person:edward snowden

  • View from Nowhere. Is it the press’s job to create a community that transcends borders?

    A few years ago, on a plane somewhere between Singapore and Dubai, I read Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1983). I was traveling to report on the global market for passports—how the ultrawealthy can legally buy citizenship or residence virtually anywhere they like, even as 10 million stateless people languish, unrecognized by any country. In the process, I was trying to wrap my head around why national identity meant so much to so many, yet so little to my passport-peddling sources. Their world was the very image of Steve Bannon’s globalist nightmare: where you can never be too rich, too thin, or have too many passports.

    Anderson didn’t address the sale of citizenship, which only took off in earnest in the past decade; he did argue that nations, nationalism, and nationality are about as organic as Cheez Whiz. The idea of a nation, he writes, is a capitalist chimera. It is a collective sense of identity processed, shelf-stabilized, and packaged before being disseminated, for a considerable profit, to a mass audience in the form of printed books, news, and stories. He calls this “print-capitalism.”

    Per Anderson, after the printing press was invented, nearly 600 years ago, enterprising booksellers began publishing the Bible in local vernacular languages (as opposed to the elitist Latin), “set[ting] the stage for the modern nation” by allowing ordinary citizens to participate in the same conversations as the upper classes. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the proliferation (and popularity) of daily newspapers further collapsed time and space, creating an “extraordinary mass ceremony” of reading the same things at the same moment.

    “An American will never meet, or even know the names of more than a handful of his 240,000,000–odd fellow Americans,” Anderson wrote. “He has no idea of what they are up to at any one time.” But with the knowledge that others are reading the same news, “he has complete confidence in their steady, anonymous, simultaneous activity.”

    Should the press be playing a role in shaping not national identities, but transnational ones—a sense that we’re all in it together?

    Of course, national presses enabled more explicit efforts by the state itself to shape identity. After the US entered World War I, for instance, President Woodrow Wilson set out to make Americans more patriotic through his US Committee on Public Information. Its efforts included roping influential mainstream journalists into advocating American-style democracy by presenting US involvement in the war in a positive light, or simply by referring to Germans as “Huns.” The committee also monitored papers produced by minorities to make sure they supported the war effort not as Indians, Italians, or Greeks, but as Americans. Five Irish-American papers were banned, and the German-American press, reacting to negative stereotypes, encouraged readers to buy US bonds to support the war effort.

    The US media played an analogous role in selling the public on the 2003 invasion of Iraq. But ever since then, in the digital economy, its influence on the national consciousness has waned. Imagined Communities was published seven years before the fall of the Berlin Wall, twenty-two years before Thomas Friedman’s The World Is Flat, and a couple of decades before the internet upended print-capitalism as the world knew it (one of Anderson’s footnotes is telling, if quaint: “We still have no giant multinationals in the world of publishing”).

    Since Trump—a self-described nationalist—became a real contender for the US presidency, many news organizations have taken to looking inward: consider the running obsession with the president’s tweets, for instance, or the nonstop White House palace intrigue (which the president invites readily).

    Meanwhile, the unprofitability of local and regional papers has contributed to the erosion of civics, which, down the line, makes it easier for billionaires to opt out of old “imagined communities” and join new ones based on class and wealth, not citizenship. And given the challenges humanity faces—climate change, mass migration, corporate hegemony, and our relationships to new technologies—even if national papers did make everyone feel like they shared the same narrative, a renewed sense of national pride would prove impotent in fighting world-historic threats that know no borders.

    Should the press, then, be playing an analogous role in shaping not national identities, but transnational ones—a sense that we’re all in it together? If it was so important in shaping national identity, can it do so on a global scale?

    Like my passport-buying subjects, I am what Theresa May, the former British prime minister, might call a “citizen of nowhere.” I was born in one place to parents from another, grew up in a third, and have lived and traveled all over. That informs my perspective: I want deeply for there to be a truly cosmopolitan press corps, untethered from national allegiances, regional biases, class divisions, and the remnants of colonial exploitation. I know that’s utopian; the international working class is hardly a lucrative demographic against which publishers can sell ads. But we seem to be living in a time of considerable upheaval and opportunity. Just as the decline of religiously and imperially organized societies paved the way for national alternatives, then perhaps today there is a chance to transcend countries’ boundaries, too.

    Does the US media help create a sense of national identity? If nationalism means putting the interests of one nation—and what its citizens are interested in—before more universal concerns, then yes. Most journalists working for American papers, websites, and TV write in English with a national audience (or regional time zone) in mind, which affects how we pitch, source, frame, and illustrate a story—which, in turn, influences our readers, their country’s politics, and, down the line, the world. But a news peg isn’t an ideological form of nationalism so much as a practical or methodological one. The US press feeds off of more pernicious nationalisms, too: Donald Trump’s false theory about Barack Obama being “secretly” Kenyan, disseminated by the likes of Fox and The Daily Caller, comes to mind.

    That isn’t to say that global news outlets don’t exist in the US. When coaxing subscribers, the Financial Times, whose front page often includes references to a dozen different countries, openly appeals to their cosmopolitanism. “Be a global citizen. Become an FT Subscriber,” read a recent banner ad, alongside a collage featuring the American, Chinese, Japanese, Australian, and European Union flags (though stories like the recent “beginner’s guide to buying a private island” might tell us something about what kind of global citizen they’re appealing to).

    “I don’t think we try to shape anyone’s identity at all,” Gillian Tett, the paper’s managing editor for the US, says. “We recognize two things: that the world is more interconnected today than it’s ever been, and that these connections are complex and quite opaque. We think it’s critical to try to illuminate them.”

    For Tett, who has a PhD in social anthropology, money serves as a “neutral, technocratic” starting point through which to understand—and tie together—the world. “Most newspapers today tend to start with an interest in politics or events, and that inevitably leads you to succumb to tribalism, however hard you try [not to],” Tett explains. “If you look at the world through money—how is money going around the world, who’s making and losing it and why?—out of that you lead to political, cultural, foreign-policy stories.”

    Tett’s comments again brought to mind Imagined Communities: Anderson notes that, in 18th-century Caracas, newspapers “began essentially as appendages of the market,” providing commercial news about ships coming in, commodity prices, and colonial appointments, as well as a proto–Vows section for the upper crust to hate-read in their carriages. “The newspaper of Caracas quite naturally, and even apolitically, created an imagined community among a specific assemblage of fellow-readers, to whom these ships, brides, bishops, and prices belonged,” he wrote. “In time, of course, it was only to be expected that political elements would enter in.”

    Yesterday’s aristocracy is today’s passport-buying, globe-trotting one percent. The passport brokers I got to know also pitched clients with the very same promise of “global citizenship” (it sounds less louche than “buy a new passport”)—by taking out ads in the Financial Times. Theirs is exactly the kind of neoliberal “globalism” that nationalist politicians like Trump have won elections denouncing (often hypocritically) as wanting “the globe to do well, frankly, not caring about our country so much.” Isn’t upper-crust glibness about borders, boundaries, and the value of national citizenship part of what helped give us this reactionary nativism in the first place?

    “I suspect what’s been going on with Brexit and maybe Trump and other populist movements [is that] people. . . see ‘global’ as a threat to local communities and businesses rather than something to be welcomed,” Tett says. “But if you’re an FT reader, you see it as benign or descriptive.”

    Among the largest news organizations in the world is Reuters, with more than 3,000 journalists and photographers in 120 countries. It is part of Thomson Reuters, a truly global firm. Reuters does not take its mandate lightly: a friend who works there recently sent me a job posting for an editor in Gdynia, which, Google clarified for me, is a city in the Pomeranian Voivodeship of Poland.

    Reuters journalists cover everything from club sports to international tax evasion. They’re outsourcing quick hits about corporate earnings to Bangalore, assembling teams on multiple continents to tackle a big investigation, shedding or shuffling staff under corporate reorganizations. Perhaps unsurprisingly, “more than half our business is serving financial customers,” Stephen Adler, the editor in chief, tells me. “That has little to do with what country you’re from. It’s about information: a central-bank action in Europe or Japan may be just as important as everything else.”

    Institutionally, “it’s really important and useful that we don’t have one national HQ,” Adler adds. “That’s the difference between a global news organization and one with a foreign desk. For us, nothing is foreign.” That approach won Reuters this year’s international Pulitzer Prize for uncovering the mass murder of the Rohingya in Myanmar (two of the reporters were imprisoned as a result, and since freed); it also comes through especially sharply in daily financial stories: comprehensive, if dry, compendiums of who-what-where-when-why that recognize the global impact of national stories, and vice versa. A recent roundup of stock movements included references to the US Fed, China trade talks, Brexit, monetary policy around the world, and the price of gold.

    Adler has led the newsroom since 2011, and a lot has changed in the world. (I worked at Reuters between 2011 and 2013, first as Adler’s researcher and later as a reporter; Adler is the chair of CJR’s board.) Shortly after Trump’s election, Adler wrote a memo affirming the organization’s commitment to being fair, honest, and resourceful. He now feels more strongly than ever about judiciously avoiding biases—including national ones. “Our ideology and discipline around putting personal feelings and nationality aside has been really helpful, because when you think about how powerful local feelings are—revolutions, the Arab Spring—we want you writing objectively and dispassionately.”

    The delivery of stories in a casual, illustrated, highly readable form is in some ways more crucial to developing an audience than subject matter.

    Whether global stories can push communities to develop transnationally in a meaningful way is a harder question to answer; it seems to impugn our collective aptitude for reacting to problems of a global nature in a rational way. Reuters’s decision not to fetishize Trump hasn’t led to a drop-off in US coverage—its reporters have been especially strong on immigration and trade policy, not to mention the effects of the new administration on the global economy—but its stories aren’t exactly clickbait, which means ordinary Americans might not encounter them at the top of their feed. In other words, having a global perspective doesn’t necessarily translate to more eyeballs.

    What’s more, Reuters doesn’t solve the audience-class problem: whether readers are getting dispatches in partner newspapers like The New York Times or through the organization’s Eikon terminal, they tend to be the sort of person “who does transnational business, travels a good deal, is connected through work and media, has friends in different places, cares about what’s going on in different places,” Adler says. “That’s a pretty large cohort of people who have reason to care what’s going on in other places.”

    There are ways to unite readers without centering coverage on money or the markets. For a generation of readers around the world, the common ground is technology: the internet. “We didn’t pick our audience,” Ben Smith, the editor in chief of BuzzFeed, tells me over the phone. “Our audience picked us.” He defines his readers as a cohort aged 18–35 “who are on the internet and who broadly care about human rights, global politics, and feminism and gay rights in particular.”

    To serve them, BuzzFeed recently published a damning investigative report into the World Wildlife Fund’s arming of militias in natural reserves; a (not uncontroversial) series on Trump’s business dealings abroad; early exposés of China’s detention of Uighur citizens; and reports on child abuse in Australia. Climate—“the central challenge for every newsroom in the world”—has been harder to pin down. “We don’t feel anyone has cracked it. But the shift from abstract scientific [stories] to coverage of fires in California, it’s a huge change—it makes it more concrete,” Smith says. (My husband is a reporter for BuzzFeed.)

    The delivery of these stories in a casual, illustrated, highly readable form is in some ways more crucial to developing an audience than subject matter. “The global political financial elites have had a common language ever since it was French,” Smith says. “There is now a universal language of internet culture, [and] that. . . is how our stuff translates so well between cultures and audiences.” This isn’t a form of digital Esperanto, Smith insists; the point isn’t to flatten the differences between countries or regions so much as to serve as a “container” in which people from different regions, interest groups, and cultures can consume media through references they all understand.

