person:martin dempsey

  • “Échanges entre militaires” : les révélations de Seymour Hersh sur la Syrie
    Source : London Review of Book, 12/2015.
    Traduction : BR pour les-crises.fr | 28 décembre 2015
    http://www.les-crises.fr/echanges-entre-militaires-par-seymour-hersh

    L’insistance de Barack Obama à réclamer le départ d’Assad – et à affirmer qu’il y a des groupes de rebelles modérés en Syrie capables de le renverser – a provoqué ces dernières années des dissensions feutrée, est même une opposition ouverte parmi les plus hauts fonctionnaires de l’État Major conjoint du Pentagone. Leurs critiques se sont concentrées sur ce qu’ils considèrent comme une obsession de l’administration sur le principal allié d’Assad, Vladimir Poutine. Selon eux, Obama est prisonnier d’une vision de la Russie et de la Chine digne de la guerre froide, et n’a pas ajusté son discours sur la Syrie, qui tiendrait compte du fait que tous deux partagent l’inquiétude de Washington, de voir le terrorisme se propager dans et au-delà de la Syrie. ; comme Washington, ils pensent que l’islamisme doit être stoppé.

    La résistance de l’armée remonte à l’été 2013, lorsqu’un bulletin d’évaluation classé secret défense, rassemblé par l’Agence de Renseignement du Ministère de la Défense ( DIA) et les chefs d’États major interarmes, alors dirigés par le Général Martin Dempsey, prévoyait que la chute d’Assad allait mener au chaos et sans doute à la conquête de la Syrie par des extrémistes djihadistes, à l’image de ce qui était en train de se passer en Libye. Un exconseiller de l’État-Major interarmes me raconta que le document était une synthèse de sources diverses, élaborant un scenario à partir de signaux, de renseignements satellitaires et humains, et il voyait d’un mauvais œil l’entêtement de l’administration Obama à continuer de financer et d’armer les soi-disant groupes de rebelles modérés. À cette époque, la CIA complotait depuis plus d’un an avec ses alliés du Royaume Uni, d’Arabie Saoudite et du Qatar pour expédier des armes et des marchandises – dans le but de renverser Assad – à partir de la Libye, via la Turquie, jusqu’en Syrie.(...)

  • Seymour Hersh’s bizarre new conspiracy theory about the US and Syria, explained
    http://www.vox.com/2015/12/21/10634002/seymour-hersh-syria-joint-chiefs

    The fatal flaw at the heart of the story

    Hersh alleges that the mastermind of this entire conspiracy was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Martin Dempsey, whom Hersh says was horrified by Obama’s plan to arm Syrian rebels and sought to aid Assad. This claim is difficult to believe: While in office, Dempsey famously and publicly clashed with Obama over Syria because Dempsey wanted to do more to arm Syrian rebels. Contemporaneous accounts of arguments within the White House support this, with Dempsey arguing the US should more robustly arm Syrian rebels, and Obama arguing for less.

    Yet Hersh claims, with no evidence, that Dempsey was so opposed to arming Syrian rebels that he would commit an apparent act of treason to subvert those plans. Hersh makes no effort to reconcile this seemingly fatal contradiction, and indeed it is not clear Hersh is even aware that Dempsey is known for supporting rather than opposing efforts to arm the Syrian rebels.

    • La réponse de Moon of Alabama : “How Criticism Of Hersh’s New Piece Fails To Understand What Really Happened”
      http://www.moonofalabama.org/2015/12/how-a-critic-of-hershs-new-piece-fails-to-understand-what-really-happ

      Hersh is of course perfectly aware what Dempsey said and thought in early 2013. The one not aware is the critic.
      Dempsey argued in early 2013 that the Pentagon should give weapons to a few carefully vetted rebels.
      The Pentagon plan was killed by the White House in favor of the ongoing CIA operation. This exchange then does not contradict but even supports the Hersh reporting. Let me explain the context.

      By early 2013 Dempsey knew perfectly well that the CIA was supplying -directly or indirectly- everyone in Syria who asked for arms and ammunition. These weapons were going to the Jihadis who were simply the best financed groups. Because the CIA program was secret Dempsey of course could not say so in a public Congress hearing. But Dempsey wanted to give arms to “carefully vetted Syrian rebels” to replace the CIA program with a Pentagon program under his command. He would then have been able to direct the weapon flow and to prevent a further arming of the Islamist terrorists. Dempsey supported a Pentagon program arming the rebels so he could control the arming of the rebels that was already happening under a CIA program but was creating long term trouble.

      When the hostile takeover of the CIA arming program failed, Dempsey and the JCS tried to sabotage it by providing old Turkish weapons to the CIA.

