person:abu

  • Two deaths and one big lie
    Maureen Clare Murphy Rights and Accountability 10 June 2019
    https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/maureen-clare-murphy/two-deaths-and-one-big-lie

    The killing of math teacher Yaqoub Abu al-Qiyan during an early 2017 raid on a Palestinian village was in many respects a typical act of violence by Israel’s colonization project. A Palestinian was left dead, others injured and homes were destroyed – starting with those belonging to Abu al-Qiyan’s family – to make way for a Jewish settlement.

    There are unique aspects to his case – he was killed in Israel, not in the occupied West Bank, for one. And thanks to the UK-based research group Forensic Architecture, a moment-by-moment breakdown of the events leading up to Abu al-Qiyan’s death and the state cover-up that followed has been made publicly available. (...)

    (...) Israel’s official narrative soon fell apart, but Forensic Architecture “wanted to understand better what had happened in the moments leading to Abu al-Qiyan’s death.”

    Mishandling of evidence

    The research group has published a new video report https://vimeo.com/337735829

    that includes more documentation contradicting Israel’s claims. That documentation includes newly available footage from body and handheld cameras operated by police officers at the scene, a “partial and incomplete” police evidence file, the full recording of the thermal aerial video, and recordings of police radio channels.

    The body cam footage recorded by one of the officers indicated that Forensic Architecture’s earlier suspicion that Abu al-Qiyan was killed by a single bullet fired at close range while his car had come to a stop – to “confirm the kill” – was unlikely.

    The research group also used reenactment at the scene of Abu al-Qiyan’s killing, as well as synchronization of audio and video documentation, 3D modeling and other methodologies, to reach its conclusions. (...)

    https://seenthis.net/messages/561578
    #Palestine_assassinée

  • Israeli Soldiers Kill A Palestinian Child Near Bethlehem
    May 31, 2019 12:10 PM IMEMC News
    https://imemc.org/article/israeli-soldiers-kill-a-palestinian-child-near-bethlehem

    Israeli soldiers killed, Friday, a Palestinian child near the West Bank city of Bethlehem, and injured a young man from Hebron, while trying to enter Jerusalem for Friday prayers in the Al-Aqsa Mosque.

    Media sources said the soldiers shot and killed Abdullah Luay Gheith , 16, from the southern West Bank city of Hebron, after opening fire at him and several Palestinians, who were trying to enter Jerusalem from Wad Abu al-Hummus area, near the villages of al-Khass and an-No’man, east of Bethlehem.

    The slain Palestinian child was shot with a live Israeli army round in his heart, and died instantly after the soldiers shot him.

    They added that the soldiers also shot and seriously injured a young man, identified as Mo’men Abu Tbeish, 21, in the same incident.

    The seriously wounded young man, from Hadabat al-Fawwar area, near Hebron, was rushed by Palestinian medics to Beit Jala governmental hospital.

    #Palestine_assassinée

  • » Wounded Palestinian, Who Burnt Him Self Demanding Medical Care, Dies In Gaza
    IMEMC News - April 30, 2019 11:49 PM
    https://imemc.org/article/wounded-palestinian-who-burnt-him-self-demanding-medical-care-dies-in-gaza

    A young Palestinian man, who was shot with several Israeli army live rounds on April 16, 2018, and torched himself two weeks ago after his repeated calls for medical treatment abroad went unanswered, has died from his serious wounds, on Tuesday evening.

    Media sources said the young man, Bilal Mohammad Masoud , 24, from Jabalia refugee camp in northern Gaza, has succumbed to his serious wounds at the Intensive Care Unit of the Shifa Medical Center, in Gaza.

    The Palestinian was shot by Israeli soldiers, on April 16th, 2018, who fired live rounds at him, wounding him in his arm and legs, causing serious bone fractures and fragmentation, before he underwent several surgeries, including bone grafting, but his condition never improved.

    He was shot while participating in the Great Return March processions by soldiers, stationed across the perimeter fence, near Abu Safiyya area, east of Jabalia in northern Gaza. (...)

    #Palestine_assassinée #marcheduretour

  • #Niger, part 3 : Guns won’t win the war

    After an ambush killed four US special forces and five local soldiers in #Tongo_Tongo, a village in the northern part of the #Tillabéri region close to Niger’s border with Mali, Boubacar Diallo’s phone rang constantly.

    That was back in October 2017. Journalists from around the world were suddenly hunting for information on Aboubacar ‘petit’ Chapori, a lieutenant of #Islamic_State_in_the_Greater_Sahara, or #ISGS – the jihadist group that claimed the attack.

    Diallo, an activist who had been representing Fulani herders in peace negotiations with Tuareg rivals, had met Chapori years earlier. He was surprised by his rapid – and violent – ascent.

    But he was also concerned. While it was good that the brewing crisis in the remote Niger-Mali borderlands was receiving some belated attention, Diallo worried that the narrow focus on the jihadist threat – on presumed ISGS leaders Chapori, Dondou Cheffou, and Adnan Abou Walid Al Sahrawi – risked obscuring the real picture.

    Those concerns only grew later in 2017 when the G5 Sahel joint force was launched – the biggest military initiative to tackle jihadist violence in the region, building on France’s existing Operation Barkhane.

    Diallo argues that the military push by France and others is misconceived and “fanning the flames of conflict”. And he says the refusal to hold talks with powerful Tuareg militants in #Mali such as Iyad Ag Ghaly – leader of al-Qaeda-linked JNIM, or the Group for the support of Islam and Muslims – is bad news for the future of the region.

    Dialogue and development

    Niger Defence Minister Kalla Moutari dismissed criticism over the G5 Sahel joint force, speaking from his office in Niamey, in a street protected by police checkpoints and tyre killer barriers.

    More than $470 million has been pledged by global donors to the project, which was sponsored by France with the idea of coordinating the military efforts of Mauritania, Mali, #Burkina_Faso, Niger, and Chad to fight insurgencies in these countries.

    “It’s an enormous task to make armies collaborate, but we’re already conducting proximity patrols in border areas, out of the spotlight, and this works,” he said.

    According to Moutari, however, development opportunities are also paramount if a solution to the conflict is to be found.

    "Five years from now, the whole situation in the Sahel could explode.”

    He recalled a meeting in the Mauritanian capital, Nouakchott, in early December 2018, during which donors pledged $2.7 billion for programmes in the Sahel. “We won’t win the war with guns, but by triggering dynamics of development in these areas,” the minister said.

    A European security advisor, who preferred not to be identified, was far more pessimistic as he sat in one of the many Lebanese cafés in the Plateau, the central Niamey district where Western diplomats cross paths with humanitarian workers and the city’s upper-class youth.

    The advisor, who had trained soldiers in Mali and Burkina Faso, said that too much emphasis remained on a military solution that he believed could not succeed.

    “In Niger, when new attacks happen at one border, they are suddenly labelled as jihadists and a military operation is launched; then another front opens right after… but we can’t militarise all borders,” the advisor said. If the approach doesn’t change, he warned, “in five years from now, the whole situation in the Sahel could explode.”

    Tensions over land

    In his home in east Niamey, Diallo came to a similar conclusion: labelling all these groups “jihadists” and targeting them militarily will only create further problems.

    To explain why, he related the long history of conflict between Tuaregs and Fulanis over grazing lands in north Tillabéri.

    The origins of the conflict, he said, date back to the 1970s, when Fulani cattle herders from Niger settled in the region of Gao, in Mali, in search of greener pastures. Tensions over access to land and wells escalated with the first Tuareg rebellions that hit both Mali and Niger in the early 1990s and led to an increased supply of weapons to Tuareg groups.

    While peace agreements were struck in both countries, Diallo recalled that 55 Fulani were killed by armed Tuareg men in one incident in Gao in 1997.

    After the massacre, some Fulani herders escaped back to Niger and created the North Tillabéri Self-Defence Militia, sparking a cycle of retaliation. More than 100 people were killed in fighting before reconciliation was finally agreed upon in 2011. The Nigerien Fulani militia dissolved and handed its arms to the Nigerien state.

    “But despite promises, our government abandoned these ex-fighters in the bush with nothing to do,” Diallo said. “In the meantime, a new Tuareg rebellion started in Mali in 2012.”

    The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (known as MUJAO, or MOJWA in English), created by Arab leaders in Mali in 2011, exploited the situation to recruit among Fulanis, who were afraid of violence by Tuareg militias. ISGS split from MUJAO in 2015, pledging obedience to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

    Diallo believes dialogue is the only way out of today’s situation, which is deeply rooted in these old intercommunal rivalries. “I once met those Fulani fighters who are the manpower of MUJAO and now of ISGS, and they didn’t consider themselves as jihadists,” he said. “They just want to have money and weapons to defend themselves.”

    He said the French forces use Tuareg militias, such as GATIA (the Imghad Tuareg Self-Defence Group and Allies) and the MSA (Movement for the Salvation of Azawad), to patrol borderlands between Mali and Niger. Fulani civilians were killed during some of these patrols in Niger in mid-2018, further exacerbating tensions.

    According to a UN report, these militias were excluded from an end of the year operation by French forces in Niger, following government requests.

    ‘An opportunistic terrorism’

    If some kind of reconciliation is the only way out of the conflict in Tillabéri and the neighbouring Nigerien region of Tahoua, Mahamadou Abou Tarka is likely to be at the heart of the Niger government’s efforts.

    The Tuareg general leads the High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace, a government agency launched following the successive Tuareg rebellions, to ensure peace deals are respected.

    “In north Tillabéri, jihadists hijacked Fulani’s grievances,” Abou Tarka, who reports directly to the president, said in his office in central Niamey. “It’s an opportunistic terrorism, and we need to find proper answers.”

    The Authority – whose main financial contributor is the European Union, followed by France, Switzerland, and Denmark – has launched projects to support some of the communities suffering from violence near the Malian border. “Water points, nurseries, and state services helped us establish a dialogue with local chiefs,” the general explained.

    “Fighters with jihadist groups are ready to give up their arms if incursions by Tuareg militias stop, emergency state measures are retired, and some of their colleagues released from prison.”

    Abou Tarka hailed the return to Niger from Mali of 200 Fulani fighters recruited by ISGS in autumn 2018 as the Authority’s biggest success to date. He said increased patrolling on the Malian side of the border by French forces and the Tuareg militias - Gatia and MSA - had put pressure on the Islamist fighters to return home and defect.

    The general said he doesn’t want to replicate the programme for former Boko Haram fighters from the separate insurgency that has long spread across Niger’s southern border with Nigeria – 230 of them are still in a rehabilitation centre in the Diffa region more than two years after the first defected.

    “In Tillabéri, I want things to be faster, so that ex-fighters reintegrate in the local community,” he said.

    Because these jihadist fighters didn’t attack civilians in Niger – only security forces – it makes the process easier than for ex-Boko Haram, who are often rejected by their own communities, the general said. The Fulani ex-fighters are often sent back to their villages, which are governed by local chiefs in regular contact with the Authority, he added.

    A member of the Nigerien security forces who was not authorised to speak publicly and requested anonymity said that since November 2018 some of these Fulani defectors have been assisting Nigerien security forces with border patrols.

    However, Amadou Moussa, another Fulani activist, dismissed Abou Tarka’s claims that hundreds of fighters had defected. Peace terms put forward by Fulani militants in northern Tillabéri hadn’t even been considered by the government, he said.

    “Fighters with jihadist groups are ready to give up their arms if incursions by Tuareg militias stop, emergency state measures are retired, and some of their colleagues released from prison,” Moussa said. The government, he added, has shown no real will to negotiate.

    Meanwhile, the unrest continues to spread, with the French embassy releasing new warnings for travellers in the border areas near Burkina Faso, where the first movements of Burkinabe refugees and displaced people were registered in March.

    https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/special-report/2019/04/15/niger-part-3-guns-conflict-militancy
    #foulani #ISIS #Etat_islamique #EI #Tuareg #terrorisme #anti-terrorisme #terres #conflit #armes #armement #North_Tillabéri_Self-Defence_Militia #MUJAO #MOJWA #Movement_for_Oneness_and_Jihad_in_West_Africa #Mauritanie #Tchad

    @reka : pour mettre à jour la carte sur l’Etat islamique ?
    https://visionscarto.net/djihadisme-international

  • Health Ministry : “Army Killed 266 Palestinians In One Year”
    March 31, 2019 7:22 AM
    https://imemc.org/article/health-ministry-army-killed-266-palestinians-in-one-year

    The Palestinian Health Ministry in the Gaza Strip has reported, Saturday, that Israeli soldiers killed 266 Palestinians, and injured 30398 others, since the Great Return March processions started on March 30, 2018, which also marks Palestinian Land Day. Four Palestinians were killed, Saturday, and 316, including 86 children and 29 women, were injured.

    The Health Ministry stated that the soldiers killed 266 Palestinians, including 50 children, six women and one elderly man, and injured 30398 others, including 16027 who were moved to various hospitals and medical centers.

    It said that among the wounded are 3175 children and 1008 women, and added that 136 Palestinians suffered amputations; 122 in the lower limbs, and 14 in the upper limbs.

    The Ministry also stated that the soldiers killed three medics, identified as Razan Najjar, 22, Mousa Jaber Abu Hassanein, 36, and Abdullah al-Qutati, 20, and injured 665 others, in addition to causing damage to 112 ambulances.

    Among the slain Palestinians are two journalists, identified as Yasser Mortaja, and journalist Ahmad Abu Hussein, in the Gaza Strip, while the soldiers injured dozens of journalists.

    The latest information does not include dozens of Palestinians who were killed and injured by the Israeli army after crossing the perimeter fence and were never returned to the Gaza Strip. (...)

    ““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““
     » Updated : Land Day ; Israeli Soldiers Kill Four Palestinians, Injure 316, In Gaza
    March 30, 2019 11:56 PM
    https://imemc.org/article/land-day-israeli-soldiers-kill-three-palestinians-injure-316-in-gaza

    Israeli soldiers killed, Saturday, four Palestinians, and injured 316 others, including 14 who suffered life-threatening wounds, during protests across the perimeter fence, in the eastern parts of the Gaza Strip.

    On Saturday at night, a Palestinian teen, identified as Bilal Mahmoud Najjar (Abu Jamous), 17, from Bani Soheila near Khan Younis, in southern Gaza Strip, died from serious wounds suffered earlier after the soldiers shot him with live fire.


    The Palestinian Health Ministry has reported that, among the wounded are 86 children and 29 women.

    Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians gathered on lands near the perimeter fence, marking Palestinian Land Day, and the first anniversary since the beginning of the Great Return March.

    Media sources in Gaza said that National Committee for Breaking the Siege has called for a million-person march, marking Land Day, and the first anniversary of the Great Return March, demanding lifting the siege on Gaza, the internationally-guaranteed Right of Return, the liberation of Palestine and independence.


    On Saturday evening, the Health Ministry in Gaza said the soldiers killed Tamer Hashem Abu al-Kheir , 17, after shooting him with a live round in the chest, east of Khan Younis, in the southern part of the coastal region.

    His death came just hours after the soldiers killed Adham Nidal ‘Amara , 17, who was fatally shot during the processions east of Gaza city.


    On Friday morning, the soldiers killed Mohammad Jihad Sa’ad , 20, east of Gaza city, before the Great Return March processions started.

    #Palestine_assassinée #marcheduretour
    https://seenthis.net/messages/771083

  • ‘Where are you from?’ Facing fines and bureaucracy, refugee children in Jordan go undocumented

    Located off the highway in the southern Amman suburbs, the Syrian embassy in Jordan almost looks like it’s made for long waits.

    It’s a quiet day outside, as a group of elderly Syrians wearing traditional keffiyeh scarves sit on a patch of grass next to the sand-colored building smoking cigarettes and passing the time.

    Aside from two flags attached to the roof of the embassy, the steel bars across the windows—shaped in classic Umayyad patterns—are one of the few hints of the otherwise rather anonymous building’s affiliation with Damascus.

    On the wall between the counters, a large bulletin board is plastered with instructions for various civil status procedures: births, marriages and identity cards. Flyers address the “brothers and sisters of the nation” waiting quietly outside.

    But not all Syrians feel welcome here.

    “I feel uncomfortable going to the embassy,” says Bassam al-Karmi, a Syrian refugee in Jordan originally from Deir e-Zor.

    “I can’t control my feelings and might start rambling on about politics and other things,” he explains, adding with a laugh, “I really can’t stand seeing the red [Syrian] flag, either.”

    If possible, al-Karmi says, he avoids approaching the embassy. But when he had his first daughter two years ago, there was no way around it. That’s where he needed to go to register her birth—at least if he wanted her to be recognized as a Syrian national.

    At last week’s international “Brussels III” donor conference, Jordan was commended for its efforts to provide Syrians with legal documentation. The civil status department of Jordan’s Ministry of Interior even maintains a presence in refugee camps, tasked with issuing official birth certificates.

    But acquiring Jordanian documents is only one part of the process. Having them authenticated by the Syrian authorities is a whole other story.

    According to several Syrian refugees in Jordan, bureaucratic procedures, lack of information and high costs are deterring them from registering their children’s births at the Syrian embassy—leaving thousands of Jordanian-born Syrian children without proof of nationality, and some potentially at risk of statelessness.

