organization:u.s. coast guard

suite du feuilleton ▻https://seenthis.net/messages/764006

The incident adds to a busy start to the year in terms of maritime accidents.
On December 31, the car carrier Sincerity Ace suffered a fire with five fatalities in the Pacific Ocean between Japan and Hawaii. This ship is now abandoned, adrift and the fire continues on board.
On January 1, the mega containership MSC ZOE lost an estimated 270 containers overboard in heavy weather in the North Sea. No injuries were reported. 
On January 2, a 308-foot Chinese-flagged fish carrier, named Ou Ya Leng No. 6, ran aground on an uninhabited atoll in the Marshall Islands. Currently the crew of 24 remain on board the vessel. 

Yantian Express Abandoned in North Atlantic Due to Ongoing Container Fire – gCaptain
▻https://gcaptain.com/yantian-express-abandoned-in-north-atlantic-due-to-ongoing-container-fire

https://gcaptain.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/SHANGHAI_EXPRESS.jpg

The crew of the containership Yantian Express has been evacuated as the container fire continues to burn on board the ship in the North Atlantica, Hapag-Lloyd said in an update on Sunday.

The fire started in one container on January 3rd and has since spread to other containers.

Due to bad weather conditions, the fire has not been successfully contained and has significantly increased in intensity at times, according to Hapag-Lloyd. The salvage tug Smit Nicobar is on scene fighting the fire but as of the latest update, the fire had not been extinguished.

The crew of the Yantian Express, comprised of 8 officers and 16 crew, has now been evacuated to the Smit Nicobar. All are unharmed, the company reported.

The ship was last reported to be approximately 800 nautical miles off the coast of Canada (Nova Scotia).

“Further developments of the situation on the Yantian Express are being monitored closely, and the firefighting efforts with the salvage tug are ongoing,” Hapag-Lloyd said in its update.

The company added that it could not make a precise estimate of any damage to the ship or its cargo.

La direction du canal suit sa logique…
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/686401

Panama Canal Responds: Tugboat Captains Broke the Law – gCaptain
▻http://gcaptain.com/126659-2

On April 12, a brief and isolated service interruption occurred at the Panama Canal’s Neopanamax locks when several tugboat captains refused to comply with mandatory procedures, compromising the Canal’s performance and causing economic loss. The Panama Canal normalized transits through its Neopanamax locks the next day. Operations on the Canal’s Panamax locks were never affected.

The Panama Canal is constitutionally mandated to ensure the waterway’s uninterrupted operation and therefore took steps to determine the necessary measures to discipline those responsible, as is required by Panama Canal regulations. To be clear, the responsible parties are not being investigated for “raising safety and security concerns,” but for disrupting vessel operations, which violated the law. Attempts to gain advantage in a labor dispute by conflating an unfortunate and unrelated accident from last year with this particular work stoppage is not only inaccurate and misleading, it’s irresponsible and disrespectful to those who were affected.

ITF response to statement by the Panama Canal Authority - International Transport Workers’ Federation
▻http://www.itfglobal.org/en/news-events/press-releases/2018/may/itf-response-to-statement-by-the-panama-canal-authority

We at the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) are surprised and disappointed by the statement issued by the Panama Canal Authority (ACP) in relation to the recent events in Panama.

15/05/2018

The ACP has claimed that information provided to us, and subsequently circulated, was misleading and twists reality. This allegation is offensive, not only to our affiliated unions and canal workers that are directly affected, but also to the 19.7 million transport workers that we represent.

This is not a labour dispute, as the ACP refers to in its statement, this is a fair request from transport professionals. The captains represented by UCOC must be able to ensure they can work in a safe environment for the prosperity of the Panama Canal.

The ACP conveniently omitted a report from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), one of the most reputable and recognised organisations responsible for civil transportation accident investigation. The report, which detailed the incident of the USCGC Tampa in the new canal locks, clearly identified safety hazards, something our affiliated union, Unión de Capitanes y Oficiales de Cubierta (UCOC), has repeatedly highlighted with the ACP.

We are in possession of correspondence showing that for more than two years, UCOC and other maritime unions warned the APC about issues regarding training, safety and operations in the new canal locks. Most of this correspondence was ignored, and on the few occasions that it was not the ACP’s responses were at best evasive and did not genuinely address the issues raised.

We welcome the section of ACP’s statement that encourages personnel to raise issues on the canal policy in a constructive manner. For over six weeks now, the ITF and many affiliated unions have offered to facilitate the dialogue between the parties, however, in spite of what the APC declared in its statement, the requests, which were sent to the Panama Consular representations around the world, remain unanswered.

The International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) Committee on Freedom of Association has recommended that the Government of Panama should expedite measures to facilitate dialogue between the authorities and social partners on the existing rights of representation and how they operate.

We are committed in supporting our Panama maritime affiliates and urge the ACP to engage in constructive dialogue with Panama maritime unions to demonstrate a serious consideration for safety in one of the shipping industry’s most crucial waterways.

Et, sur l’Arctique, le son de cloche de l’amiral (en retraite) Stavridis, ex-SACEUR, ▻https://seenthis.net/messages/691899

ça m’a rappelé le nombre de containers perdus chaque année, chiffre que j’avais trouvé effarant.

En y regardant de plus près, c’est pas si terrible que ça, une fois les accidents catastrophiques retirés : on est dans les 700 containers/an.
►http://gcaptain.com/number-of-containers-lost-at-sea-falling-survey-shows

#désemparé
En mouvement et avec environnement sonore…
▻https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S-9w35ZVr4c

USS Fitzgerald: missing sailors found dead in flooded area of ship | US news | The Guardian
▻https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jun/16/us-navy-destroyer-collides-ship-japan

Japanese and US officials were discussing how to conduct the investigation. Japan is permitted to investigate since the collision happened in its waters, but under the countries’ status of forces agreement the US has primary jurisdiction over incidents involving vessels such as the Fitzgerald.

