person:moshe dayan

  • Israël : l’ex-chef de Tsahal, sauveur de l’opposition et futur tombeur de Nétanyahou ?
    Par Guillaume Gendron, Correspondant à Tel-Aviv — 22 novembre 2018

    (...) Pour le reste, l’homme n’a ni parti, ni programme, ni même d’idéologie définie. Tout juste sait-on qu’il « considère très sérieusement » un avenir parlementaire. Courtisé par les stratégistes travaillistes, élevé au rang d’icône par les magazines qui l’affichent en couverture tel un Clint Eastwood attendant sous le porche de son ranch qu’on l’appelle à nouveau pour zigouiller les méchants, Gantz reste une énigme, une bulle spéculative. Et la preuve que la gauche israélienne n’en a pas finie avec son complexe originel, son syndrome Moshe Dayan : la conviction que pour être crédible et rassembleuse, elle doit être menée par un militaire.

    « Pour qu’un leader de gauche soit "téflon", imperméable aux accusations de sentimentalisme envers les Palestiniens, il faut qu’il ait tué, qu’il ait fait la guerre », explique le politologue Denis Charbit, maître de conférences à l’Université ouverte d’Israël. Théorème implacable : le prix Nobel de la paix Yitzhak Rabin était aussi l’ancien général qui voulait « briser les os » des révoltés de la première intifada. Ehud Barak, ex-chef d’état-major comme Gantz, compensait son allure bonhomme par sa réputation de plus redoutable tueur des forces spéciales… « En ce sens, Gantz est un peu le dernier espoir de ceux qui rêvent encore du grand leader ashkénaze aux yeux clairs, poursuit Charbit. Celui qui n’est pas clivant comme Nétanyahou, qui est rationnel, avec la croyance que les armes sont au-dessus des idéologies… »

    En Israël, la popularité des généraux ne s’est jamais démentie. Les législateurs (plus par calcul tactique que par intérêt démocratique) ont tenté de la circonscrire en imposant une période dite de « refroidissement », portée à trois ans en 2007, et qui interdit l’entrée en politique d’un haut gradé immédiatement après la fin de son service. Revenu à la vie civile depuis 2015, il semblerait que l’option Gantz soit encore tiède.


  • Israeli minister planned eviction of West Bank Bedouin 40 years ago, document reveals
    Now agriculture minister, then settler activist, Uri Ariel was already planning in the 1970s the eviction of Bedouin living east of Jerusalem that is taking place now in Khan al-Ahmar
    Amira Hass Jul 12, 2018 2:57 AM

    Forty years ago Uri Ariel, now agriculture minister, was already planning the eviction of Bedouin living east of Jerusalem. This emerges from a document signed by him titled, “A proposal to plan the Ma’aleh Adumim region and establish the community settlement of Ma’aleh Adumim B.”

    The document outlines a plan to turn some 100,000 to 120,000 dunams (25,000 to 30,000 acres) of Palestinian land into an area of Jewish settlement and develop it as a “Jewish corridor,” as he put it, from the coast to the Jordan River. In fact, a large part of the plan has been executed, except for the eviction of all the area’s Bedouin.

    Now the Civil Administration and the police are expediting the demolition of the homes of the Jahalin in Khan al-Ahmar. This is one of approximately 25 Bedouin communities in the area that have become a flagship of the Bedouin resistance in the West Bank’s Area C against the efforts by the Israeli occupation to uproot them, gather them in a few compounds adjacent to Area A, and impose a semi-urban lifestyle on them.

    The boundaries of the area that Ariel sets for his plan are the Palestinian villages of Hizme, Anata, Al-Azariya and Abu Dis to the west, the hills overlooking the Jordan Valley to the east, Wadi Qelt to the north and the Kidron Valley and Horkania Valley to the south. “In the area there are many Bedouin involved in the cultivation of land,” he writes, contrary to the claims voiced today by settlers that the Bedouin only recently popped up and “took over” the land.

    But Ariel has a solution: “Since the area is used by the military and a large part of the industry there serves the defense establishment, the area must be closed to Bedouin settlement and evacuated.”

    This document, exposed here for the first time, was found by Dr. Yaron Ovadia in the Kfar Adumim archives when he was doing research for a book he’s writing about the Judean Desert. Ovadia wrote his doctorate about the Jahalin tribe.

    “Since [the area] is unsettled, it is now possible to plan it entirely,” Ariel wrote, about an area that constituted the land reserves for construction, industry, agriculture and grazing for the Palestinian towns and villages east of Bethlehem, Jerusalem and Ramallah. “Arab urban/rural settlement is spreading at an amazing pace along the route from Jerusalem eastward, and this linear spread must be stopped immediately.”

    His solutions: to build urban neighborhoods that will become part of Jerusalem and to “administratively close the area of the Arab villages by means of an appropriate plan.” This administrative closure by an appropriate plan can be discerned in the reality perpetuated by the Interim Agreement of 1995, which artificially divided the West Bank into Areas A and B, to be administered by the Palestinians, and Area C, which covers 60 percent of the West Bank, to be administered by Israel. That’s how Palestinian enclaves were created with limited development potential within a large Jewish expanse.

    Ariel’s plan was apparently written between late 1978 and the beginning of 1979, and he said that as far as he recalls, it was submitted to Brig. Gen. Avraham Tamir, the IDF’s head of planning. “We have been living for three years in the existing settlement at Mishor Adumim,” writes Ariel, referring to a settlement nucleus that was established in 1975 and was portrayed as a work camp near the Mishor Adumim industrial zone. Even before Ma’aleh Adumim was officially inaugurated, Ariel was proposing to build “Ma’aleh Adumim B,” i.e., Kfar Adumim, which was established in September 1979.

    Some Jahalin families were indeed evicted from their homes in 1977 and 1980. In 1994, expulsion orders were issued against dozens more, and they were evicted in the late 1990s, with the approval of the High Court of Justice. But thousands of Bedouin and their flocks remained in the area, albeit under increasingly difficult conditions as firing zones, settlements and roads reduced their grazing areas and their access to water. From the early 2000s the Civil Administration has been planning to evacuate the Bedouin and forcibly resettle them in permanent townships.

    It’s tempting to present Ariel’s 40-year-old suggestions as an example of the personal and political determination that characterizes many religious Zionist activists and was facilitated by the Likud electoral victory in 1977. But it was Yitzhak Rabin’s first government that decided to build a 4,500-dunam industrial zone for Jerusalem in Khan al-Amar. In 1975 it expropriated a huge area of 30,000 dunams from the Palestinian towns and villages in the area and built a settlement there disguised as a work camp for employees of the industrial zone.

    In a study (“The Hidden Agenda,” 2009) written by Nir Shalev for the nonprofit associations Bimkom – Planners for Planning Rights and B’tselem, he notes that the Housing and Construction Ministry’s Jerusalem district director when Ma’aleh Adumim was first being built in 1975 said that the objective behind it was political – “to block the entrance way to Jerusalem from a Jordanian threat.” But since the objective was political, it was clear that he wasn’t referring to a military threat, but to demographic growth that would require additional construction.

    The planning for Ma’aleh Adumim actually began in Golda Meir’s time in the early 1970s; at the time, minister Israel Galili advised Davar reporter Hagai Eshed that it would be best if the press didn’t deal with this “exciting and interesting” issue, “because it could cause damage.” Both the Meir and Rabin governments considered the planned settlement to be part of metropolitan Jerusalem. Moreover, during Rabin’s second government, the period of the Oslo Accords, Bedouin were evicted, in the spirit of Ariel’s proposal.

    Perhaps the most crucial move was actually made in 1971, when under that same government of Meir, Galili and Moshe Dayan, military order No. 418 was issued, which made drastic changes to the planning apparatus in the West Bank. The order removed the rights of Palestinian local councils to plan and build. As explained in another study by Bimkom (“The Prohibted Zone,” 2008) this prepared the legal infrastructure for the separate planning systems – the miserly, restrictive system for the Palestinians and the generous, encouraging one for the settlements. This distorted planning system refused to take into account the longtime Bedouin communities that had been expelled from the Negev and had been living in the area long before the settlements were built.

    The settlement part of Ariel’s proposal succeeded because it was merely a link in a chain of plans and ideas had already been discussed when the Labor Alignment was still in power, and which were advanced by a bureaucratic infrastructure that had been in place even before 1948. Today, under a government in which Ariel’s Habayit Hayehudi party is so powerful, the open expulsion of Bedouin is possible. But the expulsion of Palestinians in general is hardly a Habayit Hayehudi invention.

