La rue algérienne craint que la transition lui échappe
▻https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/03/27/la-rue-algerienne-craint-que-la-transition-lui-echappe_5441906_3212.html
La rue algérienne craint que la transition lui échappe
Parle-t-on jamais de la « rue américaine », japonaise, russe ?
#orientalisme méprisant
Anthropologue au boulot sur le terrain dans le Néguev dans une communauté bédouine
#orientalisme :)
Capitalismo e orientalismo
Un nuovo libro analizza il lavoro di #Edward_Said alla luce del marxismo, mostrando che l’imperialismo non è soltanto un fenomeno culturale
#After_Said. Postcolonial Literary Studies in the Twenty-First Century
By the time of his death in 2003, Edward Said was one of the most famous literary critics of the twentieth century. Said’s work has been hugely influential far beyond academia. As a prominent advocate for the Palestinian cause and noted cultural critic, Said redefined the role of the public intellectual. This volume explores the problems and opportunities afforded by Said’s work: its productive and generative capacities as well as its in-built limitations. After Said captures the essence of Said’s intellectual and political contribution and his extensive impact on postcolonial studies. It examines his legacy by critically elaborating his core concepts and arguments. Among the issues it tackles are humanism, Orientalism, #culture and imperialism, exile and the contrapuntal, realism and postcolonial modernism, world literature, Islamophobia, and capitalism and the political economy of empire. It is an excellent resource for students, graduates and instructors studying postcolonial literary theory and the works of Said.
En anglais:
Capitalism and Orientalism
Rena Jackson, Jacobin, mars 2019
▻https://jacobinmag.com/2019/03/after-edward-said-review-postcolonial-theory-imperialism
THE COLLECTOR AND HIS COLLECTION | Dar El-Nimer
▻https://www.darelnimer.org/en/events/abboudi-abou-jaoud%C3%A9
Dar el-Nimer, de plus en plus essentielle à la vie culturelle libanaise, propose une riche exposition d’affiches tirées de la collection d’Abboudi Abou Jaoudé sur le thème de la représentation de l’Arabe dans le cinéma occidental.
https://www.darelnimer.org/static/media/uploads/events/nn_posterarchive0002.jpg 
https://www.alquds.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A2.jpg 
Phénoménologie politique du voile (Hourya Bentouhami, Revue Philosophiques 44/2, automne 2017)
▻https://www.erudit.org/fr/revues/philoso/2017-v44-n2-philoso03291/1042334ar.pdf
On entend par #phénoménologie #politique la manière dont l’ordre des apparences, la réalité même de ce qui est vu, est déterminée par des #rapports_de_pouvoir reposant sur des logiques de #race, de #sexe et de #classe. Mon objet porte sur la constitution du #voile et des #femmes_musulmanes qui le portent, dans les pays occidentaux et tout particulièrement en France, comme un objet « #phobogène », qui suscite un dégoût à bout d’oeil. Comment expliquer une telle insistance médiatique et politique à vouloir régler l’ordre d’apparition des femmes voilées ? Ma thèse sera de montrer que la #laïcité à la française, dans sa nouvelle version, est fondée sur une théorie des apparences largement déterminée par un #imaginaire_nationaliste de la différence des sexes, par la réactivation d’un #orientalisme_sexuel et par l’#invisibilisation propre au travail du #care auquel les femmes musulmanes sont souvent assignées.
Workshop de photo par #Fausto_Podavini organisé par #Witness_Journal —> « association de #promotion_sociale » (sic).
Voici la photo mise en avant sur twitter pour faire la promotion du workshop :
Et la photo mise en avant sur le site de WJ :
#photographie #exotisme #femmes #hommes #nudité #orientalisme #seins #soutien-gorge #sexe #zizi
Opinion : To Understand France’s Crisis, You Must First Understand Its Cheese
Karl Sharro, BuzzFeed, le 20 décembre 2018
▻https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/karlsharro/an-ancient-land-beset-by-ancient-rivalries
Karl Sharro is a Lebanese expert analyst on WENA (Western Europe and North American) affairs.
When you think of France, you think of fine cheeses and wines. Ironically — tragically, perhaps — it’s those cheeses and wines that explain the roots of France’s divisions. As the old French saying goes: “The people who make the cheese are not the ones who eat it.” The origins of the saying have been lost in time, but it’s thought to refer to the tension between the peasantry who produce but can’t afford their products and the bourgeoisie who produce nothing but consume the variety of French delicacies made in the countryside.
A French cheeseboard with several types of cheese is the perfect representation of the nation. Different parts that have never truly come together, as you know if you tried to mix a Camembert and a Roquefort. And at the center is Paris, the dominant baguette as it is referred to derogatorily. There are many fault lines in this nation, but none are stronger than those between the countryside and the city. At heart, this is a philosophical dispute, as all French disagreements are. It is a clash between the rustic and the Cartesian worldviews — the former has existed for centuries, the latter imposed after the 1789 revolution in the name of the Enlightenment.
As seasoned observers of the West like myself have become accustomed to in recent years, there is a tendency in Western culture to blame events on external actors and complex conspiracy theories. This strange trait can come as a shock to more rational Middle Eastern observers, but it is quite common across the WENA region, on the streets and in the media. Soon after the protests took off, some attributed them to a changing Facebook algorithm, and others argued they were caused by Russian agitation and propaganda.
#Karl_Sharro #KarlreMarks :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/730563
►https://seenthis.net/messages/738075
The Everyday Consumption of “#Whiteness”: The #Gaikokujin-fū (Foreign-Like) Hair Trend in Japan
In feminist literature, the beauty and the fashion industries have at times been criticized for being one of the means through which women are objectified.1 Likewise, Critical Race Studies have often pinpointed how the existence of a global beauty industry has the effect of propagating Eurocentric beauty ideals.2 Throughout this article I aim to explore the complicated ways in which beauty and racialized categories intersect in Japan through an analysis of the female-targeted hair trend of the gaikokujin-fū (foreigner-like) hair.
Essentialism is what prompts us to divide the world into two, “us” versus “them,” negating all that is in between the two categories or even changes within the categories themselves. Although this binary thinking has been subject to criticism by various disciplines, such as Critical Race Studies and Postcolonial Studies, it is still among the dominant ways in which human relations are performed in Japanese society. The essentialistic opposing duality between Foreignness and Japaneseness has been constructed in post-war Japan through widespread discourses known by the name nihonjinron (lit. the theories on the Japanese).3 Even though it could be understood as a powerful reply to American racism towards the Japanese, nihonjinron only confirms stereotypes by reversing their value, from negative to positive. Moreover, these theories have had the effect of emphasizing Japanese racial and cultural purity through the alienation and exoticization of the other, most often represented by the white “Westerner”4 (obeijin, seiyōjin, hakujin).
The ambivalent exoticism that surrounds the foreigner (gaikokujin) has made it possible for racialised categories and consumerism to intersect in the archipelago. The beauty industry is particularly susceptible to the segmentation between “self” and “other,” and the global white hegemony has a certain influence over it. However, as Miller rightly observes, dominant beauty standards in Japan are equally influenced by local values of “Japaneseness.”5 Torigoe goes even farther: in her essay, she positions whiteness as a power relation and through her analysis she demonstrates how white women are constructed as Others in Japanese media representations, thus creating “a racial ladder that places Japanese people on top.”6 The link between whiteness and widespread beauty practices has been criticized also in studies of the neighbouring country of Korea, with scholars arguing that cosmetic surgeries in the country are successful only if they enhance the body’s natural “Koreanness.”7
My aim in this paper is to tackle the capitalistic commercialization and fetishization of whiteness in contemporary Japan. As it will become clear throughout the analysis, the Japanese beauty industry is creating a particular image of whiteness that is suitable to the consumers’ needs and desires: this toned-down, less threating way of becoming “foreigner-like” is marketed as an accessory that far from overriding one’s natural features, is instrumental in accentuating and valorizing them. Investigating the peculiar position of this beauty trend, which has been affected by the influence of the two contrasting hegemonic discourses of white supremacy and the purity/superiority of the Japanese race, might be helpful in shedding some light on the increasingly complicated ways the concept of race is being constructed in a setting that has been often considered “other” to the Eurocentric gaze.
