person:abu musab al-zarqawi

  • La naissance de l’Etat islamique

    L’Etat islamique (EI) nait dans la lutte contre l’occupation américaine de l’Irak. Il s’étend en exploitant les révoltes populaires provoquées par les politiques violentes ou discriminatoires des gouvernements irakiens et syriens.

    Début 2004, le jihadiste jordanien Abu Musab al-Zarqawi forme Al-Qaïda en Irak. Il désirait chasser du pays autant les américains que les groupes religieux non-sunnites et filmait régulièrement des décapitations d’otages. Il s’autonomise rapidement de la direction centrale de Al-Qaïda, en Afghanistan. Le cercle Ben Laden s’inquiétait en effet de son comportement immodéré qui risquait de compromettre le soutien populaire à Al-Qaïda et à l’insurrection.

    Zarqawi désirait mener à bien ses projets en regroupant les sunnites du Nord sous la bannière d’un Etat islamique d’Irak (EII). Cet Etat est proclamé en octobre 2006 malgré la mort de Zarqawi quatre mois plus tôt. C’est un échec. Le millénarisme exacerbé du mouvement l’empêche de faire des choix stratégiques rationnels. L’EII s’en prend aux tribus et à toutes les factions qui refusent de lui faire allégeance. L’émir de l’EII est tué par les forces américaines en avril 2010.

    Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi prend la relève. C’est un ancien étudiant en sciences coraniques passés par les Frères Musulmans et les geôles américaines.

    Les Etats-Unis se retirent d’Irak en 2011, laissant des chiites sectaires au pouvoir et une armée nationale très faible. L’EII remonte en puissance alors que les jihadistes irakiens adaptent leur stratégie : la guérilla affaiblit le gouvernement, mais l’établissement de l’Etat islamique prophétisé passe par un véritable soutien populaire. Il faut respecter les structures du pouvoir et les pratiques religieuses locales pour s’allier les tribus et leur clientèle. Il faut proposer une alternative à la corruption des autorités centrales.

    Le Printemps arabe permet à l’EII d’étendre ses activités à la Syrie où se trouvait déjà d’importants réseaux jihadistes, établis avec le soutien du régime contre les Etats-Unis. Baghdadi n’annonce sa présence dans le pays qu’en 2013, lorsqu’il agrandit l’organisation en Etat islamique en Irak et au Levant (EIIL). Il rompt officiellement avec Al-Qaïda alors que l’EIIL se répand dans le Nord de l’Irak, enlevant Falloujah, puis Mossoul, ouvrant la route vers Bagdad.

    En juin 2014, au sommet de son exposition médiatique, Baghdadi se déclare « commandeur des croyants », un titre réservé aux califes successeurs de Mahomet et qu’avait déjà adopté le Mollah Omar lorsqu’il avait créé son émirat en Afghanistan.

    L’Etat islamique se caractérise depuis par une volonté réelle d’être un « Etat », c’est-à-dire d’administrer sa population, en lui fournissant des services et en l’encadrant.

    - William McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse : the history, strategy and doomsday vision of the Islamic State, St. Martin’s Press, 2015.

    – Charles Lister, « Jihadi Rivalry : The Islamic State Challenges al-Qaida », in : Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper, n°16, janvier 2016.

    #islamisme #Etat_islamique #Irak #Syrie #Al-Qaida

  • 3 times U.S. foreign policy helped to create the Islamic State - The Washington Post
    http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2015/03/09/3-times-u-s-foreign-policy-helped-to-create-the-islamic-state

    In a new paper for the Brookings Institution, Cole Bunzel, an expert on the Islamic State at Princeton University, (...) finds that three actions of recent United State foreign policy inadvertently helped create the conditions that would allow a self-proclaimed “caliphate” in the Middle East to come into existence. Here’s how the Islamic State’s caliphate went from a dim idea to a grim reality in a little over a decade.

    1. The war in Afghanistan

    Bunzel’s paper, titled “From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State,” shows that as far back as late 2001 or early 2002, members of al-Qaeda were discussing the idea of an Iraq-based “caliphate” with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian-born militant who founded al-Qaeda in Iraq – a key precursor to the Islamic State.

    Al-Qaeda military strategist Sayf-al’Adl claims to have discussed the idea while both he and Zarqawi were in Iran, where they had fled following the United States-led invasion of Afghanistan. “This [would be] our historic opportunity by the means of which perhaps we would be able to establish the Islamic State, which would have the main role in eradicating oppression and helping establish the Truth in the world, god willing,” Adl wrote of Zarqawi’s plan to relocate to Iraq.

    As the paper notes, at this point Zarqawi had not yet pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda (his notable hatred for Shiite Muslims was a source of disagreement with the group), and it isn’t clear whether the plan for an Iraq-based caliphate came from Zarqawi or al-Qaeda itself. What is important, Bunzel explains in an e-mail, is that the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan shaped this plan: Until 2001, al-Qaeda had viewed Afghanistan and Taliban leader Mullah Omar as the future of an Islamic caliphate. “With the loss of Afghanistan in 2001, [Adl] and others were looking for a new host for the caliphate project,” Bunzel says.

    Al-Qaeda members would later admit that the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan would force them to change their plans. "Had this emirate [the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] persisted, it would have been the beginning of the desired caliphal Islamic state for all the world’s Muslims," Adl later wrote in a 2005 letter to Zarqawi.

