• Military Bases Turn Into Small Cities as Afghans Wait Months for Homes in U.S.

    An estimated 53,000 evacuees from Kabul remain on eight military bases across the country. Thousands more are waiting at U.S. bases abroad to come to the United States.

    In late August, evacuees from Afghanistan began arriving by the busload to the #Fort_McCoy_Army_base in the Midwest, carrying little more than cellphones and harrowing tales of their narrow escapes from a country they may never see again. They were greeted by soldiers, assigned rooms in white barracks and advised not to stray into the surrounding forest, lest they get lost.

    More than a month later, the remote base some 170 miles from Milwaukee is home to 12,600 Afghan evacuees, almost half of them children, now bigger than any city in western Wisconsin’s Monroe County.

    The story is much the same on seven other military installations from Texas to New Jersey. Overall, roughly 53,000 Afghans have been living at these bases since the chaotic evacuation from Kabul this summer that marked the end of 20 years of war. While many Americans have turned their attention away from the largest evacuation of war refugees since Vietnam, the operation is very much a work in progress here, overseen by a host of federal agencies and thousands of U.S. troops.

    While an initial group of about 2,600 people — largely former military translators and others who helped allied forces during the war — moved quickly into American communities, a vast majority remain stranded on these sprawling military way stations, uncertain of when they will be able to start the new American lives they were expecting. An additional 14,000 people are still on bases abroad, waiting for transfer to the United States.

    “We built a city to house almost 13,000 guests,” said Col. Jen McDonough, deputy commander for sustainment at Fort McCoy, where about 1,600 service members are tasked with ensuring the massive operation runs smoothly.

    On a recent warm autumn day here, refugees played a pickup game of soccer with soldiers, young children made arts and crafts with volunteers while their mothers studied English in an adjacent classroom, and families at a warehouse rummaged through boxes of donated underwear, shirts and jackets.

    Afghan evacuees said they were grateful for the warm reception they have received at the fort, but for many, the long wait has been grueling. None have left the base since arriving, unless they were green card holders or U.S. citizens.

    “I have asked many times about the date of departure,’’ said Farwardin Khorasani, 36, who was an interpreter at the U.S. embassy in Kabul. He fled Afghanistan with his wife and two young daughters and hopes to relocate to Sacramento. “We are jobless here and have nothing to do.”

    U.S. officials say the delays are a result of a measles outbreak, medical checks and a vaccination campaign, as well as the need to complete immigration processing, which involves interviews, biometric exams and applications for work permits. Most bases in the United States are at or near capacity, and Afghan evacuees waiting on bases in the Middle East, Spain and Germany can be flown in only once space opens up.

    A shortage of housing also is creating delays. Many families wish to settle where they already have friends or relatives, in places with existing Afghan communities such as California and the Washington, D.C., area. But officials have said that a dearth of affordable apartments could postpone their resettlement. On Thursday, Congress passed a short-term spending bill that included $6.3 billion to relocate and settle Afghan refugees.

    Gen. Glen D. VanHerck, commander of the United States Northern Command, which oversees the operation at Fort McCoy, said the military was prepared to accommodate arrivals on bases through the spring, giving the authorities time to work through the housing shortage.

    “We’ve built housing capacity and we are providing our Afghan guests the environment they need,” he said.

    One of the first priorities has been to inoculate evacuees against a variety of diseases.

    There have been 24 cases of measles, prompting a vaccination campaign against that illness, along with mumps, rubella and polio, an effort that is just winding down. People must wait at least 21 days after those vaccinations before receiving medical clearance to leave the bases.

    Almost 85 percent of all evacuees on bases have received the single-dose Johnson & Johnson vaccine against the coronavirus, and the rate of infection among the population is less than 1 percent, General VanHerck said.

    The bases also have seen crime, not unlike densely packed cities.

    Two Afghan evacuees are in federal custody; one has been charged with engaging in a sexual act with a minor and another charged with assaulting his spouse, both at Fort McCoy.

    The F.B.I. is investigating an assault on a female service member by Afghan men at Fort Bliss in El Paso. And in Quantico, Va., a military police officer on guard duty reported that he had observed a 24-year-old Afghan sexually assaulting a 3-year-old Afghan girl, according to a criminal complaint.

    General VanHerck said the military would “continue taking all necessary measures to ensure the safety” of both those working on the base and the Afghan evacuees. He said many reports to law enforcement were made by Afghans.

    The residents seen on a tightly controlled media tour of the base represented a cross-section of Afghan society.

    Among them was a group of 148 young women who hoped to finish their university education in the United States, and the principal of an international school. There was an Afghan Air Force pilot who had learned to fly UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters in Alabama and Texas.

    There were men and women from remote provinces, including a cook who had prepared food for soldiers in a far-flung outpost. Some people wore traditional Afghan attire. Others donned jeans and T-shirts. About half knew some English, but others would need to begin learning to read and write once they resettled in the United States, officials said.

    Farzana Mohammadi, a member of the Afghan women’s Paralympic basketball team who has been unable to walk since she had polio as a child, said she hoped to keep playing sports and to study psychology in Seattle.

    While optimistic about her own future, “I am only thinking all the time about my parents and younger sister,” said Ms. Mohammadi, 24, whose family was still in Kabul.

    About 50 to 60 people live in each two-story barracks, where single beds sit side-by-side. For privacy, families have improvised partitions using sheets.

    There are robust security details outside the living quarters, which are clustered into “communities,” each with a center where evacuees can get personal hygiene items or learn about activities, such as town halls with military leadership.

    “Grab and go” cafes offering tea, coffee and light snacks are bustling. But the eight self-service laundromats have been underutilized: Most Afghans have preferred to wash their clothing by hand and hang it out to dry on lines, which the military quickly erected.

    An imam certifies that meals served at four cafeterias are halal, but the lines to buy pizza at the base exchange often stretch outside.

    After weeks of being bottled up together with no timeline for leaving, there have been tensions among the residents. Fights often break out in the line to enter the cafeteria, and there are occasional arguments between people from different tribes.

    Several young single women said they were verbally harassed by Afghan men because they were on the base alone.

    “We were told, ‘How are you here without your male family member? We won’t tolerate this,’” recalled Nilab Ibrahimy, 23, who made it to the Kabul airport in a convoy of seven buses carrying the 148 students from the Asian University for Women, based in Bangladesh, where they had all been studying before the coronavirus outbreak stranded them in Kabul.

    Ms. Ibrahimy took the issue to the U.S. military leadership, and the entire group of students was moved to another barracks housing mainly single women. There have been no problems since, she and others said.

    Passing the time has been another challenge. “When we arrived here, we were sitting in our rooms doing nothing,” said Sepehra Azami, 25, who was studying economics before she fled.

    Ms. Azami, Ms. Ibrahimy and another friend, Batool Bahnam, asked some mothers whether they were interested in having their children learn basic conversational English: What is your name? How are you? Thank you.

    They were. Soon, adults began approaching the young women about lessons, too, and classes were added for women and men. “The demand is really high,” Ms. Azami said. “Families are struggling with language barriers.”

    Mounds of clothing have been donated to the refugees, but it took until last week for every evacuee to receive items.

    On Thursday, it was finally the turn of a 12-year-old boy named Nayatola. Dressed in a brown kurta pajama, he searched for clothes in his size. He ended up with an oversize white pullover. On his feet were the adult-size plastic slippers his father had brought from Afghanistan — Nayatola had no other shoes.

    As the day wore on, children could be seen outside doodling with chalk. When the visitors passed by, they called out. “Hello, how are you?” a few of them shouted, trying out their new English phrases.

    Abdulhadi Pageman, the former Afghan Air Force pilot, looked toward the warehouse where families were getting clothes. “These children are the future of the United States,” he said, talking about the children on the base. “They will be scientists, engineers. You just have to be patient.”

    https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/03/us/afghan-evacuees-military-bases.html?referringSource=articleShare

    #bases_militaires #réfugiés #asile #migrations #transit #Afghanistan #réfugiés_afghans #limbe

    –—

    A mettre en lien avec les pays qui ont accepté d’accueillir des #réfugiés_afghans sur demande des #Etats-Unis (#USA) et dans l’attente d’une #réinstallation (qui n’arrivera jamais ?). Métaliste ici :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/928551
    #pays_de_transit

    ping @isskein @karine4

  • The Temporary Hosting of Evacuated Afghans in Third Countries : Responsibility Sharing or Externalisation ?

    In the days after the Taliban took over Kabul, tens of thousands of people tried to escape Afghanistan through emergency airlift evacuations. Many sought passage to the United States (US), having been associated with the American presence in the country. Between the fall of the Afghan government on 15 August and the end of the US withdrawal on 31 August, tens of thousands of Afghans were able to flee the country among the nearly 130,000 people evacuated on US aircraft.

    However, not all of the Afghans landed on US soil. Instead, a range of other countries, with various levels of experience hosting refugees and some with no ties to the conflict in Afghanistan, announced that they would temporarily host evacuated Afghans on behalf of the US. As reported by the US State Department, this list now includes Albania, Bahrain, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, India, Kuwait, Mexico, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rwanda, Singapore, Uganda, and the United Arab Emirates. In addition, thousands of other Afghans transited or are still in one of the US military bases in the Middle East or in Europe. Altogether, these agreements represent an novel form of international cooperation: the provision of temporary protection in third states at US request, in the context of the largest emergency evacuation since the Kosovo crisis.

    While the Biden administration has not made explicit why it asked third countries to provide temporary refuge to evacuees, three main factors can explain this decision. First, these deals have bought the US government some time to run security screenings in these countries, before moving evacuees to US soil. While a number of the evacuated Afghans already applied for the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) or Priority 2 (P-2) programs,[1] the Biden administration initially needed more time to decide on the legal channels for all those who have not completed their application, as well as the at-risk Afghans who are not SIV or P-2 applicants. Lastly, some analysts have pointed that these arrangements with third countries were partly driven by political concerns, with the Administration worried about a public backlash if tens of thousands of Afghans landed on US soil simultaneously and without a thorough security vetting.