    When Ahmad Qablan’s second son was born in 2014, one year after the family’s arrival in Jordan, he went through all the procedures and paperwork that were required of him to register them first with the Jordanian authorities and then with the UN’s refugee agency, UNHCR.

    When his third son was born, he did the same.

    Even so, years later, neither of them have Syrian documents officially proving their nationality.

    A resident of a refugee camp some 70 kilometers east of the capital, Qablan would have to travel for two and a half hours each way to get Syrian birth certificates for his two sons—by submitting the papers at the Syrian embassy—only to come back again a week later to pick them up.

    But the biggest obstacle to registering, he says, is the fees involved with late registration.

    Even though, as a teacher, Qablan claims to have one of the highest salaries in the camp, the family is only just getting by, he says.

    “Why would I go spend that money at the embassy?”

    If a Syrian child is registered at the embassy later than three months after his or her birth, a $50 fine is added on top of the standard $75 registration fees. For a delay of more than a year, the fine goes up to $100.

    According to al-Karmi, those costs make families postpone the procedure. But the longer they wait, the more expensive it gets. As a result, he and others around him find themselves caught in a spiral of increasing costs.

    “You know the fees will increase,” he says, “but in the end people keep postponing and saying, ‘Maybe there’s another solution’.”

    According to a source from the Syrian embassy, speaking on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak to the press, some refugees even choose to send family members across the border to go through the procedures in Syria itself just to save on consular fees.

    Reports: ‘125,000’ Syrian refugee children born in Jordan

    Since the beginning of the Syrian uprising and ensuing conflict, more than 125,000 Syrian children are estimated to have been born on Jordainan soil, according to reports in Jordanian media. However, with many children going unregistered with the Jordanian government, an accurate number can be hard to find.

    UNHCR counts 107,268 children under the age of five in Jordan.

    Even though the Jordanian government has issued nearly 80,000 birth certificates to Syrian children born in Jordan since 2015, experts say that the vast majority of those remain unregistered with the Syrian embassy.

    One of the largest obstacles to registration, according to aid workers and Syrian refugees alike, is a lack of information about the procedures.

    A former Daraa resident, Qasem a-Nizami attempted to navigate registration after the birth of his now three-month-old daughter, but he wasn’t sure of where to start.

    According to a UN source speaking to Syria Direct on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak to the press, there is no coordination between UNHCR and the Syrian embassy.

    However, refugees can consult UNHCR about steps they need to take to register civil status procedures in Jordan.

    After asking around in his community and finally talking to the Jordanian Civil Status Department’s office in Zaatari camp, where he resides—sometimes receiving contradictory information—a-Nizami soon discovered that the procedures were much more complicated than he thought.

    To get a birth certificate at the Syrian embassy, refugees need to present the passport of the mother and father as well as a Jordanian birth certificate and marriage contract validated by the embassy.

    When a-Nizami got married in Syria, his town was under siege, and—like many other Syrians—the couple wasn’t able to access the government civil registries responsible for recording civil status events. Instead, the couple settled with a traditional Islamic marriage, involving a sheikh and witnesses.

    Today, a-Nizami has finally registered his marriage with the Jordanian authorities and is currently waiting to get the papers.

    “I can’t register my daughter until I’m finished with the trouble that I’m going through now,” he says.

    ‘Undocumented children’

    According to the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), having valid identity papers is crucial for refugees to access basic rights in a host country like Jordan, and children lacking a Jordanian birth certificate are particularly vulnerable to exploitation, trafficking and child marriage.

    “Undocumented children in Jordan cannot prove their identity, access justice and face difficulties in enjoying rights,” the NRC said in an email to Syria Direct.

    The worst case scenario is that some children end up stateless—and because of Syria’s patrilineal nationality laws, this is particularly a risk for female-headed households unable to prove the nationality of the father.

    But a lack of Syrian documents issued by the country’s embassy also has much more immediate consequences.

    Since the Jaber-Naseeb border crossing between Syria and Jordan reopened for traffic in October after a three-year closure, at least 12,842 Syrians have made the trip across the border, according to the UNHCR.

    Crossing the border, however, either requires a passport or an exit permit issued by the Syrian embassy in Jordan—neither of which can be obtained without Syrian identity documents.

    For years, experts have advocated that the lack of civil documentation could be one of the most significant barriers to the return of Syrian refugees, and as governments, UN bodies and humanitarian organizations increasingly grapple with the infinitely complex question of return, the issue of civil documentation is ever more pressing.

    Last week’s international “Brussels III” donor conference also underlined the need for affordable access to civil documentation for Syrians.

    ‘Cut from the tree of her father’

    While the vast majority of Syrians in neighboring countries surveyed by UNHCR earlier this month have a hope of returning to Syria some day, less than six percent expressed intentions to return within the next year.

    For al-Karmi, the hope of things changing in Syria was part of the reason why he kept postponing registration.

    “I was hoping that by the time we had our first child, maybe Assad would be gone,” he explains.

    And although he eventually registered his first-born daughter, the family’s youngest—who is nine months old—still only has Jordanian documents.

    “For the next child we also thought, ‘Bashar will be gone by then’,” al-Karmi says. “But that didn’t happen.”

    Now, he says, the family is doing what they can to make sure their daughters will grow up identifying with their Syrian roots.

    “She’s been cut from the tree of her father,” he says, explaining how they’ve turned to the internet as the only way of nurturing the children’s ties to family members spread out across the globe.

    “We are currently teaching her to remember the answer to, ‘Where are you from?’ and then responding, ‘I’m from Syria’,” he says.

    “This is the most we can do in exile.”

    But not everyone feels a need to raise their children to feel Syrian.

    Abu Abida al-Hourani, a 28-year-old resident of Jordan’s Zaatari camp, is not even interested in registering his two-and-a-half-year-old son at the Syrian embassy.

    “It’s better to belong to a country that will protect my son and make him feel safe and doesn’t deprive him of the most basic rights,” he explains.

    “How am I supposed to raise my son to feel like he belongs in a country full of killing, displacement and injustice?”

    https://syriadirect.org/news/%E2%80%98where-are-you-from%E2%80%99-facing-fines-and-bureaucracy-refug
    #enfants #mineurs #enfance #Jordanie #réfugiés #réfugiés_syriens #asile #migrations #clandestinisation #certificats_de_naissance #bureaucratie #apatridie

  • Driving out demons in Mosul
    https://m.dw.com/en/mosul-where-demons-women-and-islamic-state-met/a-47319908

    During the IS occupation of Iraq’s Mosul, secret sessions were held for women to exorcise demons — despite the IS deeming them black magic and banning any alternative religious practices. DW’s Judit Neurink reports.

    “Women still come asking for the exorcism sessions,” says Othman, the muezzin who, five times a day, calls the faithful to pray at the Haiba Khatoon Mosque in the center of Mosul. He did the same during the three years Iraq’s second city was occupied by IS and recalls how women would flock to the mosque for the sessions held especially for them to evict djinns, as the Quran calls demons or supernatural creatures.

    Othman is sitting in the mosque’s gardens, where men are performing their prayers. This busy mosque near the University of Mosul is used a lot by traders, students and travelers who miss one of the set prayer times.

    It seems too busy a place for demon eviction sessions to have been held there, which hardly anyone knew about. Imams who returned to their mosques after IS left deny any knowledge of the practice anywhere during the occupation. “Most people in Mosul had no idea what was going on here,” Othman told DW. “Perhaps only those who regularly came to this mosque to pray.” The sessions were held between the midday and 3 p.m. prayer sessions, and only in the women’s section. “And the women only used the side entrance.”

    Secret sessions are said to have been held at the Haiba Khatoon Mosque

    As a muezzin during the IS period, and fearing repercussions, Othman is reluctant to provide his family name. But since he had to enter it five time a day for the call, he had a key to the mosque and saw dozens of foreign and local women who turned up regularly for the sessions.

    One of the documented cases was that of a young Dutch woman who lived with her IS husband and two children just around the corner in a house they shared with another IS couple. The house is still standing, and its original owners have returned.

    Exorcising the demons

    Laura H. (whose last name is protected under Dutch law), spoke to Dutch writer Thomas Rueb about the experience. Rueb went on to write a book about it, which was published last year. She went to the sessions, known as rukyah in Islam, because she said her husband had molested her, and she sought the cause for his behavior within herself. Djinns were blocking her faith, which is why she was making mistakes, she was told.

    She said she saw women take off their gloves and sit in a small room with their palms upturned. She witnessed how they would all close their eyes and the man leading the session would start to chant texts from the Quran in a strange, high-pitched voice, gradually getting louder and louder. How he would hit the women on the palms of their hands — a scandal according to IS rules prohibiting all physical contact between men and women who are not married or related.

    She recounts how a young woman fell into a trance and pulled off her scarf — another taboo. Then how the women would start to vomit and fall to the floor as if they had lost control of their muscles. How they screamed, cried and laughed. When the session ended after some 20 minutes, the women rearranged their clothes and went outside in silence.

    The man who led the sessions was Abu Younis, a 55-year-old tailor with no Islamic education, Othman says. Younis had no ties to IS either, but because of his popularity, the terror group allowed him to conduct the rukyah in the mosque. This is quite extraordinary, as the group had deemed many other religious practices as shirk, or idolatry. It had forbidden the sales of amulets with Quranic texts and even executed those who offered services of this kind for using black magic.

    Did IS turn a blind eye?

    Before IS, these had been common practices for Sunnis in Mosul and elsewhere in Iraq. For women who desperately wanted a son, or others with illnesses that would not clear up, a visit to an imam or holy man for an amulet and a prayer would be called for. Others would pray at the graves of saints. According to witnesses in Mosul, exorcising sessions for djinns were also common, especially among Sufis. But Sufism, a branch of Sunni Islam that is more open to the occult, was forbidden by IS, as were all other faiths and customs that were not in line with the terror group’s Salafi interpretation of Islam.

    And yet the exorcism of djinns was accepted. That is because they are part of the Quran, says Jamal Hussen, an expert and writer on Salafi Islam from Iraqi Kurdistan. “According to the Salafi doctrine, women are more susceptible to a devilish djinn, because their perceived weakness and lack of intelligence are an invitation for the devil.” Perhaps that is why the eviction sessions only seem to have been attended by women; there is no mention anywhere of sessions being held for men during the occupation.

    In the Quran, djinns are a third kind of being, along with humans and angels. The latter are God’s messengers and created from light. Djinns are spirits created from a flame, Hussen says, and disguised from human senses. They can be both good and evil, and share some habits with humans, like getting married and having children. “There is a complete Sura in the Quran about djinns,” he says, and that is why they are part of the faith of Salafi groups like IS. During the war in Syria, the terror group repeatedly stated that they had angels and djinns fighting on their side against the unbelievers.

    The djinn method

    Conventional medicine would probably diagnose the symptoms of someone who is said to have been taken over by djinns as a psychological illness. But in place of medical treatment, Salafists subject the patient to sessions in which verses of the Quran are read and the djinn is ordered to leave the body. “Often, the patient will hallucinate or may suffer epileptic fits that can sometimes even lead to death. But then it is said that this is because the djinn refused to leave the body.”

    The exorcism should be conducted by a man, preferably old and known for his faith, Hussein says, but he admits it is strange that, in societies in which the male and female worlds are as strictly separated as they were under IS, a man should have led the sessions for women at the Haiba Khatoon Mosque. “It is known for men to have abused the situation and harassed the women,” he says. That is why some of the elders of Al-Azhar, the most influential religious university for Sunni Islam in Cairo, have said “this method is nothing but trickery and corrupt.”

    After IS left, Abu Younis was picked up by the Iraqi army, Othman says initially, only to contradict himself saying the man cannot be contacted as he has gone underground. Over a year after IS fighters were driven out of Mosul, there are still requests from women for exorcism sessions which would imply that Salafi women are still present in the city. But the Haiba Khatoon Mosque will not be providing them with what they want anytime soon.

    #religion #superstition #islam #exorcisme #Iraq #guerre

  • Mumia Abu-Jamal obtient le droitde faire appel de sa condamnation

    Cette décision du juge Tucker a été rendue publique hier soir (ce vendredi 28 décembre au matin heure française). Elle est fondée sur le fait que Ronald Castille, alors juge en chef à la Cour suprême de Pennsylvanie, aurait dû se récuser lors de l’examen de l’affaire Mumia en raison de son implication précédente en qualité de procureur sur le même dossier et de ses déclarations favorables à la peine de mort lorsqu’il s’agissait d’homicide de policiers.

    Le juge Tucker a toutefois rejeté, faute de preuve « significative », l’argument de la défense selon lequel Castille avait joué un rôle « important » dans l’appel de Mumia contre sa condamnation à mort.

    Justifiant sa décision, Tucker a écrit « L’attente du public d’une justice impartiale était nécessaire. La moindre apparence de partialité ou d’impartialité mine le système judiciaire dans son ensemble » . Et de conclure « Une nouvelle plaidoirie devant la Cour suprême de Pennsylvanie serait donc préférable ». Pour sa part, Maître Judith Ritter, l’avocate de Mumia, a déclaré que Tucker avait ainsi reconnu « la nécessité d’un nouvel appel non entaché de parti pris » .

    L’avenir judiciaire de Mumia est désormais entre les mains du procureur général Larry Krasner, élu en 2017 et connu pour ses positions progressistes, notamment sur l’incarcération de masse, les discriminations sociales et raciales, les agissements de la police. Selon l’agence Associated Press, sa porte-parole a déclaré « qu’il était en train d’examiner la décision et qu’il n’avait pas encore décidé de la contester ». Pour ce faire, il dispose d’un délai de 30 jours.

    Nos amis, soutiens américains à Mumia, saluent « cette victoire légale et inédite comme la meilleure chance que nous avons de libérer Mumia depuis des décennies » .

    Le Collectif français LIBERONS MUMIA salue également le succès judiciaire et la mobilisation internationale qui a contribué à faire émerger la vérité et qui doit se poursuivre pour que Mumia quitte définitivement l’univers carcéral où il est enfermé depuis 37 ans.

    Comme chaque premier mercredi du mois, un rassemblement aura lieu à proximité de l’ambassade des Etats-Unis le 2 janvier (18h) PLACE DE LA CONCORDE à Paris (angle rue de Rivoli / jardin des Tuileries).

    Venez nombreux fêter ce succès judiciaire et montrer notre détermination à poursuivre le combat tant que MUMIA ne sera pas libéré !

    Et pensez, à la mesure de vos moyens, à apporter votre soutien financier à la défense de Mumia sans lequel il ne pourrait espérer rejoindre sa épouse, ses enfants et ses petits-enfants après tant d’années de séparation :

    Ø en achetant un livre (pour vous ou pour l’offrir) traitant de l’affaire Mumia en consultant notre site : http://mumiabujamal.com/v2/multimedias/livres

    #Mumia_Abu_Jamal #Justice #Etats-Unis

  • Chronique du cinéma palestinien : la renaissance d’un cinéma sans État
    Lou Mamalet, Middle East Eye, le 3 novembre 2018
    https://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/reportages/chronique-du-cin-ma-palestinien-la-renaissance-d-un-cin-ma-sans-tat-5

    Quand il s’agit de définir les contours du cinéma palestinien, la réponse n’est jamais évidente. Il est en effet complexe de délimiter les frontières d’un art sans État. Le cinéma palestinien est un territoire fragmenté qui s’ancre dans différents espaces temporels et géographiques, conséquence d’un passé intrinsèquement lié à l’exil et à la dispersion.

    Malgré les difficultés économiques de cette industrie en quête permanente de financement, elle continue de porter à l’écran ceux que l’on a essayé de rendre invisibles, notamment à travers une nouvelle vague de jeunes réalisateurs, tels Rakan Mayasi ou Muayad Alayan , qui se sont fait remarquer lors de festivals de films internationaux.

    Début du XIX e siècle : premiers pas du cinéma palestinien

    Les prémices du cinéma palestinien remontent au début du XX e siècle, à l’occasion d’une visite du roi d’Arabie saoudite Ibn Saoud en Palestine en 1935. Accompagné par le mufti de Jérusalem Amin al-Husseini, son périple est immortalisé par Ibrahim Hassan Sirhan, réalisateur palestinien autodidacte, qui filme l’événement avec un appareil de fortune acheté à Tel Aviv.

    Sirhan s’associe plus tard à Jamal al-Asphar, un autre réalisateur palestinien, avec qui il filme The Realized Dreams (« les rêves réalisés »), un documentaire de 45 minutes sur les orphelins palestiniens.

    Considérés comme les pères fondateurs du cinéma palestinien, Sirhan et Asphar sont les premiers autochtones à faire des films en Palestine ; les premières images du pays avaient jusqu’alors été tournées par les frères Lumières ou d’autres sociétés européennes empreintes d’une forte dimension orientaliste, se contentant de dépeindre des sujets folkloriques et traditionnels.

