les efforts, et le grand intérêt que porte l’Arabasaoudite aux droits humains.

    GENEVA, June 18, 2018 – UN Watch today expressed grave concern that Saudi Arabia, considered by many to be the most misogynistic regime in the world, has now secured key positions on the UN’s three principal women’s rights bodies:

    April 2017: Saudi Arabia elected to UN Commission on Status of Women. Belgium and at least four other EU states voted for the Saudis.

    April 2018: Saudi Arabia elected to the Executive Board of UN Women, also known as the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women.

    Saudi Arabia elected as new member to the Executive Board of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women. Saudi Arabia looks forward to working alongside our fellow members starting in January 2019 pic.twitter.com/CZw8hgrxZN

    — KSA Mission UN (@ksamissionun) April 16, 2018

    June 2018: Saudi Arabia’s candidate elected UN Committee on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, a 23-member expert body that monitors implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, reviews country reports and adopts recommendations, receives complaints from individuals or groups concerning violations of rights protected under the Convention, initiates inquiries into situations of grave or systematic violations of women’s rights, and formulates general recommendations regarding the Convention.

    Telling: Saudi ambassador (left) wouldn’t even shake her hand—his regime’s winning candidate. Whole thing is absurd: Electing Saudi Arabia’s rep to the 23-member UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women is like making a pyromaniac into the town fire chief. pic.twitter.com/ElsALRlWpD

    — Hillel Neuer (@HillelNeuer) June 18, 2018

    #arabie_saoudite #onu #droits_humains #institution

  • Chicago Tribune - We are currently unavailable in your region
    http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1997-01-05/news/9701050123_1_artifacts-looted-cambodian

    In 1924, French writer Andre Malraux was arrested and imprisoned when he removed nearly a ton of stone carvings and ornaments from a temple in the remote Cambodian jungle and trundled them away in

    Unfortunately, our website is currently unavailable in most European countries. We are engaged on the issue and committed to looking at options that support our full range of digital offerings to the EU market. We continue to identify technical compliance solutions that will provide all readers with our award-winning journalism.

    #Malraux #pillage #internet_restreint #TOR_is_love

    • LOOTED CAMBODIAN TREASURES COME HOME
      New York Times News ServiceCHICAGO TRIBUNE

      January 5, 1997 Phnom Penh

      In 1924, French writer Andre Malraux was arrested and imprisoned when he removed nearly a ton of stone carvings and ornaments from a temple in the remote Cambodian jungle and trundled them away in oxcarts.

      In 1980, starving refugees fleeing the terrors of the Khmer Rouge arrived at the border with Thailand lugging stone heads lopped from temple statues and ornate silverwork looted from museums.

      Today the looting continues, from hundreds of temples and archaeological sites scattered through the jungles of this often-lawless country, sometimes organized by smuggling syndicates and abetted by antique dealers in Thailand and elsewhere.

      Entire temple walls covered with bas-relief are hacked into chunks and trucked away by thieves. Villagers sell ancient pottery for pennies. Armed bands have attacked monks at remote temples to loot their treasures and have twice raided the conservation office at the temple complex of Angkor.

      But the tide is slowly beginning to turn. With the Cambodian government beginning a campaign to seek the return of the country’s treasures, and with cooperation from curators and customs agents abroad, 1996 was a significant year for the recovery of artifacts.

      Fifteen objects have come home, in three separate shipments from three continents, raising hopes that some of the more significant artifacts may be returned.

      In July, the U.S. returned a small head of the god Shiva that had been seized by Customs in San Francisco. Cambodia is a largely Buddhist nation, but over the centuries its history and its art have seen successive overlays of Buddhist and Hindu influences. At some temples, statues of Buddha mingle with those of the Hindu deities, Brahma, Shiva and Vishnu.

      In September, the Thai government returned 13 large stone carvings, some up to 800 years old, that had been confiscated by Thai police from an antique shop in Bangkok in 1990. Thai officials said the return was a gesture of good will meant to combat that country’s image as a center of antique trafficking.

      And in December, a British couple returned a stone Brahma head that they had bought at auction. Its Cambodian origin was confirmed by a list, published by UNESCO, of 100 artifacts that had disappeared from an inventory compiled in the 1960s.

      In addition, Sebastien Cavalier, a UNESCO representative here, said he was expecting the return as early as next month of a 10th Century Angkorean head of Shiva that is now in the Metropolitan Museum in New York.

      Six bronze pieces sent to the Guimet Museum in Paris for cleaning and safekeeping in the 1970s could also be returned in the coming months, he said.

      Now with the launching in January of a major traveling exhibition of Khmer artifacts—to Paris, Washington, Tokyo and Osaka— accompanied by an updated catalog of some of Cambodia’s missing treasures, Cavalier said he hopes the returns will accelerate.

      The exhibit will be on display in Paris from Jan. 31 to May 26, at the National Gallery in Washington from June 30 to Sept. 28, and in Japan from Oct. 28 to March 22, 1998.

      But the pillage of artifacts continues at a far greater pace than the returns.

      Government control remains tenuous in much of Cambodia and the Ministry of Culture has little money for the protection of antiquities. There is little check on armed groups and corrupt officials throughout the countryside, where hundreds of temples remain unused and unguarded or overgrown with jungle.

      Truckloads of treasures regularly pass through military checkpoints into Thailand, art experts say. Heavy stone artifacts are towed in fishing nets to cargo ships off the southern coast. In Thailand, skilled artisans repair or copy damaged objects and certificates of authenticity are forged.

      Most of Cambodia’s artistic patrimony remains uncatalogued, and Cavalier said there was no way to know the full extent of what had already been stolen over the last decades, or what remained scattered around the country.

  • International #business and #cybersecurity
    https://hackernoon.com/international-business-and-cybersecurity-988f37c9e663?source=rss----3a81

    https://www.flickr.com/photos/kvinokurov/14658257525Cybersecurity

    Flickr
    is important to every business. As soon as you collect a customer’s personal information, credit card information, or any other data, you are obligated to ensure that it is protected and used properly at all times.This is not just a moral obligation. It is a legal one, and the recent General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) passed in the EU means companies must be even more transparent about how information they collect is stored and used.What does all this mean to an international business? It means there are challenges, including regulations in the countries where you do business, the protection of data while it is being transmitted, and the threats that are unique to individual countries and territories.Challenges of (...)

    #international-business #technology

  • Tracking China’s Muslim Gulag
    https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/muslims-camps-china

    China is accused of incarcerating hundreds of thousands of Muslims in detention camps that are rising from the desert sands in Xinjiang. A forensic analysis of satellite images of 39 of these facilities shows they are expanding at a rapid rate.

    #chine #camps_de_travail #musulman #Ouïghours #détention

    • Très belle illustration visuelle !

      La légende des différentes étapes :

      Here are the footprints of all 39 camps. Prior to April 2017, these facilities had a total of 539 buildings covering 379,000 square meters.

      By August this year, the number of buildings at these facilities had more than doubled to 1,129. The area they covered had almost tripled to more than 1 million square meters - roughly the size of 140 soccer fields.

      And the expansion continues. A further 67 buildings, covering an area of 210,000 square meters, are now under construction in these compounds, according to the most recent satellite imagery that was analyzed.

      Infographie vraiment remarquable.

      #merci @odilon

    • Opinion: The Strange Silence Over China’s Muslim Crackdown

      President Trump says trade talks between the United States and China have been, “going very well.” The United States put $250 billion worth of tariffs on Chinese goods last year, to counter what it considers unfair trade practices and theft of U.S. technology.

      But there are no indications the United States, the United Nations, or any government is prepared to use any economic or diplomatic leverage to oppose China locking up between 800,000 and 2 million Uighurs, Kazakhs and other Chinese Muslims into internment camps in the western Xinjiang region.

      The camps are in remote locations — closed to the world — and ringed with barbed wire. But they have been photographed by satellite. The Chinese government calls them “re-education centers,” a phrase that carries a sinister history from the murderous purges of Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution.

      The people in the camps are forced to denounce their faith and pledge loyalty to the Communist Party. According to multiple reports, a number of people in the camps have also been tortured.

      As Sophie Richardson, China director at Human Rights Watch, told The Independent, “If any other government in the world was locking up a million Muslims I think we can reasonably expect to have seen demands for a debate at the U.N. Security Council or an international investigation. That’s generally unlikely to happen with China.”

      There were calls in the U.S. Congress last fall for the Trump administration to consider sanctions against China for what Secretary of State Mike Pompeo denounced as “awful abuses.”

      But China is America’s largest creditor: it holds more than a trillion dollars in U.S. Treasury securities. Look down at whatever you’re wearing, carrying, riding in or working on right now. American businesses get rich relying on Chinese workers who earn low wages to produce our clothing, mobile phones, building materials, and dazzling new tech devices.

      The Trump administration imposed tariffs on China over unfair trade practices. But it has offered no more than a few rhetorical flourishes over human rights crimes. Neither did the Obama administration, or the European Union.

      And Muslim countries — including Saudi Arabia and Iran — have been similarly, conspicuously, silent. China invests heavily, and strategically in their nations too.

      Sometimes, the price of human rights just cannot compete.

      https://www.npr.org/2019/01/12/684687441/opinion-the-strange-silence-over-chinas-muslim-crackdown
      #disparitions

  • Austria agrees benefit cuts aimed at foreigners

    Austria on Wednesday finalised the details of welfare cuts aimed at immigrants, in a move criticised by anti-poverty campaigners and church groups.

    Immigrants whose German-language skills are not up to scratch will see their benefit payments cut under the plan, agreed by the ruling centre-right People’s Party (OeVP) and far-right Freedom Party (FPOe).

    Rules will also be tightened for people judged to be unwilling to work.

    In last year’s election campaigns, both parties promised to get tough on illegal immigration while cutting taxes and bureaucracy and in December they agreed to share power.

    According to their new plan, the minimum monthly payment will be set at 863 euros ($974). For asylum seekers with poor German or English however, that will be cut to 563 euros.

    FPOe Social Affairs Minister Beate Hartinger-Klein summed up the aims of the new measures: “First, fairness for Austrians. Foreigners must wait. This is of clear benefit to our citizens.”

    But critics of the government’s plans expressed concern that the cuts will push children in particular into poverty.

    The anti-poverty network, the Armutskonferenz, said that “instead of turning people into beggars, the laws need to be changed so that they fight poverty and don’t make people poorer.”

    And the head of the church charity Caritas, Michael Landau, posted on Facebook: "If the government reforms the minimum allowance, my call and request is that child and old-age poverty is not allowed to increase in Austria.

    “We have to fight poverty, not people affected by poverty.”

    Critics also hit out at the fact that the reforms focused on the migration background of those receiving benefits.

    The FPOe has argued that migrants who had never worked in Austria or paid into the social system should not be entitled to the same level of benefits as Austrians.

    However, in a ruling last week on a specific case in the province of Upper Austria, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) said refugees were entitled to social benefits under the same conditions as nationals, irrespective of the duration of validity of their residence permit.

    The government hopes that the language requirement in the new measures will avoid any claims that it is discriminatory.

    The reform proposals will now have to be put to parliament in February and March before they can legally come into effect starting from April 1.

    http://www.digitaljournal.com/news/world/austria-agrees-benefit-cuts-aimed-at-foreigners/article/537844#ixzz5YFnTu36v

    #autriche #discriminations #langue #intégration #assistance_sociale #réfugiés #migrations #étrangers #asile

  • Democracy not for sale
    The struggle for food sovereignty in the age of austerity in Greece

    19 November 2018
    Report
    Austerity measures led to increased rural poverty and food insecurity in Greece and violated her people’s human right to food. How did this happen and who is responsible?

    This Report examines the impacts of austerity in Greece on the right to food. It concludes that the Greek State and the Eurozone Member States violated the Greek people’s right to food as a result of the austerity measures required by three Memorandums of Understanding (2010, 2012 and 2015). In other words, the austerity packages imposed on Greece contravened international human rights law.

    The share of households with children unable to afford a protein-based meal on a daily basis doubled from 4.7% in 2009 to 8.9% in 2014. EU statistics estimate that 40.5% of children in 2016 faced material and social deprivation.

    Taxes as a proportion of agricultural net value added soared from 4% between 1993 and 2010 to 15.4% in 2016.

    Troika members claim that the sole responsibility for the impacts of the MoUs lies with the Greek State. This argument is false because they, with Greece, were joint signatures of the three MoUs. Therefore, the responsibility for violations of the right to food is a shared one too. Indeed it can be argued that the responsibility of the Eurozone Member States is much bigger, given the evidence of direct interference or even coercion by the Member States of the Troika on Greece to sign the MoUs.