    This post sets out what we know about the situation of the Afghans who were evacuated to a third country (outside of a US military base), specifically looking at what living conditions, protection, and legal pathways to the US the evacuees have access to. The post finally discuss whether these agreements between the US and third countries should be understood as a form of responsibility sharing or externalisation of international protection.

    Temporary hosts

    So far, the group of states that have offered temporary protection to evacuated Afghans announced pledges ranging from 450 in Northern Macedonia, 2,000 in Uganda and 5,000 evacuees in Ecuador. But while governments have publicised these targets, there is limited information as to how many Afghans each country has received so far, and how many more people, including family members of evacuees, could be evacuated in the future.

    The nature of the agreements between the US and third countries has also been informal so far, mainly publicised through government press releases or media coverage. There are presently no signs of more detailed arrangements, suggesting they were negotiated hastily, with operational details being worked out after public announcement.

    At operational level, reception conditions for Afghans upon arrival vary from country to country, with evacuees being hosted in reception centres or ad hoc accommodation, including student housing and hotels. In Albania, for instance, the reception capacity for asylum seekers is limited overall but the government decided to open a separate mechanism to host the rescued Afghans.

    The budget and funding for these arrangements are yet to be made public, but the US government is presumably bearing the costs of reception and processing. However, in high-income countries like Canada or where the government is directly coordinating the operation, it remains unclear which state bears the costs for these arrangements.

    Finally, and critically, the duration of the arrangements remains unclear. The agreements for the purpose of transit through US military bases made clear that Afghan evacuees should not spend over 10 days in the third countries, including the United Arab Emirates or Germany. In contrast, the information available on the temporary hosting arrangements with third countries shows that these governments have not set a time limit, simply calling it a temporary mechanism. The Albanian government, for example, already shared that it expected the evacuees to stay for at least one year.

    Unanswered questions and emerging answers

    The procedure for Afghans in these third countries is yet to be clearly outlined, starting with the question of who was (and could be) sent there in the first place. Due to the chaotic situation at Kabul airport before 31 August, it is possible that evacuated Afghans were sent to US bases abroad or third countries more-or-less at random. But it is also likely that people who had already launched a SIV or P-2 application were sent to US military bases to be processed more quickly. Some anecdotal evidence also suggests that the distribution may be based on the occupation of the evacuees in Afghanistan. For instance, the North Macedonian government reported they would host people who previously worked with US-led international forces while the Albanian Prime Minister said they were focusing on Afghans who previously worked for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

    Second, it remains to be seen what status Afghans will enjoy in these third countries, and the implications for their rights, including reception conditions and freedom of movement. Albania, for instance, reported that it would grant evacuees temporary protection status, Kosovo announced they would get a one-year residence permit and North Macedonia provided them with a three-month visa.

    Third, there is limited information as to what will happen to evacuees after screenings in these third countries and how this procedure differs in nature and duration from a screening in the US or at a US military base abroad. It remains unclear, for example, how many of the evacuees in these third countries could benefit from the humanitarian parole scheme announced for 50,000 Afghans on 23 August, that allows access to the US on a temporary humanitarian residence permit. Other legal pathways to the US could be offered to these groups, but it remains to be seen what they would be and how long it would take for these options to materialize.

    The third country agreements seem to leave open the possibility that some Afghans could be granted a form of local integration in the host state as refugees or beneficiaries of other forms of international protection. While there has been little indication of such development in the third countries so far, 90 Afghans staying in a US base in Germany have applied for asylum there in the past week.

    Ultimately, one of the most pressing questions is what will happen to those evacuees who are ‘screened out’ by the US. The government insists that Afghans who do not pass the security vetting will not be allowed into the US, or may be deported if security concerns arise after their arrival on US soil. However, officials have not specified where these people will be sent.

    Of course, the US and third states are bound by the principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits the return of any person to a real risk of torture or other ill treatment at the hands of the Taliban. Some Afghans in third states may receive offers of local integration or an alternative resettlement country, though where they are rejected by the US on security grounds, it is difficult to imagine that any other country would want to assume this responsibility.

    Responsibility sharing or externalisation?

    The rapid emergence of these temporary protection agreements could be a sign of a new responsibility sharing mechanism for refugees, but it could also constitute another form of externalisation designed to prevent Afghan refugees from accessing US territory and protection. Given that these arrangements grew out of an emergency situation and were primarily agreed upon broad principles, their operationalization in the next few weeks should provide a definitive answer to this question.

    Responsibility sharing, on the one hand, is a principle of international refugee law emerging from the preamble to the 1951 Refugee Convention, which provides in part:

    the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations has recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without international co-operation

    The principle does not form part of the substantive obligations of the Convention, though a UNHCR expert roundtable on the principle recommends that cooperation must ‘enhance refugee protection and prospects for durable solutions’ and ‘must be in line with international refugee and human rights law’. The Global Compact on Refugees, a non-binding agreement passed by the United Nations General Assembly in 2018, has ‘more equitable sharing of the burden and responsibility for hosting and supporting the world’s refugees’ as its primary objective.

    Thus, one reading of the third country arrangements for Afghan refugees is as a new form of responsibility sharing, with a varied range of states, often with no prior links to Afghanistan, stepping up to host evacuees as a sign of international solidarity. This might neatly fit into what Durieux labels the ‘rescue paradigm’ as the provision of a safe haven by a collective of states. Many of these countries are from the Global South, with some like Colombia and Uganda already hosting very large refugee populations despite widely underfunded humanitarian and development responses. But even though these arrangements were born to a sense of global responsibility, it remains to be seen how the US will have to show its appreciation and payback.

    On the other hand, externalisation describes migration control policies carried out by high-income states outside their borders. Crisp previously defined externalisation as ‘measures taken by states in locations beyond their territorial borders to obstruct, deter or otherwise avert the arrival of refugees.’ UNHCR recently referred to ‘measures preventing asylum-seekers from entering safe territory and claiming international protection, or transfers of asylum-seekers and refugees to other countries without sufficient safeguards.’ While the term ‘externalisation’ does not appear in international refugee law, it has developed into an umbrella concept encompassing migration control measures intended to deter asylum seekers and refugees either extraterritorially or with extraterritorial effects.

    Another reading of these arrangements could then place them alongside existing externalisation efforts. Thus, rather than providing evacuees admission into its territory, the US government is using its diplomatic clout to delegate responsibility for Afghans to partner states. This is likely to raise serious challenges as without guarantees that evacuated Afghans will receive protection in the US, they could enter a form of legal limbo, with no status in the third country nor the US, and no possibility to return home.

    Conclusions

    It is too early to say whether the current US-led temporary protection arrangements for Afghan evacuees in third countries should be considered responsibility sharing, externalisation or even a third policy approach. What is clear is that the US government is still figuring out how these arrangements will be implemented. Ultimately, they will be assessed based on their impact on the rights of Afghans in need of protection, including their reception conditions and freedom of movement in third countries, the duration of their temporary hosting, the scale of admission to the US, and the provision of solutions for those who are not granted passage to the US.

    Many thanks to Camille Le Coz for her invaluable help in drafting this piece.

    [1] The SIV program grants those who worked with the American government of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) or a successor mission in Afghanistan legal status in the US. On August 2, the US government also announced a broader category, the Priority-2 refugee status, opened to a broader category of applicants such as Afghans who do not qualify for SIV but still worked for the US government or ISAF, Afghans who worked for a US-funded program, and Afghans who were employed by a US-based media organization or non-governmental organization.

    https://rli.blogs.sas.ac.uk/2021/09/15/the-temporary-hosting-of-evacuated-afghans-in-third-countries-responsibility-sharing-or-externalisation/#es_form_f1-n1

    #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #réfugiés_afghans #transit #pays_de_transit #Afghanistan #évacuation #réinstallation #responsabilité

    –—

    ajouté à la métaliste des pays qui ont accepté d’accueillir des #réfugiés_afghans sur demande des #Etats-Unis (#USA) et dans l’attente d’une #réinstallation (qui n’arrivera jamais ?)
    https://seenthis.net/messages/928551

  • Des trajectoires immobilisées : #protection et #criminalisation des migrations au #Niger

    Le 6 janvier dernier, un camp du Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les Réfugiés (HCR) situé à une quinzaine de kilomètres de la ville nigérienne d’Agadez est incendié. À partir d’une brève présentation des mobilités régionales, l’article revient sur les contraintes et les tentatives de blocage des trajectoires migratoires dans ce pays saharo-sahélien. Depuis 2015, les projets européens se multiplient afin de lutter contre « les causes profondes de la migration irrégulière ». La Belgique est un des contributeurs du Fonds fiduciaire d’urgence de l’Union européenne pour l’Afrique (FFUE) et l’agence #Enabel met en place des projets visant la #stabilisation des communautés au Niger

    http://www.liguedh.be/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Chronique_LDH_190_voies-sures-et-legales.pdf
    #immobilité #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Agadez #migrations #asile #réfugiés #root_causes #causes_profondes #Fonds_fiduciaire #mécanisme_de_transit_d’urgence #Fonds_fiduciaire_d’urgence_pour_l’Afrique #transit_d'urgence #OIM #temporaire #réinstallation #accueil_temporaire #Libye #IOM #expulsions_sud-sud #UE #EU #Union_européenne #mise_à_l'abri #évacuation #Italie #pays_de_transit #transit #mixed_migrations #migrations_mixtes #Convention_des_Nations_Unies_contre_la_criminalité_transnationale_organisée #fermeture_des_frontières #criminalisation #militarisation_des_frontières #France #Belgique #Espagne #passeurs #catégorisation #catégories #frontières #HCR #appel_d'air #incendie #trafic_illicite_de_migrants #trafiquants

    –----

    Sur l’incendie de janvier 2020, voir :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/816450

    ping @karine4 @isskein :
    Cette doctorante et membre de Migreurop, Alizée Dauchy, a réussi un super défi : résumé en 3 pages la situation dans laquelle se trouve le Niger...

