organization:european union

  • Swarms of Drones, Piloted by Artificial Intelligence, May Soon Patrol Europe’s Borders
    https://theintercept.com/2019/05/11/drones-artificial-intelligence-europe-roborder

    Imagine you’re hiking through the woods near a border. Suddenly, you hear a mechanical buzzing, like a gigantic bee. Two quadcopters have spotted you and swoop in for a closer look. Antennae on both drones and on a nearby autonomous ground vehicle pick up the radio frequencies coming from the cell phone in your pocket. They send the signals to a central server, which triangulates your exact location and feeds it back to the drones. The robots close in. Cameras and other sensors on the (...)

    #algorithme #robotique #militarisation #aérien #migration #surveillance #frontières #Roborder (...)

    ##drone

  • Russia’s Payback Will Be Syria’s Reconstruction Money – Foreign Policy
    https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/05/russias-payback-will-be-syrias-reconstruction-money


    Russian President Vladimir Putin and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad inspect a military parade during their visit to the Russian air base in Hmeimim in the northwestern Syrian province of Latakia on Dec. 11, 2017.
    MIKHAIL KIMENTYEV/AFP/GETTY IMAGES

    But international donors—and Bashar al-Assad—aren’t playing along yet.
    […]
    Almost four years later, with rebels having mostly abandoned calls for regime change and losing large swaths of their enclaves, Russia has achieved most of its short- and medium-term goals in Syria. A growing number of signs suggest Moscow is now shifting focus to another objective: The Kremlin would like Syria to provide it a financial windfall.
    […]
    Russian analysts say Moscow had originally envisaged a sect-based power-sharing arrangement, modeled on Lebanon, between the Syrian government and several opposition groups as the political panacea for the conflict. But Russia could neither convince the regime nor the rebels to compromise and abandoned the plan. Now it has reduced its ambitions and is focused on using its leverage with Assad to agree on a constitutional committee whose members have been appointed by the regime, the opposition, and representatives of Syrian civil society.

    Max Suckov, a Russia analyst, said Moscow would achieve little more in terms of a political settlement. “Russia is not very hopeful about a political settlement which satisfies all Syrian actors,” he said. “I think Russia has accepted that Syria will continue to be a centralized state, but that certainly makes it difficult to convince the EU to pay for reconstruction.”

  • Inside Facebook’s war room : the battle to protect EU elections
    https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/may/05/facebook-admits-huge-scale-of-fake-news-and-election-interference

    Less than three years ago, Facebook’s chief executive, Mark Zuckerberg, dismissed as “crazy” the idea that fake news on his platform could have influenced the election of Donald Trump as US president. Today the company admits it is under siege from billions of fake accounts trying to game its systems to win elections, make money or influence people in other ways, and battling a tsunami of fake news, disinformation and hate speech. Defeating them has become a matter of corporate survival, and (...)

    #Facebook #Twitter #algorithme #manipulation #élections #filtrage

    https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/cb78edd000f69ca225c88d849ba503cc18a62ab2/0_112_3500_2101/master/3500.jpg

  • Facebook Opens a Command Post to Thwart Election Meddling in Europe
    https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/05/technology/facebook-opens-a-command-post-to-thwart-election-meddling-in-europe.html

    The social network took the wraps off a special operations center in Dublin ahead of this month’s European Union voting. Inside a large room in Facebook’s European headquarters in Ireland’s capital, about 40 employees sit at rows of desks, many with two computer screens and a sign representing a country in the European Union. Large screens at the front display charts and other information about trends on the social network’s services, including Instagram and the messaging app WhatsApp. In the (...)

    #Facebook #Twitter #algorithme #manipulation #élections #publicité #filtrage

    ##publicité

  • Refugee, volunteer, prisoner: #Sarah_Mardini and Europe’s hardening line on migration

    Early last August, Sarah Mardini sat on a balcony on the Greek island of Lesvos. As the sun started to fade, a summer breeze rose off the Aegean Sea. She leaned back in her chair and relaxed, while the Turkish coastline, only 16 kilometres away, formed a silhouette behind her.

    Three years before, Mardini had arrived on this island from Syria – a dramatic journey that made international headlines. Now she was volunteering her time helping other refugees. She didn’t know it yet, but in a few weeks that work would land her in prison.

    Mardini had crossed the narrow stretch of water from Turkey in August 2015, landing on Lesvos after fleeing her home in Damascus to escape the Syrian civil war. On the way, she almost drowned when the engine of the inflatable dinghy she was travelling in broke down.

    More than 800,000 people followed a similar route from the Turkish coast to the Greek Islands that year. Almost 800 of them are now dead or missing.

    As the boat Mardini was in pitched and spun, she slipped overboard and struggled to hold it steady in the violent waves. Her sister, Yusra, three years younger, soon joined. Both girls were swimmers, and their act of heroism likely saved the 18 other people on board. They eventually made it to Germany and received asylum. Yusra went on to compete in the 2016 Olympics for the first ever Refugee Olympic Team. Sarah, held back from swimming by an injury, returned to Lesvos to help other refugees.

    On the balcony, Mardini, 23, was enjoying a rare moment of respite from long days spent working in the squalid Moria refugee camp. For the first time in a long time, she was looking forward to the future. After years spent between Lesvos and Berlin, she had decided to return to her university studies in Germany.

    But when she went to the airport to leave, shortly after The New Humanitarian visited her, Mardini was arrested. Along with several other volunteers from Emergency Response Centre International, or ERCI, the Greek non-profit where she volunteered, Mardini was charged with belonging to a criminal organisation, people smuggling, money laundering, and espionage.

    According to watchdog groups, the case against Mardini is not an isolated incident. Amnesty International says it is part of a broader trend of European governments taking a harder line on immigration and using anti-smuggling laws to de-legitimise humanitarian assistance to refugees and migrants.

    Far-right Italian Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini recently pushed through legislation that ends humanitarian protection for migrants and asylum seekers, while Italy and Greece have ramped up pressure on maritime search and rescue NGOs, forcing them to shutter operations. At the end of March, the EU ended naval patrols in the Mediterranean that had saved the lives of thousands of migrants.

    In 2016, five other international volunteers were arrested on Lesvos on similar charges to Mardini. They were eventually acquitted, but dozens of other cases across Europe fit a similar pattern: from Denmark to France, people have been arrested, charged, and sometimes successfully prosecuted under anti-smuggling regulations based on actions they took to assist migrants.

    Late last month, Salam Kamal-Aldeen, a Danish national who founded the rescue non-governmental organisation Team Humanity, filed an application with the European Court of Human Rights, challenging what he says is a Greek crackdown on lifesaving activities.

    According to Maria Serrano, senior campaigner on migration at Amnesty International, collectively the cases have done tremendous damage in terms of public perception of humanitarian work in Europe. “The atmosphere… is very hostile for anyone that is trying to help, and this [has a] chilling effect on other people that want to help,” she said.

    As for the case against Mardini and the other ERCI volunteers, Human Rights Watch concluded that the accusations are baseless. “It seems like a bad joke, and a scary one as well because of what the implications are for humanitarian activists and NGOs just trying to save people’s lives,” said Bill Van Esveld, who researched the case for HRW.

    While the Lesvos prosecutor could not be reached for comment, the Greek police said in a statement after Mardini’s arrest that she and other aid workers were “active in the systematic facilitation of illegal entrance of foreigners” – a violation of the country’s Migration Code.

    Mardini spent 108 days in pre-trial detention before being released on bail at the beginning of December. The case against her is still open. Her lawyer expects news on what will happen next in June or July. If convicted, Mardini could be sentenced to up to 25 years in prison.

    “It seems like a bad joke, and a scary one as well because of what the implications are for humanitarian activists and NGOs just trying to save people’s lives.”

    Return to Lesvos

    The arrest and pending trial are the latest in a series of events, starting with the beginning of the Syrian war in 2011, that have disrupted any sense of normalcy in Mardini’s life.

    Even after making it to Germany in 2015, Mardini never really settled in. She was 20 years old and in an unfamiliar city. The secure world she grew up in had been destroyed, and the future felt like a blank and confusing canvas. “I missed Syria and Damascus and just this warmness in everything,” she said.

    While wading through these emotions, Mardini received a Facebook message in 2016 from an ERCI volunteer. The swimming sisters from Syria who saved a boat full of refugees were an inspiration. Volunteers on Lesvos told their story to children on the island to give them hope for the future, the volunteer said, inviting Mardini to visit. “It totally touched my heart,” Mardini recalled. “Somebody saw me as a hope… and there is somebody asking for my help.”

    So Mardini flew back to Lesvos in August 2016. Just one year earlier she had nearly died trying to reach the island, before enduring a journey across the Balkans that involved hiding from police officers in forests, narrowly escaping being kidnapped, sneaking across tightly controlled borders, and spending a night in police custody in a barn. Now, all it took was a flight to retrace the route.

    Her first day on the island, Mardini was trained to help refugees disembark safely when their boats reached the shores. By nighttime, she was sitting on the beach watching for approaching vessels. It was past midnight, and the sea was calm. Lights from the Turkish coastline twinkled serenely across the water. After about half an hour, a walkie talkie crackled. The Greek Coast Guard had spotted a boat.

    Volunteers switched on the headlights of their cars, giving the refugees something to aim for. Thin lines of silver from the reflective strips on the refugees’ life jackets glinted in the darkness, and the rumble of a motor and chatter of voices drifted across the water. As the boat came into view, volunteers yelled: “You are in Greece. You are safe. Turn the engine off.”

    Mardini was in the water again, holding the boat steady, helping people disembark. When the rush of activity ended, a feeling of guilt washed over her. “I felt it was unfair that they were on a refugee boat and I’m a rescuer,” she said.

    But Mardini was hooked. She spent the next two weeks assisting with boat landings and teaching swimming lessons to the kids who idolised her and her sister. Even after returning to Germany, she couldn’t stop thinking about Lesvos. “I decided to come back for one month,” she said, “and I never left.”
    Moria camp

    The island became the centre of Mardini’s life. She put her studies at Bard College Berlin on hold to spend more time in Greece. “I found what I love,” she explained.

    Meanwhile, the situation on the Greek islands was changing. In 2017, just under 30,000 people crossed the Aegean Sea to Greece, compared to some 850,000 in 2015. There were fewer arrivals, but those who did come were spending more time in camps with dismal conditions.

    “You have people who are dying and living in a four-metre tent with seven relatives. They have limited access to water. Hygiene is zero. Privacy is zero. Security: zero. Children’s rights: zero. Human rights: zero… You feel useless. You feel very useless.”

    The volunteer response shifted accordingly, towards the camps, and when TNH visited Mardini she moved around the island with a sense of purpose and familiarity, joking with other volunteers and greeting refugees she knew from her work in the streets.

    Much of her time was spent as a translator for ERCI’s medical team in Moria. The camp, the main one on Lesvos, was built to accommodate around 3,000 people, but by 2018 housed close to 9,000. Streams of sewage ran between tents. People were forced to stand in line for hours for food. The wait to see a doctor could take months, and conditions were causing intense psychological strain. Self-harm and suicide attempts were increasing, especially among children, and sexual and gender-based violence were commonplace.

    Mardini was on the front lines. “What we do in Moria is fighting the fire,” she said. “You have people who are dying and living in a four-metre tent with seven relatives. They have limited access to water. Hygiene is zero. Privacy is zero. Security: zero. Children’s rights: zero. Human rights: zero… You feel useless. You feel very useless.”

    By then, Mardini had been on Lesvos almost continuously for nine months, and it was taking a toll. She seemed to be weighed down, slipping into long moments of silence. “I’m taking in. I’m taking in. I’m taking in. But it’s going to come out at some point,” she said.

    It was time for a break. Mardini had decided to return to Berlin at the end of the month to resume her studies and make an effort to invest in her life there. But she planned to remain connected to Lesvos. “I love this island… the sad thing is that it’s not nice for everybody. Others see it as just a jail.”
    Investigation and Arrest

    The airport on Lesvos is on the shoreline close to where Mardini helped with the boat landing her first night as a volunteer. On 21 August, when she went to check in for her flight to Berlin, she was surrounded by five Greek police officers. “They kind of circled around me, and they said that I should come with [them],” Mardini recalled.

    Mardini knew that the police on Lesvos had been investigating her and some of the other volunteers from ERCI, but at first she still didn’t realise what was happening. Seven months earlier, in February 2018, she was briefly detained with a volunteer named Sean Binder, a German national. They had been driving one of ERCI’s 4X4s when police stopped them, searched the vehicle, and found Greek military license plates hidden under the civilian plates.

    When Mardini was arrested at the airport, Binder turned himself in too, and the police released a statement saying they were investigating 30 people – six Greeks and 24 foreigners – for involvement in “organised migrant trafficking rings”. Two Greek nationals, including ERCI’s founder, were also arrested at the time.

    While it is still not clear what the plates were doing on the vehicle, according Van Esveld from HRW, “it does seem clear… neither Sarah or Sean had any idea that these plates were [there]”.

    The felony charges against Mardini and Binder were ultimately unconnected to the plates, and HRW’s Van Esveld said the police work appears to either have been appallingly shoddy or done in bad faith. HRW took the unusual step of commenting on the ongoing case because it appeared authorities were “literally just [taking] a humanitarian activity and labelling it as a crime”, he added.
    Detention

    After two weeks in a cell on Lesvos, Mardini was sent to a prison in Athens. On the ferry ride to the mainland, her hands were shackled. That’s when it sank in: “Ok, it’s official,” she thought. “They’re transferring me to jail.”

    In prison, Mardini was locked in a cell with eight other women from 8pm to 8am. During the day, she would go to Greek classes and art classes, drink coffee with other prisoners, and watch the news.

    She was able to make phone calls, and her mother, who was also granted asylum in Germany, came to visit a number of times. “The first time we saw each other we just broke down in tears,” Mardini recalled. It had been months since they’d seen each other, and now they could only speak for 20 minutes, separated by a plastic barrier.

    Most of the time, Mardini just read, finishing more than 40 books, including Nelson Mandela’s autobiography, which helped her come to terms with her situation. “I decided this is my life right now, and I need to get something out of it,” she explained. “I just accepted what’s going on.”

    People can be held in pre-trial detention for up to 18 months in Greece. But at the beginning of December, a judge accepted Mardini’s lawyer’s request for bail. Binder was released the same day.
    Lingering fear

    On Lesvos, where everyone in the volunteer community knows each other, the case came as a shock. “People started to be... scared,” said Claudia Drost, a 23-year-old from the Netherlands and close friend of Mardini’s who started volunteering on the island in 2016. “There was a feeling of fear that if the police… put [Mardini] in prison, they can put anyone in prison.”

    “We are standing [up] for what we are doing because we are saving people and we are helping people.”

    That feeling was heightened by the knowledge that humanitarians across Europe were being charged with crimes for helping refugees and migrants.

    During the height of the migration crisis in Europe, between the fall of 2015 and winter 2016, some 300 people were arrested in Denmark on charges related to helping refugees. In August 2016, French farmer Cédric Herrou was arrested for helping migrants and asylum seekers cross the French-Italian border. In October 2017, 12 people were charged with facilitating illegal migration in Belgium for letting asylum seekers stay in their homes and use their cellphones. And last June, the captain of a search and rescue boat belonging to the German NGO Mission Lifeline was arrested in Malta and charged with operating the vessel without proper registration or license.