    BuzzFeed might not be setting out to shape its readers’ identities (I certainly can’t claim to feel a special bond with other people who found out they were Phoebes from the quiz “Your Sushi Order Will Reveal Which ‘Friends’ Character You’re Most Like”). An audience defined by its youth and its media consumption habits can be difficult to keep up with: platforms come and go, and young people don’t stay young forever. But if Anderson’s thesis still carries water, there must be something to speaking this language across cultures, space, and time. Call it “Web vernacular.”

    In 2013, during one of the many recent and lengthy US government shutdowns, Joshua Keating, a journalist at Slate, began a series, “If It Happened There,” that imagined how the American media would view the shutdown if it were occurring in another country. “The typical signs of state failure aren’t evident on the streets of this sleepy capital city,” Keating opens. “Beret-wearing colonels have not yet taken to the airwaves to declare martial law. . . .But the pleasant autumn weather disguises a government teetering on the brink.”

    It goes on; you get the idea. Keating’s series, which was inspired by his having to read “many, many headlines from around the world” while working at Foreign Policy, is a clever journalistic illustration of what sociologists call “methodological nationalism”: the bias that gets inadvertently baked into work and words. In the Middle East, it’s sectarian or ethnic strife; in the Midwest, it’s a trigger-happy cop and a kid in a hoodie.

    His send-ups hit a nerve. “It was huge—it was by far the most popular thing I’ve done at Slate,” Keating says. “I don’t think that it was a shocking realization to anyone that this kind of language can be a problem, but sometimes pointing it out can be helpful. If the series did anything, it made people stop and be conscious of how. . . our inherent biases and perspectives will inform how we cover the world.”

    Curiously, living under an openly nationalist administration has changed the way America—or at the very least, a significant part of the American press corps—sees itself. The press is a de facto opposition party, not because it tries to be, but because the administration paints it that way. And that gives reporters the experience of working in a place much more hostile than the US without setting foot outside the country.

    Keating has “semi-retired” the series as a result of the broad awareness among American reporters that it is, in fact, happening here. “It didn’t feel too novel to say [Trump was] acting like a foreign dictator,” he says. “That was what the real news coverage was doing.”

    Keating, who traveled to Somaliland, Kurdistan, and Abkhazia to report his book Invisible Countries (2018), still thinks the fastest and most effective way to form an international perspective is to live abroad. At the same time, not being bound to a strong national identity “can make it hard to understand particular concerns of the people you’re writing about,” he says. It might be obvious, but there is no one perfect way to be internationally minded.

    Alan Rusbridger—the former editor of The Guardian who oversaw the paper’s Edward Snowden coverage and is now the principal at Lady Margaret Hall, a college at Oxford University—recognizes the journalistic and even moral merits of approaching news in a non-national way: “I think of journalism as a public service, and I do think there’s a link between journalism at its best and the betterment of individual lives and societies,” he says. But he doesn’t have an easy formula for how to do that, because truly cosmopolitan journalism requires both top-down editorial philosophies—not using certain phrasings or framings that position foreigners as “others”—and bottom-up efforts by individual writers to read widely and be continuously aware of how their work might be read by people thousands of miles away.

    Yes, the starting point is a nationally defined press, not a decentralized network, but working jointly helps pool scarce resources and challenge national or local biases.

    Rusbridger sees potential in collaborations across newsrooms, countries, and continents. Yes, the starting point is a nationally defined press, not a decentralized network; but working jointly helps pool scarce resources and challenge national or local biases. It also wields power. “One of the reasons we reported Snowden with the Times in New York was to use global protections of human rights and free speech and be able to appeal to a global audience of readers and lawyers,” Rusbridger recalls. “We thought, ‘We’re pretty sure nation-states will come at us over this, and the only way to do it is harness ourselves to the US First Amendment not available to us anywhere else.’”

    In employing these tactics, the press positions itself in opposition to the nation-state. The same strategy could be seen behind the rollout of the Panama and Paradise Papers (not to mention the aggressive tax dodging detailed therein). “I think journalists and activists and citizens on the progressive wing of politics are thinking creatively about how global forces can work to their advantage,” Rusbridger says.

    But he thinks it all starts locally, with correspondents who have fluency in the language, culture, and politics of the places they cover, people who are members of the communities they write about. That isn’t a traditional foreign-correspondent experience (nor indeed that of UN employees, NGO workers, or other expats). The silver lining of publishing companies’ shrinking budgets might be that cost cutting pushes newsrooms to draw from local talent, rather than send established writers around. What you gain—a cosmopolitanism that works from the bottom up—can help dispel accusations of media elitism. That’s the first step to creating new imagined communities.

    Anderson’s work has inspired many an academic, but media executives? Not so much. Rob Wijnberg is an exception: he founded the (now beleaguered) Correspondent in the Netherlands in 2013 with Anderson’s ideas in mind. In fact, when we speak, he brings the name up unprompted.

    “You have to transcend this notion that you can understand the world through the national point of view,” he says. “The question is, What replacement do we have for it? Simply saying we have to transcend borders or have an international view isn’t enough, because you have to replace the imagined community you’re leaving behind with another one.”

    For Wijnberg, who was a philosophy student before he became a journalist, this meant radically reinventing the very structures of the news business: avoiding covering “current events” just because they happened, and thinking instead of what we might call eventful currents—the political, social, and economic developments that affect us all. It meant decoupling reporting from national news cycles, and getting readers to become paying “members” instead of relying on advertisements.

    This, he hoped, would help create a readership not based on wealth, class, nationality, or location, but on borderless, universal concerns. “We try to see our members. . . as part of a group or knowledge community, where the thing they share is the knowledge they have about a specific structural subject matter,” be it climate, inequality, or migration, Wijnberg says. “I think democracy and politics answers more to media than the other way around, so if you change the way media covers the world you change a lot.”

    That approach worked well in the Netherlands: his team raised 1.7 million euros in 2013, and grew to include 60,000 members. A few years later, Wijnberg and his colleagues decided to expand into the US, and with the help of NYU’s Jay Rosen, an early supporter, they made it onto Trevor Noah’s Daily Show to pitch their idea.

    The Correspondent raised more than $2.5 million from nearly 50,000 members—a great success, by any measure. But in March, things started to get hairy, with the publication abruptly pulling the plug on opening a US newsroom and announcing that staff would edit stories reported from the US from the original Amsterdam office instead. Many of the reasons behind this are mundane: visas, high rent, relocation costs. And reporters would still be reporting from, and on, the States. But supporters felt blindsided, calling the operation a scam.

    Today, Wijnberg reflects that he should have controlled the messaging better, and not promised to hire and operate from New York until he was certain that he could. He also wonders why it matters.

    “It’s not saying people who think it matters are wrong,” he explains. “But if the whole idea of this kind of geography and why it’s there is a construct, and you’re trying to think about transcending it, the very notion of Where are you based? is secondary. The whole point is not to be based anywhere.”

    Still: “The view from everywhere—the natural opposite—is just as real,” Wijnberg concedes. “You can’t be everywhere. You have to be somewhere.”

    And that’s the rub: for all of nationalism’s ills, it does instill in its subjects what Anderson calls a “deep, horizontal comradeship” that, while imagined, blossoms thanks to a confluence of forces. It can’t be replicated supranationally overnight. The challenge for a cosmopolitan journalism, then, is to dream up new forms of belonging that look forward, not backward—without discarding the imagined communities we have.

    That’s hard; so hard that it more frequently provokes a retrenchment, not an expansion, of solidarity. But it’s not impossible. And our collective futures almost certainly depend on it.

    https://www.cjr.org/special_report/view-from-nowhere.php
    #journalisme #nationalisme #Etat-nation #communauté_nationale #communauté_internationale #frontières #presse #médias

  • Israël aurait largement compté sur la #NSA pendant la #guerre du #Liban de 2006 | The Times of Israël
    https://fr.timesofisrael.com/israel-aurait-largement-compte-sur-la-nsa-pendant-la-guerre-du-lib

    Israël a largement compté sur les renseignements américains lors de la guerre du Liban de 2006, et a demandé, à de nombreuses reprises, de l’aide pour localiser des terroristes du #Hezbollah en vue d’assassinats ciblés, selon les derniers documents classifiés ayant fuité par l’intermédiaire du lanceur d’alerte américain Edward Snowden.

    Les deux documents divulgués mercredi ont révélé que même si l’Agence de sécurité nationale (NSA) n’avait pas l’autorisation légale de partager des informations en vue d’assassinats ciblés, la pression israélienne a conduit à la création d’un nouveau cadre de travail pour faciliter le partage de renseignements entre les deux pays.

    L’un des documents rendu public cette semaine, par The Intercept, était un article de 2006 paru dans la newsletter interne de la NSA, SIDToday, écrit par un officiel anonyme de la NSA à Tel Aviv qui officiait comme agent de liaison avec des officiels israéliens pendant le conflit de 2006.

    [...]

    Le rapport explique que la guerre de 2006 a poussé l’ISNU [l’unité israélienne SIGINT de renseignements militaires] dans ses « limites techniques et de moyens », et des officiels israéliens se sont tournés vers leurs homologues américains à la NSA pour obtenir un grand soutien et de nombreuses informations sur des cibles du Hezbollah.

    #états-unis #agression #guerre_des_33_jours

  • Baltimore paralysée par un virus informatique en partie créé par la NSA
    https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2019/05/29/la-ville-de-baltimore-paralysee-par-un-virus-informatique-en-partie-cree-par

    Le problème, c’est que, trois semaines plus tard, l’affaire n’est toujours pas résolue. Les serveurs et les e-mails de la ville restent désespérément bloqués. « Service limité », indiquent les écriteaux à l’entrée les bâtiments municipaux. Les équipes municipales, le FBI, les services de renseignement américains et les firmes informatiques de la Côte ouest s’y sont tous mis : impossible de débarrasser les dix mille ordinateurs de la ville de ce virus, un rançongiciel. Et pour cause : selon le New York Times, l’un des composants de ce programme virulent a été créé par les services secrets américains, la National Security Agency (NSA), qui ont exploité une faille du logiciel Windows de Microsoft. L’ennui, c’est que la NSA s’est fait voler en 2017 cette arme informatique devenue quasi impossible à contrôler.

    Alors, beaucoup de bruit pour rien ? Non, à cause du rôle trouble de la NSA. Selon le New York Times, celle-ci a développé un outil, EternalBlue (« bleu éternel »), en cherchant pendant plus d’une année une faille dans le logiciel de Microsoft.

    L’ennui, c’est que l’outil a été volé par un groupe intitulé les Shadow Brokers (« courtiers de l’ombre »), sans que l’on sache s’il s’agit d’une puissance étrangère ou de hackeurs américains. Les Nord-Coréens l’ont utilisé en premier en 2017 lors d’une attaque baptisée Wannacry, qui a paralysé le système de santé britannique et touché les chemins de fer allemands. Puis ce fut au tour de la Russie de s’en servir pour attaquer l’Ukraine : code de l’opération NotPetya. L’offensive a atteint des entreprises, comme l’entreprise de messagerie FedEx et le laboratoire pharmaceutique Merck, qui auraient perdu respectivement 400 millions et 670 millions de dollars.

    Depuis, EternalBlue n’en finit pas d’être utilisé, par la Chine ou l’Iran, notamment. Et aux Etats-Unis, contre des organisations vulnérables, telle la ville de Baltimore, mais aussi celles de San Antonio (Texas) ou Allentown (Pennsylvanie). L’affaire est jugée, à certains égards, plus grave que la fuite géante d’informations par l’ancien informaticien Edward Snowden en 2013.

