organization:saudi government

  • Iran and Saudi Arabia Clash Inside Syria Talks
    http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-11-04/iran-and-saudi-arabia-clash-inside-syria-talks

    Inside the nine-hour meeting, according to two Western officials briefed on it, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir got into a heated argument, during which Zarif blamed Saudi Arabian nationals for the 9/11 attacks. The comments startled the participants, who included Secretary of State John Kerry, and the room went quiet after Zarif’s remark.

    Zarif confirmed to me that he made the remark and pointed out that he was not blaming the Saudi government for the 9/11 attacks, just Saudi nationals. Fifteen of the 19 attackers were Saudi citizens.

  • Kosovo Islamic Body Accused of Tolerating Extremists
    http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-islamic-body-accused-of-tolerating-extremists-10-28-2015

    The event was held by “Fol Tash” (“Speak Now”), a Kosovar media portal run by moderate Islamic theologians, researchers and imams, who seek to explain traditional Islamic values as opposed to the violent practices of organisations such as the Islamic State.

    Most of the participants felt that Kosovo’s official Islamic body had failed to prevent the growth of extremism and the emerging Wahhabist ideology backed by Saudi Arabian funds.

    “Saudi Arabia has allocated more money for this ideology than it has for aid for the poor in countries with a Muslim majority, specifically the Saudi government and its NGOs, which are state-controlled,” Bekim Jashari, editor of “Fol Tash”, said.

    More than 200 fighters from Kosovo have reportedly joined the ranks of ISIS and Al Nusra in Syria and Iraq. Around 40 hardliners, including imams and alleged former fighters, are being tried in courts following a crackdown on suspected groups and individuals from autumn 2014 to spring 2015.

  • Nasrallah: ‘Riyadh responsible for chaos in region’
    http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2015/10/07/432363/-Nasrallah-Saudi-Arabia-Hajj-Iran

    “Al Saud (the Saudi ruling family) is responsible for any killing and massacre in the region,” Nasrallah said in remarks published by Lebanese newspaper al-Akhbar.

    He also held Saudi Arabia responsible for the bloodshed and killing of people from all tribes and sects in Lebanon, saying Riyadh paid the costs of all wars in the region, including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

    Nasrallah said that the role of the Saudi government, since the establishment of the Riyadh regime, has been to serve the interests of Israel and the United States in the region.

    The chief of the Lebanese resistance movement said Saudi Arabian officials oversee the activities of the terrorists from al-Qaeda and Daesh groups in Yemen despite knowing that the terrorists will pose a threat to Saudi Arabia itself in the future.

    […]

    The existential danger in the region is Wahhabism, Nasrallah said, adding that there are efforts to expand Wahhabism to the entire world.

    Sunni Muslims are not Takfiri and Wahhabi, he stressed, adding that Wahhabis form a tiny fraction of the Muslim population in the world.

    He blamed the Saudi regime for its “inhumane” and “Daesh-like” behavior in the recent deadly crush during the Hajj rituals in Mina, near the city of Mecca in Saudi Arabia.

  • Hajj Stampede Near Mecca Leaves Over 700 Dead - The New York Times
    http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/25/world/middleeast/mecca-stampede.html?_r=2

    But some present in the area at the time said security forces had temporarily closed exits from an area packed with pilgrims, causing the crowding that led to the stampede.

    Khalid Saleh, a Saudi government employee who rushed to the site when he heard screams and sirens, said he had found “huge numbers of people on the ground either dying or injured.” Pilgrims there told him that some of the area’s exits had been closed so that V.I.P. cars could pass, he said.

  • Wikileaks: Saudi Arabia and #Azhar on the ’Shia encroachment’ in Egypt | Mada Masr
    http://www.madamasr.com/sections/politics/wikileaks-saudi-arabia-and-azhar-shia-encroachment-egypt

    Faisal sent another “secret and urgent” cable to the Saudi king and prime minister that said the Al-Azhar sheikh met the Saudi ambassador in August 2010, and told him that the Iranians were pushing for a meeting for rapprochement between different sects, and that the Al-Azhar sheikh “didn’t want to make a decision in this regard before coordinating with the [Saudi] Kingdom about it .”

    Then, in September 2011, newly appointed Al-Azhar Grand Sheikh Ahmed #al-Tayyeb condemned “the attempts to propagate Shia beliefs in Sunni countries, especially Egypt, and next to the minaret of Al-Azhar, the bastion of the people of Sunna.”

    Amr Ezzat, a freedom of religion and belief officer at the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), says that Al-Azhar cannot be dealt with as one body with a unified intellectual reference. He considers it a jungle of diverse ideas and religious directions, with the Al-Azhar chiefdom at the top, which has the authority to coordinate with several political players, given that its main concern is maintaining stability.

    That’s why Al-Azhar continues to play an essential role as an institutional alternative in moments when the state needs to resist political religious movements and crack down on them, according to Ezzat.

    But in general, Ezzat thinks that the concept of “Shia encroachment” is highly exaggerated.

    He adds that the Saudi government is afraid of the increase of Iranian influence in the area because of the Shia population that lives in East Saudi, which is close to the Shia communities of Iraq, Iran, Syria and Lebanon, who are considered enemies of the Saudi regime.

    But he says that there’s an overestimation of the relation of Shia communities outside of Iran. For example, Ezzat says that a group of Egyptian Shia who decided to demand their rights to practice their beliefs and rituals after the 2011 revolution has a deep political disagreement with Iran.

    #Saoud

    • Pour replacer ces infos très intéressantes dans un contexte historique plus large de la politisation de la question chiite à al-Azhar et en Egypte, depuis l’époque de Nasser jusqu’à nos jours, voici un intéressant article d’al-Ahram. Les critiques sur les qualités de l’article - qui dépasse mes connaissances limitées - sont plus que bienvenues :
      Identity-politics , Egypt and the Shia / al-Ahram weekly 2013
      http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/2376/21/Identity-politics,-Egypt-and-the-Shia.aspx
      Sur la fatwa de Shaltoot en 1959 (grand imam d’al-Azhar) qui reconnaît la doctrine jaafarite (chiite duodécimaine), fatwa récusée en 2012 :

      In 1959, the sheikh of Al-Azhar Mahmoud Shaltout, who had established that office, issued a fatwa, or religious edict, sanctioning worship in accordance with the rights of the Jaafari school of religious jurisprudence, to which the majority of Shia subscribe. His fatwa stated, “It is legally permissible to worship in accordance with the Jaafari doctrine, which is known to be the doctrine of the Twelver Shiites, as is the case with the Sunni doctrines. The Muslim people should know this and shed unwarranted bigotry against certain creeds. The religion of God and His Sharia have never been affiliated with or restricted to any one doctrinal order. All who strive to perfect their faith are acceptable to Almighty God, and those who are not qualified to engage in the disciplines of theological and jurisprudential inquiry may emulate and follow the rulings of those that are. There is no difference[between Muslims] in the [basic tenets of] worship and interaction.”

      Une note dans wikipedia cite la biographie de Nasser par Said Aburish pour expliquer l’aspect politique de cette fatwa, Nasser espérait affaiblir l’alliance du général Qassem et des communistes en rendant la RAU et le nationalisme arabe plus atttractif pour les chiites irakiens :
      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Azhar_Shia_Fatwa

      Aburish, Saïd K. (2004). Nasser: the last Arab (illustrated ed.). Duckworth. pp. 200–201. ISBN 9780715633007. “But perhaps the most far reaching change [initiated by Nasser’s guidance] was the fatwa commanding the readmission to mainstream Islam of the Shia, Alawis, and Druze. They had been considered heretics and idolaters for hundreds of years, but Nasser put an end to this for once and for all. While endearing himself to the majority Shia of Iraq and undermining Kassem [the communist ruler of Iraq at the time] might have played a part in that decision, there is no doubting the liberalism of the man in this regard.”

      Il me semble avoir lu (est-ce dans la biographie de Saddam Hussein par le même Aburish ?) que Saddam Hussein (alors réfugié en Egypte) avait joué un rôle pour l’édiction de cette fatwa. J’avais souvenir aussi que le grand mufti d’Arabie saoudite s’était opposé à cette fatwa. Si des seenthissiens éclairés ont des infos et des sources...
      A l’époque de Sadate et dans le cadre de son opposition à la révolution iranienne puis de son engagement auprès de l’Irak contre l’Iran :

      President Sadat, who had opposed the Iranian Revolution, hosted the deposed Shah in Egypt, initiating a decades-long rupture in relations between Cairo and Tehran. Yet, in that very year, he closed down the Society of the Ahl Al-Bayt (the House of the Prophet Mohamed), the main Shia institute in Egypt. Henceforward, the Egyptian-Iranian conflict would acquire a salient sectarian dimension. This development was aggravated by the Shia insularism that had begun to permeate Iran’s theocratic regime under the system of vilayet-e faqih (rule by clergy) and that rendered the Shia affiliation virtually synonymous with Iranian identity. When Egypt became involved on the Iraqi side of the Iraq-Iran war, Egyptian security services became acutely sensitive to this identity and began to clamp down on all forms of Shia associations in Egypt, regardless of the fact that this community exists on the margins of society which, in turn, was geographically and emotionally remote from that conflict. At the same time, the state had begun to allow the Salafist tide to penetrate society, giving rise to the spread of ultraconservative doctrinal rigidity and the onset of mounting sectarian tensions between Muslims and Copts.

