organization:national assembly

  • Child Inmates of South Korea’s Immigration Jail

    Helene* had a challenge that no mother would want. She, with her husband, was a refugee in a foreign land with a foreign language, trying despite all odds to raise her children as best she could. If this weren’t enough of a challenge, Helene was in jail, locked up in a 10-person cell with others she didn’t know. The only time she could leave her cell was for a 30-minute exercise time each day. But her task was more daunting still. Her children were locked up with her.

    Helene’s jail was an immigration detention facility, and her crime was not having enough money to begin refugee applicant proceedings. She spent 23 days in that cell with her two sons. Her oldest, Emerson, was three years and eight months old, and her youngest, Aaron, was only 13 months old. She watched their mental health and physical health slowly deteriorate while her pleadings for help fell on deaf ears.

    *

    In June, American news media were shocked by the revelation that migrant children, who were only guilty of not possessing legal migrant status, were being held in large-scale detention facilities. This was something new—a part of President Donald Trump’s ‘tough on immigration’ stance.

    In South Korea, detaining children simply due to their migration status, or the migration status of their parents, is standard practice.

    Children make up a very small percentage of the total picture of unregistered migrants in South Korea. However, as the nation’s foreign population reaches 2 million and beyond, that small percentage becomes a large number in real terms. The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) doesn’t keep statistics on the exact number of unregistered child migrants in the country.

    Most unregistered child migrants in South Korea fall into one of two broad categories: teenagers who come alone, and infants or toddlers brought by their parents or born to migrants already living in the country. In both cases, the majority of children (or their parents) come from other parts of Asia seeking work in the industrial sector.

    These children often end up in detention facilities when immigration authorities carry out routine crackdowns targeting workplaces in industrial districts or transportation routes workers use to get to these districts. Authorities, by policy, detain any unregistered migrant who is 14 or older. Younger children are technically exempt from detention orders, but parents are often caught in crackdowns while with their children. The parents can’t leave their children on the street to fend for themselves, and so, left with no other options, they choose to bring their children with them into the detention facilities.

    Helene’s case was different. She and her husband brought their sons to South Korea with them when they fled religious persecution in their home country of Liberia. The South Korean government rejected their refugee applications, and the family only had enough money to begin a legal challenge for one person. Emerson and Aaron, along with Helene, became unregistered migrants.

    How they were detained would be comical if their case were not so tragic. After a trip to a hospital, the family was trying to board a subway to return home. Their stroller could not fit through the turnstiles, and after a brief altercation an upset station manager called the police. The police asked to see the family’s papers, but only Helene’s husband had legal status. The police were obligated to arrest Helene due to her unregistered status and turn her over to immigration authorities. Because her children were very young – the youngest was still breastfeeding – she had no viable option but to bring her children with her.

    *

    Helene and her sons were sent to an immigration detention facility in Hwaseong, some 60 kilometers southwest of Seoul. Inside and out, the facility is indistinguishable from a prison. Detainees wear blue jumpsuits with the ironic Korean phrase “protected foreigner” printed in large white letters on the back. They live in 10-person cells with cement walls and steel bars at the front. Each cell has a small common area up front with tables, a sleeping area in the middle, and a bathroom at the back.

    For detainees, these cells become the entirety of their existence until they are released. Food is delivered through a gap in the bars, and the only opportunity to leave the cell is for a brief 30-minute exercise period each day.

    These facilities were never intended to house children, and authorities make little to no effort to accommodate them. Young children have to live in a cell with a parent and as many as eight other adults, all unknown to the child. The detention center doesn’t provide access to pediatricians, child appropriate play and rest time, or even food suitable for young children.

    Government policy states that education is provided only for children detained for more than 30 days. Children have no other children to interact with, and no space to play or explore. During daytime, when the sleeping mats are rolled up and stored, the sleeping area becomes a large open space where children could play. According to Helene, whenever her sons entered that area guards would shout at them to come back to the common area at the front of the cell.

    Emerson’s fear of the guards’ reprimand grew to the point that he refused to use the toilets at the back of the cell because that would mean crossing the sleeping area, instead choosing to soil himself. Even after the family was eventually released, Emerson’s psychological trauma and his refusal to use bathrooms remained.

    The stress and anxiety of being locked in a prison cell naturally takes a severe toll on children’s wellbeing. Like the adults they’re detained with, they don’t know what will happen to them or when they will be released. Unlike the adults, they don’t understand why they are in a prison cell to begin with. Without any way to alleviate the situation, the stress and anxiety they feel turn into mental disorders. These conditions can include depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and even increased rates of suicide and self-harm.

    Kim Jong Chul has seen many examples of these symptoms firsthand. Kim is a lawyer with APIL, a public interest law firm, and he’s worked to secure the release of many migrant children held in detention.

    In one such case, May, a 5-year-old migrant from China, spent 20 days in a detention facility with her mother. Over those 20 days, May’s extreme anxiety produced insomnia, a high fever, swollen lips and more. Despite this, her guards never brought a doctor to examine her.

    For most migrants in immigration custody, children included, their release comes only when they are deported. In 2016, authorities held 29,926 migrants in detention, and 96 percent of them were deported. The whole deportation process, from arrest to boarding a plane, typically takes ten days.

    But for children, ten days in detention are enough to develop severe stress and anxiety. Special cases, including refugee applications or a migrant laborer with unpaid wages, can take much longer to process. South Korea’s immigration law doesn’t set an upper limit on migrant detention, and there are cases of migrants held for more than a year. The law also doesn’t require regular judicial review or in-person checks from a case worker at any point in the process. According to Kim from APIL, the longest child detention in recent years was 141 days.

    Existing children’s welfare services would benefit migrant children, but the MOJ opposes any such idea. In the view of the MOJ and the Ministry of Health and Welfare, welfare facilities should be reserved only for citizens and foreigners with legal status.

    Children between the ages of 14 and 18 are yet another matter. The MOJ’s stance is that most of these children are physically similar to adults, highly likely to commit crimes and in general a danger to society, and they need to be detained.

    Kim argues that it’s hard to interpret the MOJ’s stance that migrant teenagers are all potential criminals as anything other than institutional racism. South Korean citizens who are under 18 are considered minors and treated differently in the eyes of the law.

    International treaties ban detaining children, including teenagers, due to migration status, and the South Korean government has signed and ratified each of the UN treaties that relate to children’s rights. It means that under the country’s constitution, the treaties have the same power as domestic law. And yet abuses persist.

    Lawmaker Keum Tae-seob from the ruling Minjoo Party—often called one of the most progressive members of the National Assembly— is fighting this reality. He has proposed a revision to the current immigration law that would ban detention of migrant children, but it has met opposition from the MOJ. Ironically, the ministry argues that because South Korea has signed the relevant international treaties, there is no need to pass a separate domestic law that would ban such detention. This is despite the fact that immigration authorities, who belong to the MOJ, have detained over 200 children over the past 3 years, including many under the age of 14.

    To rally support for a ban on detaining migrant children, APIL and World Vision Korea launched an awareness campaign in 2016, complete with a slick website, emotional videos and a petition. As of this writing, the petition has just under 9,000 signatures, and APIL is hoping to reach 10,000.
    Back in June of last year, another petition received significant media attention. A group of Yemeni refugee applicants—fewer than 600—arrived on the island of Jeju, and in response a citizen’s petition against accepting refugees on the office of the president’s website garnered over 714,000 signatures. A collection of civic groups even organized an anti-refugee rally in Seoul that same month.

    APIL’s campaign has been underway for more than two years, but the recent reaction to Yemeni refugees in Jeju has unveiled how difficult it will be change the government’s position on asylum seekers. A Human Rights Watch report released on Thursday also minced no words in critiquing the government policies: “even though [South Korean president] Moon Jae-in is a former human rights lawyer,” he “did little to defend the rights of women, refugees, and LGBT persons in South Korea.”

    For now, Keum’s bill is still sitting in committee, pending the next round of reviews. Helene’s family has been in the UK since her husband’s refugee status lawsuit failed.

    *Helene is a pseudonym to protect the identity of her and her family.

    https://www.koreaexpose.com/child-migrant-inmates-south-korea-immigration-jail-hwaseong
    #enfants #enfance #mineurs #rétention #détention_administrative #Corée_du_Sud #migrations #sans-papiers #réfugiés #asile

    • t’as aussi Yellow Vests ailleurs.
      https://seenthis.net/messages/740447
      No homeless, pensions, maximum salary… Discover the list of claims of the “yellow vests”

      The movement sent a press release to the media and MPs with about 40 demands on Thursday.
      The claims of the “yellow vests” now officially go beyond the issue of fuel prices alone. In a lengthy statement sent to the media and members of parliament on Thursday 29 November, the movement’s delegation listed a series of demands it wanted to see implemented.

      “Deputies of France, we inform you of the people’s directives so that you can transpose them into law (…). Obey the will of the people. Enforce these instructions”, write the “yellow vests”. Delegation spokespersons are to be received on Friday at 2 p.m. by Prime Minister Edouard Philippe and Minister of Ecological Transition François de Rugy.

      Increase of the minimum wage to 1,300 euros net, return to retirement at age 60 or abandonment of withholding tax…. The list includes many social measures, but also measures concerning transport, such as the end of the increase in fuel taxes and the introduction of a tax on marine fuel and kerosene. Here is a non-exhaustive list of claims:

      – Zero homeless : URGENT.

      – More progressiveness in income tax, i.e. more brackets.

      – Smic at 1,300 euros net.