    Eurozone Member States – as States Parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and other international human rights instruments – have therefore breached their extraterritorial obligations to respect the human right to food in Greece.

    https://www.tni.org/en/democracy-not-for-sale

    #grèce #austérité #nourriture #UE #EU #souveraineté_alimentaire

  • L’Europe utilisera-t-elle les drones israéliens contre les réfugiés ?

    En matière de sécurité, #Israël en connait un rayon. Ses entreprises sont particulièrement actives sur ce marché lucratif et peuvent démontrer l’efficacité de leurs produits en prenant les Palestiniens comme cobayes. Pour contrôler l’arrivée de réfugiés, l’agence européenne #Frontex s’intéresse ainsi de près au drone #Heron. L’engin a fait ses “preuves au combat” durant l’#opération_Plomb durci. (IGA)

    En septembre, l’Agence de surveillance des frontières de l’Union européenne Frontex a annoncé le démarrage de vols d’essais de drones en #Italie, en #Grèce et au #Portugal. Il y avait une omission majeure dans la déclaration de Frontex : le type de drones testé avait été utilisé auparavant pour attaquer Gaza.

    Certains détails sur les compagnies impliquées dans ces essais ont été publiés plus tôt cette année. Un « avis d’attribution de marché » a révélé qu’#Israel_Aerospace_Industries était l’un des deux fournisseurs sélectionnés.

    Israel Aerospace Industries a reçu 5.,5 millions de dollars pour jusqu’à 600 heures de vols d’essais.

    Le drone qu’Israel Aerospace Industries offre pour la #surveillance maritime s’appelle le #Heron.

    Selon le propre site web de la compagnie, le Heron a « fait ses preuves au combat ». C’est une expression codée signifiant qu’il a été employé pendant trois attaques majeures d’Israël contre Gaza pendant la dernière décennie.

    Après l’opération Plomb durci, l’attaque israélienne sur Gaza de fin 2008 et début 2009, une enquête de Human Rights Watch a conclu que des dizaines de civils avaient été tués par des missiles lancés à partir de drones. Le Heron a été identifié comme l’un des principaux drones déployés dans cette offensive.

    Frontex – qui expulse fréquemment des réfugiés d’Europe – a étudié les #drones depuis un certain temps. Déjà en 2012, Israel Aerospace Industries avait présenté le Heron à un événement organisé par Frontex.

    Par ses vols d’essais, Frontex permet à l’industrie de guerre israélienne d’adapter la technologie testée sur les Palestiniens à des fins de surveillance. Alors que les dirigeants de l’Union européenne professent couramment leur souci des droits humains, l’implication de fabricants d’armes pour surveiller les frontières partage plus que quelques similitudes avec les politiques belliqueuses poursuivies par le gouvernement de Donald Trump aux USA.

    Des opportunités commerciales

    Les entreprises israéliennes bénéficient des décisions prises des deux côtés de l’Atlantique.

    L’année dernière, #Elta – une filiale d’Israel Aerospace Industries – a été engagée pour dessiner un prototype pour le mur controversé que Trump a proposé d’établir le long de la frontière USA- Mexique. Elbit, un autre fabricant israélien de drones, a gagné en 2014 un contrat pour construire des tours de surveillance entre l’Arizona et le Mexique.

    Les mêmes compagnies poursuivent les opportunités commerciales en Europe.

    Elta a été en contact avec divers gouvernements à propos de leur système « de #patrouille_virtuelle des #frontières » – qui est basé sur l’interception des communications téléphoniques des mobiles et l’#espionnage des usagers d’internet. Pour fournir un prétexte à une telle intrusion, la compagnie joue sur la politique de la #peur. Amnon Sofrin, un dirigeant d’Elta qui occupait auparavant une position de premier plan dans l’agence israélienne d’espionnage et d’assassinat du Mossad, a recommandé que l’Europe choisisse en priorité la « #sécurité » plutôt que les libertés civiles.

    L’entreprise israélienne #Magal_Systems cherche aussi des contrats en Europe. Magal a installé ce qu’elle appelle une barrière « intelligente » — livrée avec des capteurs et un équipement avancé de caméras – le long de la frontière d’Israël avec Gaza.

    Saar Koush, jusqu’à récemment le PDG de Magal, a argué que le rôle de l’entreprise dans la mise en place d’un siège des deux millions d’habitants de Gaza leur donnait un argument commercial unique – ou au moins rare. « Tout le monde peut vous donner un très joli Powerpoint, mais peu de gens peuvent vous montrer un projet aussi complexe que Gaza, qui est constamment testé en combat », a dit Koush.

    Apprendre d’Israël ?

    Frontex est en contact avec d’autres entreprises israéliennes.

    En juin de cette année, l’Union européenne a publié une notice montrant que la compagnie israélienne #Windward avait gagné un contrat de près d’ 1 million de dollars pour travailler à un projet d’« analyse maritime » organisé par Frontex. #Gabi_Ashkenazi, un ancien chef de l’armée israélienne, est conseiller à Windward ; #David_Petraeus, qui a commandé les troupes US occupant l’Irak et l’Afghanistan, est l’un de ses investisseurs.

    Dans son rapport annuel 2016, Frontex déclarait que « les premiers pas avaient été faits afin de développer des relations « stratégiques » avec Israël. Frontex a ultérieurement exprimé son intention d’accroître cette coopération d’ici 2020.

    Un point clé est « l’apprentissage mutuel ». Il est plus que probable qu’il s’agisse d’un euphémisme pour échanger des notes sur les tactiques qui devraient être utilisées contre les gens fuyant la pauvreté ou la persécution.

    Israël a une réputation effroyable en ce qui concerne le traitement des réfugiés. Des Africains vivant en Israël ont été sujets à des mauvais traitements racistes de la part des plus hauts niveaux du gouvernement. Benjamin Netanyahou, le Premier ministre, les a étiquetés comme des « infiltrés ».

    Un autre ministre du gouvernement a soutenu que les Africains ne peuvent être considérés comme des humains.

    Selon l’institut de sondage Gallup, Israël est l’un des pays les moins hospitaliers du monde pour les demandeurs d’asile. Malgré sa proximité géographique avec la Syrie, Israël a refusé l’entrée aux victimes de la guerre en cours.

    L’an dernier, Netanyahou a été entendu disant aux dirigeants du groupe de Visegrad (ou Visegrad 4) – la Hongrie, la Pologne, la République tchèque et la Slovaquie – qu’ils devraient fermer leurs frontières aux réfugiés. Il a aussi déclaré qu’Israël joue un rôle important dans la réduction de la migration vers l’Europe et suggéré qu’Israël devrait être récompensé pour cela.

    L’identification d’Israël comme partenaire pour une « coopération stratégique » avec Frontex est inquiétante en soi. Les préparatifs pour utiliser les outils de répression d’Israël contre les réfugiés faisant route vers l’Europe le sont encore plus.

    https://www.investigaction.net/fr/leurope-utilisera-t-elle-les-drones-israeliens-contre-les-refugies

    #surveillance_frontalière #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #asile #migrations #réfugiés #sécurité #Méditerranée #Heron #Israeli_Aerospace_Industries #Gaza #business

    • #Leonardo deploys its #Falco_EVO_RPAS for drone-based maritime surveillance as part of the Frontex test programme

      Leonardo’s Falco EVO Remotely-Piloted Air System (RPAS), in a maritime patrol configuration, has been deployed from Lampedusa airport (Lampedusa Island) as part of the Frontex surveillance research programme to test its ability to monitor the European Union’s external borders.

      Frontex is exploring the surveillance capability of medium-altitude, long-endurance RPAS as well as evaluating cost efficiency and endurance. Leonardo was selected by the European agency under a service contract tender for drone operations for maritime surveillance across the Italian and Maltese civil airspace. The current agreement provides for 300 flight hours and may be extended into a longer-term agreement.

      Under the deployment, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) activities are organised by Guardia di Finanza under coordination of the Ministry of Interior and are undertaken by Leonardo from Lampedusa also thanks to the decisive support and collaboration of ENAC and ENAV. Leonardo’s flight crews and maintenance teams are present to support the operations with the Falco EVO, which is equipped with a complete on-board sensor suite including the Company’s Gabbiano TS Ultra Light radar. This configuration allows it to carry out extended-range day and night-time missions.

      “We are proud to be able to demonstrate the capabilities of our Falco EVO to Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, which is facing the on-going and evolving surveillance challenges posed by maritime borders. We are ready to leverage our years of experience in drone-based surveillance operations, working with the United Nations and many other international customers,” said Alessandro Profumo, CEO of Leonardo. “I wish to thank all the Italian stakeholders who contributed to this important achievement and I am convinced that this fruitful partnering approach will allow Frontex to define the best possible use for drone-based technologies.”

      The Falco EVO will operate under a “Permit to Fly” issued by the Italian Civil Aviation Authority (ENAC), which authorizes flights in the Italian and Maltese Flight Information Region (FIR)’s civil airspace. The innovative agreement reached with ENAC guarantees compliance with national and international regulations and coordination with relevant authorities. The agreement also provides for close involvement from the Guardia di Finanza as subject matter experts with operational experience in defining mission profiles and ensuring the best operational conditions in which to undertake the 300- hours test programme.

      The Falco EVO configuration being deployed includes a high-definition InfraRed (IR) electro-optical system, a Beyond-Line-Of-Sight (BLOS) satellite data-link system, a new propulsion system based on a heavy-fuel engine, an Automatic Identification System (AIS) and a complete communications relay suite.

      Leonardo is the only European company providing a comprehensive RPAS ISR capability, from the design of each system element all the way through to operations. Today the Company is an international pioneer in the operation of unmanned flights on behalf of civil organizations in “non-segregated”, transnational airspace.

      Under an innovative business model, Leonardo owns and operates its Falco family of RPAS and provides surveillance information and data directly to its customers. This ‘managed service’ model is expected to be an area of growth for Leonardo which is expanding its ‘drones as a service’ offering to customers such as the police and emergency responders in line with the growth path outlined in the Company’s industrial plan.


      https://www.edrmagazine.eu/leonardo-deploys-its-falco-evo-rpas-for-drone-based-maritime-surveillanc

    • Leonardo: il #Falco_Evo inizia i voli per il programma Frontex

      Il Falco Evo, il velivolo a pilotaggio remoto di Leonardo, ha iniziato la campagna di voli in una configurazione specifica per il monitoraggio marittimo, nell’ambito del programma Frontex, finalizzato alla sperimentazione di droni per il controllo delle frontiere esterne dell’Unione europea. Frontex, l’agenzia europea della guardia di frontiera e costiera, sta infatti analizzando la capacità di sorveglianza a media altitudine e lunga persistenza offerta dai velivoli pilotati a distanza, valutando efficienza economica ed efficacia operativa di tali sistemi. Leonardo è stata selezionata a seguito di una gara per un contratto di servizio per fornire attività di sorveglianza marittima attraverso l’uso di droni nello spazio aereo civile italiano e maltese. L’accordo attuale prevede un totale di 300 ore di volo con possibili ulteriori estensioni contrattuali. Le operazioni di sorveglianza e ricognizione effettuate da Leonardo con il Falco Evo vengono pianificate dalla Guardia di Finanza sotto il coordinamento del ministero dell’Interno, con il supporto di Enac, Enav e AST Aeroservizi Società di Gestione dell’aeroporto di Lampedusa, dove si svolgono i voli.
      “Siamo orgogliosi di dimostrare le capacità del Falco EVO all’agenzia europea Frontex e alle Forze di Sicurezza, che affrontano quotidianamente la sfida del controllo e della protezione dei confini marittimi – ha commentato Alessandro Profumo, amministratore delegato di Leonardo -. Leonardo mette a disposizione di questo programma la lunga esperienza acquisita anche grazie alle attività svolte per le Nazioni Unite e molti altri clienti internazionali con i propri sistemi pilotati da remoto”.
      Il Falco Evo opera grazie ad un “Permit to Fly” rilasciato dall’Enac, che autorizza i voli nello spazio aereo civile italiano e maltese. L’accordo innovativo raggiunto con Enac garantisce quindi la conformità alle normative nazionali e internazionali e il coordinamento con le relative autorità. L’attività prevede, inoltre, un forte coinvolgimento della Guardia di Finanza in virtù della significativa esperienza del Corpo nella definizione dei profili di missione, assicurando le migliori condizioni operative per lo svolgimento delle 300 ore di volo programmate. La configurazione del Falco Evo impiegato nel programma include un sistema ottico all’infrarosso ad alta definizione, un collegamento dati satellitari oltre la linea di vista (Beyond-Line-Data-Of-Sight - BLOS), un nuovo sistema di propulsione basato su un motore a combustibile pesante, un sistema di identificazione automatico (Automatic Identification System - AIS) e una suite completa per le comunicazioni. Leonardo è l’unica azienda europea in grado di fornire capacità complete RPAS e ISR, progettando e sviluppando tutti gli elementi che compongono un sistema pilotato da remoto, anche nell’ambito di contratti di servizio per operazioni “unmanned” e tra i pochi player al mondo a poter operare per conto di enti civili in spazi aerei non segregati trasnazionali.

      https://www.trasporti-italia.com/focus/leonardo-il-falco-evo-inizia-i-voli-per-il-programma-frontex/36521

    • Frontex Director meets with Portugal’s Minister of Internal Administration

      The Executive Director of Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, met with Portugal’s Minister of Internal Administration and with the National Director of Portuguese Immigration and Border Service (SEF) on Friday to introduce the agency’s liaison officer for Portugal and Spain.

