Is Your Ship Safe? Help Us Find Out Whether Navy Reforms… — ProPublica
▻https://www.propublica.org/getinvolved/is-your-ship-safe-navy-fleet-reforms
The Navy promised to implement reforms in the wake of two deadly 2017 crashes. We’re trying to find out how it’s doing — and we need to hear from sailors in all six of the numbered fleets that patrol the world’s oceans.
#merci !
intéressant de voir combien #ProPublica obtiendra de réponses et lesquelles. Le rapport de l’Amiral Fort, sorti la semaine dernière, laisse voir (au moins) certaines des unités dans un état véritablement désastreux…
Et, dans la série : TVB vs rien ne bouge, cet article d’hier sur ProPublica :
An Admiral Told a Senator Most Navy Reforms Were… — ProPublica
▻https://www.propublica.org/article/admiral-bill-moran-navy-reforms
Adm. Bill Moran told ProPublica this week that none of the promised reforms had been completed, but that work had started on the pledges.
Sen. Angus King wanted some straight answers. At a Feb. 12 hearing of a panel of the Senate Armed Services Committee, he expressed alarm over recent revelations concerning two deadly collisions of Navy ships in the Pacific in 2017. King, a Maine independent, declared the accidents avoidable and questioned the Navy’s commitment to fixing the problems that had helped cause them. Frustrated, King challenged a top Navy leader to come clean.
“I want real numbers. I don’t want general ‘We’re working on staffing’ or ‘We’re working on more training,’ because these were avoidable tragedies,” King told Adm. Philip Davidson, the top military commander in the Pacific. “I would like to see specific responses from the Navy. Not promises and not good feelings.”
Nine days later, Davidson sought to reassure King, who while an independent caucuses with Democrats, that his worry and frustration were unwarranted. In a letter dated Feb. 21, Davidson told King the Navy counted as “complete” 91 of the more than 100 reforms it had promised to make in the months after 17 sailors died in back-to-back crashes with civilian ships in the summer of 2017.
It is a claim directly contradicted by Adm. Bill Moran, the No. 2 man in charge of the Navy. Moran told ProPublica this week that, in fact, none of the promised reforms had been completed. Moran said work had started on 91 of what he said were 103 pledges to, among other things, provide more sailors to under-manned ships in Japan and stop ships from sailing without complete certifications regarding their navigation and war-fighting abilities — both issues in the two 2017 deadly collisions.
“It doesn’t happen overnight,” Moran said of the reforms.
ProPublica contacted both the Navy and King’s office to inquire about the discrepancy. A spokesman for the Navy said it had “implemented” 91 of its many reforms, pledges that included more sailors for its ships, fixes for its equipment and ending the practice of forcing ships out to sea before they were ready. The spokesman said “implemented” meant “corrective actions, plans or policies are in place.” But they are not yet completed, the spokesman said, correcting Davidson’s claim.
“Many of these recommendations will take time to fully assess their completeness. So even though they may be fully implemented, they won’t be considered complete … until measurable outcomes are achieved,” the spokesman said. “We are not concerned with actions taken but rather on outcomes achieved, and while significant improvements have been made, we are urgently focused on how we can do things better.”
The spokesman said the Navy planned to update its response to King and the Armed Services Committee.
The Navy released a breakdown of the status of every reform Wednesday evening. ProPublica has asked sailors to weigh in on the changes they have seen.
Davidson’s letter to King was first reported on the U.S. Naval Institute’s news website, which posted a copy.
les déclarations de l’amiral Moran à ProPublica, reprises sur gCaptain. Et autres,…
Top US Navy Admiral Says « None Of The Promised Reforms Are Complete » – gCaptain
▻https://gcaptain.com/top-us-navy-admiral-says-none-of-the-promised-reforms-are-complete
Nine days later, Davidson sought to reassure [Sen. Angus] King [Maine, independent], who while an independent caucuses with Democrats, that his worry and frustration were unwarranted. In a letter dated Feb. 21, Davidson told King the Navy counted as “complete” 91 of the more than 100 reforms it had promised to make in the months after 17 sailors died in back-to-back crashes with civilian ships in the summer of 2017.
It is a claim directly contradicted by Adm. Bill Moran, the No. 2 man in charge of the Navy. Moran told ProPublica this week that, in fact, none of the promised reforms had been completed. Moran said work had started on 91 of what he said were 103 pledges to, among other things, provide more sailors to under-manned ships in Japan and stop ships from sailing without complete certifications regarding their navigation and war-fighting abilities — both issues in the two 2017 deadly collisions.
[…]
At the hearing, Davidson defended the Navy by noting that the vast majority of ships were not crashing, a remark that drew widespread derision.
ProPublica also reported that after the crashes, in a talk to ship commanders and other officers, Davidson was asked whether they would be able to push back against orders to sail if they believed their ships were not ready.
Davidson, according to an admiral inside the theater, responded with anger.
“If you can’t take your ships to sea and accomplish the mission with the resources you have,” he said, “then we’ll find someone who will.”
The remark spread across the Navy, stoking fears among commanders about honestly communicating unsafe conditions for fear of losing their jobs.
Davidson’s spokesman told ProPublica that he only meant to say that if ships were not fit to sail, they would be replaced by other ships that were.
Over a Third of U.S. Navy Ships in Pacific Lack Training Certification -Watchdog – gCaptain
▻http://gcaptain.com/over-a-third-of-u-s-navy-ships-in-pacific-lack-training-certification-watc
Speaking before a House of Representatives Armed Services Committee hearing, John Pendleton, from the U.S. #Government_Accountability_Office (#GAO), said that a report had found that 37 percent of U.S. Navy cruisers and destroyers based out of Japan had expired warfare certifications as of June 2017. That was a five-fold increase from the number in May 2015.
The certification is a measurement of whether a ship and its crew are well trained and ready for operations.
The GAO report also found that a reduction in crew sizes was contributing to safety risks, with some sailors working over 100 hours a week and there was limited training because of an increased demand for operations.
“The Navy has made plans to revise operational schedules to provide dedicated training time for overseas-based ships, but this schedule has not yet been implemented,” the report said.
#USS_John_S_McCain #USS_Fitzgerald
Ah ouais !
note : on est plus près de 40% que du tiers…
On est encore en dessous de cela : 8 sur 11 navires (72,7% !) n’ont pas la qualification « navigation » en juin 2017…
Readiness of U.S. Ships in Japan Focus of USS John S. McCain, USS Fitzgerald Collision Hearing - USNI News
▻https://news.usni.org/2017/09/07/readiness-u-s-ships-japan-focus-uss-john-s-mccain-uss-fitzgerald-collisio
“I have had made the assumption for many, many years that our forward deployed forces in Japan were the most proficient, well-trained, most experienced force we have because they were operating all the time,” [Navy’s second in command, VCNO Adm.] Moran told a Thursday joint hearing before the House Armed Services readiness and seapower and projection forces subcommittees.