      – Promote small businesses in villages and town centres. Stop the construction of large commercial areas around large cities that kill small businesses and more free parking in city centres.

      – Large plan of Insulation of the dwellings to make ecology by making savings to the households.

      – Taxes: that BIG companies (MacDonald’s, Google, Amazon, Carrefour…) pay BIG and that small companies (craftsmen, very small SMEs) pay small.

      – Same social security system for all (including craftsmen and self-employed entrepreneurs). End of the RSI.

      – The pension system must remain united and therefore socialized. No point retreat.

      – End of the fuel tax increase.

      – No retirement below 1,200 euros.

      – Any elected representative will be entitled to the median salary. His transport costs will be monitored and reimbursed if justified. Entitlement to a meal ticket and a holiday voucher.

      – The salaries of all French people, as well as pensions and allowances, must be indexed to inflation.

      – Protecting French industry: prohibit relocations. Protecting our industry means protecting our know-how and our jobs.

      – End of seconded work. It is abnormal that a person working in France does not enjoy the same salary and rights. Anyone authorised to work on French territory must be on an equal footing with a French citizen and his employer must contribute at the same level as a French employer.

      – For job security: further limit the number of fixed-term contracts for large companies. We want more permanent contracts.

      – End of the CICE. Use of this money to launch a French hydrogen car industry (which is truly ecological, unlike the electric car.)

      – End of the austerity policy. We stop paying interest on the debt that is declared illegitimate and we start paying down the debt without taking money from the poor and the less poor, but by collecting the $80 billion in tax evasion.

      – That the causes of forced migration be addressed.

      – That asylum seekers are treated well. We owe them housing, security, food and education for minors. Work with the UN to ensure that reception camps are opened in many countries around the world, pending the outcome of the asylum application.

      – That rejected asylum seekers be returned to their country of origin.

      – That a real integration policy be implemented. Living in France means becoming French (French language courses, French history courses and civic education courses with a certificate at the end of the course).

      – Maximum salary set at 15,000 euros.

      – That jobs be created for the unemployed.

      – Increase in disabled benefits.

      – Limitation of rents. More affordable housing (especially for students and precarious workers).

      – Prohibition to sell property belonging to France (dam, airport…)

      – Substantial resources granted to the judiciary, police, gendarmerie and army. Whether law enforcement overtime is paid or recovered.

      – All the money earned by motorway tolls will be used for the maintenance of France’s motorways and roads as well as for road safety.

      – As the price of gas and electricity has risen since privatisation took place, we want them to become public again and prices to fall significantly.

      – Immediate end of the closure of small lines, post offices, schools and maternity hospitals.

      – Let us bring well-being to our seniors. Prohibition to make money on the elderly. White gold is over. The era of grey well-being is beginning.

      – Maximum 25 students per class from kindergarten to high school.

      – Substantial resources brought to psychiatry.

      – The popular referendum must be incorporated into the Constitution. Creation of a readable and effective website, supervised by an independent control body where people can make a legislative proposal. If this bill obtains 700,000 signatures, then this bill must be discussed, supplemented and amended by the National Assembly, which will have the obligation (one year to the day after obtaining 700,000 signatures) to submit it to the vote of all French people.

      – Return to a 7-year term of office for the President of the Republic. The election of deputies two years after the election of the President of the Republic made it possible to send a positive or negative signal to the President of the Republic regarding his policy. This helped to make the voice of the people heard.)

      – Retirement at age 60 and for all persons who have worked in a profession that wears out the body (e. g. bricklayer or boner) entitled to retirement at age 55.

      – A 6-year-old child not caring for himself, continuation of the PAJEMPLOI assistance system until the child is 10 years old.

      – Encourage the transport of goods by rail.

      – No withholding tax.

      – End of presidential lifetime benefits.

      – Prohibition to make merchants pay a tax when their customers use the credit card. Tax on marine fuel oil and kerosene.

      https://www.francetvinfo.fr/economie/transports/gilets-jaunes/zero-sdf-retraites-superieures-a-1-200-euros-salaire-maximum-a-15-000-e


      #yellow_vests

  • What’s Driving the Conflict in Cameroon?
    Violence Is Escalating in Its Anglophone Regions.

    In recent months, political violence in the Northwest and Southwest regions of Cameroon has escalated dramatically. So far, at least 400 civilians and 160 state security officers have been killed in the conflict between the government and an armed separatist movement that, just two short years ago, started as a peaceful strike of lawyers and teachers. How did such upheaval come to a country that has prided itself for decades as a bulwark of stability in a region of violent conflict? And why has it escalated so quickly?

    THE ROOTS OF THE VIOLENCE

    The Northwest and Southwest regions of Cameroon have a special historical legacy that sets them apart from the country’s other eight regions: between 1922 and 1960, they were ruled as a British trust or protectorate while the rest of the territory was administered by France. This is why today, 3 million residents of the Northwest and Southwest regions—roughly 20 percent of the Cameroonian population—speak primarily English, not French. These two regions also use their own legal and educational systems, inherited from the British, and have a unique cultural identity.

    Many analysts argue that the current conflict stems from the intractable historical animosity between Cameroon’s Anglophones and Francophones. Yet if that is the case, it is strange that the violence is only occurring now. Why not in 1972, when Ahmadou Ahidjo, the first president of Cameroon, ended the federation between the Anglophone and Francophone regions, forcing the Anglophones to submit to a unitary state? Or in 1992, when current President Paul Biya held Cameroon’s first multi-party elections, and narrowly won a heavily rigged contest by four percentage points against Anglophone candidate John Fru Ndi? Furthermore, if differences in identity are the primary driver of the conflict, it is quite surprising that Cameroon—one of the most ethnically diverse countries in Africa—has largely avoided ethnic conflict.

    Most Anglophones themselves say that they would be happy to put their national identity above their linguistic one if they weren’t systematically neglected and repressed by Cameroon’s central government. According to a survey from the Afrobarometer, an independent polling and research network, when asked whether they identify more as Cameroonians or more with their ethnic group, the vast majority of respondents in the Northwest and Southwest regions said they identified with these categories equally. Less than five percent said they identified more with their ethnic group. Nonetheless, members of this population have long felt themselves to be treated as second-class citizens in their own country. Anglophones who go to the capital city of Yaoundé to collect government documents, for example, often report being ridiculed or turned away by public officials because they cannot speak French. Separatists argue that this mistreatment and discrimination by Yaoundé, and Francophone Cameroonians more broadly, is grounds for secession.

    Yet regional neglect and mistreatment are not enough to explain the current wave of violence. If they were the root cause, then we should also be seeing separatist movements in Cameroon’s North and Far North regions, where state violence has become endemic in the fight against Boko Haram over the past four years. Moreover, in the North and Far North regions, the poverty rate is higher (more than 50 percent in each, compared to 15 percent in the Southwest and 25 percent in the Northwest) and state investment in public goods such schools, health clinics, and roads is lower than anywhere else in the country.

    To be sure, the Anglophones’ unique linguistic and cultural identity has played a role in the rebellion. But in order to understand why the escalating violence is taking place where and when it is, we must consider not only the Anglophone regions’ exceptional political isolation and relative economic autonomy from the rest of Cameroon, but also the increasing impatience of Africans living under non-democratic regimes.
    WHY THE ANGLOPHONE REGIONS?

    Biya, who last month won his seventh term in office, has been in power since 1982, making him one of the longest ruling leaders in the world. In fact, Cameroon has only had two presidents since gaining independence in 1960. Because the country’s median age is 18, this means that the majority of Cameroonians have only ever known one president. Yet the decline of Africa’s strongmen over the past two decades—most recently Blaise Compaoré in Burkina Faso, Yahya Jammeh in the Gambia, Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, José Eduardo dos Santos in Angola, and even Jacob Zuma in South Africa—has made Biya’s continued rule increasingly untenable. Democracy may have begun to lose its appeal in many parts of the world, but it remains important to most sub-Saharan Africans. Many Cameroonians with an education and a smart phone consider their president’s extended rule increasingly illegitimate. The political tide currently washing away the strongmen of Africa has made this moment an exceptional one for mobilizing people against the regime.

    In spite of these democratic headwinds, Biya has managed to maintain his legitimacy in some quarters through his cooptation of Francophone elites and control of information by means of the (largely Francophone) state-owned media. He has masterfully brought Francophone leaders into government, offering them lucrative ministerial posts and control over various government revenue streams. Importantly, he has not been excessively repressive—at least not before the current outbreak of violence—and has gone out of his way to uphold the façade of democratic legitimacy through holding regular elections, allowing a relatively unfettered (although weak) independent media, and having a general laissez-faire attitude toward governing.

    The state media and elites within the ruling Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement are stalwart defenders of the president, operating whole-heartedly on the fictitious assumption that the regime is democratic. Many Cameroonians, especially those isolated from independent media, opposition parties, or information from outside of the country, earnestly believe this narrative. Another survey by the Afrobarometer conducted in 2015 before the outbreak of violence, showed that the presidency is the second most trusted institution of the state, after the army. It also showed that only ten percent of Cameroonian respondents believe that their country is not a democracy.

    In contrast, the Anglophone regions’ relative distance from both Biya’s networks of patronage and influence and the Francophone state media puts them in a unique position to see the autocratic nature of the regime and rebel against it. Although 75.4 percent of Francophone Cameroonian respondents said they trust Biya “somewhat” or “a lot,” in the Afrobarometer poll, only 45.5 percent of Anglophones felt the same way. Part of the reason for this is easier access to criticism of the Biya government. In electoral autocracies, opposition parties are often the only institutions that consistently voice the view that the regime is not truly democratic. The strongest opposition party in Cameroon—the Social Democratic Front (SDF)—is headquartered in the Northwest region, thus further exposing Anglophones to narratives of state repression. Other parts of Cameroon do not have occasion to become as familiar with opposition party politics. In the most recent 2013 elections for the National Assembly, for example, the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement ran completely unopposed in 13 of the country’s 83 electoral districts.