  • In Words and Deeds: The Genesis of Israeli #Violence

    Russian-born Menachem Begin was the leader of the Irgun which, along with the Stern Gang and other Jewish militants, massacred hundreds of civilians in Deir Yassin.

    ‘Tell the soldiers: you have made history in Israel with your attack and your conquest. Continue this until victory. As in Deir Yassin, so everywhere, we will attack and smite the enemy. God, God, Thou has chosen us for conquest," Begin wrote at the time. He described the massacre as a “splendid act of conquest.”

    The intrinsic link between words and actions remain unchanged.

    Nearly 30 years later, a once wanted terrorist, Begin became Prime Minister of Israel. He accelerated land theft of the newly-occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem, launched a war on Lebanon, annexed Occupied Jerusalem to Israel and carried out the massacre of Sabra and Shatilla in 1982.

    Some of the other terrorists-turned-politicians and top army brass include Begin, Moshe Dayan, Yitzhak Rabin, Ariel Sharon, Rafael Eitan and Yitzhak Shamir. Each one of these leaders has a record dotted with violence.

    Shamir served as the Prime Minister of Israel from 1986 – 1992. In 1941, Shamir was imprisoned by the British for his role in the Stern Gang. Later, as Prime Minister, he ordered a violent crackdown against a mostly non-violent Palestinian uprising in 1987, purposely breaking the limbs of kids accused of throwing rocks at Israeli soldiers.

    So, when government ministers like Ariel and Bennett call for wanton violence against Palestinians, they are simply carrying on with a bloody legacy that has defined every single Israeli leader in the past. It is the violent mindset that continues to control the Israeli government and its relationship with Palestinians; in fact, with all of its neighbors.


  • ’We look at them like donkeys’: What Israel’s first ruling party thought about Palestinian citizens -

    Quand Ben Gourion et le parti travailliste israélien (la “gauche”) qualifiaient des Palestiniens d’Israël d’ “ânes” et réfléchissait sur la manière de les expulser

    Israel’s first ruling party, Mapai, was torn about the status of Arabs who remained in the country after the War of Independence; almost 70 years later, the ’Arab question’ has yet to be answered
    By Adam Raz Jan 13, 2018
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    “The Arab question in Israel” was the term used in the top ranks of Mapai, the ruling party in the young State of Israel – and forerunner of Labor – to encapsulate the complex issue that arose after the War of Independence of 1948-49. In the wake of the fighting, and the armistice agreements that concluded the war, about 156,000 Arabs remained within Israel (out of an estimated 700,000 before the war), accounting for 14 percent of the nascent state’s population. So it was with some justification that Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett stated in a meeting of Mapai Knesset members and the party’s senior leadership, on June 18, 1950, that “this is one of the fundamental questions of our policy and of the future of our country.” He added that the issue was one “that will determine the direction of the country’s morality,” for “our entire moral stature depends on this test – on whether we pass it or not.”
    Almost 70 years later, the “Arab question in Israel” continues to pose a conundrum for politicians when they address the issue of the status of Palestinian citizens of Israel (or, as they are often imprecisely called, “Israeli Arabs”).
    The minutes of the meetings held by Mapai, which are stored in the Labor Party Archive in Beit Berl, outside Kfar Sava, attest to the deep dispute in the party over two conflicting approaches concerning the Arabs in Israel. Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and his associates – Moshe Dayan (Israel Defense Forces chief of staff 1953-1958) and Shimon Peres, at the time a senior official in the Defense Ministry – urged a policy of segregation and a hard hand against what he argued was a communal threat to national security; while Sharett and other Mapai leaders – Pinhas Lavon, Zalman Aran, David Hacohen and others – promoted a policy of integration.

    The disagreement between Ben-Gurion and Sharett mirrored the respective approaches held by the two regarding the Arab world in general. Sharett was critical of Ben-Gurion’s policy, which he said, held that “the only language the Arabs understand is force,” and called for an approach that preferred the “matter of peace.” Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, then a Knesset member, and later Israel’s second president (1952-1963), summed up succinctly the alternatives in a meeting of the Mapai MKs several weeks later, on July 9, 1950: “The question is the attitude the state takes toward the minorities. Do we want them to remain in the country, to be integrated in the country, or to get out of the country We declared civic equality irrespective of race difference. Does this refer to a time when there will be no Arabs in the country? If so, it’s fraud.”
    ’Transfer’ option
    The discussions within the party were quite freewheeling, even if speakers frequently expressed concern of leaks to the press, which could have lead to international pressure on Israel to improve the treatment of its Arab citizens. Indeed, the future of the relations between the peoples who inhabited the country demanded weighty political decisions. Among the issues in question: the right to vote, the Absentees’ Property Law, the status of the Arab education system, membership of Arab workers in the Mapai-affiliated Histadrut federation of labor, and more.

    One proposition that arose frequently in the discussions was that of a “transfer” – the expulsion of the Arabs who continued to reside in Israel – a term that some found grating already then. In the June 1950 meeting, Sharett took issue with the allegation, voiced by Ben-Gurion and his supporters, that the Arabs in Israel were a “fifth column.” That was a simplistic assumption, Sharett said, “which needs to be examined.” As he saw it, the fate of the relations between the two peoples depended overwhelmingly on the Jews. “Will we continue to fan the flames?” Sharett asked, or try to douse them? Even though a high-school education was not yet mandatory under law (and the state was not obligated to offer one), a large number of the Jewish youth in the country attended high school, and Sharett thought that the state should establish high schools for the Arabs as well. Israel needs “to guarantee them their cultural minimum,” he added.
    For political reasons, the segregationists tended to ignore the difference between the Arabs living in Israel and those who were left on the other side of the border following the war, many of whom made attempts to “infiltrate” and return to their homes. Sharett took the opposite view: “A distinction must be made between vigorous action against Arab infiltration” and “discrimination against Arabs within the country.”

    David Ben-Gurion. Fritz Cohen / GPO
    Ranking figures such as Sharett and Lavon, who was defense minister in 1954-55, viewed positively a further exodus of Arabs from the country, but only “by peaceful means.” Sharett vehemently objected to the position taken by Dayan, who not only wanted to bring about a situation in which there would be fewer Arabs in Israel, but sought to achieve this through active expulsion. In Sharett’s view, “We must not strive to do this by a wholesale policy of persecution and discrimination.” Sharett spoke of “distinctly unnecessary forms of cruelty, which are tantamount to an indescribable desecration of God’s name.”
    Dayan, notwithstanding the fact that he was serving in the army at the time – as head of Southern Command – participated in Mapai’s political meetings and helped set public policy. He was one of the leaders of the aggressive stance against the country’s Arabs and was against a proposal that they should serve in the army (an idea that came up but was shelved). He opposed granting the Arabs “permanent-citizenship certificates,” opposed compensating those who had been dispossessed of their land, and in fact opposed every constructive action that could contribute to bridge-building between the peoples. “Let’s say that we help them live in the situation they are in today” and no more, he proposed.
    Dayan’s approach remained consistent over the years, and conflicted with the view taken by Sharett and the stream in Mapai that he represented. Speaking in the same June 1950 meeting, Dayan asserted, “I want to say that in my opinion, the policy of this party should be geared to see this public, of 170,000 Arabs, as though their fate has not yet been sealed. I hope that in the years to come there will perhaps be another possibility to implement a transfer of these Arabs from the Land of Israel, and as long as a possibility of this sort is feasible, we should not do anything that conflicts with this.”
    Dayan also objected to Sharett’s proposals to improve the level of education among the country’s Arabs. “It is not in our interest to do that,” he said. “This is not the only question on which the time for a final solution has not yet arrived.”
    Zalman Aran, a future education minister, objected to the military government that had been imposed on Israel’s Arabs at the time of statehood and remained in effect until 1966. Under its terms, Arabs had to be equipped with permits both to work and to travel outside their hometowns, which were also under curfew at night. “As long as we keep them in ghettos,” Aran said, no constructive activity will help. Lavon, too, urged the dismantlement of the military government. In 1955, a few months after resigning as defense minister, he savaged the concept at a meeting in Beit Berl. “The State of Israel cannot solve the question of the Arabs who are in the country by Nazi means,” he stated, adding, “Nazism is Nazism, even if carried out by Jews.”
    Even earlier, Lavon was a sharp critic of the line taken by Dayan and other advocates of transfer. At a meeting of another Mapai leadership forum, on May 21, 1949, he said acidly, “It’s well known that we socialists are the best in the world even when we rob Arabs.” A few months later, on January 1, 1950, in another meeting, he warned, “It is impossible to take action among the Arabs when the policy is one of transfer. It is impossible to work among them if the policy is to oppress Arabs – that prevents concrete action. What is being carried out is a dramatic and brutal suppression of the Arabs in Israel... Transfer is not on the cards. If there is not a war, they will not go. Two-hundred thousand Arabs will be citizens in terms of voting... As the state party, we must set for ourselves a constructive policy in the Arab realm.”
    Back in December 1948, during the discussions on granting the right to vote for the Constituent Assembly – Israel’s first parliamentary institution, which was elected in January 1949, and a month later became the “Israel Knesset” – Ben-Gurion agreed to grant the right to vote to the Arabs who had been in the country when a census was taken, a month earlier. About 37,000 Arabs were registered in the census. The decision to enfranchise them apparently stemmed from party-political considerations. The thinking was that most of them would vote for Mapai.
    This assessment was voiced in the discussions on the Citizenship Law in early 1951, when Ben-Gurion expressed the most assertive opinion. He refused to grant the right to vote to the Arabs who were living in the country lawfully (as Sharett demanded) but who had been elsewhere during the census (because they had fled or had been expelled in the wake of the war); or to those Arabs who resided in the “Triangle” (an area of Arab towns and villages on the Sharon plain), which was annexed to Israel only in April 1949, under the armistice agreement with Jordan. “Is there no country in the world that has two types of citizens in elections [meaning voting and non-voting],” Ben-Gurion asked rhetorically in a meeting of Mapai MKs on February 20, 1951.