    • Voix’s #Max_Fisher is wrong about Seymour Hersh, explained
      https://shadowproof.com/2015/12/22/voxs-max-fisher-is-wrong-about-seymour-hersh-explained

      Fisher chose to ignore comments by former DIA director Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, who spoke to Hersh on the record. Flynn shares his belief that the Obama administration did not want to hear the truth about Syria. DIA and the Joint Chiefs were concerned about the Islamic State’s long-term strategy and how jihadists controlled the opposition. They feared what would happen if Assad was toppled. So, according to a former Joint Chiefs adviser, they took the step of indirectly passing intelligence to Assad in order to possibly prevent a feared outcome.

      [...]

      Fisher declines to contemplate the realpolitik nature of sharing intelligence indirectly with Syria, and contends it is impossible for retired JCS Chairman Gen. Martin Dempsey to be an opponent of arming the “moderate” rebel groups.

      “While in office, Dempsey famously and publicly clashed with Obama over Syria because Dempsey wanted to do more to arm Syrian rebels. Contemporaneous accounts of arguments within the White House support this, with Dempsey arguing the US should more robustly arm Syrian rebels, and Obama arguing for less,” Fisher writes.

      One major flaw in this rebuttal is that the story linked to is a New York Times report on statements Dempsey made in February 2013. When was the DIA’s defense intelligence assessment put together? Summer 2013.

      [...]

      Individuals like Fisher should be inspired to dig deeper when Hersh publishes investigative reports, but instead, they publish hammy explainers and demonstrate they are nothing more than ornamented stenographers of power.

      #chiens_de_garde #sténographes

  • A lire absolument, le dernier article de « Sy » Hersh dans la London Review of Books, « Military to military » :
    http://www.lrb.co.uk/v38/n01/seymour-m-hersh/military-to-military
    Je tente un long résumé avec citations, mais ce serait plutôt à lire in extenso.

    A partir de l’été 2013, des membres haut placés dans l’appareil militaire américain (notamment le chef de la DIA M. Flynn et le chef d’état-major M. Dempsey) commencent à s’alarmer des conséquences du programme de la CIA d’armement des « rebelles syriens » en collaboration avec les pétromonarchies et la Turquie. Selon leurs informations il renforcerait les groupes les plus radicaux (parmi lesquels al-Nusra et Da’ich) :

    The military’s resistance dates back to the summer of 2013, when a highly classified assessment, put together by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then led by General Martin Dempsey, forecast that the fall of the Assad regime would lead to chaos and, potentially, to Syria’s takeover by jihadi extremists, much as was then happening in Libya. A former senior adviser to the Joint Chiefs told me that the document was an ‘all-source’ appraisal, drawing on information from signals, satellite and human intelligence, and took a dim view of the Obama administration’s insistence on continuing to finance and arm the so-called moderate rebel groups. By then, the CIA had been conspiring for more than a year with allies in the UK, Saudi Arabia and Qatar to ship guns and goods – to be used for the overthrow of Assad – from Libya, via Turkey, into Syria. The new intelligence estimate singled out Turkey as a major impediment to Obama’s Syria policy. The document showed, the adviser said, ‘that what was started as a covert US programme to arm and support the moderate rebels fighting Assad had been co-opted by Turkey, and had morphed into an across-the-board technical, arms and logistical programme for all of the opposition, including Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State. The so-called moderates had evaporated and the Free Syrian Army was a rump group stationed at an airbase in Turkey.’ The assessment was bleak: there was no viable ‘moderate’ opposition to Assad, and the US was arming extremists.

    Ces militaires américains, persuadés que dans ces conditions la chute d’Assad mènerait au chaos, vont tenter de convaincre l’administration Obama de changer de politique en Syrie ; mais en vain.

    Flynn told me. ‘We understood Isis’s long-term strategy and its campaign plans, and we also discussed the fact that Turkey was looking the other way when it came to the growth of the Islamic State inside Syria.’ The DIA’s reporting, he said, ‘got enormous pushback’ from the Obama administration. ‘I felt that they did not want to hear the truth.’
    ‘Our policy of arming the opposition to Assad was unsuccessful and actually having a negative impact,’ the former JCS adviser said. ‘The Joint Chiefs believed that Assad should not be replaced by fundamentalists. The administration’s policy was contradictory. They wanted Assad to go but the opposition was dominated by extremists. So who was going to replace him? To say Assad’s got to go is fine, but if you follow that through – therefore anyone is better. It’s the “anybody else is better” issue that the JCS had with Obama’s policy.’ The Joint Chiefs felt that a direct challenge to Obama’s policy would have ‘had a zero chance of success’.

    Ils vont alors tenter de contre-balancer celle-ci, sans rentrer en franche dissidence vis à vis de Washington, en faisant parvenir du renseignement par des canaux indirects (des militaires allemands, israéliens et russes) à Damas :

    So in the autumn of 2013 they decided to take steps against the extremists without going through political channels, by providing US intelligence to the militaries of other nations, on the understanding that it would be passed on to the Syrian army and used against the common enemy, Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State.
    Germany, Israel and Russia were in contact with the Syrian army, and able to exercise some influence over Assad’s decisions – it was through them that US intelligence would be shared. Each had its reasons for co-operating with Assad: Germany feared what might happen among its own population of six million Muslims if Islamic State expanded; Israel was concerned with border security; Russia had an alliance of very long standing with Syria, and was worried by the threat to its only naval base on the Mediterranean, at Tartus. ‘We weren’t intent on deviating from Obama’s stated policies,’ the adviser said. ‘But sharing our assessments via the military-to-military relationships with other countries could prove productive.