    Le débat s’ouvre à nouveau sur la responsabilité de la NSA, qui n’aurait informé Microsoft de la faille de son réseau qu’après s’être fait voler son outil. Trop tard. En dépit d’un correctif, des centaines de milliers d’ordinateurs n’ayant pas appliqué la mise à jour restent non protégés. Un de ses anciens dirigeants, l’amiral Michael Rogers, a tenté de dédouaner son ancienne agence en expliquant que, si un terroriste remplissait un pick-up Toyota d’explosifs, on n’allait pas accuser Toyota. « L’outil qu’a développé la NSA n’a pas été conçu pour faire ce qu’il a fait », a-t-il argué.

    Tom Burt, responsable chez Microsoft de la confiance des consommateurs, se dit « en total désaccord » avec ce propos lénifiant : « Ces programmes sont développés et gardés secrètement par les gouvernements dans le but précis de les utiliser comme armes ou outils d’espionnage. Ils sont, en soi, dangereux. Quand quelqu’un prend cela, il ne le transforme pas en bombe : c’est déjà une bombe », a-t-il protesté dans le New York Times.

    #Virus #NSA #Baltimore #Cybersécurité

  • D’abord, ils sont venus pour Assange…
    https://lundi.am/D-abord-ils-sont-venus-pour-Assange-par-LeakyWeek

    En conclusion, et comme l’ont déjà affirmé Edward Snowden, Glenn Greenwald, Reporters Sans Frontières, The Guardian et bon nombre d’autres institutions [5] pourtant plus souvent complaisantes qu’adverses à l’égard des puissants, l’arrestation d’#Assange est un coup porté à la #liberté d’#information dans son ensemble. Sa capture est voulue à tout prix pour l’exemple au mépris du droit international et des promesses faites dans le passé par un gouvernement Équatorien manifestement acheté par les US (l’Équateur a opportunément reçu un prêt de 10 milliards par le FMI [6]...). Jeter Assange en prison vise à décourager quiconque de suivre son inspiration pour publier sans compromis ce qui expose les crimes et #mensonges des puissants. Ne nous y trompons pas, et au-delà des désaccords avec certains des propos d’Assange, il est urgent de reconnaître la portée de l’héritage de #WikiLeaks : de ce qu’il inspire pour le présent et pour le futur d’une presse libre et d’une information qui permettrait de collectivement et durablement rétablir les rapports de force, d’inquiéter les dominants et d’espérer un jour les faire payer pour leurs crimes et mensonges.

    • A tous ceux qui nous ont abandonné : nous n’oublierons pas. A tous les autres : nous nous battrons jusqu’au bout pour empêcher l’extradition et la mise au ban de celui qui fut, il y a deux ans, reconnu par l’ONU comme le seul détenu politique du continent.

      Les cinq ans de prison auxquels fait face théoriquement Julian Assange sont d’évidence une façon pour les Etats-Unis d’obtenir son extradition – en prétendant à une peine légère – afin d’ensuite dévoiler l’ensemble des autres poursuites qui pourraient le mener à la prison à vie.

      Il n’y a aucun doute sur le fait que cette procédure, enclenchée dès le départ dans un seul but, détruire Wikileaks et cet individu, est politique et ne s’achèvera que lorsqu’il sera complètement écrasé.

      C’est à nous de l’éviter.

      Juan Branco

    • lien propre:

      Glen Greenwald, Micah Lee - 20190412

      https://theintercept.com/2019/04/11/the-u-s-governments-indictment-of-julian-assange-poses-grave-threats-t

      In April, 2017, Pompeo, while still CIA chief, delivered a deranged speech proclaiming that “we have to recognize that we can no longer allow Assange and his colleagues the latitude to use free speech values against us.” He punctuated his speech with this threat: “To give them the space to crush us with misappropriated secrets is a perversion of what our great Constitution stands for. It ends now.”

      From the start, the Trump DOJ has made no secret of its desire to criminalize journalism generally. Early in the Trump administration, Sessions explicitly discussed the possibility of prosecuting journalists for publishing classified information. Trump and his key aides were open about how eager they were to build on, and escalate, the Obama administration’s progress in enabling journalism in the U.S. to be criminalized.

      Today’s arrest of Assange is clearly the culmination of a two-year effort by the U.S. government to coerce Ecuador — under its new and submissive president, Lenín Moreno — to withdraw the asylum protection it extended to Assange in 2012. Rescinding Assange’s asylum would enable the U.K. to arrest Assange on minor bail-jumping charges pending in London and, far more significantly, to rely on an extradition request from the U.S. government to send him to a country to which he has no connection (the U.S.) to stand trial relating to leaked documents.

      Indeed, the Trump administration’s motive here is clear. With Ecuador withdrawing its asylum protection and subserviently allowing the U.K. to enter its own embassy to arrest Assange, Assange faced no charges other than a minor bail-jumping charge in the U.K. (Sweden closed its sexual assault investigation not because they concluded Assange was innocent, but because they spent years unsuccessfully trying to extradite him). By indicting Assange and demanding his extradition, it ensures that Assange — once he serves his time in a London jail for bail-jumping — will be kept in a British prison for the full year or longer that it takes for the U.S. extradition request, which Assange will certainly contest, to wind its way through the British courts.

      The indictment tries to cast itself as charging Assange not with journalistic activities but with criminal hacking. But it is a thinly disguised pretext for prosecuting Assange for publishing the U.S. government’s secret documents while pretending to make it about something else.

      Whatever else is true about the indictment, substantial parts of the document explicitly characterize as criminal exactly the actions that journalists routinely engage in with their sources and thus, constitutes a dangerous attempt to criminalize investigative journalism.

      The indictment, for instance, places great emphasis on Assange’s alleged encouragement that Manning — after she already turned over hundreds of thousands of classified documents — try to get more documents for WikiLeaks to publish. The indictment claims that “discussions also reflect Assange actively encouraging Manning to provide more information. During an exchange, Manning told Assange that ‘after this upload, that’s all I really have got left.’ To which Assange replied, ‘curious eyes never run dry in my experience.’”

      But encouraging sources to obtain more information is something journalists do routinely. Indeed, it would be a breach of one’s journalistic duties not to ask vital sources with access to classified information if they could provide even more information so as to allow more complete reporting. If a source comes to a journalist with information, it is entirely common and expected that the journalist would reply: Can you also get me X, Y, and Z to complete the story or to make it better? As Edward Snowden said this morning, “Bob Woodward stated publicly he would have advised me to remain in place and act as a mole.”

      Investigative journalism in many, if not most, cases, entails a constant back and forth between journalist and source in which the journalist tries to induce the source to provide more classified information, even if doing so is illegal. To include such “encouragement” as part of a criminal indictment — as the Trump DOJ did today — is to criminalize the crux of investigative journalism itself, even if the indictment includes other activities you believe fall outside the scope of journalism.

      As Northwestern journalism professor Dan Kennedy explained in The Guardian in 2010 when denouncing as a press freedom threat the Obama DOJ’s attempts to indict Assange based on the theory that he did more than passively receive and publish documents — i.e., that he actively “colluded” with Manning:


      The problem is that there is no meaningful distinction to be made. How did the Guardian, equally, not “collude” with WikiLeaks in obtaining the cables? How did the New York Times not “collude” with the Guardian when the Guardian gave the Times a copy following Assange’s decision to cut the Times out of the latest document dump?

      For that matter, I don’t see how any news organisation can be said not to have colluded with a source when it receives leaked documents. Didn’t the Times collude with Daniel Ellsberg when it received the Pentagon Papers from him? Yes, there are differences. Ellsberg had finished making copies long before he began working with the Times, whereas Assange may have goaded Manning. But does that really matter?

      Most of the reports about the Assange indictment today have falsely suggested that the Trump DOJ discovered some sort of new evidence that proved Assange tried to help Manning hack through a password in order to use a different username to download documents. Aside from the fact that those attempts failed, none of this is new: As the last five paragraphs of this 2011 Politico story demonstrate, that Assange talked to Manning about ways to use a different username so as to avoid detection was part of Manning’s trial and was long known to the Obama DOJ when they decided not to prosecute.

      There are only two new events that explain today’s indictment of Assange: 1) The Trump administration from the start included authoritarian extremists such as Sessions and Pompeo who do not care in the slightest about press freedom and were determined to criminalize journalism against the U.S., and 2) With Ecuador about to withdraw its asylum protection, the U.S. government needed an excuse to prevent Assange from walking free.

      A technical analysis of the indictment’s claims similarly proves the charge against Assange to be a serious threat to First Amendment press liberties, primarily because it seeks to criminalize what is actually a journalist’s core duty: helping one’s source avoid detection. The indictment deceitfully seeks to cast Assange’s efforts to help Manning maintain her anonymity as some sort of sinister hacking attack.

      The Defense Department computer that Manning used to download the documents which she then furnished to WikiLeaks was likely running the Windows operating system. It had multiple user accounts on it, including an account to which Manning had legitimate access. Each account is protected by a password, and Windows computers store a file that contains a list of usernames and password “hashes,” or scrambled versions of the passwords. Only accounts designated as “administrator,” a designation Manning’s account lacked, have permission to access this file.

      The indictment suggests that Manning, in order to access this password file, powered off her computer and then powered it back on, this time booting to a CD running the Linux operating system. From within Linux, she allegedly accessed this file full of password hashes. The indictment alleges that Assange agreed to try to crack one of these password hashes, which, if successful, would recover the original password. With the original password, Manning would be able to log directly into that other user’s account, which — as the indictment puts it — “would have made it more difficult for investigators to identify Manning as the source of disclosures of classified information.”

      Assange appears to have been unsuccessful in cracking the password. The indictment alleges that “Assange indicated that he had been trying to crack the password by stating that he had ‘no luck so far.’”

      Thus, even if one accepts all of the indictment’s claims as true, Assange was not trying to hack into new document files to which Manning had no access, but rather trying to help Manning avoid detection as a source. For that reason, the precedent that this case would set would be a devastating blow to investigative journalists and press freedom everywhere.

      Journalists have an ethical obligation to take steps to protect their sources from retaliation, which sometimes includes granting them anonymity and employing technical measures to help ensure that their identity is not discovered. When journalists take source protection seriously, they strip metadata and redact information from documents before publishing them if that information could have been used to identify their source; they host cloud-based systems such as SecureDrop, now employed by dozens of major newsrooms around the world, that make it easier and safer for whistleblowers, who may be under surveillance, to send messages and classified documents to journalists without their employers knowing; and they use secure communication tools like Signal and set them to automatically delete messages.

      But today’s indictment of Assange seeks to criminalize exactly these types of source-protection efforts, as it states that “it was part of the conspiracy that Assange and Manning used a special folder on a cloud drop box of WikiLeaks to transmit classified records containing information related to the national defense of the United States.”

      The indictment, in numerous other passages, plainly conflates standard newsroom best practices with a criminal conspiracy. It states, for instance, that “it was part of the conspiracy that Assange and Manning used the ‘Jabber’ online chat service to collaborate on the acquisition and dissemination of the classified records, and to enter into the agreement to crack the password […].” There is no question that using Jabber, or any other encrypted messaging system, to communicate with sources and acquire documents with the intent to publish them, is a completely lawful and standard part of modern investigative journalism. Newsrooms across the world now use similar technologies to communicate securely with their sources and to help their sources avoid detection by the government.