    Moshe Dayan. Fritz Cohen / GPO
    In the view of Sharett, who submitted a conflicting draft resolution, it would not be possible to defend “this situation in regard to ourselves and in regard to these Arabs, and in regard to the Arabs in Israel as a whole and in terms of world public opinion. Accordingly, I suggest granting them the right to vote... Discriminate only against the Arabs who entered Israel without permission.”
    Sharett maintained that Ben-Gurion had not given consideration to the root of the problem. “Terrible things” were being done against Arabs in the country, he warned. “Until a Jew is hanged for murdering an Arab for no reason, in cold blood, the Jews will not understand that Arabs are not dogs but human beings.” Sharett’s view carried the day in the vote, and the Arabs in the Triangle voted in the elections.
    In the July 9, 1950, meeting, MK David Hacohen disputed the argument that discrimination against the Arabs and the institution of the military government were essential for the country’s security. Assailing the Absentees’ Property Law – a series of measures that allowed the state to expropriate land and homes abandoned by Palestinians who were displaced during the war, even if they subsequently returned to the country – he said, “I don’t know whether it was clear to us all, when we voted, how grave it is.” He noted that, “According to the law, when an Arab dies, his property does not go to his wife but to the Custodian of Absentees’ Property It is inconceivable for us to declare equality of all citizens and at the same time have a law like this on the books.”
    Apparently, no one took issue with the next comparison Hacohen drew: “These laws that we are coming up with in regard to Israel’s Arab residents cannot even be likened to the laws that were promulgated against the Jews in the Middle Ages, when they were deprived of all rights. After all, this is a total contrast between our declarations and our deeds.”
    A similar approach was voiced during the same meeting by Zalman Aran, who viewed Mapai’s handling of the Arabs as a “process of despair” that must be rejected instead of finding excuses for it.
    “Morally, if we are a movement that does not lie, and we do not want to lie, we are here living a total lie,” he said. “All the books and articles that have been written, and the speeches made internally and for external consumption, are groundless when it comes to implementation. I am not talking about the attitude of individuals in the country toward the Arabs. I am talking about a [policy] line. I reject this line, which has emerged within society and has a thousand-and-one manifestations. I do not accept all the excuses that have been put forward.”
    Taking issue with Dayan’s approach, Aran compared the situation of the Arabs in Israel with the situation of Jews in other countries. “On the basis of what we are doing here to the Arabs, there is no justification for demanding a different attitude toward Jewish minorities in other countries I would be contemptuous of Arabs who would want to form ties with us on the basis of this policy. We would be lying in the [Socialist] Internationale, we are lying to ourselves and we are lying to the nations of the world.”
    Dayan – still an officer in uniform, it must be remembered – objected to the opinions voiced by Hacohen and Aran, and saw no reason to draw a distinction between the Arab public in Israel and Arabs in enemy countries. “I am far more pessimistic about the prospect of viewing these Arabs as loyal,” he countered.

    Moshe Sharett. Frank Scherschel
    Flawed democracy
    During the same period of a decade-plus when Ben-Gurion was premier, a political battle raged in Mapai over the continued existence of the military government. Ben-Gurion persistently defended the military government, which he saw as a “deterrent force” against the Arabs in Israel. In a meeting of the Mapai Secretariat on January 1, 1962, he railed against the “dominant naivete” of those, such as Sharett and Aran, who do not understand the Arabs, and warned of the possible consequences: “There are people living under the illusion that we are like all the nations, that the Arabs are loyal to Israel and that what happened in Algeria cannot happen here.”
    He added, “We view them like donkeys. They don’t care. They accept it with love...” To loosen the reins on the Arabs would be a great danger, he added: “You and your ilk” – those who support the abolition of the military government or making it less stringent – “will be responsible for the perdition of Israel.” A decade earlier, on January 15, 1951, Shmuel Dayan, Moshe Dayan’s father, a Mapai leader and longtime Knesset member, had voiced similar sentiments in a meeting of Mapai MKs. The Arabs, he said, “could be good citizens, but it’s clear that at the moment they become an obstacle, they will constitute a terrible danger.”
    A decade later, Aran offered an opposite assessment of the situation. Speaking at a meeting of the Mapai Secretariat in January 1962, he maintained that it was the military government that “is exacerbating the situation.” He also rejected the Algeria analogy. On the contrary, he thought, the existence of the military government would not delay an Arab uprising but would only spur it. He reiterated his critique of the early 1950s a decade later. He was against a situation in which the Arabs are “second-class” citizens who lack rights like the Jews, and he was critical of both himself and his colleagues: “We accepted this thing, we became accustomed to it... We took it in stride... It’s hard to swallow... No Arab in the State of Israel is able, needs to, is capable of – whatever you give him economically, educationally – accepting that he is a second-class citizen in this country. I think that the world does not know the true situation. If it did, it would not let us keep going on this way.”
    Already then, Finance Minister Levi Eshkol, under whose term as prime minister the military government would be abolished, foresaw the dire consequences: “It would not surprise me if something new suddenly emerges, that people will not want to rent a stable – or a room – to an Arab in some locale, which is the [logical] continuation of this situation. Will we be able to bear that?”
    One person who was not impressed by such arguments was the deputy defense minister, Shimon Peres. In a Mapai Secretariat meeting on January 5, 1962, he maintained that in practice, the military government “is not a strain on the Arabs.” The military government, he added, was [effectively] created by the Arabs, “who endanger Israel and as long as that danger exists, we must meet it with understanding.” In contrast, Isser Harel, head of the Shin Bet security service (1948-1952) and the Mossad (1952-1963), stated in 1966, days after resigning as Eshkol’s adviser for intelligence and security, that “the military government is not a security necessity, and therefore there is no need for its existence. The army should not be dealing with the Arab citizens. That is a flaw in terms of our democracy” (quoted in the daily Maariv, July 10, 1966). That had been the view of the security hawks, including Yigal Allon, since the early 1950s.
    Over the years, it was claimed that the military government had served as a tool in Mapai’s hands for reinforcing its rule, both by giving out jobs and by distributing benefits, and also by intervening in election campaigns through the creation of Arab factions within existing parties that were convenient for the ruling party (and suppressing opponents on the other side). This is not the venue to discuss that allegation – for which evidence exists – but it’s worth noting one of the motifs of the hard-hand policy, which preserved the segregation between Arabs and Jews, as expressed candidly by Ben-Gurion in the meeting of the Mapai Secretariat on January 5, 1962: “The moment that the difference between Jews and Arabs is eliminated, and they are at the same level If on that day there does not exist a regime in a world where there are no more wars, I do not have the shadow of a doubt that Israel will be eradicated and no trace will remain of the Jewish people.”