    Drost said that after Mardini was released the fear faded a bit, but still lingers. There is also a sense of defiance. “We are standing [up] for what we are doing because we are saving people and we are helping people,” Drost said.

    As for Mardini, the charges have forced her to disengage from humanitarian work on Lesvos, at least until the case is over. She is back in Berlin and has started university again. “I think because I’m not in Lesvos anymore I’m just finding it very good to be here,” she said. “I’m kind of in a stable moment just to reflect about my life and what I want to do.”

    But she also knows the stability could very well be fleeting. With the prospect of more time in prison hanging over her, the future is still a blank canvas. People often ask if she is optimistic about the case. “No,” she said. “In the first place, they put me in… jail.”

    https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/feature/2019/05/02/refugee-volunteer-prisoner-sarah-mardini-and-europe-s-hardening-
    #criminalisation #délit_de_solidarité #asile #migrations #solidarité #réfugiés #Grèce #Lesbos #Moria #camps_de_réfugiés #Europe

    Avec une frise chronologique:

    ping @reka

    • Demand the charges against Sarah and Seán are dropped

      In Greece, you can go to jail for trying to save a life. It happened to Seán Binder, 25, and Sarah Mardini, 24, when they helped to spot refugee boats in distress. They risk facing up to 25 years in prison.

      Sarah and Seán met when they volunteered together as trained rescue workers in Lesvos, Greece. Sarah is a refugee from Syria. Her journey to Europe made international news - she and her sister saved 18 people by dragging their drowning boat to safety. Seán Binder is a son of a Vietnamese refugee. They couldn’t watch refugees drown and do nothing.

      Their humanitarian work saved lives, but like many others across Europe, they are being criminalised for helping refugees. The pair risk facing up to 25 years in prison on ‘people smuggling’ charges. They already spent more than 100 days in prison before being released on bail in December 2018.

      “Humanitarian work isn’t criminal, nor is it heroic. Helping others should be normal. The real people who are suffering and dying are those already fleeing persecution." Seán Binder

      Criminalising humanitarian workers and abandoning refugees at sea won’t stop refugees crossing the sea, but it will cause many more deaths.

      Solidarity is not a crime. Call on the Greek authorities to:

      Drop the charges against Sarah Mardini and Seán Binder
      Publicly acknowledge the legitimacy of humanitarian work which supports refugee and migrant rights

      https://www.amnesty.org/en/get-involved/write-for-rights/?viewCampaign=48221

  • The Terrifying Potential of the 5G Network | The New Yorker
    https://www.newyorker.com/news/annals-of-communications/the-terrifying-potential-of-the-5g-network

    Two words explain the difference between our current wireless networks and 5G: speed and latency. 5G—if you believe the hype—is expected to be up to a hundred times faster. (A two-hour movie could be downloaded in less than four seconds.) That speed will reduce, and possibly eliminate, the delay—the latency—between instructing a computer to perform a command and its execution. This, again, if you believe the hype, will lead to a whole new Internet of Things, where everything from toasters to dog collars to dialysis pumps to running shoes will be connected. Remote robotic surgery will be routine, the military will develop hypersonic weapons, and autonomous vehicles will cruise safely along smart highways. The claims are extravagant, and the stakes are high. One estimate projects that 5G will pump twelve trillion dollars into the global economy by 2035, and add twenty-two million new jobs in the United States alone. This 5G world, we are told, will usher in a fourth industrial revolution.

    A totally connected world will also be especially susceptible to cyberattacks. Even before the introduction of 5G networks, hackers have breached the control center of a municipal dam system, stopped an Internet-connected car as it travelled down an interstate, and sabotaged home appliances. Ransomware, malware, crypto-jacking, identity theft, and data breaches have become so common that more Americans are afraid of cybercrime than they are of becoming a victim of violent crime. Adding more devices to the online universe is destined to create more opportunities for disruption. “5G is not just for refrigerators,” Spalding said. “It’s farm implements, it’s airplanes, it’s all kinds of different things that can actually kill people or that allow someone to reach into the network and direct those things to do what they want them to do. It’s a completely different threat that we’ve never experienced before.”

    Spalding’s solution, he told me, was to build the 5G network from scratch, incorporating cyber defenses into its design.

    There are very good reasons to keep a company that appears to be beholden to a government with a documented history of industrial cyber espionage, international data theft, and domestic spying out of global digital networks. But banning Huawei hardware will not secure those networks. Even in the absence of Huawei equipment, systems still may rely on software developed in China, and software can be reprogrammed remotely by malicious actors. And every device connected to the fifth-generation Internet will likely remain susceptible to hacking. According to James Baker, the former F.B.I. general counsel who runs the national-security program at the R Street Institute, “There’s a concern that those devices that are connected to the 5G network are not going to be very secure from a cyber perspective. That presents a huge vulnerability for the system, because those devices can be turned into bots, for example, and you can have a massive botnet that can be used to attack different parts of the network.”

    This past January, Tom Wheeler, who was the F.C.C. chairman during the Obama Administration, published an Op-Ed in the New York Times titled “If 5G Is So Important, Why Isn’t It Secure?” The Trump Administration had walked away from security efforts begun during Wheeler’s tenure at the F.C.C.; most notably, in recent negotiations over international standards, the U.S. eliminated a requirement that the technical specifications of 5G include cyber defense. “For the first time in history,” Wheeler wrote, “cybersecurity was being required as a forethought in the design of a new network standard—until the Trump F.C.C. repealed it.” The agency also rejected the notion that companies building and running American digital networks were responsible for overseeing their security. This might have been expected, but the current F.C.C. does not consider cybersecurity to be a part of its domain, either. “I certainly did when we were in office,” Wheeler told me. “But the Republicans who were on the commission at that point in time, and are still there, one being the chairman, opposed those activities as being overly regulatory.”

    Opening up new spectrum is crucial to achieving the super-fast speeds promised by 5G. Most American carriers are planning to migrate their services to a higher part of the spectrum, where the bands are big and broad and allow for colossal rivers of data to flow through them. (Some carriers are also working with lower-spectrum frequencies, where the speeds will not be as fast but likely more reliable.) Until recently, these high-frequency bands, which are called millimetre waves, were not available for Internet transmission, but advances in antenna technology have made it possible, at least in theory. In practice, millimetre waves are finicky: they can only travel short distances—about a thousand feet—and are impeded by walls, foliage, human bodies, and, apparently, rain.

    Deploying millions of wireless relays so close to one another and, therefore, to our bodies has elicited its own concerns. Two years ago, a hundred and eighty scientists and doctors from thirty-six countries appealed to the European Union for a moratorium on 5G adoption until the effects of the expected increase in low-level radiation were studied. In February, Senator Richard Blumenthal, a Democrat from Connecticut, took both the F.C.C. and F.D.A. to task for pushing ahead with 5G without assessing its health risks. “We’re kind of flying blind here,” he concluded. A system built on millions of cell relays, antennas, and sensors also offers previously unthinkable surveillance potential. Telecom companies already sell location data to marketers, and law enforcement has used similar data to track protesters. 5G will catalogue exactly where someone has come from, where they are going, and what they are doing. “To give one made-up example,” Steve Bellovin, a computer-science professor at Columbia University, told the Wall Street Journal, “might a pollution sensor detect cigarette smoke or vaping, while a Bluetooth receiver picks up the identities of nearby phones? Insurance companies might be interested.” Paired with facial recognition and artificial intelligence, the data streams and location capabilities of 5G will make anonymity a historical artifact.

    To accommodate these limitations, 5G cellular relays will have to be installed inside buildings and on every city block, at least. Cell relays mounted on thirteen million utility poles, for example, will deliver 5G speeds to just over half of the American population, and cost around four hundred billion dollars to install. Rural communities will be out of luck—too many trees, too few people—despite the F.C.C.’s recently announced Rural Digital Opportunity Fund.

    Deploying millions of wireless relays so close to one another and, therefore, to our bodies has elicited its own concerns. Two years ago, a hundred and eighty scientists and doctors from thirty-six countries appealed to the European Union for a moratorium on 5G adoption until the effects of the expected increase in low-level radiation were studied. In February, Senator Richard Blumenthal, a Democrat from Connecticut, took both the F.C.C. and F.D.A. to task for pushing ahead with 5G without assessing its health risks. “We’re kind of flying blind here,” he concluded. A system built on millions of cell relays, antennas, and sensors also offers previously unthinkable surveillance potential. Telecom companies already sell location data to marketers, and law enforcement has used similar data to track protesters. 5G will catalogue exactly where someone has come from, where they are going, and what they are doing. “To give one made-up example,” Steve Bellovin, a computer-science professor at Columbia University, told the Wall Street Journal, “might a pollution sensor detect cigarette smoke or vaping, while a Bluetooth receiver picks up the identities of nearby phones? Insurance companies might be interested.” Paired with facial recognition and artificial intelligence, the data streams and location capabilities of 5G will make anonymity a historical artifact.

    #Surveillance #Santé #5G #Cybersécurité

  • Spain’s Far-right Vox Received Almost $1M from ’Marxist-Islamist’ Iranian Exiles: Report | News | teleSUR English
    https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Spains-Far-right-Vox-Received-Almost-1M-from-Marxist-Islamist-Irania

    It is unlikely that Vox’s hyper-nationalist voters know that their party scored a significant presence in Spain’s parliament mostly thanks to Zionists, Islamists and foreigners.

    With the April 28 general elections in Spain over, the far-right party Vox gained about 10 percent of parliamentary seats, marking the far-right’s rising comeback into politics four decades after Francisco Franco’s dictatorship. While a less alarmist reading would say that the far-right was always there, hidden in the conservative People’s Party (PP), the fact that they are out in the open strengthens Europe’s wave of far-right xenophobic and anti-European advance.

    The party appealed to voters in one of Spain’s most contested elections since its return to democracy, mostly basing its arguments against leftists politics, social liberals, migrants, charged mainly with an Islamophobic narrative. Emphasizing the return of a long lost Spain and pushing to fight what they refer to as an “Islamist invasion,” which is the “enemy of Europe.” One could summarize it as an Iberian version of “Make Spain Great Again.”

    Yet while this definitely appealed to almost two million voters, many are unaware of where their party’s initial funding came from. Back in January 2019, an investigation made by the newspaper El Pais revealed, through leaked documents, that almost one million euros - approximately 80 percent of its 2014 campaign funding - donated to Vox between its founding in December 2013 and the European Parliament elections in May 2014 came via the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), a self-declared “Marxist” organization and an Islamist group made up of Iranian exiles.

    However, this is where things get complicated. The NCRI is based in France and was founded in 1981 by Massoud Rajavi and Abolhassan Banisadr, nowadays its president-elect is Maryam Rajavi (Massoud’s wife). The Rajavis are also the leaders of the Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK). A reason for many to believe that the NCRI is just a front for the MEK, which over the past few decades has managed to create a complicated web of anti-Iranian, pro-Israel and right-wing government support from all over the world.

    To understand MEK, it’s necessary to review the 1953 U.S. and British-backed coup which ousted democratically elected prime minister of Iran Mohammad Mosaddegh and instituted a monarchical dictatorship led by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

    The oppression carried out by the Pahlavi royal family led to the creation of many radical groups, one which was MEK, whose ideology combined Marxism and Islamism. Its original anti-west, especially anti-U.S. sentiment pushed for the killing of six U.S citizens in Iran in the 1970s. While in 1979, they enthusiastically cheered the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran. After the Iranian Revolution, its young leaders, including Rajavi, pushed for endorsement from the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, but were denied.

    So Rajavi, allied with the winner of the country’s first presidential election, Abolhassan Banisadr, who was not an ally of Khomeini, either. Soon Banisadr and MEK became some of Khomeini’s main opposition figures and had fled to Iraq and later to France.

    In the neighboring country, MEK allied with Sadam Hussein to rage war against Iran. In a RAND report, allegations of the group’s complicity with Saddam are corroborated by press reports that quote Maryam Rajavi encouraging MEK members to “take the Kurds under your tanks, and save your bullets for the Iranian Revolutionary Guards."

    The organization was deemed a terrorist organization by the U.S. and European Union for the better part of the 1990s, but things changed after the U.S. invasion to Iraq in 2003. This is when the U.S. neoconservative strategist leading the Department of State and the intelligence agencies saw MEK as an asset rather than a liability. Put simply in words they applied the dictum of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”

    The U.S.’s dismissal of past crimes reinvigorated MEK’s intense lobbying campaign to have itself removed from terrorist lists in the U.S. and the European Union. MEK, which by the beginning of the 21 century had morphed into a cult-like group according to many testimonies from dissidents, moved from Camp Ashraf to the U.S-created Camp Liberty outside of Baghdad. And that’s when things rapidly changed.

    According to the Guardian, between 2007 and 2012, a number of Iranian nuclear scientists were attacked. In 2012, NBC News, citing two unnamed U.S. officials, reported that the attacks were planned by Israel’s Mossad and executed by MEK operatives inside Iran. By 2009 and 2012, the EU and the U.S. respectively took it out of its terrorist organizations list.

    Soon after it gained support from U.S. politicians like Rudy Giuliani and current National Security Advisor John Bolton, who now call MEK a legitimate opposition to the current Iranian government. As the U.S. neocon forefathers did before, MEK shed its “Marxism.” After the U.S.’s official withdrawal from Iraq, they built MEK a safe have in Albania, near Tirana, where the trail of money can be followed once again.

    Hassan Heyrani, a former member of MEK’s political department who defected in 2018, and handled parts of the organization’s finances in Iraq, when asked by Foreign Policy where he thought the money for MEK came from, he answered: “Saudi Arabia. Without a doubt.” For another former MEK member, Saadalah Saafi, the organization’s money definitely comes from wealthy Arab states that oppose Iran’s government.

    “Mojahedin [MEK] are the tool, not the funders. They aren’t that big. They facilitate,” Massoud Khodabandeh, who once served in the MEK’s security department told Foreign Policy. “You look at it and say, ‘Oh, Mojahedin are funding [Vox].’ No, they are not. The ones that are funding that party are funding Mojahedin as well.”

    Meanwhile, Danny Yatom, the former head of the Mossad, told the Jersulamen Post that Israel can implement some of its anti-Iran plans through MEK if a war were to break out. Saudi Arabia’s state-run television channels have given friendly coverage to the MEK, and Prince Turki al-Faisal, Saudi Arabia’s former intelligence chief, even appeared in July 2016 at a MEK rally in Paris.

    With Israel and Saudi Arabia backing MEK, the question of why a far-right movement would take money from an Islamist organization clears up a bit. Israel’s support of European far-right parties has been public. In 2010, a sizeable delegation arrived in Tel Aviv, consisting of some 30 leaders of the European Alliance for Freedom, gathering leaders such as Geert Wilders of the Netherlands, Philip Dewinter from Belgium and Jorg Haider’s successor, Heinz-Christian Strache, from Austria.

    Yet for the U.S., Israel, and Saudi Arabia, MEK represents an anti-Iranian voice that they so desperately need, and that on the surface didn’t come from them directly. It is unlikely that Vox’s hyper-nationalist voters know that their party scored a significant presence in Spain’s parliament mostly thanks to Zionists, Islamists and foreigners.

    #Espagne #extrême_droite #Israël #Iran #Arabie_Saoudite #OMPI #Albanie

  • From Bosnia and Herzegovina a video showing seven adults and five children detained in cage-like detention cells in #Klobuk near #Trebinje as part of the #International_Border_Crossing (#MGP) was published. It is terrifying to read the official statement of the BiH Border Police, where they state how all is in line with EU standards- we must ask whether inhumane and humiliating treatment of people who migrate is an EU standard?