“It was the wrong assumption.”
[…]
As of June 2017, 37 percent of the warfare certifications for cruiser and destroyer crews homeported in Japan had expired, and over two-thirds of the expired certifications—including mobility-seamanship and air warfare—had been expired for five months or more
“There were specific areas that were higher than 37 percent and one of those was seamanship. Eight of the 11 ships had expired certification for seamanship,” he told the panel
“This represents more than a fivefold increase in the percentage of expired warfare certifications for these ships since our May 2015 report.”
Both the Fitzgerald and McCain had expired certifications, but Pendleton wouldn’t detail the precise certifications that were out of date.
Faut-il s’en étonner quand on voit la programmation du temps consacré aux différentes activités ?
Donc, si on lit le graphique, en 2015 le GAO constate sereinement (?) que pour la flotte déployée au Japon, sur un cycle de 2 ans, il n’y aucune séquence consacrée à l’entrainement ou la formation…
On rappelle par ailleurs que depuis 2003, il n’y a plus non plus de séquence de formation initiale des futurs officiers à la navigation qu’elle soit théorique (uniquement sur CD ou DVD) ou pratique (sur le tas pendant les prochains embarquements)…
Arf ! 3 jours après, CNN se réveille. Mais c’est Exclusive !
Exclusive : US Navy ships in deadly collisions had dismal training records - CNNPolitics
▻http://edition.cnn.com/2017/09/11/politics/navy-ships-training-expired/index.html
The two US Navy destroyers involved in deadly collisions in the Pacific this summer both had lengthy records of failure to fulfill key training requirements, according to Government Accountability Office data provided to Congress and obtained by CNN.
The USS Fitzgerald had expired training certification for 10 out of 10 key warfare mission areas in June, and the USS John S. McCain had let its certifications lapse in six out of the 10 mission areas, the data show.
The dismal training record for the two ships sheds new light on one factor that may have contributed to the two collisions with commercial ships in June and August, which killed 17 sailors.
[…]
A Navy official contested the GAO’s training certification data, arguing that the GAO was focused on higher-level warfighting certifications and not the nuts-and-bolts certifications for operating ships where the Pacific fleet’s destroyers and cruisers have a better record. There are 22 certifications required for each ship and the GAO only reported on half, the official noted, though they declined to provide the full training records for the USS Fitzgerald and USS McCain, citing the ongoing investigations into the collisions.
Mais, apparemment, il ne s’agit pas des compétences de navigation.
The GAO examined training records in June for all of the Japan-based destroyers and cruisers, focusing on 10 key warfare training areas. They included air warfare, ballistic missile defense, electronic warfare, fire support, cruise missiles and more.
The USS Fitzgerald had let its training certifications expire for all of them, according to the GAO data.
The Navy’s preliminary findings in its Fitzgerald investigation found the crew failed to understand and acknowledge the cargo ship was approaching and failed to take any action necessary to avoid the collision.
(sur ce dernier point, c’était dans le rapport préliminaire de l’US Navy il y a un peu plus de 3 semaines ▻https://seenthis.net/messages/607667#message623706 )
Cyber Probes to be Part of All Future Navy Mishap Investigations After USS John S. McCain Collision - USNI News
▻https://news.usni.org/2017/09/14/cyber-probes-part-future-navy-mishap-investigations-uss-john-s-mccain-col
Probing potential cyber tampering and cyber intrusion will now be a standard part of U.S. Navy accident investigation following the Aug. 21 collision of guided missile destroyer USS John S. McCain (DDG-56) with a chemical tanker, Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Bill Moran told Congress last week.
As part of the investigation into McCain’s collision, a team from the Navy’s U.S. 10th Fleet cyber arm traveled to Singapore to see if a reported steering failure of the destroyer was a result of cyber tampering, USNI News reported last month.
[…]
“I would also offer to you that just about every three letter agency in Washington, D.C. has looked to see if there were indications of an intent or a potential acknowledgement of a cyber attack. We have seen — I have personally not seen any evidence of that. But we’re not stopping there. The team is in place in Singapore today, has been for several days capturing all of the computer and network information to see if they can find any abnormalities or disruptions.” [Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Bill Moran said]
The effort, called Operation #Orion’s_Hammer, focused on the reported failure of the aft steering mechanism that early reports say helped cause the collision between McCain and a chemical tanker off the coast of Singapore on Aug. 21 resulting in the death of 10 sailors, several Navy officials have told USNI News.
On aurait donc bien confirmation d’une avarie de barre.
Sen. John S McCain III (R-AZ) dont le grand-père est l’éponyme du USS John S McCain à propos des collisions. Quelles que soient les conclusions des enquêtes, il est facile d’utiliser ces événements pour réclamer une augmentation du budget de la Navy
#send_more_money …
McCain Laments ’Accident After Accident’ After Military Cuts - Bloomberg
▻https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-17/mccain-laments-accident-after-accident-after-military-cuts
Following a series of deadly accidents, Senator John McCain on Sunday renewed his calls to address what he described as a U.S. failure during the past eight years to ensure that the military is prepared, equipped and trained.
“Whenever you cut defense capabilities, the first thing that goes is the training and the readiness, because that’s easy enough to cancel,” the Arizona Republican and chairman of the Senate Armed Service Committee said on CBS’s “Face the Nation.”
McCain, a Vietnam War veteran from a military family, has been a longtime critic of the automatic cuts in U.S. spending — including reductions in U.S. defense — known as sequestration that began in 2013 under an earlier deal to raise the country’s debt limit.
[…]
“When you really look at how much time they have at actual training and readiness, it’s continued to shrink,” McCain said. “We have accident after accident after accident. We are killing more Americans in uniform in training than we are in engagement with the enemy. That’s not acceptable.”
A King’s Orders To The U.S. Navy – gCaptain
▻http://gcaptain.com/kings-orders-u-s-navy-avoid-excess-detail-orders-instructions
In the wake of the USS John S. McCain incident. “Every Captain in the whole military industrial complex received multiple emails demanding better ship handling from every officer.” said one pilot.” The USNS xxx’s Master said he got over 20 of them… forwarded and cc’d around the globe, covering everyone’s butt.” Another pilot said “I’ve seen these emails. Some are broad but many contain detailed lists of actions that should be taken by crews. None contain anything that will prevent the next collision at sea.”