    Adam Raz
    Haaretz Contributor

  • Israeli prime minister after Six-Day War: ’We’ll deprive Gaza of water, and the Arabs will leave’
    Declassified minutes of inner cabinet sessions in the months after the Six-Day War show government ministers who were at a loss to deal with its implications
    Ofer Aderet Nov 16, 2017 8:24 AM

    “Empty” the Gaza Strip, “thin out” the Galilee, rewrite textbooks and censor political cartoons in Haaretz: These are among the proposals discussed by cabinet ministers after the Six-Day War that will be available to the public in a major release of declassified government documents by the Israel State Archives on Thursday.

    The material being posted on the state archives’ website includes hundreds of pages of minutes from meetings of the inner cabinet between August and December 1967. From reading them, it is clear that in the several months that followed the June 1967 war, members of the security cabinet were perplexed, confused and sometimes helpless in the face of the new challenges to the state. Israel conquered East Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula in under a week. It was not even remotely prepared for this scenario, and had to hit the ground running.

    In December 1967, six months after the war, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol speculated over how to deal with the hundreds of thousands of Arabs newly under the state’s control. “At some point we will have to decide. There are 600,000 Arabs in these territories now. What will be the status of these 600,000 Arabs?” he asked.

    Eshkol evidently felt no urgency in regard to the matter. “I suggest that we don’t come to a vote or a decision today; there’s time to deal with this joy, or better put, there’s time to deal with this trouble,” he said. “But for the record I’m prepared to say this: There’s no reason for the government to determine its position on the future of the West Bank right now. We’ve been through three wars in 20 years; we can go another 20 years without a decision.”

    He got backing from Transportation Minister Moshe Carmel, who said, “If we sit 20 years, the world will get used to our being in those territories, in any case no less than they got used to [Jordan’s King] Hussein being there. We have more rights; we are more identified with these territories than he is.”

    But an examination of other documents shows that Eshkol was well aware that Israel couldn’t ignore the problems posed by the occupation for long, particularly its rule over hundreds of thousands of Arabs. In one discussion he compared the Israel to “a giraffe’s neck,” because it was so narrow. “The strip of this country is like a miserable, threatening neck for us, literally stretched out for slaughter,” he said. “I cannot imagine it — how we will organize life in this country when we have 1.4 million Arabs and we are 2.4 million, with 400,000 Arabs already in the country?”

    One of the “solutions” to the new situation, according to Eshkol, was to encourage Arabs to emigrate. In this context Eshkol told the ministers that he was “working on the establishment of a unit or office that will engage in encouraging Arab emigration.” He added, “We should deal with this issue quietly, calmly and covertly, and we should work on finding a way from them to emigrate to other countries and not just over the Jordan [River].”

    Eshkol expressed the hope that, “precisely because of the suffocation and imprisonment there, maybe the Arabs will move from the Gaza Strip,” adding that there were ways to remove those who remained. “Perhaps if we don’t give them enough water they won’t have a choice, because the orchards will yellow and wither,” he said in this context. Another “solution,” he said, could be another war. “Perhaps we can expect another war and then this problem will be solved. But that’s a type of ‘luxury,’ an unexpected solution.”

    “We are interested in emptying out Gaza first,” Eshkol summed up. To which Labor Minister Yigal Allon suggested “thinning the Galilee of Arabs,” while Religious Affairs Minister Zerah Warhaftig said, “We must increase [the number of] Jews and take all possible measures to reduce the number of Arabs.”

    One idea raised by Defense Minister Moshe Dayan was to give the Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza permits to work abroad, in the hope that some would prefer to stay there. “By allowing these Arabs to seek and find work in foreign countries, there’s a greater chance that they’ll want to migrate to those countries later,” Dayan said.

    As for Gaza, Dayan was pretty optimistic. According to his calculations, of the 400,000 people who then lived in Gaza, only 100,000 would remain. The rest, whom he termed refugees, “must be removed from there under any arrangement that’s made.” Among his ideas was to resettle the Gazans in eastern Jordan.

    Nor was Dayan particularly worried about Israeli military rule in the West Bank. “No soldier will have any interest in interfering in the lives of the inhabitants. I have no interest in the army sitting precisely in Nablus. It can sit on a hill outside Nablus.”

    Justice Minister Yaakov Shimshon Shapira took the opposite position, calling for Israel to withdraw from the territories and warning that Israel couldn’t exist as a Jewish state if it retained them. “We won’t be able to maintain the army, when there will such a large percentage of residents who [won’t serve] in the army. There won’t be a[n army] command without Arabs and certainly there won’t be a government or a Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee without Arabs when they’re 40 percent,” he said.

    Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir said that remaining in the territories would be “a disaster for the State of Israel,” which would become an Arab state. He warned that there was nothing to stop the West Bank from suddenly declaring independence, and that it was only a matter of time.

    Education Minister Zalman Aranne felt similarly. “I do not for one minute accept the idea that the world outside will look at the fact that we’re taking everything for ourselves and will say, ‘Bon Appetit,’” he said. “After all in another year or half a year the world will wake up; there’s a world out there and it will ask questions.”

    Aranne objected to the argument, put forth by Dayan and others, that Israel must retain the territories for security reasons. “Suddenly, after all these victories, there’s no survival without these territories? Without all those things we never dreamed of before the six days of this war, like Jerusalem?” he asked.

    Arab rights didn’t seem to be much of a concern for Aranne; he was more worried about the future of the Jewish state.

    “The way I know the Jewish people in Israel and the Diaspora, after all the heroism, miracles and wonders, a Jewish state in which there are 40 percent Arabs, is not a Jewish state. It is a fifth column that will destroy the Jewish state. It will be the kiss of death after a generation or a generation and a half,” he warned. “I see the two million Jews before me differently when there will be 1.3 million Arabs — 1.3 million Arabs, with their high birth rate and their permanent pent-up hatred. ... We can overcome 60,000 Arabs, but not 600,000 and not a million,” Aranne concluded.

    Within the inconclusive discussions of the future of the territories are the seeds of talk of establishing settlements, outposts and army bases. The minutes show that even half a year after the war, the government had not formulated an orderly policy on this issue, but discussed various ideas even as it chose to delay making these tough decisions as well.

    Thus it was, for example, in the case of Hebron, when there were requests to renew the Jewish presence in the city. Eshkol showed the ministers a letter he received in November 1967 from associates of the dean of Hebron Yeshiva — which relocated to Jerusalem after the 1929 Hebron Massacre — asking the government to “make appropriate arrangements to let dozens of the yeshiva’s students, teachers and supervisors return and set up a branch in Hebron.”

    Allon was all for it. “There is a benefit in finding the first nucleus of people willing to settle there. The desire of these yeshiva students is a great thing. There aren’t always candidates willing to go to such a difficult place.” No decision on the matter was made at that time, however.

    There were also cabinet members who spoke of preparing for the next war. The minutes included pessimistic reports about the number of warplanes left to Israel after the war. It was argued that the Arab states had already acquired new planes and had more than Israel.

    Ezer Weizman, deputy chief of staff at the time, detailed the difficulty of trying to extract promises of military aid from Washington. “Is there no hope of getting planes from any other country?” asked Interior Minister Haim-Moshe Shapira. Weizman replied, “We checked in Sweden. Sweden isn’t prepared to talk about this. England has nothing to buy. I don’t think Australia will give us anything.”

    Belgium was mentioned as a possibility: It was claimed that Brussels had offered to help Jerusalem circumvent the French embargo by procuring French planes and even German tanks for Israel.

    Dayan warned, “The impression, as of now, is that not only are the Arabs not rushing to make peace, they are slowly starting to think again about war.” It was six years before the Yom Kippur War.

  • Guerre de 6 jours, occupation de 50 ans… – Le Saker Francophone

    Aaron Mate : – Vous avez abordé un peu ce sujet, mais peut-être pouvez-vous entrer dans les détails : pourquoi Israël a-t-il pris des mesures si extraordinaires pour lancer cette guerre et s’emparer de tant de territoires ? Quelle était leur motivation ?