    Dix ans plus tard, Ibrahim Hassan Sirhan ouvre le premier studio de production cinématographique en Palestine avec Ahmad al-Kalini, un compatriote ayant étudié le cinéma au Caire. Le duo produira plusieurs longs métrages, dont aucune trace ne demeure de nos jours, comme la majeure partie des réalisations de cette époque.

    La déclaration Balfour en 1917 et la création de l’État d’Israël trente ans plus tard dessinent cependant un autre destin pour le cinéma palestinien. En 1948, plus de 700 000 Palestiniens sont forcés à l’exil lors de la Nakba (« catastrophe »), assénant un coup dur à la production cinématographique palestinienne. Le peuple est traumatisé et doit faire face à une nouvelle situation, ne laissant derrière lui presqu’aucun document. C’est le commencement d’une longue période de silence cinématographique de plus de deux décennies.

    Fin des années 1960, début des années 1970 : le cinéma de la révolution

    Ce mutisme prend fin en 1968, après la défaite arabe de la guerre des Six Jours (la Naksa) et ses conséquences politiques : l’occupation israélienne de la Cisjordanie, de Jérusalem-Est et de Gaza.

    Cette tragédie renforce le statut de l’Organisation de libération de la Palestine (OLP) et d’autres institutions palestiniennes, qui sont alors perçues comme les derniers symboles d’espoir et de résistance arabe. Sous leurs auspices, un nouveau cinéma militant apparaît afin de documenter la lutte palestinienne et la vie des réfugiés dans les camps.

    Certains réalisateurs palestiniens ayant étudié à l’étranger rejoignent ainsi les rangs de l’OLP à Amman, puis à Beyrouth. Parmi eux, Sulafa Jadallah Mirsal, une jeune photographe palestinienne qui a étudié au Caire. Dans sa cuisine, elle monte une unité photographique avec des équipements basiques et se focalise sur les photographies des martyrs de guerre.

    En 1968, son travail est transféré à Amman où se situe le siège du Fatah, principal parti de l’OLP dirigé par Yasser Arafat, et pour la première fois, un département de photographie est créé.

    Elle est très rapidement rejointe par deux réalisateurs palestiniens : Mustafa Abu Ali , qui a par ailleurs travaillé avec Jean-Luc Godard sur son film Ici et ailleurs (1974), et Hani Jawharieh, avec qui elle mettra en place la première Unité du film palestinien (PFU).

    Ils sortent en 1969 No to a Peace Solution (« Non à une solution de paix »), un film de vingt minutes qui documente les manifestations de civils contre la solution de paix proposée par le secrétaire d’État américain de l’époque William Rogers.

    Suite au conflit entre l’OLP et le roi Hussein de Jordanie qui débouche, en 1970, sur les événements de Septembre noir , l’organisation de Yasser Arafat doit quitter la Jordanie et se relocalise au Liban. Durant cette période, plus de 60 documentaires sont tournés malgré les difficultés économiques et le début de la guerre civile libanaise, comme With our Souls and our Blood (« avec nos âmes et notre sang »), qui narre les massacres de septembre 1970.

    On assiste alors à l’accélération d’une prise de conscience de l’importance du cinéma et des images comme outil politique dans la promotion des idéaux révolutionnaires de la cause palestinienne.

    En 1974, est ainsi produit par Mustafa Abu Ali They Do Not Exist (« ils n’existent pas »), un documentaire dépeignant la vie des Palestiniens dans un camp de réfugiés du Sud-Liban et dont le titre est inspiré des déclarations négationnistes de Golda Meir (Première ministre israélienne de l’époque) au sujet des Palestiniens.

    Comme l’explique à Middle East Eye Hanna Atallah, réalisateur palestinien et directeur de FilmLab Palestine , une association qui supporte l’industrie cinématographique palestinienne, « Il s’agissait de construire un récit-réponse à celui des Israéliens, de trouver une alternative au discours selon lequel la Palestine était une terre sans habitants uniquement peuplée de bédouins. Les Israéliens ont vite compris qu’écrire l’histoire était un instrument politique, chose que les Palestiniens n’avaient pas réalisée jusqu’alors ».

    Un outil politique qui nécessite de centraliser les œuvres réalisées, ce à quoi s’attèle Mustafa Abu Ali en créant l’Archive du film palestinien en vue de réunir les efforts des réalisateurs palestiniens du monde entier et de préserver l’identité palestinienne en donnant une certaine reconnaissance à son cinéma.

    Cette archive contient une vaste quantité de documents sur le siège de Beyrouth, les batailles des fédayins, mais aussi des interviews de politiciens et d’intellectuels. Malheureusement, elle disparaîtra lors de l’invasion du Liban par Israël en 1982.

    Des efforts seront toutefois déployés par plusieurs réalisateurs – comme Monica Maurer, cinéaste allemande ayant autrefois opéré au sein de l’Unité du film palestinien de l’OLP, et l’artiste palestinienne Emily Jacir – afin de restaurer et digitaliser les rushes de cette période, à l’instar de ceux de Tel al-Zaatar , un film sur le siège du camp de réfugiés palestiniens du même nom à Beyrouth par les milices chrétiennes, initialement filmé par le cinéaste libanais Jean Khalil Chamoun et le Palestinien Mustafa Abu Ali.

    Une période également documentée dans Off Frame a.k.a. Revolution Until Victory (2016) de Mohanad Yaqubi, cinéaste palestinien et fondateur de Idiom , une société de production basée à Ramallah. Après un long travail de recherche dans le monde entier, Yaqubi est parvenu à exhumer des images d’archives inédites montrant le travail de cinéastes militants durant les années 60-70, un résultat qui réfléchit aussi sur la lutte palestinienne dans sa représentation d’elle-même et la réappropriation de son récit à travers l’établissement de l’Unité du film palestinien.

    1980-1990 : cinéma indépendant et réalisme social

    Les années 1980-1990 sont particulièrement difficiles pour les Palestiniens. Face à la persistance de l’occupation israélienne et à l’échec des tentatives de paix, les nouvelles générations commencent à perdre espoir en l’avenir. La crise économique, le chômage et l’augmentation des colonies dans les territoires occupés sont autant de facteurs qui précipitent l’éclatement de la première Intifada , le 9 décembre 1987.

    Un tournant politique qui marque aussi l’avènement d’une nouvelle génération de réalisateurs palestiniens ayant étudié à l’étranger. D’un cinéma de la révolution, principalement militant et documentaire, on passe alors au récit de la vie sous occupation et de la résistance.

    Parmi eux, Michel Khleifi , qui revient dans sa ville natale de Nazareth, en Galilée, après avoir passé dix ans en Belgique. Il produit son premier long métrage, Fertile Memory (mémoire fertile), en 1980, une fiction empruntant au documentaire qui raconte l’histoire de deux femmes palestiniennes dont l’une est forcée de travailler dans une entreprise de textile israélienne après avoir vu sa terre expropriée par Israël.

    Cette nouvelle vague est également représentée par les œuvres de Mai Masri , une réalisatrice palestinienne qui a grandi à Beyrouth et étudié à San Francisco. Dans Wild Flowers : Women of South Lebanon (1987), réalisé avec Jean Khalil Chamoun, elle filme la vie de femmes libanaises résistant durant l’occupation militaire israélienne du Sud Liban.

    Après les accords d’Oslo en 1993, on assiste à une certaine désillusion de la société palestinienne, qui se ressent à l’écran. Le cinéma s’éloigne de l’esprit révolutionnaire des années 1970 et de la nostalgie des années 1980 pour migrer vers un réalisme social traitant des problèmes que rencontrent les Palestiniens dans leur vie quotidienne.

    Comme le souligne Hanna Atallah, « Il n’est plus question de la vision romanesque et fantasmée de la Palestine perdue, avec ses champs d’orangers et d’oliviers. On parle du quotidien, des check-points et du mur ».

    Une situation tragique souvent tournée au ridicule par les réalisateurs, à l’instar d’Elia Suleiman, qui se met toujours en scène dans ses films comme observateur passif du délitement de l’identité palestinienne.

    Avec Chronique d’une disparition (1996), il dresse un portrait caustique de la réalité palestinienne sous occupation, entre anecdotes personnelles et discours politique sur Israël. Dans Intervention divine (2002), il raconte les déboires d’un couple de Palestiniens qui, pour se voir, l’un vivant à Jérusalem-Est et l’autre à Ramallah, doit se donner rendez-vous dans un terrain vague proche du check-point.

    Des difficultés de l’occupation aussi décrites par Rashid Masharawi. Qu’il s’agisse de Couvre-feu , description de celui imposé à son village de la bande de Gaza pendant 40 jours en 1993 (film qui lui fait gagner le prix UNESCO au festival de Cannes 1993), de L’Attente , qui suit Ahmad, un réalisateur faisant passer des auditions dans différents camps de réfugiés du Proche-Orient afin de constituer la troupe du futur théâtre palestinien (2006), ou de L’Anniversaire de Leïla (2008), qui raconte les obstacles d’un juge forcé de devenir chauffeur de taxi, le réalisateur évoque la douleur d’un peuple qui doit subir un état d’apartheid.

    Des années 2000 à nos jours : nouvelle vague et changement de récit

    Depuis les années 2000, si la politique reste en toile de fond des films palestiniens, elle n’est plus nécessairement au cœur du sujet, faisant place à des fictions au ton décalé et aux intrigues inattendues.

    De nouveaux thèmes sont abordés par de jeunes réalisateurs qui explorent la complexité de la réalité palestinienne, tels les écarts de perception entre les Palestiniens restés sur place et ceux revenus après avoir commencé une nouvelle vie à l’étranger ou encore les différences intergénérationnelles.

    C’est le cas de Wajib – L’invitation au mariage d’Annemarie Jacir (2017) , un long métrage qui illustre avec humour et tendresse la situation palestinienne à travers le regard de deux générations. Alors que le fils reproche au père d’inviter un ami juif, qu’il suspecte de travailler pour les services de renseignement israéliens, au mariage de sa sœur, le père en veut à son fils d’être en couple avec la fille d’un membre de l’OLP à qui il reproche de ne pas se soucier du sort des Palestiniens.

    Autre exemple, Love, Theft and Other Entanglements (« Amours, larcins et autres complications », 2015) des frères Muayad et Rami Musa Alayan, une fable absurde aux allures de western qui met en scène les aventures au milieu des milices palestiniennes et des services d’intelligence israéliens d’un petit magouilleur palestinien qui espère pouvoir se payer un visa de sortie du pays en volant une voiture appartenant à un Israélien et qui se retrouve enfermé dans le coffre de la voiture volée avec le soldat israélien qu’il a kidnappé.

    Des œuvres qui n’hésitent donc pas à utiliser l’humour et le symbolisme pour dénoncer le quotidien tragique des Palestiniens sous occupation, à l’instar de The Wanted 18 (« les dix-huit fugitives »), film d’animation intégrant des images d’archives qui raconte l’histoire vraie de Palestiniens du village de Beit Sahour, en Cisjordanie, tentant de maintenir clandestinement une industrie de vaches laitières pendant la première Intifada. Réalisé par Amer Shomali et Paul Cowan, le film a reçu le prix du meilleur documentaire au Festival du film d’Abou Dabi.

    Les courts-métrages ne font pas exception à la règle. En témoigne Farawaleh (« fraises »), la dernière création de la jeune réalisatrice palestinienne Aida Kaadan, lauréate du festival Palest’In & Out 2018, qui décrit l’épopée de Samir, responsable d’un magasin de chaussures à Ramallah qui n’a jamais vu la mer et qui décide, pour accomplir son rêve, de traverser la frontière israélienne parmi des ouvriers du bâtiment palestiniens.

    Un autre court-métrage, réalisé par le cinéaste Rakan Mayasi, raconte pour sa part l’histoire d’un couple palestinien qui, pour faire un enfant, décide de sortir clandestinement du sperme de la prison israélienne où l’époux purge sa peine. Bonboné (« bonbon ») a cumulé les prix de festivals (notamment meilleur scénario au Festival du court-métrage méditerranéen de Tanger , meilleur film au Twin Cities Arab Film Festival ).

    Bien que jamais très loin, la politique est devenue le personnage secondaire de ces nouvelles fictions qui font la part belle aux Palestiniens et à leur histoire, laquelle n’est plus cantonnée à une simple quête identitaire. The Reports on Sarah and Saleem , de Muayad Alayan, présenté au Festival des cinémas arabes de l’Institut du monde arabe en juillet dernier, retrace ainsi une histoire d’adultère banale entre une juive israélienne et un livreur palestinien, qui se transforme en affaire politique.

    Un changement de paradigme dans les intrigues regretté par certains, qui y voient une perte des valeurs propres à la cause palestinienne, comme l’explique à MEE Mohanad Yaqubi.

    « Le cinéma palestinien doit rester militant et engagé dans son essence. Avant, les réalisateurs parlaient un langage commun : celui du droit au retour. Aujourd’hui, l’identité palestinienne est dissoute et perd en force, alors que faire partie du peuple palestinien, c’est appartenir à une lutte pour l’auto-indépendance, que le cinéma doit soutenir », estime-t-il.

    Une mission pour l’avenir de cette industrie qui a su se renouveler sur la forme et sur le fond, malgré une situation politique stagnante....

    #Palestine #Cinéma

  • Antisémitisme : le leader travailliste britannique Jeremy Corbyn à nouveau dans la tourmente

    Plusieurs erreurs dans un article du Monde

    https://abonnes.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2018/08/14/antisemitisme-le-leader-travailliste-britannique-jeremy-corbyn-a-nou

    Le Daily Mail a publié samedi une photo montrant M. Corbyn en 2014 tenant en ses mains une couronne de fleurs lors d’une cérémonie à Tunis. Celui qui était alors simple député était sur place pour une conférence consacrée à la Palestine, organisée par le président tunisien. A la fin, deux gerbes de fleurs ont été déposées sur des tombes palestiniennes.

    La première commémorait 47 Palestiniens tués dans une attaque aérienne israélienne sur une base de l’Organisation de libération de la Palestine (OLP) en 1985. M. Corbyn affirme que c’est ce que la photo du Daily Mail montre. La seconde a été déposée sur les tombes de Salah Khalaf, le fondateur de Septembre noir, Fakhri al-Omari, son bras droit, et Hayel Abdel-Hamid, le chef de la sécurité de l’OLP. Tous les trois ont été assassinés vingt ans après l’attentat de Munich par le Mossad, les services secrets israéliens. C’est cette cérémonie à laquelle M. Corbyn dit avoir été simplement « présent ».

    Noter : que Salah Khalaf, aussi connu sous le nom d’Abou Iyad, a été assassiné par le groupe Abou Nidal. Mais le réduire à fondateur de Septembre Noir est une absurdité : il était un des principaux compagnons d’Arafat et un des principaux dirigeants de l’OLP. Il a soutenu les évolutions politiques de l’organisation après 1973. Il faut lire le livre qu’Eric Rouleau lui a consacré « Palestinien sans patrie ».Pourquoi refuserait-on de déposer des fleurs sur sa tombe ? Il faudrait alors refuser aux dirigeants étrangers d’aller sur la tombe de Yasser Arafat.

    La campagne engagée contre Corbyn ne vise pas des dérives antisémites, mais bien la solidarité avec les Palestiniens. Il est dommage que Le Monde y contribue.

    A relire sur OrientXXI
    https://orientxxi.info/magazine/antisemitisme-offensive-orchestree-contre-jeremy-corbyn-au-royaume-uni,2

  • By Stifling Migration, Sudan’s Feared Secret Police Aid Europe

    At Sudan’s eastern border, Lt. Samih Omar led two patrol cars slowly over the rutted desert, past a cow’s carcass, before halting on the unmarked 2,000-mile route that thousands of East Africans follow each year in trying to reach the Mediterranean, and then onward to Europe.

    His patrols along this border with Eritrea are helping Sudan crack down on one of the busiest passages on the European migration trail. Yet Lieutenant Omar is no simple border agent. He works for Sudan’s feared secret police, whose leaders are accused of war crimes — and, more recently, whose officers have been accused of torturing migrants.

    Indirectly, he is also working for the interests of the European Union.

    “Sometimes,” Lieutenant Omar said, “I feel this is Europe’s southern border.”

    Three years ago, when a historic tide of migrants poured into Europe, many leaders there reacted with open arms and high-minded idealism. But with the migration crisis having fueled angry populism and political upheaval across the Continent, the European Union is quietly getting its hands dirty, stanching the human flow, in part, by outsourcing border management to countries with dubious human rights records.

    In practical terms, the approach is working: The number of migrants arriving in Europe has more than halved since 2016. But many migration advocates say the moral cost is high.

    To shut off the sea route to Greece, the European Union is paying billions of euros to a Turkish government that is dismantling its democracy. In Libya, Italy is accused of bribing some of the same militiamen who have long profited from the European smuggling trade — many of whom are also accused of war crimes.

    In Sudan, crossed by migrants trying to reach Libya, the relationship is more opaque but rooted in mutual need: The Europeans want closed borders and the Sudanese want to end years of isolation from the West. Europe continues to enforce an arms embargo against Sudan, and many Sudanese leaders are international pariahs, accused of committing war crimes during a civil war in Darfur, a region in western Sudan.