Whiteness and the Global Beauty Industry
Beauty is an important practice in our daily life, and as such it has been at the center of animated discussions about its social function. Seen as one of the practices through which gender is performed, it has been put into scrutiny by feminist literature. The approach used to analyze beauty has been dualistic. On the one hand, the beauty and fashion industries have been criticized for being among the reasons of women’s subordination, depriving them financially8 and imposing on them male normative standards of beauty.9 On the other, it has been cited as one of the ways in which female consumers could express their individuality in an oppressive world.10
The increasingly globalized beauty and fashion industries have also been subjects of criticism from the viewpoint of Critical Race Studies. It is not uncommon to hear that these industries are guilty of spreading Eurocentric tastes, thus privileging pale-skinned, thin women with light hair.11 The massive sale of skin-whitening creams in Asia and Africa as well as the creation of new beauty standards that privilege thinness over traditionally preferred plump forms are often cited to defend this argument. At the same time, there have been instances in which this denouncing of Eurocentrism itself has been charged guilty of the same evil. Practices such as plastic surgery in South Korea and Japanese preference for white skin have been often criticized as being born out of the desire to be “Western”: these analyses have been contested as simplistic and ignoring the cultural significance of local standards of beauty in shaping beauty ideals.12
Answers to these diatribes have not been yet found.13 It is nonetheless clear that beauty practices articulate a series of complex understandings about gender and race, often oscillating between particularisms and universalisms. Throughout this article I would like to contribute to this ongoing discussion analyzing how pre-existing notions of race and gender intersect and are re-shaped in a newly emerging trend aptly called gaikokujin-fū (foreigner-like) hair.
Us/Others in Japan: The Essentialization of the Foreign
Japan and the tan’itsu minzoku
It is not uncommon to hear that Japan is one of the most ethnically homogenous countries in the world. In Japanese, the locution tan’itsu minzoku (single/unique ethnic group, people, nation), was often used as a slogan when comparing the archipelago with significantly multi-ethnic countries such as the USA.14 The notion of Japan as a mono-ethnic country is being starkly criticized in recent years:15 minorities such as the zainichi Koreans and Chinese who have been living in the country since the end of the second world war, the conspicuous populations of foreign immigrants from Asia and Latin America, as well as mixed-race people, who were thought of as a social problem until these last ten years,16 have been making their voices heard. In the following paragraphs, I will trace how the idea of a racially homogeneous Japan was constructed.
The word minzoku (ethnic group, people, nation) first appeared in the Japanese language in the Taishō Period (1912-1926), as an alternative to the term jinshū (race).17 The concept of race did not exist prior to the Meiji period (1868-1912), when it was introduced by scholars as one of the ideas from the “West” that would have helped Japan become a modernized nation.18 It could be argued that while the opening up of Japan after the sakoku period was not the first time that the Japanese government had to interact with people of different racial features,19 it was the first time that the idea of racial hierarchies were introduced to the country. Japanese scholars recognized themselves to be part of the ōshoku jinshū (“yellow race”), hierarchically subordinate to the “white race.”20 With rising nationalism and the beginning of the colonization project during the Taishō period, the need arose for a concept that could further differentiate the Japanese people from the neighboring Asian countries such as the newly annexed Taiwan and Korea:21 the newly created minzoku fit this purpose well. Scholar Kawai Yuko compared the term to the German concept of Volk, which indicates a group whose identity is defined by shared language and culture. These traits are racialized, as they are defined as being “biological,” a natural component of the member of the ethnic group who acquires them at birth.22 It was the attribution of these intrinsic qualities that allowed the members of the naichi (mainland Japan) to be assigned in a superior position to the gaichi (colonies). Interestingly, the nationalistic discourse of the pre-war and of the war period had the double intent of both establishing Japanese supremacy and legitimizing its role as a “guide” for the colonies grounding it in their racial affinities: unlike the conquerors from Europe, the Japanese were of similar breed.
These hierarchies were ultimately dissociated from the term minzoku after the end of the Second World War, when it was appropriated by Leftist discourse. Opposing it to ta-minzoku (multiethnic nation or people)23
that at the time implied divisions and inequalities and was perceived as a characteristic of the Japanese Empire, Left-leaning intellectuals advocated a tan’itsu minzoku nation based on equality. The Leftist discourse emphasized the need of the “Japanese minzoku” to stand up to the American occupation, but the term gradually lost its critical nuance when Japan reached economic prosperity and tan’itsu minzoku came to mean racial homogeneity as a unique characteristic of Japanese society, advocated by the Right.24
Self-Orientalism
The term minzoku might have “lost his Volk-ish qualities,”25 but homogeneity in Japan is also perceived to be of a cultural nature. Sociologists Mouer and Sugimoto26 lament that many Japanese people believe to be the carriers of an “unique” and essentialized cultural heritage, that renders them completely alien to foreigners. According to the two scholars, the distinctive qualities that have been usually (self-)ascribed to Japanese people are the following: a weak individuality, the tendency to act in groups, and the tendency to privilege harmony in social situations.27 Essentialized “Japaneseness” is a mixture of these psychological traits with the products of Japanese history and culture. The perception that Japaneseness is ever unchanging and a cultural given of each Japanese individual was further increased by the popularity of the nihonjinron discourse editorial genre, which gained mass-media prominence in the archipelago after the 1970s along with Japan’s economic growth.28 Drawing on Said’s notion of Orientalism,29 Miller states that “in the case of Japan, we have to deal […] with the spectacle of a culture vigorously determined to orientalize itself.”30 According to Roy Miller, Japan has effectively constructed Japaneseness through a process of self-othering, which he refers to as self-Orientalism. The nihonjinron publications were very much influenced by cultural anthropologist Ruth Benedict’s highly influential “The Chrysanthemum and the Sword,” published in 1946. Benedict’s study of the “Japanese people” is based on the assumption that the USA and Japan are polar opposites where the former stands for modernity and individualism whereas the latter is characterized by tradition and groupism.31
Japanese anthropologists and psychoanalysts, such as Nakane and Doi32 further contributed to the study of Japaneseness, never once challenging the polar opposition between the “Japanese” and the “Westernerners.”
It would seem contradictory at first for a large number of people in Japan to have this tendency to think and consume their own culture through stereotypes. However, Iwabuchi draws attention to the fact that Japan’s self-Orientalism is not just a passive acceptance of “Western” values but is in fact used to assert the nation’s cultural superiority. It remains nonetheless profoundly complicit with Euro-American Orientalism insofar that it is an essentializing and reifying process: it erases all internal differences and external similarities.33 This essentialization that Japan is capitalizing on proves fundamental for the “West,” as it is the tool through which it maintains its cultural hegemony.
Images of the Foreigner
Images of the foreigner are not equal, and they form an important node in the (self-)Orientalistic relations that Japan entertains with the rest of the world. An essentialized view of both the Euro-American and Asian foreigner functions in different ways as a counterweight to the “we-Japanese” (ware ware Nihonjin) rhethoric.