    Norman Finkelstein : – Eh bien, ce sont plusieurs motivations qui convergent. L’image d’ensemble est qu’Israël, depuis sa fondation en 1948, en particulier son Premier ministre et sa figure dominante, David Ben Gourion, s’est toujours inquiété de ce qu’il appelait un « Atatürk arabe » arrivant au pouvoir dans le monde arabe. À savoir, quelqu’un comme la figure turque Kemal Ataturk qui a modernisé la Turquie, a amené la Turquie dans le monde moderne, et il y avait toujours la peur de Ben Gurion selon lequel une figure comme Ataturk pourrait émerger dans le monde arabe, et le monde arabe se retirerait alors de l’état d’arriération et de dépendance vis-à-vis de l’Occident, et deviendrait une puissance avec laquelle il faudrait compter dans le monde et dans la région. En 1952, quand il y a eu la révolution égyptienne, et que finalement Nasser a émergé comme la figure dominante, Nasser était une sorte de figure emblématique de cette époque. C’est évidemment complètement oublié par tout le monde, sauf les historiens, mais c’était une époque très enivrante, c’était l’ère d’après-guerre du non-alignement, le Tiers-mondisme…

    Aaron Mate : – La solidarité au sein du Tiers-Monde, oui.

    Norman Finkelstein : – … l’anti-impérialisme, la décolonisation et les figures emblématiques étaient Nehru en Inde, Tito en Yougoslavie et Nasser. Ils n’étaient pas officiellement dans le bloc soviétique. Ils étaient une troisième force.

    Aaron Mate : – Non-alignée.

    Norman Finkelstein : Non alignée, exactement. Les non-alignés ont tendance à pencher vers le bloc soviétique parce que le bloc soviétique était officiellement anti-impérialiste, mais ils n’étaient pas alignés. Nasser était l’un des personnages dominants de cette période, donc il était anti-impérialiste, il était un modernisateur. Israël était vu, non sans raison, comme un implant occidental dans le monde arabe, et était également considéré comme essayant de maintenir le monde arabe [dans l’arriération].

    Il y avait donc une sorte de conflit et de collision entre Nasser et Israël. Et cela a commencé, encore une fois [ce que je dis est] très scrupuleusement documenté, pas par Finkelstein, mais par un historien dominant très réputé, à savoir Benny Morris. Si vous regardez son livre, Les guerres des frontières d’Israël, qui parle de la période de 1949 à 1956, il montre qu’autour de 1952-1953, Ben Gourion et Moshe Dayan étaient vraiment déterminés, et je le cite littéralement, à provoquer Nasser. À continuer à le frapper et à le frapper jusqu’à ce qu’ils aient un prétexte pour détruire Nasser. Ils voulaient se débarrasser de lui, et continuer à le provoquer, et dans une certaine mesure, Nasser ne pouvait pas s’empêcher [de riposter] après un certain point, il a été pris dans le piège, essentiellement. Cela n’a pas fonctionné exactement comme l’espéraient les Israéliens et donc en 1956, ils ont comploté, en collusion avec les Britanniques et les Français, pour renverser Nasser. Cela a fonctionné, jusqu’à un certain point. Ils ont envahi le Sinaï, les Britanniques et les Français ont joué leur rôle dans cette collusion…

    Aaron Mate : – Mais les Américains leur ont dit d’arrêter.

    #israël #palestine #juin67

  • A l’encontre » Israël : Shimon Peres a « défini la poussée coloniale comme étant un processus de paix »
    par Amira Hass | Article publié dans la rubrique « opinion » de Haaretz, en date du 7 octobre 2016 ; traduction A l’Encontre

    (...) Le discernement et la débrouillardise de Peres ont beaucoup contribué à ce qu’Israël puisse asseoir et élargir son entreprise coloniale profitable : en définissant la poussée coloniale comme étant un processus de paix, il a même réussi à obtenir des subsides internationaux pour la mener à bien.

    La réalité des enclaves palestiniennes – séparées au milieu des colonies israéliennes en plein développement et résultat inébranlable des négociations d’Oslo – ne constitue pas un malencontreux accident historique. La « solution » des enclaves palestiniennes a pris forme, sous différentes tournures, depuis l’occupation de 1967 : c’était une manière d’harmoniser la version israélienne des colonies de peuplement dans une ère post-coloniale.

    Cette réalité des enclaves palestiniennes a été en partie créée par des idées exprimées publiquement, mais surtout en les imposant sur le terrain : les colonies, les routes, l’annulation des statuts de résidants de milliers de Palestiniens dans la bande de Gaza et en Cisjordanie (y compris Jérusalem-Est), le manque d’entretien de l’infrastructure et les obstacles mis au développement des zones où vivent les Palestiniens. Lorsque cela nous convenait, nous avons accordé aux Palestiniens une liberté de mouvement. Lorsque cela leur donnait trop de moyens (notamment lors de la première Intifada – qui a commencé en décembre 1987), nous l’avons révoquée. Et Peres était présent à chacun de ces différents moments.

    Dans les années 1970, Peres et Moshe Dayan [1915-1981] ont promu l’idée du « compromis fonctionnel » – il s’agissait non pas d’une partition des terres, mais plutôt d’une partition de l’autorité gouvernementale. Nous, les Israéliens, devions contrôler le territoire. Les colons continueraient à s’y multiplier et à être des citoyens israéliens, alors que la Jordanie contrôlerait les Palestiniens. Le plan d’autonomie issue des Accords de Camp David avec l’Egypte au cours du mandat de Menachem Begin en tant que Premier ministre [1977-1983] était une variante de ce « compromis fonctionnel ».

    Peres, qui a donné sa bénédiction pour l’établissement d’un partenariat confidentiel lors des négociations d’Oslo, a été très clair à l’époque sur le fait qu’il était opposé à la constitution d’un Etat palestinien.

    Cette opposition a entravé les négociations, et lorsqu’il a finalement été décidé d’accepter l’accord et de l’appliquer graduellement, il n’y avait plus d’objectif final. Mais dans quelle direction pouvaient aller un accord si l’objectif n’avait pas été défini ? La réponse est évidente : ils iraient là où le déciderait le pouvoir souverain – le côté ayant la suprématie militaire, économique et diplomatique. C’est ainsi qu’on est arrivé aux enclaves. Et ce n’est pas par hasard si l’avocat Joel Singer [conseiller légal du ministère des Affaires étrangères] a participé aux négociations et aux rédactions des accords aussi bien à Camp David ]1978] qu’à « Oslo » [« finalisé » en 1993].(...)

  • Un document secret de 1970 confirme que les premières colonies de Cisjordanie ont été construites sur un mensonge
    Yotam Berger | 28 juillet 2016 | Haaretz |

    Dans le procès-verbal de la réunion au Cabinet du ministre de la défense de l’époque, Moshe Dayan, de hauts responsables israéliens discutent des moyens de violer le droit international pour la construction de la colonie de Kiryat Arba, près d’Hébron.


  • Secret 1970 document confirms first West Bank settlements built on a lie
    In minutes of meeting in then-defense minister Moshe Dayan’s office, top Israeli officials discussed how to violate international law in building settlement of Kiryat Arba, next to Hebron.
    By Yotam Berger | Jul. 28, 2016 | 10:17 AM

    1973 map of West Bank settlement Kiryat Arba credit:Peace Now

    It has long been an open secret that the settlement enterprise was launched under false pretenses, involving the expropriation of Palestinian land for ostensibly military purposes when the true intent was to build civilian settlements, which is a violation of international law.

    Now a secret document from 1970 has surfaced confirming this long-held assumption. The document, a copy of which has been obtained by Haaretz, details a meeting in the office of then-defense minister Moshe Dayan at which government and military leaders spoke explicitly about how to carry out this deception in the building of Kiryat Arba, next to Hebron.

    The document is titled “The method for establishing Kiryat Arba.” It contains minutes of a meeting held in July 1970 in Dayan’s office, and describes how the land on which the settlement was to be built would be confiscated by military order, ostensibly for security purposes, and that the first buildings on it would be falsely presented as being strictly for military use.

    Aside from Dayan, the participants include the director general of the Housing Ministry, the Israel Defense Forces’ commander in the West Bank and the coordinator of government activities in the territories.

    ’Construction will be presented as ...’

    According to the minutes, these officials decided to build “250 housing units in Kiryat Arba within the perimeter of the area specified for the military unit’s use. All the building will be done by the Defense Ministry and will be presented as construction for the IDF’s needs.”

