organization:international atomic energy agency

  • Iran Isn’t Trying to Build a Bomb Tomorrow. It Wants Sanctions Relief. – Foreign Policy

    Iran’s decision to surpass uranium enrichment limits isn’t a dangerous provocation. It’s a calculated effort to get European leaders to reinforce the nuclear deal and halt the drift toward war.
    By Gérard Araud, Ali Vaez | July 2, 2019,

    On Monday, for the first time since the nuclear deal with Iran went into effect on Jan. 16, 2016, Iran has deliberately violated its terms by producing more low-enriched uranium than the agreement permits. The threshold of 300 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride—corresponding to 202.8 kilograms of enriched uranium—was designed to keep Iran at a comfortable distance from nearly 1,500 kilograms of 3.67 percent enriched uranium that would be needed for a single nuclear weapon if the uranium were to be further enriched to 90 percent.

    Trump claimed that withdrawal would lead to a better deal—it has not, and chances of that are diminishing if they ever were realistic.It has been a long time coming. A little over a year ago, U.S. President Donald Trump decided to withdraw the United States from the 2015 nuclear agreement that bound Iran to carefully crafted restrictions on its nuclear program and intrusive inspections of its nuclear sites. He claimed that the Iranians were cheating—they were not, as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has consistently reported. He claimed that this action would lead to a better deal—it has not, and chances of that are diminishing if they ever were realistic.

  • Oman attack: Iran is the immediate, but unlikely, suspect - Iran -

    Oman attack: Iran is the immediate, but unlikely, suspect
    U.S. officials rushed to point to Tehran, but somehow the world’s leading intelligence services failed to discover who is actually behind the strike. And even if they knew, what could be done without risking all-out war?
    Zvi Bar’el | Jun. 14, 2019 | 8:36 AM | 3

    A unnamed senior U.S. Defense Department official was quick to tell CBS that Iran was “apparently” behind the Thursday attack on two oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman, followed by State Secretary Mike Pompeo who later told reported that it was his government’s assessment. There’s nothing new about that, but neither is it a decisive proof.

    Who, then, struck the tankers? Whom does this strike serve and what can be done against such attacks?

    In all previous attacks in the Gulf in recent weeks Iran was naturally taken to be the immediate suspect. After all, Iran had threatened that if it could now sell its oil in the Gulf, other countries would not be able to ship oil through it; Tehran threatened to block the Strait of Hormuz, and in any case it’s in the sights of the United States, Saudi Arabia and Israel. But this explanation is too easy.

    The Iranian regime is in the thrones of a major diplomatic struggle to persuade Europe and its allies, Russia and China, not to take the path of pulling out of the 2015 nuclear agreement. At the same time, Iran is sure that the United States is only looking for an excuse to attack it. Any violent initiative on Tehran’s part could only make things worse and bring it close to a military conflict, which it must avoid.

    Iran has announced it would scale back its commitments under the nuclear deal by expanding its low-level uranium enrichment and not transferring the remainder of its enriched uranium and heavy water to another country, as the agreement requires. The International Atomic Energy Agency’s reports reveal that it has indeed stepped up enrichment, but not in a way that could support a military nuclear program.

    It seems that alongside its diplomatic efforts, Iran prefers to threaten to harm the nuclear deal itself, responding to Washington with the same token, rather than escalate the situation to a military clash.

    Other possible suspects are the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen, who continue to pound Saudi targets with medium-range missiles, as was the case last week with strikes on the Abha and Jizan airports, near the Yemeni border, which wounded 26 people. The Houthis have also fired missiles at Riyadh and hit targets in the Gulf. In response, Saudi Arabia launched a massive missile strike on Houthi-controlled areas in northern Yemen.

    The strike on the oil tankers may have been a response to the response, but if this is the case, it goes against Iran’s policy, which seeks to neutralize any pretexts for a military clash in the Gulf. The question, therefore, is whether Iran has full control over all the actions the Houthis take, and whether the aid it gives them commits them fully to its policies, or whether they see assaults on Saudi targets as a separate, local battle, cut off from Iran’s considerations.

    The Houthis have claimed responsibility for some of their actions in Saudi territory in the past, and at times even took the trouble of explaining the reasons behind this assault or the other. But not this time.

    Yemen also hosts large Al-Qaida cells and Islamic State outposts, with both groups having a running account with Saudi Arabia and apparently the capabilities to carry out strikes on vessels moving through the Gulf.

    In the absence of confirmed and reliable information on the source of the fire, we may meanwhile discount the possibility of a Saudi or American provocation at which Iran has hinted, but such things have happened before. However, we may also wonder why some of the most sophisticated intelligence services in the world are having so much trouble discovering who actually carried out these attacks.

    Thwarting such attacks with no precise intelligence is an almost impossible task, but even if the identity of those responsible for it is known, the question of how to respond to the threat would still arise.

    If it turns out that Iran initiated or even carried out these attacks, American and Saudi military forces could attack its Revolutionary Guards’ marine bases along the Gulf coast, block Iranian shipping in the Gulf and persuade European countries to withdraw from the nuclear deal, claiming that continuing relations with Iran would mean supporting terrorism in general, and maritime terrorism in particular.

