person:el-sisi

  • Egyptian Chronicles: Rebellion in Egypt’s Clubs : Beyond Classism
    http://egyptianchronicles.blogspot.fr/2017/09/rebellion-in-egypts-clubs-beyond.html

    Rebellion in Egypt’s Clubs : Beyond Classism
    On Thursday, Egyptian Olympic Committee “EOC” rejected a request from The Egyptian Shooting Club to hold another General assembly meeting on Friday to have a new vote on the Club’s bylaws and rules once again.

    The Upper Middle class-Giza club held its general assembly meeting early August and out of 94 thousand members, only 573 attended the meeting.

    As a result of failing to meet the minimum number of members eligible to vote on the famous club’s bylaws, the club would be following the guideline bylaws issued by the EOC instead of the Club’s elected board of administration’s bylaws.

    An old 1950s news report in some old
    Egyptian magazine about Cairo clubs 
    What followed then at upscale and Upper/Upper middle classes clubs in Cairo was hysteria and panic reaching to the level of mobilization for a vote to save the “clubs’ independence and class” that some considered unjustified. Before going on with that August hysteria, I must go back a couple of months to explain what is going on.

    In May, the Egyptian Parliament approved the new Sports law prepared by Egypt’s Sports and Youth ministry “Yes, we have a ministry with such name” after two years of debates and amendments.
    In June, President El-Sisi ratified the Sports law aka No.71 for the year 2017.

    Aside from creating a judicial body that has the power to judge sports disputes and to regulate spectators’ attendance and violations “aka a special court, not a civilian court”, the law also regulates the relation between the government or the state and sports clubs as well sports associations.

    Compiled as much as it can be with the provisions of the International Olympic Charter, the law moves power and control over sports clubs and sports associations to the elected boards of those bodies themselves as well to the Olympic Committee in Egypt. The government represented in the Youth and Sports Ministry and its minister will be monitoring only the sports clubs and sports associations.

    Theoretically, this is a huge improvement because now officially and legally the State has got no control on the clubs and sports associations if their General assemblies chose the official guidelines bylaws over their clubs’ bylaws.

    According to the Sports law’s 4th article, the social and sports clubs got 3 months since the start of June till 31 August to adopt the new system and to have general assemblies.

    There are more than 40 sports clubs in the country classified into Sports clubs, clubs owned by companies and syndicates as well clubs owned by the armed forces and police. Each one of those categories got guideline bylaws issued by the EOC.

  • Les Etats-Unis vont livrer des hélicoptères Apaches à l’Egypte. Kerry a parlé avec Sissi de « contre-terrorisme » en Libye, en Irak et en Syrie, des droits humains et de la société civile égyptienne - Ahram Online

    http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/113009/Egypt/Politics-/US-to-send-Egypt-Apache-helicopters-in-November-Ke.aspx

    The United States will send Apache helicopters to Egypt in November, said US Secretary of State John Kerry Monday at a meeting Monday with President El-Sisi in the presence of foreign minister Sameh Shokry, reported Egypt’s official state news agency MENA.
    Kerry also said that a group of investors will visit Egypt the same month to study available investment opportunities, as Kerry made clear US intentions to assist Egypt to grow and prosper economically.

    Kerry broached human rights during the meeting as well.

    “The Secretary also emphasised the importance of a vibrant civil society and giving all Egyptians space to make their voices heard,” a State Department official said.

    The US had planned to deliver ten Apache helicopters to Egypt to support Cairo’s counterterrorism efforts, according to words exchanged between US defense secretary Chuck Hagel and Egyptian defense minister Sedki Sobhy in late September.

  • The Blurred Lines of Religious Zealotry
    http://www.lobelog.com/the-blurred-lines-of-religious-zealotry

    #Paul_Pillar, sur les très grossiers radotages du sioniste #Dennis_Ross,

    Where Ross’s schema completely breaks down is with some of the biggest and most contorted squiggles in the line he has drawn. He places Saudi Arabia in the “non-Islamist” camp because it has supported el-Sisi in his bashing of the Brotherhood and wasn’t especially supportive of Hamas when Israel was bashing the Gaza Strip. Saudi Arabia—where the head of state has the title Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, the country’s constitution is the Koran, and thieves have their hands amputated—is “non-Islamist”? Remarkable. Conversely, the Assad regime in Syria, which is one of the most secular regimes in the region notwithstanding the sectarian lines of its base of support, is pointedly excluded from Ross’s “non-Islamist” side of the line because of, he says, Syrian dependence on Iran and Hezbollah. Of course, any such alliances refute the whole idea of a “fundamental division” in the region between Islamists and non-Islamists, but Ross does not seem to notice.