      Après la victoire du Hezbollah en 2006 et l’enthousiasme qu’elle génère y compris dans les masses sunnites arabes, qui mettent en difficulté les alliances de Moubarak, les salafistes égyptiens relancent le discours sectaire sur le « danger » de la pénétration chiite en Egypte, tout cela en lien avec les pétromonarchies du Golfe :

      Although initially the Shia question had not featured strongly in Salafist rhetoric, it was not remote. When Egyptians rejoiced at the Hizbullah victory over the Israeli army in 2006, Salafi sheikhs moved to avert the perceived threat to Sunni Egypt from the admiration of the victory, and produced a battery of recordings and lectures warning of the looming Shia tide. This drive coincided with an official rhetoric on the part of the Egyptian government, which at the time was engaged in a war of strategic balances against Iran and its allies, in alliance with the governments of the Gulf that are the chief sponsors of the Salafist movements in the Arab world.

      Après la chute de Moubarak et dans le cadre de la rivalité FM/salafistes les FM et le pouvoir de Morsi ne sont pas en reste selon l’auteur - je me demande si ce passage ne manque pas un peu de nuance car l’attitude de Morsi face à l’Iran fut très ambivalente et versatile :

      The decision to restore relations with Iran was taken by the regime that the Muslim Brotherhood now controls. In view of its totalitarian nature and the fact that it is an expression of the religious characteristics of Egyptian society, the Muslim Brotherhood did not originally define itself on the basis of Muslim doctrinal divides. Nevertheless, since the 1970s when it found itself in competition with the Salafis over the apportionment of the Egyptian societal pie, it also began to veer toward Salafism. The sensitivity of the doctrinal conflict with the Shia was one of the reasons it had severed connections with the Iranian regime with which it had initially established ties immediately following the victory of the Iranian Revolution. The speech that Morsi delivered in Tehran last August and that alluded heavily to the Sunni-Shia divide was clearly intended to outbid the Salafis at home by playing on the mounting sectarian sensitivities in Egyptian society.

  • Saudis jail Pakistani who allegedly criticized Yemen airstrikes
    http://www.latimes.com/world/afghanistan-pakistan/la-fg-saudis-pakistan-arrest-blogger-20150703-story.html

    Les citoyens des pays qui acceptent l’argent des Saoud doivent la fermer.

    controversial Pakistani commentator has been jailed in Saudi Arabia and reportedly sentenced to receive 1,000 lashes for allegedly criticizing the Saudi government while on a religious pilgrimage.

    Saudi authorities have so far denied consular access to Zaid Hamid, who was arrested last month in the holy city of Medina while traveling with his wife.

  • The Angry Arab News Service/وكالة أنباء العربي الغاضب : Saudi war on Ahmadiyyah
    http://angryarab.blogspot.com/2015/06/saudi-war-on-ahmadiyyah.html

    The Ahmadiyyah sect in Pakistan has been subjected to persecution and terrorism. This Saudi cables directly implicates the Saudi government in the war on Ahmadiyyah. Sultan in Pakistan sent it to me with this note: "RE: Saudi foreign policy over the decades was a liberal one based on the premise of “noninterference” in the affairs of others.

    #saudileaks

  • Ben Hubbard du New York Times : les saudileaks sont des pétards mouillés
    http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/21/world/middleeast/cables-released-by-wikileaks-reveal-saudis-checkbook-diplomacy.html

    Some found the documents underwhelming, noting that similar activities are carried out by many countries, including the United States.

    “There is not really something shocking that compromises Saudi security,” said Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, a political science professor in the United Arab Emirates, who had read about 100 cables.

    Everyone knows that Saudi Arabia practices checkbook diplomacy, he said, adding that it now had to compete for clients with other rich states, like Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.

    • Ben Hubbard on Saudi cables: My take versus the NYTimes
      http://angryarab.blogspot.fr/2015/06/ben-hubbard-on-saudi-cables-my-take.html

      There is so much wrong about the article by Ben Hubbard on Saudi cables.

      1) There is clearly an attempt by Western media to downplay those documents, and not to cover them extensively. Just compare the coverage to the coverage of silly emails by Syrian officials. They have inflamed Arab social media and this is even after the release of 60,000.

      2) It is not true that there are is no explosive information. There is much there about the close work of Saudi foreign ministry with the Saudi intelligence service and Ministries and interior and information.

      3) Saudi bureaucracy is weird as revealed: Saudi princes can spend millions and billions and not account for them, but civilians in the bureaucracy have to account for every penny and the purchase of new furniture for the Saudi embassy has to reach the King himself.

      4) The level of political corruption is staggering: Ben Hubbard does not tell the story of how the entire class of March 14 is revealed in the documents as nothing but paid puppets for Saudi Arabia. Lebanese MP Butrus Harb begs for money to form a new political party and then requests that the money not go through Sa‘d Hariri, whom he criticizes.

      5) One document talks about how the Saudi government should issue a statement on behalf of its own Mufti (without the Mufti knowing about) after he made a statement about the ban on churches in the peninsula.

      6) Al-Azhar is also revealed to be a mere tool for the Saudi government.

      6) Mr. Hubbard missed the most important point about the document: that they reveal clearly that anti-Shi‘ite hatred is an official policy and obsession by the Saudi regime.

      7) he cited the opinion of a UAE professor (Abdul-Khaliq ‘Abdullah, one of my closest friends at Georgetown and a former political comrade of mine) but he does not mention that ‘Abdul-Khaliq tweets praise for GCC royal family around the clock. He is hardly an objective observer in this.

      8) Why did he not mention the case of the brave former Reuters correspondent, Andrew Hammond? Andrew is mentioned and singled out because unlike most Western correspondents in the region has has been critical of the Saudi royal family, which pressured the management of Reuters to expel him from the kingdom, and he was. That is worth mentioning, Mr. Hubbard.

      9) There was the curious case of Egyptian journalist Mustafa Bakri and a proposal that he sought funding for, and which was studied by the government and his plan including an anti-Shi‘ite TV channel. This was also not of interest to Mr. Hubbard.

      10) Hubbard does not mention that the documents reveal two systems of payment to journalists, politicians and clerics: one price for silence and another price for praise. 10) He does not mention how monitoring of individuals is requested by embassy dispatches. That was not of interest either.

      11) He does not mention that Saudi and Qatari regime media are ignoring those documents. 12) He does not explain the Saudi official position: that they claim that “many documents” are forged and yet also say that they don’t contradict the policies of the kingdom.

      #saudileaks

  • La Russie poursuit sa percée dans le secteur nucléaire au Moyen Orient, après la Russie et la Jordanie
    Nuclear deal among key Saudi-Russian pacts | News , Middle East | THE DAILY STAR
    http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2015/Jun-20/302970-nuclear-deal-among-key-saudi-russian-pacts.ashx

    Saudi Arabia and Russia have signed several key agreements, including on nuclear energy, after President Vladimir Putin met with Saudi Prince Mohammad bin Salman al Saud.

    A Saudi government body in charge of such projects confirmed the agreements.

    The government body, the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy, announced the nuclear cooperation deal on its website Thursday.

    Saudi-owned Al-Arabiya TV, citing unidentified sources, said that the Gulf kingdom planned to construct 16 nuclear reactors in which Russia would play a significant role in operating.
    [...]
    In 2012, Saudi Arabia said it aimed to build 17 gigawatts (GW) of nuclear power by 2032 as well as around 41 GW of solar capacity. The oil exporter currently has no nuclear power plants.

    Nuclear and solar power stations would reduce the diversion of Saudi Arabia’s oil output for use in domestic power generation, leaving more available for export.

    #énergie #electricité #nucléaire

  • WikiLeaks ’Saudi Cables’ reveal secret Saudi government influence in Australia
    http://www.smh.com.au/national/wikileaks-saudi-cables-reveal-secret-saudi-government-influence-in-australia

    The leaked Saudi government documents include extensive correspondence between the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Kingdom’s embassy in Canberra that reveals sustained Saudi efforts to influence political and religious opinion within Australia’s Arabic and Islamic communities.

    The documents include instructions from the Saudi government to its embassy relating to the payment of large subsidies from the Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information to prominent Arabic newspapers and media organisations in Australia, with reference made to cheques to the value of $10,000 and $40,000.

