For years, EUobserver has been tracking the European Union’s increasing efforts to move asylum processing and responsibilities beyond its borders — a policy euphemistically referred to as “externalisation” and “border management”.
This controversial trend raises significant legal, ethical, and humanitarian questions — but recently has been gaining increasing political acceptability.
It’s a policy that has been years in the making, and one that raises serious concerns about the EU’s adherence to rule of law and guaranteeing fundamental rights to people.
Here, because it’s not always easy to piece together the context from individual news stories, we answer some of the most pressing questions — and offer further reading based on our extensive reporting.
1. What exactly is ’externalisation of asylum’ in the EU context?
It refers to a range of policies and practices where the EU or its member states aim to transfer responsibility for asylum seekers — including their reception, processing of their claims, and potentially their long-term protection — to countries outside the EU.
The EU’s deal with Ankara back in 2016, for instance, helped pioneer the approach whereby Syrians would be returned from Greece to Turkey without having their cases for international protection heard based on a so-called ‘safe third country’ concept.
Further reading:
EU leaders to discuss offshoring asylum centres to Turkey (2015)
Europe’s solution to migration is to outsource it to Africa (2018)
2. How does ‘externalisation’ actually work?
The policy can involve formal agreements with third countries — countries outside of the EU — to host asylum processing centres (like the proposed Italy-Albania deal), funding third countries to intercept and manage migrants before they reach EU borders (like in the EU-Tunisia deal), or exploring models where certain protection claims sought in the EU could be processed elsewhere in a country, like Turkey, deemed ‘safe’ to send people back to.
Further reading:
Libyan coast guard infiltrated by criminals, says EU commissioner
EU unclear on legality of Italy-Albania deal to offshore asylum
3. Why is the EU pursuing these policies?
Our reporting has identified a few different factors that play a role in the development and acceleration of implementing policies that would allow the EU to offshore asylum cases.
Deterrence: A primary goal is to deter asylum seekers from attempting to reach EU territory in the first place.
Reducing arrivals: To lower the number of asylum applications lodged within EU member states.
Political pressure: To respond to domestic political pressure in some member states concerned about migration numbers.
Perceived burden sharing: An attempt (often criticised) to shift the ’burden’ of asylum processing away from EU states, even if it means transferring it to countries with fewer resources and oversight.
Further reading:
The asylum files: deadlock and dead-ends (2017)
The secrecy behind the EU’s plans to ’externalise’ migration (2023)
4. Is this a new development?
No. A European Parliament briefing from early 2024 lays out the timeline of the concept. Already back in 1986, Denmark tabled a draft resolution in the United Nations General Assembly to create “UN centres where asylum claims could be processed, in order to coordinate the resettlement of refugees among all states.”
In the early 2000s, several proposals were made to ‘externalise’ the processing of asylum claims. Both the UK (then in the EU) and Germany proposed the establishment of asylum centres in 2003 and 2005. None of these proposals passed.
After the 2014-2016 rise in asylum seeker’s requests, the EU-Turkey asylum deal was signed, which stated that “all new irregular migrants and asylum seekers arriving from Turkey to the Greek islands and whose applications for asylum have been declared inadmissible should be returned to Turkey,” effectively implementing externalisation.
Further reading:
EU looks to African dictators for migration solutions (2014)
EU leaders to discuss offshoring asylum centres (2015)
5. What are some key examples of these offshoring efforts?
Albania: Italy’s 2023 deal aims to transfer people plucked from international waters to then have their asylum claims processed in Albania. Crucially, the processing of the claims in the Albanian centres would fall under Italian jurisdiction - an innovation praised by European Commission president Ursual Von der Leyen.
Tunisia: The EU’s €1bn deal with Tunisia, including €105m specifically for migration control, sought to stem irregular migrant arrivals towards Italy. The deal was described as a blue-print for future cash-for-migrant deals.
Libya: EU states cannot return asylum seeker hopefuls and refugees back to Libya given the rights abuses. So the European Commission helped bankroll Libya’s own search-and-rescue zone so that its Libyan coast guard could intercept and return people to the war-torn country.
UN investigators in 2023 accused Libyan authorities of “widespread practice” of arbitrary detention, murder, torture, rape, enslavement and enforced disappearance of migrants. A few months later, the Libyan coast guard received its first EU-funded patrol boat with the European commission openly admitting that some of its ranks were infiltrated by criminal gangs.
Turkey: The EU’s 2016 deal with Turkey sought to curb arrivals of Syrian refugees on the Greek islands in exchange for billions of euros in funds and political concessions to Ankara. But Turkey stopped accepting returns leading to a containment policy in Greece, described as inhumane by rights defenders.