    The concern is that such a military response would lead Iran to escalate its own and openly strike American and Saudi targets in the name of self-defense and protecting its sovereignty. In that case, a large-scale war would be inevitable. But there’s no certainty that U.S. President Donald Trump, who wants to extricate his forces from military involvement in the Middle East, truly seeks such a conflict, which could suck more and more American forces into this sensitive arena.

    An escape route from this scenario would require intensive mediation efforts between Iran and the United States, but therein lies one major difficulty – finding an authoritative mediator that could pressure both parties. Russia or China are not suitable candidates, and ties between Washington and the European Union are acrimonious.

    It seems that all sides would be satisfied if they could place responsibility for the attacks on the Houthis or other terror groups. That is not to say that the United States or Saudi Arabia have any magic solutions when it comes to the Houthis; far from it. The war in Yemen has been going on for five years now with no military resolution, and increased bombardment of concentrations of Houthi forces could only expand their efforts to show their strength. But the United States would pay none of the diplomatic or military price for assaults on the Houthis it would for a forceful violent response against Iran itself.

    If sporadic, small-scale attacks raise such complex dilemmas, one can perhaps dream of an all-out war with Iran, but it is enough to look at the chaos in Iraq and Afghanistan to grow extremely cautious of the trajectory in which such dreams become a nightmare that lasts for decades.❞
    #Oman #Iran

    • UPDATE 1-"Flying objects" damaged Japanese tanker during attack in Gulf of Oman
      Junko Fujita – June 14, 2019
      (Adds comments from company president)
      By Junko Fujita

      TOKYO, June 14 (Reuters) - Two “flying objects” damaged a Japanese tanker owned by Kokuka Sangyo Co in an attack on Thursday in the Gulf of Oman, but there was no damage to the cargo of methanol, the company president said on Friday.

      The Kokuka Courageous is now sailing toward the port of Khor Fakkan in the United Arab Emirates, with the crew having returned to the ship after evacuating because of the incident, Kokuka President Yutaka Katada told a press conference. It was being escorted by the U.S. Navy, he said.

      “The crew told us something came flying at the ship, and they found a hole,” Katada said. “Then some crew witnessed the second shot.”

      Katada said there was no possibility that the ship, carrying 25,000 tons of methanol, was hit by a torpedo.

      The United States has blamed Iran for attacking the Kokuka Courageous and another tanker, the Norwegian-owned Front Altair, on Thursday, but Tehran has denied the allegations.

      The ship’s crew saw an Iranian military ship in the vicinity on Thursday night Japan time, Katada said.

      Katada said he did not believe Kokuka Courageous was targetted because it was owned by a Japanese firm. The tanker is registered in Panama and was flying a Panamanian flag, he said.

      “Unless very carefully examined, it would be hard to tell the tanker was operated or owned by Japanese,” he said. (...)

  • Iran circles wagons as Trump’s B Team beats war drum
    Posted on May 9, 2019 by M. K. BHADRAKUMAR - Indian Punchline

    If there can be a lethal game of Russian roulette in international politics, this is it — what just began on May 8, the first anniversary of the United States’ withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal of July 2015.

    Iran exercised “strategic patience” for one full year, as President Hassan Rouhani noted, upon the request from the five remaining signatories of the nuclear deal — Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China. That period has run out.

    Not only have the five powers failed to persuade the Trump administration to retract from its decision, but Washington has gone on a warpath of sanctions and deployment of a formidable strike group to the Persian Gulf.

    On the other hand, the five big powers couldn’t ensure that Iran got the full benefits out of the nuclear deal as envisaged under the nuclear deal, despite its full compliance with the terms of the deal, which has been acknowledged repeatedly by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Only Russia and China observed the commitments given to Iran as signatories, while the three European powers merely paid lip service.

    Against this sombre backdrop, Rouhani announced on Wednesday that if the remaining signatories fail to provide Iran with the merits stated under the deal in the next 60 days, Tehran will stop complying with its nuclear undertakings in consequent phases. For a start, Iran will cease to observe the capping on the volume of enriched uranium and heavy water reserves that it is permitted to hold.

    After 60 days, if Iran’s grievances are not still addressed, it will no longer observe the restrictions on the 3.6 percent level of uranium enrichment and will resume work on its heavy water reactor at Arak. Iran has underlined that it is not withdrawing from the nuclear deal but is only taking reciprocal measures as provided under articles 26 and 32 of the agreement regarding the eventuality of one or more of the six powers failing to observe the treaty. Rouhani has specified Iran’s concerns particularly in the oil industry and the banking sector, which Washington has targeted with sanctions.

    Rouhani said that after 120 days from now, even if Iran starts enriching uranium beyond the 3.6 level and resumes work in Arak, it will give yet another 60 days for negotiations before taking additional unspecified (which could be by the yearend). Meanwhile, Iran will react strongly against any move by the western powers to approach the UN Security Council for reimposition of the old UN sanctions. (...)