      The indictment similarly alleges that “it was part of the conspiracy that Assange and Manning took measures to conceal Manning as the source of the disclosure of classified records to WikiLeaks, including by removing usernames from the disclosed information and deleting chat logs between Assange and Manning.”

  • Robert Tibbo, l’avocat d’Edward Snowden forcé à l’exil
    https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2019/03/29/robert-tibbo-l-avocat-d-edward-snowden-force-a-l-exil_5443069_4408996.html

    Le sort de cet avocat des droits de l’homme et de sept de ses clients est lié au destin du lanceur d’alerte américain, à l’origine des révélations sur la surveillance de masse menée par les Etats-Unis. C’est une belle victoire qui a dû adoucir, au moins pendant quelques heures, l’exil de Robert Tibbo en France. Après plusieurs années de bataille, l’une des clientes de cet avocat canadien, Vanessa Rodel, et sa fille Keana viennent d’obtenir, le 25 mars, l’asile au Canada. Elles faisaient partie d’un (...)

    #web #surveillance #activisme #PRISM

  • Snowden Joins Calls For Google To End Censored Chinese Search Project
    https://www.dailydot.com/debug/snowden-google-censored-china

    Mikael Thalen— Dec 11 2018 - Former NSA contractor Edward Snowden has joined numerous human rights groups in condemning Google over its plan to launch a censored search engine in China.

    In an open letter published Monday, Snowden and more than 60 organizations including Amnesty International, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and Human Rights Watch, called on the tech giant to cease its work on the secretive “Dragonfly” project.

    “Facilitating Chinese authorities’ access to personal data, as described in media reports, would be particularly reckless,” the letter states. “If such features were launched, there is a real risk that Google would directly assist the Chinese government in arresting or imprisoning people simply for expressing their views online, making the company complicit in human rights violations.”

    First revealed last August by the Intercept, the search app, made in an attempt by Google to re-enter the Chinese market, would not only surveil users but blacklist results for search queries such as “student protest” and “Nobel Prize” at the behest of Beijing.

    “New details leaked to the media strongly suggest that if Google launches such a product it would facilitate repressive state censorship, surveillance, and other violations affecting nearly a billion people in China,” the letter adds.

    Describing the project as “reckless,” the letter also warns that deploying Dragonfly would likely “set a terrible precedent for human rights and press freedoms worldwide.”

    Monday’s statement comes just weeks after more than 600 Google employees signed a similar letter demanding the company cancel Dragonfly’s development.

    Google CEO Sundar Pichai, who was confronted about Dragonfly during testimony in front of the House Judiciary Committee Monday, has repeatedly alleged that there are no plans “right now” to launch the project.

    A leaked meeting transcript from July, however, revealed Google’s search chief Ben Gomes had said the company intended to launch Dragonfly somewhere between January and April of 2019.

    #Chine #surveillance #Google

  • Best Operating Systems for Anonymity: Comparing Titans
    https://hackernoon.com/best-operating-systems-for-anonymity-comparing-titans-3501fd5cba3b?sourc

    There are plenty of operating systems aimed at achieving online anonymity. But how many of them are really good? I think that not many. Below I want to suggest several Linux distributions that can help to solve numerous privacy\anonymity issues. Let’s go!Tails OSTails is a Debian-based Linux distribution designed to provide privacy and anonymity. All outgoing connections are routed through the #tor network, and all non-anonymous connections are blocked. The system is designed to boot from Live CD or Live USB and leaves no traces on the machine on which it was used. The Tor project is the main sponsor of Tails. This operating system is recommended for use by the Freedom of the Press Foundation and was also used by Edward Snowden to expose PRISM.In order to evaluate all the pros and cons of (...)

    #anonimity #kodachi #tail #whonix

  • How much does your government spy on you? U.N. may rank the snoopers | Reuters
    https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-un-cyber-rights-idUKKCN1QH1YU
    https://s2.reutersmedia.net/resources/r/?m=02&d=20190228&t=2&i=1361381786&w=1200&r=LYNXNPEF1R144

    Joseph Cannataci, the U.N. special rapporteur on the right to privacy, submitted the draft questionnaire - touching on everything from chatrooms to systematic surveillance - to the U.N. Human Rights Council, and invited comments by June 30.

    Cannataci’s role investigating digital privacy was created by the council in 2015 after Edward Snowden’s revelations about U.S. surveillance, and he has strongly criticised #surveillance activities by the United States and other countries.

    As the first person in the job, Cannataci set out an action plan for tackling the task and said he planned to take a methodical approach to monitoring surveillance and privacy laws to help him to decide which countries to investigate.

    The council’s 47 member states are not be obliged to agree with his findings, but special rapporteurs’ reports are generally influential in a forum where governments are keen to appear to have an unblemished human rights record.

    #vie_privée #onu

  • #Huawei : les #Etats-Unis mettent la pression sur l’#Europe
    https://www.lesechos.fr/tech-medias/hightech/0600686058084-huawei-les-etats-unis-mettent-la-pression-sur-leurope-2244251

    « Quand le parti communiste demande quelque chose à une entreprise chinoise, elle obéit », assure un porte-parole du Département d’Etat. « La Chine est un pays communiste depuis 1949, mais l’autoritarisme s’y est encore renforcé ces six dernières années. Cela se reflète dans les lois passées récemment sur la sécurité nationale, la cybersécurité, le contre-terrorisme... Il y est très clair que les entreprises doivent collaborer, sans qu’il soit besoin d’une décision de justice ».

    Après les révélations d’Edward Snowden, qui ont prouvé l’étendue de l’espionnage américain sur ses propres alliés, la mise en garde peut faire sourire. Mais les Etats-Unis font valoir qu’il existe à l’Ouest des contre-pouvoirs - tribunaux indépendants, partis d’opposition, presse libre... - qui n’existent pas en Chine. Au Département d’Etat, on ajoute que « les Etats-Unis, comme la France ou le Royaume-Uni, ne mènent pas ce genre d’opérations pour réprimer la dissidence politique, intimider les gens, faire profiter ses propres entreprises de l’espionnage commercial. La Chine, si »

    #sans_vergogne

  • Alerte / en marche vers la privatisation de la démocratie ?
    par Quitterie de Villepin, démocrate, qui rapelle des choses simples et basiques autour des enjeux des outils informatiques pour un réel débat public. Elle tacle la #startup Cap Collectif mais pourrait aussi bien évoquer #facebook...
    https://blogs.mediapart.fr/quitterie-de-villepin/blog/300119/alerte-en-marche-vers-la-privatisation-de-la-democratie

    Alors qu’explose en France une demande sans précédent de démocratie de la part des citoyens et des citoyens, de Nuit Debout, aux Gilets jaunes (assemblées réunies à Commercy) celles et ceux qui sont censés être au service de cette participation citoyenne, ne voient pas ou font semblant de ne pas voir, qu’une entreprise s’approprie et capte cette formidable émulation collective, qui représente un commun, puisque financé par des deniers publics et enrichis grâce au travail de toutes et tous.

    /.../

    Pour moi, les plus grands visionnaires de notre ère sont Richard Stallman, Wikipédia, Edward Snowden, Aaron Schwartz, Birgitta Jonsdottir, Audrey Tang.
    Celles et ceux qui se battent par et pour les citoyen.ne.s, la connaissance partagée, la coopération de pair à pair, la transparence, l’émancipation de toutes et tous par toutes et tous. Qui ont compris que philosophiquement les choix de code d’algorithmes sont par essence politique.
    Et vous, qui sont vos héros ? Zuckerberg ? Cambridge Analytica ? Monsanto ? Bayer ?

    Pour rappel cette startup a fait ses premières armes-test via les assemblées des #giletsjaunes https://duckduckgo.com/?q=cap+collectif&t=fpas&ia=web ... ça vous rappelle rien ? Mais siii vous savez, cette privatisation du nom #Nuit_Debout qui avait provoqué une super enquête #seenthissienne !
    #privatisation #algocratie

  • Why Signal and not Threema ? : signal
    https://www.reddit.com/r/signal/comments/852qor/why_signal_and_not_threema

    Signal is open source, Threema is not, so that disqualifies Threema as a secure app in my opinion. You could as well continue using WhatsApp since it’s also end to end encrypted but closed source. Wire is another great alternative, and it’s German.

    Hacker erklären, welche Messenger-App am sichersten ist - Motherboard
    https://motherboard.vice.com/de/article/7xea4z/hacker-erklaren-welche-messenger-app-am-sichersten-ist


    C’est en allemand, mais c’est valable sans égard de la langue que vous utilisez pour votre communication.
    – La communication sécurisée en ligne doit obligatoirement passer par une app et un prootocole open source.
    – Il vous faut un système qui exclue ou rend très difficile la collection de métatdonnées par des tiers.
    – Votre système de communication « voice » et « chat » doit fonctionner avec des clients smartphome et desktop si vous voulez entretenir un fil de commmunication indépendamment du type d’appareil à votre disposition.

    Passons sur les exigences plus poussées, je ne vois que Signal qui satisfait tous ces besoins. Après on peut toujours utiliser plusieurs « messenger apps » afin de rester au courant des « updates » de tout le monde - à l’exception des apps de Facebook (Whatsapp), Wechat et Google parce que leur utilistion constitue une menace de votre vie privée simplement par l’installation sur votre portable.

    Roland Schilling (33) und Frieder Steinmetz (28) haben vor sechs Jahren begonnen, an der TU Hamburg unter anderem zu dieser Frage zu forschen. In einer Zeit, als noch niemand den Namen Edward Snowden auch nur gehört hatte, brüteten Schilling und Steinmetz bereits über die Vor- und Nachteile verschiedener Verschlüsselungsprotokolle und Messenger-Apps. So haben sie beispielsweise im vergangenen Jahr geschafft, die Verschlüsselung von Threema per Reverse Engineering nachzuvollziehen.

    Ihre Forschung ist mittlerweile zu einer Art Aktivismus und Hobby geworden, sagen die beiden: Sie wollen Menschen außerhalb von Fachkreisen vermitteln, wie elementar die Privatsphäre in einer Demokratie ist. Im Interview erklären sie, auf was man bei der Wahl des Messengers achten soll, welche App in punkto Sicherheit nicht unbedingt hält, was sie verspricht und warum Kreditinstitute sich über datenhungrige Messenger freuen.
    ...
    Roland Schilling: Bei mir ist es anders. Ich bringe die Leute einfach dazu, die Apps zu benutzen, die ich auch nutze. Das sind ausschließlich Threema, Signal und Wire. Wenn Leute mit mir reden wollen, dann klappt das eigentlich immer auf einer von den Dreien.
    ...
    Frieder: ... Signal und WhatsApp etwa setzen auf die gleiche technische Grundlage, das Signal-Protokoll, unterscheiden sich aber in Nuancen. Threema hat ein eigenes, nicht ganz schlechtes Protokoll, das aber beispielsweise keine ‘Perfect Forward Secrecy’ garantiert. Die Technik verhindert, dass jemand mir in der Zukunft meinen geheimen Schlüssel vom Handy klaut und damit meine gesamte verschlüsselte Kommunikation entschlüsseln kann, die ich über das Handy geführt habe. Signal und WhatsApp haben das.
    ...
    Roland: Ein gutes Messenger-Protokoll ist Open Source und ermöglicht damit Forschern und der Öffentlichkeit, eventuell bestehende Schwachstellen zu entdecken und das Protokoll zu verbessern. Leider gibt es auf dem Messenger-Markt auch viele Angebote, die ihre vorgebliche „Verschlüsselung“ diesem Prozess entziehen und geheim halten, oder das Protokoll zwar veröffentlichen, aber auf Kritik nicht eingehen.