    #Bosnie #Bosnie-Herzégovine #Monténégro #frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #route_des_Balkans #Balkans

    –-> signalé par Inicijativa Dobrodosli, via leur mailing-list (29.04.2019)

    Held in a cage?!

    We have received footage and photos displaying two detained families after they were pushed back in the border area between Bosnia and Herzegovina with Montenegro, Klobuk border crossing near Trebinje.


    Video and the photos show people being held in cage-like detention cells, previously also seen and mentioned with the case of the Houssiny family. There were reportedly 7 adults and 5 children among the detained people. The youngest is 3 years old.

    They were detained in this way and stayed over night. However, the authorities claim everything is “by the book” and in accordance with the EU standards.

    They say since the border crossing where people were later taken to is not a firm building, they have no barred rooms to detain people, so they use this — ironically funded by the European Commission — in order to “provide daylight” to the people and they stress the people were not locked inside.

    Either way, the question remains — is this the standard and a collective decision to treat and detain currently the most vulnerable group in the planet, refugees?

    Will anyone finally bring into question and condemn the methods and current human rights breaking detention and push back practice?

    https://medium.com/are-you-syrious/ays-daily-digest-23-4-19-weekend-of-violent-push-backs-from-croatia-and-bosn

    Lien vers la vidéo:
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T4YAoBPGBHw


    #cages #cage #vidéo #animalisation #brutalisation

    • In our neighbouring country Bosnia and Herzegovina, the local authorities consider volunteers to disturb public order and peace by helping migrants. As a result, the work of some of them has been banned - you can read more about it in this article: https://www.telegram.hr/politika-kriminal/vlasti-bih-smatraju-da-volonteri-remete-javni-red-i-mir-tako-sto-pomazu-mig. This is the last example of the criminalization of solidarity work, yet it’s not the only one: nowadays Europe is becoming more and more a place of repression towards those who are willing to oppose hate speech and intolerance, promoting and everyday practicing solidarity. You can read more about it in this article: http://novilist.hr/Komentari/Kolumne/Pronadena-zemlja-Borisa-Pavelica/BORIS-PAVELIC-Brigade-bespomocnih?meta_refresh=true.

      Reçu via la mailing-list Inicijativa Dobrodošli, le 31.05.2019

    • Migrants dying in Bosnia: Red Cross

      Thousands of migrants and refugees are stranded in Bosnia on their way to Western Europe. They are in desperate need of humanitarian assistance. The international Red Cross says some have died while trying to find shelter.

      About 6,000 people have entered Bosnia and Herzegovina since the start of the year, according to the country’s security agencies. But all the transit centers, which can accommodate around 3,500 people, are full, forcing thousands to sleep rough.

      “People are sleeping in parks, in carparks, on the footpath, and in dangerous buildings,” said Indira Kulenovic, operations manager for the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) in Bosnia.

      “A few weeks ago, three migrants sheltering in an abandoned building burned to death when a candle they were using caused a fire. Soon after, another fell from the top floor of a building he was sheltering in. Psychological stress among migrants is high – just last week one man set himself on fire in desperation,” Kulenovic said.

      ‘Humanitarian crisis’

      Bosnia is on the route of thousands of people from Asia and North Africa who try to enter Europe via neighboring Croatia, an EU member state. Last year, about 25,000 people entered Bosnia from Serbia and Montenegro.

      Mobile teams from the Bosnian Red Cross society have been handing out food, water, clothes, blankets and first aid to the migrants, as well as trying to provide psychological support.

      Red Cross workers are also distributing information about active landmine fields to warn people of the dangers of unexploded bombs. Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the most landmine-contaminated countries in Europe.

      The Red Cross is working in five migrant centers across the country providing meals for 3,000 people a day, as well as clothing, bedding, tents and first aid. Meanwhile, the UN migration agency, IOM, is providing food supplies.

      Despite their efforts, the head of the Bosnian Red Cross, Rajko Lazic, says living conditions for many people remain inadequate in the centers and worse for those outside. “The situation has reached a critical point. This is a humanitarian crisis,” Lazic said.

      Disease outbreaks

      In migrant reception centers, overcrowding has led to an increase in infectious diseases. The Bosnian health minister, Nermina Cemalovic, said on 15 May there were 800 cases of scabies in transit centers in Bihac, one of the western towns where migrants are concentrated.

      Health workers have also been trying to prevent an outbreak of measles after aid workers were hospitalized with the disease.

      “We are extremely concerned for people on the move in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” the IFRC’s Kulenovic said. “They are arriving in poor condition, and many, including children, have walked for weeks. They are hungry, exhausted, sick and cold and traumatized by their journeys. The recent wet weather has just made their journeys worse.”

      Kulenovic added that the local population was also suffering from the pressure that extra numbers had put on services, land and property. The IFRC and the Red Cross Society of Bosnia aim to provide food, first aid and other assistance to 7,600 of the most vulnerable migrants as well as cash grants for 1,500 host families during 2019.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/17218/migrants-dying-in-bosnia-red-cross?ref=tw
      #mourir_en_Bosnie #morts #décès #Kljuc #OIM #IOM #Croix-Route

  • The human rights monitoring ship #Mare_Liberum is being prevented from leaving port.
    Press release 29th of april 2019

    The Berlin based non-governmental organization (NGO) Mare Liberum e.V. conducts human rights monitoring in the Aegean Sea to draw attention to the deadly sea route between Turkey and Greece. The aim is to strengthen solidarity and promote fundamental human rights.

    Germany’s Federal Ministry of Transportation (Bundesverkehrsministeriums) sent an order of suspension for the ship Mare Liberum to the German association of traffic and transportation (Berufsgenossenschaft Verkehr)—which handles the registration, licenses and flags for ships—to further scrutinize civil rescue vessels in the Mediterranean Sea.

    “The ministry of transportation, led by the conservative Christian Social Union (CSU) politician Andreas Scheuer, apparently wants to perfidiously prevent any civil presence in the Mediterranean Sea to document human rights violations and the effects of the European Union’s deadly border policy. We are urging for an accelerated response to repeal the decision,” says Hanno Bruchmann, spokesperson for Mare Liberum e.V.

    The suspension order presupposes that Mare Liberum is a rescue ship which should be classified in the same category as commercial freightliner and not, as hitherto customary, as a sport and leisure boat.

    The crew on Mare Liberum observes—without pay and in their spare time—the human rights situation in the Aegean Sea. With Mare Liberum’s presence on the water, authorities should be more inclined to rescue refugees and migrants and adhere to basic human rights standards while doing so. The ship Mare Liberum was never operated as a freightliner; nevertheless, the authorities incorrectly compare the 1917 built fishing boat which was converted to a houseboat in 1964 as a ship holding containers or tank vessels. The classification of Mare Liberum as a commercial vessel imposes equipment requirements that cannot be fulfilled by Mare Liberum.

    “The claim that we operate a freightliner leaves us stunned. It is an insult to our volunteers that our dedication for human rights is not recognized,” said Bruchmann.

    https://mare-liberum.org/user/pages/09.presse/Mare%20Liberum%201.jpeg
    https://mare-liberum.org/en/presse

    #ONG #sauvetage #asile #migrations #Méditerranée #réfugiés

    Ajouté à la métaliste ici:
    https://seenthis.net/messages/706177

    • Mare Liberum interdit de mission d’observation des frontières maritimes

      Lesbos, Grèce : Les autorités allemandes ont interdit le départ du port du bateau humanitaire Mare Liberum (https://mare-liberum.org/en/our-mission), démontrant ainsi une énième fois que la politique de l’UE repose sur la pénalisation de la solidarité. Voir leur communiqué de presse (https://mare-liberum.org/en/presse).

      Le bateau Mare Liberum se trouve à Lesbos pour une mission de « surveillance des droits humains en Egée » ; l’équipage est chargé de vérifier si les autorités respectent bien la législation lors de l’arrivée des bateaux de réfugiés. C’est une mission d’observation qui concernent toute opération violente qui pourraient y avoir lieu- refoulement illégals, sabottages de bateau, etc- soit de la part des forces militaires turques, soit de la part des forces européennes qui patrouillent dans la région. Le gouvernement allemand justifie sa décision par un raisonnement fallacieux : il met en avant le fait que le bateau n’est pas équipé pour mener des opérations de sauvetage, ce qui n’est point sa mission. Par contre pour une opération de surveillance la certification d’un bateau de plaisance dont Mare Liberum est doté est largement suffisante. Mais, comme au large de la Libye, au large de Lesbos aussi, il ne faut pas qu’il y ait des observateurs internationaux, c’est-à-dire des témoins des crimes qui pourraient y avoir lieu.

      Au moment où Mare Liberum reste immobilisé au port, le bateau Open arms de l’ONG espagnole Proactiva est interdit d’accoster à Lesbos : il a été forcé de mouiller au large, à l’extérieur du port de Lesbos, avec à son bord 20 tonnes d’aide humanitaires pour les réfugiés en attente d’être déchargés. Il s’agit de l’opération décrite par l’InfoMigrants ici : https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/16402/spanish-ngos-to-deliver-aid-supplies-to-greek-islands.

      Open arms, après une opération de sauvetage en Méditéranée, a été immobilisé au port de Barcelone par les autorités espagnoles pendant 100 jours, avant de recevoir l’autorisation de naviguer, non plus pour des opérations de sauvetage cette fois-ci, mais pour transporter l’aide humanitaire récoltée par plusieurs ONG aux réfugiés confinés aux îles grecques.

      La cargaison était initialement destinée en partie au hot-spot de Samos où les autorités portuaires ont aussi interdit au bateau l’accès au port. A Lesbos, ce sont les douaniers qui ont stoppé le déchargement de l’aide humanitaire, pour vérifier la conformité des certificats qui l’accompagne. Ainsi pour l’instant l’aide humanitaire dont plusieurs tonnes de médicaments reste bloquée au bord du bateau. C’est la troisième fois dans un mois qu’un bateau humanitaire –soit transportant de l’aide humanitaire, soit en mission d’observation- est empêché de mener à bien sa mission : il y a quelques semaines, la présidente de la région nord de la mer Egée Mme Christiania Kaloghirou avait protesté contre le déchargement d’aide humanitaire par un bateau espagnol. Il s’agit très probablement du bateau Alta Mari, également en mission humanitaire dans la région voir ici : https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/16715/hoping-to-help-the-long-journey-of-a-spanish-rescue-ship-banned-from-r

      –---------

      Communiqué de presse :

      Press release Mare Liberum 29th of april 2019

      The human rights monitoring ship Mare Liberum is being prevented from leaving port.

      The Berlin based non-governmental organization (NGO) Mare Liberum e.V. conducts human rights monitoring in the Aegean Sea to draw attention to the deadly sea route between Turkey and Greece. The aim is to strengthen solidarity and promote fundamental human rights.

      Germany’s Federal Ministry of Transportation (Bundesverkehrsministeriums) sent an order of suspension for the ship Mare Liberum to the German association of traffic and transportation (Berufsgenossenschaft Verkehr)—which handles the registration, licenses and flags for ships—to further scrutinize civil rescue vessels in the Mediterranean Sea.

      “The ministry of transportation, led by the conservative Christian Social Union (CSU) politician Andreas Scheuer, apparently wants to perfidiously prevent any civil presence in the Mediterranean Sea to document human rights violations and the effects of the European Union’s deadly border policy. We are urging for an accelerated response to repeal the decision,” says Hanno Bruchmann, spokesperson for Mare Liberum e.V.

      The suspension order presupposes that Mare Liberum is a rescue ship which should be classified in the same category as commercial freightliner and not, as hitherto customary, as a sport and leisure boat.

      The crew on Mare Liberum observes—without pay and in their spare time—the human rights situation in the Aegean Sea. With Mare Liberum’s presence on the water, authorities should be more inclined to rescue refugees and migrants and adhere to basic human rights standards while doing so. The ship Mare Liberum was never operated as a freightliner; nevertheless, the authorities incorrectly compare the 1917 built fishing boat which was converted to a houseboat in 1964 as a ship holding containers or tank vessels. The classification of Mare Liberum as a commercial vessel imposes equipment requirements that cannot be fulfilled by Mare Liberum.

      “The claim that we operate a freightliner leaves us stunned. It is an insult to our volunteers that our dedication for human rights is not recognized,” said Bruchmann.

      contact: press@mare-liberum.org

    • Open Letter from U.S. and Global Sociologists in Support of Brazilian Sociology Departments

      On April 25th, Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, along with his Minister of Education, Abraham Weintraub, declared the government’s intent to “decentralize investments in philosophy and sociology” within public universities, and to shift financial support to “areas that give immediate returns to taxpayers, such as veterinary science, engineering, and medicine.”

      As professors, lecturers, graduate students, post-doctoral fellows, and other scholars in sociology and related disciplines at colleges and universities in the United States and worldwide, we write to declare our unwavering support for continued funding for sociology programs at Brazilian universities. We oppose President Bolsonaro’s attempt to disinvest in sociology, or any other program in the humanities or social sciences.

      As historical and contemporary sociologists, we understand that the decades-long marketization of higher education has convinced many politicians - in Brazil, in the United States, and globally - that a university education is valuable only insofar as it is immediately profitable. We reject this premise.

      The purpose of higher education is not to produce “immediate returns” on investments. The purpose of higher education must always be to produce an educated, enriched society that benefits from the collective endeavor to create human knowledge. Higher education is a purpose in and of itself.

      An education in the full range of the arts and sciences is the cornerstone of a liberal arts education. This is as true in Brazil as it is in the United States as it is in any country in the world.

      Brazilian sociology departments produce socially engaged and critical thinkers, both in Brazil and worldwide. Brazilian sociologists contribute to the global production of sociological knowledge. They are our colleagues within the discipline and within our shared departments and institutions. When sociologists from abroad conduct research or other academic work in Brazil, we are welcomed by Brazilian sociologists and by their departments. Many of our own students receive world-class training in sociology at Brazilian universities.

      President Bolsonaro’s intent to defund sociology programs is an affront to the discipline, to the academy, and, most broadly, to the human pursuit of knowledge. This proposal is ill-conceived, and violates principles of academic freedom that ought to be integral to systems of higher education in Brazil, in the United States, and across the globe. We urge the Brazilian government to reconsider its proposition.

      https://sites.google.com/g.harvard.edu/brazil-solidarity

    • Brazilian Government To Defund Philosophy in Public Universities

      Jair M. Bolsonaro, the current president of Brazil, has announced on Twitter his plans to stop government funding of philosophy and sociology in the nation’s public universities.

      A rough translation is: “The Minister of Education, Abraham Weintraub, is studying how to decentralize investment in philosophy and sociology at universities. Students who have already enrolled will not be affected. The objective is to focus on areas that generate immediate return to the taxpayer, such as: veterinary, engineering, and medicine.”

      By way of explanation, he added:

      Again, roughly translated, this says: “The role of the Government is to respect the taxpayer’s money, teaching young people to read, write, and learn job skills that generates income for the person and well-being for the family, which improves the society around them.”