  • First Images of Saudi Nuclear Reactor Show Plant Nearing Finish - Bloomberg

    Saudi Arabia is nearing completion of its first nuclear reactor, satellite images of the facility show, triggering warnings about the risks of the kingdom using the technology without signing up to the international rules governing the industry.

    The research facility is located in the southwest corner of the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology in Riyadh, according to images published by GoogleEarth. They’re the first in the public domain to confirm that the program is advancing, showing construction nearing its finish around a columnar vessel that will contain atomic fuel.

    The advancement is alarming to arms-control experts because Saudi Arabia has yet to sign up to the international framework of rules other nuclear powers follow to ensure that civilian atomic programs aren’t used to build weapons. Nuclear fuel providers won’t move to supply the unit until new surveillance arrangements have been sealed with the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.

    On ne va tout de même pas traiter l’Arabie de MBS comme l’Irak de Saddam ?

  • Iran Was Closer to a Nuclear Bomb Than Intelligence Agencies Thought – Foreign Policy

    ecret Iranian archive seized by Israeli agents earlier this year indicates that Tehran’s nuclear program was more advanced than Western intelligence agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency had thought, according to a prominent nuclear expert who examined the documents.

    That conclusion in turn suggests that if Iran pulls out of the 2015 multilateral nuclear deal that U.S. President Donald Trump has already abandoned, it has the know-how to build a bomb fairly swiftly, perhaps in a matter of months, said David Albright, a physicist who runs the nonprofit Institute for Science and International Security in Washington, D.C.

    Iran would still need to produce weapons-grade uranium. If it restarts its centrifuges, it could have enough in about seven to 12 months, added Albright, who is preparing reports on the archive.

    Before the 2015 multilateral nuclear deal mainly negotiated by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, that would have taken only two months, but under the accord Iran was required to ship about 97 percent of its nuclear fuel out of the country and dismantle most its centrifuges.
    The archive, which is well over 100,000 pages long, covers the period from 1999 to 2003, a decade before negotiations on a nuclear deal began. But the trove of documents demonstrates that Washington and the IAEA were constantly underestimating how close Tehran was to a bomb.
    Mossad agents seized the archive in a daring nighttime raid on a warehouse in Tehran at the end of January. In late April, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu revealed some of the content in a speech that was panned as a melodramatic attempt to prod Trump into leaving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the formal name for the Iran nuclear deal. “These files conclusively prove that Iran is brazenly lying when it said it never had a nuclear weapons program,” Netanyahu said.

  • The #Iran deal explained: what is it and why does Trump want to scrap it? | World news | The Guardian

    Au cas où on aurait oublié.

    What is the Iran nuclear deal?

    Iran and a six-nation negotiating group reached a landmark agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in July 2015. It ended 12 years of deadlock over Tehran’s nuclear programme. Struck in Vienna after nearly two years of intensive talks, the deal limited the Iranian programme to reassure the rest of the world that it would be unable to develop nuclear weapons, in return for sanctions relief.

    At its core, the JCPOA is a straightforward bargain. Iran’s acceptance of strict limits on its nuclear programme in return for an escape from the sanctions that grew up around its economy over a decade prior to the accord. Under the deal, Iran unplugged two-thirds of its centrifuges, shipped out 98% of its enriched uranium and filled its plutonium production reactor with concrete.
    Iran deal: Donald Trump says US will no longer abide by nuclear agreement – live
    Read more

    Tehran also accepted extensive monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which has verified 10 times since the agreement, and as recently as February, that Tehran has complied with its terms. In return, all nuclear-related sanctions were lifted in January 2016, reconnecting Iran to global markets.
    Which countries are involved?

    The six major powers involved in the nuclear talks with Iran were in a group known as the P5+1: the UN security council’s five permanent members – China, France, Russia, the UK and the US – and Germany. The nuclear deal is also enshrined in a UN security council resolution that incorporated it into international law. The 15 members of the council at the time unanimously endorsed the agreement.


  • UN atomic chief says Iran meeting terms of nuclear deal

    #Amano : l’#Iran respecte ses engagements, mais les #Etats-Unis ont le droit de décider du contraire.

    VIENNA (AP) — The head of the U.N. agency monitoring Iran’s compliance with nuclear deal said Monday that Tehran is implementing the agreement — but says the ultimate judgment on compliance with the deal rests with the six world powers that signed the pact with the Islamic Republic.

    Yukiya Amano of the International Atomic Energy Agency told the 35-nation IAEA board that the terms Iran accepted “are being implemented” — an assessment that comes as members of the U.S. administration argue otherwise.

    The U.S. administration has faced two 90-day certification deadlines to state whether Iran was meeting the conditions needed to continue enjoying sanctions relief under the deal and has both times backed away from a showdown.

    But U.S. President Donald Trump more recently has said he does not expect to certify Iran’s compliance again. The next deadline is in mid-October.

    Pressed on whether he is saying that Iran is adhering to the terms of the deal, Amano said that can be determined only by a nation that is “party to the agreement.”