      Frontex is deploying 11 liaison officers to enhance the cooperation between the agency and national authorities responsible for border management, returns and coast guard functions in 30 EU Member States and Schengen Associated Countries.

      In Lisbon, Frontex Director Fabrice Leggeri met with Eduardo Cabrita, Portugal’s Minister of Internal Administration and Cristina Gatões, the National Director of Portuguese Immigration and Border Service (#SEF).

      During his visit to Portugal, Fabrice Leggeri also visited the headquarters of the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and met with its new Executive Director, Maja Markovčić Kostelac. Frontex and EMSA, along with the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA), work together in in the maritime domain to support EU Member States and develop European coast guard functions.

      https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-director-meets-with-portugal-s-minister-of-internal-administr

  • The Administrative Arrangement between Greece and Germany

    The Administrative Arrangement between Ministry of migration Policy of the Hellenic Republic and the Federal Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Germany has been implemented already to four known cases. It has been the product of bilateral negotiations that occurred after German Chancellor Merkel faced another political crisis at home regarding the handling of the refugee issue.

    The document which has been the product of undisclosed negotiations and has not been made public upon its conclusion is a brief description of the cooperation of Greek and German authorities in cases of refusal of entry to persons seeking protection in the context of temporary checks at the internal German-Austrian border, as defined in its title. It essentially is a fast track implementation of return procedures in cases for which Dublin Regulation already lays down specific rules and procedures. The procedures provided in the ‘Arrangement’ skip all legal safeguards and guarantees of European Legislation.

    RSA and PRO ASYL have decided to publicize the document of the Arrangement for the purpose of serving public interest and transparency. The considerable secrecy that the two member states kept on a document of such importance is a scandal itself. There are two first underlying observations which incur/ result from studying the document. First, the Arrangement has the same institutional (or by institutional) features with the EU-Turkey deal, it is the product of negotiations which intend to regulate EU policy procedures without having been the product of an EU level institutional procedure. It circumvents European law (the Dublin regulation) in order to serve the interests of a group of particular member states. As a result its status within the legal apparatus of the EU and international law is obscure.

    Secondly, the ‘Arrangement’ introduces a grey zone (intentionally if not geographically) where a bilateral deal between two countries gains supremacy over European (Dublin regulation) and international legislation (Geneva convention). It is therefore an important document that should be critically and at length studied by all scholars and experts active in the field of refugee protection as it deprives asylum seekers of their rights and is a clear violation of EU law.

    Last but not least as Article 15-ii of the ‘Arrangement’ notes “This Administrative Arrangement will also discontinue upon entry into force of the revised Common European Asylum System”. Still as everyone in Brussels already admits the CEAS reform has been declared dead. So if nothing occurs to reconstitute the defunct CEAS policy and the arrangement remains as the only channel/form of cooperation between Greece and Germany in order to establish responsibility for asylum seekers arriving in Germany after coming through Greece, then could Greece and Germany, in their irregular bilateral efforts to circumvent the European process, have actually produced one of the first post EU legal arrangements?

    https://rsaegean.org/en/the-administrative-arrangement-between-greece-and-germany

    #accord #Allemagne #Grèce #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Dublin #Règlement_Dublin #renvois #expulsions #accord_bilatéral #regroupement_familial #liaison_officers #officiers_de_liaison #Eurodac #refus_d'entrée #renvois #expulsions #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #Autriche #réadmission #avion #vol

    ping @isskein

    • Germany – Magdeburg Court suspends return of beneficiary of international protection to Greece

      On 13 November 2018, the Administrative Court of Magdeburg granted an interim measure ordering the suspensive effect of the appeal against a deportation order of an international protection beneficiary to Greece.

      The case concerned a Syrian national who applied for international protection in Germany. The Federal Office of Migration and Refugees (BAMF) rejected the application based on the fact that the applicant had already been granted international protection in Greece and ordered his deportation there.

      The Administrative Court held that there were serious doubts regarding the conformity of the BAMF’s conclusion that there were no obstacles to the deportation of the applicant to Greece with national law, which provides that a foreign national cannot be deported if such deportation would be in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Court found that there are substantial grounds to believe that the applicant would face a real risk of inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 ECHR if returned to Greece.

      The Court based this conclusion, inter alia, on the recent reports highlighting that international protection beneficiaries in Greece had no practical access to accommodation, food distribution and sanitary facilities for extended periods of time after arrival. The Court further observed that access of international protection beneficiaries to education, health care, employment, accommodation and social benefits under the same conditions as Greek nationals is provided in domestic law but is not enforced. Consequently, the ensuing living conditions could not be considered adequate for the purposes of Article 3 ECHR.

      Finally, the Court found that the risk of destitution after return could be excluded in cases where individual assurances are given by the receiving authorities, clarifying, however, that any such guarantees should be specific to the individual concerned. In this respect, guarantees given by the Greek authorities that generally refer to the transposition of the Qualification Directive into Greek law, as a proof that recognised refugees enjoy the respective rights, could not be considered sufficient.

      https://mailchi.mp/ecre/elena-weekly-legal-update-08-february-2019#8

    • Germany Rejects 75% of Greek Requests for Family Reunification

      In 2019, the German Federal Office for Asylum and Migration (BAMF) rejected three quarters of requests for family reunification under the Dublin III regulation from Greece. The high rejection rate draws criticism from NGOs and MPs who say the BAMF imposes exceedingly harsh requirements.

      The government’s response to a parliamentary question by the German left party, Die Linke, revealed that from January until May 2019 the BAMF rejected 472 of 626 requests from Greece. Under the Dublin III Regulation, an EU Member State can file a “take-charge request” to ask another EU member state to process an asylum application, if the person concerned has family there. Data from the Greek Asylum Service shows that in 2018 less than 40% of “take-charge requests” were accepted, a stark proportional decrease from 2017, when over 90% of requests were accepted. The German government did not provide any reasons for the high rejection rate.

      Gökay Akbulut, an MP from Die Linke, noted that often family reunification failed because the BAMF imposes exceedingly strict requirements that have no basis in the regulation. At the same time people affected have limited access to legal advice needed to appeal illegitimate rejections of their requests. For people enduring inhuman conditions on Greek Islands family reunifications were often the last resort from misery, Akbulut commented.

      In 2018, 70% of all Dublin requests from Greece to other EU Member states related to family reunification cases. Germany has been the major country of destination for these request. An estimate of over 15,000 live in refugee camps on Greek islands with a capacity of 9000.

      https://www.ecre.org/germany-rejects-75-of-greek-requests-for-family-reunification

  • Botched Israeli operation in Gaza endangers human rights groups - Palestinians

    If it turns out that the IDF invented a fictitious aid group for the operation, from now on it can be expected that every real new organization will find it difficult to be trusted by the authorities and residents in the Gaza Strip

    Amira Hass
    Nov 25, 2018

    https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/.premium-botched-israeli-operation-in-gaza-endangers-human-rights-groups-1.

    If members of the Israeli special operations force that Hamas exposed in the Gaza Strip this month indeed impersonated aid workers, as Walla news and the Israel Television News Company reported, it will reinforce and even retroactively justify Hamas’ longtime suspicions.
    Hamas has in the past claimed that, consciously or not, international humanitarian organizations assist Israel’s Shin Bet security service and the Israeli military.
    To really understand Israel and the Palestinians - subscribe to Haaretz
    This is exactly what the employees of foreign aid organizations, as well as Palestinian ones with some foreign staff, fear. A senior employee in one of these organizations told Haaretz that if Israel has abused the network of international or local aid groups, it could undermine the critical activities of organizations large and small: The Hamas government that controls the Gaza Strip might take precautions that will interfere with their entry into the Strip and their work.
    “No one will listen to the protest of a small organization on the exploitation of humanitarian activity,” he said. “Large organizations need to make their voices heard.”

    The bodies of four of the six men killed during an Israeli raid on Khan Younis in a hospital morgue in Gaza, on Sunday, November 11, 2018AFP
    Foreigners who entered the Gaza Strip last week reported more exacting questioning than usual at Hamas’ border control position and strict identity checks of passengers at checkpoints within the Strip.

    A Westerner who visits the Strip frequently told Haaretz they sense some suspicion on the part of ordinary Gazans toward foreigners — and not for the first time.
    What is interesting is that Palestinian media outlets did not publish the suspicions about the Israel special force impersonating aid workers: In other words, Hamas did not raise this claim publicly.
    According to versions heard in the Gaza Strip, the members of the unit carried forged Palestinian ID cards, presumably of Gazans, and said they had food distribution coupons. It also seems they spent a number of days in the Strip before they were exposed.
    Working for an aid organization is a logical and convenient cover story. As part of the strict limits on movement by Israel, foreigners and Palestinians who are not residents of the Strip, who work for international aid organizations (and foreign journalists) are among the few who receive entry permits into the Gaza Strip.

    Palestinian militants of Hamas’ military wing attend the funeral of seven Palestinians, killed during an Israeli special forces operation in the Gaza, in Khan Younis, on November 12, 2018.AFP
    Hamas senior official Moussa Abu Marzouk was quoted as hinting that the entry of the unit was made possible through a checkpoint of the Palestinian Authority, at the Erez border crossing.
    His statement fed the constant suspicions against the PA’s security services of cooperation and help for the Israeli security forces. But knowing how the official entry process into the Gaza Strip from Israel works raises doubts about the feasibility of this scenario.
    In addition to navigating the bureaucracy of Israel’s Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories to obtain an entry permit from Israel, foreigners seeking to enter the Gaza Strip must also coordinate their travel in advance with the Hamas authorities.
    To enter officially through the Erez crossing, you must submit full identification details, including details on the purpose of the visit and the organization and identity of contact persons inside the Gaza Strip.
    >> How Hamas sold out Gaza for cash from Qatar and collaboration with Israel | Opinion
    The military unit’s entry through Erez would have required Israel to use the name of a well-known aid organization, which would not raise any suspicions. Did the Israel Defense Forces use the name of an organization such as UNRWA or an Italian aid group funded by the European Union, for example?
    And if it turns out that to carry out the mission, the IDF invented a fictitious aid group a long time ago, and in doing so received the help of COGAT, from now on it can be expected that every real new organization will find it difficult to be trusted by the authorities and residents in the Gaza Strip.
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    On entry to the Gaza Strip, those who receive permits go through four checkpoints: On the Israel side of the crossing, at the first registration position of the PA on the other side of the crossing, at the checkpoint of the PA police, which was once the Hamas checkpoint and was handed over to the PA about a year ago when it was attempted to establish a reconciliation government, and at the new registration position of Hamas, which has restarted operations these last few months.
    Even those bearing Palestinian identity cards — which according to reports the members of the unit carried — must pass through the posts of the PA and Hamas and answer questions. At the Hamas position, suitcases are not always checked, but a person who often enters the Gaza Strip told Haaretz that the check — even if only to search for alcohol — is always a risk to be taken into account.
    It is hard to believe that the members of the Israeli military unit would have entered Gaza without weapons, on one hand, or would have risked exposure, on the other, he said. 
    One gets the impression from media reports that Hamas and the IDF are both busy competing over who was humiliated more by the exposure of the unit’s operations. What is certain is that making humanitarian aid into a tool in the service of Israeli military intelligence contributes to the feeling of vulnerability and isolation of the Strip.