    L’article se poursuit avec un paragraphe rappelant l’ambition partagée par l’administration G.W. Bush et Obama de renverser Assad depuis au moins 2003, avec les différentes actions entreprises, malgré une coopération sécuritaire de Damas appréciée par les cercles militaires et de renseignement américains (choses assez bien connues).
    Ensuite Hersh balance une sacrée révélation : à partir de l’automne 2013, dans un contexte où l’effort financier turco-qataro-saoudien augmente et où l’ensemble de l’opération de déstabilisation d’Assad semble échapper aux Américains, ces militaires « dissidents » vont jouer un coup : en remplaçant la ligne d’approvisionnement principale libyenne des rebelles et des jihadistes en Syrie, par une ligne venue de Turquie, ils vont réussir à abaisser la qualité de l’armement obtenu par ceux-ci :

    The CIA was approached by a representative from the Joint Chiefs with a suggestion: there were far less costly weapons available in Turkish arsenals that could reach the Syrian rebels within days, and without a boat ride.’ But it wasn’t only the CIA that benefited. ‘We worked with Turks we trusted who were not loyal to Erdoğan,’ the adviser said, ‘and got them to ship the jihadists in Syria all the obsolete weapons in the arsenal, including M1 carbines that hadn’t been seen since the Korean War and lots of Soviet arms. It was a message Assad could understand: “We have the power to diminish a presidential policy in its tracks.”’
    The flow of US intelligence to the Syrian army, and the downgrading of the quality of the arms being supplied to the rebels, came at a critical juncture.

    Par la suite en 2014, Brennan (directeur de la CIA) tente de reprendre la main dans ce maelström. Il réunit les chefs du renseignement des Etats « arabes sunnites » et leur demande de ne soutenir que l’opposition modérée. Il obtient un oui poli mais non suivi d’effet, tandis que la ligne générale de l’administration Obama reste la même :

    Brennan’s message was ignored by the Saudis, the adviser said, who ‘went back home and increased their efforts with the extremists and asked us for more technical support. And we say OK, and so it turns out that we end up reinforcing the extremists.’

    Et reste le problème des Turcs, moins faciles à manipuler, qui soutiennent à la fois al-Nusra et Da’ich :

    But the Saudis were far from the only problem: American intelligence had accumulated intercept and human intelligence demonstrating that the Erdoğan government had been supporting Jabhat al-Nusra for years, and was now doing the same for Islamic State. ‘We can handle the Saudis,’ the adviser said. ‘We can handle the Muslim Brotherhood. You can argue that the whole balance in the Middle East is based on a form of mutually assured destruction between Israel and the rest of the Middle East, and Turkey can disrupt the balance – which is Erdoğan’s dream. We told him we wanted him to shut down the pipeline of foreign jihadists flowing into Turkey. But he is dreaming big – of restoring the Ottoman Empire – and he did not realise the extent to which he could be successful in this.’

    Suit un long exposé, d’une part sur les relations américano-russes, que certains du côté de ces « dissidents » perçoivent comme trop marquées du côté de Washington par une mentalité anti-russe anachronique venue de la guerre froide, et sur les raisons de la peur de la Russie du phénomène jihadiste, amplifiée depuis la mort de Kadhafi, d’autre part. Evoqué aussi le traitement médiatique hostile aux USA à l’intervention russe en Syrie.
    Reprise du récit. Après l’attentat de novembre dernier en France et le bombardier russe abattu par la chasse turque, Hollande tente d’amener Obama à un rapprochement avec la Russie mais sans succès, la ligne d’Obama restant départ d’Assad, opposition à l’intervention russe en Syrie, soutien à la Turquie, et maintien de l’idée d’une réelle opposiotn modérée :

    The Paris attacks on 13 November that killed 130 people did not change the White House’s public stance, although many European leaders, including François Hollande, advocated greater co-operation with Russia and agreed to co-ordinate more closely with its air force; there was also talk of the need to be more flexible about the timing of Assad’s exit from power. On 24 November, Hollande flew to Washington to discuss how France and the US could collaborate more closely in the fight against Islamic State. At a joint press conference at the White House, Obama said he and Hollande had agreed that ‘Russia’s strikes against the moderate opposition only bolster the Assad regime, whose brutality has helped to fuel the rise’ of IS. Hollande didn’t go that far but he said that the diplomatic process in Vienna would ‘lead to Bashar al-Assad’s departure … a government of unity is required.’ The press conference failed to deal with the far more urgent impasse between the two men on the matter of Erdoğan. Obama defended Turkey’s right to defend its borders; Hollande said it was ‘a matter of urgency’ for Turkey to take action against terrorists. The JCS adviser told me that one of Hollande’s main goals in flying to Washington had been to try to persuade Obama to join the EU in a mutual declaration of war against Islamic State. Obama said no. The Europeans had pointedly not gone to Nato, to which Turkey belongs, for such a declaration. ‘Turkey is the problem,’ the JCS adviser said.