    Secure WhatsApp Alternatives – Messenger Comparison
    https://www.boxcryptor.com/en/blog/post/encryption-comparison-secure-messaging-apps

    Threema and Telegram under Control of Russia’s Government ?
    https://medium.com/@vadiman/threema-and-telegram-under-control-of-russias-government-f81f8e28714b

    WhatsApp Exploited by NSA and US Secret Services?
    Go to the profile of Vadim An
    Vadim An
    Mar 7, 2018
    This is the end of era centralized communication!

    The 2017/2018 years are hot and saturated with cybersecurity challenges. Almost every week, a major media source reported hacking incidents or backdoor exploits in popular communication and messaging services. Some of which granted government agents unauthorized access to private and confidential information from within the communications industry.

    According to mass-media reports, one of the most popular Swiss secure messaging apps Threema moved under the control of the Russian government and has been listed in the official registry with a view to controlling user communications.

    This can be seen on regulatory public website https://97-fz.rkn.gov.ru/organizer-dissemination/viewregistry/#searchform

    This knockout news was commented by Crypviser — innovative German developer of the most secure instant communication platform based on Blockchain technologies, of the point of view, what does it mean for millions of Threema users?

    To answer this question, let’s understand the requirements for getting listed in this registry as an “information-dissemination organizers” according to a new Russian federal law, beginning from 01 June 2018.

    The law requires that all companies listed in internet regulator’s registry must store all users’ metadata (“information about the arrival, transmission, delivery, and processing of voice data, written text, images, sounds, or other kinds of action”), along with content of correspondence, voice call records and make it accessible to the Russian authorities. Websites can avoid the hassle of setting aside this information by granting Russian officials unfettered, constant access to their entire data stream.

    This is very bad news for Threema users. Threema officials have reported that they are not aware of any requirements to store, collect, or provide information. Maybe not yet though since there is still some time until 01 June 2018 when the new law kicks in and Threema will be obligated to provide direct access to sensitive user’s data.

    It’s possible that Threema is fully aware of this despite claiming otherwise. They may realize that the most popular messenger in Russia, Telegram, has been under pressure since refusing to officially cooperate with Russian secret services. If Russia takes steps to block Telegram as a result, then Threema would become the next best alternative service. That is assuming they’re willing to violating the security and privacy rights of its users by giving in to the new law’s requirements.

    Based on the reports of Financial Time magazine, the Telegram founder agreed to register their app with Russian censors by the end of June 2017. This, however; is not a big loss for Telegram community because of the lack of security in Telegram to date. During the last 2 years, its security protocol has been criticized many times and many security issues were found by researchers. Although there is no direct evidence showing that Telegram has already cooperated with the Russian government or other governments, these exploitable bugs and poor security models make Telegram users vulnerable victims to hackers and secret services of different countries.

    The same security benchmark issues have been explored in the biggest communication app WhatsApp. The security model of WhatsApp has been recognized as vulnerable by the most reputed cryptographic experts and researchers worldwide. According to the Guardian, a serious “backdoor” was found in encryption. More specifically, the key exchange algorithm.

    A common security practice in encrypted messaging services involves the generation and store of a private encryption key offline on the user’s device. And only the public key gets broadcasted to other users through the company’s server. In the case of WhatsApp, we have to trust the company that it will not alter public key exchange mechanism between the sender and receiver to perform man-in-the-middle attack for snooping of users encrypted private communication.

    Tobias Boelter, security researcher from the University of California, has reported that WhatsApp’s end-to-end encryption, based on Signal protocol, has been implemented in a way that if WhatsApp or any hacker intercepts your chats, by exploiting trust-based key exchange mechanism, you will never come to know if any change in encryption key has occurred in the background.

    The Guardian reports, “WhatsApp has implemented a backdoor into the Signal protocol, giving itself the ability to force the generation of new encryption keys for offline users and to make the sender re-encrypt messages with new keys and send them again for any messages that have not been marked as delivered. The recipient is not made aware of this change in encryption.”

    But on the other hand, the developer of Signal messaging app Open Whisper Systems says, ”There is no WhatsApp backdoor”, “it is how cryptography works,” and the MITM attack “is endemic to public key cryptography, not just WhatsApp.”

    It’s worth noting that none of the security experts or the company itself have denied the fact that, if required by the government, WhatsApp can intercept your chats. They do say; however, WhatsApp is designed to be simple, and users should not lose access to messages sent to them when their encryption key is changed. With this statement, agrees on a cybersecurity expert and CTO of Crypviser, Vadim Andryan.

    “The Man-in-the-Middle attack threat is the biggest and historical challenge of asymmetric cryptography, which is the base of end-to-end encryption model. It’s hard to say, is this “backdoor” admitted intentionally or its became on front due lack of reliable public — key authentication model. But it definitely one of the huge disadvantages of current cryptographic models used for secure instant communication networks, and one of the main advantage of Crypviser platform.”

    Crypviser has introduced a new era of cryptography based on Blockchain technologies. It utilizes Blockchain to eliminate all threats of Man-in-the-Middle attack and solves the historical public key encryption issue by using decentralized encryption keys, exchanges, and authorization algorithms. The authentication model of Crypviser provides public key distribution and authorization in peer-to-peer or automated mode through Blockchain.

    After commercial launch of Crypviser unified app, ”messenger” for secure social communication will be available on the market in free and premium plans. The free plan in peer-to-peer authentication mode requires user interaction to check security codes for every new chat and call. The full-featured premium plan offers Blockchain based automated encryption model and powerful professional security features on all levels.

    You can see the comperisation table of Crypviser with centralized alternatives in the below table

    #internet #communication #sécurité #vie_privée

  • #cequilrestedenosrêves... Le #11janvier prochain, ce sera le #AaronSwartzDay : l’anniversaire de la mort de Aaron Swartz, génie informatique partisan du #Libre qui a été suicidé par la défense vorace de la #propriété_privée pour avoir libéré des millions de documents judiciaires du système #PACER... oui, tu sais, le truc qui fait désormais kiffer les macronistes et autres libéraux capitalistes en se disant qu’ils pourraient en tirer profit via la #legaltech à l’étude en france...



    Je commence donc ici ma recension annuelle à sa mémoire avec ce qui semble un magnifique cadeau : un livre de Flore Vasseur à paraître demain, 9 janvier : « Ce qu’il reste de nos rêves »
    Au vu du parcours de l’auteure, je pense qu’il y a des chances qu’il soit un jour en libre accès quelque part sur le web.

    Dans Ce qu’il reste de nos rêves*, Flore Vasseur inscrit le génie du code dans la lignée des lanceurs d’alerte ayant marqué l’histoire des États-Unis. Broyé par le gouvernement américain, Aaron #Swartz était l’enfant qui voulait changer le monde.

    #Internet ne doit pas servir à vendre de la pâtée pour chiens mais être l’outil pour trouver des remèdes au cancer. Du haut de ses 14 ans, Aaron Swartz ne transige pas avec ses idéaux face aux patrons de la tech’. Virtuose de la #programmation informatique dès son plus jeune âge, Internet est son moyen de changer le monde. Créateur d’une encyclopédie collaborative avant Wikipédia et d’Infogami, une plateforme de création de sites et de blogs accessible sans savoir coder, il veut libérer la connaissance. Un combat pour lequel il a sacrifié sa vie. À 26 ans, il est retrouvé pendu à la fenêtre de son appartement new-yorkais. Nous sommes en janvier 2013. Poursuivi par le gouvernement américain, il risquait trente-cinq ans de prison et un million de dollars d’amende pour avoir téléchargé des millions de publications scientifiques sur les serveurs du Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Après quatre ans d’enquête, Flore Vasseur porte son message avec engagement et tendresse dans son dernier ouvrage, Ce qu’il reste de nos rêves.

    https://www.lelanceur.fr/aaron-swartz-lanceur-dalerte-sublime-par-les-mots-de-flore-vasseur

    Le jour de sa mort, #Facebook a gagné. Son #algorithme est la nouvelle main invisible qui régule rage et #consommation, élections et émotions. Sa disparition révèle un destin, une époque et notre tragédie”, écrit Flore Vasseur.

    Présentation vidéo des Éditions des Équateurs :
    https://youtu.be/aF-Feid2RuU

    Autre article paru pour annoncer une rencontre au bar le 61 à Paris (sniff !) :


    Et une présentation du livre par Télérama : https://www.telerama.fr/livres/ce-quil-reste-de-nos-reves,n6074156.php

    C’est à l’occasion de l’écriture de ce livre et de l’enquête qu’elle a menée qu’elle a pu rencontrer Edward Snowden pour le documentaire Meeting Snowden :

    La rencontre avec #Snowden est survenue parce que je marchais dans les pas d’Aaron, a confié Flore Vasseur au Lanceur. Je sais qu’il le lisait et que son suicide l’a bouleversé. C’est une espèce de grand frère. Et je suis persuadée qu’il n’aurait pas fait ce qu’il a fait s’il n’y avait pas eu Aaron Swartz.” En 2011, deux ans avant qu’Edward Snowden n’en transmette les preuves, Aaron Swartz avait évoqué l’ampleur de la surveillance de masse des États-Unis, de sa propre population et de ses alliés. Pour comprendre “la filiation et les héritiers” d’un fantôme qui la fascine, Flore Vasseur est allée rencontrer les parents et le cercle proche d’Aaron Swartz. Comme un heureux hasard, elle a fait la rencontre de celui qui le considérait “comme son fils”, Lawrence Lessig. Quand Aaron Swartz avait 14 ans, c’est ensemble qu’ils présentèrent un mouvement de libération du droit d’auteur à travers la création des Creative Commons. Professeur à Harvard, Lawrence Lessig partage avec Aaron la volonté de “contrer l’influence de l’argent en politique”. Il est aussi l’une des rares personnalités à avoir pris la défense d’Edward Snowden aux États-Unis. C’est grâce à ce chemin que la romancière a réalisé, à Moscou, le documentaire Meeting Snowden. Après avoir négocié avec Arte, son film est désormais en accès libre.

    A retrouver sur son blog http://blog.florevasseur.com

    Même 6 ans après sa mort, l’effet #Streisand se fait encore sentir. Il y a un mois, aux States, le site Gizmodo a fait une révélation impliquant les archives des mails de Aaron Swartz, démontrant que le #FBI gardait tout, absolument toutes les données qu’il avait pu collecter autour d’enquêtes, et ce même s’il n’y avait aucun rapport :

    Près de deux ans avant la première enquête connue du gouvernement américain sur les activités du cofondateur de Reddit et célèbre activiste du numérique, Aaron Swartz, le FBI a balayé ses données de courrier électronique dans une enquête antiterroriste qui avait également pris au piège des étudiants d’une université américaine. document secret publié pour la première fois par Gizmodo.
    https://gizmodo.com/fbi-secretly-collected-data-on-aaron-swartz-earlier-tha-1831076900
    Les données de courrier électronique appartenant à Swartz, qui n’était probablement pas la cible de l’enquête antiterroriste, ont été cataloguées par le FBI et consultées plus d’un an plus tard, car elles pesaient des accusations potentielles contre lui pour quelque chose de totalement indépendant.

    https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20181217/11080641248/fbi-swept-up-info-about-aaron-swartz-while-pursuing-al-qaeda-investigation

    Comme tous les ans, des dizaines et des dizaines d’initiatives sont prévues pour lui rendre hommage, elles sont regroupées sur le site https://www.aaronswartzday.org accompagné d’un compte twitter https://twitter.com/aaronswartzday

    J’ai l’impression par contre que le blog de Aaron Swartz n’est plus accessible, il est heureusement sauvegardé dans la #WayBackMachine, fondée à sa mémoire : https://web.archive.org/web/20190103112701/http://www.aaronsw.com

    La recension de l’année dernière : https://seenthis.net/messages/658967

    (par contre, #seenthis, je suis étonnée de ne toujours pas voir de tag « personnalité » #Aaron_Swartz sur son nom... peut-être est-ce l’occasion de le créer ;) ?)

