Last month, despite an ongoing Russian-backed regime counteroffensive that seems to have largely targeted Jaish al-Fateh—rather than the self-proclaimed Islamic State, as Moscow first claimed it would—the rebel coalition announced it would launch a new offensive to take central Hama province. But less than two weeks later, Jund al-Aqsa declared its withdrawal from the coalition in the most controversial terms possible: It not only quit, it nearly accused some of its former allies of apostasy. Rumors swirled that Jabhat al-Nusra, one of Jaish al-Fateh’s two core groups, had also suspended its role in the coalition.
Jund al-Aqsa said it was leaving Jaish al-Fateh because of what it called some coalition members’ un-Islamic political positions and because of “constant pressure” from Ahrar al-Sham specifically to fight the Islamic State. Jund al-Aqsa said it would rejoin only if Jaish al-Fateh’s members met its high-ceilinged demands, including that the coalition declare war on Russia and America and commit to a binding Islamic charter. (This despite the fact that Jaish al-Fateh has administered Idlib city in accordance with strict Islamic law.)
Jund al-Aqsa’s complaints that Jaish al-Fateh members have supported “projects in conflict with Islamic shariah” seem to have been aimed in large part at Ahrar al-Sham. The latter Islamist rebel group has evolved lately from a more traditionally jihadi faction to something more sophisticated and interested in political engagement. But some of its outreach has provoked criticism from harder-line jihadi elements. Ahrar al-Sham certainly seems to have assumed it was the target of Jund al-Aqsa’s criticisms, as two of Ahrar’s top leaders issued sharply worded responses.
But whatever political grievances Jund al-Aqsa mustered, the main reason for its withdrawal seems to have been its borderline refusal to fight the Islamic State. Any Jaish al-Fateh offensive south into Hama will eventually bring rebels face-to-face with the Islamic State. In its statement announcing the Hama offensive, Jaish al-Fateh promised to fight any military force that stood in its way, including the Islamic State. Although Jund al-Aqsa said it viewed the Islamic State’s “caliphate” as invalid and condemned its extremist transgressions, it only said that repelling the Islamic State’s aggression “in the areas where we are present” was legitimate. Instead, it proposed an unlikely truce between the Islamic State and Syria’s Islamist brigades.
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Jaish al-Fateh’s successes have been attributed in large part to a new rapprochement between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar. But even open-handed external support and battlefield momentum may only go so far in holding together Syria’s more mainstream rebels with jihadis like Jund al-Aqsa and Jabhat al-Nusra. However much effort and resources regional powers expend to bolt together ideologically diverse factions, those clients ultimately have their own probably irreconcilable agendas.
Jund al-Aqsa rejoining Jaish al-Fateh will not somehow fix that. As part of the agreement bringing Jund al-Aqsa back in, the rebel coalition will reportedly issue the sort of Islamic charter the hard-liners demanded. A charter tailored to Jund al-Aqsa’s extremist views will not reconcile the politics of these factions. What it could do, however, is succeed in making Jaish al-Fateh’s more mainline members toxic to an international audience, thus sabotaging their attempts at diplomatic outreach.
Jaish al-Fateh’s unity looks untenable over the long term. The centrifugal forces that drive Syria’s rebels and jihadis apart, from ideology to money to personality, are still at work, even within such a successful alliance. And whatever efforts regional states and rebels themselves make, there may be nothing that can ultimately keep these rebels together.