In the Japanese language, gaikokujin (foreigner) refers to every person who doesn’t have the same nationality as the country she/he lives in.34 The term gaikokujin does not have racial connotations and can be used to effectively describe anyone that is not a Japanese citizen. However, the racially-charged related term gaijin35 refers especially to the “white” foreigner.36 Written very similarly to gaikokujin, the word gaijin actually has a different origin and the double meaning of “foreigner” and “outsider.” The word carries strong implications of “othering,” and refers to the construction of the Europe and America as other to the young nation-state in the Meiji period, during which knowledge was routinely imported from the “West.”37 Thus, gaijin and the representation of foreigners-as-other came to reflect the dominant hierarchies of nineteenth-century “Western” knowledge.38
Putting every white-skinned individual in the same category functions as a strategy to create the antithetical “West” that is so important as a marker of difference in self-Orientalism: it serves to create an “Other” that makes it possible to recognize the “Self.”39 At the same time, it perpetuates the perception of whiteness as the dominant position in America and Europe. In her analysis on the use of foreigner models in Japanese advertisements, Creighton notes that representation of gaijin positions them both as a source of innovation and style and as a potential moral threat.40
This splitting is not uncommon when dealing with representations of the Other. What generates it is the fetishistic component that is always present in the stereotype.41 Bhabha argues that this characteristic allows the Other to be understood in a contradictory way as a source of both pleasure and anxiety for the Non-Other. Stuart Hall draws on Bhabha’s theories to state that the stereotype makes it so that this binary description can be the only way in which is possible to think of the Other–they generate essentialized identities.42 In the Japanese context, the gaijin, fulfilling his role as a racially visible minority,43 is thus inscribed in the double definition of source of disruption and person to admire (akogare no taishō).
Whiteness in the Japanese Context
Akogare (admiration, longing, desire) is a word that young women44 in Japan often use when talking about the “white, Western” foreigner. Kelsky explains that the word indicates the longing for something that is impossible to obtain and she maintains that “it is a rather precise gloss […] of the term “desire” in Lacanian usage. […] Desire arises from lack and finds expression in the fetish. The fetish substitutes the thing that is desired but impossible to obtain.”45 Fulfilment of this unattainable desire can be realized through activities such as participation in English conversation classes and engaging in conversation with “Western” people.46 The consumption of “Western” images and representations as well as everyday practices associated with the Euro-American foreigner could also be considered a fetish that substitutes the unattainable object of desire. In this sense, the gaikokujin-fū hairstyle trend might be for the producers one such way of catering to young Japanese women’s akogare for the “Western” world.
Gaikokujin-fū is inextricably connected to gaijin, “white” foreigners. For instance, the Hair Encyclopedia section of the website Hotpepper Beauty reports two entries with the keyword gaikokujin-fū: gaikokujin-fū karā (foreigner-like color) and gaikokujin-fū asshu (foreigner-like ash). The “color” entry states the following:
Gaikokujin-fū karā means, as the name suggests, a dye that colors the hair in a tint similar to that of foreigners. The word “foreigner” here mostly stands for people with white skin and blond hair that are usually called “American” and “European.”47
Similarly, the “ash” entry explains the following:
The coloring that aims for the kind of blond hair with little red pigments that is often found among Americans is called gaikokujin-fū asshu.
Asshu means “grey” and its characteristic is to give a slightly dull (dark?) impression. It fits well with many hairstyles ranging from short cuts to long hair, and it can be done in a way to make you look like a “western” hāfu (mixed race individual).
It is clear from these descriptions that the term gaikokujin-fū is racially charged. What hairdresser discourse is trying to reproduce is a kind of hair color associated with America and Europe’s Caucasian population. They are selling “whiteness.”
Writing from the viewpoint of multicultural England, Dyer writes that the study of the representation of white people is important because “as long as white people are not racially seen and named, they/we function as a human norm.”49 White discourse is ubiquitous, and it is precisely this unmarked invisibility that makes it a position of dominance. The representation of people belonging to minority groups is inevitably marked or tied to their race or skin color, but Caucasians are often “just people.” At the base of white privilege there is this characteristic of universality that is implied in whiteness.
The marked positioning of the white foreigner in Japanese society would seem an exception to this rule. Torigoe, while acknowledging that the Japanese media “saturated [her] with images of young white females as the standard of beauty,”50 analyzes in her article how white beauty actually embodies values such as overt sexual attractiveness that would be considered deviant or over the top by standard societal norms.51 Likewise, Russell points to the scrutiny that the bodies of the white female woman receive on Japanese mass media, dominated by a male gaze. White females become subject to the sexual curiosity of the Japanese male, and being accompanied by one of them often makes him look more sophisticated and competitive in a globalized world.52 As the most easily, less controversially portrayed Other through which Japanese self-identity is created, the white individual is often subject to stereotyping and essentialization. Russell notes this happening in both advertisement and the portrayal of white local celebrities, that assume even “whiter” characteristics in order to better market their persona in the Japanese television environment.
However, it is my opinion that we must be careful to not be exceedingly uncritical of the marginality that Caucasians are subject to in Japanese society. I argue that whiteness is in an ambiguous position in the Japanese context: it would be wrong to say that in the archipelago white people do not benefit from the privileges that have accompanied their racialization up to the present times. The othering processes that whites are subject to is more often than not related to them being brought up and representing a different culture than to their racial difference.54 The word hakujin (lit. white person) is barely used in everyday conversation, whereas it is more common to hear the term kokujin (lit. black person): white people are not reduced to their racial characteristics in the same way as black people might be.55 Whiteness might not be the completely hegemonic in the Japanese context, but the country does not exist in a vacuum, and its standards have been influenced by the globally hegemonic white euro-centric values to some extent.
To reiterate, white people in the Japanese archipelago experience the contradictory position of being a visible minority subject to reifying “othering” processes while at the same time reaping many of the benefits and privileges that are usually associated with the color of their skin. They are socially and politically located at the margins but are a hegemonic presence in the aesthetic consciousness as an ideal to which aspire to. In the following sections, I will expand on gaikokujin’s ambiguous location by looking at the ways in which whiteness is consumed through the gaikokujin-fū hairstyle trend.
Producing Whiteness: Selling gaikokujin-fū Hair
Creating the “New”
In order to understand the meanings shaping the catchphrase gaikokujin-fū, I have used a mixture of different approaches. My research began by applying the methods of Visual Analysis56 to the latest online promotional material. I have tried to semiotically analyze the pictures on the websites in relation to the copywriting. In addition, I have complemented it with fieldwork, interviewing a total of seven hairdressers and four girls aged from 20 to 2457 in the period between April and June 2017. It was while doing fieldwork that I realized how important social networking is for the establishment of contemporary trends: this is frequently acknowledged also in the press by textually referencing hashtags.58 Instagram is a very important part of Japanese girls’ everyday life, and is used both as a tool for self-expression/self-promotion as well as a compass to navigate the ever-growing ocean of lifestyle trends. Japanese internet spaces had been previously analyzed as relatively closed spaces created and accessed by predominantly Japanese people, and this had implications on how online discourses about races were carried on.59 However, being a predominantly visual medium, Instagram also functions as a site where information can, to a large extent, overcome language barriers.
The gaikokujin-fū hashtag counts 499,103 posts on Instagram, whereas 381,615 pictures have been tagged gaikokujin-fū karā.60 Most of them are published by professional whose aim is to publicize their work, and it is not uncommon to find pricing and information for booking in the description.
Scrolling down the results of the Instagram search, it is easy to notice the high number of back and profile shots; what the hairdressers are trying to show through these pictures is their hairdressing skills. By cutting out the face they are putting the hair itself at the center of the viewer’s attention and eliminating any possibility of identification. The aim here is to sell “whiteness” as an object. The trendsetters are capitalizing on a term (gaikokujin-fū) that has already an appealing meaning outside the field of hair coloring, and that is usually associated with the wider desire or longing (akogare) for “Western” people, culture and lifestyle.
To the non-initiated, the term gaikokujin-fū might indicate anything that is not “Japanese like” such as curly hair, or blonde hair. However, it became clear when speaking to my hairdresser informants that they only used the term referring to the ash-like coloring. Professionals in the field are reclaiming it to define a new, emerging niche of products that only started appearing a couple of years ago.61 In doing so, Japanese hairdressers are creating a new kind of “whiteness” that goes beyond the “Western” cultural conception of white as blonde and blue-eyed, in order to make it more acceptable to Japanese societal standards. In fact, fair hair is considered extremely unnatural.62 The advantage that ash brown hair has over blonde is the relatively darker shade that allows consumers to stand out without being completely out of place.63
However, gaikokujin-fū hair comes at a cost. All of my informants told me during the interviews that the colors usually associated with this trend involve dyes have a blue or green base, and are very difficult to recreate on most people of the East Asia whose naturally black hair has a red base. The difficulty they experienced in reproducing the Ash (asshu) and Matt colors on Japanese hair constituted a fundamental charm point for hair technicians, and precisely because of this being able to produce a neat ash coloring might be considered synonymous with keeping on pace with the last technology in hair dying. The Wella “Illumina Color”64 series came out in September 2015, while Throw,65 a Japanese-produced series of hair dyes that eliminate the reddish undertones of Japanese black hair, went on sale very recently in June 2016.66 Another Japanese maker, Milbon, released its “Addichty Color”67 series as recently as February 2017. The globally dominant but locally peripheral whiteness has been “appropriated” and domesticated by Japanese hairdressers as a propeller of the latest trends, as a vital tool in creating the “new.”