Most mariners will shake their heads in disgust at this #C.Y.A. mentality but few will flag them as dangerous. Which they most certainly are.
In the short term, C.Y.A. messages send the clear message that mistakes will not be tolerated. The authors of these emails often believe they are doing good by keeping the men on their toes and focused on the problems at hand. They are partly correct, C.Y.A. messages do narrow a crew’s focus. These signals focus the mind on problems – not solutions – they also induce stress and fear and repress original thought. A watchstander needs to approach heavy traffic with plenty of rest, a clear mind and the ability to engage the problems ahead intuitively… not worried about his career and the possibility of being hit by another ship.
[…]
#Intrusive_leadership becomes especially dangerous when dictated by leaders who lack training and experience at the helm of a ship. The Secretary of the Navy is a USMC Aviator. Chief Of Naval Operations, Adm. John Richardson, is a submarine commander. Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Bill Moran, is an aviator. Adm. Scott Swift, the commander of the Navy’s Pacific Fleet and the man selected to fix the problems, is an aviator.
In the wake of the USS Fitzgerald incident the small handful of senior U.S. Navy leaders with shipboard experience, like Adm. Michelle Howard, were not dispatched to Japan – where her indomitable leadership might have found solutions – but to ribbon cutting ceremonies in Europe.
Joseph Konrad éditeur de gCaptain reste en pointe…
Il appelle à la rescousse les grands anciens (directive du 21/01/1941)…
#cover_your_ass
And that person is a man with significant watchstanding experience aboard ships, Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, Commander in Chief of Naval forces in WWII.
7. The corollaries of paragraph 6 are:
(a) adopt the premise that the echelon commanders are competent in their several command echelons unless and until they themselves prove otherwise;
(b) teach them that they are not only expected to be competent for their several command echelons but that it is required of them that they be competent;
(c) train them — by guidance and supervision — to exercise foresight, to think, to judge, to decide and to act for themselves;
(d) stop ‘nursing’ them;
(e) finally, train ourselves to be satisfied with ‘acceptable solutions’ even though they are not “staff solutions or other particular solutions that we ourselves prefer.”
Dans une US Navy qu’il décrit comme étant commandée essentiellement par des aviateurs – et un sous-marinier, des hommes, blancs, Joseph Konrad déplore le non recours à l’expérience maritime (de navigation et de commandement à la mer) d’une amirale, femme, afro-américaine qu’on préfère employer à inaugurer les chrysanthèmes en Europe…
Michelle Howard — Wikipédia
▻https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michelle_Howard
Michelle Janine Howard, née le 30 avril 1960 sur la March Air Reserve Base (Californie), est une amirale américaine. Elle est la première femme afro-américaine à commander un navire militaire (1999), première femme à devenir amiral quatre étoiles, à devenir femme vice-chef des Opérations navales (2014-2016), à diriger l’United States Naval Forces Europe (depuis 2016) puis l’Allied Joint Force Command Naples (depuis 2016).
Mêmes conclusions ici. Avec extension à la dépendance globale de la société aux technologies…
USS Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain Mishaps Reveal Vulnerability | Observer
▻http://observer.com/2017/08/navy-uss-john-s-mccain-collision
First, neither the Naval Academy nor OCS produces naval officers qualified to fill seagoing billets without further training. The Surface Officer Warfare School that conducted this preparation was eliminated and ensigns were sent to sea in large numbers. Commanding officers and distance learning means were put in place to conduct this training. That did not work.
Technology is also a culprit. The bridge of a modern warship is loaded with super technology. Radars and sonars have been augmented with infrared sensors and night vision devices. Computers navigate by GPS (global positioning system) and alert watch standers of potential dangers of collision or when in restricted waters. Seaman’s eye and good seamanship have been partially replaced by technology. As a result, traditional mariners’ skills have atrophied.
Each of the services faces potential similar problems mandated by judgments at the time that made sense given the pressures and demands. These institutional decisions have vulnerabilities of their own. For example, American military forces are entirely dependent today on the network and GPS that provide the life’s blood of C3I (command, control and intelligence) to logistics and from firing precision ordinance against the enemy to supplying cheeseburgers and smart phones to forward operation bases.
Similarly, society at large is dependent on the Internet, cell phones and electronic everything from depositing money in banks to paying bills and having intimate conversations with friends. Cyber attacks and hacking are the most well known disrupters that exploit these vulnerabilities.
The Pentagon is well aware of many of these vulnerabilities. Naval officers are oiling ancient sextants to navigate by the sun and stars. Soldiers and marines are reading maps instead of iPads. And “distributed operations” that assume the “net” no longer works are being practiced.
Given that the other services may face issues similar to the Navy’s, the Pentagon would be well advised to conduct a major review of these potential vulnerabilities created by institutional choices. Two topics are less visible although possibly more important. The first has to do with preparing flag and general officer for higher command and geopolitical and strategic issues. The second has to do with civilian control of the military.
Maybe today’s Navy is just not very good at driving ships
▻https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2017/08/27/navy-swos-a-culture-in-crisis
In the wake of two fatal collisions of Navy warships with commercial vessels, current and former senior surface warfare officers are speaking out, saying today’s Navy suffers from a disturbing problem: The SWO community is just not very good at driving ships.
The two collisions — and a total of 17 sailors lost at sea this summer — have raised concerns about whether this generation of surface fleet officers lack the basic core competency of their trade.
The problem is years in the making. Now, the current generation of officers rising into command-level billets lacks the skills, training, education and experience needed to operate effectively and safely at sea, according to current and former officers interviewed by Navy Times.
[…]
For nearly 30 years, all new surface warfare officers spent their first six months in uniform at the Surface Warfare Officer’s School in Newport, Rhode Island, learning the theory behind driving ships and leading sailors as division officers.
But that changed in 2003. The Navy decided to eliminate the “SWOS Basic” school and simply send surface fleet officers out to sea to learn on the job. The Navy did that mainly to save money, and the fleet has suffered severely for it, said retired Cmdr. Kurt Lippold.
“The Navy has cut training as a budgetary device and they have done it at the expense of our ability to operate safely at sea,” said Lippold, who commanded the destroyer Cole in 2000 when it was attacked by terrorists in Yemen.
After 2003, each young officer was issued a set of 21 CD-ROMs for computer-based training — jokingly called “SWOS in a Box” — to take with them to sea and learn. Young officers were required to complete this instructor-less course in between earning their shipboard qualifications, management of their divisions and collateral duties.