ACX Crystal sur MarineTraffic

https://dl.dropbox.com/s/gxez2y738kr7084/USS_Fitzgerald2.png

et sa vitesse

https://dl.dropbox.com/s/1s4v6gmr1lgs0ov/USS_Fitzgerald0.png

U.S. destroyer almost foundered after collision, bodies found: Seventh Fleet | Reuters
▻https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-navy-asia-idUSKBN199020

Japanese authorities were looking into the possibility of “endangerment of traffic caused by professional negligence”, Japanese media reported, but it was not clear whether that might apply to either or both of the vessels.

The U.S. Navy said the collision happened at about 2:30 a.m. local time (1730 GMT Friday), while the Japanese Coast Guard said it was 1:30 a.m. local time.

An hour passed before Japan authorities were notified of Fitzgerald collision | Reuters
▻http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-navy-asia-idUSKBN19913U

The incident has sparked as many as three investigations by the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard, and two by Japanese authorities.

Complicating the inquiries could be issues of which side has jurisdiction and access to data such as radar records that the United States could deem classified.

Although the collision occurred in Japanese waters, under a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that defines the scope of the U.S. military’s authority in Japan, the U.S. Navy could claim it has the authority to lead the investigations.

The three U.S. investigations include a JAGMAN command investigation often used to look into the cause of major incidents, which can be used as a basis to file lawsuits against the Navy.

Excellent et long article d’un marin sur l’abordage et les responsabilités

The USS Fitzgerald Is At Fault. This Is Why. – gCaptain
▻http://gcaptain.com/uss-fitzgerald-fault

While the media, with a very little hard data, attempts to understand the erratic maneuvers of the containership ACX Crystal on the night of her collision with the Destroyer USS Fitzgerald… professional mariners are certain that a long investigation will find the US Navy ship at fault.

Is this conclusion the result of professional arrogance? Or maybe because of resentment and jealousy over the fact that Navy captains are praised and decorated by the public and media while merchant ship captains live mostly unnoticed. Or is it because they are correct?

As a ship captain along with years working with the U.S. Navy both aboard ships and ashore – here are the reasons why I believe they are correct. The USS Fitzerald was at fault.

Despite recent advancements in electronic collision avoidance tools like automatic identification systems (AIS), the three most important tools for avoiding a collision are a Captain’s eyes, tongue and ears.

• Eyes, looking out the windows of his ship, are important because they can process information – like erratic course changes – faster and more accurately than electronic RADAR and charting systems that take time to aggregate data.
• A tongue because the quickest and most effective way to predict how a ship is going to maneuver in the minutes before a collision is to call the Captain of the other ship on the VHF radio and ask.
• Ears are important because language barriers and cultural differences are prominent at sea and you must listen intently to the other ship’s reply if you want any chance of understanding her intentions.

It is likely that USS Fitzgerald’s Captain used only one, or possibly none, of these tools when communicating with the ACX Crystal.

Avec cette question que je me suis immédiatement posée quand j’ai appris que le commandant avait été blessé parce que… bloqué dans sa cabine par la collision : qu’est-ce qu’il f… dans sa cabine ?

Son navire était dans un endroit au trafic intense – depuis plusieurs années des voix s’élèvent pour y réclamer l’instauration de rails (ie Dispositif de Séparation de Trafic) – et le commandant se reposait !

Why Was The Navy Captain In His Cabin?

On peut ajouter que sur un navire de guerre la veille en passerelle est un impératif majeur.

U.S. Coast Guard interviews container ship crew after warship collision | World | Reuters
▻http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKBN19B0DG

“We are scheduled to interview the crew members,” said U.S. Lieutenant Scott Carr told Reuters, referring the crew of the merchant ship. The USS Fitzgerald crew will also be interviewed.

The U.S. coast guard, which is undertaking the investigation on behalf of the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board, will gather electronic data and ship tracking information from the USS Fitzgerald and ACX Crystal.

The investigation will also look into a time discrepancy in the ACX Crystal’s initial report of the incident south of Tokyo Bay, said Scott. “There is a contradiction. It will be part of the investigation,” Carr said.

The Japan Coast Guard has already spoken to the Filipino crew and is also probing the inconsistency. It is in talks with the U.S. Navy for access to its crew members and data from the destroyer, a spokesman for the organisation said.

The U.S. Navy did not immediately respond when asked if it would release tracking data to the Japan Coast Guard.

Investigators Believe USS Fitzgerald Crew Fought Flooding For An Hour Before Distress Call Reached Help
▻https://news.usni.org/2017/06/21/investigators-believe-uss-fitzgerald-crew-fought-flooding-for-an-hour-bef

Investigators now think Crystal was transiting to Tokyo on autopilot with an inattentive or asleep crew when the merchant vessel struck a glancing blow on the destroyer’s starboard side at about 1:30 AM local time on Friday. When the crew of Crystal realized they had hit something, the ship performed a U-turn in the shipping lane and sped back to the initial site of the collision at 18 knots, discovered Fitzgerald, and radioed a distress call to authorities at about 2:30 AM. U.S. Navy officials initially said the collision occurred at around the time of the distress call at 2:30 AM.

Voilà qui expliquerait le « tiroir » observé sur l’enregistrement du Crystal

Du même article :

https://news.usni.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/unnamed-3.jpg

Meanwhile, when Crystal’s port bow hit Fitzgerald, the warship was performing a normal transit off the coast of Japan, USNI News understands. Above the waterline, the flared bow of Crystal caved in several spaces in the superstructure, including the stateroom of commanding officer Cmdr. Bryce Benson.

The impact not only ripped a hole in the steel superstructure in the stateroom but also shifted the contents and shape of the steel so Benson was “squeezed out the hull and was outside the skin of the ship,” a sailor familiar with the damage to the ship told USNI News.

“He’s lucky to be alive.”

Fitzgerald sailors had to bend back the door of the stateroom to pluck Benson from the side of the ship and bring him inside. He and two other sailors were later evacuated from the ship via a Japanese helicopter to a Navy hospital at Yokosuka.

La mise en cause du commandant de l’USS Fitzgerald a déclenché une véritable tornade. Réponse de l’éditeur, avec entre autres, un aperçu de l’état des relations entre MarMar et Royale outre-Atlantique.