    The Saudi embassy is also revealed to pay close attention to the political and religious beliefs of Saudi university students studying in Australia with reports sent to the Mabahith, the General Investigation Directorate of the Saudi Ministry of Interior, the Kingdom’s brutal secret police that deals with domestic security and counter-intelligence. The directorate is also revealed to make recommendations in relation to Saudi government funding for building mosques and supporting Islamic community activities in Australia.

    The documents show the Sunni kingdom’s strong concern about efforts by Shiite Islamic leaders to engage with the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils and the kingdom’s funding of visits to Australia by Sunni Islamic clerics to counter Shiite influence.

    #saudileaks

  • Immigration au #Qatar : la #kafala toujours en place malgré les promesses

    L’ONG Amnesty International publie ce jeudi un rapport pour rappeler au Qatar qu’il n’a pas tenu ses promesses en matière d’amélioration des droits des ouvriers, et notamment la réforme de la Kafala, ce système qui met tout employé à la merci de son employeur pour changer de travail, sortir du territoire…Une réforme annoncée il y a un an et qui n’a pas eu lieu.

    http://www.rfi.fr/moyen-orient/20150521-immigration-qatar-kafala-rapport-amnesty-travailleurs-migrants
    #migration #travail #exploitation

    • Will Migrant Domestic Workers in the Gulf Ever Be Safe From Abuse?

      Jahanara* had had enough. For a year, the Bangladeshi cook had been working 12 to 16 hours a day, eating only leftovers and sleeping on the kitchen floor of her employer’s Abu Dhabi home – all for half the salary she had been promised. She had to prepare four fresh meals a day for the eight-member family, who gave her little rest. She was tired, she had no phone and she was alone. So, in the summer of 2014, in the middle of the night after a long day’s work, she snuck out into the driveway, scaled the front gate and escaped.

      Jahanara ran along the road in the dark. She did not know where she was going. Eventually, a Pakistani taxi driver pulled over, and asked her if she had run away from her employer, and whether she needed help. She admitted she had no money, and no clue where she wanted to go. The driver gave her a ride, dropping her off in the neighboring emirate of Dubai, in the Deira neighborhood. There, he introduced her to Vijaya, an Indian woman in her late fifties who had been working in the Gulf for more than two decades.

      “It’s like I found family here in this strange land.”

      Vijaya gave the nervous young woman a meal of rice, dal and, as Jahanara still recalls, “a beautiful fish fry.” She arranged for Jahanara to rent half a room in her apartment and, within a week, had found her part-time housekeeping work in the homes of two expat families.

      Jahanara is a 31-year-old single woman from north Bangladesh, and Vijaya, 60, is a grandmother of eight from Mumbai, India. Jahanara speaks Bengali, while Vijaya speaks Telugu. Despite the differences in age and background, the two women have become close friends. They communicate in gestures and broken Urdu.

      “It’s like I found family here in this strange land,” Jahanara says.

      The younger woman now cleans four houses a day, and cooks dinner for a fifth, while the older woman works as a masseuse, giving traditional oil massages to mothers and babies.

      Jahanara’s experience in #Abu_Dhabi was not the first time she had been exploited as a domestic worker in the Gulf. She originally left Bangladesh six years ago, and has been home only once since then, when she ran away from abusive employers in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and the police deported her. She had no choice – under the much-criticized kafala system for legally employing migrant workers, a domestic worker is attached to a particular household that sponsors their visa. Employers often keep the worker’s passport to prevent their leaving, although this is illegal in most Gulf countries today.

      Under kafala, quitting a bad boss means losing your passport and vital work visa, and potentially being arrested or deported. This is why, the second time, Jahanara escaped in the dead of night. Now, she works outside official channels.

      “You earn at least three times more if you’re ‘khalli walli,’” Vijaya says, using a colloquial Arabic term for undocumented or freelance migrant workers. The name loosely translates as “take it or leave it.”

      “You get to sleep in your own house, you get paid on time and if your employer misbehaves, you can find a new one,” she says.

      “The Gulf needs us, but like a bad husband, it also exploits us.”

      Ever year, driven by poverty, family pressure, conflict or natural disasters back home, millions of women, mainly from developing countries, get on flights to the Gulf with their fingers crossed that they won’t be abused when they get there.

      It’s a dangerous trade-off, but one that can work out for some. When Jahanara and Vijaya describe their lives, the two women repeatedly weigh the possibility of financial empowerment against inadequate wages, routine abuse and vulnerability.

      By working for 23 years in Dubai and Muscat in Oman, Vijaya has funded the education of her three children, the construction of a house for her son in a Mumbai slum and the weddings of two daughters. She is overworked and underpaid, but she says that’s “normal.” As she sees it, it’s all part of working on the margins of one of the world’s most successful economies.

      “The Gulf needs us,” Vijaya says. “But like a bad husband, it also exploits us.”

      The International Labour Organization (ILO) reports that there are 11.5 million migrant domestic workers around the world – 73 percent of them are women. In 2016, there were 3.77 million domestic workers in Oman, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

      In a single household in these states, it’s common to find several domestic workers employed to do everything from cleaning and cooking, to guarding the home and tutoring the children.

      Unlike other sectors, the demand for domestic workers has been resilient to economic downturns. Estimated to be one of the world’s largest employers of domestic workers, Saudi Arabia hosts around 2.42 million. The majority of these workers (733,000) entered the country between 2016 and 2017, during its fiscal deficit. In 2017, domestic workers comprised a full 22 percent of Kuwait’s working age population. Oman has seen a threefold explosion in its domestic work sector since 2008. Overall, the GCC’s migrant domestic work sector has been growing at an annual average of 8.7 percent for the past decade.

      That growth is partly fueled by the increasing numbers of women entering the workforce. The percentage of Saudi Arabia’s adult female population in the formal labor force has risen from 18 percent to 22 percent over the past decade. In Qatar, the figure has jumped from 49 percent to 58 percent. And as more women go to work, there’s a growing need for others to take over the child and elderly care in their households. Experts call this transfer of care work from unpaid family members to paid workers from other countries the “global care chain.”

      A 2017 report, which examined the effect of changing demographics in the Gulf, found that dramatically decreased fertility – thanks to improved female education and later marriages – and greater numbers of the dependent elderly have resulted in an “increased trend for labour participation of ‘traditional’ informal care givers (usually women).”

      The enduring use of migrant domestic workers in the region is also a result of local traditions. For example, while Saudi Arabia was still the only country in the world that banned women from driving, there was a consistent need for male personal drivers, many coming from abroad. The ban was lifted in June 2018, but the demand for drivers is still high because many women don’t yet have licenses.

      “Without domestic workers, societies could not function here,” says Mohammed Abu Baker, a lawyer in Abu Dhabi and a UAE national. “I was brought up by many Indian nannies, at a time when Indians were our primary migrants. Now, I have a Pakistani driver, an Indonesian cook, an Indian cleaner, a Filipino home nurse and a Sri Lankan nanny. None of them speak Arabic, and they can hardly speak to each other, but they run my household like a well-oiled machine.”

      There is also demand from expatriate families, with dual wage earners looking for professional cleaning services, part-time cooks and full-time childcare workers.

      “When I came from Seattle with my husband, we were determined not to hire servants,” says Laura, a 35-year-old teacher in an American primary school in Abu Dhabi. “But after we got pregnant, and I got my teaching job, we had to get full-time help.”

      “My American guilt about hiring house help disappeared in months!” she says, as her Sri Lankan cook Frida quietly passes around home-baked cookies. “It is impossible to imagine these conveniences back home, at this price.”

      Laura says she pays minimum wage, and funds Frida’s medical insurance – “all as per law.” But she also knows that conveniences for women like her often come at a cost paid by women like Frida. As part of her local church’s “good Samaritan group” – as social workers must call themselves to avoid government scrutiny – Laura has helped fundraise medical and legal expenses for at least 40 abused migrant workers over the past two years.

      Living isolated in a house with limited mobility and no community, many domestic workers, especially women, are vulnerable to abuse. Afraid to lose their right to work, employees can endure a lot before running away, including serious sexual assault. Legal provisions do exist – in many countries, workers can file a criminal complaint against their employers, or approach labor courts for help. But often they are unaware of, or unable to access, the existing labor protections and resources.

      “I never believed the horror stories before, but when you meet woman after woman with bruises or unpaid wages, you start understanding that the same system that makes my life easier is actually broken,” Laura says.

      In 2007, Jayatri* made one of the hardest decisions of her life. She left her two young children at home in Sri Lanka, while the country was at war, to be with another family in Saudi Arabia.

      It was near the end of Sri Lanka’s protracted civil war and 22-year-old Jayatri had been struggling to support her family since her husband’s death in the war two years earlier. The 26-year conflict claimed the lives of tens of thousands of fathers, husbands, sons and brothers, forcing many Tamil women to take on the role of sole breadwinner for their families. But there are few job opportunities for women in a culture that still largely believes their place is in the home. Women who are single or widowed already face stigma, which only gets worse if they also try to find paying work in Sri Lanka.