    A “few days” after Base 14 had “completed its activities,” the document continued, “the commander of the Hebron district will summon the mayor of Hebron, and in the course of raising other issues, will inform him that we’ve started to build houses on the military base in preparation for winter.” In other words, the participants agreed to mislead the mayor into thinking the construction was indeed for military purposes, when in fact, they planned to let settlers move in – the same settlers who on Passover 1968 moved into Hebron’s Park Hotel, which was the embryo of the settler enterprise.

    2015 map of West Bank settlement Kiryat Arba credit:Peace Now

    The system of confiscating land by military order for the purpose of establishing settlements was an open secret in Israel throughout the 1970s, according to people involved in creating and implementing the system. Its goal was to present an appearance of complying with international law, which forbids construction for civilian purposes on occupied land. In practice, everyone involved, from settlers to defense officials, knew the assertion that the land was meant for military rather than civilian use was false.

    This system was used to set up several settlements, until the High Court of Justice outlawed it in a 1979 ruling on a petition against the establishment of the settlement of Elon Moreh.

    Participant: We all knew the score

    Maj. Gen. (res.) Shlomo Gazit, who was coordinator of government activities in the territories at the time of the 1970 meeting in Dayan’s office about Kiryat Arba, told Haaretz it was clear to all the meeting’s participants that settlers would move into those buildings. He said that to the best of his recollection, this constituted the first use of the system of annexing land to a military base for the purpose of civilian settlement in the West Bank. He also recalled Dayan as the one who proposed this system, because he didn’t like any of the alternative locations proposed for Kiryat Arba.

    Nevertheless, and despite what the document advocated, Gazit said, army officers told the mayor of Hebron explicitly that a civilian settlement would be established next to his city, rather than telling him the construction was for military purposes.

    Hagit Ofran, head of Peace Now’s Settlement Watch project, also said this appears to be the first use of the system of using military orders to seize land for civilian settlement. And while this system is no longer in use, she said, “Today, too, the state uses tricks to build and expand settlements. We don’t need to wait decades for the revelation of another internal document to realize that the current system for taking over land – wholesale declarations of it as state land – also violates the essence of the law.”

    Gazit said that in retrospect, the system was wrong, but that he was just “a bureaucrat, in quotation marks; I carried out the government’s orders, in quotation marks.”

    “I think this pretense has continued until today,” he added. “Throughout my seven years as coordinator of government activities in the territories, we didn’t establish settlements anywhere by any other system.”

    But government officials had no idea Kiryat Arba (pop. 8,000) would become so big, Gazit insisted. They only sought to provide a solution for the squatters in the Park Hotel, who “weren’t more than 50 families.”

    Today, even Kiryat Arba residents admit that this system was a deception. Settler ideologue Elyakim Haetzni, one of Kiryat Arba’s original residents, noted that during a Knesset debate at the time, cabinet minister Yigal Allon said clearly that this would be a civilian settlement.

    “It’s clear why this game ended; after all, how long could it go on? This performance had no connection whatsoever to Herut (the predecessor to Likud); it was all within Mapai,” Haetzni added, referring to the ruling party at the time, a precursor of today’s Labor Party.

  • The Brotherhood and Moshe Dayan
    Khalil al Anani

    “Moshe Dayan did not do to Egypt what the Muslim Brotherhood and the Supreme Guide’s gang did to it.” Someone who is said to be the minister of culture in Egypt made this statement. Forget this witless statement, as the minister belongs to a long line of “intelligent” Egyptians who showed their loyalty and obedience to the military in order to receive a piece, albeit a small one, of the authority cake. The true disaster is the fact that this individual is described in Egyptian media as being an “enlightened intellectual”, a label being generously given to those who appear to suffer from large doses of “Ikhwanophobia”, Islamophobia and Theophobia. The more “phobias” one has, the higher they climb up the ladder of “enlightened intellectuals”, and there are many examples of this.

    We can start with Gaber Asfour, the former minister of culture. The list goes on and on and includes the Al-Shobashi siblings (Sharif and Fareeda). All of these individuals exercise a type of “intellectual” guardianship over society, which seems to them to be “incapable” of understanding and needs someone to take its hand and lead it to “enlightenment”.

    Let’s go back to our friend, the current minister of culture, and his “bright” statement comparing the Muslim Brotherhood to Moshe Dayan. This statement not only provokes disgust and despair regarding the level of deterioration and disappointment reached by the intellectual field in Egypt, but also shows him shamelessly falsifying history. This man, who presents himself as a brilliant historian, is defending one of Israel’s biggest war criminals who killed and arrested thousands of Egyptians during the 1950’s, 60s and 70s and who is associated to a racist and colonial state.

  • To most Israelis, a colonial regime is preferable - Opinion - - Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News

    By Zeev Sternhell

    Israeli society’s fundamental problem lies in the fact that the first phase of the War of Independence ended only in 1966 with the lifting of military rule in Arab areas. The second phase began immediately thereafter, in June 1967.

    Israel transitioned smoothly from curfews on Taibeh to military rule over Nablus. The emergency regime under which Israelis lived for the first two decades after independence prevented the introduction of a constitution and created shameful habits of governance.

    In retrospect, one can ask whether our leaders intended, perhaps unconsciously, to make inferiority seem second nature to the vanquished people. The transition from this to the occupation regime in the territories was completely natural.

    After Prime Minister Levi Eshkol’s modest liberalization in 1963, it seemed the days of conquering the land had ended. But the Six-Day War halted the attempts to ratchet down the conquering nationalism and gradually shift to a situation in which tribal particularism could be tamed by the universal principles of democracy.

    While it’s true that the Zionism of the Labor Party and its antecedents wasn’t much less radical than that of the right-wing Revisionists, and the cult of historical rites was natural to Labor even without “the two banks of the Jordan,” there was still a chance the party would recognize that all Zionism’s goals had been attained within the existing borders. But even that tiny spark of normalization was obliterated by the great victory of ‘67.

    Still, the supremacy of the national aims over any other aim remained unquestioned throughout. After 1967, the left’s social and political elite had 10 years in power to contend with the occupation, but the only thing it did was offer the half-lunatic proposals of the trio of Yigal Allon, Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres.

    This was based on the annexation of wide swaths of territory as part of the partition of the West Bank between Jordan and Israel. Dayan had a more “original” idea: The Palestinians would live under Israeli rule as Jordanian citizens, with voting rights in that country.

    And so, unless today’s center-left leaders undergo a deep intellectual and conceptual turnaround, the question of who will rule has no real meaning. To most of the public, a colonial regime is preferable to dealing with the settlements, and disadvantaged groups willingly sacrifice their economic interests on the altar of Jewish national superiority.

    This is the reality the Labor Party refuses to address for fear of losing half its voters. Thus, all the pronouncements about two states aren’t worth a thing without the genuine political will to withdraw from the vast majority of the occupied territories.

    If Labor had won another six Knesset seats at the expense of Yair Lapid’s Yesh Atid, replaced Likud and formed a coalition with Moshe Kahlon’s Kulanu and the ultra-Orthodox parties, the style would be different and the sword would not be hanging over the Supreme Court. But nothing significant would have changed regarding the existential situation of the occupation.

    The problem lies deep within Israeli society. After nearly half a century of controlling the territories, most Israelis view the colonial regime as something to be taken for granted and the invalidation of the Palestinians’ rights as part of the natural order of things.

    The segregation of the buses was an interesting symbolic test that reflected reality. The average Israeli will rebel against apartheid only the day he’s barred from trading with Europe and has to wait three months for a visa to visit Paris.

  • Mais d’où viennent donc les préoccupations anti-« impérialisme chiite » des experts de la « rue sunnite humiliée » ? Et comment font-ils encore pour se présenter dans le même temps comme opposés à la fois aux dictatures arabes et à Israël ?

    Lire par exemple : Conflit entre sunnites et chiites : le Moyen-Orient à la veille d’une guerre entre Arabes et Iraniens ?, revue Outre-Terre, 2009, texte signé Uzi Rabi, directeur du centre d’Étude Moshe Dayan à l’université de Tel Aviv (!)