    –---

    Pour @sinehebdo, un nouveau mot : l’#exodant
    –-> #vocabulaire #terminologie #mots

    Les origine de ce terme :

    Sur l’origine et l’emploi du terme « exodant » au Niger, voir Bernus (1999), Bonkano et Boubakar (1996), Boyer (2005a). Les termes #passagers, #rakab (de la racine arabe rakib désignant « ceux qui prennent un moyen de trans-port »), et #yan_tafia (« ceux qui partent » en haoussa) sont également utilisés.

    https://www.reseau-terra.eu/IMG/pdf/mts.pdf

  • Counter-mapping: cartography that lets the powerless speak | Science | The Guardian
    https://www.theguardian.com/science/blog/2018/mar/06/counter-mapping-cartography-that-lets-the-powerless-speak

    Sara is a 32-year-old mother of four from Honduras. After leaving her children in the care of relatives, she travelled across three state borders on her way to the US, where she hoped to find work and send money home to her family. She was kidnapped in Mexico and held captive for three months, and was finally released when her family paid a ransom of $190.

    Her story is not uncommon. The UN estimates that there are 258 million migrants in the world. In Mexico alone, 1,600 migrants are thought to be kidnapped every month. What is unusual is that Sara’s story has been documented in a recent academic paper that includes a map of her journey that she herself drew. Her map appears alongside four others – also drawn by migrants. These maps include legends and scales not found on orthodox maps – unnamed river crossings, locations of kidnapping and places of refuge such as a “casa de emigrante” where officials cannot enter. Since 2011, such shelters have been identified by Mexican law as “spaces of exception”.

    #cartographie_radicale #contre_cartographie #cartographie_participative #cartoexperiment

  • 21.11.2018 – UE - Tunisie - Conseil d’association - Priorités stratégiques

    Décision n° 1/2018 du Conseil d’association UE-Tunisie du 9 novembre 2018 adoptant les priorités stratégiques UE-Tunisie pour la période 2018-2020

    (...)

    Consolider le partenariat privilégié UE-Tunisie : priorités stratégiques pour la période 2018-2020

    (...)

    2.3. Rapprochement entre les peuples, mobilité et migration

    Le rapprochement entre les sociétés tunisiennes et européennes constitue un pilier essentiel du partenariat privilégié, à travers le renforcement des échanges entre peuples, sociétés et cultures. Cette dimension mobilité revêt une importance particulière dans la mise en œuvre du partenariat pour la Jeunesse. La mise en œuvre effective de l’association de la Tunisie à Horizon 2020 et sa participation à Europe Créative et Erasmus+ seront les pierres angulaires de ces efforts.

    La gestion concertée de la migration est une priorité politique, tant pour la Tunisie que pour l’Union européenne. Les deux parties s’engagent à intensifier le dialogue et la coopération, notamment par la mise en œuvre du partenariat pour la mobilité, le renforcement de la lutte contre les causes profondes de la migration irrégulière, ainsi qu’une disponibilité européenne pour soutenir la mise en place d’un système d’asile tunisien. Cette coopération, qui reflétera aussi la dimension régionale de ces problématiques, inclura :

    -- la mise en œuvre de la stratégie nationale tunisienne en matière de migration, couvrant également l’asile et la protection internationale, y inclus la mise en œuvre d’un cadre législatif approprié,

    -- la conclusion des négociations d’accords de réadmission et de facilitation des visas,

    -- la bonne gouvernance de la migration légale, par une meilleure coordination avec les États membres de l’Union européenne dans le respect de leurs compétences, y compris à travers la mise en place de schémas pilotes de mobilité et une meilleure intégration des migrants dans les pays hôtes,

    --

    le soutien à la mobilisation des Tunisiens de l’étranger pour les investissements dans les secteurs innovants en Tunisie,

    -- le soutien à la prévention de la migration irrégulière, en particulier par une meilleure prise en compte des questions migratoires dans les stratégies de développement ; ceci passe également par une gestion des frontières renforcée et par des campagnes de sensibilisation sur les risques de la migration irrégulière,

    -- le soutien aux activités de prévention, et de lutte contre le trafic des migrants et la traite des êtres humains, y compris à travers la détection et la poursuite des réseaux criminels, et

    -- la consolidation de la coopération en matière de retour et réadmission, y compris à travers le soutien à la réinsertion durables des Tunisiens de retour.

    –-> https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2018.293.01.0039.01.FRA&toc=OJ:L:2018:293:TOC

    http://www.europeanmigrationlaw.eu/fr/articles/actualites/ue-tunisie-conseil-d-association-priorites-strategiques.html
    #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Tunisie #EU #UE #Europe

    Commentaire de Claudia Charles sur la mailing-list Migreurop :

    En complément du message envoyé par Alizée, voici un article sur la décision n° 1/2018 du conseil d’association (en vertu de l’#accord_d'association UE - Tunisie) "adoptant les priorités stratégiques UE - Tunisie pour la période 2018 - 2020

    Le point sur « rapprochement entre les peuples, mobilité et migration » se résume (rien de nouveau) à l’adoption, par la Tunisie, d’une réglementation en matière de migration et d’asile, des mesurettes concernant la mobilité (ce qui était déjà dit à multiples occasions et enceintes (processus de Rabat, Sommet de Malte, FFU, partenariat pour la mobilité), et les #accords_de_réadmission / facilitation de #visa.

    L’#OIM aura sa part du gâteau : « la consolidation de la coopération en matière de retour et #réadmission, y compris à travers le soutien à la #réinsertion durables des Tunisiens de retour. »

    #IOM #retours #renvois #expulsions

    ping @_kg_

    • L’émigration irrégulière : Conception de l’opération et parade

      L’émigration vers l’Europe n’est pas un phénomène nouveau en Tunisie car elle date depuis 1970. Par contre, l’émigration irrégulière (la #Harga) entre les côtes tunisiennes et italiennes a commencé en 1990 lorsque l’#Italie a ratifié les accords #Schengen imposant ainsi des #visas d’entrée pour les ressortissants tunisiens.

      Une étude élaborée par le Forum tunisien des droits économiques et sociaux (FTDES) montre qu’avant la révolution de 2011, 30% des Tunisiens de moins de 35 ans exprimaient le désir de migrer vers l’Europe. En raison de la #crise_économique qui ne cesse de frapper le pays durant la période de transition démocratique, ce chiffre a grimpé à 54% en 2017.

      La recrudescence de l’#émigration clandestine à partir de 2015 s’est traduite par des chiffres très alarmants. En effet, 119.369 migrants sont arrivés en Italie en 2017 alors que le nombre de victimes en 2016 est de 5000 selon un rapport publié par les Nations Unies.

      Face à cette situation préoccupante, l’Europe cherche à coordonner avec les #pays_de_transit en vue de trouver une solution à ce quelle considère une menace asymétrique qui pèse sur la sécurité de l’Occident.

      Aujourd’hui, les causes de l’émigration irrégulière sont connues et toute solution au problème doit passer par une combinaison de mesures politiques, économiques, sociales et sécuritaires.
      Sachant que les mesures politiques et socio-économiques ont fait l’objet de plusieurs études, le présent article est consacré à l’explication du volet opérationnel de l’émigration irrégulière. Une explication sans laquelle toute mesure sécuritaire reste incomplète et non concluante.

      Ainsi, après une présentation succincte de l’importance géographique de la Tunisie qui fait du pays un tremplin pour l’Europe, je prendrai en détails la conception de l’opération d’émigration clandestine avant de proposer les actions à entreprendre pour interdire ou contrer cette opération.

      1. Importance géographique de la Tunisie

      Selon une carte tracée par l’Union Européenne, les flux de l’émigration clandestine à destination de l’Europe suivent trois routes en mer méditerranéenne : La route occidentale qui passe par Gibraltar, la route centrale qui passe par la Tunisie et la Libye (carte nr1) et la route orientale qui passe par la Turquie et la mer Egée.

      Sur cette route centrale, la Tunisie occupe une place privilégiée. En effet, située sur le canal de Sicile qui constitue un pont entre l’Afrique et l’Europe et marquée par des conditions météorologiques clémentes sur la quasi-totalité de l’année, elle offre plusieurs possibilités pour rallier l’Italie (carte nr2) :

      Au nord, on trouve deux routes : La Galite-La Sardaigne (130 km) et Bizerte-Mazzara (175km).
      le nord-est présente trois options : Kélébia-Pantelleria (70km), Al Hawaria-Mazzara (160km) et Béni Khiar-Lampedusa (195km).
      au sud, trois autres itinéraires vers Lampedusa : à partir de Chebba (135km), de Kerkennah (140km) et de Zarzis (250km).