Why The USS Fitzgerald Is At Fault, Part 2 - Questions And Answers – gCaptain
▻http://gcaptain.com/uss-fitzgerald-fault-part-2-questions-answers

The recent editorial “The USS Fitzgerald Is At Fault. This Is Why.“ has been read 103,667 times, shared by 9,699 people via social media and ignited a firestorm of over 500 facebook comments, forum posts, emails and phone calls to gCaptain HQ. Feedback I have received from Navy brass, journalists, pilots and Merchant Mariners working aboard commercial ships has been positive. We also received some highly negative comments from both current and former members of the U.S. Navy Surface Warfare community. This is my reply to them… specifically to Navy sailors who have stood watch on the bridge of a warship.
[…]
Naval destroyers have never been, and never will be, the first American ships to be attacked during times of war… that distinction has always been, and will always be held by the US merchant fleet.

The Navy flew me literally half way around the world last year to advise them on why gCaptain gets some on scene information before Naval Intelligence does. And the reason is that merchant mariners and offshore workers are the eyes and ears of the ocean and gCaptain simply gives them a platform to share that information. If the navy wants civilian mariners to send them the information before posting it to gCaptain, then they must start by acknowledging the fact that the US Navy does not have the market cornered on the subject of naval war, combat and national defense because THE US MERCHANT MARINE also plays a vital role in both.

Il a fallu une semaine, mais il commence à circuler des interprétations loufoque dont une « théorie du complot » délirante… Je ne mets pas le lien, je résume :
– initialement, une attaque électronique effectuée par le Crystal a rendu inopérants tous les systèmes de l’USS Fitzgerald, l’assaillant poursuit sa route
– ayant transmis l’information du succès de l’attaque, il reçoit des instructions des « méchants » (nord-coréens, chinois ou russes, va savoir) de venir achever le destroyer désemparé
– il aurait d’ailleurs visé spécifiquement la cabine du commandant
– mais n’arrive pas à le couler et signale alors « l’accident »

Variantes :
– c’est un drone qui a lancé l’attaque électronique
– c’est une attaque sous false flag qui aurait échoué le bâtiment états-unien aurait dû couler sans survivants, ce qui aurait permis de lancer des représailles contre l’auteur putatif de l’attaque (choisir dans la liste des méchants ci-dessus)

Je n’ai que les éléments qui émergent dans la presse (et que je rassemble ici) une expérience (lointaine…) d’officier de quart en passerelle pendant mon service national sur un bateau qui naviguait beaucoup et, indirectement, celle de mon père, commandant dans la marine marchande. Je penche assez pour l’analyse de gCaptain : responsabilités partagées avec un gros bout pour le philippin.

Il est probable que la veille en passerelle de l’ACX Crystal (20 hommes d’équipage) était défaillante, c’est un reproche récurrent – ils dorment –, certains évoquent même l’idée qu’il aurait été en pilotage automatique. Cela expliquerait l’étrange tiroir de la trajectoire : ils ont continué, ont mis un certain temps à se rendre compte du problème, envoyer quelqu’un à l’avant du bateau et constater que le choc ressenti ne pouvait en aucun cas être causé par la rencontre d’un conteneur flottant à la dérive mais par un abordage. Ils ont fait demi-tour pour s’enquérir du navire abordé, réflexe normal de marin, et quand ils ont découvert l’USS Fitzgerald qu’ils ont donné l’alerte. Le Crystal a ensuite repris une route vers Tokyo ce qu’il n’a pu envisager qu’après avoir constaté que le Fitzgerald pouvait se passer d’assistance (ou s’être fait intimer l’ordre de s’éloigner…)

Sur l’USS Fitzgerald il y a vraiment un GROS problème. On peut à peu près supposer qu’il était en conditions de route normales puisque le commandant se reposait dans sa cabine. Et là, en passerelle, on a du monde ! y compris une veille optique sur chaque côté et un des boulots de l’officier de quart, c’est de veiller aux veilleurs… Alors se faire aborder en plein travers, c’est assez difficilement concevable.

Le problème c’est qu’il n’y a aucune information sur l’USS Fitzgerald. Est-il possible qu’il ait perdu toute source d’énergie lors de la collision (plusieurs compartiments inondés par la brèche provoquée par le bulbe du porte-conteneurs) ? La Navy dit que le bâtiment a failli couler, ce qui laisse entendre que ses moyens d’assèchement (les pompes) soit ne suffisaient pas à étaler la voie d’eau, soit étaient hors d’état de fonctionner. En tout état de cause, il a certainement prévenu de l’abordage dès qu’il a été en l’état de le faire. Quand ? ça, il faut le demander à l’US Navy…

Ceci dit, pour une catastrophe dans la Navy, il y a un (lointain, 1923) précédent célèbre …
▻https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catastrophe_de_Honda_Point

Première version émanant de l’abordeur philippin (du rapport du commandant de l’ACX Crystal à son armateur)

Exclusive : U.S. warship stayed on deadly collision course despite warning-container ship captain | Reuters
▻http://in.reuters.com/article/usa-navy-asia-idINKBN19H143

In the first detailed account from one of those directly involved, the cargo ship’s captain said the ACX Crystal had signalled with flashing lights after the Fitzgerald “suddenly” steamed on to a course to cross its path.

The container ship steered hard to starboard (right) to avoid the warship, but hit the Fitzgerald 10 minutes later at 1:30 a.m., according to a copy of Captain Ronald Advincula’s report to Japanese ship owner Dainichi Investment Corporation that was seen by Reuters.

(l’abattée à droite est parfaitement attestée par les enregistrements AIS)

Point de vue – tranché – d’un «  vieux crabe  »

USS Fitzgerald - Stop, Analyze, Dissect And Let’s Figure Out What Went Wrong – gCaptain
▻http://gcaptain.com/uss-fitzgerald-stop-analyze-dissect-lets-figure-went-wrong

Regardless of how much vessel traffic exists, or how many background lights exist, or state of visibility, etc, a deck watch officer should be trained to successfully stand a watch. Most of us who have been at sea have sailed through fog, night, storms, high-density traffic, currents, rain, sandstorms, etc and done so successfully. That is what we do, that is what we are bound to do. If you call yourself a mariner, then you don’t have collisions with other vessels. Period. You cannot make excuses. If you cannot stand a competent watch, then don’t assume the watch.