  • Egypt : Sabbahi may still run for president despite potential competition with El-Sisi - Ahram Online
    http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/91359.aspx

    Nasserist figure Sabbahi says his decision to run in this year’s presidential elections will not depend on whether General El-Sisi nominates himself as a candidate; the latter said hours earlier he might run for president

    #élections #Egypte

  • New Texts Out Now : Farha Ghannam, Live and Die Like a Man : Gender Dynamics in Urban Egypt
    http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/15258/new-texts-out-now_farha-ghannam-live-and-die-like-

    Un passage sur la « masculinité » de Abdelfatah Al-Sisi

    Most recently, my knowledge of the social views of what constitutes a proper man—that is, a man who is strong, productive, and assertive but also kind, affectionate, and caring—helped me understand the feelings of my interlocutors in the summer of 2013 when they expressed fervent negative feelings towards ex-president Muhammad Morsi and strongly supported Abdel Fattah-el-Sisi, the current Minister of Defense. While Morsi was often seen as kindhearted (tayyib), most people came to see him as lacking the strength, assertiveness, and skills needed to rule the whole nation and to establish security in Cairo and the rest of the country. In contrast, Sisi was seen as assertive, firm, and strong but at the same time as caring, compassionate, and reliable. Many saw him as holding the promise of effectively addressing their daily hardships, especially the serious problems of food, transportation, fuel, cleanliness, and security. In particular, he was seen as capable of protecting the country and re-establishing security in Cairo. I think it was largely his ability to materialize some of the key norms that define manhood that earned him tremendous popularity, today making many excited about voting for him if he runs for the office of the president.

    [... Plus généralement, quelle est la pricnipale difficulté à écrire un livre sur la masculinité en Egypte :

    my main challenge was not in having access to men and women and discussing various topics with them. Instead, my main challenge was in communicating my knowledge of my interlocutors and their daily realities into a text that can be read by people in other places. While this is a challenge that faces all anthropologists, it becomes especially problematic in the context of the anthropology of the Middle East, an area that has a complex and turbulent relationship with the US and Europe. The fact that there are so many simplistic ideas, negative assumptions, and damaging stereotypes about the region and its people that are common in the media, policy circles, and some scholarly work made the writing process particularly difficult.

    For example, when writing about masculinity and violence, I had to negotiate my interest in a thick description of the gendered nature of violence with current dominant stereotypes about the “aggressive” and “domineering” Arab man. When writing about sickness and death, I had to struggle against the powerful discourse that generates a divide between the “culture of life” associated with the West and the “culture of death” associated with Islam. How to write, I asked myself continuously, in a way that is intellectually honest and politically responsible? How to write to humanize but not to romanticize or idealize? One way I found productive to deal with this challenge was by tracing specific masculine trajectories and offering rich contextualization of the inequalities that structure the interaction between male and female, young/old, government/citizen, and individual/society. I told stories of specific individuals and tried to account for the multiple struggles they have to engage in daily, as well as the powerful structures (particularly gender and class) that shape their bodies and practices.

    #Egypte
    #Masculinité
    #genre
    #anthropologie

  • Baheyya : Egypt Analysis and Whimsy
    بهيّة : Military Tutelage, Egyptian-Style

    http://baheyya.blogspot.fr/2013/07/military-tutelage-egyptian-style_16.html

    If there were lingering doubts that the military pounced on the June 30 protests to re-establish its political supremacy, Gen. El-Sisi’s Sunday address removed a lot of them. Using convoluted language and tortured logic, the speech’s organizing premise is that the “people summoned the armed forces for the mission of balancing the tipped scale and restoring diverted goals.” “The people” are mentioned 28 times, but their sovereignty is not once affirmed. What’s emphasized is that the armed forces are the unmoved mover, guarding the country’s politics, not just its borders.

    In tandem with the speech, the armed forces released a 30-minute video presenting their narrative of the Morsi presidency and the July 3 coup. After introductory scenes glorifying military exercises, the narrator launches into a story of an irresponsible, inept president who picked fights with every significant institution and repeatedly ignored the sage advice of the generals, threatening a slide to “civil war.”