    In comparison to other parts of the country, such as the north, Cameroon’s Anglophone regions are also more economically autonomous from Yaoundé. They have a robust cross-border trade with Nigeria, successful plantations in the Southwest, and fertile farming land. They are not overly-reliant on the export of primary resources, such as oil or timber, which funnels through state-owned corporations. And they are not as poor as, for example, the northern regions, which face chronic food insecurity. The Anglophones thus have not only the will, but also the resources to rebel.

    THE SUCCESSION QUESTION

    Unfortunately, an end to the crisis is nowhere in sight. Last month, Biya won his seventh term as president with 71.3 percent of the vote. The already unfair election was marked by exceedingly low participation in the Anglophone regions—just five percent in the Northwest—due to security fears. Meanwhile, Biya has responded to the separatists with an iron fist. He refuses to negotiate with them, instead sending in his elite Rapid Intervention Battalion (trained by the United States and led by a retired Israeli officer), which has now been accused of burning villages and attacking civilians in the Northwest and Southwest. But as long as the violence does not spill over into the Francophone regions, the crisis will likely not affect the president’s legitimacy in the rest of the country. Moreover, Biya remains staunchly supported by the West—especially France, but also the United States, which relies strongly on Cameroon in the fight against Boko Haram. The separatists, meanwhile, remain fractured, weak, and guilty of their own atrocities against civilians. Apart from attacking security forces, they have been kidnapping and torturing teachers and students who refuse to participate in a school strike.

    It is extremely unlikely that Biya will make the concessions necessary for attacks from separatists to stop, and the fluid nature of the insurgency will make it difficult for state security forces to end the violence. The scorched earth tactics on both sides only work to further alienate the population, many of whom have fled to Nigeria. It seems likely that a resolution to the crisis can only happen once the questions of when Biya will step down and who will replace him are fully answered. Right now, there is only unsubstantiated speculation. Many assume he will appoint a successor before the next presidential elections, scheduled for 2025. But if there are any surprises in the meantime similar to the military move against Mugabe in Zimbabwe or the popular uprising against Compaoré in Burkina Faso, a transition may come sooner than expected. A post-Biya political opening might provide a way for Cameroon’ s Anglophones to claim their long-awaited autonomy.

    https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/cameroon/2018-11-08/whats-driving-conflict-cameroon?cid=soc-tw
    #Cameroun #conflit #Cameroun_anglophone #violence #différent_territorial #autonomie

  • 2.3 million Venezuelans now live abroad

    More than 7% of Venezuela’s population has fled the country since 2014, according to the UN. That is the equivalent of the US losing the whole population of Florida in four years (plus another 100,000 people, give or take).

    The departing 2.3 million Venezuelans have mainly gone to neighboring Colombia, Ecuador, Brazil, and Peru, putting tremendous pressure on those countries. “This is building to a crisis moment that we’ve seen in other parts of the world, particularly in the Mediterranean,” a spokesman for the UN’s International Organization for Migration said recently.

    This week, Peru made it a bit harder for Venezuelans to get in. The small town of Aguas Verdes has seen as many as 3,000 people a day cross the border; most of the 400,000 Venezuelans in Peru arrived in the last year. So Peru now requires a valid passport. Until now, ID cards were all that was needed.

    Ecuador tried to do the same thing but a judge said that such a move violated freedom-of-movement rules agreed to when Ecuador joined the Andean Community. Ecuador says 4,000 people a day have been crossing the border, a total of 500,000 so far. It has now created what it calls a “humanitarian corridor” by laying on buses to take Venezuelans across Ecuador, from the Colombian border to the Peruvian border.

    Brazil’s Amazon border crossing in the state of Roraima with Venezuela gets 500 people a day. It was briefly shut down earlier this month—but that, too, was overturned by a court order.

    Venezuela is suffering from severe food shortages—the UN said more than 1 million of those who had fled since 2014 are malnourished—and hyperinflation. Things could still get worse, which is really saying something for a place where prices are doubling every 26 days. The UN estimated earlier this year that 5,000 were leaving Venezuela every day; at that rate, a further 800,000 people could leave before the end of the year (paywall).

    A Gallup survey from March showed that 53% of young Venezuelans want to move abroad permanently. And all this was before an alleged drone attack on president Nicolas Maduro earlier this month made the political situation even more tense, the country’s opposition-led National Assembly said that the annual inflation rate reached 83,000% in July, and the chaotic introduction of a new currency.

    https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/08/venezuela-has-lost-2-3-million-people-and-it-could-get-even-worse
    #Venezuela #asile #migrations #réfugiés #cartographie #visualisation #réfugiés_vénézuéliens

    Sur ce sujet, voir aussi cette longue compilation initiée en juin 2017 :
    http://seen.li/d26k

    • Venezuela. L’Amérique latine cherche une solution à sa plus grande #crise_migratoire

      Les réunions de crise sur l’immigration ne sont pas l’apanage de l’Europe : treize pays latino-américains sont réunis depuis lundi à Quito pour tenter de trouver des solutions communes au casse-tête migratoire provoqué par l’#exode_massif des Vénézuéliens.


      https://www.courrierinternational.com/article/venezuela-lamerique-latine-cherche-une-solution-sa-plus-grand

    • Bataille de #chiffres et guerre d’images autour de la « #crise migratoire » vénézuélienne

      L’émigration massive qui touche actuellement le Venezuela est une réalité. Mais il ne faut pas confondre cette réalité et les défis humanitaires qu’elle pose avec son instrumentalisation, tant par le pouvoir vénézuélien pour se faire passer pour la victime d’un machination que par ses « ennemis » qui entendent se débarrasser d’un gouvernement qu’ils considèrent comme autoritaire et source d’instabilité dans la région. Etat des lieux d’une crise très polarisée.

      C’est un véritable scoop que nous a offert le président vénézuélien le 3 septembre dernier. Alors que son gouvernement est avare en données sur les sujets sensibles, Nicolas Maduro a chiffré pour la première fois le nombre de Vénézuéliens ayant émigré depuis deux ans à 600 000. Un chiffre vérifiable, a-t-il assuré, sans toutefois donner plus de détails.

      Ce chiffre, le premier plus ou moins officiel dans un pays où il n’y a plus de statistiques migratoires, contraste avec celui délivré par l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) et le Haut-Commissariat aux Réfugiés (HCR). Selon ces deux organisations, 2,3 millions de Vénézuéliens vivraient à l’étranger, soit 7,2% des habitants sur un total de 31,8 millions. Pas de quoi tomber de sa chaise ! D’autres diasporas sont relativement bien plus nombreuses. Ce qui impressionne, c’est la croissance exponentielle de cette émigration sur un très court laps de temps : 1,6 million auraient quitté le pays depuis 2015 seulement. Une vague de départs qui s’est accélérée ces derniers mois et affectent inégalement de nombreux pays de la région.
      Le pouvoir vénézuélien, par la voix de sa vice-présidente, a accusé des fonctionnaires de l’ONU de gonfler les chiffres d’un « flux migratoire normal » (sic) pour justifier une « intervention humanitaire », synonyme de déstabilisation. D’autres sources estiment quant à elles qu’ils pourraient être près de quatre millions à avoir fui le pays.

      https://www.cncd.be/Bataille-de-chiffres-et-guerre-d
      #statistiques #guerre_des_chiffres

    • La formulation est tout de même étrange pour une ONG… : pas de quoi tomber de sa chaise, de même l’utilisation du mot ennemis avec guillemets. Au passage, le même pourcentage – pas si énorme …– appliqué à la population française donnerait 4,5 millions de personnes quittant la France, dont les deux tiers, soit 3 millions de personnes, au cours des deux dernières années.

      Ceci dit, pour ne pas qu’ils tombent… d’inanition, le Programme alimentaire mondial (agence de l’ONU) a besoin de sous pour nourrir les vénézuéliens qui entrent en Colombie.

      ONU necesita fondos para seguir atendiendo a emigrantes venezolanos
      http://www.el-nacional.com/noticias/mundo/onu-necesita-fondos-para-seguir-atendiendo-emigrantes-venezolanos_25311

      El Programa Mundial de Alimentos (PMA), el principal brazo humanitario de Naciones Unidas, informó que necesita 22 millones de dólares suplementarios para atender a los venezolanos que entran a Colombia.

      «Cuando las familias inmigrantes llegan a los centros de recepción reciben alimentos calientes y pueden quedarse de tres a cinco días, pero luego tienen que irse para que otros recién llegados puedan ser atendidos», dijo el portavoz del PMA, Herve Verhoosel.
      […]
      La falta de alimentos se convierte en el principal problema para quienes atraviesan a diario la frontera entre Venezuela y Colombia, que cuenta con siete puntos de pasaje oficiales y más de un centenar informales, con más de 50% de inmigrantes que entran a Colombia por estos últimos.

      El PMA ha proporcionado ayuda alimentaria de emergencia a más de 60.000 venezolanos en los departamentos fronterizos de Arauca, La Guajira y el Norte de Santander, en Colombia, y más recientemente ha empezado también a operar en el departamento de Nariño, que tiene frontera con Ecuador.
      […]
      De acuerdo con evaluaciones recientes efectuadas por el PMA entre inmigrantes en Colombia, 80% de ellos sufren de inseguridad alimentaria.