On s’en doutait un peu, mais ça se précise : on sort les arguments juridiques…
U.S. Likely to Bar Japan Investigators from Interviewing Fitzgerald Crew, Official Says – gCaptain
▻http://gcaptain.com/u-s-likely-bar-japan-investigators-interviewing-fitzgerald-crew-official-s

The United States will likely bar Japanese investigators from interviewing USS Fitzgerald crew manning the guided missile destroyer when it was struck by a cargo ship in Japanese waters killing seven American sailors, a U.S. navy official said.
[…]
The U. S. Coast Guard, which is investigating on behalf of the National Transportation Safety Board, has interviewed the crew of the container ship.

But the U.S. navy official, who declined to be identified, said warships were afforded sovereign immunity under international law and foreign investigators were not expected to get access to the U.S. crew.

“It’s unlikely Japanese or Philippine authorities will have direct access to crew members,” said the U.S. official.

The U.S. Coast Guard would instead provide summaries of crew interviews to the Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB), which would share them with the Japan Coast Guard (JCG), he said.

Navy struggles with approach to fix crippled destroyer Fitzgerald, as investigation continues
▻http://www.defensenews.com/articles/navy-struggles-with-approach-to-fix-crippled-fitzgerald-destroyer-as-in

The bulbous bow of the ACX Crystal left a 12x17-foot hole beneath the waterline, per three Navy sources who spoke on background, an enormous breach that rapidly flooded three spaces.

Passage en cale sèche dans une semaine pour évaluer les dommages :
• peut-on le retaper suffisamment pour qu’il rentre par ses propres moyens aux É.-U. ?
• est-ce que l’antenne tribord de son super-radar a été atteinte ? ce qui ferait exploser le coût de remise en état (et… ce qui est très probable au vu du gauchissement du panneau concerné…)
▻https://staticviewlift-a.akamaihd.net/dims4/default/61c03fe/2147483647/thumbnail/1000x563%3E/quality/90/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fsnagfilms-a.akamaihd.net%2F3b%2F32%2F1f

Un précédent, la remise en état de l’USS Cole après l’attaque du 12 octobre 2000 au Yémen (coût 250 M$), à noter l’unité de mesure de la dépense, le F-35…

Once the ship is in dry-dock, the Navy will complete a thorough assessment of what is wrong with the ship and will get estimates of how much it’s going to cost. In the case of the Cole, it cost the Navy about $250 million – or about two-and-a-half F-35s – to complete the repairs.

ici lors de son rapatriement sur plate-forme (autre élément de coût…)

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/32/MV_Blue_Marlin_carrying_USS_Cole.jpg

U.S. Navy temporarily relieves commander of ship struck in Japanese waters.
▻https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-navy-asia-idUSKBN19W1HK

The U.S. Navy on Tuesday said on Tuesday it has temporarily relieved, for medical reasons, the commander of a warship involved in a crash with a container vessel in Japanese waters that killed seven American sailors.
[…]
“Cmdr Bryce Benson, who is recovering from injuries sustained during Fitzgerald’s June 17 collision with the merchant vessel ACX Crystal was relieved temporarily,” the U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet said in a press release.

#pour_raisons_de_santé …

Entrée en cale sèche pour poursuite de l’évaluation des dégâts. Note : on ne voit pas grand chose, l’ouverture dans les œuvres vives ayant été aveuglée et renforcée par des moyens de fortune…

Damaged Destroyer USS Fitzgerald Moves to Dry Dock in Japan -PHOTOS – gCaptain
▻http://gcaptain.com/damaged-destroyer-uss-fitzgerald-moves-dry-dock-japan-photos

http://3kbo302xo3lg2i1rj8450xje.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/170711-N-WC492-025.jpg

The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) entered dry dock July 11 at the Fleet Activities (FLEACT) Yokosuka base.

U.S. warship crew found likely at fault in June collision : official
▻http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-navy-idUSKBN1A62FX

The crew of the USS Fitzgerald was likely at fault in the warship’s collision with a Philippine cargo ship in June and had not been paying attention to their surroundings, according to initial findings in an investigation, a U.S. defense official told Reuters on Friday.
[…]
The official said that in addition to crew members not paying attention to their surroundings, they did not take action until it was too late.

While the investigation is not complete, the official said crew members had given statements and radar data had been gathered, and it was unlikely the findings would change.

On s’en doutait un peu (cf. supra) mais voir confirmer que la veille en passerelle est aux abonnés absents la nuit dans une zone fréquentée sur un navire de guerre états-unien, ça fait quand même quelque chose.

Bon, mais il paraît qu’après l’abordage, ils ont tous été exemplaires. Ouf !

U.S. to haul stricken destroyer from Japan back to U.S. for repairs
▻https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-navy-asia-idUSKBN1AO13O

The U.S. Navy on Tuesday said it will haul the guided missile destroyer severely damaged in a collision with a freighter in Japanese waters back to the United States for repairs as soon as September.

The collision killed seven sailors aboard the USS Fitzgerald and ripped a hole below the vessels waterline. Naval engineers in Japan have patched up the destroyer but extensive damage that nearly sank the warship means it is unable to sail under its own steam.

“The Fitzgerald may be moved in September but it could be later than that,” a spokesman for the U.S. Seventh Fleet said.

USS Fitzgerald, les sanctions arrivent… le commandant, le second, le chef mécanicien, plus divers autres (j’imagine toute l’équipe de quart en passerelle)

Dozen U.S. sailors to be punished for June collision -U.S. Navy
▻https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-navy-asia-idUSL2N1L323R

About a dozen U.S. sailors are expected to face punishment for a collision in June between the USS Fitzgerald and a Philippine cargo ship, including the warship’s commander officer and other senior leaders of the ship, the Navy said on Thursday.

Admiral Bill Moran, deputy chief of naval operations, told reporters that the ship’s commanding officer, executive officer and master chief, would be removed from the vessel because “we’ve lost trust and confidence in their ability to lead.”

Moran said that in total close to a dozen sailors would face punishment without detailing the exact punishment.