“The elimination of SWOS Basic was the death knell of professional SWO culture in the United States Navy,” Hoffman said. “I’m not suggesting that … the entire surface warfare community is completely barren of professionalism. I’m telling you that there are systemic problems, particularly at the department head level, where they are timid, where they lack resolve and they don’t have the sea time we expect.”
“There is a growing suspicion among a small circle of current and former COs that chickens may be coming home to roost,” retired Capt. Kevin Eyer, who commanded three Aegis cruisers, wrote in Proceedings Magazine online after the McCain collision.
’The chickens come home to roost’ - the meaning and origin of this phrase
▻http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/chickens-come-home-to-roost.html
The notion of bad deeds, specifically curses, coming back to haunt their originator is long established in the English language and was expressed in print as early as 1390, when Geoffrey Chaucer used it in The Parson’s Tale:
And ofte tyme swich cursynge wrongfully retorneth agayn to hym that curseth, as a bryd that retorneth agayn to his owene nest.
The allusion that was usually made was to a bird returning to its nest at nightfall, which would have been a familiar one to a medieval audience. Other allusions to unwelcome returns were also made, as in the Elizabethan play The lamentable and true tragedie of Arden of Feversham, 1592:
For curses are like arrowes shot upright, Which falling down light on the suters [shooter’s] head.
Chickens didn’t enter the scene until the 19th century when a fuller version of the phrase was used as a motto on the title page of Robert Southey’s poem The Curse of Kehama, 1810:
“Curses are like young chicken: they always come home to roost.”
This extended version is still in use, notably in the USA.
The notion of the evil that men create returns to their own door also exists in other cultures. Buddhists are familiar with the idea that one is punished by one’s bad deeds, not because of them. Samuel Taylor Coleridge revived the imagery of a bird returning to punish a bad deed in The Rime of the Ancient Mariner, 1798. In the poem the eponymous mariner kills an albatross, which was regarded as an omen of good luck, and is punished by his shipmates by having the bird hung around his neck:
Ah! well a-day! what evil looks
Had I from old and young!
Instead of the cross, the Albatross
About my neck was hung.
Seven sailors missing, three injured after U.S. Navy destroyer collides with container ship off Japan | Reuters
▻http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-navy-asia-idUSKBN1972SW
Seven sailors are missing and three injured after a U.S. Navy destroyer collided early on Saturday morning with a Philippine-flagged container ship south of Tokyo Bay in Japan, the U.S. Navy said.
The Japanese Coast Guard said the destroyer was experiencing some flooding but was not in danger of sinking, while the merchant vessel was able to sail under its own power.
The U.S. Navy said in a statement the USS Fitzgerald, an Aegis guided missile destroyer, collided with a merchant vessel at about 2:30 a.m. local time (1730 GMT), some 56 nautical miles southwest of Yokosuka, a rare incident on a busy waterway.
Three aboard the destroyer had been medically evacuated, including the ship’s commanding officer, Cmdr. Bryce Benson, who was reportedly in stable condition after being airlifted to the U.S. Naval Hospital on the Yokosuka base, the Navy said.
The other two injured were transferred to the hospital to treat lacerations and bruises, it said. The Fitzgerald, the Japanese Coast Guard and Maritime Self-Defense Force were searching for the seven missing sailors.
[…]
It was unclear how the collision happened. “Once an investigation is complete then any legal issues can be addressed,” the 7th Fleet spokesman said.
“The USS Fitzgerald suffered damage on her starboard side above and below the waterline,” the Navy said in a statement.
[…]
Japan’s Nippon Yusen KK (9101.T), which charters the container ship, ACX Crystal, said in a statement it would “cooperate fully” with the Coast Guard’s investigation of the incident. At around 29,000 tons displacement, the ship is about three times the size of the U.S. warship, and was carrying 1,080 containers from the port of Nagoya to Tokyo.
None of the 20 crew members aboard, all Filipino, were injured, and the ship is not leaking oil, Nippon Yusen said. The ship was due to arrive at Tokyo Bay around 4:30 p.m. (0730 GMT), the Coast Guard said.
USS Fitzgerald: missing sailors found dead in flooded area of ship | US news | The Guardian
▻https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jun/16/us-navy-destroyer-collides-ship-japan
Japanese and US officials were discussing how to conduct the investigation. Japan is permitted to investigate since the collision happened in its waters, but under the countries’ status of forces agreement the US has primary jurisdiction over incidents involving vessels such as the Fitzgerald.
ACX Crystal sur MarineTraffic
et sa vitesse
U.S. destroyer almost foundered after collision, bodies found: Seventh Fleet | Reuters
▻https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-navy-asia-idUSKBN199020
Japanese authorities were looking into the possibility of “endangerment of traffic caused by professional negligence”, Japanese media reported, but it was not clear whether that might apply to either or both of the vessels.
The U.S. Navy said the collision happened at about 2:30 a.m. local time (1730 GMT Friday), while the Japanese Coast Guard said it was 1:30 a.m. local time.
An hour passed before Japan authorities were notified of Fitzgerald collision | Reuters
▻http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-navy-asia-idUSKBN19913U
The incident has sparked as many as three investigations by the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard, and two by Japanese authorities.
Complicating the inquiries could be issues of which side has jurisdiction and access to data such as radar records that the United States could deem classified.
Although the collision occurred in Japanese waters, under a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that defines the scope of the U.S. military’s authority in Japan, the U.S. Navy could claim it has the authority to lead the investigations.
The three U.S. investigations include a JAGMAN command investigation often used to look into the cause of major incidents, which can be used as a basis to file lawsuits against the Navy.
Excellent et long article d’un marin sur l’abordage et les responsabilités
The USS Fitzgerald Is At Fault. This Is Why. – gCaptain
▻http://gcaptain.com/uss-fitzgerald-fault
While the media, with a very little hard data, attempts to understand the erratic maneuvers of the containership ACX Crystal on the night of her collision with the Destroyer USS Fitzgerald… professional mariners are certain that a long investigation will find the US Navy ship at fault.
Is this conclusion the result of professional arrogance? Or maybe because of resentment and jealousy over the fact that Navy captains are praised and decorated by the public and media while merchant ship captains live mostly unnoticed. Or is it because they are correct?
As a ship captain along with years working with the U.S. Navy both aboard ships and ashore – here are the reasons why I believe they are correct. The USS Fitzerald was at fault.
Despite recent advancements in electronic collision avoidance tools like automatic identification systems (AIS), the three most important tools for avoiding a collision are a Captain’s eyes, tongue and ears.