      Those with more knowledge of the situation are encouraged to share what they know in the comments here, or by email to dailynouseditor@gmail.com.

      http://dailynous.com/2019/04/26/brazilian-government-defund-philosophy-public-universities

    • Le post de Rodrigo (reçu par email de @isskein):

      Some friends have written to ask about the Brazilian government’s announcement of an attack on the humanities (http://tiny.cc/d10t5y) –– and, very kindly, how/whether that affected me personally. As I thought other people might be interested, here’s a couple of things.
      Secondary things first: the decision, whatever it is, does not affect me directly, as PUC-Rio is thankfully under the jurisdiction of a rather more stable authority, the Vatican. (Well, the Jesuits, technically –– and let me tell you, one really comes to appreciate the charms of actual warrior priests when faced with the Holy Crusade LARPers we currently have in power.) Indirectly, however, this decision, whatever it is, can have effects across the board.

      “Whatever it is” is the main thing at this point. There is no decision as such yet, and the announcement is quite vague, possibly because, not having much of a clue how the state machine works, they still don’t know how to implement it. “Decentralising funds” doesn’t really mean anything, and public universities have autonomy to employ their resources, so “defunding the humanities” is not something Brasília can decide like that. What this can mean in the long run, however, is two things. One is something that has already been happening for a while and was already expected to get worse: a substantial cut in research funding across the board, but especially for the humanities. This does have an impact on non-public universities as well, or at least the few like PUC that do research, since the vast majority of research in Brazil is publicly funded, particularly in the humanities. The other thing, which was also expected to some extent, is that the new chancellors the government will pick for federal universities will be politically and ideologically aligned with it, and will implement this policy.

      It is worth pointing out that, because of the notoriously perverse way HE recruitment works in Brazil, the humanities tend to be the courses of choice for the students who went to the worst schools (read poor, black, brown, indigenous), as they’re easier to get into. So defunding the humanities is indirectly also a policy of restricting access to HE, reverting the positive trend of expansion established in the last two decades. With the economic crisis, of course, that reversal had already begun.

      Now, as for the context. This government’s ideological core is not just anti-intellectual, but made up of wannabe alt-right ideologues, conspiracy nuts and a bunch of ressentis who managed to square their belief in free competition with their utter failure in life by constructing the fantasy of a communist-globalist plot against the(ir) world. Less charmingly, they are historical revisionists (regarding the dictatorship, the Nazis, slavery...) and climate denialists. It is therefore in their interest to eliminate anything that refers to a reality other than the one they have fabricated or deals with the development of critical tools for analysing evidence. This extends to the war they are already waging against the state departments that deal with the census, statistics and applied research. The more they can make the world inaccessible by either fact or interpretation, the freer they are from the resistance imposed by reality –– including from the very possibility of statistically assessing the impact that their actions will have.

      Why now, though? Bolsonaro is too divisive and politically inept, his programme potentially too harmful, to build a stable majority. It’s still unclear whether he can deliver a pension reform, which is essential to ensure the continuing support of big capital, and his popularity rates have taken a considerable fall since January, especially among the poor. (See: https://tinyurl.com/yyl2kff7). He knows, on the other hand, that his greatest asset is a very engaged core base of true believers. US friends will be familiar with this behaviour from Trump: whenever the boat rocks, he will throw his base a bait, and this is mostly what this announcement is.

      Unlike Trump, Bolsonaro doesn’t even have economic recovery going for him, so if things remain as they are, we should expect him to become more divisive, and his support to become more unstable (in every sense). But there’s another political rationale to this attack specifically. As more poor people were making it into university, especially in the humanities, the left was also losing most of its direct presence in the peripheries and favelas. This means that this layer of the university-educated poor, who have increasingly taken on a protagonist role, have become central to any future left strategy in the country. This was the background from which hailed Marielle Franco, an object of especially vicious hate for Bolsonarismo, and in relation to whose death they still have serious questions to answer (https://tinyurl.com/y3btg54d).

      If you’re worried and you’d like to help, stay tuned to this story, stay in touch with colleagues in Brazil or in your countries/institutions who are doing stuff on Brazil, keep an eye on the news and be ready to call out reporting in your countries that normalises the absurdity of so much that’s going on. It might be a tad premature right now, but motions from union branch and professional association motions might be in a good order at some point; every little bit helps. It is likely that there’ll be opportunities in the future for putting pressure on foreign governments to get them to put pressure on Brazil to curb the worst impulses of this government. Several measures announced in these early months were retracted once there was some pushback, so that does not seem a far-fetched possibility. In the meantime, you might consider circulating this manifesto by 600 scientists from all over the world demanding that the EU hold Brazilian trade to minimal indigenous rights and environmental standards: https://science.sciencemag.org/content/364/6438/341.1. This is the kind of thing we’ll probably be seeing more of in the near future.

    • MEC bloqueia 30% do orçamento de três universidades federais; outras unidades também são atingidas

      Mãos de tesoura Entidades que monitoram o investimento no ensino superior detectaram novo bloqueio de verbas de instituições federais no fim de abril, após Abraham Weintraub assumir o Ministério da Educação. Cerca de R$ 230 milhões foram contingenciados.

      Mãos de tesoura 2 Várias unidades do país sofreram com o congelamento de valores previstos no orçamento de investimentos e outras despesas correntes, mas o volume da tesourada em três universidades chamou a atenção: a Federal da Bahia, a de Brasília e a Federal Fluminense.

      Mãos de tesoura 3 De acordo com números preliminares, o valor bloqueado nas três entidades corresponde a mais da metade do contingenciamento imposto a todas as universidades. Procurado, o MEC informou que UFBA, UnB e UFF tiveram 30% das dotações orçamentárias bloqueadas.

      Mãos de tesoura 4 Em nota, a pasta disse que “estuda os bloqueios de forma que nenhum programa seja prejudicado e que os recursos sejam utilizados da forma mais eficaz. O Programa de Assistência Estudantil não sofreu impacto em seu orçamento.”

      Verão passado Em 2018, a UFF foi palco de um rumoroso “ato contra o fascismo”, na reta final da eleição presidencial. Já a UnB foi palco recentemente de debates com Fernando Haddad (PT) e Guilherme Boulos (PSOL).

      https://outline.com/NwUD9a

    • British Philosophical Association Defends Philosophy in Brazil

      The Executive Committee of the British Philosophical Association (BPA) has issued a statement responding to Brazil’s president, Jair Bolsonaro, who last week proposed that federal funding for the study and teaching of philosophy and sociology be ended.


      The statement reads:
      The British Philosophical Association is highly alarmed by President Bolsonaro’s plans to remove funding from Philosophy and Sociology in Brazilian Universities. Such a move is not in Brazil’s interests – having well-funded, vibrant, internationally-connected philosophy and sociology departments is crucial to healthy universities and, by extension, to healthy societies. Philosophers, alongside colleagues in the humanities, arts and social sciences, have a crucial role in helping us to understand, question, invent and reinvent the communities, towns, cities, societies and economies in which we exist. They help us understand what is valuable and why. They help us understand the results and implications of the fruits of science and technology.

      The proposal to defund philosophy departments in Brazil is bad for philosophy as a worldwide discipline; philosophy directly benefits from the diversity of experiences of the people that contribute to it. Brazil has been home to generations of distinguished philosophy scholars: Paulo Freire, Oswaldo Chateaubriand, Newton da Costa, Walter Carnielli, Itala D’ottaviano, Vladimir Safatle, Ana Paula Cavalcanti Simioni to name but a few. Brazil’s philosophy departments attract visiting philosophers from all over the world to study alongside leading figures. Brazil’s universities have produced philosophers who have gone on to work at leading universities around the world; for example, Roberto Mangabeira Unger is Professor at Harvard Law School, and two of the three Editors-in-Chief of Synthese, one of the world’s top ranking philosophy journals, are Brazilian and trained at the University of Sao Paulo – Catarina Dutilh Novaes and Otavio Bueno.

      This move strikes a blow against academic freedom and freedom more broadly; while President Bolsonaro’s statements have been framed as an attempt to channel investment towards programmes of study which might provide shorter-term benefits to Brazil’s economy, the BPA note that authoritarian governments often attempt to silence philosophers and sociologists as a move to make it more difficult for people to express views critical of those in power. The British Philosophical Association calls on leaders around the world to urge President Bolsonaro to reconsider this move.

      http://dailynous.com/2019/05/01/british-philosophical-association-defends-philosophy-brazil

    • La direction du président Jair Bolsonaro (PSL) a bloqué les dernières heures de bourses d’études et de doctorat offertes par Capes (Coordination pour l’amélioration du personnel de l’enseignement supérieur).
      Selon les informations communiquées par les coordonnateurs de programme, les fonds inutilisés temporairement auraient été retirés du système d’agence de développement rattaché au ministère de l’Éducation.

      Les bourses ont été accordées à des étudiants ayant déjà défendu leur travail récemment et seraient destinées à des étudiants approuvés dans le cadre de processus de sélection terminés ou en cours.

      La coupure a pris les universités par surprise a touché non seulement les domaines de l’homme, mais la direction du ministre Abraham Weintraub a déclaré que ce n’était pas la priorité des investissements publics, mais également de la science.

      À l’Institute of Biosciences of USP, 38 bourses d’études ont été coupées - 17 masters, 19 doctorats et deux postdoctoraux.
      voir plus :

      https://www.tudosobreposgraduacao.com/post/gest%C3%A3o-bolsonaro-faz-corte-generalizado-em-bolsas-de-pes

  • Ensemble pour le Frexit ! : Rendez-vous le 1er mai 2019 à 14h place de la Nation - Paris (UPR)
    https://www.crashdebug.fr/actualites-france/15966-ensemble-pour-le-frexit-rendez-vous-le-1er-mai-2019-a-14h-place-de-

    Comme l’an dernier, l’Union populaire républicaine (UPR) organise une grande manifestation pour le Frexit à Paris, le 1er mai.

    Cette année, le parcours commencera à la place de la Nation, à 13 h pour se terminer place de la République vers 15 h.

    Là se tiendra un grand meeting avec un discours de François Asselineau, président de l’UPR et candidat tête de liste aux élections européennes.

    Plusieurs personnalités s’exprimeront également. Brian Denny, syndicaliste britannique à la tête du TUAEU, le “Trade Unionists Against the EU”, chantre du « Brexit », a notamment confirmé sa présence pour soutenir le « Frexit ».

    La dissolution de la manifestation est prévue à 17 h.

    Il y a un an, le 1er mai 2018, la manifestation de l’UPR avait réuni environ 3 500 personnes. Nous attendons cette année bien davantage de monde. (...)

    #En_vedette #Actualités_françaises

  • Nord Stream 2 souhaite obtenir une dérogation aux nouvelles règles européennes sur le transport du gaz | Connaissances des énergies
    https://www.connaissancedesenergies.org/afp/ue-nord-stream-2-veut-une-derogation-aux-nouvelles-regles-s

    La lettre, adressée au président de l’exécutif européen Jean-Claude Juncker, plaide pour un « règlement à l’amiable » après la récente révision de la réglementation européenne sur le marché du gaz, qui va affecter directement le nouveau gazoduc et pour laquelle le patron de Nord Stream 2 Matthias Warnig demande une dérogation.

    Ce dernier déplore le changement de règles dans ce courrier, révélé par le site Politico et que l’AFP a également consulté. « Il serait déraisonnable et discriminatoire pour l’UE de concevoir la directive amendée et la dérogation d’une telle façon que seul Nord Stream 2 soit significativement affecté », écrit M. Warnig.

    Changer les règles en court de route, sur pression de qui on sait...

  • Comment #Big_Pharma pénalise-t-il le traitement de l’épidémie des opiacés ? - Actualité Houssenia Writing
    https://actualite.housseniawriting.com/sante/2017/08/09/comment-big-pharma-penalise-t-il-le-traitement-de-lepidemie-des-opiaces/23013

    Traduction d’un article de The Conversation par Robin Feldman, professeure de propriété intellectuelle à l’université de Californie.

    Les grandes entreprises pharmacologiques (Big Pharma) utilisent de nombreuses tactiques pour retarder l’arrivée des #génériques et on peut prendre l’exemple des traitements contre l’épidémie des #opiacés.

    • En 2015, 80 % de la croissance des bénéfices des 20 plus grandes entreprises technologiques provenaient de l’augmentation des prix. Et les médicaments aux États-Unis sont largement plus chers que dans d’autres pays. Par exemple, le Syprine, un médicament contre l’insuffisante hépatique, coute moins de 400 dollars pour un an de traitement dans de nombreux pays. Aux États-Unis, ce médicament coute 300 000 dollars. Sovaldi, le médicament contre l’hépatite C de Gilead, coute environ 1 000 dollars à l’étranger. Aux États-Unis, il coute 84 000 dollars.

      Il faudra un motif d’inculpation pour trainer les gens qui décident cela devant la justice. Un truc du genre crime contre l’humanité.

    • Un des aspects intéressants des câbles diplomatiques américains, publiés par Wikileaks, c’était justement qu’une des activités principales des ambassades ricaines dans monde consiste à défendre les intérêts des grands groupes pharmaceutiques américaines.

      Par exemple (quasiment au hasard), ce câble de 2005 à ce sujet au Brésil :
      https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05BRASILIA1567_a.html

      1. (C) Summary. Ambassador Hugueney of Brazil’s Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty) told Ambassador June 6 that U.S. pharmaceutical companies should improve their offers on pricing and/or voluntary licenses for AIDS treatment drugs so as to avoid compulsory licensing by the Ministry of Health (MoH). Hugueney believed movement in the Chamber of Deputies of legislation that would deny patentability to AIDS drugs was likely intended to provide greater leverage to the Ministry of Health in its negotiations with the pharmaceutical companies. The bill’s broad political backing, he observed, makes a presidential veto unlikely should the legislation pass. On the WTO Doha Round of trade negotiations, Hugueney said Brazil will submit a “substantially improved” revised services offer the week of June 6. Hugueney expects to take up the post of Brazil’s Ambassador to the WTO by late August or early September. Hugueney confirmed Brazil’s plan to attend the June 21 to 22 US-EU International Conference on Iraq. End Summary.

      2. (SBU) On June 6, Ambassador met with Clodoaldo Hugueney, Itamaraty’s Under Secretary for Economic and Technological Affairs, to discuss a number of trade issues, principally, pending legislation that would render drugs to prevent and treat AIDS un-patentable, and the continuing threat of compulsory licensing facing the U.S. pharmaceutical companies Gilead Sciences, Abbott Laboratories, and Merck, Sharp & Dohme for their AIDS treatment drugs (ref A). Hugueney was accompanied by his assistant, Miguel Franco, and Otavio Brandelli, Chief of the Ministry’s IPR Division. Ecouns, Commoff, and Econoff accompanied Ambassador.

      AIDS Drugs - Compulsory License Threat and Patent Legislation

      3. (C) Hugueney, who had just returned from Doha negotiations in Geneva, said Itamaraty is following MoH negotiations with the pharmaceutical companies closely and described them as boiling down to issues of pricing or voluntary license/royalty payments. He noted the intense pressure the GoB is under from civil society, particularly NGOs, to issue compulsory licenses. Hugueney agreed the best outcome would be to avoid compulsory licenses, but opined that to do so would require improved offers on price or voluntary licensing from the companies. (Upon relaying this message to the companies, the Merck representative here told us his company was in the process of preparing a more detailed offer, although he did not say that it would be more forthcoming on prices. As for Gilead and Abbott, they have taken Hugueney’s suggestion “under advisement.”) Hugueney further advised the companies to maintain a dialog with the MoH to forestall precipitous, politically motivated action by that Ministry, and encouraged them to explain/present their proposals to a wide array of GoB interlocutors.