  • #data #privacy & #decentralization
    https://hackernoon.com/data-privacy-decentralization-2f894c5d9a25?source=rss----3a8144eabfe3---

    A diagram of different network structures.If there’s one thing the #internet lacks, it’s privacy. With almost half of the world’s population online and over 1.5 billion websites to interact with, the sheer volume of information available brings into question the way this data is managed and distributed. And from Facebook’s now infamous data privacy crisis to the EU’s recent implementation of the new GDPR data law, the longstanding issue of privacy and security on the World Wide Web seems to finally be coming to an important turning point for users, businesses, and organizations all over the world.Still, despite stricter government regulations and increased transparency by companies, our data is still at risk. Even the GDPR, with its strict compliance rules and obvious data privacy benefits, (...)

    #technology

  • Israeli academics and artists warn against equating anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism
    Their open letter ahead of a conference in Vienna advises against giving Israel immunity for ‘grave and widespread violations of human rights and international law’

    Ofer Aderet
    Nov 20, 2018

    https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israeli-professors-warn-against-equating-anti-zionism-with-anti-se

    An open letter from 35 prominent Israelis, including Jewish-history scholars and Israel Prize laureates, was published Tuesday in the Austrian media calling for a distinction between legitimate criticism of Israel, “harsh as it may be,” and anti-Semitism.
    To really understand Israel and the Middle East - subscribe to Haaretz
    The letter was released before an international gathering in Vienna on anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism in Europe.
    The event this week, “Europe beyond anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism: Securing Jewish life in Europe,” is being held under the auspices of Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz. His Israeli counterpart, Benjamin Netanyahu, had been due to take part but stayed in Israel to deal with the crisis in his coalition government. 
    “We fully embrace and support the [European Union’s] uncompromising fight against anti-Semitism. The rise of anti-Semitism worries us. As we know from history, it has often signaled future disasters to all mankind,” the letter states. 
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    “However, the EU also stands for human rights and has to protect them as forcefully as it fights anti-Semitism. This fight against anti-Semitism should not be instrumentalized to suppress legitimate criticism of Israel’s occupation and severe violations of Palestinian human rights.” 

    The signatories accuse Netanyahu of suggesting an equivalence between anti-Israel criticism and anti-Semitism. The official declaration by the conference also notes that anti-Semitism is often expressed through disproportionate criticism of Israel, but the letter warns that such an approach could “afford Israel immunity against criticism for grave and widespread violations of human rights and international law.”
    The signatories object to the declaration’s alleged “identifying” of anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism. “Zionism, like all other modern Jewish movements in the 20th century, was harshly opposed by many Jews, as well as by non-Jews who were not anti-Semitic,” they write. “Many victims of the Holocaust opposed Zionism. On the other hand, many anti-Semites supported Zionism. It is nonsensical and inappropriate to identify anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism.”
    Among the signatories are Moshe Zimmerman, an emeritus professor at Hebrew University and a former director of the university’s Koebner Center for German History; Zeev Sternhell, a Hebrew University emeritus professor in political science and a current Haaretz columnist; sculptor Dani Karavan; Miki Kratsman, a former chairman of the photography department at the Bezalel Academy of Arts and Design; Jose Brunner, an emeritus professor at Tel Aviv University and a former director of the Minerva Institute for German History; Alon Confino, a professor of Holocaust Studies at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst; and graphic designer David Tartakover.

    Ofer Aderet
    Haaretz Correspondent

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    • La liste des signataires:
      Moshe Zimmerman, an emeritus professor at Hebrew University and a former director of the university’s Koebner Center for German History; Moshe Zukermann, emeritus professor of history and philosophy of science at Tel Aviv University; Zeev Sternhell, a Hebrew University emeritus professor in political science and a current Haaretz columnist; Israel Prize laureate, sculptor Dani Karavan; Israel Prize laureate, photographer Alex Levac; Israel Prize laureate, artist Michal Naaman; Gadi Algazi, a history professor at Tel Aviv University; Eva Illouz, a professor of Sociology at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and former President of Bezalel Academy of Art and Design; Gideon Freudenthal, a professor in the Cohn Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Ideas at Tel Aviv University; Rachel Elior, an Israeli professor of Jewish philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Anat Matar, philosophy professor at Tel Aviv University; Yael Barda, a professor of Sociology at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem; Miki Kratsman, a former chairman of the photography department at the Bezalel Academy of Arts and Design; Jose Brunner, an emeritus professor at Tel Aviv University and a former director of the Minerva Institute for German History; Alon Confino, a professor of Holocaust Studies at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst; Israel Prize laureate, graphic designer David Tartakover; Arie M. Dubnov, Chair of Israel Studies at George Washington University; David Enoch, history, philosophy and Judaic Studies professor at Israel’s Open University; Amos Goldberg, Jewish History and Contemporary Jewry professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Israel Prize laureate and vice-president of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities David Harel; Hannan Hever, comparative literature and Judaic Studies professor at Yale University; Hannah Kasher, professor emerita in Jewish Thought at Bar-Ilan University; Michael Keren, emeritus professor of economics at Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Israel Prize laureate, Yehoshua Kolodny, professor emeritus in the Institute of Earth Sciences at Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Nitzan Lebovic, professor of Holocaust studies at Lehigh University; Idith Zertal, Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Dmitry Shumsky, professor of Jewish History at Hebrew University; Israel Prize laureate David Shulman, professor emeritus of Asian studies at Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Ishay Rosen-Zvi, Jewish philosophy professor at Tel Aviv University; Dalia Ofer, professor emerita in Jewry and Holocaust Studies at Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Paul Mendes-Flohr, professor emeritus for Jewish thoughts at the Hebrew University; Jacob Metzer, former president of Israel’s Open University; and Israel Prize laureate Yehuda Judd Ne’eman, professor emeritus at Tel Aviv University arts faculty

  • 21.11.2018 – UE - Tunisie - Conseil d’association - Priorités stratégiques

    Décision n° 1/2018 du Conseil d’association UE-Tunisie du 9 novembre 2018 adoptant les priorités stratégiques UE-Tunisie pour la période 2018-2020

    (...)

    Consolider le partenariat privilégié UE-Tunisie : priorités stratégiques pour la période 2018-2020

    (...)

    2.3. Rapprochement entre les peuples, mobilité et migration

    Le rapprochement entre les sociétés tunisiennes et européennes constitue un pilier essentiel du partenariat privilégié, à travers le renforcement des échanges entre peuples, sociétés et cultures. Cette dimension mobilité revêt une importance particulière dans la mise en œuvre du partenariat pour la Jeunesse. La mise en œuvre effective de l’association de la Tunisie à Horizon 2020 et sa participation à Europe Créative et Erasmus+ seront les pierres angulaires de ces efforts.

    La gestion concertée de la migration est une priorité politique, tant pour la Tunisie que pour l’Union européenne. Les deux parties s’engagent à intensifier le dialogue et la coopération, notamment par la mise en œuvre du partenariat pour la mobilité, le renforcement de la lutte contre les causes profondes de la migration irrégulière, ainsi qu’une disponibilité européenne pour soutenir la mise en place d’un système d’asile tunisien. Cette coopération, qui reflétera aussi la dimension régionale de ces problématiques, inclura :

    -- la mise en œuvre de la stratégie nationale tunisienne en matière de migration, couvrant également l’asile et la protection internationale, y inclus la mise en œuvre d’un cadre législatif approprié,

    -- la conclusion des négociations d’accords de réadmission et de facilitation des visas,

    -- la bonne gouvernance de la migration légale, par une meilleure coordination avec les États membres de l’Union européenne dans le respect de leurs compétences, y compris à travers la mise en place de schémas pilotes de mobilité et une meilleure intégration des migrants dans les pays hôtes,

    --

    le soutien à la mobilisation des Tunisiens de l’étranger pour les investissements dans les secteurs innovants en Tunisie,

    -- le soutien à la prévention de la migration irrégulière, en particulier par une meilleure prise en compte des questions migratoires dans les stratégies de développement ; ceci passe également par une gestion des frontières renforcée et par des campagnes de sensibilisation sur les risques de la migration irrégulière,

    -- le soutien aux activités de prévention, et de lutte contre le trafic des migrants et la traite des êtres humains, y compris à travers la détection et la poursuite des réseaux criminels, et

    -- la consolidation de la coopération en matière de retour et réadmission, y compris à travers le soutien à la réinsertion durables des Tunisiens de retour.

    –-> https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2018.293.01.0039.01.FRA&toc=OJ:L:2018:293:TOC

    http://www.europeanmigrationlaw.eu/fr/articles/actualites/ue-tunisie-conseil-d-association-priorites-strategiques.html
    #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Tunisie #EU #UE #Europe

    Commentaire de Claudia Charles sur la mailing-list Migreurop :

    En complément du message envoyé par Alizée, voici un article sur la décision n° 1/2018 du conseil d’association (en vertu de l’#accord_d'association UE - Tunisie) "adoptant les priorités stratégiques UE - Tunisie pour la période 2018 - 2020

    Le point sur « rapprochement entre les peuples, mobilité et migration » se résume (rien de nouveau) à l’adoption, par la Tunisie, d’une réglementation en matière de migration et d’asile, des mesurettes concernant la mobilité (ce qui était déjà dit à multiples occasions et enceintes (processus de Rabat, Sommet de Malte, FFU, partenariat pour la mobilité), et les #accords_de_réadmission / facilitation de #visa.

    L’#OIM aura sa part du gâteau : « la consolidation de la coopération en matière de retour et #réadmission, y compris à travers le soutien à la #réinsertion durables des Tunisiens de retour. »

    #IOM #retours #renvois #expulsions

    ping @_kg_

    • L’émigration irrégulière : Conception de l’opération et parade

      L’émigration vers l’Europe n’est pas un phénomène nouveau en Tunisie car elle date depuis 1970. Par contre, l’émigration irrégulière (la #Harga) entre les côtes tunisiennes et italiennes a commencé en 1990 lorsque l’#Italie a ratifié les accords #Schengen imposant ainsi des #visas d’entrée pour les ressortissants tunisiens.

      Une étude élaborée par le Forum tunisien des droits économiques et sociaux (FTDES) montre qu’avant la révolution de 2011, 30% des Tunisiens de moins de 35 ans exprimaient le désir de migrer vers l’Europe. En raison de la #crise_économique qui ne cesse de frapper le pays durant la période de transition démocratique, ce chiffre a grimpé à 54% en 2017.

      La recrudescence de l’#émigration clandestine à partir de 2015 s’est traduite par des chiffres très alarmants. En effet, 119.369 migrants sont arrivés en Italie en 2017 alors que le nombre de victimes en 2016 est de 5000 selon un rapport publié par les Nations Unies.

      Face à cette situation préoccupante, l’Europe cherche à coordonner avec les #pays_de_transit en vue de trouver une solution à ce quelle considère une menace asymétrique qui pèse sur la sécurité de l’Occident.

      Aujourd’hui, les causes de l’émigration irrégulière sont connues et toute solution au problème doit passer par une combinaison de mesures politiques, économiques, sociales et sécuritaires.
      Sachant que les mesures politiques et socio-économiques ont fait l’objet de plusieurs études, le présent article est consacré à l’explication du volet opérationnel de l’émigration irrégulière. Une explication sans laquelle toute mesure sécuritaire reste incomplète et non concluante.

      Ainsi, après une présentation succincte de l’importance géographique de la Tunisie qui fait du pays un tremplin pour l’Europe, je prendrai en détails la conception de l’opération d’émigration clandestine avant de proposer les actions à entreprendre pour interdire ou contrer cette opération.

      1. Importance géographique de la Tunisie

      Selon une carte tracée par l’Union Européenne, les flux de l’émigration clandestine à destination de l’Europe suivent trois routes en mer méditerranéenne : La route occidentale qui passe par Gibraltar, la route centrale qui passe par la Tunisie et la Libye (carte nr1) et la route orientale qui passe par la Turquie et la mer Egée.

      Sur cette route centrale, la Tunisie occupe une place privilégiée. En effet, située sur le canal de Sicile qui constitue un pont entre l’Afrique et l’Europe et marquée par des conditions météorologiques clémentes sur la quasi-totalité de l’année, elle offre plusieurs possibilités pour rallier l’Italie (carte nr2) :

      Au nord, on trouve deux routes : La Galite-La Sardaigne (130 km) et Bizerte-Mazzara (175km).
      le nord-est présente trois options : Kélébia-Pantelleria (70km), Al Hawaria-Mazzara (160km) et Béni Khiar-Lampedusa (195km).
      au sud, trois autres itinéraires vers Lampedusa : à partir de Chebba (135km), de Kerkennah (140km) et de Zarzis (250km).