To summarize, the technological developments in hair dyes certainly gave a big push to the popularizing of the gaikokujin-fū hairstyle trend. Moreover, in a very chicken-and-egg-like fashion, the technological advancing itself was at the same time motivated by the admiration and desire towards Euro-American countries. However, this desire for “Westerness” does not entail adopting whiteness in its essentialized “purest” form,68 as that would have negative implications in the context of Japanese society. Rather, Japanese trendsetters have operated a selection and chosen the variant of whiteness that would be different enough to allow the creation of the “latest” while minimizing its more threatening aspects.
Branding the “New”
In the previous section I mentioned the fact that most of pictures posted on the social network Instagram serve to amplify and diffuse existing values for consumption, and constantly refer to a set of meanings that are generated elsewhere reifying them. Throughout this section I will examine the production of these values through the branding of the aforementioned hair dye brands: Wella’s “Illumina Color,” THROW, and Milbon’s “Addichty Color.”
Wella’s “Illumina Color” offers an interesting case study as it is produced by an American multinational brand. Comparing the Japanese website with the international one, it is clear that we have before our eyes a prime example of “glocalization.”69 While on the international webpage70 the eye-catch is a picture of a white, blue-eyed blonde woman that sports an intricate braided hairstyle with some purplish accents in the braid, the Japanese71 version features a hāfu-like72 young woman with long, flowing straight dark brown hair. The description of the product also contains the suggestive sentence “even the hard and visible hair typical of the Japanese [can become] of a pale, soft color.” The keywords here are the terms hard (katai) and soft (yawaraka). Hardness is defined as being a characteristic typical of the Japanese hair texture (nihonjin tokuyū) and it is opposed to the desired effect, softness. The sentence implies by contrasting the two terms that softness is not a characteristic of Japanese hair, and the assumption could be taken further to understand that it is a quality typical of the “foreign.” Perhaps unsurprisingly, the international webpage contains no such reference and instead vaguely praises the hair dye’s ability to provide a light color. The visuals of the latter are consistent with Dyer’s definition of whiteness.
Unlike Wella, Milbon and beauty experience are Japanese companies, and their products ORDEVE Addichty and THROW are only geared to the Japanese marketplace. Milbon’s ORDEVE Addichty dye series is the most recent of the two. The product’s promotional webpage is almost entirely composed of pictures: the top half features 14 moving pictures, two for each of the seven colours available. The pictures slide in a way that shows the customer all the four sides of the model’s bust up, and each one of the girls is holding a sign with the name of the product. To the center left, we see a GIF image with the name of the brand in the roman and Japanese alphabet, accompanied by the catchphrase hajimete mitsukaru, atarashii watashirashisa (“I found it for the first time, a new way of being myself”), that slides into another text-filled picture that explains the concepts behind the branding.
Occidental-like (ōbeijin) voluminous hair with a shine (tsuya) never seen before. This incredible feeling of translucence (tōmeikan) that even shows on your Instagram [pictures], will receive a lot of likes from everybody. Let’s find the charm of a freer myself with Addichty color!
The red-diminishing dyes are here associated with both physical and ideological characteristics identified as “Western,” like the “feeling of translucence” (tōmeikan)73 and “freedom” (jiyū). The word tōmeikan is a constant of technical descriptions of gaikokujin-fū and it is generally very difficult for the hairdressers to explain what does it mean. My hairdresser informant N. quickly explained to me that having translucent hair means to have a hair color that has a low red component. Informants H. and S., also hair professionals, further explained that translucency is a characteristic typical of hair that seems to be semi-transparent when hit by light. While in the English-speaking world it would certainly be unusual to positively describe somebody’s hair as translucent, tōmeikan is a positive adjective often used as a compliment in other different contexts and it indicates clarity and brightness. In fact, the Japanese Daijisen dictionary lists two definitions for translucent, the second of which reads “clear, without impurities.”74 It is perhaps in relation to this meaning that the melanin-filled black core of the Japanese hair is considered “heavy” (omoi) and strong. Reddish and lighter brown colors are also defined in the same way. What is more, even hair colors at the other end of the spectrum can be “muddy”（nigori no aru）: blonde hair is also described as such.75 It is clear that while tōmeikan is a quality of “occidental hair,” it is not a characteristic of all the shades that are usually associated with whiteness.
In the last sentence, “freedom” is linked to charm (miryoku) and the individual. These three concepts are also very often associated with the foreigner. The freedom of the gaijin is a freedom from social constraints and from the sameness that pervades dominant representations of Japaneseness.76 Individualism is further emphasized by the pronoun “myself,” which in the original Japanese is a possessive pronoun to the word “charm” (miryoku). As a word, miryoku has an openly sexual connotation, and because of this it might be linked to the concept of “foreignness.” As Torigoe found out in her analysis of Japanese advertisements, white women are often represented as a sexualized counterpart to the more innocent Japanese woman.77 Gaikokujin-fū hair offers customers the possibility to become closer to obtaining this sexiness, that distances the self from the monotone standards of society.
Of the three, THROW is possibly the most interesting to analyze, mostly because of the huge quantity of content they released in order to strengthen the brand image. In addition to the incredibly detailed homepage, they are constantly releasing new media contents related to gaikokujin-fū coloring on their “THROW Journal.”78
The “story” page of the website serves as an explanation of the brand identity. It is a vertically designed page heavy on images, possibly designed to be optimally visualized in mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets. The first image that the viewer encounters is that of a girl whose brown hair is flowing in the wind, which results in some strands covering the features of her pale-white face. This makes it hard to understand her nationality and makes it so that all the attention is focused on the light, airy qualities of the hair. As I said before, “lightness” (karusa) is associated to translucency and is one of the characteristics at the center of the marketing of gaikokujin-fū. This picture very clearly renders those sensations in a way that is very pleasant to the eye and indeed invites consumption.
Under the picture we find a very short narration that complements it. In bigger characters, the words dare de mo nai, watashi ni naru, that roughly translates as “I’ll become a myself, that is nobody else.” Here again we find an emphasis on individuality and difference. Scrolling down, we find the following paragraph written in a smaller font:
I leave my body to the blowing wind.
My hair is enveloped in light, and is filled by the pleasant air.
What I needed was this [facial] expression.
I got rid of what I did not need, and refreshingly freed my mind.
Gracefully, freely.
I should just enjoy myself more.79
Unlike the tagline in the Addichty webpage, THROW’s brand identity is here described in ideological terms only. Once again, “freedom” is the central theme, and is associated with a sensation of freshness (kaze, “the wind”; also, the onomatopoeia sutto, here rendered as “refreshingly”). The image of release is further emphasized by the fact that “I” of this text is in close contact with nature: her skin feels the wind, she is shrouded in light and breathes pure air. But what is the subject being released from? The fourth and the last line would suggest that she is being trapped by social constraints, something akin to the Freudian super-ego, that somehow renders her unable to enjoy herself for what she really is. My literal translation of the sixth line makes it hard to understand the hedonistic implications of its meaning: what the original Japanese implies is not simply that she should “have fun,” but she should be finding pleasure in what she is and not what she is expected to be. It is perhaps strange to the eyes of the Euro-American observer accustomed to the discourse of white supremacy that the consumption of whiteness comes with an invitation to spontaneity. The whiteness being sold here is certainly perceived in a radically different way from the Eurocentric “West,” where it is associated with self-constraint.80 It is being marketed to the Japanese public in a way that reminds the portrayal of minorities in the white-dominated world,81 and that makes it particularly appealing to the archipelago’s consumers.