    #onu #aiea #mascarade #comparses

    • L’ONU annonce des crimes contre l’humanité au Vénézuela mais est de marbre avec l’Egypte et le Yémen... L’ONU annonce que le respect d’un accord ne dépend pas du respect des termes de l’accord, mais de l’avis des partis...
      Les fonctionnaires de l’ONU ont-ils le petit doigt raide ?

  • Five Years After Fukushima : Making Nuclear Power Safer | International Atomic Energy Agency

    Désespérant l’AIEA, rendre le nucléaire plus sur ? par sortir du nucléaire ?

    It has been five years since the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. In marking the anniversary this week, IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano recognized the progress made in Japan and worldwide in nuclear safety since the accident, but underscored the importance of all countries remaining vigilant in putting safety first.

  • Pendant qu’on publiait ça Quartz publie ceci :

    New nuclear reactors are being built a lot more like cars - Quartz

    At its birth, nuclear power was a closely guarded national enterprise, only accessible to the most prosperous nations. But over the last 50 years it has evolved into a robust international market with a global supply chain. Not only are more countries starting or considering new nuclear plants, a great many more countries are contributing to their construction.

    According to data from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 64 nuclear reactors are under construction around the world. Dozens more are in various stages of planning.


  • The IAEA’s ‘Final Assessment’
    by Gareth Porter, December 18, 2015

    Sur le rôle de #supplétif des #Etats-Unis de l’#AIEA

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) assessment has cleared the way for the board of governors to end the Agency’s extraordinary investigation into accusations of Iran’s past nuclear weapons work. But a closer examination of the document reveals much more about the political role that the Agency has played in managing the Iran file.

    Contrary to the supposed neutral and technical role that Director General Yukiya Amano has constantly invoked and the news media has long accepted without question, the Agency has actually been serving as prosecutor for the United States in making a case that #Iran has had a nuclear weapons program.


    Now that the Obama administration has settled on a nuclear agreement with Iran, the IAEA will no longer have to find contorted language to discuss Iran’s past and present nuclear program. Nevertheless, the Agency remains a highly political actor, and its role in monitoring and reporting on the implementation of the agreement may bring more occasions for official assessments that reflect the political interest of the U.S.-led dominant coalition in the IAEA board of governors rather than the objective reality of the issue under review.

  • Deux manières de présenter les choses,


    UN believes Iran worked on developing nuclear weapons

    A U.N. atomic agency says it believes that Iran worked in the past on nuclear weapons but its activities didn’t go past planning and basic component experiments.


    "This is critical: #IAEA report says the suspected Iranian weapons activities did not move beyond “feasibility and scientific studies”

  • Behind the Scenes: How the US and Iran Reached Their Landmark Deal | The Nation

    For months before the Lausanne framework was adopted, Western diplomats had been linking the lifting of sanctions with the resolution of the issue the United States and its negotiating partners had called “possible military dimensions,” or PMD—the demand that #Iran account for two sets of intelligence documents purporting to demonstrate Iranian nuclear-weapons-related research and development. But one set of documents had originated in #Israel, and the other had been submitted by the Mujahedin-e Khalq (#MEK), the cult-like Iranian terror group that had been known to act as a client for Israel. The authenticity of both sets of documents was extremely doubtful, as indicated by a number of anomalies in the papers, especially the fact that the most important documents purported to show Iranian efforts to integrate a nuclear weapon into a missile that Iran had already abandoned.

    Iran had not only rejected the linkage between its response to those documents and the lifting of sanctions; it also refused to accept the phrase “possible military dimensions,” which the IAEA had coined in 2008. Instead, the final document refers to “clarification of past and present outstanding issues.”

    The US and European negotiators had treated resolution of this issue as a potential bargaining chip that could be used on other issues, according to the Iranian official I met on June 29. “They would say if you reduce this, reduce that, we will get a resolution of the PMD,” the official told me. But he said Iran had never agreed to any linkage requiring that it must wait for an official IAEA assessment on PMD before getting sanctions lifted. The Lausanne framework included language that Iran would carry out “an agreed set of measures” on the PMD issue, but those measures remained to be negotiated.

  • Confidential UN report positive on Iran nuclear commitments

    VIENNA (AP) — Iran has met a key commitment under a preliminary nuclear deal setting up the current talks on a final agreement, leaving it with several tons less of the material it could use to make weapons, according to a U.N. report issued Wednesday.

    Obtained by The Associated Press, the confidential International Atomic Energy Agency report said more than four tons of the enriched uranium had been fed into a pipeline that ends with conversion of it into oxide, which is much less likely to be used to make nuclear arms.

  • Iran nuclear deal : ’Accusations with very little proof’

    #Israel et les #États-Unis sont considérés par l’#AIEA comme suffisamment objectifs pour que leurs accusations soient considérées comme des preuves,

    Robert Kelley [former IAEA nuclear inspector]: The IAEA is receiving external information, primarily from intelligence agencies in Israel and the United States. And they have written up this information in a report published in November 2011 in which they raise a whole series of allegations that Iran had a nuclear weapons program prior to 2004 and it may have continued past that point. That report concerned things like high explosives and electronic detonators that set off explosives, calculations of neutron multiplication in weapon-type systems. All those things are thrown out as accusations with very little proof or information where the allegations came from.