    But the relationship is unmistakably deepening. A recent dialogue, named the Khartoum Process (in honor of Sudan’s capital) has become a platform for at least 20 international migration conferences between European Union officials and their counterparts from several African countries, including Sudan. The European Union has also agreed that Khartoum will act as a nerve center for countersmuggling collaboration.

    While no European money has been given directly to any Sudanese government body, the bloc has funneled 106 million euros — or about $131 million — into the country through independent charities and aid agencies, mainly for food, health and sanitation programs for migrants, and for training programs for local officials.

    “While we engage on some areas for the sake of the Sudanese people, we still have a sanction regime in place,” said Catherine Ray, a spokeswoman for the European Union, referring to an embargo on arms and related material.

    “We are not encouraging Sudan to curb migration, but to manage migration in a safe and dignified way,” Ms. Ray added.

    Ahmed Salim, the director of one of the nongovernmental groups that receives European funding, said the bloc was motivated by both self-interest and a desire to improve the situation in Sudan.

    “They don’t want migrants to cross the Mediterranean to Europe,” said Mr. Salim, who heads the European and African Center for Research, Training and Development.

    But, he said, the money his organization receives means better services for asylum seekers in Sudan. “You have to admit that the European countries want to do something to protect migrants here,” he said.

    Critics argue the evolving relationship means that European leaders are implicitly reliant on — and complicit in the reputational rehabilitation of — a Sudanese security apparatus whose leaders have been accused by the United Nations of committing war crimes in Darfur.

    “There is no direct money exchanging hands,” said Suliman Baldo, the author of a research paper about Europe’s migration partnership with Sudan. “But the E.U. basically legitimizes an abusive force.”

    On the border near Abu Jamal, Lieutenant Omar and several members of his patrol are from the wing of the Sudanese security forces headed by Salah Abdallah Gosh, one of several Sudanese officials accused of orchestrating attacks on civilians in Darfur.

    Elsewhere, the border is protected by the Rapid Support Forces, a division of the Sudanese military that was formed from the janjaweed militias who led attacks on civilians in the Darfur conflict. The focus of the group, known as R.S.F., is not counter-smuggling — but roughly a quarter of the people-smugglers caught in January and February this year on the Eritrean border were apprehended by the R.S.F., Lieutenant Omar said.

    European officials have direct contact only with the Sudanese immigration police, and not with the R.S.F., or the security forces that Lieutenant Omar works for, known as N.I.S.S. But their operations are not that far removed.

    The planned countertrafficking coordination center in Khartoum — staffed jointly by police officers from Sudan and several European countries, including Britain, France and Italy — will partly rely on information sourced by N.I.S.S., according to the head of the immigration police department, Gen. Awad Elneil Dhia. The regular police also get occasional support from the R.S.F. on countertrafficking operations in border areas, General Dhia said.

    “They have their presence there and they can help,” General Dhia said. “The police is not everywhere, and we cannot cover everywhere.”

    Yet the Sudanese police are operating in one unexpected place: Europe.

    In a bid to deter future migrants, at least three European countries — Belgium, France and Italy — have allowed in Sudanese police officers to hasten the deportation of Sudanese asylum seekers, General Dhia said.

    Nominally, their official role is simply to identify their citizens. But the officers have been allowed to interrogate some deportation candidates without being monitored by European officials with the language skills to understand what was being said.

    More than 50 Sudanese seeking asylum in Europe have been deported in the past 18 months from Belgium, France and Italy; The New York Times interviewed seven of them on a recent visit to Sudan.

    Four said they had been tortured on their return to Sudan — allegations denied by General Dhia. One man was a Darfuri political dissident deported in late 2017 from France to Khartoum, where he said he was detained on arrival by N.I.S.S. agents.

    Over the next 10 days, he said he was given electric shocks, punched and beaten with metal pipes. At one point the dissident, who asked that his name be withheld for his safety, lost consciousness and had to be taken to the hospital. He was later released on a form of parole.

    The dissident said that, before his deportation from France, Sudanese police officers had threatened him as French officers stood nearby. “I said to the French police: ‘They are going to kill us,’” he said. “But they didn’t understand.”

    European officials argue that establishing Khartoum as a base for collaboration on fighting human smuggling can only improve the Sudanese security forces. The Regional Operational Center in Khartoum, set to open this year, will enable delegates from several European and African countries to share intelligence and coordinate operations against smugglers across North Africa.

    But potential pitfalls are evident from past collaborations. In 2016, the British and Italian police, crediting a joint operation with their Sudanese counterparts, announced the arrest of “one of the world’s most wanted people smugglers.” They said he was an Eritrean called Medhanie Yehdego Mered, who had been captured in Sudan and extradited to Italy.

    The case is now privately acknowledged by Western diplomats to have been one of mistaken identity. The prisoner turned out to be Medhanie Tesfamariam Berhe, an Eritrean refugee with the same first name as the actual smuggler. Mr. Mered remains at large.

    Even General Dhia now admits that Sudan extradited the wrong man — albeit one who, he says, admitted while in Sudanese custody to involvement in smuggling.

    “There were two people, actually — two people with the same name,” General Dhia said.

    Mr. Berhe nevertheless remains on trial in Italy, accused of being Mr. Mered — and of being a smuggler.

    Beyond that, the Sudanese security services have long been accused of profiting from the smuggling trade. Following European pressure, the Sudanese Parliament adopted a raft of anti-smuggling legislation in 2014, and the rules have since led to the prosecution of some officials over alleged involvement in the smuggling business.

    But according to four smugglers whom I interviewed clandestinely during my trip to Sudan, the security services remain closely involved in the trade, with both N.I.S.S and R.S.F. officials receiving part of the smuggling profits on most trips to southern Libya.

    The head of the R.S.F., Brig. Mohammed Hamdan Daglo, has claimed in the past that his forces play a major role in impeding the route to Libya. But each smuggler — interviewed separately — said that the R.S.F. was often the main organizer of the trips, often supplying camouflaged vehicles to ferry migrants through the desert.

    After being handed over to Libyan militias in Kufra and Sabha, in southern Libya, many migrants are then systematically tortured and held for ransom — money that is later shared with the R.S.F., each smuggler said.

    Rights activists have previously accused Sudanese officials of complicity in trafficking. In a 2014 report, Human Rights Watch said that senior Sudanese police officials had colluded in the smuggling of Eritreans.

    A British journalist captured by the R.S.F. in Darfur in 2016 said that he had been told by his captors that they were involved in smuggling people to Libya. “I asked specifically about how it works,” said the journalist, Phil Cox, a freelance filmmaker for Channel 4. “And they said we make sure the routes are open, and we talk with whoever’s commanding the next area.”

    General Dhia said that the problem did not extend beyond a few bad apples. Sudan, he said, remains an effective partner for Europe in the battle against irregular migration.

    “We are not,” he said, “very far from your standards.”

    https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/22/world/africa/migration-european-union-sudan.html
    #Soudan #externalisation #asile #migrations #contrôles_frontaliers #frontières #réfugiés #police_secrète #Europe #UE #EU #processus_de_Khartoum
    signalé par @isskein

    • Sudan : The E.U.’s Partner in Migration Crime

      The first part of our new investigation finds key individuals in the Khartoum regime complicit in #smuggling and trafficking. Reporting from Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea and the Netherlands reveals security services involved in a trade they are meant to police.


      https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/articles/2018/01/19/sudan-the-e-u-s-partner-in-migration-crime
      #soudan #migrations #réfugiés #asile #EU #Europe #complicité #UE #trafic_d'êtres_humains #traite #processus_de_khartoum #Shagarab #Omdurman #Rapid_Support_Forces #RSF #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #Free_Lions

    • Inside the EU’s deeply flawed $200 million migration deal with Sudan

      The EU has allocated over $200 million to help Sudan stem migration since 2015
      Asylum seekers allege Sudanese officials are complicit in abuse, extortion
      Traffickers said to hold people for weeks, beat and torture them for money
      Arrivals in Italy from Horn of Africa fell to a fraction in 2017, but new routes are opening up
      Crackdown has seen asylum seekers rountinely rounded up, taken to Khartoum to pay fines or be deported
      The EU insists strict conditions govern the use of its money and it is monitoring for abuses

      https://www.irinnews.org/special-report/2018/01/30/inside-eu-s-deeply-flawed-200-million-migration-deal-sudan-0

    • Enquête sur les dérives de l’aide européenne au Soudan

      En l’absence d’une prise en compte des causes profondes des migrations, seuls les officiels corrompus et les trafiquants tirent bénéfice de la criminalisation des migrants. Alors que des millions de dollars de fonds de l’Union européenne affluent au Soudan pour endiguer la migration africaine, les demandeurs d’asile témoignent : ils sont pris au piège, et vivent dans un état perpétuel de peur et d’exploitation dans ce pays de transit.

      https://orientxxi.info/magazine/enquete-sur-les-derives-de-l-aide-europeenne-au-soudan,2298

      Traduction française de cet article :
      https://www.irinnews.org/special-report/2018/01/30/inside-eu-s-flawed-200-million-migration-deal-sudan

    • L’Europe collabore avec un dictateur pour mieux expulser vers le Soudan

      Migreurop demande l’arrêt immédiat de toutes les collaborations initiées par l’Union européenne et ses Etats membres avec la dictature d’Omar El-Béchir et avec tout Etat qui bafoue les droits fondamentaux.

      Lorsqu’il s’agit d’expulser des étrangers jugés indésirables, rien ne semble devoir arrêter l’Union européenne (UE) et ses États membres qui n’hésitent pas à se compromettre avec Omar el-Béchir, le chef d’État du Soudan qui fait l’objet de deux mandats d’arrêt internationaux pour génocide, crimes contre l’Humanité et crimes de guerre.

      Il y a longtemps que l’UE a fait le choix de sous-traiter à des pays tiers, sous couvert d’un partenariat inéquitable et avec des fonds issus du développement, la lutte contre l’immigration irrégulière et même la gestion de la demande d’asile. Ce processus d’externalisation, qui s’accompagne de la délocalisation de la surveillance des frontières européennes très en amont de leur matérialisation physique, a été encore renforcé à la suite de la si mal nommée « crise des réfugiés » [1].

      Ainsi, dans le cadre du Processus de Khartoum, initié par l’UE en 2014 et consolidé suite au Sommet de La Valette de fin 2015, les régimes les plus répressifs, tels que le Soudan et l’Erythrée – que des dizaines de milliers de demandeurs d’asile cherchent à fuir – bénéficient de subsides pour retenir leur population et « sécuriser » leurs frontières… sans que l’UE ne se préoccupe des atteintes dramatiques portées aux droits humains dans ces pays.

      Dans ce domaine, l’UE et les États membres agissent de concert. Ainsi, de nombreux pays européens n’hésitent pas à renvoyer vers Khartoum des ressortissants soudanais - peu importe qu’il puisse s’agir de demandeurs d’asile - et à collaborer avec les autorités locales pour faciliter ces expulsions.

      Dernièrement, c’est dans un parc bruxellois que des émissaires soudanais procédaient à l’identification de leurs nationaux en vue de leur retour forcé, semant la terreur parmi les personnes exilées qui y campaient [2].

      Si l’affaire a suscité de vives réactions, le gouvernement belge s’est retranché, pour se justifier, derrière l’exemple donné par ses voisins et continue de programmer des expulsions de ressortissants soudanais [3].
      En France, une coopération similaire existe ainsi depuis 2014 : des représentants de Khartoum auraient visité plusieurs centres de rétention pour identifier des ressortissants soudanais et faciliter leur renvoi [4]. Selon les chiffres dont disposent les associations qui interviennent dans les CRA français, 9 personnes auraient été renvoyées vers le Soudan depuis 2015 et environ 150 remises à l’Italie et exposées au risque d’un renvoi vers Khartoum depuis le territoire italien.

      Par ailleurs, des retours forcés vers le Soudan ont eu lieu depuis l’Allemagne, l’Italie et la Suède, grâce notamment à des accords de police bilatéraux, souvent publiés uniquement à la suite des pressions exercées par la société civile [5] . L’Italie, à l’avant-garde de la vision sécuritaire en matière de collaboration dans le domaine des migrations, a ainsi conclu en août 2016 un accord de coopération policière avec le Soudan, dans le cadre duquel 48 personnes, originaires du Darfour, ont été refoulées à Khartoum. Celles qui ont pu résister à leur renvoi depuis l’Italie ont demandé et obtenu une protection, tandis que cinq des personnes refoulées ont porté plainte auprès de la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme [6].

      Ces accords et pratiques bafouent en effet toutes les obligations des pays européens en matière de respect des droits humains (droit d’asile, principe de non-refoulement, interdiction des expulsions collectives et des traitements inhumains et dégradants, droit à la vie, etc…) et révèlent le cynisme qui anime l’Union et les États-membres, prêts à tout pour refuser aux exilés l’accès au territoire européen.

      Il faut le dire et le répéter : toute forme de coopération avec les autorités soudanaises bafoue les obligations résultant du droit international et met en danger les personnes livrées par les autorités européennes au dictateur Omar el-Béchir.

      Le réseau Migreurop et ses membres demandent en conséquence l’arrêt immédiat des expulsions vers le Soudan et de toute démarche de coopération avec ce pays.

      http://www.migreurop.org/article2837.html

  • ’Nothing is ours anymore’: Kurds forced out of #Afrin after Turkish assault

    Many who fled the violence January say their homes have been given to Arabs.
    When Areen and her clan fled the Turkish assault on Afrin in January, they feared they may never return.

    Six months later, the Kurdish family remain in nearby villages with other Afrin locals who left as the conquering Turks and their Arab proxies swept in, exiling nearly all its residents.

    Recently, strangers from the opposite end of Syria have moved into Areen’s home and those of her family. The few relatives who have made it back for fleeting visits say the numbers of new arrivals – all Arabs – are rising each week. So too is a resentment towards the newcomers, and a fear that the steady, attritional changes may herald yet another flashpoint in the seven-year conflict.

    Unscathed through much of the Syrian war, and a sanctuary for refugees, Afrin has become a focal point of a new and pivotal phase, where the ambitions of regional powers are being laid bare and a coexistence between Arabs and Kurds – delicately poised over decades – is increasingly being threatened.

    The small enclave in northwestern Syria directly reflects the competing agendas of four countries, Turkey, Syria, Russia and the US – though none more so than Ankara, whose creeping influence in the war is anchored in Afrin and the fate of its peoples.

    Turkey’s newfound stake has given it more control over its nearby border and leverage over its arch foe, the Kurdistan Workers’ party (PKK), which had used its presence in Afrin to project its influence northwards.

    But the campaign to oust Kurdish militias has raised allegations that Ankara is quietly orchestrating a demographic shift, changing the balance of Afrin’s population from predominantly Kurdish to majority Arab, and – more importantly to Turkish leaders – changing the composition of its 500-mile border with Syria.

    Ahead of the January assault, the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, said: “We will return Afrin to its rightful owners.”

    Erdoğan’s comments followed a claim by US officials that it would help transform a Kurdish militia it had raised to fight Islamic State in northeastern Syria into a more permanent border force. The announcement incensed Turkish leaders, who had long feared that Syria’s Kurds would use the chaos of war to advance their ambitions – and to move into a 60-mile area between Afrin and the Euphrates river, which was the only part of the border they didn’t inhabit.

    Ankara denies it is attempting to choreograph a demographic shift in Afrin, insisting it aimed only to drive out the PKK, not unaffiliated Kurdish locals.

    “The people of Afrin didn’t choose to live under the PKK,” said a senior Turkish official. “Like Isis, the PKK installed a terrorist administration there by force. Under that administration, rival Kurdish factions were silenced violently. [The military campaign] resulted in the removal of terrorists from Afrin and made it possible for the local population to govern themselves. The vast majority of the new local council consists of Kurds and the council’s chairperson is also Kurdish.”

    Many who remain unable to return to Afrin are unconvinced, particularly as the influx from elsewhere in Syria continues. Both exiles and newcomers confirmed to the Guardian that large numbers of those settling in Afrin came from the Damascus suburb of Ghouta, where an anti-regime opposition surrendered to Russian and Syrian forces in April, and accepted being transferred to northern Syria

    Between bandits, militiamen, and wayfarers, Afrin is barely recognisable, say Kurdish locals who have made it back. “It’s not the Afrin we know,” said Areen, 34. “Too many strange faces. Businesses have been taken over by the Syrians, stores changed to Damascene names, properties gone. We feel like the Palestinians.

    “The Syrian government couldn’t care less to help us reclaim our property, they won’t even help us get back into Afrin. We want to go back, we couldn’t care less if we’re governed by the Kurds or Turks or Assad, we just want our land back.”

    A second Afrin exile, Salah Mohammed, 40, said: “Lands are being confiscated, farms, wheat, furniture, nothing is ours anymore; it’s us versus their guns. It’s difficult to come back, you have to prove the property is yours and get evidence and other nearly impossible papers to reclaim it.

    “There is definitely a demographic change, a lot of Kurds have been forcibly displaced on the count that they’re with the PKK when in fact they weren’t. There are barely any Kurds left in Afrin, no one is helping us go back.”