Listening to the producers’ interviews, it becomes clear for them that the red pigments of the hair, as a symbol of this self-Orientalistically represented “Japaneseness” are represented as a further constraint. Producer Kimura Naoto speaks of a “liberation from redness for the women who hate it”;82 fellow member of the production team Horiuchi brings up the ever-present desire in Japanese women to “become like foreigners,”83 but neither of the two explains the connection between the deletion of red pigments from the hair and the possibility of becoming foreigner-like. It is perhaps this lack of an explicit connection in an explanation from an expert that makes it perceived as an “obvious truth.” In fact, nobody seems to refer to the fact that red undertones are common overseas as well, not to mention the existence of redheads in predominantly Caucasian regions. By hiding these facts, the red pigments are constructed as something that is peculiarly Japanese and juxtaposed to the exclusively foreign blue pigments, further contributing to the essentializing of the gaikokujin that propels self-Orientalism.
Consuming Whiteness: Gaikokujin-fū and Everyday Life
To understand the ways that gaikokujin-fū was being interpreted and consumed I conducted fieldwork for two months (April-June 2017) in Tokyo. Engaging in participant observation proved to be relatively easy, since superficial conversation about beauty trends is one of the most common ways that young women around my age use to socialize. Most of my peers were very quick to react every time I lightly introduced the subject. However, due to the perceived “lightness” of the topic, not many people showed to be willing to talk prolongedly about it. This prompted me to supplement the fieldwork with semi-structured interviews I conducted with four people aged 20-22.
The general reaction to the gaikokujin-fū buzzword was one of recognition–the existence of the trend was acknowledged both by people who were actually familiar with it as well as by others who were not really interested but had seen the phrase and recognized a more general idea behind it. As the reader might expect after having gone through the previous chapter, consumers of gaikokujin-fū hair all brought up the difficulties they had in obtaining the desired results. When I first contacted K., a 23-year-old university student in Tokyo, she told me to wait till the following week for the interview since she had an appointment to dye her hair of an ash-like color. Seven days later, I was surprised to see that her hair had not changed much. Turns out that her virgin hair was a very difficult base to work with: having never bleached it, it proved to be very resistant to blue-green dyes. Dying the hair of an ash-like color would have been impossible as the naturally red pigments of the hair would have completely nullified the effect.
Whiteness as Empowerment, Whiteness as Difference
K. was nonetheless very accommodating and answered my questions very enthusiastically. To her, the word gaikokujin had indeed a very positive meaning, and she specifically associated it to difference. My informant used a very harsh word when talking about her fellow Japanese: to her, Japanese style equals mass-production. Her image of Japan was perfectly congruent with those described by Mouer and Sugimoto in their critique of Nihonjinron. “Ordinary” Japanese girls were, in her opinion, the cutesy and quiet girls with straight black hair and bangs covering their foreheads. Why did she feel attracted to gaikokujin-fū in the first place? K. felt that the “traditional” Japanese image was constraining, and she had both very physical and empirical reasons (she does not like face with bangs) as well as a specific ideological background. It is worth nothing here that K. has had since her childhood a very strong akogare towards “Western countries”: she has studied English since she was a small child and is now studying Italian, which led her to spend a year abroad in the University of Venice. Moreover, she attended a very liberal protestant high school in Tokyo, where students were allowed to dye their hair and had no obligation to wear the school uniform. She herself stated that the liberal environment she was brought up in had a huge influence on her view of the world and thus she did not feel the need to “conform.” K. speaks from a privileged position that allowed her to glimpse a “different” world, in which she is promised freedom. In a similar fashion to the representations I analysed in the previous chapter, “Western” foreign becomes a symbol of liberation from the societal constraints of a traditionalistic society.
The liberating qualities of the akogare towards the essentialized “Western” foreign have been brought up in previous research as a space for young women to astray themselves from the hierarchies of everyday life. The link between freedom and diversity was indeed particularly strong in K., who feels somehow “oppressed” by certain aspects of society. However, this is far from being a universal mode of consumption: in fact, the other three girls never even mentioned anything ideological. To S., a 22-year-old girl I met while studying in Tokyo two years ago, dying her hair of an ash-like hue was an act genuinely finalized to the enhancement of her beauty: she thought the color made her face look brighter. While she too stated during the interview that foreigners are viewed as cool and fashionable, she did not allude to a desire to “become” one nor she mentioned any ideological values associated with them that she emphasized with. In her everyday practice, whiteness is consumed as a tool regardless of its hegemonic signified. Informants A. and H. talked about the trend in a similar way. H. initially dyed her hair because she liked how cute ash hair looked on her favourite model, and had little more to say other than that. Her friend A., who recently graduated from a fashion school, confessed that in her environment standing out was more the rule than a subversive act. Her ash phase was brief and followed by even more explosive hues such as blue and pink. S., A., and H., were very much less conscious of their ways of consumption, but, as French theorist Michel de Certeau argues,84 it is precisely the aimlessness of their wandering that make their practices subvert the hegemony established by the global white supremacy. Having gaikokujin-fū hair is one of the strategies that Japanese women have at their disposition to attain beauty, and while it is trendy, it is far from being superior to different styles. Whiteness becomes an accessory that enhances the natural beauty of the self, and it is not employed to override one’s original racial features but rather to enrich them through the display of individuality. Under this light, it is possible to see the consumption of foreign-like hair as an unconscious tentative of overcoming the racialized barriers that might generate uncanny feelings in the eyes of the “white” spectator.
Subdued Subversion and the Ambiguities of Consumption
There are however at least two factors that complicate the consumption of gaikokujin-fū hair, making it a multifaceted and complex process. Firstly, during my interview with K. we discussed the differences between this and other fashion trends that tend to refuse the stereotypical sameness of the constructed Japanese image. K. suggested the existence of an even more individualistic trend–Harajuku–style fashion. The Harajuku district of Tokyo is famous world-wide for hosting a wide range of colourful subcultures,85 which my interviewee described with terms such as dokusouteki (creative) and yancha (mischievous). Harajuku fashion is individuality taken to such a level in which it becomes even more openly contestant of society. S. described these subcultures as referencing the image of “an invented fantasy world, completely out of touch with reality.” The gaikokujin-fū hair colour is indeed a way to break out of the “factory mould,” but it is a relatively tame way of doing it as it is the consumption of a domesticized otherness. As I also pointed out during the analysis of the production processes, the aesthetics of the trend are largely shaped in relation to societal norms and purposely do not excessively break out of them. Especially in its darker tones, foreign-like ash hair is visually closer (albeit chemically harder to obtain) than platinum blonde, and it is precisely in these shades that the hue is being consumed by girls like K. and S.
Furthermore, one could say that Gaikokujin-fū hues can at times be experimentations instrumental to the formation of one’s identity. H. and S. both explained that they tried out ash dyes as a phase, only then to move on to something that they thought better reflected their own selves. In both cases, that meant going back to their natural black color and to darker tones. H., in particular, after spending her three years of freedom in university experimenting with various hues, finally concluded in her fourth and final year that natural black hair was “what suits Japanese people best.”. After trying out the “Other” and recognizing it as such, her identification acted as what Stuart Hall might have called a suture between her as an acting subject and the discursive practices of “Japaneseness.”86 As “foreignness,” and whiteness as one of its variants, cannot be easily conceived outside the dominant self-Orientalistic discourses, even gaikokujin-fū is inevitably bound to the essentialized “Japaneseness” of the Nihonjinron. This is only worsened by the fact that foreign-like hair colors are a product in the beauty market: they need to be marketed to the consumers, and this necessitates simplification. Essentialization and the reinforcement of self-Orientalism are the high prices that one must pay for the consumption of the other, and constitute a big limitation of its subversive power.