  • Des anges gardiens de l’Est au service d’une Europe vieillissante
    (anges gardiennes, non, plutôt ?)
    https://www.nouvelobs.com/societe/20190421.AFP5077/des-anges-gardiens-de-l-est-au-service-d-une-europe-vieillissante.html
    https://information.tv5monde.com/info/des-anges-gardiens-de-l-est-au-service-d-une-europe-vieillissa (avec des photos)

    Dans les cas les plus graves, le mal-être des auxiliaires de vie peut tourner à la dépression. En Roumanie, le phénomène est connu sous le nom de « syndrome italien ». Le terme désigne les troubles psychiatriques dont souffrent certaines soignantes ayant travaillé des années à l’étranger, souvent en Italie, laissant leur propre famille derrière elles.

    Durant la seule année dernière, plus de 150 femmes souffrant de ce syndrome ont été admises dans une unité spécialisée de l’hôpital psychiatrique de Iasi, dans le nord de la Roumanie.

    Parmi les anciennes patientes de l’unité, une quinquagénaire ayant travaillé en Italie de 2002 à 2014, décrit la montée d’une angoisse « profonde et sombre » au fil des ans : « C’est avantageux d’un point de vue de financier mais après la tête ne fonctionne plus correctement », confie cette mère de deux enfants sous couvert d’anonymat.

    « J’ai travaillé la plupart du temps auprès de malades d’Alzheimer, coincée entre quatre murs (...) Je leur ai sacrifié mes plus belles années ».

    also in english (article plus long, il semble)

    Care workers cross Europe’s east-west divide
    https://news.yahoo.com/care-workers-cross-europes-east-west-divide-024600024.html
    [AFP]
    Julia ZAPPEI with Ionut IORDACHESCU in Bucharest, AFP•April 21, 2019

    Women from Slovakia and Romania form the backbone of Austria’s domestic care sector (AFP Photo/JOE KLAMAR)

    Leoben (Austria) (AFP) - Every two weeks, Alena Konecna packs her bags to leave her own mother and daughter at home in Slovakia and travel some 400 kilometres (250 miles) across the border into Austria to take care of someone else’s mother.

    As citizens across the continent prepare to vote in May’s European Parliament elections, 40-year-old Konecna is an example of those who regularly take advantage of one of the EU’s most important pillars: the free movement of labour.

    She’s one of more than 65,000 people — mostly women from Slovakia and Romania — who form the backbone of Austria’s domestic care sector.

    For two weeks at a time, Konecna stays with the 89-year-old bedridden woman to cook and care for her.

    “Without care workers from abroad, the 24-hour care system would break down... No one (in Austria) wants to do it,” says Klaus Katzianka, who runs the agency that found Konecna her current job and who himself needs round-the-clock care due to a disability.

    But the arrangement may be coming under strain.

    – Demographic time bomb -

    Austria — along with other countries such as Germany, Greece and Italy — looked to poorer neighbouring states after the fall of communism to meet the need for carers generated by an ageing population and changing family structures.

    But it is “problematic to build a system on this,” says Kai Leichsenring, executive director of the European Centre for Social Welfare Policy and Research.

    As eastern European nations become richer and their own populations age, workers there may increasingly choose to stay put, he warns.

    Western European nations would then have to look further afield — to Ukraine or China, for example — to meet the ever-growing demand.

    In Konecna’s case, she started to work as a caregiver more than two years ago in the town of Leoben, nestled amid mountains in the Austrian countryside, which reminds her of her home in Banska Bystrica in Slovakia.

    Previously the single mother worked in a factory in the car industry.

    Fed up with the long shifts and inspired by her mother’s erstwhile career as a nurse, in 2015 she took a three-month course in first aid and care skills, including some practical experience in nursing homes.

    She also took a one-month German course, allowing her to watch TV with her employer and read newspapers to her.

    Care workers can earn roughly double as much in Austria than in Slovakia, although Konecna says it’s hard to leave behind her daughter, now 19.

    “My daughter was often sick when I was away. And I have missed things like my daughter’s birthday,” she says, adding she would prefer working in Slovakia if wages were better there.

    – ’Italy syndrome’ -

    Besides being separated from their families, there are other problems in how the sector works across Europe.

    A study by the Johannes Gutenberg University in Mainz found inadequate training, extreme working hours and salaries below the legal minimum wage.

    Up to 300,000 caregivers are estimated to work in private homes in Germany, mostly illegally. They previously hailed mostly from Poland but now increasingly come from poorer EU states such as Romania and Slovakia.

    Konecna was put off going to Germany by the more gruelling cycle which is common there, with workers staying three months at a time.

    For many of those from poorer EU member states working in the West, workplace conditions can leave lasting effects.

    In Romania, more than 150 women were hospitalised at Socola Psychiatric Hospital in the country’s northeast last year alone, their mental health having suffered after caring for the elderly abroad — what has become known as the “Italy syndrome”.

    “I had the misfortune to work all the time for elderly people suffering from Alzheimer’s so I spent most of my time between four walls, under constant pressure,” says one former hospital patient, a 58-year-old mother of two who worked in Italy from 2002 until 2014.

    “I devoted the most beautiful years of my life to elderly Italians.”

    – ’Big minus’ -

    Added to the stress of such jobs, there are signs that EU migrant workers like Konecna may come under fire from their host governments.

    Last year in Austria for example, the right-wing government decided to cut the amount of child benefit paid to foreigners who work in Austria but whose children live abroad in lower income countries.

    With a monthly salary of about 1,200 euros ($1,400), Konecna says the changes have meant an effective pay cut of 80 euros, a “big minus” for her.

    Katzianka, who fears difficulties to find carers from Slovakia now, has hired a lawyer for Konecna to contest the change.

    Romania has also protested to the European Commission over the change, saying it violates EU principles of equal treatment.

  • How I got Rejected by 30+ Startups Before Landing a “Dream” Job
    https://hackernoon.com/how-i-got-rejected-by-30-startups-before-landing-a-dream-job-6582e42aca7

    I recently went through a job change and would like to post my experience. My post got a lot of people interested on reddit.TL;DR: Lot of companies do not focus on good engineering. Prepare. The algorithm rounds were a hit-or-miss for me.Always negotiate.Some facts:I resigned and decided to take a 2 month break to completely focus on job-huntingInterviewed (i.e. at least 1 online round) with 35+ companies. Mostly startups (seed to series A).Mostly in India. ~10 in EU, Japan, and other overseas countries through stack overflow careers. I don’t think my then 8k SO reputation helped out.I had linked to my medium profile in my CV and in 3 or 4 interviews (after initial screening rounds), we talked about my (somewhat controversial) blog Can’t hack your way to the topI practiced mostly using (...)

    #interview #job-rejection #startup-job-rejection #startup-rejection #algorithms

  • Aaron Swartz n’en finira donc pas d’être suicidé ?

    Quand la France accuse l’Internet Archive de propagande terroriste
    Et demande la suppression de contenus licites

    Dans un billet de blog, l’Internet Archive raconte avoir récemment reçu de multiples demandes de retrait de contenu pour cause d’apologie du terrorisme. Ces demandes, que l’organisme considère comme erronées, viennent de France.

    Article par Johann Breton pour Les Numériques : https://www.lesnumeriques.com/vie-du-net/quand-france-accuse-internet-archive-propagande-terroriste-n85871.htm

    L’Internet Archive, organisme à but non lucratif basé aux États-Unis, s’est donné une mission : sauvegarder plus ou moins tout ce qui apparaît sur Internet. Ainsi, ses bases de données contiennent les copies de milliards de pages web de même que de très nombreux ouvrages. Les pages peuvent notamment être consultées au moyen de la célèbre Wayback Machine, tandis que les livres, logiciels, films et autres enregistrements sont mis à disposition sous forme de collections. Naturellement, l’organisme veille à ne pas mettre n’importe quoi à la portée de tous, mais archive parfois des contenus qui ne sont pas nécessairement tous publics.

    En ce début de mois d’avril, l’Internet Archive a eu droit à une petite surprise. Elle a reçu quelque 550 demandes de suppression de contenu émises par une adresse courriel @europol.europa.eu, et pas pour n’importe quel motif : propagande terroriste. Dans un premier temps, l’organisme a (logiquement) cru avoir affaire à l’Union européenne, mais en y regardant de plus près, il s’est rendu compte que les demandes émanaient d’une autorité française, cette dernière passant simplement par la plateforme d’Europol. Et en examinant le détail des demandes, le spécialiste de l’archivage a constaté qu’il n’avait pas nécessairement été aussi négligeant que le nombre de requêtes pouvait le laisser à supposer.

    /.../ /.../ /.../

    De manière générale, ces demandes sont une vraie source de pression, dans la mesure où l’Internet Archive pourrait être sanctionnée pour son refus d’obtempérer. Plus ennuyeux, l’Union européenne travaille actuellement sur un texte qui ne laisserait qu’une heure aux administrateurs pour supprimer les contenus identifiés comme des incitations au terrorisme (texte qui s’adresse avant tout à la problématique des réseaux sociaux). Or, il va sans dire qu’un tel organisme serait incapable de contrôler des centaines de demandes en une heure. La question est ouvertement posée à la fin du billet : comment peut-on parler de respect de la liberté d’expression dans le cadre de ces dispositifs si de telles demandes peuvent être émises sous l’égide de l’UE ? Faut-il traiter aveuglément les requêtes au risque d’effacer à tort des contenus d’intérêt majeur ?

    Source [en] sur le blog de Internet Archive : Official EU Agencies Falsely Report More Than 550 Archive.org URLs as Terrorist Content : https://blog.archive.org/2019/04/10/official-eu-agencies-falsely-report-more-than-550-archive-org-urls-as-

    #internet #archives #Loi #terrorisme #censure #Aaron_Swartz

  • #Perturbateurs_endocriniens : les #rivières françaises regorgent de #pesticides
    https://www.lemonde.fr/planete/article/2019/04/16/les-rivieres-francaises-regorgent-de-pesticides-suspectes-d-etre-des-perturb

    Les rivières et les #lacs français débordent de pesticides suspectés d’être des perturbateurs endocriniens. Glyphosate, atrazine, chlordécone… des résidus d’#herbicides et d’#insecticides particulièrement néfastes pour la #santé sont omniprésents dans les #eaux de surface en #France, révèle une étude inédite publiée mardi 16 avril à laquelle Le Monde a eu accès.

    Réalisé par Générations futures, association en pointe dans le combat contre les pesticides, le rapport montre qu’en moyenne plus de 41 substances actives de pesticides ou de métabolites supposés perturbateurs endocriniens (PE) sont présents dans les cours d’eau.

    Ce cocktail de molécules menace directement la #faune aquatique et les #écosystèmes, contribue à l’érosion de la biodiversité et n’est pas sans conséquence sur notre santé, alerte le rapport. Les PE sont en effet des substances capables d’interférer avec le système hormonal et impliquées dans une variété de troubles et de pathologies : de l’#obésité à la baisse du quotient intellectuel en passant par des #cancers des systèmes reproducteurs masculin et féminin.

    Depuis une note de 2015 du Commissariat général au développement durable, on savait que la grande majorité (92 %) des cours d’eau français étaient contaminés par les pesticides utilisés massivement par les agriculteurs. Générations futures a cherché à quantifier la part de ces pesticides aux effets de perturbation endocrinienne.

    L’association a d’abord identifié, à partir de deux bases de données (EU Pesticides database et TEDX qui porte spécifiquement sur les perturbateurs endocriniens), les pesticides (autorisés ou non) potentiellement PE. Elle a ensuite vérifié lesquels avaient été analysés par les agences de l’eau et répertoriés (département par département) dans la base de données nationale Naïades sur la qualité des eaux de surface.

    Générations futures a dû remonter jusqu’à l’année 2015 pour obtenir la couverture territoriale la plus complète. Elle s’est également heurtée à des difficultés liées à l’absence d’harmonisation des méthodes et des listes de substances recherchées : les agences de l’eau n’utilisent pas les mêmes seuils de quantification et de détection et certaines substances ne sont pas testées dans tous les départements.

    Sur la base des données 2015, le rapport établit qu’un total de 232 substances actives de pesticides ou de métabolites supposés PE ont été recherchés, soit une moyenne de 183 par département. En moyenne, plus de 41 (soit environ 23 %) ont été quantifiés. Avec des différences notables selon les départements.

    • le sang des bébés est pollué : les dangers de l’effet cocktail
      https://www.franceculture.fr/sciences/le-sang-des-bebes-est-pollue-les-dangers-de-leffet-cocktail

      Qu’appelle-t-on « effet cocktail » ?

      Barbara Demeneix : L’effet cocktail est un mélange complexe de produits chimiques qui ne devraient pas être dans notre sang. La question qui se pose aujourd’hui : étant donné les centaines de milliers de substances auxquelles on pourrait être exposé, quelles sont les interactions entre ces différentes substances au niveau de notre physiologie ? Chez des femmes enceintes ou chez des enfants qui naissent, on a mesuré des taux de produits chimiques dans le sang du cordon ombilical, et on a trouvé des centaines de produits chimique. Nous savons que ces produits passent la barrière placentaire et se retrouvent dans le liquide amniotique. Les enfants sont donc contaminés pendant tout le début de leur vie intra-utérine. La période de développement dans le ventre de la mère est très importante parce que c’est là où le cerveau se forme, c’est là où tous les organes se forment et se mettent en place. Beaucoup de maladies que l’on va avoir, que l’on soit adolescent, adulte ou vieux, ont pour origine cette vie fœtale qui détermine toute notre santé d’adulte.

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UAi7-CyTFDg&list=RDUAi7-CyTFDg&start_radio=1&t=596


      Alertez les bébés - Jacques Higelin

  • #Niger, part 3 : Guns won’t win the war

    After an ambush killed four US special forces and five local soldiers in #Tongo_Tongo, a village in the northern part of the #Tillabéri region close to Niger’s border with Mali, Boubacar Diallo’s phone rang constantly.

    That was back in October 2017. Journalists from around the world were suddenly hunting for information on Aboubacar ‘petit’ Chapori, a lieutenant of #Islamic_State_in_the_Greater_Sahara, or #ISGS – the jihadist group that claimed the attack.

    Diallo, an activist who had been representing Fulani herders in peace negotiations with Tuareg rivals, had met Chapori years earlier. He was surprised by his rapid – and violent – ascent.

    But he was also concerned. While it was good that the brewing crisis in the remote Niger-Mali borderlands was receiving some belated attention, Diallo worried that the narrow focus on the jihadist threat – on presumed ISGS leaders Chapori, Dondou Cheffou, and Adnan Abou Walid Al Sahrawi – risked obscuring the real picture.

    Those concerns only grew later in 2017 when the G5 Sahel joint force was launched – the biggest military initiative to tackle jihadist violence in the region, building on France’s existing Operation Barkhane.

    Diallo argues that the military push by France and others is misconceived and “fanning the flames of conflict”. And he says the refusal to hold talks with powerful Tuareg militants in #Mali such as Iyad Ag Ghaly – leader of al-Qaeda-linked JNIM, or the Group for the support of Islam and Muslims – is bad news for the future of the region.

    Dialogue and development

    Niger Defence Minister Kalla Moutari dismissed criticism over the G5 Sahel joint force, speaking from his office in Niamey, in a street protected by police checkpoints and tyre killer barriers.