      S. Senthurajah, executive director of SOND, an organization that raises awareness about safe migration, says that as a result, an increasing number of women are migrating from Sri Lanka to the Gulf. More than 160,000 Sri Lankan women leave home annually to work in other countries, including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Malaysia, according to the International Organization for Migration.

      Senthurajah says recruitment agencies specifically target vulnerable female heads of households: widows, single and divorced women and women whose husbands are disabled or otherwise unable to work to support the family. Women like Jayatri.

      When a local recruitment agency approached her and offered her a job as a domestic worker in the Gulf, it was an opportunity she felt she couldn’t turn down. She traveled from Vavuniya, a town in the island’s north – which was then under the control of Tamil Tiger rebels – to Colombo, to undergo a few weeks of housekeeping training.

      She left her young children, a boy and a girl, with her mother. When she eventually arrived in Saudi Arabia, her passport was taken by the local recruitment agency and she was driven to her new home where there were 15 children to look after. From the start, she was abused.

      “I spent five months in that house being tortured, hit and with no proper food and no salary. I worked from 5 a.m. to midnight every day,” she says, not wanting to divulge any more details about how she was treated.

      “I just wanted to go home.”

      Jayatri complained repeatedly to the recruitment agency, who insisted that she’d signed a contract for two years and that there was no way out. She was eventually transferred to another home, but the situation there was just as bad: She worked 18 hours a day and was abused, again.

      “It was like jail,” she says.

      “I spent five months in that house being tortured, hit and with no proper food and no salary. I worked from 5 a.m. to midnight every day.”

      In 2009, Jayatri arrived back in northern Sri Lanka with nothing to show for what she had endured in Saudi Arabia. She was never paid for either job. She now works as a housemaid in Vavuniya earning $60 per month. It’s not enough.

      “This is the only opportunity I have,” she says. “There’s no support. There are so many difficulties here.”

      Jayatri’s traumatic time in Saudi Arabia is one of many stories of abuse that have come out of the country in recent years. While there are no reliable statistics on the number of migrant domestic workers who suffer abuse at the hands of their employers, Human Rights Watch says that each year the Saudi Ministry of Social Affairs and the embassies of source countries shelter thousands of domestic workers with complaints against their employers or recruiters.

      Excessive workload and unpaid wages are the most common complaints. But employers largely act with impunity, Senthurajah says.

      “It’s like a human slave sale,” Ravindra De Silva, cofounder of AFRIEL, an organization that works with returnee migrant workers in northern Sri Lanka, tells News Deeply.

      “Recruitment agencies have agents in different regions of the country and through those agents, they collect women as a group and send them. The agents know which families [to] pick easily – widows and those with financial difficulties,” he says.

      In 2016, a man turned up at Meera’s* mud-brick home on the outskirts of Jaffna, the capital of Sri Lanka’s Northern Province, offering her a job in the Gulf.

      “They told me I could earn well if I went abroad and that they could help me to look after my family,” she says.

      Within a few months of arriving in Saudi Arabia, Meera, 42, couldn’t keep up with the long hours and strenuous housework. She cooked and cleaned for 12 family members and rarely got a break.

      Her employer then became abusive.

      “He started beating me and put acid in my eyes,” she says. He also sexually assaulted her.

      But she endured the attacks and mistreatment, holding on to the hope of making enough money to secure her family’s future. After eight months, she went back home. She was never paid.

      Now Meera makes ends meet by working as a day laborer. “The agency keeps coming back, telling me how poor we are and that I should go back [to Saudi Arabia] for my children,” she says.

      “I’ll never go back again. I got nothing from it, [except] now I can’t see properly because of the acid in my eyes.”

      While thousands of women travel to a foreign country for work and end up exploited and abused, there are also those who make the journey and find what they were looking for: opportunity and self-reliance. Every day, more than 1,500 Nepalis leave the country for employment abroad, primarily in Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, India and Malaysia. Of the estimated 2.5 million Nepalis working overseas, about 11 percent are female.

      Many women from South Asian countries who work in the Gulf send remittances home that are used to improve their family’s socio-economic status, covering the cost of education, health care, food and housing. In addition to financial remittances, the social remittances of female migrants in terms of skills, attitudes, ideas and knowledge can also have wide-ranging benefits, including contributing to economic development and gender equality back home.

      Kunan Gurung, project coordinator at Pourakhi Nepal, an organization focused on supporting female returnee migrants, says those who have “successful” migration journeys are often able to use their experiences abroad to challenge gender norms.

      “Our society is patriarchal and male-dominated, but the boundaries expand for women who return from the Gulf successfully because they have money and thus some power,” he says.

      “The women have left their village, taken a plane and have lived in the developed world. Such experiences leave them feeling empowered.”

      Gurung says many returning migrant workers invest their savings in their own businesses, from tailoring to chicken farms. But it can be difficult, because women often find that the skills they earned while working abroad can’t help them make money back home. To counter this, Pourakhi trains women in entrepreneurship to not only try to limit re-migration and keep families together but also to ensure women are equipped with tangible skills in the context of life in Nepal.

      But for the women in Nepal who, like Jayatri in Sri Lanka, return without having earned any money, deep-rooted stigma can block their chances to work and separate them from their families. Women who come home with nothing are looked at with suspicion and accused of being sexually active, Gurung says.

      “The reality is that women are not looked after in the Gulf, in most cases,” he says.

      In Kathmandu, Pourakhi runs an emergency shelter for returning female migrants. Every evening, staff wait at Kathmandu airport for flights landing from the Gulf. They approach returning migrants – women who stand out because of their conservative clothes and “the look on their faces” – and offer shelter, food and support.

      Of the 2,000 women they have housed over the last nine years, 42 have returned pregnant and 21 with children.

      “There are so many problems returnee migrants face. Most women don’t have contact with their families because their employer didn’t pay, or they have health issues or they’re pregnant,” says Krishna Gurung (no relation to Kunan), Pourakhi’s shelter manager.

      “They don’t reintegrate with their families. Their families don’t accept them.” Which could be the biggest tragedy of all. Because the chance to make life better for their families is what drives so many women to leave home in the first place.

      Realizing how crucial their workers are to the Gulf economies, major labor-sending countries such as Nepal, Bangladesh, India and the Philippines have been using both pressure and dialogue to improve conditions for their citizens.

      Over recent years, they have instituted a wide array of bans and restrictions, often linked to particularly horrifying cases of abuse. Nepal has banned women from working in the Gulf in 2016; the same year, India disallowed women under 30 from migrating to the Gulf. In 2013, Sri Lanka temporarily banned women from leaving the country for domestic work, citing abuse abroad and neglected families at home, and now requires a family background report before women can travel.

      The most high-profile diplomatic dispute over domestic workers unfolded between the Philippines and Kuwait this year. In January, the Philippines banned workers from going to Kuwait, and made the ban “permanent” in February after a 29-year-old Filipino maid, Joanna Demafelis, was found dead in a freezer in her employers’ abandoned apartment in Kuwait City.

      “Bans provide some political leverage for the sending country.”

      At the time, the Philippines’ firebrand president, Rodrigo Duterte, said he would “sell my soul to the devil” to get his citizens home from Kuwait to live comfortably back home. Thousands of Filipino citizens were repatriated through a voluntary return scheme in the first half of 2018, while Kuwait made overtures to Ethiopia to recruit more maids to replace the lost labor force. Duterte’s ban was eventually lifted in May, after Kuwait agreed to reform its migrant work sector, ending the seizure of passports and phones, and instituting a 24-hour hotline for abused workers.

      It’s well established that bans do not stop women from traveling to the Gulf to become domestic workers. Bandana Pattanaik, the international coordinator of the Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women, has criticized bans as being “patriarchal, limiting to female agency and also ending up encouraging illegal human smuggling.”

      But others point out that the international pressure generated by travel bans has had some effect, as in the case with the Philippines and Kuwait. “Bans provide some political leverage for the sending country,” says Kathmandu-based researcher Upasana Khadka. “But bans do not work as permanent solutions.”
      ATTEMPTS AT REFORM

      Today, after decades of criticism and campaigning around labor rights violations, the Gulf is seeing a slow shift toward building better policies for domestic workers.

      “In the past five years, five of the six GCC countries have started to adopt laws for the protection of migrant domestic workers for the very first time,” says Rothna Begum, women’s rights researcher for Middle East and North Africa at Human Rights Watch.

      “The GCC countries have long cultivated the image of being luxurious economies meant for the good life,” Begum says. “This image is hard to maintain as labor exploitation comes to light. So, while they try to shut the reporting down, they have also been forced to address some of the issues raised by their critics.”

      Legal and institutional reforms have been announced in the domestic work sector in all GCC countries except Oman. These regulate and standardize contracts, mandate better living conditions, formalize recruitment, and plan rehabilitation and legal redress for abused workers.