Conclusion
I have attempted to analyse the ways in which whiteness is produced and consumed in Japan, a country with significant economic and cultural power that does not have a significant Caucasian population. I have chosen as the topic a feature of the human body that is usually considered peripherical to the construction of racialized categories, and I have attempted to demonstrate how it becomes central in the production of an occidentalistic image of “whiteness” in the Japanese Archipelago.
What this trend helps us to understand is the complexities and multiplicities of whiteness. By shedding some light on the way that hairdressers in Japan construct and sell the gaikokujin-fū trend we become aware of the fact that an aspect such as hair color that we do not usually pay much attention to in relation to this racialized category can be central when the same is consumed in a different setting. It is significant that what is being marketed here it is a slightly different paradigm from the Eurocentric or conventional idea of “white” people, that sees at its center blonde-haired, fair-skinned people with blue or green eyes: whiteness is mitigated and familiarized in order to make it more desirable to wider audiences. Its localized production and its consumption as a disposable accessory might be taken as challenging to the global dominance of Caucasian aesthetic.
Acting in the (locally) ambiguous field of racial representations,87 hairdressers in Japan are creating their own whiteness, one that is starkly defined by what is socially acceptable and what is rejected.88 It thus becomes apparent the fact that racialized categories are nothing but discourses, constantly morphing in relation to time and space. The existence of a different whiteness created by and for the use of people who are not considered as belonging to this racialized category creates conflict with the discourse of a global, hegemonic whiteness by demonstrating its artificiality and construction.
However, the use of the word gaikokujin inevitably generates ambivalent meanings. The trend becomes linked to the discourse of “foreignness” and the desires associated with it. Eventually, it ends up reproducing the essentialist and reifying stereotypes that are creating through the occidentalistic (and self-Orientalistic) practices of nihonjinron. The trend potentially reinforces the “us/them” barriers that are at the basis of essentialistic thought by juxtaposing the desired “foreign hair” as a polar opposite of the more conservative and traditional “Japanese hair.”
To reiterate, gaikokujin-fū might be subversive on the global scale, but it is nonetheless an expression of the oppressive mainstream on the local level, as it restates notions of difference and exclusivity that form the basis for social exclusion of phenotypically alien foreigners. Unfortunately, the practices of marketing necessitate simplifications, and makes it is hard to achieve what I believe would be the most subversive action: the elimination of these reifying barriers. It is imperative that we start to think about ways to talk about race and culture in a non-essentializing manner while maintaining an anti-white-centric stance.
Although the problem of essentialization cannot be resolved by looking at representation only, by looking at how the product is effectively consumed in everyday life we might find that these semi-conscious practices already offer some hints on how to overcome the barriers that reification builds around us. It is indeed true that consumers answer to the “call” of the marketers, and that they identify themselves to some extent with the images of racialized whiteness created by the beauty industry. However, what the interviews revealed is that often times the link between image and product is broken in the immediacy of consumption. By using whiteness as an accessory, some of the consumers open up a space in which they contest the seriousness and rigidity of racialized categories–a space that allows hybridity to exist.
ميلانيا ترامب تشيد بكافانو وتنتقد التركيز على ملابسها | القدس العربي Alquds Newspaper
▻http://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=1028548
et clichés coloniaux #orientalisme
▻https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/afrique/au-kenya-melania-trump-a-porte-un-casque-colonial_2038623.html
The Angry Arab News Service/وكالة أنباء العربي الغاضب : Beirut, the movie
▻http://angryarab.blogspot.com/2018/09/beirut-movie.html
By far, my favorite scene of Jon Hamm’s movie, Beirut: Camels on the beaches of Beirut. Some Israeli assistant director must have come up with this touch.
Le Huff Maghreb a un article à ce sujet, et cite une libanaise particulière remontée :
▻https://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/entry/lacteur-americain-jon-hamm-sexplique-apres-la-polemique-sur-le-film
Curieusement, la « Rédaction du HuffPost Maroc » traduit la partie en anglais du tweet de cette Raweezy, et oublie la partie en arabe libanais, pourtant la plus poétique et intéressante de son message :
▻https://twitter.com/habibitingxo/status/951904998547484672
Kelo khara. Yel 3ane sa3a allah khalfkon ya ebin kleb
Toutes les musiques du #monde_arabe
▻http://www.laviedesidees.fr/Toutes-les-musiques-du-monde-arabe.html
Comment présenter quinze siècles de musiques arabes au public français en évitant l’écueil de l’orientalisme ? Première #exposition en Europe consacrée à la question, Al Musiqa s’attache à déconstruire les clichés en proposant un nouveau voyage en Orient – cette fois, éclairé de l’intérieur.
/ #musique, monde arabe, exposition, #orientalisme
Toutes les musiques du #monde_arabe
▻http://www.laviedesidees.fr/Les-mille-et-un-sons-du-monde-arabe.html
Comment présenter quinze siècles de musiques arabes au public français en évitant l’écueil de l’orientalisme ? Première #exposition en Europe consacrée à la question, Al Musiqa s’attache à déconstruire les clichés en proposant un nouveau voyage en Orient – cette fois, éclairé de l’intérieur.
/ #musique, monde arabe, exposition, #orientalisme
Philharmonie de Paris jusqu’au 19 août
▻https://philharmoniedeparis.fr/fr/exposition-al-musiqa
Why I don’t like the term “#Western_Balkans”
“Western Balkans” is a label born 15 years ago that has certainly not helped – if anything it has slowed down – the path of south-east Europe towards the EU. A comment
cc @reka
Article en italien :
▻https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/aree/Balcani-notizie/Perche-non-mi-piace-il-termine-Balcani-occidentali-187621
cc @albertocampiphoto @wizo
Recently, I had the following conversation with an American friend of mine:
– I want to visit the Western Balkans this summer! Where do you think I should go first?, he asked me.
_Brussels, I couldn’t help but reply.
:-)
C’est pourtant simple, les Balkans orientaux sont restés… orientaux (et donc, orthodoxes), comme l’Empire romain dont ils faisaient partie. D’ailleurs, les grands blonds germains n’y sont pas allés…
(du moins, après les tout premiers en 378 (Andrinople !!!), les plus… orientaux (!) sur la carte ci-dessous) heureusement, ils ont terminé à l’ouest (Toulouse puis péninsule Ibérique)
World to end on August 22 | Opinion | The Guardian
▻https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/aug/09/worldtoendonaugust22
While the Middle East smoulders, commentators of an apocalyptic bent are lining up for a date with Armageddon.
Better cancel those holidays. We now have a date for Armageddon, and it’s a week on Tuesday - August 22.
This information comes from no lesser source than the Wall Street Journal, where Bernard Lewis, President Bush’s favourite historian, provides the details.
“In Islam, as in Judaism and Christianity,” the professor writes, "there are certain beliefs concerning the cosmic struggle at the end of time - Gog and Magog, anti-Christ, Armageddon, and for Shiite Muslims, the long-awaited return of the Hidden Imam, ending in the final victory of the forces of good over evil, however these may be defined.
Rappelée par Angry Arab, la foudroyante prédiction du génie de l’orientalisme nord-américain, Bernard Lewis (décédé hier).
On connaît le rôle des prédictions apocalyptiques dans le déclenchement de la seconde guerre d’Irak par Bush et par les néoconservateurs.
La première fois que j’ai entendu parler de cette histoire, c’était ici :
▻http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/latenightlive/looking-back-at-bush/7702590
Pour résumer : dans sa biographie de Bush fils, Jean E. Smith raconte comment le président US a tenté d’expliquer à Chirac l’histoire de Gog et Magog, et la nécessité théologique d’une intervention en Irak. Face à l’incompréhension de Chirac, Bush demande ensuite à ses services de contacter la faculté de théologie de Louvain, pour qu’ils expliquent à Villepin.
Or le mois dernier j’ai croisé avec un célèbre bibliste - professeur au collège de France. Et lui-même raconte une histoire similaire : il a été contacté, à cette même époque, par l’administration américaine pour donner des cours d’exégèse biblique « appliquée » à l’administration française.