    • Migrants du Venezuela vers la Colombie : « ni xénophobie, ni fermeture des frontières », assure le nouveau président colombien

      Le nouveau président colombien, entré en fonction depuis hier (lundi 8 octobre 2018), ne veut pas céder à la tentation d’une fermeture de la frontière avec le Venezuela.


      https://la1ere.francetvinfo.fr/martinique/migrants-du-venezuela-colombie-xenophobie-fermeture-frontieres-a
      #fermeture_des_frontières #ouverture_des_frontières

    • Fleeing hardship at home, Venezuelan migrants struggle abroad, too

      Every few minutes, the reeds along the #Tachira_River rustle.

      Smugglers, in ever growing numbers, emerge with a ragtag group of Venezuelan migrants – men struggling under tattered suitcases, women hugging bundles in blankets and schoolchildren carrying backpacks. They step across rocks, wade into the muddy stream and cross illegally into Colombia.

      This is the new migration from Venezuela.

      For years, as conditions worsened in the Andean nation’s ongoing economic meltdown, hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans – those who could afford to – fled by airplane and bus to other countries far and near, remaking their lives as legal immigrants.

      Now, hyperinflation, daily power cuts and worsening food shortages are prompting those with far fewer resources to flee, braving harsh geography, criminal handlers and increasingly restrictive immigration laws to try their luck just about anywhere.

      In recent weeks, Reuters spoke with dozens of Venezuelan migrants traversing their country’s Western border to seek a better life in Colombia and beyond. Few had more than the equivalent of a handful of dollars with them.

      “It was terrible, but I needed to cross,” said Dario Leal, 30, recounting his journey from the coastal state of Sucre, where he worked in a bakery that paid about $2 per month.

      At the border, he paid smugglers nearly three times that to get across and then prepared, with about $3 left, to walk the 500 km (311 miles) to Bogota, Colombia’s capital. The smugglers, in turn, paid a fee to Colombian crime gangs who allow them to operate, according to police, locals and smugglers themselves.

      As many as 1.9 million Venezuelans have emigrated since 2015, according to the United Nations. Combined with those who preceded them, a total of 2.6 million are believed to have left the oil-rich country. Ninety percent of recent departures, the U.N. says, remain in South America.

      The exodus, one of the biggest mass migrations ever on the continent, is weighing on neighbors. Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, which once welcomed Venezuelan migrants, recently tightened entry requirements. Police now conduct raids to detain the undocumented.

      In early October, Carlos Holmes Trujillo, Colombia’s foreign minister, said as many as four million Venezuelans could be in the country by 2021, costing national coffers as much as $9 billion. “The magnitude of this challenge,” he said, “our country has never seen.”

      In Brazil, which also borders Venezuela, the government deployed troops and financing to manage the crush and treat sick, hungry and pregnant migrants. In Ecuador and Peru, workers say that Venezuelan labor lowers wages and that criminals are hiding among honest migrants.

      “There are too many of them,” said Antonio Mamani, a clothing vendor in Peru, who recently watched police fill a bus with undocumented Venezuelans near Lima.
      “WE NEED TO GO”

      By migrating illegally, migrants expose themselves to criminal networks who control prostitution, drug trafficking and other rackets. In August, Colombian investigators discovered 23 undocumented Venezuelans forced into prostitution and living in basements in the colonial city of Cartagena.

      While most migrants are avoiding such straits, no shortage of other hardship awaits – from homelessness, to unemployment, to the cold reception many get as they sleep in public squares, peddle sweets and throng already overburdened hospitals.

      Still, most press on, many on foot.

      Some join compatriots in Brazil and Colombia. Others, having spent what money they had, are walking vast regions, like Colombia’s cold Andean passes and sweltering tropical lowlands, in treks toward distant capitals, like Quito or Lima.

      Johana Narvaez, a 36-year-old mother of four, told Reuters her family left after business stalled at their small car repair shop in the rural state of Trujillo. Extra income she made selling food on the street withered because cash is scarce in a country where annual inflation, according to the opposition-led Congress, recently reached nearly 500,000 percent.

      “We can’t stay here,” she told her husband, Jairo Sulbaran, in August, after they ran out of food and survived on corn patties provided by friends. “Even on foot, we must go.” Sulbaran begged and sold old tires until they could afford bus tickets to the border.

      Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro has chided migrants, warning of the hazards of migration and that emigres will end up “cleaning toilets.” He has even offered free flights back to some in a program called “Return to the Homeland,” which state television covers daily.

      Most migration, however, remains in the other direction.

      Until recently, Venezuelans could enter many South American countries with just their national identity cards. But some are toughening rules, requiring a passport or additional documentation.

      Even a passport is elusive in Venezuela.

      Paper shortages and a dysfunctional bureaucracy make the document nearly impossible to obtain, many migrants argue. Several told Reuters they waited two years in vain after applying, while a half-dozen others said they were asked for as much as $2000 in bribes by corrupt clerks to secure one.

      Maduro’s government in July said it would restructure Venezuela’s passport agency to root out “bureaucracy and corruption.” The Information Ministry didn’t respond to a request for comment.
      “VENEZUELA WILL END UP EMPTY”

      Many of those crossing into Colombia pay “arrastradores,” or “draggers,” to smuggle them along hundreds of trails. Five of the smugglers, all young men, told Reuters business is booming.

      “Venezuela will end up empty,” said Maikel, a 17-year-old Venezuelan smuggler, scratches across his face from traversing the bushy trails. Maikel, who declined to give his surname, said he lost count of how many migrants he has helped cross.

      Colombia, too, struggles to count illegal entries. Before the government tightened restrictions earlier this year, Colombia issued “border cards” that let holders crisscross at will. Now, Colombia says it detects about 3,000 false border cards at entry points daily.

      Despite tougher patrols along the porous, 2,200-km border, officials say it is impossible to secure outright. “It’s like trying to empty the ocean with a bucket,” said Mauricio Franco, a municipal official in charge of security in Cucuta, a nearby city.

      And it’s not just a matter of rounding up undocumented travelers.

      Powerful criminal groups, long in control of contraband commerce across the border, are now getting their cut of human traffic. Javier Barrera, a colonel in charge of police in Cucuta, said the Gulf Clan and Los Rastrojos, notorious syndicates that operate nationwide, are both involved.

      During a recent Reuters visit to several illegal crossings, Venezuelans carried cardboard, limes and car batteries as barter instead of using the bolivar, their near-worthless currency.

      Migrants pay as much as about $16 for the passage. Maikel, the arrastrador, said smugglers then pay gang operatives about $3 per migrant.

      For his crossing, Leal, the baker, carried a torn backpack and small duffel bag. His 2015 Venezuelan ID shows a healthier and happier man – before Leal began skimping on breakfast and dinner because he couldn’t afford them.

      He rested under a tree, but fretted about Colombian police. “I’m scared because the “migra” comes around,” he said, using the same term Mexican and Central American migrants use for border police in the United States.

      It doesn’t get easier as migrants move on.

      Even if relatives wired money, transfer agencies require a legally stamped passport to collect it. Bus companies are rejecting undocumented passengers to avoid fines for carrying them. A few companies risk it, but charge a premium of as much as 20 percent, according to several bus clerks near the border.

      The Sulbaran family walked and hitched some 1200 km to the Andean town of Santiago, where they have relatives. The father toured garages, but found no work.

      “People said no, others were scared,” said Narvaez, the mother. “Some Venezuelans come to Colombia to do bad things. They think we’re all like that.”

      https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-migration-insight/fleeing-hardship-at-home-venezuelan-migrants-struggle-abroad-too-idUSKCN1MP

      Avec ce commentaire de #Reece_Jones:

      People continue to flee Venezuela, now often resorting to #smugglers as immigration restrictions have increased

      #passeurs #fermeture_des_frontières

    • ’No more camps,’ Colombia tells Venezuelans not to settle in tent city

      Francis Montano sits on a cold pavement with her three children, all their worldly possessions stuffed into plastic bags, as she pleads to be let into a new camp for Venezuelan migrants in the Colombian capital, Bogota.

      Behind Montano, smoke snakes from woodfires set amid the bright yellow tents which are now home to hundreds of Venezuelans, erected on a former soccer pitch in a middle-class residential area in the west of the city.

      The penniless migrants, some of the millions who have fled Venezuela’s economic and social crisis, have been here more than a week, forced by city authorities to vacate a makeshift slum of plastic tarps a few miles away.

      The tent city is the first of its kind in Bogota. While authorities have established camps at the Venezuelan border, they have resisted doing so in Colombia’s interior, wary of encouraging migrants to settle instead of moving to neighboring countries or returning home.

      Its gates are guarded by police and officials from the mayor’s office and only those registered from the old slum are allowed access.

      “We’ll have to sleep on the street again, under a bridge,” said Montano, 22, whose children are all under seven years old. “I just want a roof for my kids at night.”

      According to the United Nations, an estimated 3 million Venezuelans have fled as their oil-rich country has sunk into crisis under President Nicolas Maduro. Critics accuse the Socialist leader of ravaging the economy through state interventions while clamping down on political opponents.

      The exodus - driven by violence, hyperinflation and shortages of food and medicines - amounts to one in 12 of the population, placing strain on neighboring countries, already struggling with poverty.