• Eyes, looking out the windows of his ship, are important because they can process information – like erratic course changes – faster and more accurately than electronic RADAR and charting systems that take time to aggregate data.
• A tongue because the quickest and most effective way to predict how a ship is going to maneuver in the minutes before a collision is to call the Captain of the other ship on the VHF radio and ask.
• Ears are important because language barriers and cultural differences are prominent at sea and you must listen intently to the other ship’s reply if you want any chance of understanding her intentions.
It is likely that USS Fitzgerald’s Captain used only one, or possibly none, of these tools when communicating with the ACX Crystal.
Avec cette question que je me suis immédiatement posée quand j’ai appris que le commandant avait été blessé parce que… bloqué dans sa cabine par la collision : qu’est-ce qu’il f… dans sa cabine ?
Son navire était dans un endroit au trafic intense – depuis plusieurs années des voix s’élèvent pour y réclamer l’instauration de rails (ie Dispositif de Séparation de Trafic) – et le commandant se reposait !
Why Was The Navy Captain In His Cabin?
On peut ajouter que sur un navire de guerre la veille en passerelle est un impératif majeur.
U.S. Coast Guard interviews container ship crew after warship collision | World | Reuters
▻http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKBN19B0DG
“We are scheduled to interview the crew members,” said U.S. Lieutenant Scott Carr told Reuters, referring the crew of the merchant ship. The USS Fitzgerald crew will also be interviewed.
The U.S. coast guard, which is undertaking the investigation on behalf of the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board, will gather electronic data and ship tracking information from the USS Fitzgerald and ACX Crystal.
The investigation will also look into a time discrepancy in the ACX Crystal’s initial report of the incident south of Tokyo Bay, said Scott. “There is a contradiction. It will be part of the investigation,” Carr said.
The Japan Coast Guard has already spoken to the Filipino crew and is also probing the inconsistency. It is in talks with the U.S. Navy for access to its crew members and data from the destroyer, a spokesman for the organisation said.
The U.S. Navy did not immediately respond when asked if it would release tracking data to the Japan Coast Guard.
Investigators Believe USS Fitzgerald Crew Fought Flooding For An Hour Before Distress Call Reached Help
▻https://news.usni.org/2017/06/21/investigators-believe-uss-fitzgerald-crew-fought-flooding-for-an-hour-bef
Investigators now think Crystal was transiting to Tokyo on autopilot with an inattentive or asleep crew when the merchant vessel struck a glancing blow on the destroyer’s starboard side at about 1:30 AM local time on Friday. When the crew of Crystal realized they had hit something, the ship performed a U-turn in the shipping lane and sped back to the initial site of the collision at 18 knots, discovered Fitzgerald, and radioed a distress call to authorities at about 2:30 AM. U.S. Navy officials initially said the collision occurred at around the time of the distress call at 2:30 AM.
Voilà qui expliquerait le « tiroir » observé sur l’enregistrement du Crystal
Du même article :
Meanwhile, when Crystal’s port bow hit Fitzgerald, the warship was performing a normal transit off the coast of Japan, USNI News understands. Above the waterline, the flared bow of Crystal caved in several spaces in the superstructure, including the stateroom of commanding officer Cmdr. Bryce Benson.
The impact not only ripped a hole in the steel superstructure in the stateroom but also shifted the contents and shape of the steel so Benson was “squeezed out the hull and was outside the skin of the ship,” a sailor familiar with the damage to the ship told USNI News.
“He’s lucky to be alive.”
Fitzgerald sailors had to bend back the door of the stateroom to pluck Benson from the side of the ship and bring him inside. He and two other sailors were later evacuated from the ship via a Japanese helicopter to a Navy hospital at Yokosuka.
La mise en cause du commandant de l’USS Fitzgerald a déclenché une véritable tornade. Réponse de l’éditeur, avec entre autres, un aperçu de l’état des relations entre MarMar et Royale outre-Atlantique.
Why The USS Fitzgerald Is At Fault, Part 2 - Questions And Answers – gCaptain
▻http://gcaptain.com/uss-fitzgerald-fault-part-2-questions-answers
The recent editorial “The USS Fitzgerald Is At Fault. This Is Why.“ has been read 103,667 times, shared by 9,699 people via social media and ignited a firestorm of over 500 facebook comments, forum posts, emails and phone calls to gCaptain HQ. Feedback I have received from Navy brass, journalists, pilots and Merchant Mariners working aboard commercial ships has been positive. We also received some highly negative comments from both current and former members of the U.S. Navy Surface Warfare community. This is my reply to them… specifically to Navy sailors who have stood watch on the bridge of a warship.
[…]
Naval destroyers have never been, and never will be, the first American ships to be attacked during times of war… that distinction has always been, and will always be held by the US merchant fleet.
The Navy flew me literally half way around the world last year to advise them on why gCaptain gets some on scene information before Naval Intelligence does. And the reason is that merchant mariners and offshore workers are the eyes and ears of the ocean and gCaptain simply gives them a platform to share that information. If the navy wants civilian mariners to send them the information before posting it to gCaptain, then they must start by acknowledging the fact that the US Navy does not have the market cornered on the subject of naval war, combat and national defense because THE US MERCHANT MARINE also plays a vital role in both.
Il a fallu une semaine, mais il commence à circuler des interprétations loufoque dont une « théorie du complot » délirante… Je ne mets pas le lien, je résume :
– initialement, une attaque électronique effectuée par le Crystal a rendu inopérants tous les systèmes de l’USS Fitzgerald, l’assaillant poursuit sa route
– ayant transmis l’information du succès de l’attaque, il reçoit des instructions des « méchants » (nord-coréens, chinois ou russes, va savoir) de venir achever le destroyer désemparé
– il aurait d’ailleurs visé spécifiquement la cabine du commandant
– mais n’arrive pas à le couler et signale alors « l’accident »
Variantes :
– c’est un drone qui a lancé l’attaque électronique
– c’est une attaque sous false flag qui aurait échoué le bâtiment états-unien aurait dû couler sans survivants, ce qui aurait permis de lancer des représailles contre l’auteur putatif de l’attaque (choisir dans la liste des méchants ci-dessus)
Je n’ai que les éléments qui émergent dans la presse (et que je rassemble ici) une expérience (lointaine…) d’officier de quart en passerelle pendant mon service national sur un bateau qui naviguait beaucoup et, indirectement, celle de mon père, commandant dans la marine marchande. Je penche assez pour l’analyse de gCaptain : responsabilités partagées avec un gros bout pour le philippin.