  • Article très instructif.
    Le directeur du ministère des Affaires étrangères israélien adresse une lettre à son ministre (Avigdor Lieberman) rappelant le « prix à payer » pour réparer les mauvaises relations avec l’administration Obama.
    Fait nouveau : Israël subit des pressions sur son programme nucléaire par la Conférence des Parties chargée d’examiner le traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires (TNP) de 2015 qui débute le 27 avril prochain. Et des initiatives anti-israéliennes sont prises par l’IAEA

    Foreign Ministry director : Israel may pay a heavy price for crisis with U.S. - Diplomacy and Defense - Israel News | Haaretz

    Coordination with the U.S. is crucial to Israel’s ability to cope with Palestinian UN bid and rearming of Hezbollah, top official says.
    By Barak Ravid

    The director of the Foreign Ministry on Wednesday sent a letter to Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman warning that Israel “is liable to pay a heavy price” because of the “intense, ongoing, and public” crisis in relations with the U.S. administration.

    In a two-page letter obtained by Haaretz, Foreign Ministry director-general Nissim Ben-Sheetrit called on Israel to take steps to quickly repair U.S.-Israel ties or face the consequences in the diplomatic and security arenas.

    Ben-Sheetrit’s letter focuses on the tense relations between the Netanyahu government and the Obama administration. He wrote that close coordination with the United States is crucial and directly connected to Israel’s ability to cope with all its diplomatic and security challenges.

    Under the heading “Diplomatic Challenges and Reorganization of the Foreign Ministry,” Ben-Sheetrit details the position of the Foreign Service’s professional staff regarding several issues Israel will have to address within weeks of the new government’s establishment. He said Israel will have to contend with the following issues before the June 30 deadline for reaching a final agreement between Iran and the large powers:

    The pending UN Security Council resolution initiated by France that deals with the Palestinian Authority’s request to become a full member of the United Nations. This resolution is expected to set parameters for resolving the core issues for reaching a permanent-status arrangement between Israel and the Palestinians.

    Palestinian lawsuits against Israel at the International Criminal Court at The Hague.

    * Pressure on Israel regarding its nuclear program by the Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which opens later this month, and anti-Israel initiatives by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

    Threat from the north

    One of the most serious problems Israel must address is the need to formulate a clear and firm stance on Hezbollah’s rearming and the increasing threat from the north, wrote Ben-Sheetrit. Calling this “a most urgent and critical issue for Israel,” he added: “Dealing well with this issue will be next to impossible if it is done without close coordination with the United States.”

    The Foreign Ministry director also addressed the effort by Israel to improve the conditions of the nuclear agreement with Iran before June 30. In diplomatic language, Ben-Sheetrit criticized Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s approach to the dispute with the Obama administration on this matter.

    “The loud argument being conducted with the White House on the Iranian issue, beyond the other damage, is undermining Israel’s ability to persuade the U.S. administration of the need for crucial changes in the final version of the developing nuclear agreement,” Ben-Sheetrit wrote.

    Given all these challenges, Foreign Ministry officials say the most important challenge facing the Israeli government is repairing relations with the United States. “We ascribe the greatest importance to leading processes that will quickly rehabilitate Israeli-American relations so as to prevent harm to many vital Israeli interests in the international arena,” Ben-Sheetrit wrote.

    He does not clarify what he means by “processes that will quickly rehabilitate” these bilateral ties. However, numerous Foreign Ministry officials, as well as officials of American Jewish organizations and members of the Obama administration, say replacing Ron Dermer as Israeli ambassador to the United States is one step that must be taken to end the crisis.

    So far Netanyahu has supported Dermer, who is considered one of the premier’s closest advisers, and is not considering a replacement.

    Ben-Sheetrit suggests bolstering the Foreign Ministry units that handle Israeli relations with the black and Hispanic communities in the United States and with the Christian world in general, particularly “given the great harm by radical Islam against the Christian population of the Middle East and Africa.”