  • " Meeting Snowden " par Flore Vasseur
    https://enuncombatdouteux.blogspot.com/2018/12/meeting-snowden-par-flore-vasseur.html

    Le temps d’une rencontre inédite, Edward Snowden, Lawrence Lessig et Birgitta Jónsdóttir, figures de la lutte pour les libertés, s’interrogent sur l’avenir de la démocratie.
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=3&v=Q2yb6dyrsh0


    Députée islandaise depuis 2009, Birgitta Jónsdóttir se mobilise pour redonner le pouvoir au peuple. Professeur de droit à Harvard et pionnier de l’Internet libre, l’Américain Lawrence « Larry » Lessig dénonce sans relâche l’influence délétère de l’argent sur la politique et la collusion des élites, qui mine l’intérêt général. Quant à son compatriote Edward Snowden, ancien collaborateur de la CIA et de la NSA, il a révélé la surveillance généralisée de la population et des alliés des États-Unis, et vit désormais en Russie, où il a obtenu un asile politique d’autant plus précaire que les relations entre les deux pays apparaissent aujourd’hui illisibles.

    Tandis que, depuis Moscou, Vladimir Poutine règne en maître sur la scène internationale, son homologue américain Donald Trump, pur produit de la société du spectacle, s’installe aux commandes de la première puissance nucléaire avec autoritarisme… Cette nouvelle page de l’histoire signera-t-elle la fin de la démocratie ?

    Figures de proue d’un mouvement mondial de défense des libertés, ces trois compagnons de lutte, qui s’estiment et s’entraident à distance sur Internet, se sont rencontrés pour la première fois en secret à Moscou, à la veille de Noël. Ils ont autorisé les caméras de Flore Vasseur à capter cette conversation hors norme, au fil de laquelle émergent des questionnements essentiels : comment sauver la démocratie ? Qu’est-ce que l’échec ? Qui écrit l’histoire ?

    Documentaire complet de Flore Vasseur

  • Using #amazon? Your Data is Probably Already in the Hands of Foreign Companies
    https://hackernoon.com/using-amazon-your-data-is-probably-already-in-the-hands-of-foreign-compa

    As big tech companies have steadily and stealthily made ever-increasing profits from using our data, governments have finally started to wake up to the fact that our #privacy is being eroded. After Edward Snowden leaked evidence that the NSA had been spying on citizens across the globe, the European Parliament passed the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), imposing extensive requirements on organizations that process the data of EU citizens.The US has been slower to regulate. However, from March of this year, all 50 US states now have laws that require data processors to inform citizens in case of a data breach. Not quite as far-reaching as the GDPR, but it’s a start.The Limitations of RegulationRegulations that protect our data and privacy create a deterrent for companies who (...)

    #amazon-customer-data #cambridge-analytica #hacking

  • Israeli cyber firm negotiated advanced attack capabilities sale with Saudis, Haaretz reveals

    Just months before crown prince launched a purge against his opponents, NSO offered Saudi intelligence officials a system to hack into cellular phones ■ NSO: We abide the law, our products are used to combat crime and terrorism

    https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israeli-company-negotiated-to-sell-advanced-cybertech-to-the-saudi

    The Israeli company NSO Group Technologies offered Saudi Arabia a system that hacks cellphones, a few months before Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman began his purge of regime opponents, according to a complaint to the Israel Police now under investigation.
    But NSO, whose development headquarters is in Herzliya, says that it has acted according to the law and its products are used in the fight against crime and terror.
    To really understand Israel and the Middle East - subscribe to Haaretz
    Either way, a Haaretz investigation based on testimony and photos, as well as travel and legal documents, reveals the Saudis’ behind-the-scenes attempts to buy Israeli technology.
    In June 2017, a diverse group gathered in a hotel room in Vienna, a city between East and West that for decades has been a center for espionage, defense-procurement contacts and unofficial diplomatic meetings.
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    Arriving at the hotel were Abdullah al-Malihi, a close associate of Prince Turki al-Faisal – a former head of Saudi Arabia’s intelligence services – and another senior Saudi official, Nasser al-Qahtani, who presented himself as the deputy of the current intelligence chief. Their interlocutors were two Israeli businessmen, representatives of NSO, who presented to the Saudis highly advanced technology.

    >> Israel’s cyber-spy industry helps world dictators hunt dissidents and gays | Revealed
    In 2017, NSO was avidly promoting its new technology, its Pegasus 3 software, an espionage tool so sophisticated that it does not depend on the victim clicking on a link before the phone is breached.
    During the June 2017 meeting, NSO officials showed a PowerPoint presentation of the system’s capabilities. To demonstrate it, they asked Qahtani to go to a nearby mall, buy an iPhone and give them its number. During that meeting they showed how this was enough to hack into the new phone and record and photograph the participants in the meeting.
    The meeting in Vienna wasn’t the first one between the two sides. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has recently expressed pride in the tightening ties with Gulf states, with Israel’s strength its technology. The message is clear: Israel is willing to sell these countries security-related technologies, and they forge closer ties with Israel in the strategic battle against Iran.
    >> $6 billion of Iranian money: Why Israeli firm Black Cube really went after Obama’s team
    According to the complaint, the affair began with a phone call received by a man identified as a European businessman with connections in the Gulf states. On the line was W., an Israeli dealing in defense-related technologies and who operates through Cyprus-based companies. (Many defense-related companies do business in Cyprus because of its favorable tax laws.) W. asked his European interlocutor to help him do business in the Gulf.

    FILE Photo: Two of the founders of NSO, Shalev Julio and Omri Lavi.
    Among the European businessman’s acquaintances were the two senior Saudi officials, Malihi and Qahtani.
    On February 1, 2017, W. and the businessman met for the first time. The main topic was the marketing of cyberattack software. Unlike ordinary weapons systems, the price depends only on a customer’s eagerness to buy the system.
    The following month, the European businessman traveled to a weapons exhibition in the United Arab Emirates, where a friend introduced him to Malihi, the Saudi businessman.
    In April 2017, a meeting was arranged in Vienna between Malihi, Qahtani and representatives of Israeli companies. Two more meetings subsequently took place with officials of Israeli companies in which other Israelis were present. These meetings took place at the Four Seasons Hotel in Limassol, Cyprus, where Israeli cybercompanies often meet with foreign clients.
    >> Snowden: Israeli firm’s spyware was used to track Khashoggi
    The meetings were attended by W. and his son. They were apparently friendly: In photographs documenting one of them, W. and Qahtani are shown after a hunting trip, with the Saudi aiming a rifle at a dead animal.
    In the Vienna meeting of April 2017, the Saudis presented a list of 23 systems they sought to acquire. Their main interest was cybersystems. For a few dozens of millions of dollars, they would be able to hack into the phones of regime opponents in Saudi Arabia and around the world and collect classified information about them.
    According to the European businessman, the Saudis, already at the first meeting, passed along to the representatives of one of the companies details of a Twitter account of a person who had tweeted against the regime. They wanted to know who was behind the account, but the Israeli company refused to say.

    Offices of Israeli NSO Group company in Herzliya, Israel, Aug. 25, 2016Daniella Cheslow/AP
    In the June 2017 meeting, the Saudis expressed interest in NSO’s technology.
    According to the European businessman, in July 2017 another meeting was held between the parties, the first at W.’s home in Cyprus. W. proposed selling Pegasus 3 software to the Saudis for $208 million.
    Malihi subsequently contacted W. and invited him to Riyadh to present the software to members of the royal family. The department that oversees defense exports in Israel’s Defense Ministry and the ministry’s department for defense assistance, responsible for encouraging exports, refused to approve W.’s trip.
    Using the initials for the defense assistance department, W. reportedly said “screw the D.A.” and chartered a small plane, taking with him NSO’s founder, Shalev Hulio, to the meetings in the Gulf. According to the European businessman, the pair were there for three days, beginning on July 18, 2017.
    At these meetings, the European businessman said, an agreement was made to sell the Pegasus 3 to the Saudis for $55 million.
    According to the European businessman, the details of the deal became known to him only through his contacts in the defense assistance department. He said he had agreed orally with W. that his commission in the deal would be 5 percent – $2.75 million.
    But W. and his son stopped answering the European businessman’s phone calls. Later, the businessman told the police, he received an email from W.’s lawyer that contained a fake contract in which the company would agree to pay only his expenses and to consider whether to pay him a bonus if the deal went through.
    The European businessman, assisted by an Israeli lawyer, filed a complaint in April 2018. He was questioned by the police’s national fraud squad and was told that the affair had been transferred to another unit specializing in such matters. Since then he has been contacted by the income tax authorities, who are apparently checking whether there has been any unreported income from the deal.
    The European businessman’s claims seem to be substantiated by correspondence Haaretz has obtained between Cem Koksal, a Turkish businessman living in the UAE, and W.’s lawyers in Israel. The European businessman said in his complaint that Koksal was involved in mediating the deal.
    In a letter sent by Koksal’s lawyer in February of this year, he demanded his portion from W. In a response letter, sent in early March, W.’s attorney denied the existence of the deal. The deal had not been signed, the letter claimed, due to Koksal’s negligence, therefore he was due no commission or compensation of any kind.
    These issues have a wider context. From the claims by the European businessman and Koksal’s letter, it emerges that the deal was signed in the summer of 2017, a few months before Crown Prince Mohammed began his purge of regime opponents. During that purge, the Saudi regime arrested and tortured members of the royal family and Saudi businessmen accused of corruption. The Saudis also held Lebanese Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri for a few days in a Riyadh hotel.
    In the following months the Saudis continued their hunt for regime opponents living abroad, which raised international attention only when the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul came to light in October.
    It has recently been claimed that NSO helped the Saudi regime surveil its opponents. According to an article in Forbes magazine and reports from the Canadian cyber-related think tank Citizen Lab, among the surveillance targets were the satirist Ghanem Almasrir and human rights activist Yahya Asiri, who live in London, and Omar Abdulaziz, who lives in exile in Canada.
    These three men were in contact with Khashoggi. Last month, Edward Snowden, who uncovered the classified surveillance program of the U.S. National Security Agency, claimed that Pegasus had been used by the Saudi authorities to surveil Khashoggi.
    “They are the worst of the worst,” Snowden said of NSO, whose people he accused of aiding and abetting human rights violations.
    NSO’s founders and chief executives are Omri Lavie and Shalev Hulio. The company is registered in Cyprus but its development headquarters is in Herzliya. In 2014 the company was sold to private equity firm Francisco Partners based on a valuation of $250 million.
    Francisco Partners did not respond to Haaretz’s request for comment.
    In May, Verint Systems offered to buy NSO for $1 billion, but the offer was rejected. The company is awash in cash. Earlier this month all its employees went on vacation in Phuket, Thailand. Netta Barzilai, Lior Suchard, the Ma Kashur Trio and the band Infected Mushroom were also flown there to entertain them.
    The Pegasus system developed by NSO was a “one-click system,” meaning that the victim had to press on a link sent to him through phishing. The new system no longer requires this. Only the number of the SIM card is needed to hack into the phone. It’s unknown how Pegasus does this.
    Technology sources believe that the technology either exploits breaches in the cellphone’s modem, the part that receives messages from the antenna, or security breaches in the apps installed on a phone. As soon as a phone is hacked, the speaker and camera can be used for recording conversations. Even encoded apps such as WhatsApp can be monitored.
    NSO’s operations are extremely profitable.
    The company, which conceals its client list, has been linked to countries that violate human rights. NSO says its products are used in the fight against crime and terror, but in certain countries the authorities identify anti-regime activists and journalists as terrorists and subject them to surveillance.
    In 2012, NSO sold an earlier version of Pegasus to Mexico to help it combat the drug cartel in that country. According to the company, all its contracts include a clause specifically permitting the use of its software only to “investigate and prevent crime or acts of terror.” But The New York Times reported in 2016 that the Mexican authorities also surveilled journalists and lawyers.
    Following that report, Mexican victims of the surveillance filed a lawsuit in Israel against NSO last September. This year, The New York Times reported that the software had been sold to the UAE, where it helped the authorities track leaders of neighboring countries as well as a London newspaper editor.
    In response to these reports, NSO said it “operated and operates solely in compliance with defense export laws and under the guidelines and close oversight of all elements of the defense establishment, including all matters relating to export policies and licenses.
    “The information presented by Haaretz about the company and its products and their use is wrong, based on partial rumors and gossip. The presentation distorts reality.
    “The company has an independent, external ethics committee such as no other company like it has. It includes experts in legal affairs and international relations. The committee examines every deal so that the use of the system will take place only according to permitted objectives of investigating and preventing terror and crime.
    “The company’s products assist law enforcement agencies in protecting people around the world from terror attacks, drug cartels, child kidnappers for ransom, pedophiles, and other criminals and terrorists.
    “In contrast to newspaper reports, the company does not sell its products or allow their use in many countries. Moreover, the company greatly limits the extent to which its customers use its products and is not involved in the operation of the systems by customers.”
    A statement on W.’s behalf said: “This is a false and completely baseless complaint, leverage for an act of extortion by the complainants, knowing that there is no basis for their claims and that if they would turn to the relevant courts they would be immediately rejected.”