      Colombia, which has borne the brunt of the migration crisis, estimates it is sheltering 1 million Venezuelans, with some 3,000 arriving daily. The government says their total numbers could swell to 4 million by 2021, costing it nearly $9 billion a year.

      Municipal authorities in Bogota say the camp will provide shelter for 422 migrants through Christmas. Then in mid January, it will be dismantled in the hope jobs and new lodgings have been found.


      https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-migration-colombia/no-more-camps-colombia-tells-venezuelans-not-to-settle-in-tent-city-idUSKCN

      #camps #camps_de_réfugiés #tentes #Bogotá #Bogotà

    • Creativity amid Crisis: Legal Pathways for Venezuelan Migrants in Latin America

      As more than 3 million Venezuelans have fled a rapidly collapsing economy, severe food and medical shortages, and political strife, neighboring countries—the primary recipients of these migrants—have responded with creativity and pragmatism. This policy brief explores how governments in South America, Central America, and Mexico have navigated decisions about whether and how to facilitate their entry and residence. It also examines challenges on the horizon as few Venezuelans will be able to return home any time soon.

      Across Latin America, national legal frameworks are generally open to migration, but few immigration systems have been built to manage movement on this scale and at this pace. For example, while many countries in the region have a broad definition of who is a refugee—criteria many Venezuelans fit—only Mexico has applied it in considering Venezuelans’ asylum cases. Most other Latin American countries have instead opted to use existing visa categories or migration agreements to ensure that many Venezuelans are able to enter legally, and some have run temporary programs to regularize the status of those already in the country.

      Looking to the long term, there is a need to decide what will happen when temporary statuses begin to expire. And with the crisis in Venezuela and the emigration it has spurred ongoing, there are projections that as many as 5.4 million Venezuelans may be abroad by the end of 2019. Some governments have taken steps to limit future Venezuelan arrivals, and some receiving communities have expressed frustration at the strain put on local service providers and resources. To avoid widespread backlash and to facilitate the smooth integration of Venezuelans into local communities, policymakers must tackle questions ranging from the provision of permanent status to access to public services and labor markets. Done well, this could be an opportunity to update government processes and strengthen public services in ways that benefit both newcomers and long-term residents.

      https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/legal-pathways-venezuelan-migrants-latin-america

    • Venezuela: Millions at risk, at home and abroad

      Venezuela has the largest proven oil reserves in the world and is not engulfed in war. Yet its people have been fleeing on a scale and at a rate comparable in recent memory only to Syrians at the height of the civil war and the Rohingya from Myanmar.

      As chronicled by much of our reporting collected below, some three to four million people have escaped the economic meltdown since 2015 and tried to start afresh in countries like Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. This exodus has placed enormous pressure on the region; several governments have started making it tougher for migrants to enter and find jobs.

      The many millions more who have stayed in Venezuela face an acute humanitarian crisis denied by their own government: pervasive hunger, the resurgence of disease, an absence of basic medicines, and renewed political uncertainty.

      President Nicolás Maduro has cast aside outside offers of aid, framing them as preludes to a foreign invasion and presenting accusations that the United States is once again interfering in Latin America.

      Meanwhile, the opposition, led by Juan Guaidó, the president of the National Assembly, has invited in assistance from the US and elsewhere.

      As aid becomes increasingly politicised, some international aid agencies have chosen to sit on the sidelines rather than risk their neutrality. Others run secretive and limited operations inside Venezuela that fly under the media radar.

      Local aid agencies, and others, have had to learn to adapt fast and fill the gaps as the Venezuelan people grow hungrier and sicker.

      https://www.irinnews.org/special-report/2019/02/21/venezuela-millions-risk-home-and-abroad
      #cartographie #visualisation

    • Leaving Home Through a Darkened Border

      I’m sitting on the edge of a boat on the shore of the Grita river, a few kilometers from the Unión bridge. The border between San Antonio del Tachira (Venezuela) and Cucuta (Colombia), one of the most active in Latin America, is tense, dark and uneasy. I got there on a bus from Merida, at around 4:00 a.m., and people were commenting, between WhatsApp messages and audios, that Maduro had opened the border, closed precisely the last time I went through in a violent haze.

      Minutes after I got off the bus, I could see hundreds standing in an impossible queue for the Venezuelan immigration office, at Boca de Grita. Coyotes waited on motorbikes, telling people how much cheaper and faster it’d be if they paid to cross through the side trail. I approached the first motorbike I saw, paid 7,000 Colombian pesos (a little over $2) and sleepily made my way through the wet, muddy paths down to the river.
      Challenge 1: From Merida to the border

      Fuel shortages multiplied the bus fares to the border in less than a month; the few buses that can still make the trip are already malfunctioning. The lonely, dark roads are hunting grounds for pirates, who throw rocks at car windows or set up spikes on the pavement to blow tires. Kidnapping or robberies follow.

      The bus I was in stopped several times when the driver saw a particularly dark path ahead. He waited for the remaining drivers traveling that night to join him and create a small fleet, more difficult to attack. The criminals are after what travelers carry: U.S. dollars, Colombian pesos, Peruvian soles, gold, jewelry (which Venezuelans trade at the border for food or medicine, or a ride to Peru or Chile). “It’s a bad sign to find a checkpoint without soldiers,” the co-driver said, as he got off to stretch his legs. “We’ll stop here because it’s safe; we’ll get robbed up ahead.” Beyond the headlights, the road was lost in dusk. This trip usually takes five hours, but this time it took seven, with all the stops and checkpoints along the way.
      Challenge 2: Across the river from Venezuela to Colombia

      Reaching the river, I noticed how things had changed since the last time I visited. There was no trace of the bottles with smuggled fuel, barrels, guards or even containers over the boats. In fact, there weren’t even that many boats, just the one, small and light, pushed by a man with a wooden stick through muddy waters. I was the only passenger.

      The paracos (Colombian paramilitaries) were in a good mood. Their logic is simple: if Maduro opened the border, lots of people would try to cross, but since many couldn’t go through the bridge due to the expensive bribes demanded by the Venezuelan National Guard and immigration agents, this would be a good day for trafficking.

      The shortage of fuel in states like Tachira, Merida and Zulia destroyed their smuggling of incredibly cheap Venezuelan fuel to Colombia, and controlling the irregular crossings is now the most lucrative business. Guerrillas and paracos have been at it for a while, but now Venezuelan pro-Maduro colectivos, deployed in Tachira in February to repress protests, took over the human trafficking with gunfire, imposing a new criminal dynamic where, unlike Colombian paramilitaries, they assault and rob Venezuelan migrants.

      A woman arrives on a motorbike almost half an hour after me, and comes aboard. “Up there, they’re charging people with large suitcases between 15,000 and 20,000 pesos. It’s going to be really hard to cross today. People will grow tired, and eventually they’ll come here. They’re scared because they’ve heard stories, but everything’s faster here.”

      Her reasoning is that of someone who has grown accustomed to human trafficking, who uses these crossings every day. Perhaps she’s missing the fact that, in such a critical situation as Venezuela’s in 2019, most people can no longer pay to cross illegally and, if they have some money, they’d rather use it to bribe their way through the bridge. The binational Unión bridge, 60 km from Cucuta, isn’t that violent, making it the preferred road for families, pregnant women and the elderly.

      Coyotes get three more people on the boat, the boatman sails into the river, turns on the rudimentary diesel engine and, in a few minutes, we’re on the other side. It’s not dawn yet and I’m certain this is going to be a very long day.

      “I hope they remove those containers from the border,” an old man coming from Trujillo with a prescription for insulin tells me. “I’m sure they’ve started already.” After the failed attempt to deliver humanitarian aid in February, the crossing through the bridges was restricted to all pedestrians and only in a few exceptions a medical patient could be let through (after paying the bribe). The rest still languishes on the Colombian side.
      Challenge 3: Joining the Cucuta crowd

      I finally reach Cucuta and six hours later, mid-afternoon, I meet with American journalist Joshua Collins at the Simón Bolívar bridge. According to local news, about 70,000 people are crossing it this Saturday alone.

      The difference with what I saw last time, reporting the Venezuela Live Aid concert, is astounding: the mass of Venezuelans lifts a cloud that covers everything with a yellowish, dirty and pale nimbus. The scorching desert sunlight makes everyone bow their heads while they push each other, crossing from one side to the other. There’s a stagnant, bitter smell in the air, a kind of musk made of filth, moisture and sweat.

      Joshua points to 20 children running barefoot and shirtless after cabs and vehicles. “Those kids wait here every day for people who want to cross in or out with packs of food and merchandise. They load it all on their shoulders with straps on around their heads.” These children, who should be in school or playing with their friends, are the most active carriers nowadays, working for paramilitaries and colectivos.

      The market (where you can buy and sell whatever you can think of) seems relegated to the background: what most people want right now is to cross, buy food and return before nightfall. The crowd writhes and merges. People shout and fight, frustrated, angry and ashamed. The Colombian police tries to help, but people move how they can, where they can. It’s unstoppable.

      The deepening of the complex humanitarian crisis in the west, plus the permanent shortage of gasoline, have impoverished migrants to a dangerous degree of vulnerability. Those who simply want to reach the border face obstacles like the absence of safe transportation and well-defined enemies, such as the human trafficking networks or the pro-Maduro criminal gangs controlling the roads now. The fear of armed violence in irregular crossings and the oppressive tendencies of the people controlling them, as well as the growing xenophobia of neighboring countries towards refugees, should be making many migrants wonder whether traveling on foot is a good idea at all.