    Hersh s’appuie ensuite sur l’ambassadeur syrien en Chine pour évoquer la cas de la Chine qui soutient aussi Assad. L’occasion de mentionner le Parti islamique du Turkestan Oriental, allié d’al-Qaïda et soutenu par les services turcs, et qui offre à des combattants notamment Ouïghours l’occasion de mener le jihad en Syrie avant peut-être de retourner le pratiquer dans le Xinjiang ce qui inquiète Pékin :

    Moustapha also brought up China, an ally of Assad that has allegedly committed more than $30 billion to postwar reconstruction in Syria. China, too, is worried about Islamic State. ‘China regards the Syrian crisis from three perspectives,’ he said: international law and legitimacy; global strategic positioning; and the activities of jihadist Uighurs, from Xinjiang province in China’s far west. Xinjiang borders eight nations – Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India – and, in China’s view, serves as a funnel for terrorism around the world and within China. Many Uighur fighters now in Syria are known to be members of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement – an often violent separatist organisation that seeks to establish an Islamist Uighur state in Xinjiang. ‘The fact that they have been aided by Turkish intelligence to move from China into Syria through Turkey has caused a tremendous amount of tension between the Chinese and Turkish intelligence,’ Moustapha said. ‘China is concerned that the Turkish role of supporting the Uighur fighters in Syria may be extended in the future to support Turkey’s agenda in Xinjiang.

    L’article se finit sur le sort de ces « dissidents ». Flynn se fera virer en 2014, tandis que Dempsey et les autres au sein de l’état-major, qui ont été moins insistants, resteront en poste.

    General Dempsey and his colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff kept their dissent out of bureaucratic channels, and survived in office. General Michael Flynn did not. ‘Flynn incurred the wrath of the White House by insisting on telling the truth about Syria,’ said Patrick Lang, a retired army colonel who served for nearly a decade as the chief Middle East civilian intelligence officer for the DIA.

    Dempsey finira par partir en retraite en 2015, mettant fin à cette « dissidence douce » au sein du Pentagone :

    The military’s indirect pathway to Assad disappeared with Dempsey’s retirement in September. His replacement as chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Joseph Dunford, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in July, two months before assuming office. ‘If you want to talk about a nation that could pose an existential threat to the United States, I’d have to point to Russia,’ Dunford said.

    Conclusion :

    Obama now has a more compliant Pentagon. There will be no more indirect challenges from the military leadership to his policy of disdain for Assad and support for Erdoğan. Dempsey and his associates remain mystified by Obama’s continued public defence of Erdoğan, given the American intelligence community’s strong case against him – and the evidence that Obama, in private, accepts that case. ‘We know what you’re doing with the radicals in Syria,’ the president told Erdoğan’s intelligence chief at a tense meeting at the White House (as I reported in the LRB of 17 April 2014). The Joint Chiefs and the DIA were constantly telling Washington’s leadership of the jihadist threat in Syria, and of Turkey’s support for it. The message was never listened to. Why not?

  • Le nouveau document de Seymour M. Hersh: Military to Military: US intelligence sharing in the Syrian war
    http://www.lrb.co.uk/v38/n01/seymour-m-hersh/military-to-military

    The military’s resistance dates back to the summer of 2013, when a highly classified assessment, put together by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then led by General Martin Dempsey, forecast that the fall of the Assad regime would lead to chaos and, potentially, to Syria’s takeover by jihadi extremists, much as was then happening in Libya. A former senior adviser to the Joint Chiefs told me that the document was an ‘all-source’ appraisal, drawing on information from signals, satellite and human intelligence, and took a dim view of the Obama administration’s insistence on continuing to finance and arm the so-called moderate rebel groups. By then, the CIA had been conspiring for more than a year with allies in the UK, Saudi Arabia and Qatar to ship guns and goods – to be used for the overthrow of Assad – from Libya, via Turkey, into Syria. The new intelligence estimate singled out Turkey as a major impediment to Obama’s Syria policy. The document showed, the adviser said, ‘that what was started as a covert US programme to arm and support the moderate rebels fighting Assad had been co-opted by Turkey, and had morphed into an across-the-board technical, arms and logistical programme for all of the opposition, including Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State. The so-called moderates had evaporated and the Free Syrian Army was a rump group stationed at an airbase in Turkey.’ The assessment was bleak: there was no viable ‘moderate’ opposition to Assad, and the US was arming extremists.

    Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, director of the DIA between 2012 and 2014, confirmed that his agency had sent a constant stream of classified warnings to the civilian leadership about the dire consequences of toppling Assad. The jihadists, he said, were in control of the opposition. Turkey wasn’t doing enough to stop the smuggling of foreign fighters and weapons across the border. ‘If the American public saw the intelligence we were producing daily, at the most sensitive level, they would go ballistic,’ Flynn told me. ‘We understood Isis’s long-term strategy and its campaign plans, and we also discussed the fact that Turkey was looking the other way when it came to the growth of the Islamic State inside Syria.’ The DIA’s reporting, he said, ‘got enormous pushback’ from the Obama administration. ‘I felt that they did not want to hear the truth.’

    ‘Our policy of arming the opposition to Assad was unsuccessful and actually having a negative impact,’ the former JCS adviser said. ‘The Joint Chiefs believed that Assad should not be replaced by fundamentalists. The administration’s policy was contradictory. They wanted Assad to go but the opposition was dominated by extremists. So who was going to replace him? To say Assad’s got to go is fine, but if you follow that through – therefore anyone is better. It’s the “anybody else is better” issue that the JCS had with Obama’s policy.’ The Joint Chiefs felt that a direct challenge to Obama’s policy would have ‘had a zero chance of success’. So in the autumn of 2013 they decided to take steps against the extremists without going through political channels, by providing US intelligence to the militaries of other nations, on the understanding that it would be passed on to the Syrian army and used against the common enemy, Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State.

    Germany, Israel and Russia were in contact with the Syrian army, and able to exercise some influence over Assad’s decisions – it was through them that US intelligence would be shared. Each had its reasons for co-operating with Assad: Germany feared what might happen among its own population of six million Muslims if Islamic State expanded; Israel was concerned with border security; Russia had an alliance of very long standing with Syria, and was worried by the threat to its only naval base on the Mediterranean, at Tartus. ‘We weren’t intent on deviating from Obama’s stated policies,’ the adviser said. ‘But sharing our assessments via the military-to-military relationships with other countries could prove productive. It was clear that Assad needed better tactical intelligence and operational advice. The JCS concluded that if those needs were met, the overall fight against Islamist terrorism would be enhanced. Obama didn’t know, but Obama doesn’t know what the JCS does in every circumstance and that’s true of all presidents.’

    Once the flow of US intelligence began, Germany, Israel and Russia started passing on information about the whereabouts and intent of radical jihadist groups to the Syrian army; in return, Syria provided information about its own capabilities and intentions. There was no direct contact between the US and the Syrian military; instead, the adviser said, ‘we provided the information – including long-range analyses on Syria’s future put together by contractors or one of our war colleges – and these countries could do with it what they chose, including sharing it with Assad.

    […]

    The military’s indirect pathway to Assad disappeared with Dempsey’s retirement in September. His replacement as chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Joseph Dunford, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in July, two months before assuming office. ‘If you want to talk about a nation that could pose an existential threat to the United States, I’d have to point to Russia,’ Dunford said. ‘If you look at their behaviour, it’s nothing short of alarming.’ In October, as chairman, Dunford dismissed the Russian bombing efforts in Syria, telling the same committee that Russia ‘is not fighting’ IS. He added that America must ‘work with Turkish partners to secure the northern border of Syria’ and ‘do all we can to enable vetted Syrian opposition forces’ – i.e. the ‘moderates’ – to fight the extremists.

    Obama now has a more compliant Pentagon. There will be no more indirect challenges from the military leadership to his policy of disdain for Assad and support for Erdoğan.

  • Politics, Power, and Preventive Action » You Might Have Missed: Whack-a-mole, Sugary Drinks, and Libya
    http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2015/07/09/you-might-have-missed-whack-a-mole-sugary-drinks-and-libya

    Hearing on the Strategy to Counter ISIL, Senate Armed Services Committee, July 7, 2015.
    http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/15-07-07-counter-isil-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-the-levant-st

    Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) : General Dempsey, would you agree that there’re more terrorist organizations with more safe havens, with more weapons, with more capability, with more men to strike the homeland than any time since 9/11?

    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey : Yes .

    Graham : Do you believe that ISIL is expanding in other countries as we speak?

    Dempsey : Yes.

    [...]

    Note that Sen. Graham did not follow up to ask why terrorist organizations were larger and more capable. U.S. officials are too vested in the country’s counterterrorism strategy—nearly unchanged over the past thirteen years—to recognize that it is failing.

    #pilotage_automatique #intérêts_privés

  • Top IDF attorney: I will never call IDF the most moral army in the world - Diplomacy and Defense - Israel News | Haaretz

    http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.651148?can_id=c04bd6c1866a7591ea05420e1dd77aec&source=email-what-were-rea

    On le savait, mais c’est bien quand c’est eux même qui le disent

    Last November, some two months after the war in the Gaza Strip ended, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Gen. Martin Dempsey surprised a few people. Speaking at a conference in New York, he said Israel went to “extraordinary lengths” to prevent injury to innocent people in Gaza. “The Israel Defense Forces is not interested in creating civilian casualties. They’re interested in stopping the shooting of rockets and missiles out of the Gaza Strip and into Israel,” he added.