  • The End of Trust (McSweeney’s 54) | Electronic Frontier Foundation
    https://www.eff.org/the-end-of-trust

    anthropologist Gabriella Coleman contemplates anonymity; Edward Snowden explains blockchain; journalist Julia Angwin and Pioneer Award-winning artist Trevor Paglen discuss the intersections of their work; Pioneer Award winner Malkia Cyril discusses the historical surveillance of black bodies; and Ken Montenegro and Hamid Khan of Stop LAPD Spying debate author and intelligence contractor Myke Cole on the question of whether there’s a way law enforcement can use surveillance responsibly.

    The End of Trust is available to download and read right now under a Creative Commons BY-NC-ND license.

  • La crucifixion de Julian Assange – Ce qui arrive à Assange devrait terrifier la presse (Truth Dig) – Salimsellami’s Blog
    https://salimsellami.wordpress.com/2018/11/14/la-crucifixion-de-julian-assange-ce-qui-arrive-a-assange-dev

    Le silence sur le traitement d’Assange n’est pas seulement une trahison à son égard, mais une trahison de la liberté de la presse elle-même. Nous paierons cher cette complicité.

    L’asile de Julian Assange à l’ambassade d’Equateur à Londres s’est transformé en une petite boutique des horreurs. Au cours des sept derniers mois, il a été largement coupé de toute communication avec le monde extérieur. Sa nationalité équatorienne, qui lui a été accordée en tant que demandeur d’asile, est en cours de révocation. Sa santé s’est détériorée. On lui refuse l’accès à soins médicaux appropriés [ie à l’extérieur de l’ambassade – NdT]. Ses efforts pour obtenir réparation ont été paralysés par les « règles du bâillon » [« gag rules » – Une règle de bâillon est une règle qui limite ou interdit la discussion, la considération ou la discussion d’un sujet particulier par les membres d’un organe législatif ou exécutif. – NdT], y compris les ordres équatoriens lui interdisant de rendre publiques ses conditions de vie à l’intérieur de l’ambassade dans sa lutte contre la révocation de sa citoyenneté équatorienne.

    Le Premier ministre australien Scott Morrison a refusé d’intercéder en faveur d’Assange, un citoyen australien, même si le nouveau gouvernement équatorien, dirigé par Lenín Moreno – qui appelle Assange un « problème hérité » et un obstacle à de meilleures relations avec Washington – rend la vie du fondateur de WikiLeaks dans cette ambassade insupportable. Presque tous les jours, l’ambassade impose des conditions plus dures à Assange, notamment en lui faisant payer ses frais médicaux, en lui imposant des règles obscures sur la façon dont il doit prendre soin de son chat et en lui demandant d’effectuer diverses tâches ménagères dégradantes.

    Les Équatoriens, réticents à expulser Assange après lui avoir accordé l’asile politique et la citoyenneté, ont l’intention de rendre son existence si pénible qu’il accepterait de quitter l’ambassade pour être arrêté par les Britanniques et extradé vers les États-Unis. L’ancien président de l’Equateur, Rafael Correa, dont le gouvernement a accordé l’asile politique à l’éditeur, qualifie les conditions de vie actuelles d’Assange de « torture ».

    Sa mère, Christine Assange, a déclaré dans un récent appel vidéo : [L’auteur cite de longs extraits. Voir l’appel en entier et en français : https://www.legrandsoir.info/unity4j-christine-assange-lance-un-appel-… – NdT]

    Assange était loué et courtisé par certains des plus grands médias du monde, dont le New York Times et le Guardian, pour les informations qu’il possédait. Mais une fois que ses documents sur les crimes de guerre commis par les États-Unis, en grande partie fournis par Chelsea Manning, ont été publiés par ces médias, il fut mis à l’écart et diabolisé. Un document du Pentagone qui a fait l’objet d’une fuite et préparé par la Cyber Counterintelligence Assessments Branch (Direction du contre-espionnage cybernétique) du 8 mars 2008 a révélé une campagne de propagande visant à discréditer WikiLeaks et Assange. Le document dit que la campagne de diffamation doit chercher à détruire le « sentiment de confiance » qui est le « centre de gravité » de WikiLeaks et à salir la réputation d’Assange. Cela a largement fonctionné. Assange est particulièrement vilipendé pour avoir publié 70 000 courriels piratés appartenant au Comité national démocrate (DNC) et à de hauts responsables démocrates. Les démocrates et l’ancien directeur du FBI, James Comey, affirment que les courriels ont été copiés des comptes de John Podesta, chef de campagne de la candidate démocrate Hillary Clinton, par des pirates du gouvernement russe. Comey a dit que les messages ont probablement été transmis à WikiLeaks par un intermédiaire. Assange a dit que les e-mails n’avaient pas été fournis par des « acteurs étatiques ».

    Le Parti démocrate, qui cherche à imputer sa défaite électorale à l’ » ingérence » russe plutôt qu’à la grotesque inégalité des revenus, à la trahison de la classe ouvrière, à la perte des libertés civiles, à la désindustrialisation et au coup d’Etat des entreprises que le parti a aidé à orchestrer, accuse Assange d’être un traître, bien qu’il ne soit pas un citoyen américain. Ni un espion. Et à ma connaissance, aucune loi ne lui interdit de publier les secrets du gouvernement US. Il n’a commis aucun crime. Aujourd’hui, les articles parus dans les journaux qui publiaient autrefois des articles de WikiLeaks mettent l’accent sur son comportement prétendument négligeant – ce qui n’était pas évident lors de mes visites – et sur le fait qu’il est, selon les mots du Guardian, « un invité indésirable » à l’ambassade. La question vitale des droits d’un éditeur et d’une presse libre a cédé le place à la calomnie contre la personne.

    Assange a obtenu l’asile à l’ambassade en 2012 afin d’éviter l’extradition vers la Suède pour répondre à des questions sur des accusations d’infractions sexuelles qui ont finalement été abandonnées. Assange craignait qu’une fois détenu par les Suédois, il soit extradé vers les États-Unis [un accord d’extradition entre la Suède et les Etats-Unis autorise l’extradition d’une personne comme simple « témoin » – NdT]. Le gouvernement britannique a déclaré que, bien qu’il ne soit plus recherché pour interrogatoire en Suède, Assange sera arrêté et emprisonné s’il quitte l’ambassade pour avoir violé les conditions de sa libération sous caution.

    WikiLeaks et Assange ont fait plus pour dénoncer les sombres machinations et crimes de l’Empire américain que toute autre organisation de presse. Assange, en plus de dénoncer les atrocités et les crimes commis par l’armée américaine dans nos guerres sans fin et de révéler les rouages internes de la campagne Clinton, a rendu publics les outils de piratage utilisés par la CIA et la NSA, leurs programmes de surveillance et leur ingérence dans les élections étrangères, notamment les élections françaises. Il a révélé le complot contre le chef du Parti travailliste britannique Jeremy Corbyn par des députés travaillistes au Parlement. Et WikiLeaks s’est rapidement mobilisé pour sauver Edward Snowden, qui a exposé la surveillance totale du public américain par le gouvernement, de l’extradition vers les États-Unis en l’aidant à fuir Hong Kong pour Moscou. Les fuites de Snowden ont également révélé, de façon inquiétante, qu’Assange était sur une « liste de cibles d’une chasse à l’homme » américaine.

    Ce qui arrive à Assange devrait terrifier la presse. Et pourtant, son sort se heurte à l’indifférence et au mépris sarcastique. Une fois expulsé de l’ambassade, il sera jugé aux États-Unis pour ce qu’il a publié. Cela créera un précédent juridique nouveau et dangereux que l’administration Trump et les futures administrations utiliseront contre d’autres éditeurs, y compris ceux qui font partie de la mafia qui tentent de lyncher Assange. Le silence sur le traitement d’Assange n’est pas seulement une trahison à son égard, mais une trahison de la liberté de la presse elle-même. Nous paierons cher cette complicité.

    Même si ce sont les Russes qui ont fourni les courriels de Podesta à Assange, il a eu raison de les publier. C’est ce que j’aurais fait. Ces courriers ont révélé les pratiques de l’appareil politique Clinton qu’elle et les dirigeants démocrates cherchaient à cacher. Au cours des deux décennies où j’ai travaillé en tant que correspondant à l’étranger, des organisations et des gouvernements m’ont régulièrement divulgué des documents volés. Ma seule préoccupation était de savoir si les documents étaient authentiques ou non. S’ils étaient authentiques, je les publiais. Parmi ceux qui m’en ont transmis, il y avait les rebelles du Front de Libération Nationale Farabundo Marti (FMLN) ; l’armée salvadorienne, qui m’a un jour donné des documents du FMLN ensanglantés trouvés après une embuscade, le gouvernement sandiniste du Nicaragua ; le Mossad, le service de renseignement israélien ; le FBI ; la CIA ; le groupe rebelle du Parti des travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK) ; l’Organisation de libération de la Palestine (OLP) ; le service de renseignement français, la Direction générale de la sécurité extérieure, ou DGSE ; et le gouvernement serbe de Slobodan Milosovic, qui a ensuite été jugé comme un criminel de guerre.