      En outre, la Tunisie est devenue le seul pays de transit après la fermeture des routes partant de la Libye. En effet, le flux d’émigrés à partir de ce pays a significativement tari suite à la signature d’un mémorandum d’entente le 2 février 2017 entre Rome et Tripoli (appuyé par les dirigeants européens dans la déclaration de Malte). Aux termes de cet accord, l’Italie doit coopérer avec les forces armées et les garde-frontières libyennes afin de juguler l’afflux de migrants illégaux. Un dispositif a été alors mis en place et 20.000 émigrants ont été interceptés en 2017 et reconduits en Libye, dans des centres de détention. Ainsi, le flux venant essentiellement des pays du Sahel africain a basculé sur le territoire tunisien.
      2. Déroulement d’une opération d’émigration clandestine

      De prime abord, il est à signaler que Les voyages clandestins sont organisés par des réseaux criminels. Le trafic est devenu transnational et apporte beaucoup d’argent. Une étude publiée par le journal d’actualités américain « The Christian Science Monitor » souligne « l’apparition de groupes mafieux d’envergure internationale italiens, albanais, libyens et autres » qui se livrent à ce trafic et gagnent 400 milliards de dollars à travers leurs actions qui englobent toute la région. Selon la même étude, Le candidat à l’émigration clandestine à partir de la Tunisie doit dépenser entre 3000 et 8000 dinars.
      L’organisation d’une opération d’émigration irrégulière passe par trois phases :
      2.1. La phase de recrutement

      Il s’agit de se servir d’agents et intermédiaires pour chercher et d’identifier les postulants à l’émigration sur le territoire national. Les quartiers pauvres et les zones grises du pays sont visés en priorité. Le contact se fait soit directement de bouche à l’oreille dans les cafés et les lieux publics soit par internet et notamment à travers les réseaux sociaux. Ceux qui viennent des pays étrangers sont recrutés et regroupés dans les pays limitrophes avant de les transférer par des passeurs en Tunisie.
      2.2. La phase de préparation logistique

      Tout d’abord, il faut trouver des caches (locaux) où regrouper les postulants au voyage et stocker des vivres pour subvenir à leur besoin durant la période d’attente. Ensuite, on prévoit le moyen de transport. Il est généralement un moyen vétuste acheté à moindre coût pour effectuer un aller sans retour (canot pneumatique, embarcation ou un vieux chalutier). Ce moyen est dépourvu de tout équipement de sécurité, de navigation et de communication. Enfin, le chef de réseau doit coordonner avec ses agents locaux et ses pairs à l’étranger pour fixer les moyens et les procédures nécessaires pour passer et/ou diriger les émigrés sur le lieu du regroupement. Cette phase englobe aussi une collecte de renseignement sur les dispositifs de sécurité déployés sur le théâtre de l’opération.
      2.3. Phase de préparation du transit

      C’est la phase la plus importante car elle fait appel à une bonne expérience pour choisir l’itinéraire, la période propice au voyage et le passeur (patron) qui sera chargé de la traversée.

      2.3.1. Choix de l’itinéraire : Le choix de la route doit prendre en compte la caractéristique physique du milieu marin, la sûreté du transit et le temps mis pour la traversée :

      La route La Galite-La Sardaigne est relativement longue (130km). Elle traverse une zone connue par la faible densité du trafic maritime et le mauvais temps. Elle est donc favorable à la détection radar (difficulté de dissimulation) et défavorable à la navigation des petites embarcations.
      Les deux routes à destination de Mazzara à partir de Bizerte (175km) et de Hawaria (160km) sont similaires. Elles sont longues et traversent une zone de séparation de trafic par laquelle passe plusieurs centaines de navires par jour. La zone est caractérisée par des courants giratoires relativement forts. Elle est donc favorable à la dissimulation mais défavorable à la navigation des petites embarcations.
      La route Kélébia-Pantellaria est la plus courte (70km). Cependant, elle est risquée en raison des patrouilles, de la couverture radar et du dispositif de sécurité mis en place par les autorités italiennes.
      La route Béni Khiar-Lampedusa (195km) est longue et traverse une zone peu fréquentée sur une grande partie de l’année. Elle est donc très défavorable à l’emploi des embarcations pneumatiques qui sont handicapées par le manque d’autonomie et le mode de propulsion.
      Les deux routes à destination de Lampedusa à parir de Chebba (135km) et de Kerkenah (140km) sont très similaires. Elles ont la même distance et traversent la zone de pêche réservée délimitée par l’isobathe de 50m (la zone verte sur la carte nr3). C’est une zone de haut fond qui s’étend jusqu’aux approches de Lampedusa. Cette zone est très hospitalière pour les petits navires. Elle est fréquentée par plusieurs milliers de chalutiers et embarcations. L’environnement est donc très favorable à la navigation et la dissimulation.

      La route Zarzis-Lampedusa est la plus longue (250km). L’emploi de petites embarcations sur cette route est très risqué à moins qu’elles soient utilisées comme relais pour rallier une plate-forme plus grande stationnée au large (navire ou chalutier).

      2.3.2. Le critère de compétence : Les iles Kerkennah se distinguent par le nombre de compétences (des anciens pêcheurs) qui coopèrent avec les réseaux criminels. Ces pêcheurs reconvertis en passeurs sont chargés de la traversée. Cette reconversion s’explique par une pollution maritime qui a mis ces gens de mer au chômage. En effet, les déchets chimiques provenant des industriels dont notamment Thyna Petroleum Services (TPS) et Petrofac ont dégradé l’environnement marin détruisant ainsi la faune marine (poissons, poulpes et éponges). victime de cette pollution et de la pêche illicite, la mer n’est plus généreuse comme au bon vieux temps. D’après The Christian Science Monitor, “les pêcheurs gagnaient jusqu’à 40$ - 100$ par jour (entre 100 et 250 dinars tunisiens). Maintenant, ils ont du mal à gagner 4 à 7$ (entre 10 et 17 dinars) par jour”. Ils ce sont alors livrés aux contrebondiers et leurs embarcations sont vendues aux réseaux criminels à un coût qui fait trois fois le prix réel.

      C’est cette qualité de pêcheur qui explique l’enrôlement des Kerkéniens dans les réseaux de trafic de migrants. Les statistiques du ministère de l’intérieur montrent que la majorité des patrons d’embarcations arrêtés lors des opérations avortées sont originaires de l’archipel.

      2.3.3. Le choix de la période et lieu d’embarquement :

      C’est le critère le plus important pour décider de l’exécution de l’opération. Tout s’explique par la force et la direction du vent. Une étude élaborée par l’Institut Tunisien des Etudes Stratégiques ( ITES) montre des chiffres très significatifs tirés à partir des opérations avortées en 2017 :

      le gouvernorat de Sfax est classé premier sur la liste avec 62 opérations suivi par Nabeul (34 opérations), Bizerte (24 opérations) et Zarzis (11 opérations). En outre, les statistiques montrent que 60% de ces opérations sont effectuées pendant les mois de septembre et d’octobre, 14% pendant juin et juillet. Le reste (26%) est réparti sur toute l’année. Ceci s’explique par la force et la direction (moyenne sur toute l’année) du vent dans ces régions (voir tableau).
      En effet, dans la région de Sfax, le vent atteint sa force la plus faible durant septembre et octobre (inférieur à 10 km/h). Il souffle du secteur Est engendrant de petites vagues qui ne gênent pas le mouvement des embarcations qui naviguent bout au vent (face au vent). Les accidents qui surviennent durant cette période sont causés essentiellement par un manque de stabilité en raison d’un excès de chargement. Ces caractéristiques du vent qui s’ajoutent aux caractéristiques physiques de l’environnement et aux compétences des pêcheurs font de Kerkénah le port préféré pour l’embarquement.
      Le fait que Nabeul et Bizerte occupent respectivement la deuxième et la troisième place s’explique par le vent du secteur Ouest qui souffle sur ces régions et qui pousse les embarcations (vent arrière) sur les côtes de Pantellaria et Mazzara. Les itinéraires partant de la Galite vers la Sardaigne et de Béni Khiar vers Lampeduza, qui sont déjà discriminés par le facteur physique, sont écartés en raison du vent très défavorable (vent de travers).
      La place occupée par Zarzis (4ème place) s’explique uniquement par sa proximité des frontières libyennes et par le vent modéré qui domine la région.

      3. Comment lutter contre le fléau ?

      Tout d’abord, il faut signaler que nos voisins européens déploient leur force (Opération Sofia) sur nos frontières et cherchent à s’ingérer dans nos affaires intérieures sous prétexte de lutter contre l’immigration clandestine. Plusieurs déclarations de responsables européens rentrent dans ce sens :

      Le 15 février 2011, le ministre de l’intérieur italien Roberto Maroni propose de déployer des policiers italiens en Tunisie. Le 9 avril de la même année, il parle de « débarquement » de 22.000 Tunisiens sur les côtes italiennes.
      Le 26 mai 2011, le député maire de Nice, Christian Estrosi, déclare “On constate aussi qu’une partie d’entre eux (les imigrés) – et cela est plus grave – appartiennent aux 10 000 délinquants condamnés et évadés des prisons.”
      Le 3 juin 2018, le nouveau ministre italien de l’Intérieur Matteo Salvini déclare « Il y a de plus en plus de migrants clandestins qui arrivent de Tunisie ici. Ce ne sont pas des réfugiés de guerre mais bien souvent des délinquants et ex-détenus. »
      Dans son projet de rapport 2018/2044(INI), la commission spéciale sur le terrorisme demande au parlement européen « que le mandat de l’opération #EUNAVFOR_MED Sophia soit étendu et que sa portée territoriale soit élargie afin de mieux répondre à l’évolution des schémas migratoires tels que les débarquements fantômes en provenance de la Tunisie, et que la lutte contre le terrorisme soit spécifiquement couverte par son mandat ». Elle propose aussi de « saisir Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU en vue d’adopter une résolution permettant à Sophia d’accéder aux eaux territoriales des États côtiers afin d’effectuer des contrôles sur les navires suspects ».
      Ensuite, il faut appliquer les textes juridiques propres à la matière :
      le Protocole contre le trafic illicite de migrants par terre, air et mer, additionnel à la Convention des Nations unies contre la criminalité transnationale organisée en 2000.
      notre réglementation intérieure en matière de lutte contre l’émigration clandestine et notamment la loi du 3 février 2004 relative à la traite des personnes et au trafic des migrants.
      Les accords bilatéraux (avec la France et l’Italie) concernant les migrants.