Warship captain in collision that killed 7 to lose command - The Washington Post
▻https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/navy-hands-penalties-on-collision-both-ships-made-errors/2017/08/18/dc7a12fc-83d7-11e7-9e7a-20fa8d7a0db6_story.html

Adm. William Moran, the vice chief of naval operations, told reporters Thursday that the top three leaders aboard the USS Fitzgerald, which was badly damaged in the June collision off the coast of Japan, will be removed from duty aboard the ship. They are the commanding officer, Cmdr. Bryce Benson; the executive officer, Cmdr. Sean Babbitt; and Master Chief Petty Officer Brice Baldwin, who as the ship’s command master chief is its most senior enlisted sailor.

“The collision was avoidable, and both ships demonstrated poor seamanship,” the Navy’s 7th Fleet said in a statement, noting that “flawed” teamwork among those assigned to keep watch contributed to the collision.

The actions are being taken by Rear Adm. Joseph Aucoin, commander of the 7th Fleet, based at Yokosuka, Japan, because he lost confidence in the three, Moran said.

The Navy said the three had shown “inadequate leadership.” Separately, seven junior officers were relieved of their duties because they had shown “poor seamanship” and bad teamwork, 7th Fleet spokesman Cmdr. Clay Doss said Friday.

Administrative penalties were handed out to seven others that were members of the watch teams, he said, without giving details. All 14 remain in the Navy, but they will be assigned to other jobs, he said.

Le rapport préliminaire de l’US Navy sur les effets de la collision, la gestion des dégâts (damage control) et détails de l’intervention des équipes de sécurité à bord de l’USS Fitzgerald. Daté du 17/08/17.

Avec schéma de l’abordage et photos intérieures. Rapport caviardé.
▻https://partner-mco-archive.s3.amazonaws.com/client_files/1503000639.pdf

Parmi les infos, dans l’annexe reconstituant le déroulement :

Il a fallu une demi-heure pour que le bâtiment informe son commandement de l’abordage. Mais le commandant était très perturbé (son état est censuré) il est vrai qu’il vient de rester 10 minutes accroché à l’extérieur de la coque de son navire.

Et on notera l’incohérence entre l’heure de l’entrée dans le déroulement et celle mentionnée dans le texte.

Sans surprise, attaque à boulets rouges par le rédacteur en chef de gCaptain contre le rapport préliminaire sur l’USS Fitzgerald…

Red Over Red, The Failure Of U.S. Navy Leadership – gCaptain
▻http://gcaptain.com/editorial-red-red-us-naval-leadership-not-command

The question is… why was this document released and to what benefit? The answer is that this document was written and released for one primary purpose: Public Relations.

Decades ago each major media outlet had dock reporters; journalists who wrote exclusively on maritime affairs and had an extensive list of high level maritime contacts as well as a working knowledge of ships. Today I only know of one journalist with this background, Carl Nolte of the San Francisco Chronicle. All the rest are generalists who are too easily confused by complicated facts and too susceptible to emotional triggers. As Ryan Holiday, author of “Trust Me, I’m Lying: Confessions of a Media Manipulator” says in this bestselling book… “today’s most effective public relations firms oversimplify facts and compensate by giving the public what it craves: an emotionally compelling story.”

The US Navy’s “Deaths of Seven Sailors Aboard The USS Fitzgerald” is just that, the vapid telling of a story about a few brave and honorable sailors fighting floods, destruction and death itself with a cursory acknowledgement of fault. It does nothing to prevent future collisions at sea and everything to send the message to the fleet that mistakes will not be tolerated and junior officers will be punished.

As a work of fiction it would be praised for pitting man against machine and for well painted characters – with strong wills and moral courage – placed in extraordinary circumstances to save the lives of shipmates and friends. But this is not a work of fiction or, at least, it is not supposed to be. It is supposed to be a preliminary investigation report filled with hard facts and harder questions that remain unanswered. This report contains very little of either.
[…]
It is maritime tradition which states the Captain is the primary party at fault for all failures aboard ship and for good reason. But maritime tradition does not extend blame down the ranks and not to non-commissioned officers like the USS Fitzgerald’s master chief petty officer who has been removed by Admiral Moran.

Those who are responsible for the events leading up to the collision, not just those involved in the collision, are those who steered the naval fleet towards these errors. The U.S. Navy has experienced four major failures in navigation this year alone. The men who are cumulatively responsible for these incidents are the same men who are responsible for other troublesome oversights, like the widespread and pervading ignorance of US Naval Officers as to how merchant ships operate at sea. These men have not been called to face “administrative punishment”. At the very least they include Adm. John Richardson, Adm. Bill Moran, Admiral Scott Swift and, the author of the Damage Control Inquiry, Rear Adm. Charles Williams.

With four collisions in under ten months, when is the Navy going to “lose confidence” in it’s own ability to decide who should be in command?
[…]
This is a poor excuse. If this document has nothing to do with the collision itself then why release it alongside statements conceding “poor seamanship” and a loss of faith in leadership ability of the ship’s officers?

If the document is supposed to provide a focused look at “the crew’s damage control activities” then why is it so lacking in information about the challenges and failures the crew experienced after the incident?

Numerous problems of significant scope and size where barely mentioned in the report. Major problems, such as number 16: “The collision resulted in a loss of external communication and a loss of power in the forward portion of the ship”, are not explained at all. The most basic of commercial ships are required to have redundant emergency power systems. How then does half of the complex ship loose power completely? More importantly, why is this not explained? What lessons learned about this power loss could have been transmitted to the USS McCain? And how, in 2017, when any civilian can purchase a handheld Iridium satellite phone for less than the price of the latest iPhone and a portable EPIRB for much less, could the communications system of a US Naval warship be so damaged and the ship’s leadership so shaken, that it takes the ship a full thirty minutes to transmit a Mayday (via Cell Phone no less)?

Another important question that goes unanswered is… did the damage control efforts result in a reduced situational awareness after the collision? If not then why did it take two and a half hours to identify the name of the ship they collided with? What would have happened to damage control efforts if this had been a terrorist attack or enemy combatant?

Those facts are not even the most troubling. Both the civilian and military continue to fail to consider the design and construction of the ship itself. No experts from the vessel’s builder, Bath Iron Works, or the architect or the Admirals in charge of approving the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer design were mentioned. The report completely fails to mention the damage control done aboard the ACX Crystal because that ship suffered relatively minor damage. What design and construction tradeoffs were made that resulted in a the hull of a billion dollar warship having much less intrinsic strength than a Korean built containership that was delivered for a fraction of the cost?