    Another Afrin local, Shiyar Khalil, 32, said: “When the Kurds try to get back to their house they have to jump through hoops. You cannot deny a demographic change, Kurds are not able to go back. Women are veiled, bars are closed; it’s a deliberate erasing of Kurdish culture.”

    Umm Abdallah, 25, a new arrival from Ghouta said some Kurds had returned to Afrin, but anyone affiliated with Kurdish militias had been denied entry. “I’ve seen about 300 Kurds come back to Afrin with their families in the past month or so. I don’t know whose house I am living in honestly, but it’s been registered at the police station.”

    She said Afrin was lawless and dangerous, with Arab militias whom Turkey had used to lead the assault now holding aegis over the town. “The Turks try to stop the looting but some militias are very malicious,” she said. “They mess with us and the Kurds, it’s not stable here.”

    Both Umm Abdallah and another Ghouta resident, Abu Khaled Abbas, 23, had their homes confiscated by the Assad regime before fleeing to the north. “The Assad army stole everything, even the sinks,” said Abbas.

    “These militias now are not leaving anyone alone [in Afrin], how do you think they will treat the Kurds? There are bad things happening, murder, harassment, rapes, and theft. They believe they ‘freed’ the land so they own it now.”


    https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/07/too-many-strange-faces-kurds-fear-forced-demographic-shift-in-afrin
    #Kurdes #Kurdistan #occupation #dépossession #Syrie #déplacés_internes #IDPs #destruction
    cc @tchaala_la

  • #Seymour_Hersh on spies, state secrets, and the stories he doesn’t tell - Columbia Journalism Review
    https://www.cjr.org/special_report/seymour-hersh-monday-interview.php

    Bob Woodward once said his worst source was Kissinger because he never told the truth. Who was your worst source?

    Oh, I wouldn’t tell you.

  • Defying the gaze of others in Abu Bakr Shawky’s Yomeddine |
    Adham Youssef
    June 1, 2018
    MadaMasr

    https://www.madamasr.com/en/2018/06/01/feature/culture/defying-the-gaze-of-others-in-abu-bakr-shawkys-yomeddine

    After finishing my interview with director Abu Bakr Shawky and producer Dina Emam at this year’s Cannes Film Festival, I move to my next scheduled meeting — a group discussion with a Kenyan director about her film, which is screening in the Un Certain Regard competition. Shawky is conducting an interview with a foreign journalist nearby, and I can’t help but overhear their conversation. The reporter asks him about the “political and religious messages” behind his debut feature and Palme d’Or contender, Yomeddine (2018).

    Later, when I meet with Shawky again, I ask him to comment on that question. “Wherever there is a good story I will go,” he says. “There is an expectation from Middle Eastern films that they have to be about politics and religion, but I don’t want to do that anymore. Not because they are irrelevant, but I watch films from the United States, Europe and Asia that are not political, and I like them. So why can’t a Middle Eastern film not be political in the traditional sense and still be considered enjoyable and significant?”

    There were three other Arabic-language films in Cannes this year; Nadine Labaki’s Cafarnaüm (2018), a Lebanese drama about poor children and migrants in the informal housing areas of Beirut; Gaya Jiji’s My Favourite Fabric (2018), a film that tackles female sexuality and the Syrian revolution (guaranteed to be a hit with Western audiences); and Sofia, Meryem BenMbarek’s story about premarital pregnancy in Morocco. Yomeddine stood out among them as a different narrative that is placed within a specific context, yet is universally appealing and relatable nonetheless.

  • Names and ages of Palestinians killed by Israeli troops in Gaza

    These are the names of the unarmed Palestinians shot dead by Israeli troops since Friday 30 March, 2018. They were protesting at the Gaza border for the right of return to their ancestral lands and homes, from which they were driven out in 1948. The list does not include the many thousands wounded by live fire.

    Name and age of victims :
    01. Omar Wahid Samour, 31 years old
    02. Mohammed Kamal al-Najjar, 25 years old
    03. Jihad Zuhair Abu Jamous, 30 years old
    04. Amin Mansour Abu Muammar, 22 years old
    05. Ibrahim Salah Abu Sha’er, 17 years old
    06. Nagy Abdullah Abu Hjeir, 25 years old
    07. Musab Zuhair Al-Soloul, 23 years old
    08. Abd al-Qader Mardi al-Hawajri, 42 years old
    09. Mahmoud Saadi Rahmi, 23 years old
    10. Mohammed Naeem Abu Amro, 26.
    11. Ahmed Ibrahim Ashour Odeh, 19.
    12. Jihad Ahmed Farina, 34 years old
    13. Abdel-Fattah Abdel-Nabi, 18 years old
    14. Bader Fayiq al-Sabbagh, 22 years old
    15. Sari Walid Abu Odeh, 27 years old
    16. Hamdan Isma’il Abu Amsha, 23 years old
    17. Fares Al-Ruqab, 29 years old
    18. Ahmad Omar Arafah, 25 years old
    19. Osama Khamis Qdeih, 38 years old
    20. Majdi Ramadan Shabat, 38 years old
    21. Hussein Muhammad Adnan Madi, 13 years old
    22. Subhi Abu Atawi, 20 years old
    23. Mohammad Said al-Haj-Saleh, 33 years old
    24. Sedqi Faraj Abu Atawi, 45 years old
    25. Alaa al-Din Yahya Ismail al-Zamli, 15 years old
    26. Hamza Abd al-Al, 20 years old
    27. Yaser Murtaja, 30 years old
    28. Ibrahim Al-‘ur, 19 years old
    29. Mujahed Nabil Al-Khudari, 25 years old
    30. Marwan Odeh Qdeih, 45 years old
    31. Mohammed Hjeila, 30 years old
    32. Abdallah Al-Shahri, 28 years old
    33. Tahrir Wahba, 17 years old
    34. Saad Abu Taha, 29 years old
    35. Mohammed Ayoub, 15 years old
    36. Ahmed Abu Hussein, 25 years old
    37. Abdullah Shamali, 20 years old
    38. Ahmad Rashad Al Athamna, 23 years old
    39. Ahmed Nabil Aqel, 25 years old
    40. Mahmoud Wahba, 18 years old
    41. Ahmed Dabour, 23 years old
    42. Ayed Hamaydeh, 23 years old
    43, Amjad Qartous, 18 years old
    44. Hesham Abdul-Al, 22 years old
    45. Abd al-Salam Bakr, 29 years old
    46. Mohammed Amin al-Maqeer, 21 years old
    47. Khalil Na’im Mustafa Atallah, 22 years old
    48. Azzam Oweida, 15 years old
    49. Anas Shawqi, 19 years old
    50. Jaber Salem Abu Mustafa, 40 years old
    51. Amin Mahmoud Muammar, 26 years old
    52. Hani Fayez al-Ardarba, 23 years old
    53. Mohammed Khaled Abu Reida, 20 years old
    54. Jamal Abu Arahman Afaneh, 15 years old
    55. Laila Anwar Al-Ghandoor, 8 months old
    56. Ezz el-din Musa Mohamed Alsamaak, 14 years old
    57. Wisaal Fadl Ezzat Alsheikh Khalil, 15 years old
    58. Ahmed Adel Musa Alshaer, 16 years old
    59. Saeed Mohamed Abu Alkheir, 16 years old
    60. Ibrahim Ahmed Alzarqa, 18 years old
    61. Eman Ali Sadiq Alsheikh, 19 years old
    62. Zayid Mohamed Hasan Omar, 19 years old
    63. Motassem Fawzy Abu Louley, 20 years old
    64. Anas Hamdan Salim Qadeeh, 21 years old
    65. Mohamed Abd Alsalam Harz, 21 years old
    66. Yehia Ismail Rajab Aldaqoor, 22 years old
    67. Mustafa Mohamed Samir Mahmoud Almasry, 22 years old
    68. Ezz Eldeen Nahid Aloyutey, 23 years old
    69. Mahmoud Mustafa Ahmed Assaf, 23 years old
    70. Ahmed Fayez Harb Shahadah, 23 years old
    71. Ahmed Awad Allah, 24 years old
    72. Khalil Ismail Khalil Mansor, 25 years old
    73. Mohamed Ashraf Abu Sitta, 26 years old
    74. Bilal Ahmed Abu Diqah, 26 years old
    75. Ahmed Majed Qaasim Ata Allah, 27 years old
    76. Mahmoud Rabah Abu Maamar, 28 years old
    77. Musab Yousef Abu Leilah, 28 years old
    78. Ahmed Fawzy Altetr, 28 years old
    79. Mohamed Abdelrahman Meqdad, 28 years old
    80. Obaidah Salim Farhan, 30 years old
    81. Jihad Mufid Al-Farra, 30 years old
    82. Fadi Hassan Abu Salah, 30 years old
    83. Motaz Bassam Kamil Al-Nunu, 31 years old
    84. Mohammed Riyad Abdulrahman Alamudi, 31 years old
    85. Jihad Mohammed Othman Mousa, 31 years old
    86. Shahir Mahmoud Mohammed Almadhoon, 32 years old
    87. Mousa Jabr Abdulsalam Abu Hasnayn, 35 years old
    88. Mohammed Mahmoud Abdulmoti Abdal’al, 39 years old
    89. Ahmed Mohammed Ibrahim Hamdan, 27 years old
    90. Ismail Khalil Ramadhan Aldaahuk, 30 years old
    91. Ahmed Mahmoud Mohammed Alrantisi, 27 years old
    92. Alaa Alnoor Ahmed Alkhatib, 28 years old
    93. Mahmoud Yahya Abdawahab Hussain, 24 years old
    94. Ahmed Abdullah Aladini, 30 years old
    95. Saadi Said Fahmi Abu Salah, 16 years old
    96. Ahmed Zahir Hamid Alshawa, 24 years old
    97. Mohammed Hani Hosni Alnajjar, 33 years old
    98. Fadl Mohamed Ata Habshy, 34 years old
    99. Mokhtar Kaamil Salim Abu Khamash, 23 years old
    100. Mahmoud Wael Mahmoud Jundeyah, 21 years old
    101. Abdulrahman Sami Abu Mattar, 18 years old
    102. Ahmed Salim Alyaan Aljarf, 26 years old
    103. Mahmoud Sulayman Ibrahim Aql, 32 years old
    104. Mohamed Hasan Mustafa Alabadilah, 25 years old
    105. Kamil Jihad Kamil Mihna, 19 years old
    106. Mahmoud Saber Hamad Abu Taeemah, 23 years old
    107. Ali Mohamed Ahmed Khafajah, 21 years old
    108. Abdelsalam Yousef Abdelwahab, 39 years old
    109. Mohamed Samir Duwedar, 27 years old
    110. Talal Adel Ibrahim Mattar, 16 years old
    111. Omar Jomaa Abu Ful, 30 years old
    112. Nasser Ahmed Mahmoud Ghrab, 51 years old
    113. Bilal Badeer Hussein Al-Ashram, 18 years old
    114. Unidentified
    115. Unidentified
    116. Unidentified

    –-> https://medium.com/@thepalestineproject/names-and-ages-of-palestinians-killed-by-israeli-troops-in-gaza-29bad3a12db6

  • Des demandeurs d’asile soudanais torturés dans leur pays après avoir été expulsés par la #France

    Une enquête du New York Times a révélé dimanche soir que plusieurs demandeurs d’asile soudanais renvoyés par la France, l’#Italie et la #Belgique, avaient été torturés à leur retour dans leur pays d’origine.

    https://www.lejdd.fr/international/des-demandeurs-dasile-soudanais-tortures-dans-leur-pays-apres-avoir-ete-expuls
    #torture #asile #migrations #réfugiés #renvois #expulsions #réfugiés_soudanais #Soudan

    via @isskein sur FB

    • Et ici l’article du New York Times, repris par Lejdd :

      By Stifling Migration, Sudan’s Feared Secret Police Aid Europe

      At Sudan’s eastern border, Lt. Samih Omar led two patrol cars slowly over the rutted desert, past a cow’s carcass, before halting on the unmarked 2,000-mile route that thousands of East Africans follow each year in trying to reach the Mediterranean, and then onward to Europe.

      His patrols along this border with Eritrea are helping Sudan crack down on one of the busiest passages on the European migration trail. Yet Lieutenant Omar is no simple border agent. He works for Sudan’s feared secret police, whose leaders are accused of war crimes — and, more recently, whose officers have been accused of torturing migrants.

      Indirectly, he is also working for the interests of the European Union.

      “Sometimes,” Lieutenant Omar said, “I feel this is Europe’s southern border.”

      Three years ago, when a historic tide of migrants poured into Europe, many leaders there reacted with open arms and high-minded idealism. But with the migration crisis having fueled angry populism and political upheaval across the Continent, the European Union is quietly getting its hands dirty, stanching the human flow, in part, by outsourcing border management to countries with dubious human rights records.

      In practical terms, the approach is working: The number of migrants arriving in Europe has more than halved since 2016. But many migration advocates say the moral cost is high.
      To shut off the sea route to Greece, the European Union is paying billions of euros to a Turkish government that is dismantling its democracy. In Libya, Italy is accused of bribing some of the same militiamen who have long profited from the European smuggling trade — many of whom are also accused of war crimes.

      In Sudan, crossed by migrants trying to reach Libya, the relationship is more opaque but rooted in mutual need: The Europeans want closed borders and the Sudanese want to end years of isolation from the West. Europe continues to enforce an arms embargo against Sudan, and many Sudanese leaders are international pariahs, accused of committing war crimes during a civil war in Darfur, a region in western Sudan

      But the relationship is unmistakably deepening. A recent dialogue, named the Khartoum Process (in honor of Sudan’s capital) has become a platform for at least 20 international migration conferences between European Union officials and their counterparts from several African countries, including Sudan. The European Union has also agreed that Khartoum will act as a nerve center for countersmuggling collaboration.

      While no European money has been given directly to any Sudanese government body, the bloc has funneled 106 million euros — or about $131 million — into the country through independent charities and aid agencies, mainly for food, health and sanitation programs for migrants, and for training programs for local officials.

      “While we engage on some areas for the sake of the Sudanese people, we still have a sanction regime in place,” said Catherine Ray, a spokeswoman for the European Union, referring to an embargo on arms and related material.

      “We are not encouraging Sudan to curb migration, but to manage migration in a safe and dignified way,” Ms. Ray added.

      Ahmed Salim, the director of one of the nongovernmental groups that receives European funding, said the bloc was motivated by both self-interest and a desire to improve the situation in Sudan.

      “They don’t want migrants to cross the Mediterranean to Europe,” said Mr. Salim, who heads the European and African Center for Research, Training and Development.

      But, he said, the money his organization receives means better services for asylum seekers in Sudan. “You have to admit that the European countries want to do something to protect migrants here,” he said.

      Critics argue the evolving relationship means that European leaders are implicitly reliant on — and complicit in the reputational rehabilitation of — a Sudanese security apparatus whose leaders have been accused by the United Nations of committing war crimes in Darfur.

      “There is no direct money exchanging hands,” said Suliman Baldo, the author of a research paper about Europe’s migration partnership with Sudan. “But the E.U. basically legitimizes an abusive force.”

      On the border near Abu Jamal, Lieutenant Omar and several members of his patrol are from the wing of the Sudanese security forces headed by Salah Abdallah Gosh, one of several Sudanese officials accused of orchestrating attacks on civilians in Darfur.

      Elsewhere, the border is protected by the Rapid Support Forces, a division of the Sudanese military that was formed from the janjaweed militias who led attacks on civilians in the Darfur conflict. The focus of the group, known as R.S.F., is not counter-smuggling — but roughly a quarter of the people-smugglers caught in January and February this year on the Eritrean border were apprehended by the R.S.F., Lieutenant Omar said.

      European officials have direct contact only with the Sudanese immigration police, and not with the R.S.F., or the security forces that Lieutenant Omar works for, known as N.I.S.S. But their operations are not that far removed.

      The planned countertrafficking coordination center in Khartoum — staffed jointly by police officers from Sudan and several European countries, including Britain, France and Italy — will partly rely on information sourced by N.I.S.S., according to the head of the immigration police department, Gen. Awad Elneil Dhia. The regular police also get occasional support from the R.S.F. on countertrafficking operations in border areas, General Dhia said.

      “They have their presence there and they can help,” General Dhia said. “The police is not everywhere, and we cannot cover everywhere.”

      Yet the Sudanese police are operating in one unexpected place: Europe.

      In a bid to deter future migrants, at least three European countries — Belgium, France and Italy — have allowed in Sudanese police officers to hasten the deportation of Sudanese asylum seekers, General Dhia said.

      Nominally, their official role is simply to identify their citizens. But the officers have been allowed to interrogate some deportation candidates without being monitored by European officials with the language skills to understand what was being said.

      More than 50 Sudanese seeking asylum in Europe have been deported in the past 18 months from Belgium, France and Italy; The New York Times interviewed seven of them on a recent visit to Sudan.

      Four said they had been tortured on their return to Sudan — allegations denied by General Dhia. One man was a Darfuri political dissident deported in late 2017 from France to Khartoum, where he said he was detained on arrival by N.I.S.S. agents.