      This gradual reform is due to international pressure and monitoring by human rights groups and international worker unions. After the 2014 crash in the oil economy, the sudden need for foreign investment exposed the GCC and the multinational companies doing business there to more global scrutiny.

      Countries in the Gulf are also hoping that the new national policies will attract more professional and skilled home workers. “Domestic work is a corrupt, messy sector. The host countries are trying to make it more professional,” says M. Bheem Reddy, vice president of the Hyderabad-based Migrant Rights Council, which engages with women workers from the southern districts of India.

      Many of the Gulf states are moving toward nationalization – creating more space for their own citizens in the private sector – this means they also want to regulate one of the fastest growing job sectors in the region. “This starts with dignity and proper pay for the existing migrant workers,” Reddy says.

      There have been attempts to develop a regional standard for domestic labor rights, with little success. In 2011, the ILO set standards on decent work and minimum protection through the landmark Domestic Workers Convention. All the GCC countries adopted the Convention, but none have ratified it, which means the rules are not binding.

      Instead, each Gulf country has taken its own steps to try to protect household workers who come from abroad.

      After reports of forced labor in the lead-up to the 2022 FIFA World Cup, Qatar faced a formal inquiry by the ILO if it didn’t put in place migrant labor protections. Under that pressure, in 2017, the country passed a law on domestic work. The law stipulates free health care, a regular monthly salary, maximum 10-hour work days, and three weeks’ severance pay. Later, it set a temporary minimum wage for migrant workers, at $200 a month.

      The UAE’s new reforms are motivated by the Gulf crisis – which has seen Qatar blockaded by its neighbors – as well as a desire to be seen as one of the more progressive GCC countries. The UAE had a draft law on domestic work since 2012, but only passed it in 2017, after Kuwait published its own law. The royal decree gives household workers a regular weekly day off, daily rest of at least 12 hours, access to a mobile phone, 30 days paid annual leave and the right to retain personal documents like passports. Most importantly, it has moved domestic work from the purview of the interior ministry to the labor ministry – a long-standing demand from rights advocates.

      The UAE has also become the first Gulf country to allow inspectors access to a household after securing a warrant from the prosecutor. This process would be triggered by a worker’s distress call or complaint, but it’s unclear if regular state inspections will also occur. Before this law, says Begum, the biggest obstacle to enforcing labor protection in domestic work was the inability for authorities to monitor the workspace of a cleaner or cook, because it is a private home, unlike a hotel or a construction site.

      The UAE has not followed Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia in stipulating a minimum wage for domestic workers. But it has issued licenses for 40 Tadbeer Service Centers, which will replace recruitment agencies by the end of the year. Employers in the UAE will have to submit their requests for workers through these centers, which are run by private licensed agents but supervised by the Ministry of Human Resources. Each of the centers has accommodation for workers and can also sponsor their visas, freeing them up to take on part-time jobs while also catering to growing demand from UAE nationals and expats for legal part-timers.

      “You focus on the success stories you hear, and hope you’ll have that luck.”

      B. L. Surendranath, general secretary of the Immigration Protection Center in Hyderabad, India, visited some of these centers in Dubai earlier this year, on the invitation of the UAE human resources ministry. “I was pleasantly surprised at the well-thought-out ideas at the model Tadbeer Center,” he says. “Half the conflicts [between employer and worker] are because of miscommunication, which the center will sort out through conflict resolution counselors.”

      Saudi Arabia passed a labor law in 2015, but it didn’t extend to domestic work. Now, as unemployment among its nationals touches a high of 12.8 percent, its efforts to create more jobs include regulating the migrant workforce. The Saudi government has launched an electronic platform called Musaned to directly hire migrant domestic workers, cutting out recruitment agencies altogether. Women migrant workers will soon live in dormitories and hostels run by labor supply agencies, not the homes of their employers. The labor ministry has also launched a multi-language hotline for domestic workers to lodge complaints.

      Dhaka-based migrant rights activist Shakirul Islam, from Ovibashi Karmi Unnayan Programme, welcomes these changes, but remains circumspect. “Most women who return to Bangladesh from Saudi [Arabia] say that the revised laws have no impact on their lives,” he says. “My understanding is that the employers are not aware of the law on the one hand, and on the other, do not care about it.”

      Migrant rights activists, ILO officials, the governments of source countries and workers themselves are cautiously optimistic about the progressive direction of reforms in the Gulf. “But it is clear that none of the laws penalize employers of domestic workers for labor rights violations,” says Islam.

      Rights activists and reports from the ILO, U.N. and migrants’ rights forums have for decades repeated that full protection of domestic workers is impossible as long as GCC countries continue to have some form of the kafala sponsorship system.

      Saudi Arabia continues to require workers to secure an exit permit from their employers if they want to leave the country, while Qatar’s 2015 law to replace the kafala sponsorship system does not extend to domestic workers. Reddy of the Migrant Rights Council says the UAE’s attempt to tackle kafala by allowing Tadbeer Center agents to sponsor visas does not make agents accountable if they repeatedly send different workers to the same abusive employer.

      For now, it seems the women working on the margins of some of the richest economies in the world will remain vulnerable to abuse and exploitation from their employers. And as long as opportunities exist for them in the Gulf that they can’t find at home, thousands will come to fulfil the demand for domestic and care work, knowing they could be risking everything for little or no return.

      Jahanara says the only thing for women in her position to do is to take the chance and hope for the best.

      “You focus on the success stories you hear, and hope you’ll have that luck.”


      https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/articles/2018/08/31/will-migrant-domestic-workers-in-the-gulf-ever-be-safe-from-abuse-2

      #travail_domestique #migrations #pays_du_golfe

  • Reza Aslan se montre on ne peut plus clair : l’Arabie séoudite a dépensé plus de 100 milliards de dollars sur les 20 ou 30 dernières années pour répandre le wahhabisme dans le monde, idéologie qu’il définit comme le virus à la source de Boko Haram, ISIS ou al Qaeda…
    http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2015/01/reza-aslan-anyone-who-asks-why-muslims-have-not-condemned-terrorism-cant-u

    “There’s no question that there has been a virus that has spread throughout the Muslim world, a virus of ultra-orthodox puritanism,” Aslan replied. “But there’s also no question what the source of this virus is — whether we’re talking about Boko Haram, or ISIS, or al Qaeda, or the Taliban.”

    “All of them have as their source Wahhabism, or the state religion of Saudi Arabia,” he said. “And as we all know, Saudi Arabia has spent over $100 billion in the past 20 or 30 years spreading this ideology throughout the world.”

    C’est au tout début de la vidéo :
    http://mediamatters.org/video/2015/01/11/reza-aslan-anyone-who-asks-why-muslims-arent-de/202086

    (Ça commence à vraiment vraiment se voir. Nos usuels affreux vont devoir lancer une grande campagne de dénonciation du Saudi bashing…)

    • Chiffre qui était déjà réapparu l’année dernière, par exemple ici : Jonathan Manthorpe : Saudi Arabia funding fuels jihadist terror
      http://www.vancouversun.com/life/Jonathan+Manthorpe+Saudi+Arabia+funding+fuels+jihadist+terror/8445197/story.html

      In 2003, a United States Senate committee on terrorism heard testimony that in the previous 20 years Saudi Arabia had spent $87 billion on promoting Wahhabism worldwide.

      This included financing 210 Islamic centres, 1,500 mosques, 202 colleges and 2,000 madrassas (religious schools).

      Various estimates put the amount the Saudi government spends on these missionary institutions as up to $3 billion a year.

      This money smothers the voices of moderate Muslims and the poison flows into every Muslim community worldwide.

    • La source de ce dernier article est la déposition d’Alex Alexiev lors d’auditions du Sénat des États-Unis de 2003 : « Terrorism : Growing Wahhabi Influence in the United States », Testimony before the US Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, 26 June 2003

      http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108shrg91326/pdf/CHRG-108shrg91326.pdf

      Mr. ALEXIEV. Now how could one explain the fact that such a hateful creed in fact has been able to take over much of the Islamic establishment worldwide and become its dominant idiom? The short answer, and there are also other things we can talk about—the short answer is money; lots of it. In the past 25 years or so, according to Saudi official information, Saudi Arabia has given over $70 billion of what they call development aid, which in fact they themselves confirm goes mostly for what they call Islamic activities.

      Senator KYL. Over what period of time?

      Mr. ALEXIEV. In the last 25 years roughly, from mid 1970’s to the end of last year; 281 billion Saudi riyals according to their official statements. This is nearly $2.5 billion per year. This makes it the largest sustained ideological campaign in history, in my view. I served as what was called a Sovietology for nearly two decades and the best estimates that we had on Soviet external propaganda spending was $1 billion a year. So you are talking about an absolutely astounding amount of money being spent for the specific purpose of promoting, preaching Wahhabi hatred.