Where is the independent analysis?
[…]
Because, one thing we have learned during the past few centuries is this: no organization can work alone, no ship owner – not Olympic Steamship, not Tote and certainly not the US Navy – can be 100% objective when investigating itself. Any attempt to do so is the result of ignorance or corruption or both.

De sérieuses questions sur la survivabilité des destroyers et donc sur leur conception. En revanche, la comparaison avec celle des navires marchands abordeurs, il exagère un peu :
• dans les deux cas, c’est le bulbe d’étrave qui a percuté. Même s’ils avaient été détruits, ce qui n’est absolument pas le cas, les dégâts n’auraient absolument pas mis en danger les navires
• à l’inverse les navires de guerre ont été abordé de plein flanc, apparemment, et heureusement pour eux, sous des angles assez fermés (ce que montre le rapport pour le Fitzgerald et qu’on devine assez nettement vu la forme de la brèche du McCain)
• structurellement, un navire marchand n’a pas à prévoir de circulation entre ses compartiments

Sur l’incompétence des commentateurs, je remarque qu’aucun n’a fait la remarque que le navire de guerre coupe la route d’un bâtiment de commerce dans un rail…

L’hypothèse d’une cyberattaque relève du délire. Mais peut-être que les hackers russes ou chinois dont déjà capables aujourd’hui de liquéfier les cervelles d’une équipe de quart en passerelle, après tout de quoi ne sont-ils pas capables ?

Si le GPS est tombé en rade ou a été piraté, on dispose d’autres moyens de navigation, mille sabords, notamment en vue de terre. Bon sang, l’abordage a eu lieu à 5 miles du principal phare de la région et à 10 miles de la côte ! Si la passerelle a besoin du GPS pour naviguer, il y a lieu de s’interroger sur les compétences requises pour être officier de quart dans l’US Navy.

Mais, de fait, on en est bien là : couper la route d’un navire dans le rail (je sais je me répète, mais ça ne passe pas !…)

EDIT : là, en fait, je mords sur le fil du McCain …

Et pour finir, le titre Red over Red fait référence à une maxime anglaise pour retenir les feux de signalisation

Red over Red
The Captain is Dead

http://www.boatsafe.com/nauticalknowhow/12lite.gif

http://www.boatsafe.com/nauticalknowhow/day7.gif

cf. il n’y a pas longtemps, mais dans un tout autre contexte :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/621727#message621731 Navire non maître de sa manœuvre

Passionnant ! Merci pour ce suivi et ces éclaircissements @simplicissimus

Merci !
Tu as suivi, l’affaire du USS S John McCain ? Ça a l’air encore plus dingue… (j’attends avec impatience le rapport préliminaire de l’amirauté…)
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/623510

et aussi un autre éditorial de l’excellent Joseph Konrad (gCaptain)
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/625382
et le rapport du GCAO
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/628112

Je viens de regarder pour le McCain. C’est pas mal aussi. C’est surtout l’analyse de la vacuité des rapports officiels qui m’a intéressé ainsi que la manière dont les médias orientent leurs papiers pour intéresser sans pour autant fournir du contenu digne de ce nom, je veux dire, du travail journalistique, « à la papa » comme dirais davduf

Et donc, pas de peine de prison pour ceux qui ont couvert ces pratiques en toute connaissance de cause pendant des années…

As set forth in papers filed in court, Princess admitted to the following:
• After suspecting that the authorities had been informed, senior ship engineers dismantled the bypass pipe and instructed crew members to lie.
• Following the MCA’s inquiry, the chief engineer held a sham meeting in the engine control room to pretend to look into the allegations while holding up a sign stating: “LA is listening.” The engineers present understood that anything said might be heard by those at the company’s headquarters in Los Angeles, California, because the engine control room contained a recording device intended to monitor conversations in the event of an incident.
• A perceived motive for the crimes was financial – the chief engineer that ordered the dumping off the coast of England told subordinate engineers that it cost too much to properly offload the waste in port and that the shore-side superintendent who he reported to would not want to pay the expense.
• Graywater tanks overflowed into the bilges on a routine basis and were pumped back into the graywater system and then improperly discharged overboard when they were required to be treated as oil contaminated bilge waste. The overflows took place when internal floats in the graywater collection tanks got stuck due to large amounts of fat, grease and food particles from the galley that drained into the graywater system. Graywater tanks overflowed at least once a month and, at times, as frequently as once per week. Princess had no written procedures or training for how internal gray water spills were supposed to be cleaned up and the problem remained uncorrected for many years.

Amende de 40 M$ pour les personnes morales.
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/591926

As a luxury cruise ship comes to town, Nome confronts its future - Alaska Dispatch News
▻http://www.adn.com/alaska-news/2016/08/21/nome-rolls-out-warm-welcome-for-high-rolling-travelers-aboard-arctic-cruise
▻http://www.adn.com/resizer?op=resize&url=http%3a%2f%2fs3.amazonaws.com%2farc-wordpress-client-uplo

NOME — Residents in this Western Alaska town awoke Sunday morning to the novel sight of the largest cruise ship that has ever visited anchored just offshore.

On board the luxury-class Crystal Serenity were 1,060 cruisers making their last Alaska port call before the ship they paid many thousands of dollars to board attempts to become the largest passenger vessel to sail the Northwest Passage.

Not an hour after the ship’s arrival, they filed onto smaller vessels that would take them into Nome, where the port isn’t deep enough to accommodate the Serenity’s draft.

–----

Is the Arctic ready for the Crystal Serenity?
▻http://www.ktoo.org/2016/08/21/arctic-ready-crystal-serenity-2

http://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/ktoo/2016/08/160816_CrystalSerenity_Waldholz_01_web-better-600x4001.jpg

The luxury liner Crystal Serenity is on its way from Seward to New York City through the Northwest Passage.

It’s the largest cruise ship to navigate the route, which hugs the coasts of Alaska, Canada and Greenland. And it’s attracted international attention, with many wondering if it’s a sign of what’s to come as the Arctic sees increasingly ice-free summers.