    2. The war in Iraq

    While the Afghanistan war sparked a new search for a potential caliphate, it was another war that made that candidate actually look realistic. “In 2001/2, the Iraq-based caliphate was just an ambition,” Bunzel explains, “but after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, it appeared to al-Qaeda to be a serious possibility now.”

    After the Iraq war in March 2003, Zarqawi began to focus his attention on the country. In 2004, he pledged fealty to Osama bin Laden, renaming his group from Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad to Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn ("al-Qaeda in Iraq"). In 2005, Bunzel’s paper shows how three separate al-Qaeda leaders wrote to Zarqawi in 2005, urging him to set up an Islamic state in Iraq. Notably, Ayman al-Zawahiri, then the al-Qaeda’s second in command, told Zarqawi that he hoped such a state would “reach the status of the caliphate.”

    Despite the shared aim, from the start the relationship between al-Qaeda’s core and al-Qaeda in Iraq had its problems. In one noteworthy exchange, after a series of beheadings were carried out by Zarqawi’s group and released on videotape, Zawahiri wrote to him to urge him to stop the practice because other Muslims "will never find [the images] palatable."

    However, the rising power of the Shiite majority in post-war Iraq seems to have been a boon for Zarqawi’s extreme sectarian viewpoint, and by 2006 al-Qaeda in Iraq looked close to establishing its own Sunni state.

    Then, on June 7, a U.S. airstrike killed Zarqawi. Al-Qaeda in Iraq soon stopped existing in any official strategy.

    Instead, a group of Sunni jihadist groups rebranded themselves under a new title: “The Islamic State of Iraq.” Here, the idea of a Middle East-based caliphate proposed in 2001/2002 became a core idea. Abu ’Umar al-Baghdadi, a former Iraqi policeman whose real name was Hamid Dawud Khalil al-Zawi, was announced as its “Commander of the Faithful” – the title officially given to leaders of the caliphate in Islamic history and traced him to the lineage of the Islamic prophet Muhammad (this man in turn was killed in 2010, though the U.S. government had tried to cast doubt on whether he actually existed).

    Bunzel’s report notes that while the founding of “The Islamic State of Iraq” was greeted as big news on jihadi online forums, it struggled to unite Sunni Islamist groups in Iraq, and had a fraught relationship with al-Qaeda. For years after its founding in 2006, this "Islamic State" failed to materialize in any practical terms, instead turning into what Bunzel describes as a “paper state.” But the foundations for the next stage of caliphate were being created at this point, often in American-run prisons like Camp Bucca, where extremist Islamists mixed with ex-members of Iraq’s Baath party, combing their religious fervor with military know-how.

    3. The death of Osama bin Laden

    One of the men held at Camp Bucca was Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al-Badri, who was held there in 2004 but later released as he was not seen as a high level threat. After Abu ’Umar al-Baghdadi was killed in 2010, Badri was named the new leader of the Islamic State of Iraq, given the title of “commander of the faithful” and tied to Muhammad’s bloodline. His new name was Abu Bakr al Baghdadi.

    For a while, this new Baghdadi didn’t really do much. It took him two years to publish an audio address, and official statements didn’t appear from the Islamic State of Iraq’s new leaders until mid-2011. This wasn’t because they were inept (in fact, Bunzel argues that they were clearly far more talented than the previous leaders). Instead, it looks a lot like they were waiting for a perfect opportunity.

    It was only in 2012 the group suddenly announce their return. And the next year, on April 9, 2013, Baghdadi announced the expansion of the Islamic State to Sham — the Arabic word for greater Syria. Baghdadi went so far as to say that Jabhat al-Nusra, the official al-Qaeda branch in Syria’s brutal civil war, was now part of the “Islamic State of Iraq and Sham,” what soon become known as “ISIS.”

    The leader of Jabhat al-Nusra, Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, issued his own statement denying this and saying that his group remained under the authority of al-Qaeda, while al-Qaeda called on the Islamic State of Iraq to remain in Iraq. Regardless, thousands of Jabhat al-Nusra fighters joined ISIS and the two groups became rivals. Relations between ISIS and al-Qaeda became poor until finally, on Feb. 2, 2014, al-Qaeda issued a statement that officially disavowed any ties with ISIS.

    • #inadvertently !

      Heureusement qu’il y a encore des doctorants (pardon, experts) pour imaginer que, peut-être (attention, hein, je dis bien peut-être) ce n’était pas forcément une bonne idée :
      1. d’envahir l’Afghanistan,
      2. d’envahir l’Irak,
      3. assassiner Ben Laden.

      Cole Bunzel | Foreign Policy Research Institute
      http://www.fpri.org/taxonomy/term/2851/0

      Cole Bunzel is a third-year Ph.D. candidate in Princeton University’s Department of Near Eastern Studies, where his research focuses on the history of Wahhabism, the puritan Islamic reform movement in Saudi Arabia. A former fellow with the Center for Arabic Study Abroad in Damascus, Syria, he has also studied and researched in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Additionally, his works deals in depth with the jihadi movement identified with such groups as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS). He writes for the blog www.jihadica.com and is the author of, most recently, From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State (Brookings Institution, March 2015).