      Sur le plan opérationnel, la lutte doit se baser sur deux volets ; le renseignement et l’intervention. Le renseignement est la seule solution pour compenser le manque de moyens matériels dont souffrent nos unités.

      Aujourd’hui, l’intervention est handicapée par le manque d’unités navales et la diversité des intervenants en mer qui appartiennent aux différents ministères (marine nationale, garde maritime nationale et douane). Pour assurer notre souveraineté sur les espaces maritimes qui nous reviennent de droit et remplir nos missions en mer (dont la lutte contre l’émigration clandestine), il faut agir en deux directions :

      Adopter le concept de la sauvegarde maritime pour assurer la synergie des efforts entre tous les intervenants en mer,
      Déployer nos unités en fonction des impératifs du moment. A titre d’exemple, basculer des unités sur le port de Sfax, durant les mois de septembre et d’octobre pour couper la route à l’émigration clandestine entre Kerkennah et Lampedusa.

      Ainsi, ce sont quelques idées proposées aux décideurs pour les éclairer sur le coté opérationnel de l’émigration irrégulière. La guerre contre ce fléau ne peut être gagnée qu’avec la combinaison de mesures d’ordre économique et social.

      http://www.leaders.com.tn/article/25601-l-immigration-irreguliere-conception-de-l-operation-et-parade
      #émigration_irrégulière #migrations #asile #réfugiés #Tunisie #statistiques #chiffres #histoire #opération_sophia #externalisation
      ping @_kg_

    • Entre les années 2004 et 2014, le nombre de ressortissants non tunisiens résidant en Tunisie a évolué de 66%, passant de 35192 à 53490 personnes. Cela exclut toutefois les plus de 10’000 migrants subsahariens en situation irrégulière qui vivraient dans le pays et pour lesquels aucune statistique fiable et à jour n’est disponible, révèle la source.
      En réponse au manque d’informations sur la migration de l’Afrique subsaharienne vers la Tunisie et ses dynamiques les plus récentes, REACH et Mercy Corps ont voulu creuser la question et ont collecté entre le 9 août et le 2 septembre 2018 des données auprès des trois principaux centres de migration en Tunisie pour les migrants subsahariens à savoir Tunis, Sfax et Medenine.

      Chiffres à retenir :
      – Plus de 83% d’entre eux ont prévu de se rendre vers la Tunisie dès leur départ
      – Environ 14% entre d’eux sont motivés par les facilités de #visas
      – 1/3 des migrants subsahariens considèrent la Tunisie comme étant un tremplin
      – 1/3 des travailleurs subsahariens estime trouver des #emplois plus attractifs que dans leur pays d’origine
      – Près de la moitié des #étudiants subsahariens estiment que l’#éducation est de qualité
      – Ils sont peu nombreux ceux qui ont l’intention de rejoindre l’Europe clandestinement
      – Plus de 90% des interrogés sont venus en Tunisie par avion
      – 50% ont décidé de résider sur le Grand #Tunis
      – 3/4 des migrants subsahariens ont des difficultés d’accès au #permis_de_séjour
      – La majorité des migrants subsahariens envisagent de rester en Tunisie

      #pays_de_destination #pays_de_transit #migrations #statistiques #chiffres #travail

      Ces chiffres servent aussi à relativiser les #préjugés sur la #ruée_vers_l'Europe (v. notamment ici la référence au livre de #Stéphen_Smith : https://seenthis.net/messages/673774), l’#invasion et l’ #afflux...

  • Sudan — Ethiopian and Somali Migrants in Transit Desk Review Report (April 2018)

    this snapshot only focuses on Somali and Ethiopian migrants in transit, more precisely in Sudan. Different field locations for data collection activities were chosen and Sudan was selected as one of the transit countries. Sudan was chosen as case study under this project because of its geographical and strategic significance in the context of migration journeys from Ethiopia and Somalia towards Europe. Significant numbers of migrants from the Horn of Africa (in particular from Ethiopia and Somalia) travelling by land are known to travel through Sudan as a transit country. Available estimates of the numbers of Ethiopians going to Sudan each year range from 18,000 up to 100,000. A total of 1,197 interviews with migrants from Somalia and Ethiopia were conducted in Sudan between late November 2017 and the end of December 2017. Data was collected in the area of Khartoum, Sudan.The sample size consisted of 403 Somali and 794 Ethiopian migrants who had recently migrated from their home countries and were, at the time of data collection, passing through Sudan to reach their intended destination country in Europe.

    https://displacement.iom.int/reports/sudan-%E2%80%94-ethiopian-and-somali-migrants-transit-desk-review-
    #Soudan #réfugiés_éthiopiens #réfugiés_somaliens #réfugiés #asile #migrations #rapport #Corne_de_l'Afrique #statistiques #chiffres #transit #push-factors #facteurs_push #pays_de_transit

  • Migrants et réfugiés : la #Bosnie-Herzégovine, nouveau #pays_de_transit ?

    La « #route_des_Balkans » est fermée depuis mars 2016, mais de plus en plus de réfugiés et migrants traversent la Bosnie-Herzégovine pour se rendre en Croatie avant de rejoindre les pays de l’Europe occidentale.

    https://www.courrierdesbalkans.fr/Bosnie-Herzeovine-refugies
    #Bosnie #transit #parcours_migratoires #itinéraires_migratoires #routes_migratoires #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Balkans #nouvelle_route_des_balkans

    • Migrants take new Balkan route through Bosnia

      A new Balkan route through Bosnia has opened up for migrants, four years after a crisis in which more than one million people landed on Europe’s shores.

      Hundreds of thousands of people fleeing war and poverty in the Middle East, Asia and Africa, took the so-called Balkans route northwest of Greece in 2015 and 2016.

      The route was effectively closed in March 2016 and until recently the few still making the journey avoided Bosnia and its mountains.

      Instead they opted for a route through Serbia before dodging the Croatian and Hungarian authorities in order to make it into the European Union (EU).

      But now an alternative migrants’ itinerary from Greece through Albania, Montenegro and Bosnia has emerged.

      The route, according to a western diplomatic source, matches the one taken by arms and drugs traffickers, indicating that human smuggling networks have been established.

      – Thousands paid to people smugglers -

      One migrant Ahmed Wessam, who spoke to AFP in Sarajevo, left the northeastern Syrian town of Hassake a month ago having paid people smugglers to get him to Europe.

      “A thousand dollars (800 euros) to go from Turkey to Greece, a thousand euros to go from Greece to Albania and so on,” Wessam told AFP.

      According to Bosnian authorities, since the beginning of the year 700 migrants have entered the country illegally and almost 800 were intercepted at the border.

      Most of them are Syrians, Pakistanis, Libyans or Afghans.

      The authorities fear that the end of the cold weather could spell a big hike in numbers.

      “We have no capacity to accept thousands of refugees... although they do not want to stay in Bosnia,” Prime Minister Denis Zvizdic said recently.

      Head of the medical charity Doctors Without Borders (MSF) in the Balkans Stephane Moissaing dismissed concerns of a repeat of the 2015 migrant crisis.

      However, the Bosnian authorities should “handle (the situation) in a humane way, so it does not become a real humanitarian crisis”, he said.

      The country’s current reception capacities are limited to a centre for asylum-seekers near Sarajevo, with space for just 154 people.

      The situation “gets complicated,” Bosnian Security Minister Dragan Mektic admitted recently, stating that there were currently between 45,000 and 50,000 migrants between Greece and Bosnia, many of whom might try their luck through Bosnia.

      The border with Croatia, an EU member state, is 1,000 kilometres (600 miles) long and Sarajevo has only 2,000 border police officers.

      According to Nidzara Ahmetasevic, a volunteer working with migrants in Sarajevo, the number of migrants in the country “is at least double” what the official figures show.

      “We are in contact with more than 300 people. We have found a solution (in terms of accommodation) for some 50, but we could fill two more houses of that size,” she said.

      – Baby due -

      Initially intended to be a hostel in a Sarajevo suburb, the large building where Wessam and his relatives have been staying has individual rooms equipped with toilets.

      The house was made available by a Bosnian who lives abroad.

      Samira Samadi, 35, another migrant staying there, left the central Iranian town of Ispahan in early 2017 along with her husband.

      She takes advantage of an MSF doctor’s visit to check if her pregnancy is proceeding well.

      “I want to go to Germany but... because of my wife’s pregnancy we can’t continue,” her husband Anoush Orak said.

      “We will probably wait here for the birth of our child.”

      The couple have already tried to illegally enter Croatia but the snow and forests put them off.

      Wessam, however, will depart in a “week, maybe 10 days”.

      “I do not know how to cross the border but we will try and retry. We have already crossed many times,” he said.

      http://www.digitaljournal.com/news/world/migrants-take-new-balkan-route-through-bosnia/article/518216

    • Migrants en Bosnie-Herzégovine : l’appel à l’aide de #Bihać

      Confrontés à la fermeture des frontières des Balkans, les candidats à l’exil tentent de trouver des routes alternatives. Depuis plusieurs mois, la Bosnie-Herzégovine fait ainsi face à une très forte hausse des passages illégaux. Le maire de Bihać, à la frontière croate, lance un S.O.S : la situation est hors de contrôle dans sa ville.

      Depuis le début de l’année, Bihać fait face à une hausse exponentielle d’arrivées de migrants. Située au nord-ouest de la Bosnie-Herzégovine, cette ville de 50 000 habitants se trouve en effet tout près de la frontière avec la Croatie, porte d’entrée dans l’Union européenne.