–-----

The Arctic Circle may be more than 400 miles north, but Seward has become an Arctic port - Alaska Dispatch News
▻http://www.adn.com/arctic/2016/08/19/the-arctic-circle-may-be-more-than-400-miles-north-but-seward-has-become-an-arc
▻http://www.adn.com/resizer?op=resize&url=http%3a%2f%2fs3.amazonaws.com%2farc-wordpress-client-uplo

SEWARD — In this picturesque Alaska port town more than 400 miles south of the Arctic Circle, two big symbols of U.S. Arctic ambition loomed over the harbor.

Docked side by side, both preparing to head north, were the cutter Healy, the only polar-class U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker working in the Arctic, and the Crystal Serenity, the huge luxury cruise ship destined for an unprecedented journey through newly ice-sparse waters of the Northwest Passage over the top of Canada. Both ships’ paths converged in Seward, a tourist destination, fishing center and recreation hub that is emerging as a support center and port for Arctic marine and science activities.

Confusion Reigns Over New Container Weighing Rule | Global Trade Magazine
▻http://www.globaltrademag.com/global-trade-daily/news/confusion-reigns-over-new-container-weighing-rule

With five weeks to go before new regulation comes into effect mandating container weighing, there is still much confusion over how shippers will be able to comply, a new Drewry report concludes.

Mandatory amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) effective July 1 require shippers—and forwarders as well if they are named as the shipper on the bill of lading—to verify and provide containers’ verified gross mass (VGM) to the ocean carrier and port terminal prior to it being loaded onto a ship.

But Drewry found that as the countdown continues “it is clear that many shippers and forwarders still do not know how to comply. Better information on compliance requirements and options is starting to be communicated but there is still a lack of standardization and coordination.”

Complicating matters is a recent U.S. Coast Guard pronouncement that existing U.S. laws for providing the gross verified mass of containers were equivalent to the requirements in the amendments to SOLAS. In a letter to the IMO the USCG declared that the “current regulatory regime provides for other entities within the container export chain to work in combination with the shipper” and that the “equivalency acknowledges the dynamic and flexible business relationship between the entities in the export chain, and it provides flexibility for these entities to reach arrangements in order to ensure compliance.”

But, as Drewry noted, it’s unclear if methods acceptable to the Coast Guard for providing VGM differs from the rule as promulgated by the IMO.

Cosco Nagoya, 23/12/2013
▻https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nkwrIUawi10

En effet, si un conteneur déclaré à 5 tonnes au lieu des 25 qu’il pèse réellement est placé en haut d’une pile en pontée, les efforts sur le matériel de saisissage et sur les autres conteneurs seront bien plus élevés. En augmentant le centre de gravité de la pile, on majore les risques de perte de conteneurs à la mer. C’est l’exemple du Cosco Nagoya qui a perdu 79 boîtes dans le mauvais temps le 23 décembre 2013. Une déclaration frauduleuse du poids des conteneurs avait été identifiée comme la cause de l’accident.

MSC Napoli 18/01/2007
MSC Napoli second most expensive wreck in history, shows insurance report - Telegraph
▻http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/3397327/MSC-Napoli-second-most-expensive-wreck-in-history-shows-insurance-repor

http://i.telegraph.co.uk/multimedia/archive/01109/napoli-460_1109513a.jpg

Insurers of the 62,000-ton container ship, which suffered a “catastrophic” hull failure, have estimated the total bill for the wreck at £120 million.
The figure means the clean-up, the salvage, the vessel and the cargo costs are second only to the 2.1 billion dollars incurred by Exxon Valdez, the tanker which spilt 10.8 million gallons of crude oil into the sea at Prince William Sound, Alaska, in 1989.
The cost of the Napoli grounding was revealed by the London Steam-Ship Owners’ Mutual Insurance Association.
In its annual report, the chief executive Paul Hinton said the Napoli’s pounds 120 million estimated bill was the “second most expensive claim ever”.

Article du Marin

Ainsi, lors de l’accident du MSC Napoli sur 660 conteneurs intacts qui n’avaient pas subi d’entrée d’eau, 137 dépassaient leur masse déclarée de 3 tonnes (le poids d’un conteneur plein peut atteindre environ 30 tonnes).

IMO Urges ’Pragmatic’ Approach for Launch of New Container VGM Rules - gCaptain
▻https://gcaptain.com/imo-urges-pragmatic-approach-for-launch-of-new-container-vgm-rules

The IMO has urged regulators to take a “pragmatic” approach to the new SOLAS VGM requirements for the first three months after launch.

The body’s Maritime Safety Committee agreed that while there should be no delays to the July 1 implementation date, it would be beneficial if enforcement agencies took a “practical and pragmatic approach”.

A circular, sent to relevant agencies, noted that a more relaxed approach initially would be particularly beneficial for containers packed before July 1, but transhipped after, and thus reaching their destination port without a verified gross mass.

“It would provide flexibility, for three months immediately after July 1 2016, to all the stakeholders in containerised transport to refine, if necessary, procedures (eg. updated software) for documenting, communicating and sharing electronic verified gross mass data,” noted the advice.

Vu la nature des bateaux retenus (Riverine Command Boat) et le profil particulièrement bas des réactions états-uniennes, il est difficile de ne pas penser immédiatement à une infiltration ou une covert action…

▻https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CB90-class_fast_assault_craft

Autre vue sur Pinterest

https://s-media-cache-ak0.pinimg.com/originals/e9/c9/0b/e9c90b900c513ad83e057bf15cdae36d.jpg

L’image fournie au Monde par la marine états-unienne est ainsi légendée

http://www.navy.mil/management/photodb/webphoto/web_120612-N-NN926-199.jpg

ARABIAN SEA (June 12, 2012) A riverine command boat from Riverine Detachment 23 operates with the amphibious transport dock ship USS New York (LPD 21), not pictured, during a maritime air support operations center exercise. New York is part of the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group with the embarked 24th Expeditionary Unit. New York is deployed in support of maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility.
(U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Zane Ecklund/Released)

#armée #bateau #Iran #USA #Etats-Unis #armée_américaine #Riverine_Command_Boat #Golfe_Persique

US aircraft carrier acted provocatively after Iran arrested sailors: IRGC | News , Middle East | THE DAILY STAR
▻https://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2016/Jan-13/331642-us-aircraft-carrier-acted-provocatively-after-iran-arrested-sai

A U.S. aircraft carrier acted “provocatively and unprofessionally” for 40 minutes by carrying out maneuvers in the Gulf after Iran arrested 10 American sailors, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Naval commander, Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi, said on state television Wednesday.