    #israël #tsahal #armée_la_plus_morale_du_monde

  • Le billet gratuit d’Intelligence Online, drôlement titré :

    "Bachar al-Assad fait tomber Chuck Hagel"

    http://www.intelligenceonline.fr/renseignement-d-etat/2014/11/26/bachar-al-assad-fait-tomber-chuck-hagel,108049736-GRA-SUM

    La démission, le 24 novembre, du secrétaire américain à la défense, Chuck Hagel, intervient sur fond de profond désaccord avec la Maison Blanche, ainsi qu’avec le chef d’état-major des armées, Martin Dempsey, sur la stratégie à adopter envers l’Etat islamique (ou Daech). Hagel était partisan de frappes contre Bachar al-Assad afin de détruire le terreau principal de recrutement et de légitimité de Daech. Il plaidait également depuis plusieurs semaines pour un renforcement drastique de l’aide à l’Armée syrienne libre (ASL). Il rejoignait en cela les analyses du General Intelligence Directorate (GID) saoudien et du MIT turc (IOL nº722).

    Des sources qui ont accompagné Muteb bin Abdallah, le patron de la Garde nationale saoudienne, à Washington la semaine dernière, rapportent ainsi la profonde lassitude de l’encore secrétaire à la défense : il s’insurgeait contre le fait que l’aviation américaine était devenue la force aérienne supplétive de Bachar. Son départ voit la consécration de la stratégie de Dempsey, partisan de la réhabilitation du régime de Damas comme rempart contre le djihadisme.

  • Dempsey : US Used Attack Helicopters Near Baghdad - ABC News

    http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/dempsey-us-attack-helicopters-baghdad-26140738

    The top U.S. military officer says the U.S. called in Apache helicopters to prevent Iraqi forces from being overrun by Islamic State militants in a recent fight near Baghdad’s airport.

    Gen. Martin Dempsey says the extremists were within about 15 miles and had they overrun the Iraqis, “it was a straight shot to the airport.”

  • Les USA et Israël se sont mis d’accord sur le principe d’une frappe contre l’Iran
    http://www.brujitafr.fr/article-les-usa-et-israel-se-sont-mis-d-accord-sur-le-principe-d-une-frapp

    Un false flag que l’on attribuera à l’Iran servira de prétexte au déclenchement des hostilités. Congrès juif mondial à Paris : éloge du nouveau Premier ministre Valls Le chef d’état-major américain a confirmé que Washington n’écartait pas l’option militaire contre l’Iran Le chef d’état-major des États-Unis, Martin Dempsey a affirmé mardi que Jérusalem était maintenant convaincu que Washington n’écartait pas l’option militaire « si l’Iran sortait des sentiers diplomatiques », selon le journal américain USA Today. "Israël et les Etats-Unis ont atteint des points de convergence sur la menace potentielle que représente le programme nucléaire pour la région et sur ce qu’il doit être fait à ce « sujet » a confié le chef d’état-major (...)

    #3_ème_guerre_mondiale

  • Dempsey: Israel, U.S. now agree on Iran
    Haaretz

    http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.583247

    Israel and the United States have reached a closer understanding on the Iranian issue: the two nations agree about the potential threat to the region and what to do about it, U.S. Chief of Staff Martin Dempsey said on his plane ride home Tuesday, according to USA Today.

    Tensions that arose between Washington and Jerusalem after Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon accused the U.S. of global feebleness have abated after the minister apologized. On Sunday afternoon Dempsey met with the Israeli chief of staff, Benny Gantz. Both generals made a point of remarking on the two nations’ working relationship, and on Tuesday Dempsey drove home the point that the sides have grown closer regarding the Iranian nuclear program as well.

    Despite past differences, he now believes Jerusalem is “satisfied that we have the capability to use a military option if the Iranians choose to stray off the diplomatic path,” said Dempsey, according to USA Today. Moreover, Jerusalem is now more confident that if needed, the Americans will resort to military action, the top soldier said.

    Frustration over Iran had been one of the reasons Ya’alon lashed out at Washington and switched to advocate unilateral Israeli action against Iran’s nuclear program. He later apologized for his words.

    During his two-day visit to Israel Dempsey met with a number of military officials and political leaders and discussed the possibility of Israel and various Gulf nations cooperating on security issues.

    Asked on Monday as to whether Ya’alon’s castigation of America had hurt ties, Gantz said: “There is no doubt that the relationship is as solid as ever.” Dempsey, for his part, said that one of the things he valued most about the relationship was its candor. “The world is complicated enough without our speaking in parables to each other,” the American general said. Today he augmented that with the assurance that the two nations are more in harmony over the Iranian issue as well.