    More than $470 million has been pledged by global donors to the project, which was sponsored by France with the idea of coordinating the military efforts of Mauritania, Mali, #Burkina_Faso, Niger, and Chad to fight insurgencies in these countries.

    “It’s an enormous task to make armies collaborate, but we’re already conducting proximity patrols in border areas, out of the spotlight, and this works,” he said.

    According to Moutari, however, development opportunities are also paramount if a solution to the conflict is to be found.

    "Five years from now, the whole situation in the Sahel could explode.”

    He recalled a meeting in the Mauritanian capital, Nouakchott, in early December 2018, during which donors pledged $2.7 billion for programmes in the Sahel. “We won’t win the war with guns, but by triggering dynamics of development in these areas,” the minister said.

    A European security advisor, who preferred not to be identified, was far more pessimistic as he sat in one of the many Lebanese cafés in the Plateau, the central Niamey district where Western diplomats cross paths with humanitarian workers and the city’s upper-class youth.

    The advisor, who had trained soldiers in Mali and Burkina Faso, said that too much emphasis remained on a military solution that he believed could not succeed.

    “In Niger, when new attacks happen at one border, they are suddenly labelled as jihadists and a military operation is launched; then another front opens right after… but we can’t militarise all borders,” the advisor said. If the approach doesn’t change, he warned, “in five years from now, the whole situation in the Sahel could explode.”

    Tensions over land

    In his home in east Niamey, Diallo came to a similar conclusion: labelling all these groups “jihadists” and targeting them militarily will only create further problems.

    To explain why, he related the long history of conflict between Tuaregs and Fulanis over grazing lands in north Tillabéri.

    The origins of the conflict, he said, date back to the 1970s, when Fulani cattle herders from Niger settled in the region of Gao, in Mali, in search of greener pastures. Tensions over access to land and wells escalated with the first Tuareg rebellions that hit both Mali and Niger in the early 1990s and led to an increased supply of weapons to Tuareg groups.

    While peace agreements were struck in both countries, Diallo recalled that 55 Fulani were killed by armed Tuareg men in one incident in Gao in 1997.

    After the massacre, some Fulani herders escaped back to Niger and created the North Tillabéri Self-Defence Militia, sparking a cycle of retaliation. More than 100 people were killed in fighting before reconciliation was finally agreed upon in 2011. The Nigerien Fulani militia dissolved and handed its arms to the Nigerien state.

    “But despite promises, our government abandoned these ex-fighters in the bush with nothing to do,” Diallo said. “In the meantime, a new Tuareg rebellion started in Mali in 2012.”

    The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (known as MUJAO, or MOJWA in English), created by Arab leaders in Mali in 2011, exploited the situation to recruit among Fulanis, who were afraid of violence by Tuareg militias. ISGS split from MUJAO in 2015, pledging obedience to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

    Diallo believes dialogue is the only way out of today’s situation, which is deeply rooted in these old intercommunal rivalries. “I once met those Fulani fighters who are the manpower of MUJAO and now of ISGS, and they didn’t consider themselves as jihadists,” he said. “They just want to have money and weapons to defend themselves.”

    He said the French forces use Tuareg militias, such as GATIA (the Imghad Tuareg Self-Defence Group and Allies) and the MSA (Movement for the Salvation of Azawad), to patrol borderlands between Mali and Niger. Fulani civilians were killed during some of these patrols in Niger in mid-2018, further exacerbating tensions.

    According to a UN report, these militias were excluded from an end of the year operation by French forces in Niger, following government requests.

    ‘An opportunistic terrorism’

    If some kind of reconciliation is the only way out of the conflict in Tillabéri and the neighbouring Nigerien region of Tahoua, Mahamadou Abou Tarka is likely to be at the heart of the Niger government’s efforts.

    The Tuareg general leads the High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace, a government agency launched following the successive Tuareg rebellions, to ensure peace deals are respected.

    “In north Tillabéri, jihadists hijacked Fulani’s grievances,” Abou Tarka, who reports directly to the president, said in his office in central Niamey. “It’s an opportunistic terrorism, and we need to find proper answers.”

    The Authority – whose main financial contributor is the European Union, followed by France, Switzerland, and Denmark – has launched projects to support some of the communities suffering from violence near the Malian border. “Water points, nurseries, and state services helped us establish a dialogue with local chiefs,” the general explained.

    “Fighters with jihadist groups are ready to give up their arms if incursions by Tuareg militias stop, emergency state measures are retired, and some of their colleagues released from prison.”

    Abou Tarka hailed the return to Niger from Mali of 200 Fulani fighters recruited by ISGS in autumn 2018 as the Authority’s biggest success to date. He said increased patrolling on the Malian side of the border by French forces and the Tuareg militias - Gatia and MSA - had put pressure on the Islamist fighters to return home and defect.

    The general said he doesn’t want to replicate the programme for former Boko Haram fighters from the separate insurgency that has long spread across Niger’s southern border with Nigeria – 230 of them are still in a rehabilitation centre in the Diffa region more than two years after the first defected.

    “In Tillabéri, I want things to be faster, so that ex-fighters reintegrate in the local community,” he said.

    Because these jihadist fighters didn’t attack civilians in Niger – only security forces – it makes the process easier than for ex-Boko Haram, who are often rejected by their own communities, the general said. The Fulani ex-fighters are often sent back to their villages, which are governed by local chiefs in regular contact with the Authority, he added.

    A member of the Nigerien security forces who was not authorised to speak publicly and requested anonymity said that since November 2018 some of these Fulani defectors have been assisting Nigerien security forces with border patrols.

    However, Amadou Moussa, another Fulani activist, dismissed Abou Tarka’s claims that hundreds of fighters had defected. Peace terms put forward by Fulani militants in northern Tillabéri hadn’t even been considered by the government, he said.

    “Fighters with jihadist groups are ready to give up their arms if incursions by Tuareg militias stop, emergency state measures are retired, and some of their colleagues released from prison,” Moussa said. The government, he added, has shown no real will to negotiate.

    Meanwhile, the unrest continues to spread, with the French embassy releasing new warnings for travellers in the border areas near Burkina Faso, where the first movements of Burkinabe refugees and displaced people were registered in March.

    https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/special-report/2019/04/15/niger-part-3-guns-conflict-militancy
    #foulani #ISIS #Etat_islamique #EI #Tuareg #terrorisme #anti-terrorisme #terres #conflit #armes #armement #North_Tillabéri_Self-Defence_Militia #MUJAO #MOJWA #Movement_for_Oneness_and_Jihad_in_West_Africa #Mauritanie #Tchad

    @reka : pour mettre à jour la carte sur l’Etat islamique ?
    https://visionscarto.net/djihadisme-international

  • Turkey’s Policy in the Balkans: More than Neo-Ottomanism

    There is a fundamental misperception with regard to Turkey’s relationship with the Balkans. Turkey is not external to the region, the way Russia is for instance. Its history and geographic location make it a part of southeast Europe. Millions of Turks have their family roots in what was once known as ‘Turkey-in-Europe.’ This includes the founder of the republic, the Salonika-born Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Ties run deep at the political, economic, and societal levels.

    All those connections have drawn Turkey to the Balkans, especially after the end of the Cold War. The notion that Turks are now coming back does not hold. Closer engagement in the region started under President Turgut Özal in the early 1990s. But back then, Turkey balanced between bilateralism and multilateralism. It invested in economic and security ties with friendly countries such as Albania, Macedonia, Romania and Bulgaria while adhering to NATO as its response to the wars in ex-Yugoslavia. What changed under the Justice and Development (AK) Party, notably over the past decade, is the switch to bilateralism. That is understandable given the cracks in relations between Ankara and the West. All the same, it is concerning since it is coinciding with the push against the EU and NATO by Russia, which leverages history, religious identity and anti-Western rhetoric to legitimize its actions.

    Pundits and politicians often use ‘Neo-Ottomanism’ to describe Turkey’s forays. The label can be often misleading. Yes, Turkish President Recep Erdogan praises the Ottoman Empire and its legacy, domestically and beyond Turkey’s borders. But so did his predecessors in office. Within the country, liberals and Islamist conservatives alike all rediscovered the Ottomans from the 1980s onwards in questioning the Kemalist political order. The government has been reaching out to Balkan Muslims through TIKA, the Turkish developmental agency, and the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) for decades.

    Neo-Ottomanism is therefore the packaging, not the substance. Turkey’s objective is not to recreate the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. That is far beyond the country’s resources and capacity. The region is gravitating in economic, social, institutional and political terms to the West. What we have instead is Erdogan using the Balkans to make a case that he is the leader of the wider (Sunni) Muslim community in Europe and the Middle East. The main audience is his electorate in Turkey and only secondly Muslims abroad. The pre-election rally he held in Sarajevo in the run-up to last year’s presidential and parliamentary elections is a case in point.

    But Turkish policy in the Balkans cannot be reduced to the promotion of Islamic solidarity. Erdogan’s main achievement is the fact that he has built relations with leaders from countries that are majority non-Muslim. In October 2017, for instance, he was welcomed in Serbia by President Aleksandar Vucic. The visit gave some credence to complaints by Bosniaks (Slavic Muslims) that Turkey loves to talk brotherhood in Bosnia but when it comes to investing money it goes for Serbia. Similarly, Erdogan has strong links to Bulgaria’s Prime Minister Boyko Borisov, who hosted the EU-Turkey summit a year ago. Bulgaria and Serbia are interested in hosting an extension of the TurkStream gas pipeline, a joint Russo-Turkish venture. Greece’s Alexis Tsipras also received the red carpet treatment during his latest visit to Turkey where he discussed ideas on decreasing tensions in the Aegean.

    Despite its quest for strategic autonomy, Turkey is still partnering with Western institutions. In addition, Ankara has been supportive of the Prespa Agreement and newly renamed North Macedonia’s accession to NATO, its quarrels with the U.S. and other key members of the Alliance notwithstanding. Collectively, EU members Romania, Bulgaria and Greece account for the bulk of Turkish trade with southeast Europe, with the Western Balkans trailing far behind. Greece and Bulgaria see Turkey as key to stemming the flow of asylum seekers from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and further afield. They are highly supportive of the EU-Turkey deal on migration from March 2016, renewed last year.

    Does the authoritarian system built by Erdogan pose an ideological challenge in the Balkans? Perhaps yes. For instance, pressure on governments to close educational institutions and surrender, without due process, members of the Fethullah Gülen community, which is implicated in the coup attempt in July 2016, undermine the rule of law. At the same time, the authoritarian drift observed in the Balkans is an indigenous product. It is not imported from Vladimir Putin’s Russia nor from Turkey under its new ‘sultan’.

    https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/turkeys-policy-balkans-more-neo-ottomanism-22835

    #néo-ottomanisme #Turquie #Balkans

  • Entre massacre et lutte antiterroriste, l’armée malienne à l’épreuve du feu | Mediapart
    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/140419/entre-massacre-et-lutte-antiterroriste-l-armee-malienne-l-epreuve-du-feu?o

    L’agence française de développement a annulé la publication d’un dossier sur le Mali qui devait paraître dans sa revue Afrique contemporaine. En cause, des articles qui ont déplu, mettant à mal la stratégie de la France ou les autorités du Mali. Mediapart publie l’un d’eux, consacré aux accusations visant l’armée malienne.

    #Paypal #Mali #Censure #AgenceFrançaiseDéveloppement

    • La polémique a éclaté fin mars. Elle a pour origine la démission de Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, chercheur à l’Institut de recherche pour le développement (IRD), de ses fonctions de rédacteur en chef d’Afrique contemporaine, une revue trimestrielle éditée par l’Agence française de développement (AFD). En cause : l’AFD a refusé la publication d’un dossier consacré au Mali.

      Pourtant, les articles de ce numéro spécial, « écrits par des chercheurs réputés, qui connaissent le terrain et écrivent depuis longtemps sur le Mali et l’Afrique, avaient été acceptés et approuvés par le comité de rédaction de la revue », indique Bruno Charbonneau, qui a dirigé ce travail (et qui est lui-même professeur d’études internationales au collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean au Québec).

      L’un des textes du dossier, détaille-t-il, analyse les faiblesses de l’approche militaire du contre-terrorisme actuellement privilégiée par les puissances occidentales. Il montre « comment cette approche qui l’emporte sur tout peut être contre-productive et être elle-même génératrice de violences ». Un autre évoque « l’impunité générale et généralisée dont jouissent des représentants de l’État malien dans la mesure où leurs actions illégales, criminelles et autres ne sont pas ou que rarement punis ».
      Il semble que ce sont ces deux articles qui ont posé problème à l’AFD, laquelle édite la revue mais la dirige aussi, puisque le directeur de la rédaction, Thomas Melonio, est un de ses agents. Ce dernier est le directeur exécutif du département innovation, recherche et savoirs de l’AFD, et a été conseiller Afrique du président François Hollande, après avoir été délégué national responsable de l’Afrique au parti socialiste. Il était en poste à l’Élysée lors du lancement de l’opération militaire française Serval au Mali, en 2013.

      Auteur de l’article consacré aux défaillances de l’armée malienne, le journaliste indépendant Rémi Carayol a confié à Mediapart l’intégralité de son texte, que nous publions ici avec son autorisation.

      *

      Sept ans après sa déroute dans le nord du Mali face aux combattants du Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad (MNLA), l’armée malienne se reconstruit difficilement. Les résultats des importants moyens mis en œuvre pour lui permettre d’assumer ses missions sont pour l’heure peu probants. Il est vrai qu’elle revient de loin. En 2012, ses défaites successives dans le septentrion avaient révélé d’importantes faiblesses structurelles : manque de moyens matériels, déficit de cohésion au sein des différents corps, mauvaise gestion des ressources humaines, pratiques clientélistes, commandement défaillant, patriotisme à géométrie variable des soldats…

      Très vite après la perte d’une partie du territoire national, les partenaires du Mali ont entrepris d’aider les autorités à reconstruire une armée digne de ce nom. Il s’agissait alors de lui permettre, avec le soutien d’une force onusienne, la Mission internationale de soutien au Mali (Misma), de reconquérir au plus vite les régions tombées sous le joug des groupes armés djihadistes, lesquels avaient profité de l’offensive du MNLA pour prendre le contrôle des principales villes du nord. Cette mission a finalement été accomplie par l’armée française, avec l’appui des armées africaines, après le déclenchement de l’opération Serval en janvier 2013.

      Lancée dans la foulée de l’intervention française, en février 2013, la mission de formation de l’Union européenne au Mali1 avait pour fonction initiale de former quatre Groupements tactiques interarmes (GTIA), soit un total de 2 600 hommes, destinés à se battre dans le nord. Prolongée à trois reprises en 2014, 2016 et 2018, cette mission en a formé bien plus : environ 12 500 soldats maliens ont officiellement suivi des cours et des entraînements dans le centre de Koulikoro, où sont basés les instructeurs européens. Prévue pour durer au minimum jusqu’en mai 2020, cette mission a pour l’heure coûté près de 133 millions d’euros2.

      L’EUTM a pour mandat de fournir des conseils en matière militaire et de contribuer à rétablir les capacités opérationnelles des Forces armées maliennes (Fama). L’instruction des militaires maliens comporte plusieurs volets, dont une formation en matière de droit international humanitaire, de protection des civils et de droits de l’homme. Depuis sa création, la Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation au Mali (Minusma), qui a succédé à la Misma, a elle aussi prodigué des formations en matière de droits humains aux soldats maliens. La France et les États-Unis mènent de leur côté des programmes de formation destinés aux armées de la sous-région, dont celle du Mali.