      La municipalité tente d’apporter son aide, mais elle n’a pas les capacités pour accueillir ces centaines de migrants. Face à l’urgence, le maire a fini par lancer un appel à l’aide il y a quelques jours. « Nous cherchons une solution car nous ne pouvons plus gérer la situation », a expliqué Šuhret Fazlić. « Les gens s’installent dans les parcs, dans la rue et entrent dans les bâtiments désaffectés. Nous ne pouvons plus attendre, la situation menace de devenir une catastrophe humanitaire. »

      « À Bihać, nous avons connu la guerre, la faim et l’isolement. Nous ne pouvons pas détourner le regard, nous sommes face à un problème sécuritaire. Des cas de maltraitance ont été constatés », s’inquiète le maire. Les autorités au niveau national, compétentes pour les questions migratoires, continuent pourtant d’ignorer les appels à l’aide des autorités locales. Selon le Haut-Commissariat des Nations unies pour les Réfugiés (UNHCR), plus de 500 migrants ont été enregistrés à Bihać ces derniers jours.

      Lors d’un entretien avec l’ambassadrice slovène en Bosnie-Herzégovine, le Premier ministre du canton d’#Una-Sana, auquel est rattachée Bihać, a déclaré qu’il n’y aurait dans la région « ni construction, ni mise en place de camps ou de centres d’accueil pour les réfugiés ». Selon le ministère de l’Intérieur du canton d’Una-Sana, la police croate renverrait illégalement les migrants vers la Bosnie-Herzégovine.

      https://www.courrierdesbalkans.fr/Migrants-Bihac

    • Le UNHCR appelle la Bosnie-Herzégovine à augmenter ses capacités d’accueil

      29 avril 2018 – 21h30 Le Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies aux réfugiés (UNHCR) appelé les autorités de Bosnie-Herzégovine à augmenter leurs capacités d’accueil en raison du nombre croissants de migrants et de réfugiés qui traversent le pays et qui, pour certains, veulent y demander l’asile. Pour l’instant, il existe un seul centre d’accueil pour les demandeurs d’asile, à Delijaš près de Trnovo, avec une capacité de 150 lits. Un autre centre pourrait ouvrir à Salakovac, près de Mostar, avec une capacité d’accueil de 100 à 120 lits. Le UNHCR a déjà investi 500 000 marks (environ 250 000 euros) pour sa réhabilitation.

      https://www.courrierdesbalkans.fr/les-dernieres-infos-nuit-violences-lesbos

    • Che cosa sta succedendo in Bosnia?

      Da dicembre dell’anno scorso, la Bosnia è stata testimone di un flusso di persone sempre crescente in fuga dalla guerra. I volontari, quotidianamente presenti sul campo, sono molto preoccupati per il fatto che l’assenza e la mancanza di una risposta da parte delle istituzioni e delle organizzazioni non governative possa portare ad un tracollo della situazione.

      La Bosnia sta diventando la parte finale del collo della bottiglia lungo quella che potrebbe essere definita la nuova “rotta balcanica” di cui questo Paese non ha mai fatto parte. Si tratta di uno stato povero, uscito da pochi anni dalla guerra, circondato da montagne aspre e di difficile accesso, per terreni ancora pieni di mine anti-uomo. Nonostante tutto, è diventato un Paese di transito per i migranti che, nel tentativo di evitare la violenza della polizia ungherese e i respingimenti della polizia croata, più volte documentati da Are You Syrious, hanno intrapreso la via bosniaca.

      Secondo i dati dell’UNHCR, nelle prime due settimane di aprile sono stati registrati 13 casi di respingimenti dalla Bosnia verso la Serbia. I volontari che da un anno stanno documentando le violenze al confine serbo-ungherese sono pronti a spostarsi lungo il confine con la Bosnia per monitorare la situazione. Per il momento il confine tra la Bosnia e la Croazia, lungo 900 km, è a corto di personale e questo rende ancora facile l’attraversamento. Tuttavia, proprio questa settimana, l’UE ha deciso di stanziare nuovi fondi per aumentare il pattugliamento lungo le frontiere anche se non si sa bene dove verranno intensificati i controlli. Secondo quanto dichiarato da Dragan Mektić, il ministro della sicurezza in Bosnia Erzegovina, per proteggere i confini, servirebbero almeno 500 poliziotti di frontiera.

      Una pericolosa assenza da parte del governo e delle ong

      Il governo bosniaco ha dichiarato che non è in grado di farsi carico di un numero crescente di rifugiati. A febbraio Borislav Bojić, presidente della commissione parlamentare per i diritti umani, aveva avvertito che i fondi stanziati per la crisi migratoria sarebbero finiti a fine maggio. Tuttavia, recentemente, ha dichiarato di riuscire a gestire la situazione.

      Nell’unico centro per l’asilo a Delijaš vicino a Sarajevo, ci sono circa 160 posti, ovviamente costantemente occupati. Secondo quanto si legge nel rapporto pubblicato da Human Rights Watch, il governo, assieme ai partner internazionali, dovrebbe impegnarsi perché i diritti umani e la legge sui rifugiati vengano rispettati. Tuttavia nella realtà la situazione è molto preoccupante nonostante le dichiarazioni del rappresentante dell’Organizzazione Internazionale delle Migrazioni in Bosnia Erzegovina. “Stiamo fornendo supporto al governo per quanto riguarda la crisi migratoria nel Paese, nel rafforzamento delle capacità istituzionali, nel supporto alla polizia di frontiera e nell’assistenza diretta ai rifugiati”.

      L’UNHCR ha iniziato a fornire un contributo per alloggiare le persone negli ostelli e l’OIM ha iniziato a collaborare con i volontari per l’assistenza medica, fino ad ora gestita interamente con fondi e donazioni private. Molti migranti hanno denunciato il fatto che negli alloggi dell’UNHCR ricevono solo un pasto al giorno e alcuni si sono trasferiti nei posti messi a disposizione dei volontari.

      La complessità del sistema di asilo

      Il sistema di asilo in Bosnia Erzegovina impedisce alle persone di ottenere un riconoscimento del proprio status perché ci sono regole impossibili da rispettare. Quando una persona arriva in Bosnia, deve esprimere l’intenzione di chiedere asilo alla polizia di frontiera o al Ministero degli affari esteri. Successivamente ha 14 giorni per registrare la propria domanda di asilo. Questa procedura, tuttavia, può essere effettuata solo da coloro che si trovano nell’unico centro per l’asilo a Delijaš. Tutti gli altri invece vengono automaticamente esclusi, perché per fare la richiesta di asilo completa, è necessario presentare i documenti relativi alla propria residenza, attestazioni impossibili da ottenere per chi è fuori dal sistema di accoglienza ufficiale. I volontari, che gestiscono diverse case a Sarajevo, stanno cercando di capire, con l’aiuto dell’OIM, come poter registrare i migranti in modo che non vengano accusati di risiedere illegalmente nel Paese. Il governo bosniaco ha iniziato a diffondere illazioni sul fatto che le persone che arrivano sono richiedenti asilo falsi in quanto non desiderano fermarsi nel Paese. Nello stesso tempo però in Bosnia non esiste una legge che permette a queste persone di risiedervi legalmente. Potrebbe trattarsi di una mossa da parte del governo per accusare i volontari di aiutare persone non regolarmente registrate.

      Il sostegno da parte della popolazione locale

      Nonostante questa propaganda di stato, la mancanza di una risposta istituzionale e di un sistema di asilo adeguato, la popolazione locale è amichevole e si spende quotidianamente per aiutare le persone in transito. Molti di loro sono testimoni diretti degli orrori della recente guerra in Bosnia.

      In un parco di Sarajevo, c’è una costante distribuzione di cibo gestita dai locali. Nella più grande delle case gestite dai volontari, a circa 30 minuti dal centro di Sarajevo, gli abitanti consegnano ogni giorno donazioni. Inoltre i volontari organizzano distribuzioni quotidiane di cibo, di giorno e di notte, per assicurarsi che chi dorme per strada abbia almeno un sacco a pelo, coperte e qualcosa da mangiare.

      Molte persone, in tarda serata, prendono l’autobus per Bihać e Velika Kladuša, due città vicino al confine con la Croazia, con l’obiettivo di provare a valicare la frontiera. In entrambe le città i locali danno cibo e sostegno alle persone. In questi luoghi non sono disponibili aiuti medici da parte delle grandi ong, e l’intero sistema è totalmente gestito dalla gente locale.

      A Velika Kladuša, i volontari di AYS hanno anche scoperto che un ristorante locale sta cucinando pasti gratuiti per le persone. Quando la settimana scorsa i responsabili della Croce Rossa sono arrivata in questo paese, i locali hanno detto loro che era da novembre che stavano gestendo da soli la situazione e che era meglio che andassero via.

      La più grande ong umanitaria della Bosnia, Pomozi.ba, invierà cinque tonnellate di cibo raccolto dai locali a Velika Kladuša. La relazione per ora pacifica tra i rifugiati e gli abitanti del luogo è un equilibrio fragile e la mancanza di risposta istituzionale, col perpetrarsi e il deteriorarsi della situazione, potrebbe diventare un problema.

      Qual è la prospettiva futura?

      Per ora nessuno sa come si svilupperà la situazione nel Paese e quante persone attraverseranno la Bosnia il mese prossimo. Le autorità si aspettano che il numero degli arrivi aumenterà e che, con l’avvicinarsi dell’estate, ci sarà la necessità di un maggiore accesso alle strutture igieniche come le docce. L’ong Medici Senza Frontiere sta discutendo con Pomozi.ba su alcune possibili soluzioni e sullo stanziamento di nuovi fondi, in particolari nei due paesi di confine, Velika Kladuša e Bihac, ma devono ancora essere definite le tempistiche.

      Con l’arrivo di un numero sempre maggiore di famiglie, sarà necessario aumentare il numero degli alloggi e di strutture e servizi adatti per i bambini. Inoltre sta crescendo il numero di minori stranieri non accompagnati, che, secondo la legge del Paese, dovrebbero essere messi in strutture protette. Proprio per non rimanere bloccati in Bosnia, molti giovani mentono sulla propria età dichiarando di essere più vecchi di quello che effettivamente sono.