      Although the border’s now open, the regime’s walls grow thicker for the poor. This might translate into new internal migrations within Venezuela toward areas less affected by the collapse of services, such as Caracas or the eastern part of the country, and perhaps the emergence of poor and illegal settlements in those forgotten lands where neither Maduro’s regime, nor Iván Duque’s government hold any jurisdiction.

      For now, who knows what’s going to happen? The sun sets over the border and a dense cloud of dust covers all of us.

      https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2019/06/11/leaving-home-through-a-darkened-border

  • French President Elect: Unveiling The Golden Boy Emmanuel Macron
    http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=19045

    Sharmini Peries: And also, given that this new party has no real political base in the National Assembly and there is National Assembly election scheduled for June 11th, how will the political landscape in France respond to this, particularly given the fragmentation that we were just talking about.

    Serge Halimi: Well, it’s really difficult to tell at this time. It’s quite clear that elements of the right are going to split from the right and rejoin with Macron. Elements of the socialist party are going to split from the socialist party and rejoin Macron. But I think that one thing that is more important than this is the social element that was disclosed by the vote. Because Macron’s golden boy image and actions account for the fact that despite of his landslide victory, 56 percent of the workers voted for Marine Le Pen. Of course, Paris, which is the most bourgeois of major French cities gave a landslide to Macron; received 90 percent of the vote there.

    In other words, you saw in this vote a prosperous and educated France that voted for Macron and won. And the richer city is in terms of how much income it taxes its residents, the more likely the city is to vote for Macron, who incidentally promised to eliminate much of the wealth tax. So this is, I think, one thing we must emphasize, the fact that Macron is really the elected president of the prosperous France and of the middle class, and that Marine Le Pen got a lot of support from the working class, and this is something that will stay during Macron’s term, and I think the policies he has in mind, especially the deregulation of the labor market will insist on the features of his program, which is a program meant for the wealthy.

    Sharmini Peries: And so then let’s talk about where the French left is. Its main candidate, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, won nearly 20 percent of the vote during the first round of the elections. The highest they’ve ever had in terms of a left socialist party perspective. What are his chances of winning the National Assembly and more seats there so he can actually challenge Macron as he seeks to implement more neoliberal measures in France?

    Serge Halimi: Well, the result Mélenchon got was not the highest the left had in France, you had, of course, several decades ago, the communist party that got more than 20 percent of the vote. But it’s still a very good result he got in the first round. Now the question is the extent to which this result will translate in parliamentary seats, and the parliamentary system is such that its very unlikely that Mélenchon will get that many seats. We have 577 seats in the National Assembly and most of the projections say that Mélenchon will be able to get 40 or 50 seats at most. So maybe we will be surprised by what happens in the next few weeks, but the most likely outcome will be Macron getting almost a majority of the seats in the National Assembly. The right, getting 200 seats more or less. And then Mélenchon and the extreme right getting very few seats because the system is rigged against parties such as the National Front and the left international assembly.

    #France

  • Quand la France accueille une organisation terroriste iranienne a Paris pour préparer la reconquête de l’Iran le MEK http://ncr-iran.org/en/news/iran-resistance/20677-live-update-freeiran-gathering-2016 Des politiciens français, journalistes, pseudo-experts élus français participent à cette grand-messe en parlant en notre nom au service de la gouroute Maryam Radjavi accusée de crimes par Amnesty mais largement ignoré par les citoyens français.."Dominique Lefebvre, Member of National Assembly.
    Gilbert Mitterrand, President of France Libertés: The fight for human rights and a democratic and free Iran is why everyone is gathered there today.A delegation of French lawmakers from the National Assembly and Senate as well as renowned French personalities who have over many years supported the Iranian Resistance are now on the stage. They include Bishop Jacques Gaillot, former Minister Alain Vivien, former governor and head of France’s internal security agency DST Yves Bonnet, former mayor and MP Jean-Pierre Brard, former French MP and judge Francois Colcombet, honorary president of the French human rights group New Human Rights (NDH) Pierre Bercis, Michelle Joli and MPs Dominique Lefebvre and Michel Terrot and Senators Alain Neri and Hélène Conway-Mouret, who is a former French deputy minister of foreign affairs."
    Que du beau linge ! Allez une bonne petite guerre humanitaire en vue ??

  • The long history of the U.S. interfering with #elections elsewhere
    https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/10/13/the-long-history-of-the-u-s-interfering-with-elections-elsewhere

    In the late 1940s, the newly-established #CIA cut its teeth in Western Europe, pushing back against some of the continent’s most influential leftist parties and labor unions. In 1948, the U.S. propped up Italy’s centrist Christian Democrats and helped ensure their electoral victory against a leftist coalition, anchored by one of the most powerful communist parties in Europe. CIA operatives gave millions of dollars to their Italian allies and helped orchestrate what was then an unprecedented, clandestine propaganda campaign: This included forging documents to besmirch communist leaders in fabricated sex scandals, starting a mass letter-writing campaign from Italian-Americans to their compatriots, and spreading hysteria about a Russian takeover and the undermining of the Catholic Church.

    “We had bags of money that we delivered to selected politicians, to defray their political expenses, their campaign expenses, for posters, for pamphlets,” recounted F. Mark Wyatt, the CIA officer who handled the mission and later participated in more than two-and-a-half decades of direct support to Italy’s Christian Democrats.

    #Etats-Unis

  • Foreigners own 1.4 million hectares of farmland | New Era Newspaper Namibia
    https://www.newera.com.na/2016/07/05/foreigners-1-4-million-hectares-farmland

    A total of 281 foreign nationals own 1.4 million hectares of agricultural land in Namibia, Minister of Land Reform Utoni Nujoma revealed last week.

    Responding to questions posed by DTA president McHenry Venaani in the National Assembly, Nujoma said of the 281 foreign nationals some own land in partnership with Namibians.

    Yesterday, Venaani told reporters he would petition President Hage Geingob in an open letter on the issue, adding that the Harambee Prosperity Plan (HPP) cannot be implemented while farmland remains in the hands of foreigners.

    During the National Assembly session, Nujoma stressed that it remains a challenge to verify and conclude who the absentee landowners are, but said the process of determining this is ongoing.

    According to Nujoma, 129 German nationals top the list, owning over 620 000 hectares of farmland.

    #terres #Namibie

  • La situation française décrite dans la newsletter de ForeignPolicy.com (du groupe du Washington Post)
    (ici, au moins, le résumé de la loi ne s’embarrasse pas des « nouveaux droits » dont l’obstination de la CGT viserait à priver les salariés…)

    French Labor Strikes Disrupt the Country

    French Prime Minister Manuel Valls suggested that a controversial labor reform bill could be “modified” but not withdrawn. France is facing energy cuts, reduced train service, and fuel shortages as unions protest the bill, which was pushed through the National Assembly without a vote. The bill would ease regulations on pay reduction, layoffs, holidays and special leave, and the 35-hour work week.

    Pursuing the debate in parliament would pose the risk of . . . abandoning the compromise that we have built,” Valls said when he first announced that the National Assembly would not vote on the bill.

    • idem à la BBC

      France labour dispute : Wave of strike action nationwide - BBC News
      http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36385778

      French labour reform bill - main points
      • The 35-hour week remains in place, but as an average. Firms can negotiate with local trade unions on more or fewer hours from week to week, up to a maximum of 46 hours

      •Firms are given greater freedom to reduce pay

      • The law eases conditions for laying off workers, strongly regulated in France. It is hoped companies will take on more people if they know they can shed jobs in case of a downturn

      • Employers given more leeway to negotiate holidays and special leave, such as maternity or for getting married. These are currently also heavily regulated

  • Venezuela Passes Law Banning GMOs, by Popular Demand
    http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/01/01/venezuela-passes-law-banning-gmos-by-popular-demand-2

    The National Assembly of Venezuela, in its final session before a neoliberal dominated opposition takes the helm of legislative power on January 5, passed one of the most progressive seed laws in the world on December 23, 2015; it was promptly signed into law by President Nicolas Maduro. On December 29, during his television show, “In Contact with Maduro, number 52,” Maduro said that the new seed law provides the conditions to produce food “under an agro-ecological model that respects the pacha mama (mother earth) and the right of our children to grow up healthy, eating healthy.” The law is a victory for the international movements for agroecology and food sovereignty because it bans transgenic (GMO) seed while protecting local seed from privatization. The law is also a product of direct participatory democracy –the people as legislator– in Venezuela, because it was hammered out through a deliberative partnership between members of the country’s National Assembly and a broad-based grassroots coalition of eco-socialist, peasant, and agroecological oriented organizations and institutions. This essay provides an overview of the phenomenon of people as legislator, a summary of the new Seed Law, and an appendix with an unofficial translation of some of the articles of the law.

    #Venezuela #semences #OGM #agroécologie #agriculture

  • What next for #Venezuela?
    http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international/262581-what-next-for-venezuela

    So the Venezuelan political system, with all its flaws, is much more democratic than the conventional wisdom has maintained. Now, what about the future? If the opposition gets a two-thirds majority of seats (112 or more), it would have important powers, such as the ability to remove Supreme Court judges, censure the vice president and call an assembly to propose changes to the constitution.

    However, the opposition has more than 20 political parties and many divisions. It is possible that the government will be able to get some opposition legislators to vote with it in the National Assembly, so that it can continue governing until the next presidential election in 2018.

    If that is the case, from the government’s standpoint, the election will not have changed much. The key issue for its continued political survival will still be the economy. There is triple-digit inflation, widespread shortages of consumer goods, a recession, low oil prices, non-working price controls and a dysfunctional exchange rate system that is at the heart of the country’s economic mess. This is obviously why the government lost the National Assembly. So, as before the election, if the government does not fix this mess, the Chavistas will lose power; if they do fix it, they will probably do OK.