      En outre, la Tunisie est devenue le seul pays de transit après la fermeture des routes partant de la Libye. En effet, le flux d’émigrés à partir de ce pays a significativement tari suite à la signature d’un mémorandum d’entente le 2 février 2017 entre Rome et Tripoli (appuyé par les dirigeants européens dans la déclaration de Malte). Aux termes de cet accord, l’Italie doit coopérer avec les forces armées et les garde-frontières libyennes afin de juguler l’afflux de migrants illégaux. Un dispositif a été alors mis en place et 20.000 émigrants ont été interceptés en 2017 et reconduits en Libye, dans des centres de détention. Ainsi, le flux venant essentiellement des pays du Sahel africain a basculé sur le territoire tunisien.
      2. Déroulement d’une opération d’émigration clandestine

      De prime abord, il est à signaler que Les voyages clandestins sont organisés par des réseaux criminels. Le trafic est devenu transnational et apporte beaucoup d’argent. Une étude publiée par le journal d’actualités américain « The Christian Science Monitor » souligne « l’apparition de groupes mafieux d’envergure internationale italiens, albanais, libyens et autres » qui se livrent à ce trafic et gagnent 400 milliards de dollars à travers leurs actions qui englobent toute la région. Selon la même étude, Le candidat à l’émigration clandestine à partir de la Tunisie doit dépenser entre 3000 et 8000 dinars.
      L’organisation d’une opération d’émigration irrégulière passe par trois phases :
      2.1. La phase de recrutement

      Il s’agit de se servir d’agents et intermédiaires pour chercher et d’identifier les postulants à l’émigration sur le territoire national. Les quartiers pauvres et les zones grises du pays sont visés en priorité. Le contact se fait soit directement de bouche à l’oreille dans les cafés et les lieux publics soit par internet et notamment à travers les réseaux sociaux. Ceux qui viennent des pays étrangers sont recrutés et regroupés dans les pays limitrophes avant de les transférer par des passeurs en Tunisie.
      2.2. La phase de préparation logistique

      Tout d’abord, il faut trouver des caches (locaux) où regrouper les postulants au voyage et stocker des vivres pour subvenir à leur besoin durant la période d’attente. Ensuite, on prévoit le moyen de transport. Il est généralement un moyen vétuste acheté à moindre coût pour effectuer un aller sans retour (canot pneumatique, embarcation ou un vieux chalutier). Ce moyen est dépourvu de tout équipement de sécurité, de navigation et de communication. Enfin, le chef de réseau doit coordonner avec ses agents locaux et ses pairs à l’étranger pour fixer les moyens et les procédures nécessaires pour passer et/ou diriger les émigrés sur le lieu du regroupement. Cette phase englobe aussi une collecte de renseignement sur les dispositifs de sécurité déployés sur le théâtre de l’opération.
      2.3. Phase de préparation du transit

      C’est la phase la plus importante car elle fait appel à une bonne expérience pour choisir l’itinéraire, la période propice au voyage et le passeur (patron) qui sera chargé de la traversée.

      2.3.1. Choix de l’itinéraire : Le choix de la route doit prendre en compte la caractéristique physique du milieu marin, la sûreté du transit et le temps mis pour la traversée :

      La route La Galite-La Sardaigne est relativement longue (130km). Elle traverse une zone connue par la faible densité du trafic maritime et le mauvais temps. Elle est donc favorable à la détection radar (difficulté de dissimulation) et défavorable à la navigation des petites embarcations.
      Les deux routes à destination de Mazzara à partir de Bizerte (175km) et de Hawaria (160km) sont similaires. Elles sont longues et traversent une zone de séparation de trafic par laquelle passe plusieurs centaines de navires par jour. La zone est caractérisée par des courants giratoires relativement forts. Elle est donc favorable à la dissimulation mais défavorable à la navigation des petites embarcations.
      La route Kélébia-Pantellaria est la plus courte (70km). Cependant, elle est risquée en raison des patrouilles, de la couverture radar et du dispositif de sécurité mis en place par les autorités italiennes.
      La route Béni Khiar-Lampedusa (195km) est longue et traverse une zone peu fréquentée sur une grande partie de l’année. Elle est donc très défavorable à l’emploi des embarcations pneumatiques qui sont handicapées par le manque d’autonomie et le mode de propulsion.
      Les deux routes à destination de Lampedusa à parir de Chebba (135km) et de Kerkenah (140km) sont très similaires. Elles ont la même distance et traversent la zone de pêche réservée délimitée par l’isobathe de 50m (la zone verte sur la carte nr3). C’est une zone de haut fond qui s’étend jusqu’aux approches de Lampedusa. Cette zone est très hospitalière pour les petits navires. Elle est fréquentée par plusieurs milliers de chalutiers et embarcations. L’environnement est donc très favorable à la navigation et la dissimulation.

      La route Zarzis-Lampedusa est la plus longue (250km). L’emploi de petites embarcations sur cette route est très risqué à moins qu’elles soient utilisées comme relais pour rallier une plate-forme plus grande stationnée au large (navire ou chalutier).

      2.3.2. Le critère de compétence : Les iles Kerkennah se distinguent par le nombre de compétences (des anciens pêcheurs) qui coopèrent avec les réseaux criminels. Ces pêcheurs reconvertis en passeurs sont chargés de la traversée. Cette reconversion s’explique par une pollution maritime qui a mis ces gens de mer au chômage. En effet, les déchets chimiques provenant des industriels dont notamment Thyna Petroleum Services (TPS) et Petrofac ont dégradé l’environnement marin détruisant ainsi la faune marine (poissons, poulpes et éponges). victime de cette pollution et de la pêche illicite, la mer n’est plus généreuse comme au bon vieux temps. D’après The Christian Science Monitor, “les pêcheurs gagnaient jusqu’à 40$ - 100$ par jour (entre 100 et 250 dinars tunisiens). Maintenant, ils ont du mal à gagner 4 à 7$ (entre 10 et 17 dinars) par jour”. Ils ce sont alors livrés aux contrebondiers et leurs embarcations sont vendues aux réseaux criminels à un coût qui fait trois fois le prix réel.

      C’est cette qualité de pêcheur qui explique l’enrôlement des Kerkéniens dans les réseaux de trafic de migrants. Les statistiques du ministère de l’intérieur montrent que la majorité des patrons d’embarcations arrêtés lors des opérations avortées sont originaires de l’archipel.

      2.3.3. Le choix de la période et lieu d’embarquement :

      C’est le critère le plus important pour décider de l’exécution de l’opération. Tout s’explique par la force et la direction du vent. Une étude élaborée par l’Institut Tunisien des Etudes Stratégiques ( ITES) montre des chiffres très significatifs tirés à partir des opérations avortées en 2017 :

      le gouvernorat de Sfax est classé premier sur la liste avec 62 opérations suivi par Nabeul (34 opérations), Bizerte (24 opérations) et Zarzis (11 opérations). En outre, les statistiques montrent que 60% de ces opérations sont effectuées pendant les mois de septembre et d’octobre, 14% pendant juin et juillet. Le reste (26%) est réparti sur toute l’année. Ceci s’explique par la force et la direction (moyenne sur toute l’année) du vent dans ces régions (voir tableau).
      En effet, dans la région de Sfax, le vent atteint sa force la plus faible durant septembre et octobre (inférieur à 10 km/h). Il souffle du secteur Est engendrant de petites vagues qui ne gênent pas le mouvement des embarcations qui naviguent bout au vent (face au vent). Les accidents qui surviennent durant cette période sont causés essentiellement par un manque de stabilité en raison d’un excès de chargement. Ces caractéristiques du vent qui s’ajoutent aux caractéristiques physiques de l’environnement et aux compétences des pêcheurs font de Kerkénah le port préféré pour l’embarquement.
      Le fait que Nabeul et Bizerte occupent respectivement la deuxième et la troisième place s’explique par le vent du secteur Ouest qui souffle sur ces régions et qui pousse les embarcations (vent arrière) sur les côtes de Pantellaria et Mazzara. Les itinéraires partant de la Galite vers la Sardaigne et de Béni Khiar vers Lampeduza, qui sont déjà discriminés par le facteur physique, sont écartés en raison du vent très défavorable (vent de travers).
      La place occupée par Zarzis (4ème place) s’explique uniquement par sa proximité des frontières libyennes et par le vent modéré qui domine la région.

      3. Comment lutter contre le fléau ?

      Tout d’abord, il faut signaler que nos voisins européens déploient leur force (Opération Sofia) sur nos frontières et cherchent à s’ingérer dans nos affaires intérieures sous prétexte de lutter contre l’immigration clandestine. Plusieurs déclarations de responsables européens rentrent dans ce sens :

      Le 15 février 2011, le ministre de l’intérieur italien Roberto Maroni propose de déployer des policiers italiens en Tunisie. Le 9 avril de la même année, il parle de « débarquement » de 22.000 Tunisiens sur les côtes italiennes.
      Le 26 mai 2011, le député maire de Nice, Christian Estrosi, déclare “On constate aussi qu’une partie d’entre eux (les imigrés) – et cela est plus grave – appartiennent aux 10 000 délinquants condamnés et évadés des prisons.”
      Le 3 juin 2018, le nouveau ministre italien de l’Intérieur Matteo Salvini déclare « Il y a de plus en plus de migrants clandestins qui arrivent de Tunisie ici. Ce ne sont pas des réfugiés de guerre mais bien souvent des délinquants et ex-détenus. »
      Dans son projet de rapport 2018/2044(INI), la commission spéciale sur le terrorisme demande au parlement européen « que le mandat de l’opération #EUNAVFOR_MED Sophia soit étendu et que sa portée territoriale soit élargie afin de mieux répondre à l’évolution des schémas migratoires tels que les débarquements fantômes en provenance de la Tunisie, et que la lutte contre le terrorisme soit spécifiquement couverte par son mandat ». Elle propose aussi de « saisir Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU en vue d’adopter une résolution permettant à Sophia d’accéder aux eaux territoriales des États côtiers afin d’effectuer des contrôles sur les navires suspects ».
      Ensuite, il faut appliquer les textes juridiques propres à la matière :
      le Protocole contre le trafic illicite de migrants par terre, air et mer, additionnel à la Convention des Nations unies contre la criminalité transnationale organisée en 2000.
      notre réglementation intérieure en matière de lutte contre l’émigration clandestine et notamment la loi du 3 février 2004 relative à la traite des personnes et au trafic des migrants.
      Les accords bilatéraux (avec la France et l’Italie) concernant les migrants.

      Sur le plan opérationnel, la lutte doit se baser sur deux volets ; le renseignement et l’intervention. Le renseignement est la seule solution pour compenser le manque de moyens matériels dont souffrent nos unités.

      Aujourd’hui, l’intervention est handicapée par le manque d’unités navales et la diversité des intervenants en mer qui appartiennent aux différents ministères (marine nationale, garde maritime nationale et douane). Pour assurer notre souveraineté sur les espaces maritimes qui nous reviennent de droit et remplir nos missions en mer (dont la lutte contre l’émigration clandestine), il faut agir en deux directions :

      Adopter le concept de la sauvegarde maritime pour assurer la synergie des efforts entre tous les intervenants en mer,
      Déployer nos unités en fonction des impératifs du moment. A titre d’exemple, basculer des unités sur le port de Sfax, durant les mois de septembre et d’octobre pour couper la route à l’émigration clandestine entre Kerkennah et Lampedusa.

      Ainsi, ce sont quelques idées proposées aux décideurs pour les éclairer sur le coté opérationnel de l’émigration irrégulière. La guerre contre ce fléau ne peut être gagnée qu’avec la combinaison de mesures d’ordre économique et social.

      http://www.leaders.com.tn/article/25601-l-immigration-irreguliere-conception-de-l-operation-et-parade
      #émigration_irrégulière #migrations #asile #réfugiés #Tunisie #statistiques #chiffres #histoire #opération_sophia #externalisation
      ping @_kg_

  • Going Through the Back Door : Will UAE Sideline Renewed Iran Sanctions ?
    https://insidearabia.com/uae-sideline-renewed-iran-sanctions

    Les Emirats et leur petite cuisine avec l’Iran : pas de raison deu cela cesse, y compris avec les sanctions US.

    In June 2018, the Center for Advanced Defense Studies in a report entitled, “Tracing Sanctions Evasion Through Dubai’s Luxury Real Estate Market,” revealed that Dubai is used by seven individuals sanctioned by the US and the EU as well as their respective networks who bought 81 luxury properties in the UAE as part of an extensive “money laundering scheme” worth millions.