    L’accord avec les Iraniens signé cette semaine

    Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program
    Below are the key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program that were decided in Lausanne, Switzerland. These elements form the foundation upon which the final text of the JCPOA will be written between now and June 30, and reflect the significant progress that has been made in discussions between the P5+1, the European Union, and Iran. Important implementation details are still subject to negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. We will work to conclude the JCPOA based on these parameters over the coming months.
    • Iran has agreed to reduce by approximately two-thirds its installed centrifuges. Iran will go from having about 19,000 installed today to 6,104 installed under the deal, with only 5,060 of these enriching uranium for 10 years. All 6,104 centrifuges will be IR-1s, Iran’s first-generation centrifuge.
    • Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for at least 15 years.
    • Iran has agreed to reduce its current stockpile of about 10,000 kg of low-enriched
    uranium (LEU) to 300 kg of 3.67 percent LEU for 15 years.
    • All excess centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure will be placed in IAEA monitored storage and will be used only as replacements for operating centrifuges and equipment.
    • Iran has agreed to not build any new facilities for the purpose of enriching uranium for 15 years.
    • Iran’s breakout timeline – the time that it would take for Iran to acquire enough fissile material for one weapon – is currently assessed to be 2 to 3 months. That timeline will be extended to at least one year, for a duration of at least ten years, under this framework.
    Iran will convert its facility at Fordow so that it is no longer used to enrich uranium
    • Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium at its Fordow facility for at least 15 years.
    • Iran has agreed to convert its Fordow facility so that it is used for peaceful purposes only
    – into a nuclear, physics, technology, research center.
    • Iran has agreed to not conduct research and development associated with uranium enrichment at Fordow for 15 years.
    • Iran will not have any fissile material at Fordow for 15 years.
    • Almost two-thirds of Fordow’s centrifuges and infrastructure will be removed. The remaining centrifuges will not enrich uranium. All centrifuges and related infrastructure will be placed under IAEA monitoring.
    Iran will only enrich uranium at the Natanz facility, with only 5,060 IR-1 first-generation centrifuges for ten years.
    • Iran has agreed to only enrich uranium using its first generation (IR-1 models) centrifuges at Natanz for ten years, removing its more advanced centrifuges.
    • Iran will remove the 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at Natanz and place them in IAEA monitored storage for ten years.
    • Iran will not use its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models to produce enriched uranium for at least ten years. Iran will engage in limited research and development with its advanced centrifuges, according to a schedule and parameters which have been agreed to by the P5+1.
    • For ten years, enrichment and enrichment research and development will be limited to ensure a breakout timeline of at least 1 year. Beyond 10 years, Iran will abide by its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan submitted to the IAEA, and pursuant to the JCPOA, under the Additional Protocol resulting in certain limitations on enrichment capacity.
    Inspections and Transparency
    • The IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, including to Iran’s enrichment facility at Natanz and its former enrichment facility at Fordow, and including the use of the most up-to-date, modern monitoring technologies.
    • Inspectors will have access to the supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear program. The new transparency and inspections mechanisms will closely monitor materials and/or components to prevent diversion to a secret program.
    • Inspectors will have access to uranium mines and continuous surveillance at uranium mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25 years.
    • Inspectors will have continuous surveillance of Iran’s centrifuge rotors and bellows production and storage facilities for 20 years. Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing base will be frozen and under continuous surveillance.
    • All centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure removed from Fordow and Natanz will be placed under continuous monitoring by the IAEA.
    • A dedicated procurement channel for Iran’s nuclear program will be established to monitor and approve, on a case by case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of
    certain nuclear-related and dual use materials and technology – an additional transparency measure.
    • Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, providing the IAEA much greater access and information regarding Iran’s nuclear program, including both declared and undeclared facilities.
    • Iran will be required to grant access to the IAEA to investigate suspicious sites or allegations of a covert enrichment facility, conversion facility, centrifuge production facility, or yellowcake production facility anywhere in the country.
    • Iran has agreed to implement Modified Code 3.1 requiring early notification of construction of new facilities.
    • Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns regarding the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of its program.
    Reactors and Reprocessing
    • Iran has agreed to redesign and rebuild a heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on a design that is agreed to by the P5+1, which will not produce weapons grade plutonium, and which will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production.
    • The original core of the reactor, which would have enabled the production of significant quantities of weapons-grade plutonium, will be destroyed or removed from the country.
    • Iran will ship all of its spent fuel from the reactor out of the country for the reactor’s lifetime.
    • Iran has committed indefinitely to not conduct reprocessing or reprocessing research and development on spent nuclear fuel.
    • Iran will not accumulate heavy water in excess of the needs of the modified Arak reactor, and will sell any remaining heavy water on the international market for 15 years.
    • Iran will not build any additional heavy water reactors for 15 years. Sanctions
    • Iran will receive sanctions relief, if it verifiably abides by its commitments.
    • U.S. and E.U. nuclear-related sanctions will be suspended after the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps. If at any time Iran fails to fulfill its commitments, these sanctions will snap back into place.
    • The architecture of U.S. nuclear-related sanctions on Iran will be retained for much of the duration of the deal and allow for snap-back of sanctions in the event of significant non-performance.
    • All past UN Security Council resolutions on the Iran nuclear issue will be lifted simultaneous with the completion, by Iran, of nuclear-related actions addressing all key concerns (enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD, and transparency).
    • However, core provisions in the UN Security Council resolutions – those that deal with transfers of sensitive technologies and activities – will be re-established by a new UN Security Council resolution that will endorse the JCPOA and urge its full implementation. It will also create the procurement channel mentioned above, which will serve as a key transparency measure. Important restrictions on conventional arms and ballistic missiles, as well as provisions that allow for related cargo inspections and asset freezes, will also be incorporated by this new resolution.
    • A dispute resolution process will be specified, which enables any JCPOA participant, to seek to resolve disagreements about the performance of JCPOA commitments.
    • If an issue of significant non-performance cannot be resolved through that process, then all previous UN sanctions could be re-imposed.
    • U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place under the deal.
    • For ten years, Iran will limit domestic enrichment capacity and research and development – ensuring a breakout timeline of at least one year. Beyond that, Iran will be bound by its longer-term enrichment and enrichment research and development plan it shared with the P5+1.
    • For fifteen years, Iran will limit additional elements of its program. For instance, Iran will not build new enrichment facilities or heavy water reactors and will limit its stockpile of enriched uranium and accept enhanced transparency procedures.
    • Important inspections and transparency measures will continue well beyond 15 years. Iran’s adherence to the Additional Protocol of the IAEA is permanent, including its significant access and transparency obligations. The robust inspections of Iran’s uranium supply chain will last for 25 years.
    • Even after the period of the most stringent limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, Iran will remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits Iran’s development or acquisition of nuclear weapons and requires IAEA safeguards on its nuclear program.
    #nucléaire iranien#accord nucléaire iranien#iran