« Peintures des Lointains », des images à « montrer sans honte ni tabou » - Afrique - RFI
▻http://www.rfi.fr/culture/20180312-peintures-lointains-quai-branly-images-honte-tabou
C’est une partie méconnue de la collection du #musée du #Quai_Branly. Quelque 200 œuvres d’artistes européens qui ont représenté d’autres continents et populations à l’époque de la #colonisation. Beaucoup ont été acquises pour l’#exposition_coloniale de 1931, à une époque où l’on montrait aussi des humains en cage au Bois de Vincennes. Et la plupart de ces tableaux n’étaient plus sortis des réserves depuis longtemps.
Edward Said, l’orientalisme et le rejet de tout obscurantisme
▻https://orientxxi.info/lu-vu-entendu/edward-said-l-orientalisme-et-le-rejet-de-tout-obscurantisme,2260
#orientalisme #obscurantisme #Eward_Said #Edward_Saïd #Saïd
Décédé en septembre 2003, Edward Said a été l’intellectuel palestinien le plus important du XXe siècle. Il a bouleversé les études de littérature comparée et a été entièrement engagé dans le combat pour la #Palestine. L’essayiste et écrivaine Dominique Eddé, qui a partagé une grande partie de sa vie, lui a consacré un livre, Edward Said. Le roman de sa pensée, paru en octobre 2017. Il tient plus de l’étude analytique que de la biographie, mêlant les commentaires critiques sur l’œuvre de Said aux témoignages personnels.
En 2001, avec les poètes Mahmoud Darwich, Adonis et d’autres intellectuels arabes, Said signe un appel contre la tenue d’un colloque négationniste à Beyrouth. Mais il s’en désolidarise lorsque le colloque est interdit par les autorités. Il invoque des motifs d’éthique : « Condamner le colloque, oui ; l’interdire, non. » Une position typiquement « américaine. » Eddé comme Darwich en sont meurtris.
The Right to the City in an Age of Austerity
In Greece, resistance to austerity comprises a mosaic of struggles for a right to the city, conceived as the collective self-determination of everyday life.
When talking about Greece and “the crisis,” it is easy to fall in the trap of “Greek exceptionalism.” After all, it is through essentializing orientalist narratives that austerity and structural adjustment have been justified: the Greeks are corrupt, lazy and crisis-prone, and they should be adapted and civilized for their own good.
Nawaat – Kamel Daoud, un mercenaire au service de Caïd Essebsi ?
▻http://nawaat.org/portail/2017/10/05/kamel-daoud-un-mercenaire-au-service-de-caid-essebsi
Evoquant les récentes déclarations de Béji Caïd Essebsi concernant l’égalité successorale et le droit des Tunisiennes musulmanes d’épouser un non-musulman, Kamel Daoud leur trouve « le mérite de mettre en lumière l’essentiel de ce qui doit encore se faire dans le monde musulman pour achever les printemps arabes ». Une phrase étrange qui suggère, contre toute attente, que les « printemps arabes » auraient déjà pour une grande part réalisé leurs promesses. Que peut bien signifier cette phrase si l’on admet que son auteur est pourvu du minimum d’intelligence requis pour obtenir un prix littéraire français et qu’il n’est pas dans l’ignorance totale de la situation actuelle dans les pays arabes ? Que peut-il donc entendre par « l’essentiel » et par « achever les printemps arabes » quand on sait les désastres meurtriers en Irak, en Syrie et en Libye, les bains de sang au Yémen, le despotisme militaire égyptien, la contre-révolution rampante en Tunisie et la répression des révoltes du Rif marocain ? Pour toute personne un peu sensée, la situation tragique du monde arabe aujourd’hui n’épargne pas plus les femmes que les hommes. Or, Kamel Daoud est une personne sensée qui sait parfaitement qu’au-delà de l’inégalité dont les femmes sont victimes, ce qui caractérise aujourd’hui la majorité des pays arabes, c’est l’égalité de la misère, des prisons et des fosses communes. On ne peut donc le croire lorsqu’il se pose en avocat du droit des femmes. Alors ? La clef, il nous la donne en conclusion : « M. Essebsi a ouvert une brèche énorme dans le socle du conservatisme musulman, et a créé un antécédent unique, validant divers mouvements féministes et intellectuels. Sa prise de position n’a pas encore été appréciée à sa juste valeur : elle est révolutionnaire — copernicienne, même. Le président tunisien a clamé l’égalité de la femme dans le monde arabe, un univers social où la Terre semble encore plate. »
Portrait de Kamel Daoud pour son ouvrage « Zabor ou les psaumes » - YouTube
▻https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bGOpDLVD388
8’15
L’arabe n’est pas la langue maternelle en Algérie, ni au Maroc. Ca c’est une illusion que vous avez ici, parce que chez nous, on parle nos langues. L’arabe, c’est notre latin, quelque part. C’est la langue du clergé, de la monarchie, du pouvoir politique, de la domination, des classes dominantes, mais ça n’est pas leur lan..., ce ne sont pas, ce n’est pas notre langue. Zabor était confronté à un dilemme de fond. D’abord une école qui enseignait dans un arabe dit classique, je n’aime pas ce mot, mais qui était une très belle langue. Je ne suis pas contre l’arabe, je suis bilingue. Mais qui ne parlait – il le dit – elle ne parle que de morts, que de cadavres... Il dit à la fin : « Elle en a pris les couleurs. » Et il revient à la fin vers la langue maternelle, l’algérien, ou une autre langue maternelle algérienne et il découvre que c’est une très belle langue mais qui est incapable de dire le monde en entier. Qui est incapable de le sauver parce qu’elle n’est pas précise, elle manque de dictionnaire. Et puis il se rabat vers la troisième langue, c’est la langue de la dissidence, de l’Occident, de la découverte de la sensualité, c’est le français. Et à partir de là, il commence à construire son propre dictionnaire. Et je pense que tout écrivain commence par construire son propre dictionnaire, ce qu’on appelle par la suite, le style. Mais c’est la conquête du mot, mot par mot, et jusqu’à la fin, c’est ça ce que fait Zabor. 9’14
Pour mémoire. #langue_arabe #orientalisme
New Texts Out Now: Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel, eds. Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East
▻http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/26998/new-texts-out-now_nader-hashemi-and-danny-postel-e
Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?
Danny Postel and Nader Hashemi (DP and NH): Over the last several years, a narrative has taken root in Western media and policy circles that attributes the turmoil and violence engulfing the Middle East to supposedly ancient sectarian hatreds. “Sectarianism” has become a catchall explanation for virtually all of the region’s problems. Thomas Friedman, for instance, claims that in Yemen today “the main issue is the seventh century struggle over who is the rightful heir to the Prophet Muhammad — Shiites or Sunnis.” Barack Obama has been one the biggest proponents of this thesis. On several occasions, he has invoked “ancient sectarian differences” to explain the turmoil in the region. In his final State of the Union address, he asserted that the issues plaguing the Middle East today are “rooted in conflicts that date back millennia.” A more vulgar version of this view prevails among right-wing commentators. But in one form or another, this new sectarian essentialism, which is lazy and convenient — and deeply Orientalist — has become the new conventional wisdom in the West.
Our book forcefully challenges this narrative and offers an alternative set of explanations for the rise in sectarian conflict in the Middle East in recent years. Emphasis on recent: the book demonstrates that the sharp sectarian turn in the region’s politics is largely a phenomenon of the last few decades — really since 1979 — and that pundits who imagine it as an eternal or fixed feature of the Middle East are reading history backwards. So the book is an exercise in refutation and ideology critique on the one hand, while also offering a set of rigorous social scientific arguments about what exactly is driving the intensification of sectarian conflict in the Middle East today. Our contributors come from political science, history, anthropology, and religious studies, and it is from this range of disciplines that we present a social and political theory as well as a critical history of sectarianism.