    The report stated:

    “Dubai, the largest city in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), has become a favorable destination for these funds due in part to its high-end luxury real estate market and lax regulatory environment prizing secrecy and anonymity. While the UAE has taken steps to address this issue, its response thus far has failed to fully confront the underlying drivers enabling the manipulation of its real estate market. The permissive nature of this environment has global security implications far beyond the UAE. In an interconnected global economy with low barriers impeding the movement of funds, a single point of weakness in the regulatory system can empower a range of illicit actors. Our research shows that lax regulatory and enforcement environments –in Dubai, but also in other financial centers – have attracted criminal capital from around the world and offered a pathway into the international financial system for illicit actors and funds.”

    #Emirats #Iran

  • Why Spain is a Window into the E.U. Migration Control Industry

    Spain’s migration control policies in North Africa dating back over a decade are now replicated across the E.U. Gonzalo Fanjul outlines PorCausa’s investigation into Spain’s migration control industry and its warning signs for the rest of Europe.

    There was a problem and we fixed it.” For laconic President José María Aznar, these words were quite the political statement. The then Spanish president was speaking in July 1996, after 103 Sub-Saharan migrants who had reached Melilla, a Spanish enclave in North Africa, were drugged, handcuffed and taken to four African countries by military aircraft.

    President Aznar lay the moral and political foundations of a system based on the securitization, externalization and, increasingly, the privatization of border management. This system was consolidated by subsequent Spanish governments and later extended to the rest of the European Union, setting the grounds for a thriving business: the industry of migration control.

    Between 2001 and 2010, long before Europe faced the so-called “refugee crisis,” Spain built two walls in its North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, signed combined development and repatriation agreements with nine African countries, passed two major pieces of legislation on migration, and fostered inter-regional migration initiatives such as the Rabat Process. Spain also designed and established the Integral System of External Surveillance, to this day one of the most sophisticated border surveillance mechanisms in the world.

    The ultimate purpose of these efforts was clear: to deter irregular migration, humanely if possible, but at any cost if necessary.

    Spain was the first European country to utilize a full array of control and cooperation instruments in countries along the migration route to Europe. The system proved effective during the “cayuco crisis” in 2005 and 2006. Following a seven-fold increase in the number of arrivals from West Africa to the Canary Islands by boat, Spain made agreements with several West African countries to block the route, forcing migrants to take the even riskier Sahel passage.

    Although the E.U. questioned the humanitarian consequences of these deals at the time, less than a decade later officials across the continent have replicated large parts of the Spanish system, including the E.U. Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and agreements between the Italian and the Libyan governments.

    Today, 2005 seems like different world. That year, the E.U. adopted its Global Approach on Migration and Mobility, which balanced the “prevention of irregular migration and trafficking” with promising language on the “fostering of well-managed migration” and the “maximization” of its development impact.

    Since then, the combined effect of the Great Recession – an institutional crisis – and the increased arrival of refugees has diluted reformist efforts in Europe. Migration policies are being defined by ideological nationalism and economic protectionism. Many politicians in Europe are electorally profiting from these trends. The case of Spain also illustrates that the system is ripe for financial profit.

    For over a year, Spanish investigative journalism organization porCausa mapped the industry of migration control in Spain. We detailed the ecosystem of actors and interests facilitating the industry, whose operations rely almost exclusively on public funding. A myriad private contractors and civil society organizations operate in four sectors: border protection and surveillance; detention and expulsion of irregular migrants; reception and integration of migrants; and externalization of migration control through agreements with private organisations and public institutions in third countries.

    We began by focusing on securitization and border management. We found that between 2002 and 2017 Spain allocated at least 610 million euros ($720 million) of public funding through 943 contracts related to the deterrence, detention and expulsion of migrants. Our analysis reached two striking conclusions and one question for future research.

    Firstly, we discovered the major role that the E.U. plays in Spain’s migration control industry. Just over 70 percent of the 610 million euros came from different European funds, such as those related to External Borders, Return and Internal Security, as well as the E.U. border agency Frontex. Thus, Spanish public spending is determined by the policy priorities established by E.U. institutions and member states. Those E.U. institutions have since diligently replicated the Spanish approach. With the E.U. now driving these policies forward, the approach is likely to be replicated in other European countries.

    Secondly, our data highlights how resources are concentrated in the hands of a few businesses. Ten out of the 350 companies included in our database received over half of the 610 million euros. These companies have enjoyed a long-standing relationship with the Spanish government in other sectors such as defence, construction and communications, and are now gaining a privileged role in the highly sensitive areas of border surveillance and migration control.

    Our research also surfaced a troubling question that has shaped the second phase of our inquiry: to what extent are these companies influencing Spanish migration policy? The capture of rules and institutions by elites in an economic system has been documented in sectors such as defence, taxation or pharmaceuticals. That this could also be happening to borders and migration policy should alarm public opinion and regulators. For example, the key role played by private technology companies in the design and implementation of Spain’s Integral System of External Surveillance demonstrates the need for further investigation.

    Spain’s industry of migration control may be the prototype of a growing global phenomenon. Migration policies have been taken over by border deterrence goals and narratives. Meanwhile, border control is increasingly dependent on the technology and management of private companies. As E.U.-level priorities intersect with those of the highly-concentrated – and possibly politically influential – migration control industry, Europe risks being trapped in a political and budgetary vicious circle based on the premise of migration-as-a-problem, complicating any future reform efforts towards a more open migration system.

    https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/community/2018/05/21/why-spain-is-a-window-into-the-e-u-migration-control-industry
    #Afrique_du_Nord #externalisation #modèle_espagnol #migrations #contrôles_migratoires #asile #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #asile #réfugiés #histoire

  • La facilité en faveur des réfugiés en Turquie a permis une réaction rapide dans un contexte difficile, mais des améliorations doivent être apportées pour optimiser l’utilisation des fonds, estime la Cour des comptes européenne.

    Selon un nouveau rapport de la #Cour_des_comptes européenne, la facilité en faveur des réfugiés en Turquie, qui soutient les réfugiés et leurs communautés d’accueil turques, a permis de réagir rapidement à la crise dans des circonstances difficiles. Les auditeurs affirment que les #projets_humanitaires ont aidé les réfugiés à subvenir à leurs besoins fondamentaux, mais que l’utilisation des ressources n’a pas toujours été optimale.

    https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/INSR18_27/INSR_TRF_FR.pdf
    #externalisation #accord_ue-turquie #aide_financière #Turquie #Grèce #UE #EU #Europe #facilité #humanitaire #argent

    Le #rapport de la Cour des comptes :
    https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR18_27/SR_TRF_FR.pdf

    • En 2016, on expliquait ainsi la « facilité »...
      GESTION DE LA CRISE DES RÉFUGIÉS. LA FACILITÉ EN FAVEUR DES RÉFUGIÉS EN TURQUIE

      En raison de sa situation géographique, la Turquie est un pays de premier accueil et de transit pour de nombreux réfugiés
      et migrants. Confrontée à un afflux sans précédent de personnes en quête de refuge, elle accueille actuellement plus
      de 2,7 millions de réfugiés syriens enregistrés et déploie des efforts méritoires pour leur apporter une aide humanitaire
      et un soutien – la Turquie a déjà consacré plus de 7 milliards d’euros à cette crise. L’UE est déterminée à ne pas laisser
      la Turquie seule face à cette situation. La Commission européenne fournit une aide humanitaire destinée aux réfugiés
      vulnérables qui ont fui la violence dans leur pays, et en particulier à ceux qui vivent hors des camps et ont besoin d’une
      aide immédiate, ainsi qu’à ceux qui ont besoin d’une aide médicale et d’un accès à l’éducation.


      https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/20160420/factsheet_financing_of_the_facility_for_refugees_in_turkey_fr.pdf

    • 1.5 million refugees in Turkey supported by EU’s biggest ever humanitarian programme

      The #Emergency_Social_Safety_Net, the largest ever EU humanitarian programme, has now assisted 1.5 million of the most vulnerable refugees in Turkey.

      The EU funded programme, launched in September 2016, is the largest single humanitarian project in the history of the European Union.

      Christos Stylianides, Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management, visiting Turkey on the occasion said: “1.5 million refugees in Turkey are now able to meet their basic needs and live in dignity. The European Union, in cooperation with Turkey, is bringing a real change in the lives of the most vulnerable refugees. I am very proud of what we have achieved together. Jointly with Turkey we will continue this support, focusing on making our assistance sustainable.”

      EU humanitarian assistance in Turkey continues to deliver tangible results for the most vulnerable refugees in Turkey. The Emergency Social Safety Net provides monthly cash transfers via a debit card to help refugees buy what they need the most, such as food, medicines, or paying the rent. Another flagship programme, the Conditional Cash Transfer for Education, has surpassed its initial goals and now supports the families of more than 410,000 children who attend school regularly.

      The EU programmes will continue in 2019, with a focus on further supporting the most vulnerable and ensuring a sustainable transition from humanitarian aid to a long-term response. The EU humanitarian funding foreseen for 2019 is €640 million, out of which €80 million will be dedicated to support education in emergencies. This funding is part of the second tranche of €3 billion of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey for both humanitarian and non-humanitarian assistance.

      Background

      The EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey was set up in 2015 in response to the European Council’s call for significant additional funding to support refugees in Turkey. The EU Facility has a total budget of €6 billion for humanitarian and non-humanitarian projects, of which €3 billion for 2016-2017 and €3 billion for 2018-2019.

      The Emergency Social Safety Net programme is implemented by the World Food Programme and the Turkish Red Crescent in close collaboration with the Turkish authorities. With financing from the EU of almost €1 billion to date, the refugees receive around €20 per person per month, plus quarterly top-ups to meet their basic needs.

      Another flagship initiative, the Conditional Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE) project, helps refugee children register for and attend school. The programme builds on the Emergency Social Safety Net. It provides cash assistance to vulnerable refugee families with children who attend school regularly.

      In addition to humanitarian assistance, the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey focuses on education, migration management, health, municipal infrastructure, and socio-economic support.

      http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-1_en.htm
      #programme_humanitaire

  • Detainees Evacuated out of Libya but Resettlement Capacity Remains Inadequate

    According to the United Nations Refugee Agency (#UNHCR) 262 migrants detained in Libya were evacuated to Niger on November 12- the largest evacuation from Libya carried out to date. In addition to a successful airlift of 135 people in October this year, this brings the total number of people evacuated to more than 2000 since December 2017. However Amnesty International describes the resettlement process from Niger as slow and the number of pledges inadequate.

    The evacuations in October and November were the first since June when the Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM) centre in Niger reached its full capacity of 1,536 people, which according to Amnesty was a result of a large number of people “still waiting for their permanent resettlement to a third country.”

    57,483 refugees and asylum seekers are registered by UNHCR in Libya; as of October 2018 14,349 had agreed to Voluntary Humanitarian Return. Currently 3,886 resettlement pledges have been made by 12 states, but only 1,140 have been resettled.

    14,595 people have been intercepted by the Libyan coast guard and taken back to Libya, however it has been well documented that their return is being met by detention, abuse, violence and torture. UNHCR recently declared Libya unsafe for returns amid increased violence in the capital, while Amnesty International has said that “thousands of men, women and children are trapped in Libya facing horrific abuses with no way out”.

    In this context, refugees and migrants are currently refusing to disembark in Misrata after being rescued by a cargo ship on November 12, reportedly saying “they would rather die than be returned to land”. Reuters cited one Sudanese teenager on board who stated “We agree to go to any place but not Libya.”

    UNHCR estimates that 5,413 refugees and migrants remain detained in #Directorate_for_Combatting_Illegal_Migration (#DCIM) centres and the UN Refugee Agency have repetedly called for additional resettlement opportunities for vulnerable persons of concern in Libya.

    https://www.ecre.org/detainees-evacuated-out-of-libya-but-resettlement-capacity-remains-inadequate
    #réinstallation #Niger #Libye #évacuation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #HCR #détention #centres_de_détention #Emergency_Transit_Mechanism (#ETM)

    • ET DES INFORMATIONS PLUS ANCIENNES DANS LE FIL CI-DESSOUS

      Libya: evacuations to Niger resumed – returns from Niger begun

      After being temporarily suspended in March as the result of concerns from local authorities on the pace of resettlement out of Niger, UNHCR evacuations of vulnerable refugees and asylum seekers from Libya through the Emergency Transit Mechanism has been resumed and 132 vulnerable migrants flown to the country. At the same time the deportation of 132 Sudanese nationals from Niger to Libya has raised international concern.