Il est probable que la veille en passerelle de l’ACX Crystal (20 hommes d’équipage) était défaillante, c’est un reproche récurrent – ils dorment –, certains évoquent même l’idée qu’il aurait été en pilotage automatique. Cela expliquerait l’étrange tiroir de la trajectoire : ils ont continué, ont mis un certain temps à se rendre compte du problème, envoyer quelqu’un à l’avant du bateau et constater que le choc ressenti ne pouvait en aucun cas être causé par la rencontre d’un conteneur flottant à la dérive mais par un abordage. Ils ont fait demi-tour pour s’enquérir du navire abordé, réflexe normal de marin, et quand ils ont découvert l’USS Fitzgerald qu’ils ont donné l’alerte. Le Crystal a ensuite repris une route vers Tokyo ce qu’il n’a pu envisager qu’après avoir constaté que le Fitzgerald pouvait se passer d’assistance (ou s’être fait intimer l’ordre de s’éloigner…)
Sur l’USS Fitzgerald il y a vraiment un GROS problème. On peut à peu près supposer qu’il était en conditions de route normales puisque le commandant se reposait dans sa cabine. Et là, en passerelle, on a du monde ! y compris une veille optique sur chaque côté et un des boulots de l’officier de quart, c’est de veiller aux veilleurs… Alors se faire aborder en plein travers, c’est assez difficilement concevable.
Le problème c’est qu’il n’y a aucune information sur l’USS Fitzgerald. Est-il possible qu’il ait perdu toute source d’énergie lors de la collision (plusieurs compartiments inondés par la brèche provoquée par le bulbe du porte-conteneurs) ? La Navy dit que le bâtiment a failli couler, ce qui laisse entendre que ses moyens d’assèchement (les pompes) soit ne suffisaient pas à étaler la voie d’eau, soit étaient hors d’état de fonctionner. En tout état de cause, il a certainement prévenu de l’abordage dès qu’il a été en l’état de le faire. Quand ? ça, il faut le demander à l’US Navy…
Ceci dit, pour une catastrophe dans la Navy, il y a un (lointain, 1923) précédent célèbre …
▻https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catastrophe_de_Honda_Point
Première version émanant de l’abordeur philippin (du rapport du commandant de l’ACX Crystal à son armateur)
Exclusive : U.S. warship stayed on deadly collision course despite warning-container ship captain | Reuters
▻http://in.reuters.com/article/usa-navy-asia-idINKBN19H143
In the first detailed account from one of those directly involved, the cargo ship’s captain said the ACX Crystal had signalled with flashing lights after the Fitzgerald “suddenly” steamed on to a course to cross its path.
The container ship steered hard to starboard (right) to avoid the warship, but hit the Fitzgerald 10 minutes later at 1:30 a.m., according to a copy of Captain Ronald Advincula’s report to Japanese ship owner Dainichi Investment Corporation that was seen by Reuters.
(l’abattée à droite est parfaitement attestée par les enregistrements AIS)
Point de vue – tranché – d’un « vieux crabe »
USS Fitzgerald - Stop, Analyze, Dissect And Let’s Figure Out What Went Wrong – gCaptain
▻http://gcaptain.com/uss-fitzgerald-stop-analyze-dissect-lets-figure-went-wrong
Regardless of how much vessel traffic exists, or how many background lights exist, or state of visibility, etc, a deck watch officer should be trained to successfully stand a watch. Most of us who have been at sea have sailed through fog, night, storms, high-density traffic, currents, rain, sandstorms, etc and done so successfully. That is what we do, that is what we are bound to do. If you call yourself a mariner, then you don’t have collisions with other vessels. Period. You cannot make excuses. If you cannot stand a competent watch, then don’t assume the watch.
On s’en doutait un peu, mais ça se précise : on sort les arguments juridiques…
U.S. Likely to Bar Japan Investigators from Interviewing Fitzgerald Crew, Official Says – gCaptain
▻http://gcaptain.com/u-s-likely-bar-japan-investigators-interviewing-fitzgerald-crew-official-s
The United States will likely bar Japanese investigators from interviewing USS Fitzgerald crew manning the guided missile destroyer when it was struck by a cargo ship in Japanese waters killing seven American sailors, a U.S. navy official said.
[…]
The U. S. Coast Guard, which is investigating on behalf of the National Transportation Safety Board, has interviewed the crew of the container ship.
But the U.S. navy official, who declined to be identified, said warships were afforded sovereign immunity under international law and foreign investigators were not expected to get access to the U.S. crew.
“It’s unlikely Japanese or Philippine authorities will have direct access to crew members,” said the U.S. official.
The U.S. Coast Guard would instead provide summaries of crew interviews to the Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB), which would share them with the Japan Coast Guard (JCG), he said.
Navy struggles with approach to fix crippled destroyer Fitzgerald, as investigation continues
▻http://www.defensenews.com/articles/navy-struggles-with-approach-to-fix-crippled-fitzgerald-destroyer-as-in
The bulbous bow of the ACX Crystal left a 12x17-foot hole beneath the waterline, per three Navy sources who spoke on background, an enormous breach that rapidly flooded three spaces.
Passage en cale sèche dans une semaine pour évaluer les dommages :
• peut-on le retaper suffisamment pour qu’il rentre par ses propres moyens aux É.-U. ?
• est-ce que l’antenne tribord de son super-radar a été atteinte ? ce qui ferait exploser le coût de remise en état (et… ce qui est très probable au vu du gauchissement du panneau concerné…)
▻https://staticviewlift-a.akamaihd.net/dims4/default/61c03fe/2147483647/thumbnail/1000x563%3E/quality/90/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fsnagfilms-a.akamaihd.net%2F3b%2F32%2F1f
Un précédent, la remise en état de l’USS Cole après l’attaque du 12 octobre 2000 au Yémen (coût 250 M$), à noter l’unité de mesure de la dépense, le F-35…
Once the ship is in dry-dock, the Navy will complete a thorough assessment of what is wrong with the ship and will get estimates of how much it’s going to cost. In the case of the Cole, it cost the Navy about $250 million – or about two-and-a-half F-35s – to complete the repairs.
ici lors de son rapatriement sur plate-forme (autre élément de coût…)
U.S. Navy temporarily relieves commander of ship struck in Japanese waters.
▻https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-navy-asia-idUSKBN19W1HK
The U.S. Navy on Tuesday said on Tuesday it has temporarily relieved, for medical reasons, the commander of a warship involved in a crash with a container vessel in Japanese waters that killed seven American sailors.