    Opposition leaders will still face the same choice they have faced for the past 16 years: Do they want to participate in the political system, or simply vanquish their enemies, the Chavistas? From 1999 to 2003, they had what opposition leader Teodoro Petkoff called a “strategy of military takeover,” including the 2002 U.S.-backed military coup and the 2002–2003 oil strike. But in the past decade, they have repeatedly gone back and forth between insurrectionary and electoral strategies. In 2013, they lost the presidential elections and refused the accept the results, taking to the streets with violent demonstrations; and last year, a part of the opposition led by Leopoldo López and María Corina Machado also opted for violent street demonstrations aimed at “La Salida” — or “the exit” — of the government.

    The opposition’s victory could give the more moderate elements a leg up on their extremist partners to move the country toward a more normal, less polarized political process. The government now clearly has a new incentive to do the same. That would certainly be the best for the country, which faces serious challenges ahead in fixing the economy.

  • #Burkina_Faso on the boil (and, no BBC, #Blaise_Compaore is not a ‘peacemaker’)
    http://africasacountry.com/burkina-faso-on-the-boil-and-no-bbc-blaise-compaore-is-not-a-peacem

    Ça chauffe au Burkina, just like we knew it would. News came this morning that the National Assembly and the headquarters of the ruling party have gone up in flames, but it’s not a great surprise. A political crisis has been looming ever since it became apparent that President Blaise Compaoré (that’s him and his […]

    #POLITICS

  • KuwaitGate: Alleged coup, billions of dollars abroad, and struggles for succession
    http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/kuwaitgate-alleged-coup-billions-dollars-abroad-and-struggles-suc

    Kuwaities gather at Iradah Square opposite of the National Assembly building in #Kuwait City, on June 10, 2014. The Opposition called for the rally where they vowed to expose major corruption scams. (Photo: AFP-Yasser al-Zayyat) Kuwaities gather at Iradah Square opposite of the National Assembly building in Kuwait City, on June 10, 2014. The Opposition called for the rally where they vowed to expose major corruption scams. (Photo: AFP-Yasser al-Zayyat)

    Since the start of 2014, the tiny oil-flush country of Kuwait has been rocked by alleged scandals that supposedly involve a conspiracy to overthrow the emirate’s emir and crown prince and billions of dollars of public funds laundered aboard. While the authenticity of the (...)

    #Mideast_&_North_Africa #al-Sabah_family #Articles #Hezbollah #Iran #Israel #Jassim_al-Kharafi #Mohammed_al-Yousifi #Sheikh_Nasser_al-Mohammed

  • KuwaitGate: Alleged coup attempts at home, billions of dollars abroad, and struggles for succession
    http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/kuwaitgate-alleged-coup-attempts-home-billions-dollars-abroad-and

    Kuwaities gather at Iradah Square opposite of the National Assembly building in #Kuwait City, on June 10, 2014. The Opposition called for the rally where they vowed to expose major corruption scams. (Photo: AFP-Yasser al-Zayyat) Kuwaities gather at Iradah Square opposite of the National Assembly building in Kuwait City, on June 10, 2014. The Opposition called for the rally where they vowed to expose major corruption scams. (Photo: AFP-Yasser al-Zayyat)

    Since the start of 2014, the tiny oil-flush country of Kuwait has been rocked by alleged scandals that supposedly involve a conspiracy to overthrow the emirate’s emir and crown prince and billions of dollars of public funds laundered aboard. While the authenticity of the (...)

    #Mideast_&_North_Africa #al-Sabah_family #Articles #Hezbollah #Iran #Israel #Jassim_al-Kharafi #Mohammed_al-Yousifi #Sheikh_Nasser_al-Mohammed

  • S. Korea urges N. Korea to stop provocative threats | GlobalPost
    http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/yonhap-news-agency/131220/s-korea-urges-n-korea-stop-provocative-threats

    SEOUL, Dec. 20 (Yonhap) — South Korea’s top point man on North Korea urged Pyongyang Friday to stop its provocative threats against Seoul and called for cooperation to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

    “North Korea should take the attitude to resolve inter-Korean issues in a step by step manner through dialogue,” Unification Minister Ryoo Kihl-jae said in a forum at the National Assembly.

    #corée_du_nord

  • Daily NK - North Has 22x More Resources than South

    http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=10989

    North Korea possesses roughly $6.4 trillion in untapped mineral resources, a report released by a South Korean lawmaker asserted yesterday.

    Ruling Saenuri Party lawmaker and member of the Science, ICT, Future Planning, Broadcasting and Communications Committee Kim Eul Dong’s office based the latest assessment on data provided by the National Assembly Research Service (NARS). According to the NARS report, North Korea has around 20 different types of economically viable resource.

    #corée_du_nord

  • Gulf Daily News » Local News » VOW TO END TERRORISM
    http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=359155

    The Premier followed up the implementation of National Assembly recommendations and reviewed the security measures to deal with any emergency. He also reviewed the progress of the security and civil committees commissioned to implement the recommendations.

    The Premier said 17 out of 22 recommendations have been fully implemented and stressed the need to speed up security measures to preserve public and private interests.

    “These measures are aimed at protecting residents from militant groups, who are denying people their source of income by blocking roads and forcing them to close their businesses.”

    The Premier said he would personally follow up the implementation of anti-terror measures in order to provide citizens a safe and stable society that’s free from violence, terrorism and sectarian exploitation.

  • Bahrain: Parliament Moves to Curtail Basic Rights | Human Rights Watch
    http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/31/bahrain-parliament-moves-curtail-basic-rights

    The parliament specifically set out 22 recommendations calling for new restrictions on freedom of expression, and an indefinite ban on all public gatherings in the capital, Manama. It also called for the authorities to revoke the citizenship of Bahrainis who have been convicted of terrorist offenses, and proposed declaring a “state of national safety” in order “to impose civic security and peace.”

    • Manama, July 28. (BNA) – During the extraordinary session held here today in line with Royal Order 33 for this year issued by His Majesty King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa on July 25, members of the National Assembly agreed on the following recommendations:

      1. Issuance of Decree Laws during parliament’s summer recess in order to toughen penalties in the terrorism law and, if necessary, to implement such recommendations, in order to face any event requiring expediting the adoption of measures that brook no delay, and need swift actions to protect national security and stability, in line with Article 38 of the Kingdom’s Constitution.

      2. Revoking the citizenship of those who carry out terrorist crimes and their instigators.

      3. Inflicting tough penalties on those who incite all forms of violence and terrorism.

      4. Inflicting severe punishment on all kinds and forms of violence and terror crimes.

      5. Drying up all sources of terrorist financing.

      6. Banning sit-ins, rallies and gatherings in the capital Manama.

      7. Taking all necessary measures, including the declaration of the State of National Safety, to impose civic security and peace whenever law is violated, the security of the citizens is compromised and private and public property is under threat.

      8. Taking legal actions against some political associations which incite and support acts of violence and terrorism.

      9. Amending Law 58 of 2006 with respect to protection of the community of against terrorist acts so as to inflict punishment on those who instigate and support terrorism.

      10. Granting the security bodies all required and appropriate powers to protect society from terror incidents and prevent spreading them.

      11. Requesting Ambassadors to Bahrain not to interfere in the kingdom’s domestic affairs, in line with International Law and regulations.

      12. Toughening penalties on those who involve children and exploit them in acts of terrorism and vandalism of private or public facilities.

      13. Total commitment to applying all punitive laws related to combating violence and terrorism.

      14. Adherence to a balanced moderate discourse in order to preserve the social fabric of the Bahraini society.

      15. Direct relevant state bodies to activate the necessary legal action against those who use social networks in an illegal way, and toughening penalties against those who use those networks to disseminate false information to foreign sides which plot against the country’s security and stability.

      16. Basic liberties, particularly freedom of opinion, should be affected so as to strike a balance between law enforcement and human rights protection.

      17. Examination of the educational policies of the kingdom and review and change educational curricular in a way that protects society from violence and terrorist actions and improves the behavior of students.

      18. Using the media to shed light on the dangers of terrorism and its negative impacts on national stability and economy.

      19. Backing the loyal efforts of HM the King to encourage national dialogue and push it forward, as serious national dialogue is the best means to resolve all issues and maintain national cohesion.

      20. Those involved in terrorist acts shall not be covered by Royal pardon on crimes.

      21. Devising an integrated national security strategy in order to be able to face all developments and supporting the efforts of those in charge of it and ensuring their protection.

      22. Launching programmes to rehabilitate youths who were exploited in various crimes.

      At the end of the session, the National Assembly decided to submit its recommendations to HM the King.

      http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/573207

  • La saison de la question parlementaire est rouverte à Koweit, avec le ministre du pétrole dans le retentissant scandale de Dow Chemicals (une rupture par Koweit d’un contrat de JV avec l’Aéricain DC qui lui a valu une amende de 2.2 milliards de $) et le ministre de l’intérieur, accusé -par des parlementaires chiites- de manque de coopération avec les EAU dans l’affaire du démantèlement des cellules des FM ...et mieux encore du vol de M16 automatiques +munitions dans un lieu de stockage du ministère

    "“The Dow Chemical deal is one of the biggest financial crimes in the history of Kuwait,” said the grilling."

    http://gitm.kcorp.net/index.php?id=648101

    Three MPs yesterday filed to grill Oil Minister Hani Hussein over a variety of violations and misconduct, mainly on the payment of the $ 2.2 billion penalty to US Dow Chemical after the government pulled out of a joint deal. Two other MPs meanwhile filed a second request to grill Interior Minister Sheikh Ahmad Al-Humoud Al-Sabah alleging his failure to cooperate with the National Assembly and attempting to cover up a Kuwaiti “terror” cell having links with Islamists under trial in the United Arab Emirates.