      Over the next 10 days, he said he was given electric shocks, punched and beaten with metal pipes. At one point the dissident, who asked that his name be withheld for his safety, lost consciousness and had to be taken to the hospital. He was later released on a form of parole.
      The dissident said that, before his deportation from France, Sudanese police officers had threatened him as French officers stood nearby. “I said to the French police: ‘They are going to kill us,’” he said. “But they didn’t understand.”

      European officials argue that establishing Khartoum as a base for collaboration on fighting human smuggling can only improve the Sudanese security forces. The Regional Operational Center in Khartoum, set to open this year, will enable delegates from several European and African countries to share intelligence and coordinate operations against smugglers across North Africa.

      But potential pitfalls are evident from past collaborations. In 2016, the British and Italian police, crediting a joint operation with their Sudanese counterparts, announced the arrest of “one of the world’s most wanted people smugglers.” They said he was an Eritrean called Medhanie Yehdego Mered, who had been captured in Sudan and extradited to Italy.

      The case is now privately acknowledged by Western diplomats to have been one of mistaken identity. The prisoner turned out to be Medhanie Tesfamariam Berhe, an Eritrean refugee with the same first name as the actual smuggler. Mr. Mered remains at large.

      Even General Dhia now admits that Sudan extradited the wrong man — albeit one who, he says, admitted while in Sudanese custody to involvement in smuggling.

      “There were two people, actually — two people with the same name,” General Dhia said.

      Mr. Berhe nevertheless remains on trial in Italy, accused of being Mr. Mered — and of being a smuggler.

      Beyond that, the Sudanese security services have long been accused of profiting from the smuggling trade. Following European pressure, the Sudanese Parliament adopted a raft of anti-smuggling legislation in 2014, and the rules have since led to the prosecution of some officials over alleged involvement in the smuggling business.

      But according to four smugglers whom I interviewed clandestinely during my trip to Sudan, the security services remain closely involved in the trade, with both N.I.S.S and R.S.F. officials receiving part of the smuggling profits on most trips to southern Libya.

      The head of the R.S.F., Brig. Mohammed Hamdan Daglo, has claimed in the past that his forces play a major role in impeding the route to Libya. But each smuggler — interviewed separately — said that the R.S.F. was often the main organizer of the trips, often supplying camouflaged vehicles to ferry migrants through the desert.

      After being handed over to Libyan militias in Kufra and Sabha, in southern Libya, many migrants are then systematically tortured and held for ransom — money that is later shared with the R.S.F., each smuggler said.

      Rights activists have previously accused Sudanese officials of complicity in trafficking. In a 2014 report, Human Rights Watch said that senior Sudanese police officials had colluded in the smuggling of Eritreans.

      A British journalist captured by the R.S.F. in Darfur in 2016 said that he had been told by his captors that they were involved in smuggling people to Libya. “I asked specifically about how it works,” said the journalist, Phil Cox, a freelance filmmaker for Channel 4. “And they said we make sure the routes are open, and we talk with whoever’s commanding the next area.”

      General Dhia said that the problem did not extend beyond a few bad apples. Sudan, he said, remains an effective partner for Europe in the battle against irregular migration.

      “We are not,” he said, “very far from your standards.”

      https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/22/world/africa/migration-european-union-sudan.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSo
      #externalisation

    • Soudan : des demandeurs d’asile torturés après avoir été expulsés par la France

      Un dissident politique du #Darfour, expulsé par la France fin 2017, affirme notamment avoir été électrocuté, battu et frappé avec des tuyaux en métal pendant dix jours.
      En Belgique, c’est un scandale. En France, le silence est... assourdissant. Dans une grande enquête, publiée dimanche 22 avril, le « New York Times » révèle que des demandeurs d’asile soudanais renvoyés par la France, l’Italie et la Belgique, ont été torturés à leur retour dans leur pays.

      Une enquête de Streetpress, publiée en octobre dernier, révélait déjà que la police française collaborait étroitement, et depuis 2014, avec la dictature soudanaise, et favorisait « le renvoi à Khartoum d’opposants politiques réfugiés en France ». Le titre de Streetpress parlait de lui-même : « Comment la France a livré des opposants politiques à la dictature soudanaise ».
      Le quotidien américain a de son côté retrouvé des demandeurs d’asile et a publié les témoignages de quatre d’entre eux. Ils ont été arrêtés dès leur retour puis torturés par le régime soudanais. Un dissident politique du Darfour expulsé par la France fin 2017, affirme ainsi avoir été électrocuté, battu et frappé avec des tuyaux en métal pendant dix jours. Il affirme qu’avant son expulsion, des officiers de police soudanais l’ont menacé en présence d’officiers français :
      ""Je leur ai dit : ’Ils vont nous tuer’, mais ils n’ont pas compris.""
      Des policiers soudanais dans des centres de rétention

      Interrogé par le « New York Times », le régime du général Omar el-Béchir dément. Le dictateur, qui dirige depuis 28 ans le Soudan, est visé par un mandat d’arrêt en 2008 de la Cour pénale internationale pour génocide, crimes contre l’humanité et crimes de guerre, comme le rappelle « le Journal du dimanche ».

      Comme l’écrit le quotidien américain, la Belgique, la France et l’Italie ont autorisé des « officiels soudanais » à pénétrer dans leurs centres de rétention et à interroger des demandeurs d’asile soudanais. Ces « officiels » étaient en réalité des policiers soudanais. Selon le « New York Times », les entretiens dans les centres de rétention entre les « officiels » soudanais et les demandeurs d’asile se seraient faits « en l’absence de fonctionnaire capable de traduire les propos échangés ».

      En Belgique, les révélations sur les expulsions de demandeurs d’asile soudanais ont provoqué de vives tensions. En septembre dernier, le Premier ministre belge Charles Michel a reconnu devant une commission d’enquête de son Parlement que les polices de plusieurs pays européens collaboraient étroitement avec la dictature soudanaise d’Omar el-Béchir.

      https://www.nouvelobs.com/monde/20180424.OBS5650/soudan-des-demandeurs-d-asile-tortures-apres-avoir-ete-expulses-par-la-fr

    • Et, signalé par @isskein sur FB, un communiqué de Migreurop qui date d’il y a une année. Rappel :

      L’Europe collabore avec un dictateur pour mieux expulser vers le Soudan

      Migreurop demande l’arrêt immédiat de toutes les collaborations initiées par l’Union européenne et ses Etats membres avec la dictature d’Omar El-Béchir et avec tout Etat qui bafoue les droits fondamentaux.

      http://www.migreurop.org/article2837.html

  • The biography of the founder of the Palestinian Popular Front makes it clear: The leftist leader was right -

    Israelis considered George Habash a cruel airline hijacker, but Eli Galia’s new Hebrew-language book shows that the PFLP chief’s views would have been better for the Palestinians than Arafat’s compromises

    Gideon Levy Apr 13, 2018

    https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/.premium-biography-makes-it-clear-this-palestinian-leftist-leader-was-right

    George Habash was Israel’s absolute enemy for decades, the embodiment of evil, the devil incarnate. Even the title “Dr.” before his name — he was a pediatrician — was considered blasphemous.
    Habash was plane hijackings, Habash was terror and terror alone. In a country that doesn’t recognize the existence of Palestinian political parties (have you ever heard of a Palestinian political party? — there are only terror groups) knowledge about the man who headed the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine was close to zero.
    What’s there to know about him? A terrorist. Subhuman. Should be killed. Enemy. The fact that he was an ideologue and a revolutionary, that his life was shaped by the expulsion from Lod, changed nothing. He remains the plane hijacker from Damascus, the man from the Rejectionist Front who was no different from all the rest of the “terrorists” from Yasser Arafat to Wadie Haddad to Nayef Hawatmeh.
    Now along comes Eli Galia’s Hebrew-language book “George Habash: A Political Biography." It outlines the reality, far from the noise of propaganda, ignorance and brainwashing, for the Israeli reader who agrees to read a biography of the enemy.
    Presumably only few will read it, but this work by Galia, a Middle East affairs expert, is very deserving of praise. It’s a political biography, as noted in its subtitle, so it almost entirely lacks the personal, spiritual and psychological dimension; there’s not even any gossip. So reading it requires a lot of stamina and specialized tastes. Still, it’s fascinating.
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    Galia has written a nonjudgmental and certainly non-propagandistic biography. Taking into consideration the Israeli mind today, this isn’t to be taken for granted.
    Galia presents a wealth of information, with nearly a thousand footnotes, about the political path of Habash, a man who was considered dogmatic even though he underwent a number of ideological reversals in his life. If that’s dogmatism, what’s pragmatism? The dogmatic Habash went through more ideological changes than any Israeli who sticks to the Zionist narrative and doesn’t budge an inch — and who of course isn’t considered dogmatic.

    The exodus from Lod following an operation by the Palmach, 1948.Palmach Archive / Yitzhak Sadeh Estate
    In the book, Habash is revealed as a person of many contradictions: a member of the Christian minority who was active in the midst of a large Muslim majority, a bourgeois who became a Marxist, a tough and inflexible leader who was once seen weeping in his room as he wrote an article about Israel’s crimes against his people. He had to wander and flee for his life from place to place, sometimes more for fear of Arab regimes than of Israel.

    He was imprisoned in Syria and fled Jordan, he devoted his life to a revolution that never happened. It’s impossible not to admire a person who devoted his life to his ideas, just as you have to admire the scholar who has devoted so much research for so few readers who will take an interest in the dead Habash, in an Israel that has lost any interest in the occupation and the Palestinian struggle.
    The book gives rise to the bleak conclusion that Habash was right. For most of his life he was a bitter enemy of compromises, and Arafat, the man of compromise, won the fascinating historical struggle between the two. They had a love-hate relationship, alternately admiring and scorning each other, and never completely breaking off their connection until Arafat won his Pyrrhic victory.
    What good have all of Arafat’s compromises done for the Palestinian people? What came out of the recognition of Israel, of the settling for a Palestinian state on 22 percent of the territory, of the negotiations with Zionism and the United States? Nothing but the entrenchment of the Israeli occupation and the strengthening and massive development of the settlement project.
    In retrospect, it makes sense to think that if that’s how things were, maybe it would have been better to follow the uncompromising path taken by Habash, who for most of his life didn’t agree to any negotiations with Israel, who believed that with Israel it was only possible to negotiate by force, who thought Israel would only change its positions if it paid a price, who dreamed of a single, democratic and secular state of equal rights and refused to discuss anything but that.
    Unfortunately, Habash was right. It’s hard to know what would have happened had the Palestinians followed his path, but it’s impossible not to admit that the alternative has been a resounding failure.

    Members of the Palestinian National Council in Algiers, 1987, including Yasser Arafat, left, and George Habash, second from right. Mike Nelson-Nabil Ismail / AFP
    The Palestinian Che Guevara
    Habash, who was born in 1926, wrote about his childhood: “Our enemies are not the Jews but rather the British .... The Jews’ relations with the Palestinians were natural and sometimes even good” (p. 16). He went to study medicine at the American University in Beirut; his worried mother and father wrote him that he should stay there; a war was on.
    But Habash returned to volunteer at a clinic in Lod; he returned and he saw. The sight of the Israeli soldiers who invaded the clinic in 1948 ignited in him the flame of violent resistance: “I was gripped by an urge to shoot them with a pistol and kill them, and in the situation of having no weapons I used mute words. I watched them from the sidelines and said to myself: This is our land, you dogs, this is our land and not your land. We will stay here to kill you. You will not win this battle” (p.22).
    On July 14 he was expelled from his home with the rest of his family. He never returned to the city he loved. He never forgot the scenes of Lod in 1948, nor did he forget the idea of violent resistance. Can the Israeli reader understand how he felt?
    Now based in Beirut, he took part in terror operations against Jewish and Western targets in Beirut, Amman and Damascus: “I personally lobbed grenades and I participated in assassination attempts. I had endless enthusiasm when I was doing that. At the time, I considered my life worthless relative to what was happening in Palestine.”
    “The Palestinian Che Guevara” — both of them were doctors — made up his mind to wreak vengeance for the Nakba upon the West and the leaders of the Arab regimes that had abandoned his people, even before taking vengeance on the Jews. He even planned to assassinate King Abdullah of Jordan. He founded a new student organization in Beirut called the Commune, completed his specialization in pediatrics and wrote: “I took the diploma and said: Congratulations, Mother, your son is a doctor, so now let me do what I really want to do. And indeed, that’s what happened” (p. 41).
    Habash was once asked whether he was the Che Guevara of the Middle East and he replied that he would prefer to be the Mao Zedong of the Arab masses. He was the first to raise the banner of return and in the meantime he opened clinics for Palestinian refugees in Amman. For him, the road back to Lod passed through Amman, Beirut and Damascus. The idea of Pan-Arabism stayed with him for many years, until he despaired of that as well.
    He also had to leave medicine: “I am a pediatrician, I have enjoyed this greatly. I believed that I had the best job in the world but I had to make the decision I have taken and I don’t regret it .... A person cannot split his emotions in that way: to heal on the one hand and kill on the other. This is the time when he must say to himself: one or the other.”

    Militants from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Jordan, 1969.1969Thomas R. Koeniges / Look Magazine Photograph Collection / Library of Congress
    The only remaining weapon
    This book isn’t arrogant and it isn’t Orientalist; it is respectful of the Palestinian national ideology and those who articulated and lived it, even if the author doesn’t necessarily agree with that ideology or identify with it. This is something quite rare in the Israeli landscape when it comes to Arabs in general and Palestinians in particular. Nor does the author venerate what’s not worthy of veneration, and he doesn’t have any erroneous romantic or other illusions. Galia presents a bitter, tough, uncompromising, very much failed and sometimes exceedingly cruel struggle for freedom, self-respect and liberation.
    And this is what is said in the founding document of the PFLP, which Habash established in December 1967 after having despaired of Palestinian unity: “The only weapon left to the masses in order to restore history and progress and truly defeat enemies and potential enemies in the long run is revolutionary violence .... The only language that the enemy understands is the language of revolutionary violence” (p.125).
    But this path too met with failure. “The essential aim of hijacking airplanes,” wrote Habash, “was to bring the Palestinian question out of anonymity and expose it to Western public opinion, because at that time it was unknown in Europe and in the United States. We wanted to undertake actions that would make an impression on the senses of the entire world .... There was international ignorance regarding our suffering, in part due to the Zionist movement’s monopoly on the mass media in the West” (p. 151).
    The PFLP plane hijackings in the early 1970s indeed achieved international recognition of the existence of the Palestinian problem, but so far this recognition hasn’t led anywhere. The only practical outcome has been the security screenings at airports everywhere around the world — and thank you, George Habash. I read Galia’s book on a number of flights, even though this isn’t an airplane book, and I kept thinking that were it not for Habash my wanderings at airports would have been a lot shorter. In my heart I forgave him for that, for what other path was open to him and his defeated, humiliated and bleeding people?
    Not much is left of his ideas. What has come of the scientific idealism and the politicization of the masses, the class struggle and the anti-imperialism, the Maoism and of course the transformation of the struggle against Israel into an armed struggle, which according to the plans was supposed to develop from guerrilla warfare into a national war of liberation? Fifty years after the founding of the PFLP and 10 years after the death of its founder, what remains?
    Habash’s successor, Abu Ali Mustafa, was assassinated by Israel in 2001; his successor’s successor, Ahmad Saadat, has been in an Israeli prison since 2006 and very little remains of the PFLP.
    During all my decades covering the Israeli occupation, the most impressive figures I met belonged to the PFLP, but now not much remains except fragments of dreams. The PFLP is a negligible minority in intra-Palestinian politics, a movement that once thought to demand equal power with Fatah and its leader, Arafat. And the occupation? It’s strong and thriving and its end looks further off than ever. If that isn’t failure, what is?

    A mourning procession for George Habash, Nablus, January 2008. Nasser Ishtayeh / AP
    To where is Israel galloping?
    Yet Habash always knew how to draw lessons from failure after failure. How resonant today is his conclusion following the Naksa, the defeat in 1967 that broke his spirit, to the effect that “the enemy of the Palestinians is colonialism, capitalism and the global monopolies .... This is the enemy that gave rise to the Zionist movement, made a covenant with it, nurtured it, protected it and accompanied it until it brought about the establishment of the aggressive and fascistic State of Israel” (p. 179).
    From the Palestinian perspective, not much has changed. It used to be that this was read in Israel as hostile and shallow propaganda. Today it could be read otherwise.
    After the failure of 1967, Habash redefined the goal: the establishment of a democratic state in Palestine in which Arabs and Jews would live as citizens with equal rights. Today this idea, too, sounds a bit less strange and threatening than it did when Habash articulated it.
    On the 40th anniversary of Israel’s founding, Habash wrote that Israel was galloping toward the Greater Land of Israel and that the differences between the right and left in the country were becoming meaningless. How right he was about that, too. At the same time, he acknowledged Israel’s success and the failure of the Palestinian national movement. And he was right about that, too.
    And one last correct prophecy, though a bitter one, that he made in 1981: “The combination of a loss of lives and economic damage has considerable influence on Israeli society, and when that happens there will be a political, social and ideological schism on the Israeli street and in the Zionist establishment between the moderate side that demands withdrawal from the occupied territories and the extremist side that continues to cling to Talmudic ideas and dreams. Given the hostility between these two sides, the Zionist entity will experience a real internal split” (p. 329).
    This has yet to happen.
    Imad Saba, a dear friend who was active in the PFLP and is in exile in Europe, urged me for years to try to meet with Habash and interview him for Haaretz. As far as is known, Habash never met with Israelis, except during the days of the Nakba.
    Many years ago in Amman I interviewed Hawatmeh, Habash’s partner at the start and the leader of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which split off from the PFLP in 1969. At the time of the interview, Habash was also living in Amman and was old and sick. I kept postponing my approach — until he died. When reading the book, I felt very sorry that I had not met this man.