      Niger is the main host for refugees and asylum seekers from Libya evacuated by UNHCR. Since the UN Refugee Agency began evacuations in cooperation with EU and Libyan authorities in November 2017, Niger has received 1,152 of the 1,474 people evacuated in total. While UNHCR has submitted 475 persons for resettlement a modest 108 in total have been resettled in Europe. According to UNHCR the government in Niger has now offered to host an additional 1,500 refugees from Libya through the Emergency Transit Mechanism and upon its revival and the first transfer of 132 refugees to Niger, UNHCR’s Special Envoy for the Central Mediterranean Situation, Vincent Cochetel stated: “We now urgently need to find resettlement solutions for these refugees in other countries.”

      UNHCR has confirmed the forced return by authorities in Niger of at least 132 of a group of 160 Sudanese nationals arrested in the migrant hub of Agadez, the majority after fleeing harsh conditions in Libya. Agadez is known as a major transit hub for refugees and asylum seekers seeking passage to Libya and Europe but the trend is reversed and 1,700 Sudanese nationals have fled from Libya to Niger since December 2017. In a mail to IRIN News, Human Rights Watch’s associate director for Europe and Central Asia, Judith Sunderland states: “It is inhuman and unlawful to send migrants and refugees back to Libya, where they face shocking levels of torture, sexual violence, and forced labour,” with reference to the principle of non-refoulement.

      According to a statement released by Amnesty International on May 16: “At least 7,000 migrants and refugees are languishing in Libyan detention centres where abuse is rife and food and water in short supply. This is a sharp increase from March when there were 4,400 detained migrants and refugees, according to Libyan officials.”

      https://www.ecre.org/libya-evacuations-to-niger-resumed-returns-from-niger-begun

    • Libya: return operations running but slow resettlement is jeopardizing the evacuation scheme

      According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) 15.000 migrants have been returned from Libya to their country of origin and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has assisted in the evacuation of more than 1,300 refugees from Libya thereby fulfilling the targets announced at the AU-EU-UN Taskforce meeting in December 2017. However, a modest 25 of the more than 1000 migrants evacuated to Niger have been resettled to Europe and the slow pace is jeopardizing further evacuations.

      More than 1000 of the 1300 migrants evacuated from Libya are hosted by Niger and Karmen Sakhr, who oversees the North Africa unit at the UNHCR states to the EU Observer that the organisation: “were advised that until more people leave Niger, we will no longer be able to evacuate additional cases from Libya.”

      During a meeting on Monday 5 March with the Civil Liberties Committee and Foreign Affairs Committee MEPs, members of the Delegation for relations with Maghreb countries, Commission and External Action Service representatives on the mistreatment of migrants and refugees in Libya, and arrangements for their resettlement or return, UNHCR confirmed that pledges have been made by France, Switzerland, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Malta as well as unspecified non-EU countries but that security approvals and interviewing process of the cases is lengthy resulting in the modest number of resettlements, while also warning that the EU member states need to put more work into resettlement of refugees, and that resettlement pledges still fall short of the needs. According to UNHCR 430 pledges has been made by European countries.

      An estimated 5000 people are in government detention and an unknown number held by private militias under well documented extreme conditions.

      https://www.ecre.org/libya-return-operations-running-but-slow-resettlement-is-jeopardizing-the-evac

    • Libya: migrants and refugees out by plane and in by boat

      The joint European Union (EU), African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN) Task Force visited Tripoli last week welcoming progress made evacuating and returning migrants and refugees out of Libya. EU has announced three new programmes, for protecting migrants and refugees in Libya and along the Central Mediterranean Route, and their return and reintegration. Bundestag Research Services and NGOs raise concerns over EU and Member State support to Libyan Coast Guard.

      Representatives of the Task Force, created in November 2017, met with Libyan authorities last week and visited a detention centres for migrants and a shelter for internally displaced people in Tripoli. Whilst they commended progress on Voluntary Humanitarian Returns, they outlined a number of areas for improvement. These include: comprehensive registration of migrants at disembarkation points and detention centres; improving detention centre conditions- with a view to end the current system of arbitrary detention; decriminalizing irregular migration in Libya.

      The three new programmes announced on Monday, will be part of the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. €115 million will go towards evacuating 3,800 refugees from Libya, providing protection and voluntary humanitarian return to 15,000 migrants in Libya and will support the resettlement of 14,000 people in need of international protection from Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Burkina Faso. €20 million will be dedicated to improving access to social and protection services for vulnerable migrants in transit countries in the Sahel region and the Lake Chad basin. €15 million will go to supporting sustainable reintegration for Ethiopian citizens.

      A recent report by the Bundestag Research Services on SAR operations in the Mediterranean notes the support for the Libyan Coast Guard by EU and Member States in bringing refugees and migrants back to Libya may be violating the principle of non-refoulement as outlined in the Geneva Convention: “This cooperation must be the subject of proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights, because the people who are being forcibly returned with the assistance of the EU are being inhumanely treated, tortured or killed.” stated Andrej Hunko, European policy spokesman for the German Left Party (die Linke). A joint statement released by SAR NGO’s operating in the Mediterranean calls on the EU institutions and leaders to stop the financing and support of the Libyan Coast Guard and the readmissions to a third country which violates fundamental human rights and international law.

      According to UNHCR, there are currently 46,730 registered refugees and asylum seekers in Libya. 843 asylum seekers and refugees have been released from detention so far in 2018. According to IOM 9,379 people have been returned to their countries of origin since November 2017 and 1,211 have been evacuated to Niger since December 2017.

      https://www.ecre.org/libya-migrants-and-refugees-out-by-plane-and-in-by-boat

      Complément de Emmanuel Blanchard (via la mailing-list Migreurop):

      Selon le HCR, il y aurait actuellement environ 6000 personnes détenues dans des camps en Libye et qui seraient en attente de retour ou de protection (la distinction n’est pas toujours très claire dans la prose du HCR sur les personnes à « évacuer » vers le HCR...). Ces données statistiques sont très fragiles et a priori très sous-estimées car fondées sur les seuls camps auxquels le HCR a accès.

    • First group of refugees evacuated from new departure facility in Libya

      UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, in coordination with Libyan authorities, evacuated 133 refugees from Libya to Niger today after hosting them at a Gathering and Departure Facility (GDF) in Tripoli which opened on Tuesday.

      Most evacuees, including 81 women and children, were previously detained in Libya. After securing their release from five detention centres across Libya, including in Tripoli and areas as far as 180 kilometres from the capital, they were sheltered at the GDF until the arrangements for their evacuation were concluded.

      The GDF is the first centre of its kind in Libya and is intended to bring vulnerable refugees to a safe environment while solutions including refugee resettlement, family reunification, evacuation to emergency facilities in other countries, return to a country of previous asylum, and voluntary repatriation are sought for them.

      “The opening of this centre, in very difficult circumstances, has the potential to save lives. It offers immediate protection and safety for vulnerable refugees in need of urgent evacuation, and is an alternative to detention for hundreds of refugees currently trapped in Libya,” said UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi.

      The centre is managed by the Libyan Ministry of Interior, UNHCR and UNHCR’s partner LibAid. The initiative is one of a range of measures needed to offer viable alternatives to the dangerous boat journeys undertaken by refugees and migrants along the Central Mediterranean route.

      With an estimated 4,900 refugees and migrants held in detention centres across Libya, including 3,600 in need of international protection, the centre is a critical alternative to the detention of those most vulnerable.

      The centre, which has been supported by the EU and other donors, has a capacity to shelter up to 1,000 vulnerable refugees identified for solutions out of Libya.

      At the facility, UNHCR and partners are providing humanitarian assistance such as accommodation, food, medical care and psychosocial support. Child friendly spaces and dedicated protection staff are also available to ensure that refugees and asylum-seekers are adequately cared for.

      https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2018/12/5c09033a4/first-group-refugees-evacuated-new-departure-facility-libya.html

    • Migration : à Niamey, des migrants rapatriés de Libye protestent contre leurs conditions de séjour

      Les manifestants protestent contre leur détention de vie qu’ils jugent « déplorables » et pour amplifier leurs mouvements, ils ont brandi des pancartes sur lesquelles ils ont écrit leurs doléances. Les migrants manifestant s’indignent également de leur séjour qui ne cesse de se prolonger, sans véritable alternatives ou visibilité sur leur situation. « Ils nous ont ramené de la Libye pour nous laisser à nous-mêmes ici », « on ne veut pas rester ici, laisser nous partir là où on veut », sont entre autres les slogans que les migrants ont scandés au cours de leur sit-in devant les locaux de l’agence onusienne. Plusieurs des protestataires sont venus à la manifestation avec leurs bagages et d’autres avec leurs différents papiers, qui attestent de leur situation de réfugiés ou demandeurs d’asiles.

      La situation, quoique déplorable, n’a pas manqué de susciter divers commentaires. Il faut dire que depuis le début de l’opération de rapatriement des migrants en détresse de Libye, ils sont des centaines à vivre dans la capitale mais aussi à Agadez où des centres d’accueil sont mis à leurs dispositions par les agences onusiennes (UNHCR, OIM), avec la collaboration des autorités nigériennes. Un certain temps, leur présence de plus en plus massive dans divers quartiers de la capitale où des villas sont mises à leur disposition, a commencé à inquiéter les habitants sur d’éventuels risques sécuritaires.

      Le gouvernement a signé plusieurs accords et adopté des lois pour lutter contre l’immigration clandestine. Il a aussi signé des engagements avec certains pays européens notamment la France et l’Italie, pour l’accueil temporaire des réfugiés en provenance de la Libye et en transit en attendant leur réinstallation dans leur pays ou en Europe pour ceux qui arrivent à obtenir le sésame pour l’entrée. Un geste de solidarité décrié par certaines ONG et que les autorités regrettent presque à demi-mot, du fait du non-respect des contreparties financières promises par les bailleurs et partenaires européens. Le pays fait face lui-même à un afflux de réfugiés nigérians et maliens sur son territoire, ainsi que des déplacés internes dans plusieurs régions, ce qui complique davantage la tâche dans cette affaire de difficile gestion de la problématique migratoire.

      Le Niger accueille plusieurs centres d’accueil pour les réfugiés et demandeurs d’asiles rapatriés de Libye. Le 10 décembre dernier, l’OFPRA français a par exemple annoncé avoir achevé une nouvelle mission au Niger avec l’UNHCR, et qui a concerné 200 personnes parmi lesquelles une centaine évacuée de Libye. En novembre dernier, le HCR a également annoncé avoir repris les évacuations de migrants depuis la Libye, avec un contingent de 132 réfugiés et demandeurs d’asiles vers le Niger.

      Depuis novembre 2017, le HCR a assuré avoir effectué vingt-trois (23) opérations d’évacuation au départ de la Libye et ce, « malgré d’importants problèmes de sécurité et les restrictions aux déplacements qui ont été imposées ». En tout, ce sont 2.476 réfugiés et demandeurs d’asile vulnérables qui ont pu être libérés et acheminés de la Libye vers le Niger (2.069), l’Italie (312) et la Roumanie (95).


      https://www.actuniger.com/societe/14640-migration-a-niamey-des-migrants-rapatries-de-libye-protestent-contr

      Je découvre ici que les évacuations se sont faites aussi vers l’#Italie et... la #Roumanie !

    • Destination Europe: Evacuation. The EU has started resettling refugees from Libya, but only 174 have made it to Europe in seven months

      As the EU sets new policies and makes deals with African nations to deter hundreds of thousands of migrants from seeking new lives on the continent, what does it mean for those following dreams northwards and the countries they transit through? From returnees in Sierra Leone and refugees resettled in France to smugglers in Niger and migrants in detention centres in Libya, IRIN explores their choices and challenges in this multi-part special report, Destination Europe.

      Four years of uncontrolled migration starting in 2014 saw more than 600,000 people cross from Libya to Italy, contributing to a populist backlash that is threatening the foundations of the EU. Stopping clandestine migration has become one of Europe’s main foreign policy goals, and last July the number of refugees and migrants crossing the central Mediterranean dropped dramatically. The EU celebrated the reduced numbers as “good progress”.

      But, as critics pointed out, that was only half the story: the decline, resulting from a series of moves by the EU and Italy, meant that tens of thousands of people were stuck in Libya with no way out. They faced horrific abuse, and NGOs and human rights organisations accused the EU of complicity in the violations taking place.

      Abdu is one who got stuck. A tall, lanky teenager, he spent nearly two years in smugglers’ warehouses and official Libyan detention centres. But he’s also one of the lucky ones. In February, he boarded a flight to Niger run (with EU support) by the UN’s refugee agency, UNHCR, to help some of those stranded in Libya reach Europe. Nearly 1,600 people have been evacuated on similiar flights, but, seven months on, only 174 have been resettled to Europe.