    Pour le président Moubarak, les chiites des États arabes (avant tout ceux d’Irak et du Golfe) restent principalement fidèles à l’Iran, pas aux États dans lesquels ils résident [3] (Entretien avec la chaîne satellite de télévision Al-Arabiya,... [3]). Le ministre des Affaires étrangères saoudien Sa’ûd al-Faysal exprimant à diverses reprises et dans différents contextes le même sentiment. En décembre 2004, le roi ‘Abdallah II de Jordanie mettait en garde devant l’avènement d’un « croissant chiite » (al-hilal al-shi’i) introduisant une division au sein du monde arabe et musulman [4] (Entretien avec le Washington Post, 18 décembre 2004 ;... [4]). Une formule qui allait provoquer un vif débat dans les médias arabes où la question est devenue majeure comme en témoignent des titres du genre « Vague chiite », ou bien « Renaissance chiite », ou encore « Péril chiite » dans la presse ou sur Internet. Un semblable croissant s’étendrait de l’Iran sur le versant nord du golfe Persique à l’Irak (quelque 60 % de chiites), au Bahrein (65 %), au Koweït (30 %) et à l’Arabie saoudite (13 %). Ce croissant incluant aussi tant la Syrie client de l’Iran que le Liban (40 % de chiites).


    La guerre entre le Hezbollah et Israël à l’été 2006 a encore alimenté cette préoccupation. Les oulémas wahhabites (l’école de pensée la plus radicale de l’islam) saoudiens émettant de nombreuses fatwâ dénonçant le chiisme en tant que pure hérésie. Et les clercs wahhabites allant jusqu’à taxer Hassan Nasrallah d’ennemi et de « fils de Satan ». L’’alim saoudien Sheikh ‘Abd Allâh bin Jibrin dépassa tous les autres en qualifiant le soutien au Hezbollah de « péché » [6] (Al-Hijaz, 15 août 2006 ; et Ruz-al-Yusuf, 18 septembre... [6]). Au lendemain de la guerre, cette acrimonie arabe ne fit que s’intensifier. En août 2006, le savant égyptien résidant au Qatar Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradhawi déclencha un débat public sur le statut des chiites en Égypte ; la communauté arabe sunnite devait prendre conscience d’une « infiltration » dans les États concernés ; d’un incendie susceptible d’éradiquer largement la bonté et la piété : « Nous pourrions aisément assister à des événements de type irakien dans d’autres États arabes sunnites » [7] (Al-Masri al-Yawm, 2 septembre 2006. Et à ce propos... [7]). La presse égyptienne se fit l’écho des mises en gardes de Qaradhawi selon lequel les chiites s’employaient à légitimer la diffusion de leur message en prétendant que les tombeaux de personnages saints du chiisme comme Sayyid Hussein et Sayyida Zaybab en territoire égyptien [8] (Ruz-al-Yusuf, 18 septembre 2006. [8]). Le savant musulman prévenait aussi de l’utilisation du soufisme par les chiites en tant que tête de pont de la prédication militante tashayu’.


    La soi-disant conversion au chiisme finit par devenir une histoire de taille dans les médias arabes [11] (Bonne illustration dans Rus al-Yusuf du 16 janvier... [11]). Les chiites n’aspiraient pas seulement au « croissant », mais à la « pleine lune », ‘al-badr al-shi’i [12] (« Al-Shi’a Yahlumun bil-Badr al-Shi’i », « Al-Shi’a... [12]). Funeste prophétie : la phrase de Moubarak était censée paradoxalement s’avérer ; ceci alors que la population chiite, en Égypte, ne représente qu’1% de la population musulmane du pays, soit approximativement 650 000/700 000 personnes. Mais la couverture par les médias égyptiens montre déjà en tant que telle à quel point on s’alarme du « péril chiite » dans le monde arabe.

    Le reste de l’article est évidemment rigolo dans le genre fantasmes israéliens, ce qui donne des tournures carrément cocasses du style :

    Durant les campagnes du XXe siècle, Israël était entièrement exclu des coalitions régionales. Désormais, par contre, ses intérêts coïncident largement, à bien des égards, avec ceux du bloc modéré arabe antichiite.

    (oui @kassem, ça va te plaire, il a écrit « bloc modéré arabe antichiite ») Mais c’est bien tout l’intérêt : même les Israéliens écrivent des évidences que nos « experts de la rue sunnite » et des mouvements islamistes « grassroot » font mine d’ignorer.

  • La ville impie -
    Uri Avnery, dimanche 23 novembre 2014

    (...) KOLLEK [ maire de Jérusalem élu en 1965 ] AVAIT le soutien efficace de Moshe Dayan, alors ministre de la Défense. Dayan pensait tenir les Pales­ti­niens tran­quilles en leur accordant tous les avan­tages pos­sibles, sauf la liberté.

    Quelques jours après l’occupation de Jéru­salem Est, il fit enlever le drapeau israélien que des soldats avaient planté devant le Dôme du Rocher sur le Mont du Temple. Dayan transmit aussi l’autorité de fait sur le Mont aux auto­rités reli­gieuses musulmanes.

    Les juifs furent auto­risés à se rendre sur l’esplanade du Temple en petit nombre et seulement en visi­teurs dis­crets. Il leur était interdit d’y prier, et ils se fai­saient expulser éner­gi­quement s’ils remuaient les lèvres. Ils avaient, après tout, la pos­si­bilité de prier autant qu’il le vou­laient au Mur occi­dental voisin (qui est une partie de l’ancien mur exté­rieur de l’esplanade).

    Le gou­ver­nement avait pu imposer ce décret en raison d’une fait reli­gieux bizarre : les juifs ortho­doxes ont l’interdiction des rabbins d’entrer sur le Mont du Temple. Selon une règle biblique, les juifs ordi­naires n’ont pas accès au Saint des Saints, seul le Grand Prêtre en avait le droit. Du fait que per­sonne ne sait aujourd’hui où il se situait exac­tement, les juifs pieux ne peuvent pas avoir accès à l’ensemble de l’esplanade.

    Le résultat, c’est que les pre­mières années de l’occupation furent un temps de bonheur pour Jéru­salem Est. Juifs et Arabes se mêlaient librement. Il était de bon ton pour les Juifs de faire leurs courses au marché arabe coloré et de dîner dans les res­tau­rants “orientaux”. J’ai moi-​​même souvent fré­quenté des hôtels arabes et me suis fait un bon nombre d’amis arabes.

    Cette ambiance a changé gra­duel­lement. Le gou­ver­nement et la muni­ci­palité ont dépensé beaucoup d’argent pour embour­geoiser Jéru­salem Ouest, mais les quar­tiers arabes de Jéru­salem Est ont été négligés, et sont devenus misé­rables. Les infra­struc­tures et les ser­vices locaux se sont dégradés. Les Arabes n’obtenaient presque pas de permis de construire, afin d’obliger les jeunes géné­ra­tions à aller habiter hors des limites de la ville. C’est alors que le mur de “sépa­ration” a été construit, empê­chant les gens de l’extérieur d’entrer dans la ville, les coupant de leurs écoles et de leurs emplois. Pourtant, en dépit de tout cela, la popu­lation arabe a aug­menté pour atteindre 40% du total.

    L’oppression poli­tique a aug­menté. Dans le cadre des accords d’Oslo, les Arabes de Jéru­salem avaient le droit de voter pour l’Autorité Pales­ti­nienne. Mais ensuite ils en furent empêchés, leurs repré­sen­tants furent arrêtés et expulsés de la ville. Toutes les ins­ti­tu­tions pales­ti­niennes furent fermées par la force, y compris la célèbre Maison de l’Orient, où le très admiré et aimé leader des Arabes de Jéru­salem, feu Faisal al-​​Husseini, avait son bureau.

    KOLLEK fut rem­placé par Ehoud Olmert et un maire orthodoxe qui n’avait rien à faire de Jéru­salem Est, mis à part le Mont du Temple.

    Et c’est alors qu’un désastre sup­plé­men­taire s’est produit. Les Israé­liens laïques quittent Jéru­salem qui devient rapi­dement un bastion orthodoxe. En désespoir de cause, ils ont décidé de virer le maire orthodoxe et d’élire un homme d’affaires laïque. Mal­heu­reu­sement c’est un ultra-​​nationaliste enragé.

    Nir Barkat se com­porte en maire de Jéru­salem Ouest et en gou­verneur mili­taire de Jéru­salem Est. Il traite ses sujets pales­ti­niens en ennemis, que l’on peut tolérer s’ils obéissent pai­si­blement, que l’on réprime bru­ta­lement dans le cas contraire. L’abandon dans lequel ont été laissés les quar­tiers arabes pendant des décennies, le rythme accéléré de construction de nou­veaux quar­tiers juifs, la bru­talité excessive de la police (encou­ragée ouver­tement par le maire), tout cela crée une situation explosive.