  • La Journée de la Terre. La résilience du peuple palestinien abandonné. - RipouxBliquedesCumulardsVentrusGrosQ
    http://slisel.over-blog.com/2018/04/la-journee-de-la-terre.la-resilience-du-peuple-palestinien-abandon

    Photo : Sans abri à Gaza, source : nybooks.com

    « Si cette immigration des juifs en Palestine avait eu pour but de leur permettre de vivre à nos côtés, en jouissant des mêmes droits et en ayant les mêmes devoirs, nous leur aurions ouvert les portes, dans la mesure où notre sol pouvait les accueillir. (…) Mais que le but de cette émigration soit d’usurper notre terre, de nous disperser et de faire de nous des citoyens de deuxième catégorie, c’est là une chose que nul ne peut raisonnablement exiger de nous. C’est pour cela que, dès le début, notre révolution n’a pas été motivée par des facteurs raciaux ou religieux. Elle n’a jamais été dirigée contre l’homme juif en tant que tel, mais contre le sionisme raciste et l’agression flagrante. » (Yasser Arafat)

    Vendredi 30 mars un massacre de plus que celui de 17Palestiniens coupables de protester contre la condition infra-humaine dans la prison à ciel ouvert qu’est Gaza. Toutes factions confondues, les Palestiniens promettent de protester pacifiquement pendant un mois et demi jusqu’au 15 mai mettant à profit la journée de la Terre pour protester contre l’occupation illégale de leur territoire d’où ils furent chassés en 1948 Le 15 mai coïncide avec l’inauguration controversée de l’ambassade américaine à Jérusalem. C’est aussi la commémoration de la catastrophe (Nakba) subie par les Palestiniens lors de la création d’Israël (1948). Ils furent plus de 700 000 à fuir leur terre pour trouver refuge dans la bande de Ghaza, en Jordanie, au Liban, en Syrie. Leur enfermement et la grave crise humanitaire qui sévit à Ghaza donnent plus que jamais corps à la question du « droit au retour ». Cette demande dont les dirigeants israéliens n’en veulent à aucun prix, au contraire encourageant des juifs de la Diaspora au nom de la loi du Retour de revenir quand ils veulent en Palestine, prendre la place des exclus et pousser de plus en plus les Palestiniens restants à partir.

    Tuer délibérément « grâce aux snipers »

    Pour Ibraheem Abu Mustafa de Reuters : « Des dizaines de milliers de Palestiniens, des femmes et des enfants, ont convergé vendredi le long de la barrière frontalière qui sépare la bande de Ghaza d’Israël dans le cadre de ´´la grande marche du retour´´. Ce mouvement de protestation durera six semaines pour exiger le ´´droit au retour´´ des réfugiés palestiniens et dénoncer le strict blocus de Ghaza. Des dizaines de Palestiniens se sont approchés à quelques centaines de mètres de cette barrière ultra-sécurisée, régulièrement le théâtre de heurts sanglants contre les habitants de l’enclave par les soldats. Ces derniers ont tiré des balles réelles et fait usage de gaz lacrymogène. Selon le ministère de la Santé dans la bande de Ghaza, 16 Palestiniens ont été tués et plus de 1410 blessés dans les affrontements avec l’armée israélienne. La ´´grande marche du retour´´ a lieu à l’occasion de la ´´Journée de la Terre´´, qui marque chaque 30 mars la mort en 1976 de six Arabes israéliens pendant des manifestations contre la confiscation de terres par Israël. Les Arabes israéliens sont les descendants de Palestiniens restés sur place à la création de l’Etat d’Israël en 1948 » (1).

    Farès Chahine qui intervient à partir des territoires occupés résume la situation : « L’armée israélienne a mis en exécution ses menaces, lancées en début de semaine, d’utiliser des balles réelles pour réprimer les manifestants. Le chef de l’état-major de l’armée d’occupation avait même déclaré à la presse israélienne qu’il allait lui-même superviser la répression de :

    « La grande manifestation du retour », comme l’ont appelée les organisateurs. Les forces israéliennes, renforcées par une centaine de snipers postés tout le long de la frontière avec la bande de Gaza, n’ont ainsi pas hésité à tirer sur les manifestants désarmés qui ne portaient que des drapeaux palestiniens et lançaient des slogans réclamant le retour des réfugiés palestiniens sur leurs terres et dans leurs villages d’où ils ont été expulsés de force en 1948. (…) Au lieu de leur faire peur, les menaces israéliennes ont au contraire galvanisé les citoyens qui se sont rendus en masse vers la frontière pour scander leurs slogans. » (2)

    « L’autre point remarquable poursuit Fares Chahine, de cette journée historique était l’absence des bannières des différentes factions palestiniennes. Celles-ci ont laissé place au seul drapeau palestinien, symbole de l’unité du peuple palestinien. Des centaines de tentes ont donc été plantées tout le long de la frontière à une distance de 700 mètres environ de la clôture. Cette présence féminine remarquable a d’ailleurs apporté un démenti au gouvernement israélien de droite qui fournit de grands efforts pour accréditer l’idée que les Palestiniens sont des terroristes, des tueurs sanguinaires et des misogynes. « Malgré le danger, les Palestiniens de la bande de Ghaza, qui vivent dans des conditions inhumaines depuis de très longues années, promettent que ce 30 mars 2018 n’est que le début d’une insurrection civile contre les autorités de l’occupation. (…) La journée de la Terre, qui est célébrée depuis le 30 mars 1976, a toujours bénéficié d’un large consensus au sein de la population palestinienne. En ce jour du 30 mars 1976, les forces israéliennes ont froidement abattu six citoyens palestiniens communément appelés « Arabes d’Israël », Ces Palestiniens avaient pourtant la nationalité israélienne. Mais elle n’a servi à rien. Il s’agit de la preuve que ces « Arabes d’Israël » sont considérés comme des citoyens de seconde zone. » (2)

    Cyrille Louis du Figaro témoigne et rapporte le contenu d’une vidéo mise en ligne :

    « Une fois le fracas interrompu et la poussière retombée, les participants à cette « grande marche du retour » ont mis en ligne les vidéos tournées vendredi avec leur téléphone. L’une d’elles, filmée à l’est de Beit Lahya, a aussitôt inondé les réseaux sociaux. On y voit un jeune homme vêtu d’un jeans et d’un pull noir qui court, un pneu à la main, pour tenter d’échapper aux balles des tireurs d’élite israéliens. Une détonation claque, puis une seconde et le garçon tombe à terre. D’après ses amis, dont le témoignage a été confirmé par les secouristes palestiniens, Abdel Fattah Abdel Nabi est mort sur le coup. À en juger par ce document, l’homme âgé de 18 ans ne présentait aucun risque immédiat pour les militaires qui l’ont abattu. Pour L’ONG israélienne B’Tselem « Tirer sur des manifestants qui ne portent pas d’armes est illégal » et « tout ordre donné à cette fin l’est également ». (3)

    Les réactions

    Dans un discours le même jour vendredi, le président palestinien Mahmoud Abbas a déclaré qu’il tenait Israël pour pleinement responsable de ces morts Les Palestiniens ainsi que la Turquie ont dénoncé un « usage disproportionné » de la force. La Ligue arabe, l’Egypte et la Jordanie ont également condamné la riposte israélienne.. L’Algérie condamne « avec force » et d’un « ton très ferme » la boucherie israélienne commise par les forces d’occupation, à Ghaza, lors de la répression, vendredi, d’une marche pacifique commémorant le quarante- deuxième anniversaire de la « Journée de la Terre », sous le slogan du « grand retour » d’après le communiqué du ministère des Affaires étrangères (MAE).

    Le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies, pour sa part n’a rien décidé. Réuni en urgence vendredi soir sur les affrontements dans la bande de Ghaza, a entendu les inquiétudes quant à une escalade de la violence, mais n’est pas parvenu à s’entendre sur une déclaration commune. « Le risque de l’escalade (de la violence) est réel », a estimé devant le Conseil le représentant français. « Il y a la possibilité d’un nouveau conflit dans la bande de Ghaza. Les Etats-Unis et le Royaume-Uni ont exprimé des regrets quant au calendrier de la réunion -la Pâque juive a commencé vendredi soir- synonyme d’absence de responsables israéliens. « Il est vital que ce Conseil soit équilibré » a dit à la réunion le représentant américain..Israël a rejeté les appels internationaux à une enquête indépendante. L’usage de balles réelles par l’armée israélienne est au coeur des interrogations de la communauté internationale et des organisations de défense des droits de l’homme.

    Israël rejette toute enquête

    Vendredi 30 mars a été la journée la plus meurtrière dans la bande de Gaza depuis la guerre de 2014 : 16 Palestiniens ont été tués et plus de 1400 blessés, dont 758 par des tirs à balles réelles, selon le ministère de la Santé dans l’enclave. Le secrétaire général de l’ONU, Antonio Guterres, ainsi que la représentante de la diplomatie européenne Federica Mogherini, ont réclamé une « enquête indépendante » sur l’usage par Israël de balles réelles, une demande rejetée par l’Etat hébreu. De son côté, le ministre de la Défense israélien Avigdor Lieberman a qualifié d’« hypocrites » les appels à ouvrir une enquête. « Il n’y aura pas de commission d’enquête », a-t-il déclaré à la radio publique israélienne. « Il n’y aura rien de tel ici, nous ne coopérerons avec aucune commission d’enquête. » (3)

    Pour M.K.Bhadrakumar, l’horrible attaque de 17 manifestants palestiniens non armés et pacifiques vendredi par les forces de sécurité israéliennes a une fois de plus souligné que l’occupation par Israël des pays arabes demeure toujours la cause première de la crise au Moyen-Orient. La revendication des manifestants est qu’Israël devrait accorder le droit aux 1,3 million de réfugiés (selon les chiffres de l’ONU des réfugiés enregistrés) de « rentrer chez eux » d’où ils ont été chassés, (…)Trump entouré, dont l’islamophobie suinte de ses veines, il s’est maintenant entouré de personnes aux vues similaires, en particulier le nouveau secrétaire d’État Mike Pompeo et le conseiller à la sécurité nationale John Bolton ainsi que l’ambassadrice des États-Unis auprès de l’ONU Nikki Haley. » (4)

    La marche du désespoir des Palestiniens

     Un article du journal Le Monde nous apprend un peu plus sur cette marche pacifique :

    « Des dizaines de milliers de Palestiniens ont manifesté vendredi à quelques mètres de la clôture qui les sépare d’Israël. Au moins 16 ont été tués par l’armée israélienne. Tels des champignons de fer, les casques des tireurs d’élite israéliens se dessinent, immobiles, au sommet des collines. Des officiers assurent la liaison radio à leurs côtés. Une jeep passe dans leur dos. Les manifestants palestiniens, réunis près du camp de Bureij, contemplent ce ballet. La distance qui les sépare des soldats se compte en centaines de mètres. Soudain, une balle siffle, un corps s’effondre. On l’évacue. On continue. Ce face-à-face a duré toute la journée du vendredi 30 mars, le long de la bande de Ghaza. Cette journée marque un succès amer pour les partisans d’une résistance populaire pacifique, qui ont constaté depuis longtemps l’échec de la lutte armée. D’autant que la supériorité technologique de l’armée israélienne ne cesse de s’accroître. La manifestation de vendredi place cette armée sur la défensive, obligée de justifier des tirs à balles réelles sur des manifestants ne présentant aucun danger immédiat pour les soldats. (…) Mais contrairement aux propos calibrés des autorités israéliennes, personne n’a forcé les Ghazaouis à sortir pour réclamer le droit au retour des Palestiniens sur les terres qu’ils ont perdues en 1948, au moment de la création d’Israël. « Je n’appartiens pas à une faction, mais à mon peuple, résume Rawhi Al-Haj Ali, 48 ans, vendeur de matériaux de construction. C’est mon sang et mon coeur qui m’ont poussé à venir. (…) » (5)

    Non loin de lui, dans la zone de rassemblement de Jabaliya, dans le nord de la bande de Gaza, Ghalib Koulab ne dit pas autre chose, sous le regard de son fils.

    « On veut envoyer un message à l’occupant, résume cet homme de 50 ans. On est debout, on existe. » Dans le conflit israélo-palestinien, les mots aussi sont sacrifiés, vidés de leur sens. Dans chacun des cinq lieux de rassemblement prévus le long de la frontière a conflué le peuple ghazaoui dans sa diversité, et son dénuement. Vieillards et gamins, femmes voilées et jeunes étudiantes apprêtées, mais surtout jeunes hommes sans avenir (…) Mais personne ne contrôlait cette foule éclatée. Il est tentant de dire que ces jeunes défiaient la mort. En réalité, ils défiaient la vie, la leur, qui ressemble à une longue peine : celle des victimes du blocus égyptien et israélien, enfermées depuis bientôt onze ans dans ce territoire palestinien à l’agonie. (…) « On ne sera pas transférés dans le Sinaï égyptien, comme le veulent les Américains et les Israéliens ! On continuera jour après jour, jusqu’à ce qu’on retrouve nos terres. Le processus de réconciliation, amorcé sous les auspices de l’Egypte en octobre 2017, est au point mort, mais personne ne veut signer l’acte de décès. »(5)

    La colonisation continue : personne ne proteste

    Pendant ce temps Israël accentue sa politique de colonisation des Territoires palestiniens. Selon un rapport de La Paix maintenant, le nombre de nouveaux logements a fortement augmenté en 2017. L’an I de la présidence Trump, sans surprise, a été marqué par une poursuite des activités de colonisation en Cisjordanie. Selon le rapport annuel publié lundi par l’organisation anti-occupation La Paix maintenant, 2783 nouveaux logements y ont été mis en chantier en 2017. Ce décompte marque un léger recul par rapport à l’année précédente, mais il traduit une hausse de 17% si on le compare avec la moyenne des 10 années écoulées. Le nombre d’appels d’offres passés pour de nouvelles habitations (3154) a simultanément atteint un niveau…

    Au dernières nouvelles, ce vendredi 6 avril jour de prière. De nouveaux affrontements ont éclaté ce vendredi 6 avril entre manifestants palestiniens et soldats israéliens près de la frontière entre la bande de Gaza et Israël. Ces heurts interviennent une semaine après des violences sans précédent depuis 2014 qui ont coûté la vie à 19 Palestiniens.

    Cinq Palestiniens ont été tués et plus de 400 blessés par des soldats israéliens. Des manifestants ont incendié des pneus et lancé des pierres sur les soldats israéliens postés à la barrière de sécurité séparant les deux territoires, selon des correspondants de l’AFP sur place. Les militaires ont riposté en tirant des gaz lacrymogènes et des balles réelles (6).

    Beaucoup de commentateurs ont fait une analogie avec les massacres de Sharpeville , sauf qu’à l’époque le monde occidental avait banni l’Afrique du Sud, qui fut par la force des choses amenée à reconsidérer sa politique d’apartheid.

    Pourtant, la conscience humaine devrait retenir le bras vengeur de cette armée qui se dit « la plus morale du monde » car mettre des dizaines de snipers pour un tir aux pigeons, sauf que le pigeon est un jeune envahi par le désespoir, qui veut vivre à en mourir dans une enclave où son horizon est bouché. Il ne lui reste que la solution finale ; offrir sa poitrine et mourir pour une cause de la liberté. Ce qui est encore plus inhumain, c’est ce que doit penser le sniper dont le tableau de chasse est éloquent en fin de journée. Il ôte la vie à des jeunes comme lui qui ne demandent qu’à vivre comme lui sur cette Terre de Palestine dont il est difficile de parler d’ethnie, la science ayant prouvé que les Palestiniens et Israéliens appartiennent au même peuple de Cananéens.

    Que certains sionistes aient fait de la religion judaïque un fonds de commerce au nom de la race élue, ne doit pas porter préjudice à un peuple qui revendique de vivre sur les 18% de la Palestine originelle. S’il est connu que les Palestiniens n’ont rien à attendre des pays occidentaux tétanisés par la faute originelle, qui leur fait accepter toutes les impunités d’un pays qui brave une quarantaine de résolutions, ils sont encore mal barrés concernant la solidarité des pays arabes, encore plus tétanisés qui regardent ailleurs et se fendent de communiqués qui n’apportent rien de nouveau. La direction palestinienne s’est installée dans les temps morts et il n’y a pas de relève à l’horizon. Il est à craindre que la conscience internationale regarde ailleurs pendant qu’un peuple est en train de disparaître en tant que nation.