  • Hawking Something
    The Syria interventionists want us to go to war. They’re wrong.
    http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/30/hawking_something_syria_intervention?page=full

    The difficulty with preventing the use of chemical weapons, or securing and consolidating the several dozen sites where they are held, is that it is a resource-intensive military mission, requiring up to 75,000 troops. Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned in January: “The act of preventing the use of chemical weapons would be almost unachievable. You would have to have such clarity of intelligence, persistent surveillance — you’d have to actually see it before it happened. And that’s unlikely.” Dempsey recently declared that the Pentagon had completed the planning to secure Syria’s chemical weapons caches, but that he was not confident of success “because [Syrian security forces have] been moving it and the number of sites is quite numerous.”

  • Top general urges caution on Syria options, rebels | Reuters
    http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/18/us-syria-crisis-usa-idUSBRE92H0ZA20130318

    (Reuters) - The United States has a less clear understanding of Syria’s opposition than it did last year, the top U.S. military officer said on Monday, in comments likely to disappoint rebels hoping that America might be inching toward a decision to arm them.

    “About six months ago, we had a very opaque understanding of the opposition and now I would say it’s even more opaque,” said General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the U.S. military’s Joint Chiefs of Staff.

    Dempsey, who is President Barack Obama’s top uniformed military adviser, said he would also advise extreme caution when deliberating any military options in Syria - saying the conflict posed “the most complex set of issues that anyone could ever conceive, literally.”

  • US-SYRIE. Obama blocked US plan to arm Syrian rebels | World news | guardian.co.uk
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/feb/08/pentagon-supported-plan-syrian-rebels

    Pentagon leaders have said they supported a recommendation from the US state department and CIA to arm Syrian rebels, but Barack Obama ultimately decided against it.

    The Obama administration has limited its support to non-lethal aid for the rebels who, despite receiving weapons from countries such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia, are poorly armed compared with the army and loyalist militias of the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad.

    John McCain, a Republican senator who has championed greater US involvement, asked Pentagon leaders at a congressional hearing: “How many more have to die before you recommend military action?”

    He then pressed the outgoing defence secretary, Leon Panetta, and General Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the US military’s joint chiefs of staff, about whether they backed the recommendation by the state department and CIA chiefs last year to arm the rebels.

    Panetta and Dempsey said they had backed the recommendation and, later in the hearing, the defence secretary elaborated.

    “Obviously there were a number of factors that were involved here that ultimately led to the president’s decision to make [the aid] non-lethal,” Panetta said, adding that he supported Obama’s decision.

    The comments were the first public acknowledgement of Pentagon support to arm the rebels since 2 February when the New York Times reported on the plan developed last summer by Hillary Clinton and David Petraeus, who have since left their jobs at the state department and CIA respectively.

    The defence chiefs’ testimony suggested White House opposition alone may have been enough to override the position of most major US foreign policy and security agencies.

    The New York Times said the plan to arm and train rebels was rebuffed by the White House due to concerns that it could draw the United States into the Syrian conflict and that the arms could fall into the wrong hands.

    The questions about US policy in Syria came during a hearing focusing on Libya, with Pentagon leaders defending their response to last year’s deadly attack on the US consulate in Benghazi.

    Republican politicians raised questions about whether the reaction was too slow and whether Obama was engaged enough during the incident, choosing to get updates on the crisis from staff instead of military leaders.

    Panetta and Dempsey said US forces could not have reached Libya in time to prevent the deaths of the US ambassador and three other Americans on 11 September 2012, and insisted Obama was kept in the loop.

    Panetta stressed that it was not the US military’s responsibility to be able to immediately respond anywhere in the world to a crisis. There was no intelligence about a specific plan to attack the consulate, he and Dempsey noted.

    “The United States military … is not and, frankly, should not be a 911 service capable of arriving on the scene within minutes to every possible contingency around the world,” he said.

  • La Maison Blanche a refusé d’armer l’opposition syrienne
    http://www.lemonde.fr/ameriques/article/2013/02/08/la-maison-blanche-a-refuse-d-armer-l-opposition-syrienne_1828942_3222.html

    Au cours de l’audition de Leon Panetta et de Martin Dempsey sur l’attaque du consulat américain de Benghazi, en Libye, le 11 septembre 2012, le sénateur républicain John McCain a fait une digression sur la Syrie. « Je vais encore vous demander ce que je vous avais demandé en mars dernier lorsque 7 500 Syriens avaient été tués. On en est maintenant à au moins 60 000. Combien de gens devront encore mourir avant que vous ne recommandiez une action militaire ? » a lancé le sénateur républicain.

    « Et avez-vous soutenu la recommandation faite par le secrétaire d’Etat de l’époque Clinton et celui qui était chef de la CIA, le général Petraeus, de fournir des armes à la résistance en Syrie. Avez-vous soutenu cela ? », a insisté M. McCain, partisan d’une aide militaire américaine à l’opposition syrienne. « Nous l’avons soutenu », ont répondu tour à tour MM. Panetta et Dempsey.