[…]
“Cmdr Bryce Benson, who is recovering from injuries sustained during Fitzgerald’s June 17 collision with the merchant vessel ACX Crystal was relieved temporarily,” the U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet said in a press release.
Entrée en cale sèche pour poursuite de l’évaluation des dégâts. Note : on ne voit pas grand chose, l’ouverture dans les œuvres vives ayant été aveuglée et renforcée par des moyens de fortune…
Damaged Destroyer USS Fitzgerald Moves to Dry Dock in Japan -PHOTOS – gCaptain
▻http://gcaptain.com/damaged-destroyer-uss-fitzgerald-moves-dry-dock-japan-photos
The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) entered dry dock July 11 at the Fleet Activities (FLEACT) Yokosuka base.
U.S. warship crew found likely at fault in June collision : official
▻http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-navy-idUSKBN1A62FX
The crew of the USS Fitzgerald was likely at fault in the warship’s collision with a Philippine cargo ship in June and had not been paying attention to their surroundings, according to initial findings in an investigation, a U.S. defense official told Reuters on Friday.
[…]
The official said that in addition to crew members not paying attention to their surroundings, they did not take action until it was too late.
While the investigation is not complete, the official said crew members had given statements and radar data had been gathered, and it was unlikely the findings would change.
On s’en doutait un peu (cf. supra) mais voir confirmer que la veille en passerelle est aux abonnés absents la nuit dans une zone fréquentée sur un navire de guerre états-unien, ça fait quand même quelque chose.
Bon, mais il paraît qu’après l’abordage, ils ont tous été exemplaires. Ouf !
U.S. to haul stricken destroyer from Japan back to U.S. for repairs
▻https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-navy-asia-idUSKBN1AO13O
The U.S. Navy on Tuesday said it will haul the guided missile destroyer severely damaged in a collision with a freighter in Japanese waters back to the United States for repairs as soon as September.
The collision killed seven sailors aboard the USS Fitzgerald and ripped a hole below the vessels waterline. Naval engineers in Japan have patched up the destroyer but extensive damage that nearly sank the warship means it is unable to sail under its own steam.
“The Fitzgerald may be moved in September but it could be later than that,” a spokesman for the U.S. Seventh Fleet said.
USS Fitzgerald, les sanctions arrivent… le commandant, le second, le chef mécanicien, plus divers autres (j’imagine toute l’équipe de quart en passerelle)
Dozen U.S. sailors to be punished for June collision -U.S. Navy
▻https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-navy-asia-idUSL2N1L323R
About a dozen U.S. sailors are expected to face punishment for a collision in June between the USS Fitzgerald and a Philippine cargo ship, including the warship’s commander officer and other senior leaders of the ship, the Navy said on Thursday.
Admiral Bill Moran, deputy chief of naval operations, told reporters that the ship’s commanding officer, executive officer and master chief, would be removed from the vessel because “we’ve lost trust and confidence in their ability to lead.”
Moran said that in total close to a dozen sailors would face punishment without detailing the exact punishment.
Warship captain in collision that killed 7 to lose command - The Washington Post
▻https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/navy-hands-penalties-on-collision-both-ships-made-errors/2017/08/18/dc7a12fc-83d7-11e7-9e7a-20fa8d7a0db6_story.html
Adm. William Moran, the vice chief of naval operations, told reporters Thursday that the top three leaders aboard the USS Fitzgerald, which was badly damaged in the June collision off the coast of Japan, will be removed from duty aboard the ship. They are the commanding officer, Cmdr. Bryce Benson; the executive officer, Cmdr. Sean Babbitt; and Master Chief Petty Officer Brice Baldwin, who as the ship’s command master chief is its most senior enlisted sailor.
“The collision was avoidable, and both ships demonstrated poor seamanship,” the Navy’s 7th Fleet said in a statement, noting that “flawed” teamwork among those assigned to keep watch contributed to the collision.
The actions are being taken by Rear Adm. Joseph Aucoin, commander of the 7th Fleet, based at Yokosuka, Japan, because he lost confidence in the three, Moran said.
The Navy said the three had shown “inadequate leadership.” Separately, seven junior officers were relieved of their duties because they had shown “poor seamanship” and bad teamwork, 7th Fleet spokesman Cmdr. Clay Doss said Friday.
Administrative penalties were handed out to seven others that were members of the watch teams, he said, without giving details. All 14 remain in the Navy, but they will be assigned to other jobs, he said.
Le rapport préliminaire de l’US Navy sur les effets de la collision, la gestion des dégâts (damage control) et détails de l’intervention des équipes de sécurité à bord de l’USS Fitzgerald. Daté du 17/08/17.
Avec schéma de l’abordage et photos intérieures. Rapport caviardé.
▻https://partner-mco-archive.s3.amazonaws.com/client_files/1503000639.pdf
Parmi les infos, dans l’annexe reconstituant le déroulement :
|--------|----------------------------------------------------------|
| ~ 0130 | Collision with the ACX CRYSTAL on the starboard side. |
| | Berthing 2 is flooded within 30-60 seconds. |
| 0135 | Commanding Officer reported trapped in his stateroom. |
| 0146 | Commanding Officer freed from his stateroom |
| | and brought to the bridge. |
| 0150 | Commanding Officer reported as “down and XXXXXX” |
| | Medical team called to the bridge to assist. |
| 0200 | FTZ makes initial report of collision at sea |
| | to CDS 15 via personal cell phone at approximately 0220. |
|--------|----------------------------------------------------------|Il a fallu une demi-heure pour que le bâtiment informe son commandement de l’abordage. Mais le commandant était très perturbé (son état est censuré) il est vrai qu’il vient de rester 10 minutes accroché à l’extérieur de la coque de son navire.
Et on notera l’incohérence entre l’heure de l’entrée dans le déroulement et celle mentionnée dans le texte.
Sans surprise, attaque à boulets rouges par le rédacteur en chef de gCaptain contre le rapport préliminaire sur l’USS Fitzgerald…
Red Over Red, The Failure Of U.S. Navy Leadership – gCaptain
▻http://gcaptain.com/editorial-red-red-us-naval-leadership-not-command
The question is… why was this document released and to what benefit? The answer is that this document was written and released for one primary purpose: Public Relations.
Decades ago each major media outlet had dock reporters; journalists who wrote exclusively on maritime affairs and had an extensive list of high level maritime contacts as well as a working knowledge of ships. Today I only know of one journalist with this background, Carl Nolte of the San Francisco Chronicle. All the rest are generalists who are too easily confused by complicated facts and too susceptible to emotional triggers. As Ryan Holiday, author of “Trust Me, I’m Lying: Confessions of a Media Manipulator” says in this bestselling book… “today’s most effective public relations firms oversimplify facts and compensate by giving the public what it craves: an emotionally compelling story.”