Separately, a spokesman for the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) said the U.S. sailors were being interrogated, according to the Tasnim news agency.

Iran releases US marines
▻http://www.irna.ir/en/News/81919101

Tehran, Jan 13, IRNA – Iran has released the US marines who had crossed into Iranian terrorial waters.

According to a statement by the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, the 10 sailors have been taken to international waters and freed there.

et sans doute pas (pas encore ?) le navire de commandement, rempli d’outils de communication comme le montrent ses très nombreuses antennes…

Une heure plus tard, le communiqué complet (qui ne parle toujours pas des bateaux)

US marines entered unintentionally, released after apology : IRGC
▻http://www.irna.ir/en/News/81919286

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Public Relations Department said in a statement on Wednesday that the US sailors in custody of Iran have been released in the international waters.

The aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman and the French Navy’s Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier were present in the region when the sailors were detained and the US aircraft carrier had some nervous but passive air and naval reactions which were controlled powerfully and calm returned to the region, the statement added.

The US sailors had both light and half-heavy weapons with themselves, when arrested, it said.

The statement noted that US political officials in their repeated contacts with Iranian officials called the action as unintentional and called for the release of the marines.

The US marines were detained and questioned about their presence in Iran’s territorial waters in the IRGC naval base in the region, it said.

IRGC statement underlined that after technical and operational investigations of the case and in coordination with political and national security decision makers, the marines were released.

IRGC reiterated that the marines were released because they had entered Iran’s territorial waters unintentionally and they have apologized for their illegal action.

Americans guaranteed not to repeat such mistakes again, the statement said.

IRGC underlined that Iran’s navy is ready to powerfully make any sacrifice in defense of Iran’s sea borders in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.

The US Navy boats entered Iranian territorial waters due to a broken navigation system.

IRGC Public Relations Department, in a statement, said that the US navy boats were stopped Tuesday at 4:30 PM (local time) when they entered Iranian territorial waters near Farsi Island in the middle of the Persian Gulf.

IRGC declared that the US navy boats entered Iranian territorial waters illegally.

Anxious phone calls, tense moments before Iran’s Supreme Leader okayed U.S. sailors’ release | Reuters
▻http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-boats-diplomacy-idUSKCN0US02E20160114

The drama in the Gulf, which the U.S. government had initially hoped to keep under wraps, became public knowledge just hours before President Barack Obama was due to give his annual State of the Union address in Congress.

Kerry learned of the detention of the sailors in their two small craft at 12:30 p.m. EST (1730 GMT), as he and Defense Secretary Ash Carter met with their Filipino counterparts on the State Department’s eighth floor.

Kerry almost immediately excused himself and went to his seventh floor office. As it happened, he already had a call scheduled with Zarif at about 12.45 EST.

Appealing for the sailors’ quick release, Kerry told Zarif: “We can make this into what will be a good story for both of us,” according to a senior State Department official. He repeated that message in follow-up calls, the official said.

Looming large was the nuclear deal, which both men have invested so much in and striven to protect. In Washington, the deal has come under sustained attack from majority Republicans in Congress who have accused Obama of weakness and say the Iranians are not to be trusted.

In Tehran, the stakes were no less high. Formal implementation of the nuclear deal is expected to begin within days, giving Iran billions of dollars in relief from economic sanctions in return for curbs on its nuclear activities.

Communication officielle de la marine états-unienne (publiée le 18/01)
(il est, de nouveau, question d’une dérive inexpliquée et d’une panne de moteur)

DVIDS - News - US Central Command statement on events surrounding Iranian detainment of 10 US Navy Sailors Jan. 12-13, 2016
▻https://www.dvidshub.net/news/186483/us-central-command-statement-events-surrounding-iranian-detainment-10-us-n

The two RCBs were scheduled to conduct an underway refueling with the USCGC Monomoy in international waters at approximately 2 p.m. (GMT). At approximately 2:10 p.m. (GMT) NAVCENT received a report that the RCBs were being queried by Iranians. At approximately 2:29 p.m. (GMT) NAVCENT was advised of degraded communications with the RCBs. At 2:45 p.m. (GMT) NAVCENT was notified of a total loss of communications with the RCBs. Immediately, NAVCENT initiated an intensive search and rescue operation using both air and naval assets including aircraft from USS Harry S. Truman and the U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Coast Guard, U.K. Royal Navy and U.S. Navy surface vessels.

At the time of the incident, two carrier strike groups were operating nearby. USS Harry S. Truman carrier strike group was 45 miles southeast of Farsi Island and Charles de Gaulle carrier strike group was 40 miles north of Farsi Island. NAVCENT attempted to contact Iranian military units operating near Farsi Island by broadcasting information regarding their search and rescue effort over marine radio, and separately notified Iranian coast guard units via telephone about the search for their personnel. At 6:15 p.m. (GMT), U.S. Navy cruiser USS Anzio received a communication from the Iranians that the RCB Sailors were in Iranian custody and were “safe and healthy.”

NAVCENT’s initial operational reports showed that while in transit from Kuwait to Bahrain the RCBs deviated from their planned course on their way to the refueling. The command investigation will determine what caused the change in course and why the RCBs entered into Iranian territorial waters in the vicinity of Farsi Island.

At some point one RCB had indications of a mechanical issue in a diesel engine which caused the crews to stop the RCBs and begin troubleshooting. As the RCBs travel together, the second RCB also stopped. This stop occurred in Iranian territorial waters, although it’s not clear the crew was aware of their exact location. While the RCBs were stopped and the crew was attempting to evaluate the mechanical issue, Iranian boats approached the vessels.
[…]
A post-recovery inventory of the boats found that all weapons, ammunition and communication gear are accounted for minus two SIM cards that appear to have been removed from two handheld satellite phones.

Le commandant de la flotille est viré ▻http://seenthis.net/messages/488851