  • Le Mali et la guerre éternelle contre la terreur
    Par Pepe Escobar , Asia Times Online, le 24 janvier 2013, Traduction [JFG-QuestionsCritiques]
    http://questionscritiques.free.fr/edito/AsiaTimesOnline/Pepe_Escobar/Mali_France_Pentagone_Algerie_services_secrets_or_uranium_22

    Et l’Oscar de la meilleure suite de 2012 va à... La Guerre Mondiale Contre la Terreur (GMCT), une production du Pentagone. Qu’ils abandonnent tout espoir ceux qui pensaient que tout ce bazar était terminé avec la liquidation cinématographique de « Geronimo », alias Oussama ben Laden, réduit un peu plus en bref camée dans Zero Dark Thirty, le film qui fait une belle place à la torture.

    C’est maintenant officiel : le président du chef d’état-major interarmes, le Général Martin Dempsey, est revenu de la gueule du loup, et cela a été dûment mis en ligne sur le site AFRICOM, la branche armée africaine du Pentagone. Fini al-Qaïda « historique », terré quelque part au Waziristân dans les zones tribales pakistanaises, voici al-Qaïda au Maghreb Islamique (AQMI). Selon les mots de Dempsey, AQMI « est une menace, non seulement pour le Mali, mais pour la région, et si [...] on ne s’en occupe pas, il pourrait devenir une menace mondiale ».

    (...)

    Suivez l’or et suivez l’uranium !

    Avant même qu’il ne soit possible d’analyser complètement la myriade de ramifications - dont beaucoup sont imprévues - de la GMCT étendue, il y a deux fronts qu’il faudra observer attentivement dans un proche avenir. Par conséquent, suivons l’or et suivons l’uranium !

    L’or. Une foule de pays ont des lingots d’or déposés à la Réserve Fédérale de New York. Parmi eux, d’une importance cruciale, l’Allemagne. Récemment, Berlin a commencé à demander le rapatriement de son or - 374 tonnes de la Banque de France et 300 tonnes sur ses 1.500 tonnes qui se trouvent à la Réserve Fédérale de New York.

    Devinez ce que les Français et les Américains ont essentiellement dit : Nous n’avons pas d’or ! Du moins, en ce moment précis. Cela prendra au moins cinq ans pour que l’or allemand détenu en France soit retourné, et pas moins de sept ans pour celui qui est planqué à la Réserve Fédérale de New York. Le vrai problème est que Paris et Washington/New York doivent trouver de l’or par tous les moyens.

    C’est là que le Mali entre - magnifiquement - en scène. Le Mali - avec le Ghana - compte pour jusqu’à 8% de la production mondiale d’or. Par conséquent, si vous êtes prêt à tout pour obtenir le bon produit - l’or physique - vous devez contrôler le Mali. Imaginez que tout cet or tombe entre les mains de... la Chine !

    Maintenant, suivez l’uranium. Comme tout ceux qui ont eu les yeux fixés sur la saga du yellowcake [concentré d’uranium] juste avant l’invasion de l’Irak le savent, le Niger est le quatrième plus gros producteur d’uranium du monde. Son plus gros client est - oh ! Surprise ! - la France : la moitié de l’électricité en France provient de l’énergie nucléaire.

    Il se trouve que les mines d’uranium au Niger sont concentrées dans le nord-ouest du pays, sur la chaîne occidentale du massif de l’Aïr, à proximité de la frontière malienne, et l’une des régions bombardées par les Français.

    La question de l’uranium est intimement liée aux rébellions touareg successives ; il faut se rappeler que pour les Touaregs il n’y a pas de frontières dans le Sahel. Toutes les récentes rébellions touareg au Niger se sont produites dans la contrée uranifère - dans la province d’Agadez, près de la frontière malienne. Donc, du point de vue des intérêts français, imaginiez la possibilité que les Touaregs contrôlent ces mines d’uranium - et commencent à négocier avec... la Chine ! Après tout, Pékin est déjà présent dans la région.

  • ’Stunned’ by US no, Israel backing down from bellicose Iran-war threats
    http://www.ufppc.org/us-a-world-news-mainmenu-35/11186-news-stunned-by-us-no-israel-backing-down-from-bellicose-iran-war-threa

    On Aug. 30, speaking to journalists in London, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff of the United States armed forces, Gen. Martin Dempsey, said of Israel’s threat to attempt a military strike at Iran’s nuclear program: "I don’t want to be complicit if they [Israel] choose to do it," the London Guardian reported.[1] — A week earlier, “the former American ambassador to Israel, Martin Indyk, termed Israel’s talk of attacking Iran ’a classic case of crying wolf,’” the Times of Israel reported on Aug. 30.[2] — On Tuesday, Reuters reported that “Stunned by a rebuke from the United States’ top general, Israel is preparing a climbdown strategy in its war of words over Iran’s nuclear program, aware that its room for maneuver is shrinking rapidly.”[3] — Crispian Balmer’s article ended with these words: "’All this talk of war is bullshit. If they could do it, then they would have already done it long ago,’ a senior European diplomat in Israel said."...