      Parallèlement à ces initiatives financées par les partenaires du Mali, le gouvernement malien a fait voter une loi d’orientation et de programmation militaire ambitieuse en mars 2015, dont l’objectif était « de se doter à l’horizon 2019 d’une organisation et d’un plan d’équipements, de disposer d’un outil de défense adapté aux besoins de sécurité, et capable en toutes circonstances de défendre l’intégrité du territoire national tout en contribuant à la consolidation de la démocratie ».

      D’un coût total estimé à plus de 1 230 milliards de francs CFA (près de 1,9 milliard d’euros3) sur une période de cinq ans, ce qui représente un effort colossal pour l’État malien, cette loi visait notamment à recruter près de 10 000 hommes, afin de porter les effectifs des forces de sécurité à 20 000 éléments, et à acquérir du matériel de guerre.

      Alors que « l’horizon 2019 » est bientôt atteint, force est de constater que les objectifs recherchés, tant en matière d’efficacité opérationnelle que de respect des droits humains, sont loin d’avoir été accomplis. Plus que la guerre dans le nord, le conflit multiforme qui secoue le centre du Mali illustre cet échec relatif.

      Si les Fama ont participé à la reconquête du nord, elles ne sont intervenues qu’en second rideau, une fois que les djihadistes avaient été chassés du terrain par les troupes françaises et africaines. Les soldats maliens ont très vite été amenés à reprendre leurs positions dans les villes de Tombouctou et de Gao, mais ils n’ont pas été en mesure de s’installer durablement plus au nord, notamment dans la ville de Kidal. Aujourd’hui encore, l’armée malienne est relativement peu présente dans les zones jadis occupées par les djihadistes. La plupart du temps cantonnée dans ses bases, elle ne sort que rarement des centres urbains. Son rôle est en outre dilué du fait de la multiplication des acteurs armés.

      L’armée française poursuit ses manœuvres dans le cadre de l’opération Barkhane (4 500 hommes), qui a succédé à l’opération Serval en 2014, et dont la base principale se situe à Gao4. Elle se concentre sur les dirigeants des groupes terroristes, qu’elle traque dans l’ensemble de la sous-région avec une totale liberté d’action.

      La Minusma, qui dispose de plus de 12 000 soldats, est également présente sur l’ensemble du territoire septentrional (à Tombouctou, Gao, Tessalit, Aguelhok, Kidal, Goundam, Ber, Gossi, Ansongo et Menaka), ainsi que dans le centre (à Douentza, Sévaré et Diabaly). Si les Casques bleus sortent peu de leurs bases, au grand dam des populations, ils constituent une force non négligeable dans ces villes.

      Enfin, les groupes armés signataires de l’accord de paix issu du processus d’Alger, membres de la Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA), qui réunit d’anciens rebelles, ou de la Plateforme, dans laquelle se retrouvent des groupes qualifiés (parfois à tort) de loyalistes à l’égard de Bamako, jouent eux aussi un rôle dans la sécurisation du territoire. Le MNLA, le Haut Conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad (HCUA) ou encore le Groupe autodéfense touareg imghad et alliés (Gatia) assurent le contrôle de certaines zones rurales d’où sont absentes les Fama, en lien parfois avec les forces française et onusienne.

      ====================

      1 European Union Training Mission (EUTM)

      2 Le budget de l’EUTM Mali n’a cessé d’augmenter au fil des ans : 12,3 millions d’euros en 2013, 27,7 millions en 2014-2016, 33,4 millions en 2016-2018 et 59,7 millions pour la période 2018-2020. Cette dernière hausse spectaculaire s’explique par une extension du mandat de l’EUTM, qui, désormais, forme également des éléments de la Force conjointe du G5-Sahel. Source : EUTM Mali.

      3 427,59 milliards FCFA pour les investissements ; 442,57 milliards CFA pour le fonctionnement ; et 360,38 milliards CFA pour le personnel.

      4 Le quartier général de l’opération est basé à N’Djamena (Tchad).

      Le centre du Mali, foyer des violences
      Dans le centre du pays, par contre, les Fama sont en première ligne, et ont même longtemps été un peu seules. Cette zone, qui englobe la région de Mopti et une partie de la région de Ségou, est aujourd’hui considérée comme l’épicentre des violences au Mali, et est désormais perçue à New York, au siège des Nations unies, comme l’enjeu principal du moment. 40 à 50 % des violences recensées dans le pays en 2018 l’ont été dans ces deux régions.

      Selon un décompte de la Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l’homme (FIDH) et de l’Association malienne des droits de l’homme (AMDH), environ 1 200 personnes y ont été tuées ces deux dernières années, dont au moins 500 entre les mois de janvier et août 20185. Or l’armée malienne n’est pas étrangère à un tel bilan.

      En 2012, le centre du Mali, zone géographique relativement vague, marquait la séparation entre le nord, placé sous le joug des djihadistes, et le sud, administré par l’État. Ses habitants n’ont pas été exposés aux violences au même degré que ceux du nord, mais ils en ont subi les conséquences de manière plus ou moins directe : désertion des représentants de l’État, y compris des militaires dans certaines zones, multiplication des actes de banditisme, détérioration de la situation économique…

      En 2013, dans la foulée des troupes françaises et africaines, les Fama ont réinvesti la zone. Alors que les Français, dont les objectifs se

      IBK et Emmanuel Macron lors de la commération du centenaire de la Première Guerre mondiale à Reims le 6 novembre 2018. © Reuters
      IBK et Emmanuel Macron lors de la commération du centenaire de la Première Guerre mondiale à Reims le 6 novembre 2018. © Reuters
      situaient plus au nord, ne faisaient qu’y passer, et que la Minusma s’y implantait timidement, l’armée malienne, elle, y a repris ses positions. Cette reconquête s’est accompagnée d’exactions contre les populations locales, et plus particulièrement les Peuls, victimes d’amalgames en raison du ralliement de certains d’entre eux aux groupes djihadistes, souvent pour des raisons autres que religieuses6.
      Plusieurs dizaines de personnes ont été exécutées et jetées dans des puits par des soldats maliens à Sévaré7. Des cas de tortures ont également été mentionnés8. De nombreuses personnes ont en outre été portées disparues après avoir été arrêtées par l’armée malienne9.

      Ce retour « musclé » n’a pas permis pour autant de restaurer la sécurité, et encore moins la confiance entre les populations et l’armée. Outre les violences attribuées aux soldats maliens, des tueries (impunies jusqu’à présent) ont aussi été commises par des bandits armés10, et les pillages n’ont pas cessé.

      « Une fois que les Fama sont revenues, les vols de bétail se sont multipliés, précise un élu local de la commune de Nampala. Les gens sont allés voir les militaires pour leur demander de sécuriser les déplacements des troupeaux, mais ils n’ont rien obtenu. Certains se sont alors tournés vers les groupes armés ou ont décidé de s’armer eux-mêmes. »11

      C’est dans ce contexte de méfiance à l’égard des représentants de la force publique et de violences diffuses qu’est apparu début 2015 un nouveau mouvement djihadiste : la katiba Macina, affiliée au groupe dirigé par Iyad Ag-Ghaly, Ansar Eddine. Sa première attaque a eu lieu à Nampala, deux ans presque jour pour jour après la bataille de Konna, qui avait vu l’armée française entrer en action.

      Le 5 janvier 2015, plusieurs dizaines d’hommes armés lancent l’assaut sur le camp de l’armée malienne, puis investissent la ville et y font flotter leur drapeau noir pendant quelques heures, avant de se replier vers leur base. Depuis lors, les membres de cette katiba n’ont cessé d’étendre leur zone d’influence. Ils ont multiplié les attaques contre l’armée malienne et la Minusma, tuant des dizaines de soldats maliens et onusiens. La plupart du temps, ils profitent du passage d’un convoi pour lancer l’assaut12. Ils attaquent également des bases militaires ou des barrages de la gendarmerie à l’entrée des villes, et s’en prennent à des soldats isolés ou en permission.

      Après avoir chassé l’armée malienne des zones les plus difficiles d’accès dès les premiers mois de l’année 2015, les « hommes de la brousse » (c’est ainsi que les habitants de la zone ont pris l’habitude de les dénommer) ont mené une stratégie d’exécutions ciblées et d’enlèvements contre des représentants de l’État, des chefs religieux, des notables locaux et des élus soupçonnés de s’opposer à leur projet ou de collaborer avec l’État.

      Aujourd’hui, ils contrôlent une grande partie des zones rurales du centre du pays, où ils rendent justice, règlent les contentieux, imposent des règles de vie aux populations, gèrent l’accès aux ressources… Des centaines d’écoles publiques (dites « françaises ») ont été fermées, et parfois saccagées, ces dernières années13.

      Plusieurs facteurs peuvent expliquer la facilité avec laquelle les djihadistes se sont implantés dans le centre, et ont parfois gagné les cœurs de ses habitants : un État perçu depuis longtemps comme prédateur, notamment en raison de la corruption de certains de ses agents ; une économie vacillante, qui a subi de plein fouet les sécheresses des années 1970 et que la guerre au nord a encore un peu plus affaiblie ; la récurrence des litiges liés à l’utilisation des ressources naturelles, qui aboutissent parfois à des conflits communautaires ; la prolifération des armes…

      Mais si l’État a perdu le contrôle de pans entiers de cette zone, c’est aussi parce que l’armée malienne s’est jusqu’ici révélée incapable de faire face aux incursions djihadistes, et encore moins de gagner la confiance des populations. À Nampala, une semaine après l’attaque du 5 janvier 2015, un élu rapporte que « les [soldats des] Fama sont revenus. Ils ont dit que les Peuls étaient responsables. Ils ont arrêté des suspects, les ont tabassés. Certains ont été amenés à Bamako, et libérés après avoir dû verser de l’argent. Après ça, la population ne collaborait plus avec eux. » Les djihadistes en ont immédiatement profité : « Ils sont venus dans les villages et ont dit : “On ne vous demande rien, sauf de ne pas nous dénoncer.” Ils ont exécuté plusieurs informateurs de l’armée. »14

      Passée cette première phase de repli début 2015, au cours de laquelle elles se sont réfugiées dans les camps situés dans les grands centres urbains, les Fama ont mené des opérations anti-terroristes d’envergure, mais souvent sans lendemain. « Ils venaient, ils passaient quelques heures dans le village, ils arrêtaient des gens, puis ils repartaient, et nous laissaient à la merci des groupes armés », explique un élu local du cercle de Tenenkou15.

      International Crisis Group notait en 2016 que « ce type d’intervention vise à contenir l’expansion des groupes armés plutôt qu’à agir sur les sources de l’insécurité »16. L’opération Seno, lancée à l’automne 2015 dans le cercle de Bankass, a permis d’arrêter un certain nombre de suspects. Mais elle a également abouti à des arrestations violentes de personnes n’ayant rien à voir avec la katiba Macina, à des détentions arbitraires, parfois très longues, à des actes de torture17 et à des vexations, dont certaines, filmées et postées sur les réseaux sociaux, ont alimenté un sentiment victimaire chez nombre de Peuls.

      Début 2018, sous l’impulsion du nouveau gouvernement dirigé par Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga, un « Plan de sécurisation intégré des régions du Centre » a été élaboré. Ce plan, toujours en vigueur, prévoit le renforcement du dispositif sécuritaire dans les régions de Mopti et Ségou, et des mesures en matière de gouvernance et de développement économique et social. Des aides d’urgence ont été annoncées par le premier ministre lors de divers déplacements sur le terrain. Des représentants de l’administration, dont des sous-préfets, ont repris possession de leur poste dans quelques villes secondaires.

      Cependant, nombre de services publics sont toujours inaccessibles aux habitants des zones rurales, et l’État reste un mirage pour une grande partie d’entre eux. Au-delà des quelques promesses opportunément annoncées peu de temps avant l’élection présidentielle (à l’issue de laquelle le président sortant, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, a été réélu), seul le volet militaire a été réellement mis en œuvre.

      ========================

      5 « Dans le centre du Mali, les populations prises au piège du terrorisme et du contre-terrorisme », Rapport d’enquête n° 727 de la Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l’homme et de l’Association malienne des droits de l’homme, novembre 2018.

      6 Sangare Boukary, « Le centre du Mali : épicentre du djihadisme ? », note d’analyse du GRIP, mai 2016.

      7 Communiqué de Human Rights Watch, 31 janvier 2013 : https://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2013/01/31/mali-larmee-malienne-et-des-groupes-islamistes-ont-execute-des-prisonniers.

      8 Communiqué de Human Rights Watch, 26 mars 2013 : https://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2013/03/26/mali-des-soldats-ont-torture-des-detenus-lere.

      9 Entretiens avec l’auteur, Bamako, mars 2018.

      10 Le 18 mars 2013 à Doungoura (cercle de Tenenkou), au moins 20 personnes, essentiellement des Peuls, ont été tuées et jetées dans un puits par des hommes armés apparentés au MNLA. D’autres exactions ont été rapportées les jours suivants dans la même zone. Sources : entretiens avec l’auteur, Bamako, avril 2016.

      11 Entretien avec l’auteur, Bamako, mai 2018.

      12 Le premier semestre de l’année 2017 a été particulièrement sanglant. Le 19 janvier 2017, la pose d’une mine, suivie d’une fusillade, aurait provoqué la mort d’au moins dix soldats maliens dans la zone de Diabaly. Le 5 mars, l’attaque d’une patrouille des Fama à Boulikessi a fait 11 morts et 5 blessés. Le 2 mai, une embuscade entre Nampala et Dogofri a tué neuf soldats et en a blessé cinq autres.

      13 À la fin de l’année scolaire 2018, deux écoles sur trois de l’académie de Mopti étaient fermées. Source : ONU.

      14 Entretien avec l’auteur, Bamako, mai 2018.

      15 Entretien avec l’auteur, Bamako, mars 2018.

      16 « Mali central, la fabrique d’une insurrection ? », International Crisis Group, Rapport Afrique n° 238, juillet 2016.

      17 « Mali : Les abus s’étendent dans le sud du pays », rapport de Human Rights Watch, février 2016.

      Des massacres laissés impunis
      Dès le mois de janvier 2018, les Fama ont repris le contrôle des camps qu’elles avaient abandonnés trois ans plus tôt, et dans lesquels elles n’étaient revenues qu’occasionnellement. Elles ont en outre mené plusieurs opérations de lutte anti-terroriste, parfois sous commandement du G5-Sahel. Mais ce retour en force n’a pas permis de reprendre le contrôle des territoires perdus, qui restent encore aujourd’hui des zones de non-droit.

      Les éléments de la katiba Macina l’ont bien compris : ils évitent soigneusement les patrouilles et se cachent dans leurs repères, souvent situés dans des forêts, jusqu’à ce que les militaires repartent. Le reste du temps, ce sont eux qui dictent leur loi aux habitants. Cette situation empêche ces derniers de collaborer avec les forces de sécurité.