    The submission of the two grillings came after a morning of drama yesterday as MPs had initially planned to file three grillings against the oil minister, all focusing on the payment to Dow besides other alleged violations. But after a brief discussion, the three teams agreed to file one grilling to be signed by MPs Saadoun Hammad, Yacoub Al-Sane and Nasser Al-Marri, which highlighted four major violations with the Dow payment remaining the main issue. Besides the Dow issue, MPs also accused the minister of allowing commercial deals with Israel, not taking any action to prevent the sale of alcohol at Kuwait-owned petrol stations in Europe and approving illegal staff promotions at state-owned oil companies.

    The three MPs also accused the minister of failing to take action to stop the sale of alcohol at thousands of petrol stations in Europe owned by Kuwait Petroleum International, a subsidiary of Kuwait Petroleum Corp (KPC). He also failed to punish officials who were responsible for maintaining Kuwaiti investments in a company in Europe even after an Israeli company bought a stake in it. The three MPs also accused the minister of approving a large number of staff promotions at oil companies that were in violation of Kuwaiti laws. [...]

    Meanwhile, MPs Safa Al-Hashem and Youssef Al-Zalzalah filed to grill the interior minister over allegations he is not fully cooperating with the Assembly and over the theft of thousands of bullets from ministry stores. The two lawmakers called on the minister to resign because they have solid evidence about the accusations they made in the grilling. They charged that the minister failed to cooperate with MPs by first failing to implement a number of recommendations and also by not answering their questions as he only answered less than half of the questions.

    They held the minister responsible for the robbery of thousands of bullets and even M16 automatic rifles from Interior Ministry stores and that he has failed to maintain law and order in the country, besides failing to implement thousands of court verdicts. But the main issue the lawmakers highlighted are accusations that the minister has refused to supply UAE authorities with information about a number of Kuwaiti Islamists – members of the Muslim Brotherhood – who have links with a group of Emirati Islamists on trial on charges of plotting to overthrow the government.

    They said that the prime minister has acknowledged the information but the interior minister still told UAE authorities that there was no Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait, thus undermining the security of Kuwait and its Gulf partner UAE. The two grillings are expected to be debated after two weeks unless the Assembly decides to delay the debate or for any other reason like a government resignation, the ministers’ resignations or others.

    • Et comme quand la chasse aux ministres est ouverte, les têtes tombent : démission du cabinet suite aux menaces de questions parlementaires

      Kuwaiti Cabinet ministers resign amid standoff with MPs
      Kuwait Times - 15 May, 2013

      In what appears to be the first confrontation with supposedly loyal MPs, the government boycotted the parliamentary session yesterday as all Cabinet ministers submitted their resignations to the prime minister a day after five MPs filed to grill the oil and interior ministers.

      National Assembly Speaker Ali Al-Rashed told reporters after a meeting with Justice Minister Shareeda Al-Maousherji that he has been informed that “Cabinet ministers submitted their resignation to the prime minister and accordingly they will not attend the Assembly session tomorrow (today)”.

    • La vie parlementaire a repris son cours normal avec un jeu à couteaux tirés entre pouvoir exécutif et législatif (même si le parlement élu en Déc. 2012 a la réputation d’être docile)

      Kuwaiti Speaker rules out postponement of ministers’ grilling

      Kuwait, May 15 (KUNA) - Speaker of the National Assembly Ali Fahad Al-Rashid on Wednesday [15 May] refuted recent press reports that he reached a deal with His Highness the Prime Minister Shaykh Jabir Al-Mubarak Al-Hamad Al-Sabah to put off the grillings of First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior Shaykh Ahmad Al-Humud Al-Sabah and Minister of Oil Hani Husayn.

      “The allegations about the postponement of the two interpellations for three or four weeks are totally untrue and groundless speculations,” Al-Rashid told reporters.

      “If there is any agreement with HH the Prime Minister in this regard, I would announce it in person via the official channels of the Assembly,” he made clear.

      Al-Rashid urged the mass media which carried the reports citing what they called “a senior government official” to be more accurate and credible in their coverage.

      Source : Kuna news agency website, Kuwait, in English 15 May 13

  • Encore des avantages pour les citoyens koweitiens. La bonne recette de la redistribution de la rente pétrolière marche toujours

    http://gitm.kcorp.net/index.php?id=647118

    the National Assembly’s financial and economic affairs committee yesterday approved proposals to raise the housing loan to KD 100,000 from the current KD 70,000, head of the committee said.

    MP Youssef Al-Zalzalah also said the committee approved other proposals to raise the monthly housing allowance for Kuwaiti families waiting to get government houses from KD 150 to KD 250.

  • Nicolas Maduro Did Not Steal the Venezuelan Election
    http://www.vice.com/en_uk/read/nicolas-maduro-did-not-steal-the-venezuelan-election

    The guy in the cheap brown windbreaker walking up the dirty tenement steps to my New York office looked like a bus driver. Nicolas Maduro, elected President of Venezuela last Sunday, did indeed drive a bus, then led the drivers’ union, then drove Chávez’s laws through the National Assembly as Venezuela’s National Assembly chief. And this week, the US State Department is refusing to accept the result, suggesting Maduro hijacked the vote count. But did he? Maduro came to me that day in 2004 on (...)

  • Le Parlement koweitien discute l’accord de coopération adopté par les pays du CCEAG lors de leur dernière réunion en décembre 2012 et qui renforce la coopération entre les 6 en matière d’extradition notamment (point auquel le Koweit s’était traditionnellement opposé) :

    “Knowledgeable sources revealed to Al-Jarida that the Gulf security agreement will reach the National Assembly today or at the beginning of next week, so that the parliamentary foreign affairs committee starts discussing its clauses. They indicated that this agreement included six chapters and 20 articles, the most prominent of which is Article 2 stipulating the necessity for “the member states to cooperate in the pursuit of the outlaws or wanted by the other member states, regardless of their nationalities, while adopting the necessary measures against them.” In addition Article 10 stipulated that “the member states should collectively or bilaterally cooperate to achieve full complementarity between the security bodies and cooperation on the field.”

    “[It added:] “These bodies should provide help and assistance – in case such help is requested – to any member state, based on the circumstances of that state and those of the parties of whom this help is asked, in order to deter security turmoil and catastrophes.” As for Article 16 which was previously the object of dispute because it went against the Kuwaiti constitution at the level of the surrender of the wanted, it stipulated following its amendment that “the member states will – based on their national legislation and the agreements by which they abide – surrender the wanted persons in them, who are accused or sentenced by the specialized authorities in any of them.” What was noticeable at this level was that the agreement pointed to the local legislation and international commitments of each state as per Article 1…

    “On the parliamentary level, Deputy Muhammad aj-Jabri assured that the security agreement had not reached the National Assembly until yesterday. He added to Al-Jarida: “Today (yesterday) I called the National Assembly to inquire about the arrival of the agreement and I was told it had not yet,” indicating that he supported anything that will serve the Gulf Cooperation Council States in a way that did not go against the Kuwaiti constitution. As for Deputy Faisal al-Kandari, he considered that the agreement constituted a step towards the establishment of the Gulf confederacy, in light of the security circumstances and developments in the region. He said in statements to Al-Jarida: “In principle, we need this agreement in light of the circumstances witnessed in the region. It is a step towards the Gulf confederacy for which the kings and leaders of the GCC state called last year…””

    Al-Jarida, Kuwait

    http://www.aljarida.com/news/index/2012596174/%C2%AB%C3%87%C3%A1%C3%83%C3%A3%C3%A4%C3%AD%C3%89-%C3%87%C3%A1%C3%8E%C3%A1%

  • Wages and Wage Payments at Kaesong in North Korea

    Un peu plus de précision sur les salaires et les revenus dans la zone franche de kaesong (Corée du Nord)

    http://www.piie.com/blogs/nk/?p=8216

    October is parliamentary inspection season in South Korea, which means overtime for ministry officials as they scramble to provide answers to questions from National Assembly committees and members. An item in Yonhap (in Korean) reported on questions about Kaesong posed by members of the National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs, Trade and Unification Committee; the answers from the Ministry of Unification provide some interesting detail on wages and wage payments in the industrial zone.

    According to the MOU, the average monthly wage at KIC has reached $128.3 as of the first half of 2012. This marks a steady increase from $68.1 in 2006, $71.0 in 2007, $74.1 in 2008, $80.3 in 2009, $93.7 in 2010, $109.3 in 2011. One source of the increase is a built-in escalator clause on the minimum wage payment, which started at $50 and has increased 5% a year over the last six years. But that only gets you to about $67 for this year.

  • La police commence à mettre en oeuvre la très draconienne loi 78

    http://www.wsws.org/articles/2012/may2012/queb-m24.shtml

    Quebec student strike : Police begin to apply draconian Bill 78
    By Keith Jones
    24 May 2012

    Well over 100,000 people marched through the streets of Montreal on Tuesday to mark the 100th day of the student strike

    Quebec authorities have begun to make use of the sweeping repressive powers contained in Bill 78—the emergency legislation the provincial Liberal government rushed through the National Assembly late last week to suppress the province-wide student strike.