Laws that allow rapists to marry their victims come from colonialism, not Islam | The Independent
▻http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/rape-conviction-laws-marry-rapist-jordan-egypt-morocco-tunisia-came-f
Article 308 is a remnant of the Ottoman rule, but its origin is even more distant – historically and geographically – as the Ottomans had imported it from the French penal code. In countries that were under French colonial rule, such as Lebanon and Tunisia, laws like Article 308 are a direct hangover.
The roots of these laws lie in the cultural impact of centuries under colonial rule, where subjugation was ultimately secured by a true “gentlemen’s agreement”. While foreign powers took control of the state, in exchange they offered local men complete control of their homes.
The colonialists fed and legitimised the misogynist voices within the colonised, and so many of the barriers that women face in the region stem directly from this strategy of using patriarchy as a tool of oppression.
When seen from this perspective, it is less surprising to find that law surrounding rape that gave birth to all those we find in the Middle East and North Africa was only abolished in France as recently as 1994 – only five years before Egypt did away with it.
Suis un peu surpris par cette allusion à la situation légale en France en 1994 même s’il y a eu à cette une modification juridique, notamment sur la présomption de consentement ehntre époux, mais c’est tout de même assez différent...
Laws that allow rapists to marry their victims come from colonialism, not Islam | The Independent
▻http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/rape-conviction-laws-marry-rapist-jordan-egypt-morocco-tunisia-came-f
But while the activism challenging these laws is rooted firmly in the community, it may be surprising to some that the laws themselves are not a product of local tradition.
Article 308 is a remnant of the Ottoman rule, but its origin is even more distant – historically and geographically – as the Ottomans had imported it from the French penal code. In countries that were under French colonial rule, such as Lebanon and Tunisia, laws like Article 308 are a direct hangover.
The roots of these laws lie in the cultural impact of centuries under colonial rule, where subjugation was ultimately secured by a true “gentlemen’s agreement”. While foreign powers took control of the state, in exchange they offered local men complete control of their homes.
The colonialists fed and legitimised the misogynist voices within the colonised, and so many of the barriers that women face in the region stem directly from this strategy of using patriarchy as a tool of oppression.
Lire absolument : Ibn Kafka avait documenté précisément cet aspect en 2012 : Amina, l’article 475 et l’ancien droit français
▻https://ibnkafkasobiterdicta.wordpress.com/2012/03/15/amina-larticle-475-et-lancien-droit-francais
C’est là l’origine de l’article 475 de l’actuel code pénal marocain. Les éléments constitutifs de cet article sont tous le fruit du droit d’Ancien régime voire même canonique. Ne répondant à aucune tradition juridique proprement marocaine, ils répondent à une réalité sociale – probablement en recul – accordant bien moins d’importance à l’intégrité et l’autonomie sexuelle de l’individu qu’au monopole exclusif du mariage sur la sexualité légitime.
Jusqu’à plus ample informé, le droit musulman classique ne connaît pas de règle équivalente ; ce n’est donc pas en raison d’une islamisation du droit pénal marocain que cette règle existe, mais en raison de sa francisation, voire même de l’influence – évoquée plus haut – du droit canon sur le droit d’Ancien Régime sur lequel se fonde cette incrimination. Promulgué par dahir en 1962, soit avant même l’élection du premier parlement marocain élu au suffrage universel, le Code pénal fut l’oeuvre du ministère de la justice. 1962, c’était trois années avant la loi de 1965 sur l’unification, la marocanisation et l’arabisation de la justice – jusque là, une majorité des juges étaient français, et le français demeurait la seule langue judiciaire, du moins pour la rédaction des jugements. Des conseillers techniques français – comme Adolf Ruolt, précité – étaient à la disposition du gouvernement marocain également pour les hautes fonctions au sein du ministère, et participèrent donc au tout premier plan à la rédaction du Code pénal de 1962, rédigé en français et initialement disponible uniquement en cette langue (le Maroc était alors théoriquement indépendant depuis 6 ans…). Ce Code pénal de 1962 était donc rédigé en français par des juristes principalement français s’inspirant principalement du Code pénal français en vigueur à l’époque et accessoirement du Code pénal marocain de 1953 adopté sous le protectorat.
Nous voilà donc avec une disposition pénale dont l’interprétation erronée par une magistrature incompétente permet de violer une deuxième fois les victimes de viols en les poussant à épouser leur violeur, dont l’origine remonte au vieux droit français, qui choque l’opinion publique et qui ne répond même pas à une tradition locale. Qu’attendent nos parlementaires et notre gouvernement pour l’abroger ?
(On trouvera notamment dans cet article le texte et l’historique de la loi abrogée en France en 1994 – évoquée dans l’article du Independent et HRW.)
Marché de l’art : les orientalistes au goût du jour
▻http://www.lemonde.fr/argent/article/2017/03/07/marche-de-l-art-les-orientalistes-au-gout-du-jour_5090375_1657007.html
Art moderne arabe
L’histoire de l’orientalisme ne s’arrête pas là. Un nouveau courant émerge après les années 1950. Il s’agit alors d’art moderne arabe, représenté par des artistes syriens, libanais, algériens… Beaucoup ont été formés en France, au moment où les colonies existaient encore, et sont ensuite retournés dans leur pays d’origine ou se sont expatriés sur le long terme. « Leur cote commence à s’internationaliser, et elle devrait monter, affirme Oliver Berman, même lorsqu’il s’agit d’artistes issus de pays instables, et je suis le premier à m’en étonner. Je pense notamment aux artistes tunisiens. Ils sont encouragés par la communauté tunisienne installée à l’étranger. »
Comment considérer que l’art moderne arabe (des années 50 et Cie : voir ici par exemple ▻http://nachoua.com/Peintures/Peintres.html) est un prolongement de l’orientalisme ? J’avoue que je n’ai pas compris !
Si tu regarde ou l’e-monde a rangé cet article tu verra que c’est la rubrique « argent et placements » et pas « culture ». Cette rubrique t’indique ou placé tes X00.000 € dans un truc banquable. Demain ils te conseillerons d’investir la pierre et feront un blabla creux sur l’architecture. Mais en fait le texte dit n’importe quoi avec le mot orient dedans pour broder autour de l’info qu’il veux faire passé ;
Une cote qui grimpe, certes, mais sans égaler encore celle des anciens. Les œuvres de Majorelle, de Dinet ou de Rudolf Ernst sont estimées entre 100 000 euros et 200 000 euros. Leurs contemporains Edy Legrand (entre 60 000 euros et 80 000 euros) ou François-Louis Schmied (12 000 euros à 15 000 euros) ont des cotes inférieures, mais intéressantes.
@mad_meg : je ne suis pas certain qu’ils fassent mieux à la rubrique culture :-(
oui je suis d’accord avec toi @gonzo mais je suis toujours surprise quant je tombe sur cette rubrique « argent et investissements » qui réduit l’art à une série de x000000€. Ca donne une idée du publique très restreins que cible ce journal car combien de lecteurices de ce journal peuvent investir 200000€ dans une peinture et s’interessé à cette rubrique ?
Quant je voie ca, ca me rappelle que l’Etat a donné 13 millions d’euros de subventions a ce journal cette année.
#Le_monde et #journalisme hélas (toujours, toujours plus bas, Le Monde, un jour ils finiront bien par atteindre un fond abyssal quelconque)
Le harem sultanien et le rôle politique des femmes
▻https://www.franceculture.fr/conferences/universite-bretagne-loire/le-harem-sultanien-et-le-role-politique-des-femmes
Réflexion sur le rôle des femmes dans la sphère politique notamment au Maroc et dans l’empire ottoman. Les écarts sont profonds entre les représentations occidentales du harem et les perceptions locales. Penser le harem sultanien et la place des femmes dans une histoire islamique (XVIe-XIXe siècle).
#radio #histoire #femmes #harem #historicisation #islam #politique #pouvoir #male_gaze #orientalisme #racisme
"L’invention de l’#Orient" : Pascal Blanchard décortique la #photographie_coloniale