      Un sous-officier de l’armée malienne qui a mené plusieurs opérations en 2018 dans le centre du pays admet qu’il est compliqué de créer un lien avec les populations : « Quand on entre dans un village, on voit bien que les gens ont peur. Ils ne nous regardent même pas. Comme l’État n’est pas là la plupart du temps, ils doivent faire avec les djihadistes. Si on passe dans la journée, ils savent que le soir même les djihadistes viendront dans le village et attraperont ceux qui nous ont parlé . »18

      Outre cette menace décrite comme omniprésente par les habitants, d’autres raisons sont avancées pour expliquer cette défiance. Des Peuls déplorent notamment l’absence de dialogue avec les militaires maliens. D’autres évoquent la réputation qui les précède. Les opérations de l’armée malienne ont en effet été marquées par de nombreux abus en matière de droits humains ces derniers mois : l’enquête de la FIDH et de l’AMDH a démontré que des unités de l’armée avaient exécuté au moins 67 personnes, des Peuls dans leur grande majorité, au cours de six opérations menées entre février et juillet 2018, la plupart dans le cadre de l’opération « Dambe »19.

      D’une tuerie à l’autre, le scénario est sensiblement le même : une colonne de l’armée malienne installe un camp provisoire pendant quelques jours dans une zone considérée comme étant « infestée » de djihadistes ; elle procède à des arrestations sur la base de dénonciations villageoises ou du simple fait de l’appartenance à la communauté peule ; certaines des personnes arrêtées sont passées à tabac avant d’être libérées ou envoyées à Bamako, d’autres sont exécutées et enterrées dans une fosse commune…

      Salif Traoré, ministre malien de la sécurité et de la protection civile, en août 2018. © Reuters
      Salif Traoré, ministre malien de la sécurité et de la protection civile, en août 2018. © Reuters
      Le 21 février 2018 par exemple, dans les environs de Sokolo, les Forces armées maliennes patrouillent dans plusieurs villages et campements peuls. Elles y arrêtent neuf personnes : sept Peuls et deux Bambaras, qui sont relâchés le soir même. Quelques jours après le départ des militaires, des villageois se rendent dans leur campement pour tenter de retrouver les disparus. Sur les lieux, ils trouvent ce qui pourrait être une fosse de 3 mètres sur 2,5 mètres. « Il y avait des petits trous dans la terre, et des traces de sang, comme quand on égorge un mouton », indique un témoin20.
      Selon toute vraisemblance, les sept Peuls ont été exécutés et enterrés par des soldats maliens, sur les lieux mêmes où la colonne avait installé son camp provisoire, dans une forêt. Une enquête a été ouverte et très vite refermée. Elle n’a abouti à aucune arrestation21.

      Les méthodes employées par les soldats maliens semblent relever de la politique de la terre brûlée. « On a parfois l’impression qu’ils arrêtent n’importe qui, du moment qu’il est peul, et qu’ils ont pour consigne d’en tuer un certain nombre pour effrayer les populations », souligne un observateur onusien déployé dans la région22.

      Un officier de l’armée en poste à Bamako, loin du théâtre des opérations, pense pour sa part qu’au contraire, ces pratiques sont liées à l’absence de consignes de la part de la hiérarchie : « On envoie des jeunes éléments sur un terrain très difficile, sans consigne claire sur ce qu’il faut faire. Ils ne connaissent pas le contexte, ni parfois la langue des habitants, ils ont peur, ils sont nerveux, et donc parfois ils tirent dans le tas. »23

      Il paraît cependant difficile d’expliquer certaines opérations autrement que par une volonté manifeste de terroriser les populations. Le 5 avril, les Fama ont arrêté 14 hommes dans le hameau de Nelbal, situé à une quinzaine de kilomètres de Dioura. Selon des témoins, les militaires ont encerclé le campement peul, ils ont rassemblé tous les habitants, hommes, femmes et enfants, ont bandé les yeux à tous les hommes valides et les ont emmenés avec eux24. Le lendemain, l’armée a publié un communiqué indiquant que 14 hommes, présentés comme de présumés terroristes, étaient morts en tentant de s’évader de la prison de Dioura25.

      Deux mois plus tard, le 13 juin, les soldats maliens ont tué 25 hommes qu’ils avaient arrêtés dans les villages de Nantaka et Kobaka, situés tout près de Mopti, et les ont enterrés dans trois fosses communes à quelques kilomètres des deux villages. Dans un communiqué publié le 19 juin, le ministère de la défense a confirmé « l’existence de fosses communes impliquant certains personnels Fama dans des violations graves ayant occasionné mort d’hommes à Nantaka et Kobaka », et annoncé l’ouverture d’une enquête judiciaire26. Celle-ci n’a pour l’heure abouti à aucune arrestation ni à aucune sanction officielle.

      D’autres massacres commis par les Fama paraissent pouvoir répondre d’un esprit de vengeance. Ce qui s’est passé à Boulikessi le 19 mai 2018 en fournit une illustration. En 2015, face à la menace des djihadistes, l’armée avait quitté le camp qui jouxte cette ville. Le 28 décembre 2017, un détachement de l’armée malienne, sous commandement du G5-Sahel, a réinvesti le camp. Quelques jours après son arrivée, un lieutenant a organisé une réunion avec les habitants, au cours de laquelle il aurait annoncé que si les militaires subissaient une attaque, ils s’en prendraient aux habitants. « Pour un mort de notre côté, on en tuera vingt de votre côté », aurait-il dit à plusieurs reprises, selon des notables locaux27.

      Le 19 mai, jour de foire à Boulikessi, les militaires ont mis leur menace à exécution. Ce jour-là, un soldat qui patrouillait près du marché a été tué par un homme venu à moto et reparti aussitôt. Trente minutes plus tard, les militaires sont revenus en nombre. Ils ont tiré de manière indiscriminée sur les gens qui étaient restés sur les lieux, tuant dix hommes, puis ils sont allés chercher deux autres personnes dans la maison d’un commerçant, qu’ils ont exécutées sous les yeux du chef de village28.

      À l’évidence, les formations en matière de droits humains promulguées par l’EUTM et la Minusma n’ont pas eu l’effet escompté. Quant aux efforts consentis par l’État malien pour renforcer l’armée, ils ne lui ont pas permis pour l’heure d’engranger les victoires. Certes, des caches de la katiba Macina ont été découvertes et des combattants ont été arrêtés ou parfois tués. Un important travail a également été mené au niveau du renseignement.

      LIRE AUSSI
      Le Mali est au centre d’une polémique entre l’Agence française de développement et des chercheurs-universitaires
      PAR FANNY PIGEAUD
      Au Mali, un pogrom mené au nez et à la barbe de l’armée fait 136 morts
      PAR RÉMI CARAYOL
      Dans le centre du Mali, les milices massacrent en toute impunité
      PAR RÉMI CARAYOL
      Le Mali s’avère incapable de juger les djihadistes
      PAR RÉMI CARAYOL
      Mais la lutte anti-terroriste ne peut se résumer à ce seul tableau de chasse. Jusqu’à présent, les forces de sécurité se sont montrées incapables de protéger les civils, comme en témoigne ce chiffre de l’ONU : lors des seuls mois d’avril, mai et juin 2018, au moins 287 personnes ont été tuées dans le centre du pays29.
      Les Fama n’ont pas été plus efficaces face aux différentes milices qui se sont constituées ces trois dernières années dans cette zone. Afin de remédier à l’absence de l’État, des mouvements armés dits « d’autodéfense » ont été créés de manière plus ou moins spontanée, sur la base de l’appartenance communautaire : dogon, peul, bambara. Mais ils ne protègent que leur propre communauté, et s’en prennent plus souvent aux civils issus de la communauté « concurrente » qu’aux combattants de la katiba Macina.

      Ces milices ont commis de nombreux massacres en 2018, plus particulièrement à l’approche de la saison des pluies30. Elles ont incendié des villages et ont obligé des milliers de personnes à se déplacer. Certaines d’entre elles ont agi au nez et à la barbe des soldats maliens, et parfois avec le soutien de responsables politiques et militaires.

      Il semble notamment que les Dozos (chasseurs traditionnels), qui jouent un rôle majeur dans les milices bambara et dogon, ont été dans un premier temps utilisés par les Fama comme éclaireurs ou informateurs, avant de participer plus activement aux combats. Or cette stratégie a d’ores et déjà montré ses limites : au fil du temps, ces groupes armés ont gagné en autonomie ; ils menacent désormais de s’en prendre à l’armée si elle se met en travers de leur route31 et mènent des expéditions meurtrières d’une ampleur inédite au Mali32.

      =========================

      18 Entretien avec l’auteur, Ségou, mars 2018.

      19 Rapport d’enquête n° 727 de la Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l’homme et de l’Association malienne des droits de l’homme, novembre 2018.

      20 Entretien avec l’auteur, Bamako, mai 2018.

      21 https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/04/13/au-mali-les-autorites-enquetent-sur-des-soupcons-d-executions-sommaires-par-.

      22 Entretien avec l’auteur, Mopti, mai 2018.

      23 Entretien avec l’auteur, Bamako, mars 2018.

      24 Entretiens avec l’auteur, Bamako et Mopti, mai 2018.

      25 http://www.fama.ml/tentative-devasion-des-suspects-trouvent-la-mort-a-dioura.

      26 https://www.jeuneafrique.com/579883/societe/mali-le-gouvernement-confirme-lexistence-de-fosses-communes-impliquant.

      27 Entretiens avec l’auteur, Bamako, juin 2018.

      28 Entretiens avec l’auteur, Bamako, juin 2018. Voir également le rapport d’enquête de la Minusma : https://minusma.unmissions.org/la-minusma-conclut-son-enqu%C3%AAte-sur-les-incidents-de-boulkes.

      29 Rapport du Secrétaire général des Nations unies, S/2018/866, 25 septembre 2018.

      30 « “Avant, nous étions des frères”. Exactions commises par des groupes d’autodéfense dans le centre du Mali », rapport de Human Rights Watch, décembre 2018.

      31 https://www.voaafrique.com/a/l-arm%C3%A9e-cible-un-groupe-arm%C3%A9-dogon-au-mali/4474766.html.

      32 Le 23 mars 2019, une attaque menée par des Dozos sur le village peul d’Ogossagou, dans le centre du Mali, a fait au moins 160 morts.

  • Can #blockchain Help Ease #brexit ?
    https://hackernoon.com/can-blockchain-help-ease-brexit-196adf17d024?source=rss----3a8144eabfe3-

    It’s ugly. It’s comical. It’s tragic.UK’s departure from the European Union has at some point of time, been described as one or all of the above. This separation truly has captured the world’s attention for its rather unpleasant execution. It’s been more than three years since a referendum clearly indicated the will of the majority of British citizens, to leave the EU. However, politicians are divided on a final roadmap for Britain’s departure from the EU.Earlier this year, British legislators voted against the Brexit deal negotiated by Prime Minister Theresa May with the European Union. As I write this, the imminent date for Britain’s departure is just a day away, and there is still no agreement over how things are going to be, once this divorce finally culminates into an irreversible (...)

    #technology #european-union #politics

  • #Minniti: ‘Affidare il salvataggio dei naufraghi ai libici è stato un drammatico errore’

    Marco Minniti (PD): ‘Il problema è chi risponde al telefono. Prima rispondeva la guardia costiera italiana, ma ora nel Mediterraneo centrale non operiamo più… e la guardia costiera libica non è in grado di salvare i naufraghi’

    http://www.la7.it/piazzapulita/video/giannini-%E2%80%98l%E2%80%99italia-in-libia-ha-scommesso-sul-cavallo-sbagliato%E
    #ONG #sauvetage #asile #migrations #Méditerranée #réfugiés #erreur #erreur_dramatique #gardes-côtes_libyens #Libye
    via @isskein

    J’ai ajouté à cette métaliste:
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749#message765324

    • «La guardiacostiera libica non è preparata a svolgere attività di coordinamento e salvataggio in mare. È stato un tragico errore». L’ex ministro Minniti dice la verità. Finalmente. Dopo centinaia di morti.

      https://twitter.com/openarms_it/status/1116448798472134656

      Traduction de @isskein :

      « Les garde-côtes libyens ne sont pas prêts à mener des activités de coordination et de sauvetage en mer. C’était une erreur tragique » L’ancien ministre Minniti (qui a lancé es négociations avec les Libyens) dit la vérité. Enfin. Après des centaines de morts.

      https://twitter.com/isskein/status/1116452323050565641?s=12

    • Warning of ’Libyan death zone’ as Tripoli stops migrant rescues

      The Libyan Coast Guard has not been operating in its maritime rescue zone for three weeks. A German search and rescue NGO, Sea-Eye, has called for Malta to take over and has warned of a ’Libyan death zone.’

      Sea-Eye says the United Nations refugee agency, the UNHCR, has confirmed that there has been no search and rescue activity by the Libyan Coast Guard in the maritime rescue zone since April 10. The claim is supported by a UN official in Tripoli with access to “official information,” according to the Italian newspaper Avvenire.

      Avvenire alleges that Libyan patrol boats normally used for search and rescue, which include some supplied by Italy and France, are being deployed for combat.operations in the civil war. Since the beginning of April, hundreds of people have been killed in fighting between the Haftar Libyan National Army and the internationally-recognized Government of National Accord. “Obviously, the government of Tripoli has its own problems instead of dealing with EU border protection,” says Gorden Isler, a spokesperson for Sea-Eye.

      Blackout

      The Sea-Eye search and rescue vessel, the Alan Kurdi, will spend the next month in a Spanish shipyard for routine maintenance, leaving one other NGO ship, the Mare Jonio, in action in the Central Mediterranean.

      With very few NGOs active in the area and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) unable to work in Tripoli, Isler says there is no information about emergencies or drownings at sea. Sea-Eye has not heard of any rescues since April 10.

      However, this tweet from Alarm Phone, the hotline for people in distress at sea, says a group of 23 people was picked up by a fishing boat and returned to Libya yesterday.

      Leaving rescue to Libyans ’irresponsible’

      With Libya “paralyzed” by civil war, Europe must step in now and take over rescue work in the Mediterranean, says Isler. Sea-Eye wants immediate action from the International Maritime Organization to remove responsibility for the sea area from Libya, or “Libya’s so-called search and rescue zone will become a Libyan death zone.”

      Sea-Eye says Libya had conducted few missions in its search and rescue zone before the escalation of civil conflict, with only 12 operations this year. During the period in which the Sea-Eye’s vessel was in the area, between March 25 and April 3, the Libyan Coast Guard (LCG) failed to engage in three separate emergencies, according to Isler. “Rubber boats with people disappear without any LCG activities. It is irresponsible to leave this search and rescue area to the Libyans.”

      Malta urged to take over

      Italy handed over responsibility for rescuing migrants in the search and rescue zone to Libya last June. In February, the German left-wing party, Die Linke, called for administration of the zone to be given back to the Maritime Rescue Coordination Center in Rome. But the prospect of Italy agreeing to take back responsibility, Isler says, is “probably an illusion”.

      The best option now, according to Sea-Eye, is Malta, a small archipelago with a population of about half a million. The NGO argues that the country is capable of taking responsibility for the search and rescue zone “in principle”.

      But Malta has so far given no public sign that it would be willing to take over from Libya. Earlier this month, the Maltese government forced the Alan Kurdi, with 62 rescued migrants on board, to remain at sea for days while European countries argued over who would take them in. “Once again, the European Union’s smallest state has been put under pointless pressure in being tasked with resolving an issue which was not its responsibility,” the government complained.

      Sea-Eye says a resolution involving Malta must include support from other EU member states, particularly Germany. “We hope that our own government will lead by example and play an important role in supporting Malta,” Isler says.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/16615/warning-of-libyan-death-zone-as-tripoli-stops-migrant-rescues