  • Behind the smoke: #Gareth_Porter and the Iranian nuclear story

    Participants take their seats to attend the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors’ meeting at the International Center in Vienna on June 2, 2014. (Photo: AFP - Samuel Kubani) Participants take their seats to attend the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors’ meeting at the International Center in Vienna on June 2, 2014. (Photo: AFP - Samuel Kubani)

    Iran’s nuclear program has been a subject of obsession for Western governments and media agencies for decades, as far back as the final years of Western-backed Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi’s reign. But over the course of the last decade, the subject has reached new hysterical heights, propelled by mainstream media coverage mired with (...)

    #Culture_&_Society #Articles #cyberwarfare #EU #IFI #Iranian_nuclear_program #Israel #negotiations #US

  • Japan failed to report 640 kg of nuclear fuel to IAEA | The Japan Times

    Japan failed to include 640 kg of unused plutonium in its annual reports to the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2012 and 2013, in what experts are terming an “inappropriate omission.”

    The stock is part of mixed plutonium-uranium oxide (MOX) fuel stored in a reactor that was offline during this period, and was thus deemed exempt from IAEA reporting requirements, said an official at the Japan Atomic Energy Commission.

    Experts warn that Japan’s reporting does not reflect the actual state of unused plutonium that could be diverted for nuclear weapons. The unreported amount is enough to make about 80 nuclear bombs.
    In March 2011, the MOX fuel was loaded into the No. 3 reactor of Kyushu Electric Power Co.’s Genkai nuclear plant in Saga Prefecture during a regular checkup. It was removed two years later because the reactor has remained idled since the Fukushima nuclear crisis.

    When Japan reported to the IAEA in 2012 that it had 1.6 tons of unused plutonium at reactors nationwide as of the end of 2011, down from 2.2 tons the previous year, it excluded the 640 kg. The amount reported a year later remained at 1.6 tons.

    The fuel has been kept unused in a fuel pool since March 2013.

    Japan is subject to rigorous international monitoring, as it possesses the largest amount of plutonium among nonnuclear weaponized nations, with more than 44 tons extracted from spent fuel and reprocessed for reuse under its nuclear fuel cycle policy.

  • Was the Iranian threat fabricated by #Israel and the U.S.?
    By Shemuel Meir

    A #narrative is a story that we tell ourselves, and not necessarily what happened in reality. For example, the “Iranian threat” narrative, which has become the common wisdom in Israeli public discourse. A new book by #Gareth_Porter, an American historian and researcher specializing in U.S. national security, shows how the actual state of the Iranian nuclear program does not match the Iranian threat narrative.

    The book’s title, “Manufactured Crisis: The Untold Story of the Nuclear Scare” (Just World Books), already tells us that it is going against the current. Porter appears to be the only researcher who has read with an unprejudiced eye all the reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency from the past decade. He also had access to American intelligence reports on the Iranian issue from recent decades. In addition, Porter interviewed generations of American officials and analyzed the testimony of senior officials before Congress.

    The result is a highly detailed and well-documented book for all interested in understanding how we arrived at the Iranian nuclear crisis, and the “attack scenarios,” and invented facts and intelligence reports whose purpose was to support the preconceptions. At the same time, the book is invaluable for those wishing to understand what is being discussed in the intensive nuclear talks that have been taking place Iran and the superpowers (or, more accurately, Iran and the U.S.) since the signing of last November’s interim agreement, which surprised many Israelis.

    According to Porter, it was a hidden political #agenda of U.S. decision makers (from long before Israel entered the picture) that gave rise to the Iranian nuclear crisis. This is one of the book’s main subjects, and the starting point for a discussion with which we in Israel are unfamiliar.

    The story begins with U.S. support for the Iraqis during the 1980s Iraq-#Iran war. The critical point comes with the collapse of the Soviet empire. According to Porter, that event and the end of the Cold War pulled out the rug from under the CIA’s raison d’être. The solution the Americans found to continue providing the organization with a tremendous budget was the invention of a new threat – the merging of weapons of mass destruction (an ambiguous term in itself) and terror. Iran, which rose to the top of the list, provided the threat that “saved” the #CIA.

    The empowering of the CIA’s organizational interests was reinforced by the gallant neoconservatives, led by ideologues Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz and John Bolton, who had in the meantime reached senior positions in the government. They launched a campaign to delegitimize the Islamic Republic with the aim of toppling the regime (using the sanitized term “regime change”).