    « Est-ce ainsi que les Hommes vivent » aurait dit Aragon.

    Professeur Chems Eddine Chitour

    Ecole Polytechnique Alger

    Notes

    1.https://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/entry/ghaza-les-palestiniens-poursuivront-leur-protestation-apres-une-pre

    2.http://www.elwatan.com/international/israel-commet-un-massacre-a-ghaza-31-03-2018-365426_112.php

    3.https://assawra.blogspot.fr/2018/04/israel-rejette-toute-enquete.html

    4.http://blogs.rediff.com/mkbhadrakumar/2018/03/31/palestine-still-remains-core-issue-in-middle-east

    5.http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2018/03/31/a-la-frontiere-de-la-bande-de-gaza-une-grande-marche-du-retour-pacifique-mai

    6.https://www.nouvelobs.com/monde/20180406.OBS4747/affrontements-a-gaza-5-palestiniens-tues-dans-des-heurts-avec-l-armee-isr

    Article de référence :

    http://www.lexpressiondz.com/chroniques/analyses_du_professeur _chitour/289893-la-resilience-du-peuple-palestinien-abandonne.htm

    La source originale de cet article est Mondialisation.ca
    Copyright © Chems Eddine Chitour, Mondialisation.ca, 2018

  • Israel condemns hundreds of Palestinians to unemployment – due to their last name
    Israeli authorities revoked the work permits of over a thousand Palestinians solely because they have the same surname as the perpetrator of a stabbing attack

    Gideon Levy and Alex Levac Mar 23, 2018 1:54 PM

    https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-leaves-hundreds-of-palestinians-jobless-due-to-their-last-n

    If this isn’t collective punishment, then what is collective punishment? If this isn’t arbitrariness, then what is arbitrariness? And if this measure doesn’t ignite a fire in the relatively tranquil West Bank town of Yatta, then what is the measure intended for? Yatta is distraught, its economy is threatened with collapse, and all because of one person who transgressed, because of whom Israel is punishing an entire town.

    Up until a few months ago, over 7,000 residents of this town in the south Hebron Hills had permits to work. Of them, 915 residents with the surname Abu Aram worked in Israel and hundreds more in the settlements, according to the Palestinian District Coordination and Liaison office in Yatta. But those workers then lost their jobs in Israel and the settlements solely because of their names, in the wake of an astounding, draconian decision of the Civil Administration, Israel’s governing body in the West Bank. In desperation, dozens even changed their names in their ID cards, but to no avail. Their way back to work in Israel, where they’ve held jobs for years, is blocked, though they have done nothing wrong. Here’s what happened:
    Last August 2, a 19-year-old Yatta resident, Ismail Abu Aram, stabbed Niv Nehemia, the deputy manager of a supermarket in the Israeli city of Yavneh, wounding him seriously. The assailant was arrested. The next day, the authorities decided – in accordance with standard procedure after a terrorist attack – to bar the assailant’s family from entering Israel. The ban was lifted 10 days later, family members returned to their jobs in Israel and the settlements, and Yatta resumed its usual way of life.

  • Forget Islamist terrorism, ’Homeland’ homes in on a new threat - Television - Haaretz.com

    https://www.haaretz.com/life/television/.premium-forget-islamist-terrorism-homeland-homes-in-on-a-new-threat-1.5827

    A few days after the first episode of “Homeland” aired in America in October 2011, the U.S. State Department placed a $10 million bounty on the head of Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
    A few days after season seven of “Homeland” premiered in February 2018, the U.S. Justice Department indicted 13 Russians for trying to subvert the 2016 presidential election.
    This tells you everything you need to know about why the latest season of “Homeland” is, to borrow a phrase from a certain political leader, “America first.”
    skip - Homeland Season 7
    Homeland Season 7 - דלג

  • Saison France-Israël: Lettre de boycott from within à l’Institut français
    BDS France | 3 février 2018
    https://www.bdsfrance.org/saison-france-israel-lettre-de-boycott-from-within-a-linstitut-francais

    Madame Cécile Caillou-Robert, Commissaire Générale de l’Institut Français,

    Nous sommes des citoyen.ne.s d’Israël, opposé.e.s à la politique d’oppression, d’occupation, d’apartheid et de nettoyage ethnique de notre gouvernement à l’encontre de la population autochtone palestinienne. Nous vous écrivons pour vous demander de respecter l’appel palestinien au Boycott, Désinvestissement, et Sanctions (BDS) d’Israël, particulièrement son aspect culturel , et d’annuler les événements de la Saison France-Israël 2018 financés par l’Institut Français. Nous vous remercions de bien vouloir nous lire jusqu’à la fin.

    Puisque vous voulez mettre en lumière les innovations culturelles, scientifiques et pédagogiques d’Israël, il nous semble approprié d’attirer votre attention sur la discrimination systématique d’Israël contre les Palestinien.ne.s, y compris contre ses propres citoyen.ne.s palestinien.ne.s. Pour commencer, il est important pour nous de souligner que la Commission Économique et Sociale pour l’Asie occidentale des Nations Unies (ESCWA) estime que les violations des droits humains, commises quotidiennement par Israël dans les territoires occupés palestiniens, représentent une situation d’apartheid .(...)

    #BDS

    • Israeli Soldiers Demolish Two Classrooms In Abu Nuwwar Bedouin Community
      February 4, 2018
      http://imemc.org/article/israeli-soldiers-demolish-two-classrooms-in-abu-nuwwar-bedouin-community

      Israeli soldiers invaded, Sunday, the Abu Nuwwar Bedouin community, built on Palestinian lands in the al-‘Ezariyya town, southeast of occupied East Jerusalem, and demolished two classrooms.

      Daoud Jahalin, the representative of Abu Nuwwar, said dozens of soldiers, police officers and representatives of the “Civil Administration Office,” which is run by the military in the West Bank, invaded the community after surrounding it.

      Jahalin added that the soldiers demolished two classrooms, for children in the third and fourth grades, which were built through European donations.

  • $3.3 bn Disneyland-style theme park to open doors in Egypt - Egypt Independent
    http://www.egyptindependent.com/3-3-bn-disneyland-style-theme-park-to-open-doors-in-egypt

    Après trop de guerres et trop d’argent gaspillé en projets inutiles, on décide enfin de construire l’avenir du Moyen-Orient !

    Martouh Governor Alaa Abu Zeid signed on Thursday an investment contract with the Entertainment World Company, for a joint US-Saudi Arabian investment project to establish a Disneyland-style amusement park worth $3.3 billion.

    The park will be built on an area of 5,080 acres in the Sidi Henaish area, in the northwestern Egyptian governorate of Matrouh.

    Investment and International Cooperation Minister Sahar Nasr, Local Development Minister Abu Bakr al-Gendy, and Chairperson of the General Authority for Investment and Free Zones Mona Zobaa attended the signing ceremony between Abu Zeid and Lisa Marie Stephen, the managing director of Entertainment World in the Middle East and Africa.

    #égypte #disneyland

  • Et si les centres-villes s’inspiraient des centres commerciaux ?
    https://www.lesechos.fr/idees-debats/cercle/0301211128292-et-si-les-centres-villes-sinspiraient-des-centres-commerciaux

    LE CERCLE/POINT DE VUE - Les communes petites et moyennes pourraient, sur le modèle des centres commerciaux, regrouper les commerçants du centre-ville au sein d’une organisation permanente dans une structure foncière unique.

    La fin de l’année 2017 a vu ressurgir la question des centres-villes commerçants, notamment dans les villes petites ou moyennes. Le débat a connu cette fois une ampleur inhabituelle, forçant le gouvernement à annoncer un plan d’action pour le début 2018. Ce débat sur la situation du commerce de centre-ville a rapidement tourné à la mise en accusation des centres commerciaux qui seraient la cause unique et dernière de la mort des commerçants indépendants.

    Au-delà de l’opposition entre petit et grand commerce, et puisqu’il y a urgence à sauver le centre-ville, ne vaudrait-il pas mieux pour ce dernier s’inspirer des méthodes de développement et de gestion propres aux centres commerciaux ? C’est la vision du Conseil général de l’environnement et du développement durable (CGEDD) qui, dans un rapport de 2016, proposait « sur le modèle des centres commerciaux, le regroupement des acteurs du centre-ville au sein d’organisations permanentes ».

    Un centre commercial est défini comme « le regroupement de points de vente dans un même lieu conçu, développé, détenu et promu comme une seule entité ». La détention du centre commercial en pleine propriété par un seul acteur garantit son fonctionnement unifié avec l’inclusion dans les charges payées par les locataires de budgets destinés à la promotion du centre, sa sécurité ou sa propreté.

    En centre-ville la propriété foncière est éparpillée, avec autant de propriétaires que d’immeubles ; sécurité, propreté et signalétique relevant d’acteurs différents. Une association qui s’occupe de l’animation des rues commerçantes ne peut recueillir des adhésions que sur la base du volontariat. En résulte une faiblesse de moyens financiers et humains.

    A Saint-Quentin (Aisne), « Les Boutiques de Saint-Quentin » comptent environ 120 adhérents, avec une carte de fidélité. L’association ne regroupe que des commerçants indépendants, sans aucune succursale de grande enseigne nationale. Tous les adhérents ne participant pas au programme de fidélité.

    Créer une dynamique de centre-ville ne pourra se faire que par la coopération entre acteurs publics et privés. Aux premiers, la vision de leur territoire et de son avenir, aux seconds l’expertise sectorielle et la capacité d’investissement.
    Les outils existent déjà

    Les collectivités locales ont à leur disposition des outils ad hoc : SCOT, PLUi, PLU, CRAC, DPU et autorisations d’urbanisme. Ils doivent être utilisés dans le cadre d’un vrai projet de territoire, d’une vision détaillée de son développement, sous peine d’annulation par la justice administrative. Les acteurs de l’immobilier commercial ont, quant à eux, une expertise du fonctionnement d’un périmètre commerçant.

    De tels partenariats peuvent-ils faire l’impasse sur la question foncière ? La structure foncière de la rue de la République à Lyon, dans laquelle Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (Adia) est propriétaire de 30 immeubles qui représentent 20.000 mètres carrés de commerce, a permis la création d’un périmètre unifié par une marque, un éclairage et une mise en lumière nocturne harmonisés, etc.

    Pour un grand nombre de villes, la relance d’un centre-ville commerçant devra donc passer par la création de foncières locales dans lesquelles entreraient la collectivité, des acteurs privés de l’immobilier commercial et d’autres comme la Caisse des Dépôts. Ces foncières exerceraient leur compétence sur un périmètre géographique clairement défini par le plan local d’urbanisme, la loi ACTPE (relative à l’artisanat, au commerce et aux très petites entreprises) de 2014 permettant déjà de déléguer le droit de préemption urbain aux concessionnaires de l’aménagement urbain.

    La transformation de la ville est un travail incrémental de longue durée. Les acteurs en charge de cette transformation doivent pouvoir travailler à l’abri des aléas du calendrier politique : il faut mettre fin à l’insécurité juridique qui entoure la politique d’aménagement du territoire. En effet, la redynamisation des centres des villes, petites ou moyennes, ne pourra se faire qu’avec l’engagement pérenne de tous, l’Etat en premier. Ne sommes-nous pas en présence d’une grande cause nationale ?

    Jean-Sylvain Camus est consultant indépendant en immobilier commercial

    #urbanisme #centres_commerciaux #marchandisation

  • The Israeli military took first his legs, then his life - Opinion - Israel News | Haaretz.com
    https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.829384

    Abu Thuraya posed no danger to anyone: How much of a danger could a double amputee in a wheelchair, imprisoned behind a fence, constitute? How much evil and insensitivity does it take in order to shoot a handicapped person in a wheelchair? Abu Thuraya was not the first, nor will he be the last, Palestinian with disabilities to be killed by soldiers of the Israel Defense Forces — the most moral soldiers in the world, or not.

    • The Israeli military first took his legs, then his life
      On Friday, a sharpshooter shot and killed Ibrahim Abu Thuraya, a Gazan double amputee, as he protested from his wheelchair near the Israeli border
      By Gideon Levy | Dec. 17, 2017 | 4:36 PM

      The Israeli army sharpshooter couldn’t target the lower part of his victim’s body — Ibrahim Abu Thuraya didn’t have one. The 29-year-old, who worked washing cars and who lived in Gaza City’s Shati refugee camp, lost both legs from the hips down in an Israeli airstrike during Operation Cast Lead in 2008. He used a wheelchair to get around. On Friday the army finished the job: A sharpshooter aimed at his head and shot him dead.

      The images are horrific: Abu Thuraya in his wheelchair, pushed by friends, calling for protests against the U.S. declaration recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital; Abu Thuraya on the ground, crawling toward the fence behind which the Gaza Strip is imprisoned; Abu Thuraya waving a Palestinian flag; Abu Thuraya holding up both arms in the victory sign; Abu Thuraya carried by his friends, bleeding to death; Abu Thuraya’s corpse laid out on a stretcher: The End.

      The army sharpshooter couldn’t aim at the lower part of his victim’s body on Friday so he shot him in the head and killed him.

      It can be assumed that the soldier realized that he was shooting at a person in a wheelchair, unless he was shooting indiscriminately into the crowd of protesters.

      Abu Thuraya posed no danger to anyone: How much of a danger could a double amputee in a wheelchair, imprisoned behind a fence, constitute? How much evil and insensitivity does it take in order to shoot a handicapped person in a wheelchair? Abu Thuraya was not the first, nor will he be the last, Palestinian with disabilities to be killed by soldiers of the Israel Defense Forces — the most moral soldiers in the world, or not.

      The killing of the young disabled man passed almost without mention in Israel. He was one of three demonstrators killed Friday, just another humdrum day. One can easily imagine what would happen if Palestinians had killed an Israeli who used a wheelchair. What a furor would have erupted, with endless ink spilled on their cruelty and barbarism. How many arrests would have resulted, how much blood would have flowed in retaliation. But when soldiers behave barbarically, Israel is silent and shows no interest. No shock, no shame, no pity. An apology or expression of regret or remorse is the stuff of fantasy. The idea of holding those responsible for this criminal killing accountable is also delusional. Abu Thuraya was a dead man once he dared take part in his people’s protest and his killing is of no interest to anyone, since he was a Palestinian.

      The Gaza Strip has been closed to Israeli journalists for 11 years, so one can only imagine the life of the car-washer from Shati before his death — how he recovered from his injuries in the absence of decent rehabilitation services in the besieged Strip, with no chance of obtaining prosthetic legs; how he rumbled along in an old wheelchair, not an electric one, in the sandy alleys of his camp; how he continued washing cars despite his disability, since there are no other choices in Shati, including for people with disabilities; and how he continued struggling with his friends, despite his disability.

      No Israeli could imagine life in that cage, the biggest in the world, the one called the Gaza Strip. It is part of a never-ending mass experiment on human beings.

      One should see the desperate young people who approached the fence in Friday’s demonstration, armed with stones that couldn’t reach anywhere, throwing them through the cracks in the bars behind which they are trapped.

      These young people have no hope in their lives, even when they have two legs to walk on. Abu Thuraya had even less hope.

      There is something pathetic yet dignified in the photo of him raising the Palestinian flag, given his dual confinement — in his wheelchair and in his besieged country.

      The story of Abu Thuraya is an accurate reflection of the circumstances of his people. Shortly after he was photographed, his tormented life came to an end. When people cry out every week: “Netanyahu to Maasiyahu [prison]” someone should finally also start talking about The Hague.

    • A Gaza, un militant handicapé tué par l’armée israélienne devient le symbole des protestations

      La mort de ce Palestinien a donné un visage aux protestations déclenchées par la décision américaine de reconnaître Jérusalem comme capitale d’Israël.

      LE MONDE | 18.12.2017 à 06h38 • Mis à jour le 18.12.2017 à 09h15 | Par Piotr Smolar (bande de Gaza, envoyé spécial)
      http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2017/12/18/a-gaza-un-militant-handicape-tue-par-l-armee-israelienne-devient-le-symbole-

    • Terrorisme israélien : le meurtre pour seule et unique politique
      16 décembre 2017 – Ma’an News – Traduction : Chronique de Palestine
      http://chroniquepalestine.com/meurtre-seule-unique-politique

      Ma’an News – Ils ont été des milliers à suivre les funérailles d’un Palestinien handicapé assassiné à Gaza par les forces israéliennes d’occupation.

      Des milliers de Palestiniens de la bande de Gaza sous blocus ont suivi samedi les funérailles du Palestinien Ibrahim Abu Thurayya, âgé 29 ans, qui a été assassiné par les forces israéliennes d’occupation vendredi lors d’affrontements le long de la clôture de séparation d’avec Israël [Palestine de 1948].

      Abu Thurayya était un militant palestinien renommé, connu pour avoir constamment protesté contre l’occupation israélienne, bien qu’il ait perdu ses deux jambes lors d’une attaque aérienne israélienne en 2008. Après être resté gravement handicapé suite à l’attaque israélienne en 2008, Abu Thurayya a travaillé à laver des voitures à Gaza pour contribuer à faire vivre les 11 membres de sa famille.(...)