      The evacuation programme is part of a €500-million ($620-million) effort to resettle 50,000 refugees over the next two years to the EU, which has a population of more than 500 million people. The target is an increase from previous European resettlement goals, but still only represents a tiny fraction of the need – those chosen can be Syrians in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon as well as refugees in Libya, Egypt, Niger, Chad, Sudan, and Ethiopia – countries that combined host more than 6.5 million refugees.

      The EU is now teetering on the edge of a fresh political crisis, with boats carrying people rescued from the sea being denied ports of disembarkation, no consensus on how to share responsibility for asylum seekers and refugees within the continent, and increasing talk of further outsourcing the management of migration to African countries.

      Against this backdrop, the evacuation and resettlement programme from Libya is perhaps the best face of European policy in the Mediterranean. But, unless EU countries offer more spots for refugees, it is a pathway to safety for no more than a small handful who get the luck of the draw. As the first evacuees adjust to their new lives in Europe, the overwhelming majority are left behind.

      Four months after arriving in Niger, Abdu is still waiting to find out if and when he will be resettled to Europe. He’s still in the same state of limbo he was in at the end of March when IRIN met him in Niamey, the capital of Niger. At the time, he’d been out of the detention centre in Libya for less than a month and his arms were skeletally thin.

      “I thought to go to Europe [and] failed. Now, I came to Niger…. What am I doing here? What will happen from here? I don’t know,” he said, sitting in the shade of a canopy in the courtyard of a UNHCR facility. “I don’t know what I will be planning for the future because everything collapsed; everything finished.”
      Abdu’s story

      Born in Eritrea – one of the most repressive countries in the world – Abdu’s mother sent him to live in neighbouring Sudan when he was only seven. She wanted him to grow up away from the political persecution and shadow of indefinite military service that stifled normal life in his homeland.

      But Sudan, where he was raised by his uncle, wasn’t much better. As an Eritrean refugee, he faced discrimination and lived in a precarious legal limbo. Abdu saw no future there. “So I decided to go,” he said.

      Like so many other young Africans fleeing conflict, political repression, and economic hardship in recent years, he wanted to try to make it to Europe. But first he had to pass through Libya.

      After crossing the border from Sudan in July 2016, Abdu, then 16 years old, was taken captive and held for 18 months. The smugglers asked for a ransom of $5,500, tortured him while his relatives were forced to listen on the phone, and rented him out for work like a piece of equipment.

      Abdu tried to escape, but only found himself under the control of another smuggler who did the same thing. He was kept in overflowing warehouses, sequestered from the sunlight with around 250 other people. The food was not enough and often spoiled; disease was rampant; people died from malaria and hunger; one woman died after giving birth; the guards drank, carried guns, and smoked hashish, and, at the smallest provocation, spun into a sadistic fury. Abdu’s skin started crawling with scabies, his cheeks sank in, and his long limbs withered to skin and bones.

      One day, the smuggler told him that, if he didn’t find a way to pay, it looked like he would soon die. As a courtesy – or to try to squeeze some money out of him instead of having to deal with a corpse – the smuggler reduced the ransom to $1,500.

      Finally, Abdu’s relatives were able to purchase his freedom and passage to Europe. It was December 2017. As he finally stood on the seashore before dawn in the freezing cold, Abdu remembered thinking: “We are going to arrive in Europe [and] get protection [and] get rights.”

      But he never made it. After nearly 24 hours at sea, the rubber dinghy he was on with around 150 other people was intercepted by the Libyan Coast Guard, which, since October 2016, has been trained and equipped by the EU and Italy.

      Abdu was brought back to the country he had just escaped and put in another detention centre.

      This one was official – run by the Libyan Directorate for Combating Irregular Migration. But it wasn’t much different from the smuggler-controlled warehouses he’d been in before. Again, it was overcrowded and dirty. People were falling sick. There was no torture or extortion, but the guards could be just as brutal. If someone tried to talk to them about the poor conditions “[they are] going to beat you until you are streaming blood,” Abdu said.

      Still, he wasn’t about to try his luck on his own again in Libya. The detention centre wasn’t suitable for human inhabitants, Abdu recalled thinking, but it was safer than anywhere he’d been in over a year. That’s where UNHCR found him and secured his release.

      The lucky few

      The small village of Thal-Marmoutier in France seems like it belongs to a different world than the teeming detention centres of Libya.

      The road to the village runs between gently rolling hills covered in grapevines and winds through small towns of half-timbered houses. About 40 minutes north of Strasbourg, the largest city in the region of Alsace, bordering Germany, it reaches a valley of hamlets that disrupt the green countryside with their red, high-peaked roofs. It’s an unassuming setting, but it’s the type of place Abdu might end up if and when he is finally resettled.

      In mid-March, when IRIN visited, the town of 800 people was hosting the first group of refugees evacuated from Libya.

      It was unseasonably cold, and the 55 people housed in a repurposed section of a Franciscan convent were bundled in winter jackets, scarves, and hats. Thirty of them had arrived from Chad, where they had been long-time residents of refugee camps after fleeing Boko Haram violence or conflict in the Sudanese region of Darfur. The remaining 25 – from Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Sudan – were the first evacuees from Libya. Before reaching France, they, like Abdu, had been flown to Niamey.

      The extra stop is necessary because most countries require refugees to be interviewed in person before offering them a resettlement spot. The process is facilitated by embassies and consulates, but, because of security concerns, only one European country (Italy) has a diplomatic presence in Libya.

      To resettle refugees stuck in detention centres, UNHCR needed to find a third country willing to host people temporarily, one where European resettlement agencies could carry out their procedures. Niger was the first – and so far only – country to volunteer.

      “For us, it is an obligation to participate,” Mohamed Bazoum, Niger’s influential interior minister, said when interviewed by IRIN in Niamey. Niger, the gateway between West Africa and Libya on the migration trail to Europe, is the top recipient of funds from the EU Trust Fund for Africa, an initiative launched in 2015 to “address the root causes of irregular migration”.

      “It costs us nothing to help,” Bazoum added, referring to the evacuation programme. “But we gain a sense of humanity in doing so.”

      ‘Time is just running from my life’

      The first evacuees landed in Niamey on 12 November. A little over a month later, on 19 December, they were on their way to France.

      By March, they had been in Thal-Marmoutier for three months and were preparing to move from the reception centre in the convent to individual apartments in different cities.

      Among them, several families with children had been living in Libya for a long time. But most of the evacuees were young women who had been imprisoned by smugglers and militias, held in official detention centres, or often both.

      “In Libya, it was difficult for me,” said Farida, a 24-year-old aspiring runner from Ethiopia. She fled her home in 2016 because of the conflict between the government and the Oromo people, an ethnic group.

      After a brief stay in Cairo, she and her husband decided to go to Libya because they heard a rumour that UNHCR was providing more support there to refugees. Shortly after crossing the border, Farida and her husband were captured by a militia and placed in a detention centre.

      “People from the other government (Libya has two rival governments) came and killed the militiamen, and some of the people in the prison also died, but we got out and were taken to another prison,” she said. “When they put me in prison, I was pregnant, and they beat me and killed the child in my belly.”

      Teyba, a 20-year-old woman also from Ethiopia, shared a similar story: “A militia put us in prison and tortured us a lot,” she said. “We stayed in prison for a little bit more than a month, and then the fighting started…. Some people died, some people escaped, and some people, I don’t know what happened to them.”

      Three months at the reception centre in Thal-Marmoutier had done little to ease the trauma of those experiences. “I haven’t seen anything that made me laugh or that made me happy,” Farida said. “Up to now, life has not been good, even after coming to France.”

      The French government placed the refugees in the reception centre to expedite their asylum procedures, and so they could begin to learn French.

      Everyone in the group had already received 10-year residency permits – something refugees who are placed directly in individual apartments or houses usually wait at least six months to receive. But many of them said they felt like their lives had been put on pause in Thal-Marmoutier. They were isolated in the small village with little access to transportation and said they had not been well prepared to begin new lives on their own in just a few weeks time.

      “I haven’t benefited from anything yet. Time is just running from my life,” said Intissar, a 35-year-old woman from Sudan.

      A stop-start process

      Despite their frustrations with the integration process in France, and the still present psychological wounds from Libya, the people in Thal-Marmoutier were fortunate to reach Europe.

      By early March, more than 1,000 people had been airlifted from Libya to Niger. But since the first group in December, no one else had left for Europe. Frustrated with the pace of resettlement, the Nigerien government told UNHCR that the programme had to be put on hold.

      “We want the flow to be balanced,” Bazoum, the interior minister, explained. “If people arrive, then we want others to leave. We don’t want people to be here on a permanent basis.”

      Since then, an additional 148 people have been resettled to France, Switzerland, Sweden and the Netherlands, and other departures are in the works. “The situation is improving,” said Louise Donovan, a UNHCR communications officer in Niger. “We need to speed up our processes as much as possible, and so do the resettlement countries.”

      A further 312 people were evacuated directly to Italy. Still, the total number resettled by the programme remains small. “What is problematic right now is the fact that European governments are not offering enough places for resettlement, despite continued requests from UNHCR,” said Matteo de Bellis, a researcher with Amnesty International.
      Less than 1 percent

      Globally, less than one percent of refugees are resettled each year, and resettlement is on a downward spiral at the moment, dropping by more than 50 percent between 2016 and 2017. The number of refugees needing resettlement is expected to reach 1.4 million next year, 17 percent higher than in 2018, while global resettlement places dropped to just 75,000 in 2017, UNHCR said on Monday.

      The Trump administration’s slashing of the US refugee admissions programme – historically the world’s leader – means this trend will likely continue.

      Due to the limited capacity, resettlement is usually reserved for people who are considered to be the most vulnerable.

      In Libya alone, there are around 19,000 refugees from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan registered with UNHCR – a number increasing each month – as well as 430,000 migrants and potential asylum seekers from throughout sub-Saharan Africa. Many have been subjected to torture, sexual violence, and other abuses. And, because they are in Libya irregularly, resettlement is often the only legal solution to indefinite detention.

      In the unlikely scenario that all the sub-Saharan refugees in Libya were to be resettled, they would account for more than one third of the EU’s quota for the next two years. And that’s not taking into account people in Libya who may have legitimate grounds to claim asylum but are not on the official radar. Other solutions are clearly needed, but given the lack of will in the international community, it is unclear what those might be.

      “The Niger mechanism is a patch, a useful one under the circumstance, but still a patch,” de Bellis, the Amnesty researcher, said. “There are refugees… who cannot get out of the detention centres because there are no resettlement places available to them.”

      It is also uncertain what will happen to any refugees evacuated to Niger that aren’t offered a resettlement spot by European countries.

      UNHCR says it is considering all options, including the possibility of integration in Niger or return to their countries of origin – if they are deemed to be safe and people agree to go. But resettlement is the main focus. In April, the pace of people departing for Europe picked up, and evacuations from Libya resumed at the beginning of May – ironically, the same week the Nigerien government broke new and dangerous ground by deporting 132 Sudanese asylum seekers who had crossed the border on their own back to Libya.

      For the evacuees in Niger awaiting resettlement, there are still many unanswered questions.

      As Abdu was biding his time back in March, something other than the uncertainty about his own future weighed on him: the people still stuck in the detention centres in Libya.

      He had started his travels with his best friend. They had been together when they were first kidnapped and held for ransom. But Abdu’s friend was shot in the leg by a guard who accused him of stealing a cigarette. When Abdu tried to escape, he left his friend behind and hasn’t spoken to him or heard anything about him since.

      “UNHCR is saying they are going to find a solution for me; they are going to help me,” Abdu said. “It’s okay. But what about the others?”

      https://www.irinnews.org/special-report/2018/06/26/destination-europe-evacuation

    • Hot Spots #1 : Niger, les évacués de l’enfer libyen

      Fuir l’enfer libyen, sortir des griffes des trafiquants qui séquestrent pendant des mois leurs victimes dans des conditions inhumaines. C’est de l’autre côté du désert, au Niger, que certains migrants trouvent un premier refuge grâce à un programme d’#évacuation d’urgence géré par les Nations Unies depuis novembre 2017.

      https://guitinews.fr/video/2019/03/12/hot-spots-1-niger-les-evacues-de-lenfer-libyen

      Lien vers la #vidéo :

      « Les gens qu’on évacue de la Libye, ce sont des individus qui ont subi une profonde souffrance. Ce sont tous des victimes de torture, des victimes de violences aussi sexuelles, il y a des femmes qui accouchent d’enfants fruits de cette violences sexuelles. » Alexandra Morelli, Représentante du HCR au Niger.

      https://vimeo.com/323299304

      ping @isskein @karine4