      La maggior parte delle persone che arrivano in Bosnia sono in viaggio da anni, hanno vissuto in campi profughi e hanno fresche nella memoria storie traumatiche. Lo stress psicologico in questi contesti è molto alto e, data la recente storia bosniaca, le competenze in questo campo da parte della popolazione locale sono molto alte.

      In una Bosnia dove si incontrano rifugiati di guerra e abitanti di un Paese del dopoguerra, sono tante le storie che si intrecciano. L’assenza delle organizzazioni internazionali è tale per cui ora la popolazione locale non vuole più il loro aiuto. Tuttavia, come è già avvenuto in altri contesti, la disponibilità ad aiutare diminuisce con il perdurare e il deteriorarsi della situazione.

      https://lungolarottabalcanica.wordpress.com/2018/05/03/che-cosa-sta-succedendo-in-bosnia

    • Bosnie-Herzégovine : les autorités dépassées par l’afflux de migrants et de réfugiés

      Alors que 400 migrants campent toujours dans un parc du centre de Sarajevo et que la ville de Bihać est débordée par l’afflux de réfugiés, les autorités peinent à s’organiser et à trouver des capacités d’accueil. Les autorités de #Republika_Srpska refusent de loger des demandeurs d’asile.


      https://www.courrierdesbalkans.fr/Bosnie-Herzegovine-des-migrants-Sarajevo
      #Sarajevo

    • Commission européenne - Assistance humanitaire aux réfugiés et migrants - Bosnie-Herzégovine

      La Commission européenne a annoncé aujourd’hui 1,5 million d’euros d’aide humanitaire pour répondre aux besoins croissants des réfugiés, des demandeurs d’asile et des migrants bloqués en Bosnie-Herzégovine. Cela porte le financement humanitaire de la Commission à 30,5 millions d’euros pour répondre aux besoins dans les Balkans occidentaux depuis le début de la crise des réfugiés.

      Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management Christos Stylianides said: “The number of refugees and migrants arriving in Bosnia and Herzegovina has increased and we must act swiftly. We are committed to help Bosnia and Herzegovina deal with this situation and deliver assistance to the most vulnerable refugees and migrants. Our funding will support their basic needs and provide emergency shelter, food and health assistance, as well as protection.”

      EU humanitarian aid will be provided in locations such as Sarajevo, Bihać and Velika Kladusa in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The funding aims to strengthen the provision of assistance, the protective environment and enhancing the capacity of organisations already providing first-line emergency response.

      Background

      Since the beginning of the refugee crisis in Western Balkans the European Commission has allocated more than €25 million in humanitarian aid to assist refugees and migrants in Serbia, and over €4 million to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. EU humanitarian aid helps the most vulnerable refugees and migrants to meet basic needs and preserve their dignity.

      In addition to humanitarian assistance, the European Commission provides Western Balkans partners with significant financial and technical support for activities related to migration and refugee crisis. This is done primarily through the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance. Since 2007 the Commission has been providing assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina in the area of migration and border management through the Instrument of pre-accession amounting to €24.6 million. From January 2016 Bosnia and Herzegovina also benefits from the regional programme ’Support to Protection-Sensitive Migration Management’ worth €8 million.

      Around 4.900 refugees and migrants entered Bosnia and Herzegovina since early January 2018, according to government estimates. Approximately 2.500 refugees and migrants in need of assistance are currently stranded in the country. The EU will provide its assistance through humanitarian partner organisations already present in the country.

      http://www.europeanmigrationlaw.eu/fr/articles/actualites/commission-europeenne-assistance-humanitaire-aux-refugies-et-mi

    • Bosnia: respingimenti, violenze e pessime condizioni umanitarie alla nuova frontiera della rotta balcanica

      In Bosnia-Erzegovina si profila una crisi se non verrà avviata una risposta umanitaria coordinata prima che le temperature inizino a diminuire. Attualmente più di 4000 migranti e rifugiati stanno trovando rifugio in campi informali e abitazioni occupate lungo il confine della Bosnia con la Croazia.

      È una situazione nuova per la Bosnia, che prima di quest’anno non aveva visto un numero significativo di persone transitare attraverso il paese come parte della cosiddetta rotta balcanica. Anche se il flusso di persone che arrivano nel paese è in aumento da mesi, le condizioni umanitarie di base nei due punti di maggiore affluenza lungo il confine rimangono pesantemente inadeguate.

      Ai margini della città di Bihac, circa 3000 persone vivono dentro e intorno a una struttura di cemento in stato di deterioramento. Con dei fori aperti come finestre e pozze di fango e acqua piovana sul pavimento, l’ex dormitorio a cinque piani ora è pieno di gente che dorme su coperte, con tende allestite nei corridoi e lenzuola appese ai soffitti nel tentativo di creare un po’ di privacy. Un pendio boscoso dietro l’edificio è cosparso di altre tende.
      Nel frattempo, appena fuori dalla vicina città di Velika Kladuša, circa 1000 persone vivono in tende e rifugi improvvisati fatti di teloni e altri materiali di fortuna. Intorno ai ripari vengono scavate fosse per evitare gli allagamenti durante i forti temporali estivi.

      Adulti, famiglie e bambini non accompagnati si affollano in entrambe le località. Vengono da paesi come Pakistan, Afghanistan, Siria, Iraq e altri ancora. Come per tutti coloro che percorrono la rotta balcanica, il loro obiettivo è fuggire da conflitti e povertà nei loro paesi di origine.
      Una risposta lenta

      “Le pessime condizioni umanitarie negli insediamenti transitori al confine della Bosnia-Erzegovina sono rese peggiori da una risposta lenta e inadeguata alla situazione”, afferma Juan Matias Gil, capo missione di MSF per Serbia e Bosnia- Erzegovina.

      Da giugno 2018, MSF sta lavorando costantemente sul campo in entrambi i siti. In collaborazione con le autorità mediche locali, MSF gestisce una piccola clinica mobile per rispondere alle principali urgenze sanitarie di base mentre riferisce i casi più complessi all’assistenza sanitaria secondaria nel circostante Cantone di Una-Sana.

      “L’inverno si sta avvicinando e finora ci sono voluti mesi per fornire a questa popolazione in aumento servizi minimi di base” afferma Gil di MSF. “Con l’arrivo dell’inverno non c’è tempo da perdere. La mancanza di preparativi tempestivi potrebbe costare vite umane.”
      Gli inverni scorsi lungo la rotta balcanica

      Rifugiati e persone in movimento lungo la rotta balcanica hanno vissuto in condizioni disperate e disumane gli inverni passati.

      In Serbia e lungo i suoi confini, la mancanza di un piano per l’inverno coordinato a livello istituzionale ha lasciato migliaia di persone al freddo per diversi inverni consecutivi. Man a mano che le frontiere dell’UE si sono chiuse, migliaia di persone si sono ritrovate bloccate in condizioni di tempo gelido, bloccate in un paese che non è in grado di offrire ripari sufficienti.

      Durante gli scorsi inverni, nella regione MSF ha curato persone per ipotermia e congelamento e la clinica di MSF a Belgrado ha visto un aumento delle malattie respiratorie perché per scaldarsi le persone devono bruciare plastica e altri materiali di fortuna.

      Indipendentemente dalla stagione, migranti e richiedenti asilo che cercano di attraversare i confini settentrionali della Serbia hanno ripetutamente denunciato le violenze da parte delle guardie di frontiera. Nei primi sei mesi del 2017, le cliniche mobili di MSF a Belgrado hanno trattato 24 casi di traumi intenzionali che secondo quanto riferito si sono verificati lungo il confine tra Serbia e Croazia.
      Nuove rotte, continue problematiche

      Le persone che arrivano e cercano di attraversare il confine tra Bosnia e Croazia provengono principalmente da campi e insediamenti informali in Serbia, ma alcuni hanno tentato nuove rotte dalla Grecia attraverso l’Albania e il Montenegro per arrivare qui.

      Quello che è chiaro è che le persone che sono fuggite da conflitti e instabilità nei paesi d’origine continuano a cercare sicurezza in Europa. “Queste persone sono bloccate in Bosnia-Erzegovina”, dice Gil di MSF. “In assenza di canali sicuri per richiedere asilo e protezione internazionale, le persone sono continuamente costrette ad affrontare viaggi pericolosi e ad attraversare le frontiere in modo irregolare.”

      “Siamo preoccupati delle denunce di respingimenti e violenze contro i rifugiati e i migranti sul lato croato del confine“, conclude Gil. “Di fronte al protrarsi della stessa situazione anche in Bosnia-Erzegovina, ci aspettiamo che i migranti si troveranno ad affrontare lo stesso tipo di problemi che hanno avuto in altri punti della rotta balcanica: malattie della pelle e delle vie respiratorie, peggioramento delle condizioni di salute mentale e aumento della violenza.”

      https://www.medicisenzafrontiere.it/news-e-storie/news/bosnia-respingimenti-violenze-e-pessime-condizioni-umanitarie-a

    • Bihac, dove 4 mila migranti attendono di passare il confine tra la Bosnia e la Croazia

      “Le pessime condizioni umanitarie negli insediamenti transitori al confine della Bosnia- Erzegovina sono rese peggiori da una risposta lenta e inadeguata alla situazione”, afferma Juan Matias Gil, capo missione di Medici Senza Frontiere per Serbia e Bosnia-Erzegovina

      https://video.corriere.it/bihac-dove-4-mila-migranti-attendono-passare-confine-la-bosnia-croazia/b589f9d6-a54c-11e8-8d66-22179c67a670

    • AYS Daily Digest 16/4/19 : How do the EU Commission’s funds manage to bypass those in need ? — case : #Tuzla

      In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for a while now people have been arriving from the east part of the country, coming from Serbia to Tuzla. It has once again become a point of transit for many and, although it has been so for some months now, the problem is ignored by the only authorities who could make possible to assist the people who gather usually around the bus station or in front of the field office of the Service for Foreigners’ Affairs (SFA). It is responsible for the first step in the process of seeking asylum. In order to obtain the document from the office, people sleep rough on the pavement, sometime just in front of the lit and heated empty front space of the office that, of course, does not work on weekends and is open on workdays from 9am to 5pm.