      C’est un document qu’il faut lire.

    • Merci beaucoup Nidal pour ces articles essentiels.

      Après si des anglophones ou des « fluent » en anglais se dévouent pour faire une synthèse du rapport d’audition du Sénat américain de 2003, ils auront droit à ma reconnaissance éternelle : lire 60 pages en anglais ... il me faudrait beaucoup de temps libre. ;-)

    • Voici le texte. Tu peux tenter la traduction automatique, normalement Google s’en sort pas trop mal avec l’anglais.

      Mr. ALEXIEV. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to appear here and talk about an issue that is of the utmost importance. I have submitted a written statement and instead of reading it, with your permission I would like to briefly summarize the issues in it.

      The basic premise of my statement is that the phenomenon of violent Islamic extremism is the key problem we are facing today. Al Qaeda, murderous as it is, is but a symptom, in my view, of an underlying malignancy which is Islamic extremism and the entire edifice, if you will, of extremism that breeds terrorism. What I mean by that is even if we are successful to defeat al Qaeda totally, another al Qaeda will come by if we do not at the same time succeed in destroying the edifice of Islamic extremism.

      This huge international infrastructure is sponsored ideologically and financially by Wahhabism, and that is to say, Saudi Arabia. I do not believe that we are likely to make much progress in the war on terrorism, lasting progress, until we eliminate this edifice of extremism.

      Let me briefly talk about the ideology that drives Wahhabism. Wahhabism pretends to be Islam in its purest form. I submit to you, Mr. Chairman, that it is nothing of the kind. It is in fact an extremely reactionary, obscure sect whose teaching contradicts traditional Islamic doctrine. To that extent it is incorrect to refer to it as fundamentalist because it in fact transgresses against some of the fundamentals of Islamic teaching as given in the Koran. In fact Wahhabis teaching contradicts traditional tenets of the Koran to the point of falsifying them.

      The give you just one example, Wahhabism teaches and has been doing so since the very beginning, since the big 18th century, that all Muslims that do not subscribe to Wahhabism are in fact apostates and heretics and violence against them is not only permissible but in fact obligatory. This continues to be the teaching that Wahhabis subscribe to to this day. As a result, Wahhabism is not only directed against infidels, non-Muslims, but is in fact directed against and threatens Muslims that do not subscribe to Wahhabism. That is a key point to understand.

      As a result, this violent creed has become, in my view, the prototype ideology of all Islamic extremist and terrorist groups, and that includes those that violently oppose the House of Saud, such as bin Laden. In this respect it is very important for us to understand that Wahhabi activities are not a matter of religion, but in my view a matter of criminal sedition and ought to be treated as such.

      1 Stephen Schwartz’s affiliation with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies ended in August 2003.

      It is just as important to understand, as I mentioned, that they threaten not only our liberal democratic order but they threaten other Muslims such as Sunnis, the Shi’as, the different Sufi orders, the Barelvis in South Asia, the Bahai, the Ahmadis, et cetera. These other Muslims in fact are potential allies in the struggle against this extremist phenomenon.
      Now how could one explain the fact that such a hateful creed in fact has been able to take over much of the Islamic establishment worldwide and become its dominant idiom? The short answer, and there are also other things we can talk about—the short answer is money; lots of it. In the past 25 years or so, according to Saudi official information, Saudi Arabia has given over $70 billion of what they call development aid, which in fact they themselves confirm goes mostly for what they call Islamic activities.

      Senator KYL. Over what period of time?

      Mr. ALEXIEV. In the last 25 years roughly, from mid 1970’s to the end of last year; 281 billion Saudi riyals according to their official statements. This is nearly $2.5 billion per year. This makes it the largest sustained ideological campaign in history, in my view. I served as what was called a Sovietology for nearly two decades and the best estimates that we had on Soviet external propaganda spending was $1 billion a year. So you are talking about an absolutely astounding amount of money being spent for the specific purpose of promoting, preaching Wahhabi hatred.

      They have used this amount of money to take over mosques around the world, to establish Wahhabi control of Islamic institutions, subsidize extremist madrassas in South Asia and elsewhere, control Islamic publishing houses. They currently control probably four-fifths of all Islamic publishing houses. And spend money, a lot of it, on aggressive proselytizing, apart from direct support of terrorism.

      What have they achieved for that money? I would submit to you that they have achieved quite a bit. To give you just one example, in Pakistan there are roughly 10,000 extremist madrassas that are run by Deobandi allies of the Wahhabis, and the Deobandis are very similar in their ideology to the Wahhabis. They currently teach, according to Pakistan sources, between one and 1.7 million children, essentially to hate. They do not get much schooling in any subject that is not related to Islamic activities.

      It is important to know that of these at least 1 million children, 15 percent are foreigners. So it is not just Pakistan that is affected by the fact that tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of kids are taught how to hate, and graduate from these madrassas without any useful education that could be used in the marketplace, but perfectly prepared for a career in jihad and extremist activities. 16,000 of them, for instance, are Arabs that are taught in these schools.

      As a result, Pakistan is very close to being a dysfunctional country. Two of its provinces, the Northwest frontier province and the Beluchistan in fact have governments that are openly extremist and there is a process of Talibanization of these provinces that is extremely disturbing. It is, again, not just Pakistan. It is all over. We do not have time to discuss that here but let me just mention that in Iraq, in the Kurdish areas of Iraq there are now over 40 mosques that are starting to be active there and we are going to hear from them. This does not augur well for our efforts to build democracy in Iraq unless we undercut these activities.

      Now the money that the Saudis are spending are transferred to extremist organizations through a network of charities, front organizations. Contrary to Saudi official claims, which unfortunately quite often are uncritically accepted by many, none of them are either private or charitable. They are in fact government-controlled, government-sponsored, government-funded organizations, the main ones being the World Muslim League, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, the Al Haramain Foundation, and the International Islamic Relief Organizations. There are many, many others. There are a total of over 250 so-called charitable organizations in Saudi Arabia.

      Most of the largest organizations, all four of the ones that I just mentioned, have been implicated in the support of terrorist activities by U.S. authorities. Let me be just mention here one additional factor that indicates that the government of Saudi Arabia knows very well what these organizations are doing is the fact that they passed a law way back in 1993 which prohibited any collection of donations, of zakat donations except under state supervision. So the idea that you very often hear from the Saudis themselves that somehow these are private non-government organization is, in my opinion, bogus.

      There is, again, no indication at least to me that Riyadh is interested in stemming the flow of these monies to extremist organizations. In fact the opposite is still the case. The reason that they really cannot do that is because for them to come clean on the channels and the amount of money is simply to implicate themselves, to implicate a lot of Saudi officials and organizations in support of terrorism. While promising that they will do something about it, the reality of it is very different.

      Let me give you just one quote here from last month, and that is from the official Saudi government channel, television channel. A Wahhabi cleric who gives a prayer on the state channel which deals with the so-called American tyrannical alliance and the situation of Iraq. He says, oh, God, destroy the aggressive tyrannical alliance. Oh, God, drown its soldiers in the seas and destroy them in the deserts. All Wahhabi clerics are employees of the Saudi state, and obviously the television channel also belongs to the Saudi state. So the idea that somehow they do not know what is going on is, again, in my view, a bogus one.

      Let me just finish here by saying that the evidence of the Saudi Wahhabi sponsorship of extremist networks and activities is so overwhelming, in my view, that for us to continue to tolerate it guarantees that we are not going to be able to make meaningful and lasting progress in the war on terrorism for a long time to come.

      Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

      [The prepared statement of Mr. Alexiev appears as a submission for the record.]

      Senator KYL. Thank you, Mr. Alexiev. Stephen Schwartz.

    • Voilà ce que déclare A. Gresh..!!!! :

      Il peut y avoir une discussion autour de la politique des monarchies du Golfe, et l’idée selon laquelle ils financeraient ou aideraient ISIS. Pour moi, ce n’est pas quelque chose de réel, je ne pense pas que cela soit forcément vrai. L’État islamique a très nettement indiqué que ces monarchies étaient aussi des ennemis, on l’a vu récemment avec les attaques en Arabie saoudite contre des postes frontières. Mais il est vrai qu’une partie de la rhétorique religieuse de ces pays peut alimenter ces groupes. Il est vrai aussi qu’il y a eu une mobilisation de ces États, mais aussi de leurs réseaux associatifs et religieux, au début de la révolution syrienne. Le Koweït a joué par exemple un rôle important dans l’aide apportée aux groupes islamistes qui se sont peu à peu radicalisés.

      http://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/analyses/attentats-de-paris-l-analyse-d-alain-gresh-266376078

  • Radical Reform in Islam : Shaykh ‘Abdullah Al-‘Alayli | As‘ad AbuKhalil
    http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/radical-reform-islam-shaykh-abdullah-al-alayli

    His most daring work was his volume, “Where is the Error” in which he proposed a radical reinterpretation in Islam. The publication in 1978 was quite dramatic, and the Saudi government quickly moved to ban the book not only from Saudi Arabia but also from all Arab countries. Copies were confiscated and the distribution of the book went to the underground world. The book contains many revolutionary ideas including the ban on accumulation of wealth, the compatibility of Islam and socialism, and the secular understanding of marriage in Islam. Al-‘Alayli also considered that the wealth of oil can’t be monopolized by a royal family. Those ideas triggered strong reactions and denunciations from the clerics of the Saudi regime.