    La sépa­ration com­plète de Jéru­salem de la Cis­jor­danie, son arrière-​​pays naturel, aggrave encore davantage la situation.

    À cela on peut ajouter l’interruption du soi-​​disant pro­cessus de paix, puisque tous les Pales­ti­niens sont convaincus que Jéru­salem Est doit être la capitale du futur État de Palestine.

    À CETTE SITUATION il ne manque qu’une étin­celle pour mettre le feu à la ville. Elle a été fournie comme il se doit par les déma­gogues de droite de la Knesset. Riva­lisant pour attirer l’attention et soigner leur popu­larité, ils ont entrepris de visiter le Mont du Temple, l’un après l’autre, déclen­chant à chaque fois une tempête. Ajouté au désir évident de cer­tains reli­gieux et de fana­tiques de droite de construire le Troi­sième Temple à l’emplacement de la mosquée sainte al-​​Aqsa et du Dôme doré du Rocher, cela a suffi pour faire naître le sen­timent que les sanc­tuaires sacrés étaient vraiment en danger.

    C’est alors qu’est survenu l’horrible meurtre de ven­geance d’un garçon arabe enlevé par des Juifs et brûlé vif avec de l’essence versé dans sa bouche.

    Les habi­tants musulmans de la ville se sont mis à réagir indi­vi­duel­lement. Sans se pré­oc­cuper des orga­ni­sa­tions, presque sans armes, ils se sont livrés à une série d’attaques que l’on qua­lifie main­tenant de “l’intifada des indi­vidus”. Agissant seul, ou avec un frère ou un cousin en qui il a confiance, un Arabe prend un couteau, ou un pis­tolet (s’il peut s’en pro­curer un), ou sa voiture, ou un tracteur et tue les Israé­liens les plus proches. Il sait qu’il va mourir.(...)

  • “Et le phénomène des bédouins disparaitra” Moshe Dayan, 1963 | La mer blanche - البحر الأبيض

    Une fois n’est pas coutume, je viens écrire sur des déplacements de populations, des démolitions, des confiscations de terres. Mais cette fois cela n’a pas lieu en Cisjordanie dans sa zone C si accueillante (sic). Non, cette fois cela a lieu en Israël. Et plus précisément dans le nord du désert du Néguev où vivent près de 200.000 Bédouins. Le gouvernement israélien envisage aujourd’hui d’en déplacer 40.000 pour les installer dans des villes. Un projet qui va à l’encontre du mode de vie bédouin, nomade, et centré sur l’agriculture et l’élevage ; et qui permettrait à Israël de récupérer des terres arabes.

    « Vous imaginez le gouvernement français demander à des agriculteurs de quitter leurs terres et de les obliger à s’installer à Paris ?!. Et il leur dit : ‘Vous avez 3 ans pour le faire et si vous ne le faites pas, vous serez déplacer de force’. » Thabet Abu Rass de l’association Adalah installée à Beer Sheva, la principale ville du désert du Néguev dans le sud d’Israël. Il défend les droits de la minorité arabe en Israël (dont font partie les bédouins qui ont tous la citoyenneté israélienne) et il est la tête de proue des opposants au projet Prawer-Begin qui vise à sédentariser 40.000 bédouins dans des villes nouvelles.

    Thabet Abu Rass parle d’un plan destructeur et raciste. Doron Almog qui coordonne le plan pour le gouvernement israélien y voit, lui, amélioration et modernité : « Le but de ce plan c’est d’améliorer la qualité de vie des bédouins du Néguev. Car aujourd’hui c’est la population la plus pauvre d’Israël. Ils ont le droit à la modernité, à la scolarité et à l’emploi. C’est un grand changement que nous voulons mettre en place dans le sud d’Israël ».

    #bédouins #Néguev

  • Aux sources du négationnisme israélien : comment David Ben Gourion a sciemment mis en place la propagande niant la Nakba pour résister aux pressions américaines de Kennedy, qui voulait faire appliquer le droit au retour des Palestiniens expulsés.

    Lire absolument l’article de Shay Hazkani : Catastrophic thinking : Did Ben-Gurion try to rewrite history ?

    In 1961, after John F. Kennedy assumed office as president of the United States, calls for the return of some of the Palestinian refugees increased. Under the guidance of the new president, the U.S. State Department tried to force Israel to allow several hundred thousand refugees to return. In 1949, Israel had agreed to consider allowing about 100,000 refugees to return, in exchange for a comprehensive peace agreement with the Arab states, but by the early 1960s that was no longer on the agenda as far as Israel was concerned. Israel was willing to discuss the return of some 20,000-30,000 refugees at most.

    Under increasing pressure from Kennedy and amid preparations at the United Nations General Assembly to address the Palestinian refugee issue, Ben-Gurion convened a special meeting on the subject. Held in his office in the Kirya, the defense establishment compound in Tel Aviv, the meeting was attended by the top ranks of Mapai, including Foreign Minister Golda Meir, Agriculture Minister Moshe Dayan and Jewish Agency Chairman Moshe Sharett. Ben-Gurion was convinced that the refugee problem was primarily one of public image ‏(hasbara‏). Israel, he believed, would be able to persuade the international community that the refugees had not been expelled, but had fled. “First of all, we need to tell facts, how they escaped,” he said in the meeting. “As far as I know, most of them fled before the state’s establishment, of their own free will, and contrary to what the Haganah [the pre-independence army of Palestine’s Jews] told them when it defeated them, that they could stay. After the state’s establishment [on May 15, 1948], as far as I know, only the Arabs of Ramle and Lod left their places, or were pressured to leave.”

    Ben-Gurion thereby set the frame of reference for the discussion, even though some of the participants knew that his presentation was inaccurate, to say the least. Dayan, who as GOC Southern Command after 1949 ordered the expulsion of the Negev Bedouin, was not in a position to take issue with the prime minister’s statement that the Arabs had left “of their own free will,” despite being well aware of the facts. Ben-Gurion went on to explain what Israel must tell the world: “All of these facts are not known. There is also material which the Foreign Ministry prepared from the documents of the Arab institutions, of the Mufti, Jamal al-Husseini [He probably meant Haj Amin al-Husseini; Jamal al-Husseini was the Palestinians’ unofficial representative at the United Nations − S.H.], concerning the flight, [showing] that this was of their own free will, because they were told the country would soon be conquered and you will return to be its lord and masters and not just return to your homes.”

    In 1961, against the backdrop of what Ben-Gurion described as the need for “a serious operation, both in written form and in oral hasbara,” the Shiloah Institute was asked to collect material for the government about “the flight of the Arabs from the Land of Israel in 1948.”

  • Moshe Dayan expliquait, en 1976, ce qu’il faut comprendre par « attaque » ou « provocation » de la part des arabes : « dans plus de 80% des cas », c’est Israël qui provoque volontairement un clash selon une méthode parfaitement rodée : General’s Words Shed a New Light on the Golan - New York Times, 1997

    General Dayan interrupted: ’’Never mind that. After all, I know how at least 80 percent of the clashes there started. In my opinion, more than 80 percent, but let’s talk about 80 percent. It went this way: We would send a tractor to plow some area where it wasn’t possible to do anything, in the demilitarized area, and knew in advance that the Syrians would start to shoot. If they didn’t shoot, we would tell the tractor to advance farther, until in the end the Syrians would get annoyed and shoot. And then we would use artillery and later the air force also, and that’s how it was.’’

    Peut-être te souviens-tu de l’accrochage qui a démarré, selon les Israéliens, la présente « escalade » à Gaza ?

    (Signalé par un lecteur d’Angry Arab.)


    Scribouillardises (1) : L’oeil effrayant de Moshe Dayan
    22 novembre 2011, 17:38

    Qu’est ce qu’on doit faire du journalisme aujourd’hui ? Franchement… Parfois, je me le demande. Y’a eu comme une météorite. Ou un truc de l’ordre d’un changement climatique. Y’en a qui disent que c’est internet mais, malgré cela, je pense que ça avait déjà commencé avant. Les tirages des journaux papiers ont commencé à stagner. Puis à reculer inexorablement. Comme une grande extinction médiatique. Enfin, il reste encore quelques dinosaures, je sais les « anciens » n’aiment pas ce mot, mais plus personne, même eux, ne donnent réellement cher de leur peau.