    Nous avons appris par les courriels publiés par WikiLeaks que la Fondation Clinton a reçu des millions de dollars de l’Arabie saoudite et du Qatar, deux des principaux bailleurs de fonds de l’État islamique. En tant que secrétaire d’État, Hillary Clinton a remboursé ses donateurs en approuvant la vente de 80 milliards de dollars d’armes à l’Arabie saoudite, ce qui a permis au royaume de mener une guerre dévastatrice au Yémen qui a déclenché une crise humanitaire, notamment une grave pénurie alimentaire et une épidémie de choléra, et fait près de 60 000 morts. Nous avons appris que Clinton avait touché 675 000 $ pour une conférence chez Goldman Sachs, une somme si énorme qu’elle ne peut être qualifiée que comme un pot-de-vin. Nous avons appris que Mme Clinton avait dit aux élites financières, lors de ses entretiens lucratifs, qu’elle voulait » l’ouverture du commerce et des frontières » et qu’elle croyait que les dirigeants de Wall Street étaient les mieux placés pour gérer l’économie, une déclaration qui allait directement à l’encontre de ses promesses électorales. Nous avons appris que la campagne Clinton avait pour but d’influencer les primaires républicaines pour s’assurer que Donald Trump était le candidat républicain. Nous avons appris que Mme Clinton avait obtenu à l’avance les questions posées lors du débat pendant les primaires. Nous avons appris, parce que 1 700 des 33 000 courriels provenaient d’Hillary Clinton, qu’elle était l’architecte principale de la guerre en Libye. Nous avons appris qu’elle croyait que le renversement de Moammar Kadhafi lui permettrait d’améliorer ses chances en tant que candidate à la présidence. La guerre qu’elle a voulu a plongé la Libye dans le chaos, vu la montée au pouvoir des djihadistes radicaux dans ce qui est aujourd’hui un État en déliquescence, déclenché un exode massif de migrants vers l’Europe, vu les stocks d’armes libyens saisis par des milices rebelles et des radicaux islamiques dans toute la région, et fait 40 000 morts. Cette information aurait-elle dû rester cachée ? Vous pouvez dire oui, mais dans ce cas vous ne pouvez pas vous qualifier de journaliste.

    « Ils sont en train de piéger mon fils pour avoir une excuse pour le livrer aux États-Unis, où il fera l’objet d’un simulacre de procès« , a averti Christine Assange. « Au cours des huit dernières années, il n’a pas eu accès à un processus juridique approprié. A chaque étape, c’est l’injustice qui a prévalu, avec un énorme déni de justice. Il n’y a aucune raison de penser qu’il en sera autrement à l’avenir. Le grand jury américain qui produit le mandat d’extradition se tient en secret, a quatre procureurs mais pas de défense ni de juge.

    Le traité d’extradition entre le Royaume-Uni et les États-Unis permet au Royaume-Uni d’extrader Julian vers les États-Unis sans qu’il y ait de preuve prima facie. Une fois aux États-Unis, la National Defense Authorization Act permet la détention illimitée sans procès. Julian risque d’être emprisonné à Guantánamo Bay et torturé, d’être condamné à 45 ans de prison de haute sécurité, ou la peine de mort.« 

    Assange est seul. Chaque jour qui passe lui est plus difficile. C’est le but recherché. C’est à nous de protester. Nous sommes son dernier espoir, et le dernier espoir, je le crains, pour une presse libre.

    Chris Hedges

    Chris Hedges, a passé près de deux décennies comme correspondant à l’étranger en Amérique centrale, au Moyen-Orient, en Afrique et dans les Balkans. Il a fait des reportages dans plus de 50 pays et a travaillé pourThe Christian Science Monitor, National Public Radio, The Dallas Morning News et The New York Times, pour lesquels il a été correspondant à étranger pendant 15 ans.

    Traduction « il y aura des comptes à rendre » par VD pour le Grand Soir avec probablement toutes les fautes et coquilles habituelles » »https://www.truthdig.com/articles/crucifying-julian-assange/URL de cet article 34082 
    https://www.legrandsoir.info/la-crucifixion-de-julian-assange-ce-qui-arrive-a-assange-devrait-terri

  • You Have the Right to #anonymity
    https://hackernoon.com/you-have-the-right-to-anonymity-cec4ab82911f?source=rss----3a8144eabfe3-

    The right to anonymity should become a world standard for ensuring the fundamental rights of a person and citizen in the digital age. First and foremost, this is the right to freedom of expression and the right to #privacy. Edward Snowden said:“Saying that you don’t care about the right to privacy because you have nothing to hide is no different than saying you don’t care about freedom of speech because you have nothing to say. It’s a deeply anti-social principle because rights are not just individual, they’re collective, and what may not have value to you today may have value to an entire population, an entire people, an entire way of life tomorrow. And if you don’t stand up for it, then who will?”So what exactly is the right to anonymity and privacy in one’s private life, if we are talking (...)

    #human-rights #annonymous #right-to-anonymity

  • Saudis used Israeli spyware to track Khashoggi: Snowden - World News

    http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/saudis-used-israeli-spyware-to-track-khashoggi-snowden-138669

    Software made by an Israeli cyber security firm was used to track murdered journalist Jamal Khashoggi, a former U.S. National Security Agency contractor and whistleblower claimed Nov. 7.

    Addressing a conference in Tel Aviv, Israel via a video call from Russia, Edward Snowden said Pegasus spyware sold to governments by NSO Group Technologies was used to track opponents.

    “The Saudis, of course, knew that Khashoggi was going to go to the consulate, as he got an appointment. But how did they know his intention and plans?”

    Khashoggi, a Saudi national and columnist for The Washington Post, was killed on Oct. 2 after entering the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul.

  • The Big Hack: How China Used a Tiny Chip to Infiltrate U.S. Companies - Bloomberg
    https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-10-04/the-big-hack-how-china-used-a-tiny-chip-to-infiltrate-america-s-top-compa

    The attack by Chinese spies reached almost 30 U.S. companies, including Amazon and Apple, by compromising America’s technology supply chain, according to extensive interviews with government and corporate sources.

    […]

    There are two ways for spies to alter the guts of computer equipment. One, known as interdiction, consists of manipulating devices as they’re in transit from manufacturer to customer. This approach is favored by U.S. spy agencies, according to documents leaked by former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden. The other method involves seeding changes from the very beginning.

    One country in particular has an advantage executing this kind of attack: China, which by some estimates makes 75 percent of the world’s mobile phones and 90 percent of its PCs.

    #espionnage #Chine #États-Unis #informatique

  • Belgique : L’enquête sur le piratage de Belgacom pointe vers les services secrets britanniques Belga - 20 Septembre 2018 - RTBF
    https://www.rtbf.be/info/medias/detail_l-enquete-sur-le-piratage-de-belgacom-pointe-vers-les-services-secrets-b

    Les conclusions du parquet fédéral de l’enquête sur l’opération de piratage de Belgacom, mise à jour fin 2013, pointent vers les services secrets britanniques GCHQ, rapportent De Tijd et L’Echo jeudi.

    Le parquet général a pu reconstituer une grande partie des faits et a transmis un rapport confidentiel sur ses principales conclusions au ministre de la Justice Koen Geens. L’enquête s’est appuyée sur un vingtaine de slides « top secret » du Network Analysis Centre, un département du GCHQ, que le lanceur d’alerte Edward Snowden a communiqués parmi d’autres documents à la presse sur l’Operation Socialist, le nom de code que les services secrets britanniques GCHQ ont donné au piratage. Dans le cas du piratage de Belgacom, la cible était les « routeurs GRX » de Belgacom et de BICS, dans le but d’accéder aux communications entre smartphones par roaming, quand des opérateurs laissent des clients d’autres opérateurs accéder à leur réseau. Les communications étaient interceptées via des opérations « homme-du-milieu », qui consistent à dévier vers soi des communications sans que ni l’expéditeur, ni le destinataire ne s’en rendent compte.


    Pour y parvenir, il a été nécessaire de pirater des ordinateurs de personnes clés au sein de Belgacom, par exemple dans l’entretien et la sécurité. Elles sont notamment tombées dans le piège via de faux messages LinkedIn. Les experts sont persuadés que le feu vert au piratage a été donné à un très haut niveau, peut-être même par le ministre britannique des Affaires étrangères. Si les slides n’avaient pas fuité, les preuves contre les Britanniques seraient relativement maigres.

    #espionage #piratage #Belgique #angleterre #belgacom #GCHQ #linkedin #Edward_Snowden #prism #surveillance #révélations_d'edward_snowden #police

  • (20+) Cinq ans de prison pour la lanceuse d’alerte Reality Winner - Libération
    http://www.liberation.fr/planete/2018/08/24/cinq-ans-de-prison-pour-la-lanceuse-d-alerte-reality-winner_1674202
    http://md1.libe.com/photo/1028377-photo-obtenue-le-6-juin-2017-sur-les-reseaux-sociaux-d-un-selfie-n

    Elle est la première lanceuse d’alerte de l’ère Trump jugée au titre de l’Espionage Act, cette loi désormais centenaire utilisée sous Obama pour poursuivre Chelsea Manning, la source des documents confidentiels de l’armée américaine publiés en 2010 par WikiLeaks, et Edward Snowden, l’ancien consultant qui a révélé l’ampleur de la surveillance en ligne pratiquée par la NSA, l’Agence nationale de sécurité américaine. Ce jeudi, Reality Winner, 26 ans, a été condamnée à cinq ans et trois mois de prison par un tribunal d’Augusta (Géorgie) pour avoir transmis à la presse un document classifié sur des tentatives de piratage à l’encontre de l’infrastructure électorale, attribuées à la Russie. Soit « la sentence la plus lourde jamais prononcée contre la source d’un média dans un tribunal fédéral », relève la Freedom of the Press Foundation.

    En juin dernier, alors que Reality Winner était en détention depuis plus d’un an, son équipe de défense a négocié un accord de plaider coupable. Ce jeudi lors de l’audience, la jeune femme a dit assumer « l’entière responsabilité » de ce qu’elle a qualifié devant le juge d’« erreur incontestable ». Les procureurs, de leur côté, l’ont accusée d’avoir agi par « mépris des Etats-Unis », et ont affirmé que ses révélations avaient « causé un dommage exceptionnellement grave à la sécurité nationale ». Une assertion que les soutiens de Winner ne sont pas les seuls à réfuter. « Personne n’a été mis en danger, personne n’a vu son identité révélée, les Russes ont juste appris que lorsqu’ils s’introduisent dans nos systèmes, nous sommes capables de les repérer, ce qu’ils savaient déjà, estime un ancien avocat au département de la Justice, Robert Cattanach, cité par le New York Times. En tout état de cause, ce genre de condamnation est destiné à avoir un effet dissuasif. »

    Début mai, un rapport du Sénat américain a reproché au département de la Sécurité intérieure d’avoir eu une réponse « inadéquate » face à la « menace contre l’infrastructure électorale », et relevé que les administrations des différents Etats avaient commencé à se préoccuper de la sécurité de leurs réseaux notamment suite aux articles de presse sur le sujet… « Reality Winner est une lanceuse d’alerte qui a averti le public d’une menace grave sur la sécurité des élections, déclarait jeudi soir Trevor Timm, le directeur exécutif de la Freedom of the Press Foundation. Que le département de la Justice continue à poursuivre des sources de journalistes au titre de l’Espionage Act, une loi qui ne permet pas de se défendre en faisant valoir l’intérêt public, est une mascarade. »

    Amaelle Guiton

    #Lanceur_alerte #Presse #Médias #Journalisme