    […]

    In the context of 1950s and 1960s, in the age of Nasser, the agenda of radical reform in Islam was accepted and promoted. Nasser relied on the progressive head Shaykh of al-Azhar, Mahmud Shaltut, who implemented the most progressive vision of reform since the times of Muhammad ‘Abduh. But all talk and writings about Islam hit a brick (or Chinese) wall: the Saudi regime buys off religious establishments throughout the Arab world, and indeed the world at large, in order to thwart any radical reform in Islam. Ironically, Western governments arm and support the Saudi regime, while they lament the absence of reform in Islam.

  • The Saudi #Lobbying Complex Adds a New Member: GOP Super PAC Chair Norm Coleman
    http://m.thenation.com/article/181674-saudi-lobbying-complex-adds-new-member-gop-super-pac-chair-norm-

    For Coleman, who also serves on the board of the National Endowment for Democracy, the job of Saudi lobbyist comes as somewhat of a role reversal from the senator’s work a decade ago. In 2005, Coleman signed onto a congressional letter condemning the Saudi government for distributing publications that preach a “Nazi-like hatred for Jews” and for spreading extremist ideology throughout the world."

    #Saoud

  • Jordanian lender faces Hamas funding claims in NY trial - FT.com
    http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/163f9e54-1f30-11e4-9689-00144feabdc0.html?ftcamp=crm/email/2014811/nbe/MiddleEast/product&siteedition=intl#axzz39yrsweqV

    When the arguments begin, likely to be later this week, the trial is expected to focus on transactions performed by Arab Bank for charities in the Middle East and what their link was to the attacks for which Hamas claimed responsibility.
    One particular charity is the Saudi Committee, which the plaintiffs argued in a court document in 2004 was part of “the backbone of the donor base and operational budgets of Hamas”.
    Saudi government officials have repeatedly said that the country does not support terrorism and in 2002 the Saudi embassy in the US rejected Israeli criticism of its charities, saying that it did not finance suicide bombers but helped ordinary Palestinians. A Saudi government spokesman did not respond to a request for comment.

  • The US is paying the cost of supporting the House of Saud as cracks begin to appear
    http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/the-us-is-paying-the-cost-of-supporting-the-house-of-saud-as-cracks-b

    A problem for the Saudi government is that it has always used jihadis as an arm of its foreign policy, believing that it could disclaim responsibility for their actions. Private donors and jihadi preachers were allowed to operate unhindered. But the disadvantage of this hands-off approach is that, in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria and Iraq, the jihadis were not under total Saudi government control. Those battling in Syria and Iraq today will not be pleased to learn that Riyadh has decided that they have suddenly become outcasts. In recent months, jihadi websites and messages on Twitter have begun to attack the Saudi royal family, one showing a picture of King Abdullah giving a medal to George W Bush with the caption: “medal for invading two Islamic countries”. Another shows trucks packed with armed gunmen with a caption saying they are heading for northern Saudi Arabia.

    The Saudi government is showing signs of nervousness. It has backed a counter-revolutionary wave across the Middle East that, in many places, has succeeded. Democratic protesters in Bahrain were crushed in a Saudi-backed clampdown in 2011. In Egypt, it is financially supporting the military regime that overthrew the democratically elected President Morsi in 2013. In Syria, it has ensured that the political opposition is dominated by Islamists and is funded and largely directed by itself.

    But, along the way, the Saudi royal family is making a lot of enemies. They range from members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gulf who find they are being targeted as “terrorists” despite being peaceful. There are jihadis in Syria who feel they were encouraged and then betrayed. Saudi liberals, who like the new anti-terror laws when applied to jihadis, find that innocuous tweets may land them in jail, and a mildly progressive publisher at the Riyadh International Book Fair this month had its display smashed up, probably by the religious police.

    (...)

    The Saudi royal family survived the 2011 uprisings without domestic upheaval. It has since gone a long way to restore the old status quo of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, but the kingdom itself is becoming ever more divided and unstable.

  • Complications of the Saudi Alliance With #Israel
    http://english.al-akhbar.com/blogs/angry-corner/complications-saudi-alliance-israel

    Never before has the Saudi government felt comfortable flaunting its alliance with Israel. This alliance is not new and has long historical precedences. But the Saudi royal family, in the age of the second generation of princes, has been changing tactics: Historically cautious and duplicitous, the Saudi regime is now open about its alliance with the #united_states and Israel (closer to Israel than the US as of late).

    Related Articles: Background of the Saudi-Israeli Alliance Lines of the Game: Protecting Saudi From Israel

    read (...)

    #Saudi_Arabia #syria

    • Le Angry Corner d’As‘ad Abukhalil.

      The Saudi royal family is facing a political crisis that coincides with the crisis of succession in the kingdom. The recent uncharacteristically bold moves by the kingdom in its foreign policy are signs of indecision and conflict at the level of leadership. This could only lead to strategically wrong moves by either the government as a whole or an individual prince who is too impatient to wait for the right time to seize the throne.

  • Saudi government bans Arabic sf novel HWJN, raids bookstores - Boing Boing
    http://boingboing.net/2013/11/29/saudi-government-bans-arabic-s.html

    A trusted source who asks to remain anonymous writes, “Scores of messages on Twitter, primarily in Arabic, called attention to Tuesday’s suppression by the Saudi Arabian government of H W J N, a science fiction novel by Ibraheem Abbas. The book was charged with ’blasphemy and devil-worshiping,’ according to one source, which also notes that the apparent instigator of the ban was a post on Facebook in which the writer accused the book of referencing jinn and of leading teenage girls to experiment with Ouija boards.”

  • Saudi Gazette - France ready to be KSA’s strategic partner in nuke, renewable energy
    http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentid=20131003182448

    Speaking to the Saudi Gazette, the French Ambassador to the Kingdom said “the aim of this meeting is very clear, France has been the first country to sign government to government agreement on nuclear and energy because we do think that taking it into account the huge program the Saudi government wants to implement in the nuclear field and France has a lot to bring in terms of the best nuclear technology in the world.”

    • si ils sont aussi brillants dans ce projet qu’en Jordanie, ils tiendront la corde jusq’au dernier moment, puis les Russes, les Coréens, les Américains ou les Chinois leur passeront devant. Et pour cela, ils vont continuer à user de leur influence diplomatique dans des non-deals...

  • #Ethiopia repatriates citizens from #Saudi_Arabia due to immigrant crackdown
    http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/ethiopia-repatriates-citizens-saudi-arabia-due-violent-migrant-wo

    The Ethiopian government is repatriating its citizens living in Saudi Arabia illegally, after reports that an Ethiopian was killed by Saudi police, officials said Saturday. Last April, the Saudi government issued an amnesty period giving undocumented immigrants seven months to gain legal status or leave the country. “The ones who failed are the ones who are being repatriated,” the spokesman for the Ethiopian foreign ministry, Dina Mufti, told AFP. read (...)

    #migrant_workers #Top_News

  • Saudi government to donate $300,000 to help end maritime piracy in Somalia
    Text of report in English by Somali news website Mareeg on 18 September

    The Saudi government announced yesterday that it would donate $300,000 to a trust fund that aims to abolish maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia and to support the prosecutorial legal process.

    Prince Turki bin Muhammad bin Saud Al-Kabeer, undersecretary for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Multilateral Relations in the UAE, made the announcement in his speech in Dubai during the 3rd conference against maritime piracy. The theme of the conference was “Anti-Piracy: A Continuing Task to Build Regional Capacity.”

    Saudi Arabia is known for its active role in combating piracy around the world, as it greatly affects local and international sales of goods in the entertainment industry.

    Last year, the government adopted the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) to further boost the Kingdom’s campaign against piracy.

    The Kingdom also provided expert training courses for coast guards to identify, prosecute and apprehend pirates in the Arabian Sea’s borders.

    Piracy along the Somali coast has threatened the international shipping industry since the Somali civil war.

    International deliveries are frequently interrupted along the Somali coast, which has resulted in an unprecedented rise in shipping expenses amounting to around $6.6-6.9 billion a year, according to statistics provided by Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP).