    Running through Porter’s book is the well-substantiated claim that U.S. and Israeli policies on Iran derived from their political and organizational interests, and not necessarily from careful factual analysis of the Iranian nuclear program, which was subject to IAEA monitoring, or of the intentions of the Iranian leadership.

    According to Porter, no systematic analysis was made of the goals of the Iranian nuclear program, and neither U.S. nor Israeli policy makers devoted any thought to why all of Iran’s official declarations on the subject were in line with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Furthermore, in U.S. discussions until 2007, and in Israel until today, hovering overhead is the nuclear “axiom” that Iran is dashing toward a bomb via the route of uranium-enrichment centrifuges. Porter and the IAEA found no proof of the dash to the bomb.

    Following is Haaretz’s interview with Porter, conducted via email.


    #Etats-Unis #AIEA #nucleaire

  • #Iran #nuclear talks with Western powers “useful,” #EU says

    Iran and six world powers held more “useful” talks on Tehran’s nuclear program, the European Union announced on Wednesday, as a Western diplomat said they are still struggling to overcome deep disagreements on the future of Iranian atomic capabilities. The remarks came after two days of expert-level talks in New York between Iran and the United States, France, Germany, Britain, China and Russia on a long-term accord that would end a decade-old dispute over Tehran’s nuclear ambitions by a self-imposed July 20 deadline. read more

    #IAEA #Top_News

  • #IAEA to visit Iran nuclear sites next week

    A team of IAEA experts is expected to visit two of Iran’s nuclear sites within the next week, as part of a monitoring process agreed with the UN agency. Iran’s official IRNA news agency reported Tuesday that inspectors would travel to the Ardakan yellow-cake production plant and the Saghand uranium mine, located close together around 450 kilometers from Tehran. Visiting the two sites “is the main purpose of this trip,” Behrouz Kamalvandi, a spokesman for Iran’s atomic energy organisation, told IRNA. read more

    #Iran_nuclear_program #Top_News

  • Resolving Nuclear Arms Claims Hinges on Iran’s Demand for Documents - Inter Press Service

    The past unwillingness of the Obama administration to entertain the possibility that the documents provided by the #MEK were fabricated or to allow #Iran the opportunity to prove that through close analysis of the documents, and the IAEA’s continued commitment to the weaponisation information it has published suggest that the issue of past claims will be just as contentious as the technical issues to be negotiated, if not more so.


  • #UN finds no evidence #Iran seeks nuclear arms: #Rouhani

    President Hassan Rouhani said Sunday that despite “thousands of hours” of inspection, the UN’s atomic watchdog has found no evidence of military objectives in Iran’s nuclear drive. His remarks came on the eve of an International Atomic Energy Agency board of governors meeting in Vienna, on the sidelines of which Iran will hold expert-level talks with world powers. Western powers “all know that nuclear science in Iran follows a peaceful path”, Rouhani said in a speech broadcast on state television. read more

    #nuclear_agreement #Top_News

  • IAEA commends Jordan’s studies on planned nuclear plant | The Jordan Times
    Le choix du site de la centrale approuvé à l’avance par la commission de l’IAEA

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has commended the Jordan Atomic Energy Commission’s (JAEC) assessment studies of the Kingdom’s planned nuclear plant.

    In a letter sent last week, the IAEA recommended that Jordan be considered a case model in conducting assessment studies for locations of nuclear plants.

    The letter came following a visit of a delegation from the IAEA-affiliated International Seismic Safety Centre to the Kingdom.

    According to the Jordan News Agency, Petra, the IAEA also recommended that countries wishing to build nuclear reactors make use of Jordanian expertise in the field.

    The agency cited the high safety requirements set by JAEC when selecting the location of the nuclear plant, Petra said.

    Jordan followed the IAEA’s safety regulations to the letter, the agency said, requesting JAEC’s permission to promote its experience in selecting nuclear plant locations to other countries, according to Petra.

    IAEA delegates are scheduled to visit Jordan in April to further assess the studies conducted on the proposed site for Jordan’s planned nuclear plant, Jordan Nuclear Regulatory Commission (JNRC) President Majd Hawari said earlier this month.

    IAEA experts will train JNRC personnel on conducting the environmental impact assessment required for the nuclear project.


  • #Iran agrees to discuss detonator use, but says ballistics program off limits

    A picture obtained from Iran’s ISNA news agency shows #IAEA Deputy Director General and Head of the Department of Safeguards, Tero Varjoranta, right, and Iran’s new ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Reza Najafi shaking hands after reaching an agreement, in Tehran on February 9, 2014. (Photo: AFP /ISNA - Amir Pourmand)

    Iran’s promise to clarify its use of detonators marks only an initial step by Tehran to address long-standing allegations of past #nuclear weapons research, the UN atomic watchdog said Monday. However, Iran’s deputy foreign minister said in a statement that the country’s ballistic missile program will not be discussed in nuclear negotiations with world powers. “This is the first step that is taking place now,” (...)