      A very well organized small group of volunteers from Tuzla have been handling the situation for these people in transit who are constantly arriving. They have nowhere to go and there are no official systems of aid or accommodation. None of the big organisations are present to provide assistance, advice, nor even to research into the situation and the existing problematic in order to push for better solutions as important international stake holders on the issue in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

      Citizens who have been organizing small groups of helpers in the past months have run out of strenghts, options, finances and ways to point to the problem. They have already asked for an organised reception system, toilets to be made available 24/7, water supply, shower, food, clothes and health assistance, and if possible, an organized 24hour accommodation, as the people usually don’t stay there for logner.

      Unfortunately, along with the absence of responsibility by the county, the issue was not officially tackled by the City council, nor made part of the topics of their meetings, according to the local media, in spite of the citizens’ demands and volunteers’ desperation. To our knowledge, there wasn’t and there currently is no activity of IOM or UNHCR, as we wrote already. We intend to support their efforts to the best of our abilities, if you wish to come help (on your own expenses, staying in a hostel or so) or if you can provide financial support to them, let us know and the local team will estimate if and what sort of help is needed.

      Perhaps some explanations are due on the implementation and control of Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund and Internal Security Fund as these situations become more and more common.

      https://medium.com/are-you-syrious/ays-daily-digest-16-4-19-how-do-the-eu-commissions-funds-manage-to-bypass-th

      Reçu par email via Inicijativa Dobrodošli, avec ce commentaire :

      All the risks and threats, still are not stopping people in their determination to affirm their freedom of movement and their right to find their new homes. As reported by Are You Syrious, In Bosnia-Herzegovina people have been arriving at the eastern part of the country, coming from Serbia to Tuzla. It has once again become a point of transit for many and, although it has been so for some months now, the problem is ignored by the only authorities who could make possible to assist the people who gather usually around the bus station or in front of the field office of the Foreigners’ sector office of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In order to obtain a document from the office, continue the AYS report, people sleep rough on the pavement, sometimes just in front of the lit and heated empty front space of the office that, of course, does not work on weekends. Up until now, citizens from Tuzla are the only ones that are handling the situation, organizing small groups of helpers and volunteers in the past months.

  • 540 Nigerians to be deported from Libya Aug. 10 – NAPTIP DG

    Five hundred and forty Nigerians are set for deportation from Libya, beginning from Aug. 10, Julie Okah-Donli, Director-General, National Agency for Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons(NAPTIP), has said.

    Mrs. Okah-Donli disclosed this on Wednesday in Osogbo, at the inauguration of the North-West Zonal Command Office of the agency.

    She said the deportees would be brought back to Nigeria in three batches of 180 each.

    The NAPTIP boss said more than 2,000 Nigerians were deported from various parts of the world from February till date, over various migration offences, including human trafficking.

    Mrs. Okah-Doni disclosed that the agency had rescued and supported more than 12,000 victims of human trafficking, and also secured 325 convictions since its inception in 2003.

    She decried the rising trend of deportation of Nigerians from different parts of the world, especially in Africa, and described the situation as “frightening”.

    “Such massive deportations are not good for us as a people. Government at all levels must take steps to halt it by initiating measures that will reduce the vulnerability of our people to being trafficked.

    “Nigeria is a source, transit and destination country. Women and young girls are recruited for sexual and labour exploitation in parts of Europe, the Middle East and even within the African continent.


    http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/239725-540-nigerians-deported-libya-aug-10-naptip-dg.html
    #pays_de_transit #pays_de_destination #pays_de_départ #Nigeria #migrations #asile #réfugiés #expulsions #renvois #migrants_nigérians #réfugiés_nigérians #Libye #traite #trafic_d'êtres_humains #femmes

  • Réfugiés : « Il faut arrêter de dire que la Croatie n’est qu’un pays de transit »

    Si la route des Balkans est officiellement fermée, les réfugiés poursuivent pourtant toujours leur voyage vers le Nord de l’Europe. Et si la Croatie n’a jamais été une destination de prédilection pour ceux qui fuient leur pays, de plus en plus se retrouvent bloqués sur ce territoire, contraints d’y demander l’asile. Entretien.


    https://www.courrierdesbalkans.fr/Refugies-Il-faut-arreter-de-dire-que-la-Croatie-n-est-qu-un-pays-

    #Croatie #piège #asile #migrations #réfugiés #transit #pays_de_transit #pays_de_destination

  • Why don’t refugees just stay in Turkey or Greece? We asked them

    As the current migration and refugee crisis has unfolded, one question has frequently been asked: why don’t refugees just stay in Turkey or Greece?

    Because migration research tends to focus on why people leave their home countries in the first place, we often miss the critical in-between step. Indeed, migrants may try to establish a life in an intended destination country, such as Turkey or Greece, but then be compelled for different reasons to move on. Alternatively, refugees may become “stuck” in a country that was intended to be a stop-over on a longer journey.

    We wanted to find out how migrants in Greece and Turkey viewed their current situations and planned for the future. From May to June 2015, we interviewed more than 1,000 migrants from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Syria. The respondents included both migrants who had only recently arrived at Turkish or Greek refugee camps as well as people who had lived there for several years.


    https://theconversation.com/why-dont-refugees-just-stay-in-turkey-or-greece-we-asked-them-70257

    #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Grèce #Turquie #partir #parcours_migratoire #itinéraire_migratoire #pays_de_transit #transit

  • Migration in Libya : transit zone or final destination ?

    Since the start of the Arab Spring in 2011, North Africa and in particular Libya has become a point of departure for people attempting to make the perilous sea journey to Europe.

    Dramatic images of people in unseaworthy boats continue to capture the media’s attention, but these images obscure the long road – both in terms of distance and time – that many refugees and migrants endure before reaching Libya’s shores, let alone Europe.

    What challenges do these migrants face during their journey, what support do they receive along their journey and how can international organisations better protect and support migrants?

    Key messages:

    Not all migrants who reach Europe via Libya intend to make this journey when they leave their countries of origin, but find themselves continuing their journey due to instability, peer behavior (realising this is what a lot of other migrants are doing) or due to poor conditions in the country.
    Already fragile refugee/migrant protection has grown even more unpredictable since 2011, exposing migrants to increased abuse and exploitation and providing them with little means to seek protection from the authorities.
    Most humanitarian organisations have withdrawn their international staff from Libya and are working through national staff or local partners. This lack of access raises a number of challenges: context analysis is partial, providing accurate figures on the number of people affected is difficult and engagement with the authorities and militias is not uniform.

    http://www.odi.org/publications/10388-migration-libya-transit-zone-or-final-destination
    #Libye #migrations #asile #réfugiés #pays_de_transit #pays_de_destination

    #transit #pays_de_transit #Libye

  • Comment la France est devenue un #pays_de_transit

    Contrairement au fantasme brandi par l’extrême droite, la France ne risque pas d’être « submergée » par des flots de réfugiés. Sur les routes européennes de l’exil, le pays des Lumières a disparu des écrans radars. Même les francophones venus de Syrie l’évitent. À l’inverse, l’Allemagne, la Suède et la Grande-Bretagne suscitent l’engouement, signe de l’attractivité de ces destinations.

    http://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/110915/comment-la-france-est-devenue-un-pays-de-transit?onglet=full
    #réfugiés #asile #migrations

  • Salviamo i profughi, lasciamoli nel deserto

    Il governo italiano ha annunciato a Roma un’intesa per realizzare dei campi profughi nei paesi d’origine e di transito dei migranti per esaminare le richieste d’asilo sul posto. L’accordo, noto come “Processo di Khartoum”, è stato sottoscritto a fine novembre dai 28 paesi dell’Unione europea più Egitto, Eritrea, Etiopia, Gibuti, Kenya, Libia, Somalia, Sudan, Sud Sudan e Tunisia.

    http://www.internazionale.it/opinione/stefano-liberti/2014/12/01/salviamo-i-profughi-lasciamoli-nel-deserto
    #processus_de_Khartoum #screening #externalisation #migration #asile #réfugiés #pays_de_transit #camp_de_réfugiés

  • “Libya is a very important county in terms of irregular migration. Our interest, more generally speaking, is to establish partnership with those countries which are either countries of origin of illegal migration or countires of transit. And the philosophy behind that is that border control connot be only carried out at the border. We have to act before the border, where the problems arise. WE have to cooperate and act across the border with our colleagues in third countries and then at the border and behind the border”.
    Interview avec #Ilkka_LAITINEN, director of #Frontex

    Tiré du #film#Come_un_uomo_sulla_terra”, de #Andrea_Segre (2008):
    http://www.zalab.org/progetti-it/9

    #frontière #contrôles_frontaliers #pays_de_transit #pays_tiers #migration #Libye #documentaire

  • #Migrations et #droit_d’asile : l’#Albanie, nouveau pays de #transit, peine à suivre

    De plus en plus de #migrants transitent par l’Albanie dans l’espoir de rejoindre le #Monténégro, puis l’Union européenne. Mais l’Albanie, pays traditionnel d’émigration, a du mal à gérer ces nouveaux #flux_migratoires et manque d’infrastructures pour accueillir les #demandeurs_d’asile.

    http://balkans.courriers.info/article23444.html

    #réfugiés #pays_de_transit