    Source: Mareeg website in English 0000 gmt 18 Sep 13

    BBC Mon AF1 AFEauwaf 200913/mau

    © Copyright British Broadcasting Corporation 2013

    #piraterie #somalie

  • Saudi salaries campaign gains momentum on social media

    A Saudi-based social media campaign aimed at increasing salaries has gained a massive following among citizens of the kingdom, many of whom are facing an increasing struggle to meet their daily living costs. Supporters of the campaign, which uses the Arabic hashtag #Our_salary_does_not_meet_our_needs, have been most active on the micro-blogging site Twitter, and their hashtag is becoming the campaign’s defining symbol, generating 17 million tweets in its first two weeks and becoming the 16th most popular hashtag in any language. However the campaign has also attracted criticism, with some Saudis seeing it as misguided and others unhappy with the public way in which the country’s problems are being aired.

    Kingdom in flux
    Although the campaign’s objective, to appeal to King Abdallah “to issue a royal decree to increase the salaries of all employees”, appears clear cut, the campaign has come to embody a number of factors that reveal a society in flux: poverty and the distribution of the country’s vast oil wealth, a population that has grown from around 7 million in the 1970s to almost 30 million in 2012, a growing number of young, educated citizens, and a disconnect between the expectations of many Saudis and their government’s policies.

    Misplaced government spending?
    Supporters of the campaign have voiced criticism of what they see as the Saudi government’s misplaced spending of the country’s funds. A widely circulated cartoon on Twitter depicts a palm tree labelled “the Saudi government” on one side of a wall, with a Saudi citizen sitting beneath it while the tree leans over the wall dropping its fruit on the other side, which is captioned “95 per cent: the rest of the world”. This criticism came to a head when the government pledged 5 billion dollars in aid to Egypt in the wake of the ousting of President Muhammad Morsi in July, prompting many to express their resentment at the decision. A picture circulated on Twitter underlined the point: it showed a Saudi couple with a baby and living in squalor in a caravan, with the caption: “Saudi Arabia gives Egypt 5 billion dollars. Don’t they deserve it more?”

    Royal excesses
    Many Saudis have used the campaign to vent their frustrations with the perceived excesses of some members of the royal family. Recent reports of a prince paying half a million dollars to spend 15 minutes with the American actress Kristen Stewart were met with tweets such as: “A prince meets an actress for 500 thousand and the people are chanting ’Our salary does not meet our needs’, suffering from a housing crisis and asking ’How can a Saudi own a house?’. The country is lost.”

    “Saudization”
    Attempts at “Saudization” by the government in recent years are yet to make significant inroads into resolving employment issues in the kingdom. A number of measures aimed at reducing the country’s heavy reliance on foreign workers in favour of Saudi employees, has so far had a limited impact on the situation. With 50 per cent of its population below the age of 25, how Saudi Arabia tackles this issue will become increasingly important in future. According to a July 2013 IMF report on Saudi Arabia, one of the challenges faced by the country is in providing suitable employment for the increasing number of young Saudis expected to enter the workplace over the next decade. It also notes a complaint voiced by many of the campaign’s supporters, which is the lack of affordable housing, reporting “a sharp increase in rents during 2007-11”.

    Nation “drowning in debt”
    Preparations ahead of Saudi National Day on 23 September have led many Twitter users to express conflicted feelings over their sense of patriotism in light of the campaign. A tweet posted by many users reads: “Before you shake your behind on the street happily wearing green on National Day, remember that you were tweeting with the hashtag ’Our salary does not meet our needs’.” Another Twitter user complained: “What National Day, when my nation is drowning in debt, all the princes are in Switzerland and we’re paying bills. It’s the fault of those who allow them to play with our money and our petrol”.

    Twitter hashtag “is a front for sedition”
    Such public airing of social grievances is frowned upon in a society which prefers to keep its flaws out of the spotlight, with some believing that the campaign and the publicity it has received tarnishes the image of the country. The secretary-general of the Cabinet, Abd-al-Rahman al-Sadhan, condemned the campaign in the Saudi newspaper Al-Watan, saying that the hashtag was “a front for sedition led by people angry that the kingdom is living in peace and stability amid the struggles that some countries are facing”. He added that it was set up by “unknown, envious people who don’t like the fact that Saudi Arabia is blessed with security and peace of mind”.

    Campaign misses deeper issues
    Abd-al-Rahman Al Farhan wrote in the Saudi daily Al-Bilad that the campaign’s demand of a higher salary fails to take into account underlying issues that make it difficult for many Saudis to meet their living costs. The writer suggested that topics addressed by the campaign would be better dealt with by the introduction of measures such as ensuring accommodation by expediting housing allowance payments, and providing health insurance for all citizens to enable them to receive the best health care. According to Al Farhan, if these measures were implemented, then “all calls for increases in salaries would dissolve into a vast sea of satisfaction and contentment”.

    Source: BBC Monitoring research in English 12 Sep 13

    © Copyright British Broadcasting Corporation 2013

  • Saudi feud with Libyan and Syrian tyrants
    http://angryarab.blogspot.fr/2013/09/saudi-feud-with-libyan-and-syrian.html

    Of course, primarily the Saudi government follows the dictates of the US but there are personal reasons for Saudi feud with Qadhdhafi and with Bashshar (King ‘Abdullah was extremely close to Hafidh Al-Asad and he took Bashshar under his wing as soon as he took over after his daddy’s death).

    With Qadhdhafi, it was purely a misunderstanding. In one Arab summit meeting less than a decade ago, Qadhdhafi was rambling on incoherently (which was his style of speaking) and referred to Saudi Arabia but not unfavorably. The illiterate idiot of a King, ‘Abdullah, misunderstood the remarks and assumed that Qadhdhafi was attacking House of Saud. So he responded to him crudely and vulgarly on live TV and told him that he will face death and that he was put in place by Western foreign powers (no, Saudi kings and princes don’t see irony even if it hit them in the face). So Qadhdhafi tried to fight back with an amateurish assassination plot against the King. And on developed the feud.

    With Bashshar: it goes back to 2006 when Bashshar in the wake of the quiet support for the Israeli war of aggression exhibited by GCC countries, Bashshar described some Arab rulers as “half-men”. That was it for the Saudi King. He never forgave him for that. Of course, there is an alternative scenario of the Saudi antipathy to Bashshar (and this scenario should be included because it is peddled and believed by Western governments and media): that the Saudi king is angry with Bashshar because he has not established democracy in Syria.

  • Saudi youth fighting against Assad regime in Syria | GlobalPost
    http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-east/saudi-arabia/130312/saudi-youth-fighting-assad-regime-syria?page=0,1

    The Saudi government purges the country of young troublemakers while undermining a hostile neighbor, [Randa Slim] said. “In the name of a good cause, they are getting rid of a problem.”

    Human rights activist al-Qahtani called the Saudi stand a “don’t ask, don’t tell policy.” Saudi authorities have a strategic goal in Syria, he said.

    “Their ultimate policy is to have a regime change similar to what happened in Yemen, where they lose the head of state and substitute it with one more friendly to the Saudis,” al-Qahtani said. “But Syria is quite different. It will never happen that way.”

    Last week, a Saudi Court sentenced al-Qahtani to 10 years in prison for sedition and providing false information to foreign media. Human rights groups immediately defended al-Qahtani, saying he is being persecuted for his political views and human rights work. 

    Meanwhile, evidence mounts that Saudis are pouring into Syria.

    ... dozens of Facebook pages and Twitter feeds document the deaths of .. Saudis .... Almost all joined the al-Nusra Front.

    “Most people going there don’t think they will come back,” Alghufili said. “They will fight to die or win freedom.”

    ...

    Al-Qahtani argues that Saudi support for al-Nusra resembles their aid to the mujahedeen fighting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Back then Osama bin Laden was a scion of a Saudi construction magnate who transferred his inherited wealth out of Saudi Arabia and into what came to be called “The Base,” English for Al Qaeda. Both the United States and Saudi Arabia encouraged the flow of Arab fighters and arms to the Afghans, part of a proxy war against the Soviets.

    Saudi authorities set up networks to support the mujahedeen. “They recruited kids to fight there,” al-Qahtani said. “They financed them and provided them with [airplane] tickets.”

  • WikiLeaks cables : Saudi Arabia cannot pump enough oil to keep a lid on prices | Business | The Guardian
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/feb/08/saudi-oil-reserves-overstated-wikileaks

    The US fears that Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest crude oil exporter, may not have enough reserves to prevent oil prices escalating, confidential cables from its embassy in Riyadh show.

    The cables, released by WikiLeaks, urge Washington to take seriously a warning from a senior Saudi government oil executive that the kingdom’s crude oil reserves may have been overstated by as much as 300bn barrels – nearly 40%.

    The revelation comes as the oil price has soared in recent weeks to more than $100 a barrel on global demand and tensions in the Middle East. Many analysts expect that the Saudis and their Opec cartel partners would pump more oil if rising prices threatened to choke off demand.

    Vous faites comme vous voulez, mais moi j’ai fait le plein ce matin.

    #pétrole #Arabie_séoudite #cablegate