In the new migration pact: The EU’s pact on asylum and migration, specifically its Asylum Procedures Regulation, included a review of the safe-third country concept. The European Commission recently finalised its review, which resulted in making it easier for member states to send asylum seekers abroad to have their protection claims examined — even if they have never set foot in that country.
Further reading:
EU backs launch of Albania-Italy migrant ’offshoring’ deal (2024)
EU lays groundwork to more easily offshore asylum (2025)
6. What are the main criticisms and concerns surrounding these policies? Why are they called “cruel”?
Our reporting consistently highlights several major concerns raised by human rights organisations, legal experts, and international bodies:
Human rights violations: Risk of ’refoulement’ (sending people back to danger), substandard conditions in offshore centres, lack of access to fair and efficient asylum procedures, and potential for abuse in third countries.
Legality: Questions about compatibility with international asylum law (e.g., the 1951 Refugee Convention), EU law (including the Charter of Fundamental Rights), and national constitutions.
Accountability gaps: Difficulty in ensuring oversight and accountability when asylum processes are outsourced to countries outside the EU’s legal framework.
Ethical concerns: The morality of shifting responsibility for vulnerable people to countries often less equipped to handle them, and the potential for creating a two-tiered system of rights.
Practicality and cost: Many proposed schemes face immense logistical hurdles and can be extremely expensive, with questionable effectiveness in achieving their stated aims.
The label “cruel” often stems from the potential human suffering, the denial of access to asylum on EU territory, and the abdication of legal and moral responsibilities. The leaked plans to detain migrant children also contribute to this perception of harshness.
Further reading:
EU commission takes stand against Danish asylum law (2021)
North Africa and the human cost of Europe’s ’safe’ labels (2025)
7. Who is pushing for these policies within the EU, and who is resisting?
Proponents: EUobserver has reported that certain member states (e.g., Italy, Denmark, Hungary, Austria, Netherlands, Germany) have been strong advocates.
At the EU-level, the European Commission under Ursula von der Leyen has shown openness to, or even endorsement of, some externalisation initiatives, seeing them as part of a broader migration management strategy. The EU’s new migration pact also reflects a compromise that includes elements facilitating externalisation.
Opponents: Resistance comes from human rights organisations (Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, etc.), refugee advocacy groups, UNHCR (the UN Refugee Agency), many legal scholars, and parts of the European Parliament (particularly Green and Left MEPs). They raise the legal and ethical concerns mentioned above.
Further reading:
Commission divisions open over asylum ahead of EU elections (2024)
EU to expand deportation regime as Europe turns against migrants (2025)
8. Does EU law currently allow for widespread offshoring of asylum seekers?
This is a highly contested area.
While the EU’s new Migration Pact includes concepts like “safe third countries” and border procedures that could be interpreted as facilitating externalisation, direct offshoring of individuals who have reached EU territory to have their entire asylum claim processed elsewhere by a third country (as in the UK-Rwanda or Italy-Albania model) faces significant legal challenges under existing EU asylum directives and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
The legality often hinges on specific interpretations and whether sufficient safeguards can truly be guaranteed.
Further reading:
Polish and Danish EU presidencies press to strip safeguards from asylum outsourcing (2025)
Does the fundamental right to seek asylum still exist in the EU of 2024? (2024)
9. What are the potential long-term consequences if these policies become widespread?
Based on expert analysis covered by EUobserver, potential consequences include:
– Erosion of the international refugee protection system and the principle of asylum.
– Increased human rights abuses and suffering for asylum seekers.
– Damage to the EU’s credibility as a champion of human rights and the rule of law.
– Potential for instability in third countries tasked with hosting asylum seekers if not adequately supported or if deals are poorly designed.
– A ’race to the bottom’ where more countries globally try to offload their asylum responsibilities.
Further reading:
O’Flaherty: state of human rights in Europe ’worst in my professional life’ (2025)
EU asylum and anti-racism policies ’inadequate’ and ’abusive’, says Human Rights Watch (2025)
10. What’s next? Is this trend likely to continue?
All indications from our reporting suggest that the push for externalisation will continue, and possibly intensify.
In the new Pact on Migration and Asylum the commission proposes solidarity mechanisms to manage arrivals of asylum seekers. A part of the pact is that member states can organise and pay for the deportation of people of specific nationalities, if they have bilateral agreements with those states – again, effectively externalising the asylum procedure.
The political appetite in several member states remains strong and the new EU Migration Pact provides a framework that could be used to further these aims. We are likely to see more bilateral agreements, ‘pilot projects’, and continued political debate over the legality and morality of these approaches.
Further reading:
EU to expand deportation regime as Europe turns against migrants (2025)
Language battle over ’deportation’ shines light on EU spin (2025)