The US Navy’s “Deaths of Seven Sailors Aboard The USS Fitzgerald” is just that, the vapid telling of a story about a few brave and honorable sailors fighting floods, destruction and death itself with a cursory acknowledgement of fault. It does nothing to prevent future collisions at sea and everything to send the message to the fleet that mistakes will not be tolerated and junior officers will be punished.
As a work of fiction it would be praised for pitting man against machine and for well painted characters – with strong wills and moral courage – placed in extraordinary circumstances to save the lives of shipmates and friends. But this is not a work of fiction or, at least, it is not supposed to be. It is supposed to be a preliminary investigation report filled with hard facts and harder questions that remain unanswered. This report contains very little of either.
[…]
It is maritime tradition which states the Captain is the primary party at fault for all failures aboard ship and for good reason. But maritime tradition does not extend blame down the ranks and not to non-commissioned officers like the USS Fitzgerald’s master chief petty officer who has been removed by Admiral Moran.
Those who are responsible for the events leading up to the collision, not just those involved in the collision, are those who steered the naval fleet towards these errors. The U.S. Navy has experienced four major failures in navigation this year alone. The men who are cumulatively responsible for these incidents are the same men who are responsible for other troublesome oversights, like the widespread and pervading ignorance of US Naval Officers as to how merchant ships operate at sea. These men have not been called to face “administrative punishment”. At the very least they include Adm. John Richardson, Adm. Bill Moran, Admiral Scott Swift and, the author of the Damage Control Inquiry, Rear Adm. Charles Williams.
With four collisions in under ten months, when is the Navy going to “lose confidence” in it’s own ability to decide who should be in command?
[…]
This is a poor excuse. If this document has nothing to do with the collision itself then why release it alongside statements conceding “poor seamanship” and a loss of faith in leadership ability of the ship’s officers?
If the document is supposed to provide a focused look at “the crew’s damage control activities” then why is it so lacking in information about the challenges and failures the crew experienced after the incident?
Numerous problems of significant scope and size where barely mentioned in the report. Major problems, such as number 16: “The collision resulted in a loss of external communication and a loss of power in the forward portion of the ship”, are not explained at all. The most basic of commercial ships are required to have redundant emergency power systems. How then does half of the complex ship loose power completely? More importantly, why is this not explained? What lessons learned about this power loss could have been transmitted to the USS McCain? And how, in 2017, when any civilian can purchase a handheld Iridium satellite phone for less than the price of the latest iPhone and a portable EPIRB for much less, could the communications system of a US Naval warship be so damaged and the ship’s leadership so shaken, that it takes the ship a full thirty minutes to transmit a Mayday (via Cell Phone no less)?
Another important question that goes unanswered is… did the damage control efforts result in a reduced situational awareness after the collision? If not then why did it take two and a half hours to identify the name of the ship they collided with? What would have happened to damage control efforts if this had been a terrorist attack or enemy combatant?
Those facts are not even the most troubling. Both the civilian and military continue to fail to consider the design and construction of the ship itself. No experts from the vessel’s builder, Bath Iron Works, or the architect or the Admirals in charge of approving the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer design were mentioned. The report completely fails to mention the damage control done aboard the ACX Crystal because that ship suffered relatively minor damage. What design and construction tradeoffs were made that resulted in a the hull of a billion dollar warship having much less intrinsic strength than a Korean built containership that was delivered for a fraction of the cost?
Where is the independent analysis?
[…]
Because, one thing we have learned during the past few centuries is this: no organization can work alone, no ship owner – not Olympic Steamship, not Tote and certainly not the US Navy – can be 100% objective when investigating itself. Any attempt to do so is the result of ignorance or corruption or both.
De sérieuses questions sur la survivabilité des destroyers et donc sur leur conception. En revanche, la comparaison avec celle des navires marchands abordeurs, il exagère un peu :
• dans les deux cas, c’est le bulbe d’étrave qui a percuté. Même s’ils avaient été détruits, ce qui n’est absolument pas le cas, les dégâts n’auraient absolument pas mis en danger les navires
• à l’inverse les navires de guerre ont été abordé de plein flanc, apparemment, et heureusement pour eux, sous des angles assez fermés (ce que montre le rapport pour le Fitzgerald et qu’on devine assez nettement vu la forme de la brèche du McCain)
• structurellement, un navire marchand n’a pas à prévoir de circulation entre ses compartiments
Sur l’incompétence des commentateurs, je remarque qu’aucun n’a fait la remarque que le navire de guerre coupe la route d’un bâtiment de commerce dans un rail…
L’hypothèse d’une cyberattaque relève du délire. Mais peut-être que les hackers russes ou chinois dont déjà capables aujourd’hui de liquéfier les cervelles d’une équipe de quart en passerelle, après tout de quoi ne sont-ils pas capables ?
Si le GPS est tombé en rade ou a été piraté, on dispose d’autres moyens de navigation, mille sabords, notamment en vue de terre. Bon sang, l’abordage a eu lieu à 5 miles du principal phare de la région et à 10 miles de la côte ! Si la passerelle a besoin du GPS pour naviguer, il y a lieu de s’interroger sur les compétences requises pour être officier de quart dans l’US Navy.
Mais, de fait, on en est bien là : couper la route d’un navire dans le rail (je sais je me répète, mais ça ne passe pas !…)
EDIT : là, en fait, je mords sur le fil du McCain …
Et pour finir, le titre Red over Red fait référence à une maxime anglaise pour retenir les feux de signalisation
Red over Red
The Captain is Dead
cf. il n’y a pas longtemps, mais dans un tout autre contexte :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/621727#message621731 Navire non maître de sa manœuvre
Passionnant ! Merci pour ce suivi et ces éclaircissements @simplicissimus
Merci !
Tu as suivi, l’affaire du USS S John McCain ? Ça a l’air encore plus dingue… (j’attends avec impatience le rapport préliminaire de l’amirauté…)
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/623510
et aussi un autre éditorial de l’excellent Joseph Konrad (gCaptain)
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/625382
et le rapport du GCAO
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/628112
Je viens de regarder pour le McCain. C’est pas mal aussi. C’est surtout l’analyse de la vacuité des rapports officiels qui m’a intéressé ainsi que la manière dont les médias orientent leurs papiers pour intéresser sans pour autant fournir du contenu digne de ce nom, je veux dire, du travail journalistique, « à la papa » comme dirais davduf
