person:recep tayyip erdogan

  • Istanbul, la défaite de trop pour Erdogan

    Editorial. L’invalidation de l’élection d’un opposant à la mairie du Grand Istanbul montre que le président turc a franchi un pas de plus dans le mépris ouvert des règles de la démocratie.

    Editorial du « Monde ». Un régime autoritaire qui se sent menacé est prêt à tout. En permettant l’invalidation, mardi 7 mai, de l’élection d’Ekrem Imamoglu, du Parti républicain du peuple (CHP), la principale force de l’opposition, à la mairie du Grand Istanbul, le président Recep Tayyip Erdogan – qui se targue pourtant de tirer sa légitimité du suffrage universel – a franchi un pas de plus dans le mépris ouvert des règles de la démocratie.

    Certes, à peine 13 000 voix, sur quelque 10 millions de votants, séparent le vainqueur du scrutin de l’ex-premier ministre Binali Yildirim, candidat de l’AKP (Parti de la justice et du développement), le parti islamiste au pouvoir depuis novembre 2002. Mais les bulletins ont été comptés et recomptés. Et le Haut Conseil électoral, qui a annulé le scrutin au prétexte qu’un certain nombre de chefs de bureaux de vote n’étaient pas des fonctionnaires, n’a pas contesté l’élection des maires d’arrondissement qui, elle, a été à l’avantage de l’AKP.

  • Turkish court authenticates audio that revealed spy agency MIT’s false flag in Syria – Nordic Monitor

    A Turkish court recently confirmed the authenticity of a leaked audio clip in which top-ranking Turkish officials are heard discussing the possibility of an intervention in Syria in a false flag operation conducted by Turkish intelligence agency MİT.

    In the leaked recording, then-Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, then-Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Feridun Sinirlioğlu, MİT Undersecretary Hakan Fidan and then-Deputy Chief of General Staff Gen. Yaşar Güler are heard discussing military operations in Syria in Davutoğlu’s Foreign Ministry office on March 13, 2013.

    Fidan says in the recording: “If needed, I would dispatch four men to Syria. [Then] I would have them fire eight mortar shells at the Turkish side and create an excuse for war.”

    The judicial confirmation of the scandalous content was inadvertently revealed when the public prosecutor tried to pin the leak on a group critical of the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as part of espionage charges. The statements in the leak, included in the indictment as allegations, were formally confirmed by the Ankara 4th High Criminal Court in a reasoned decision that was announced on Jan. 16, 2019.


  • Bolton made a ‘serious mistake,’ Ankara won’t ‘swallow’ his comments on Syria’s Kurds – Erdogan — RT World News

    US National Security adviser John Bolton has made a “huge mistake” naming Ankara’s security guarantees for Kurds a precondition for US pullout from Syria, Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said.

    The Turkish leader unleashed a bitter verbal attack on Bolton while speaking before the country’s ruling party parliamentary group on Tuesday.

    “It is not possible for us to accept and swallow Bolton’s statements made in Israel,” Erdogan said. “Bolton is making a huge mistake, his statement is unacceptable.”

    Erdogan’s remarks referred to the US National Security Adviser’s statement made on Monday. Bolton revealed that the US President Donald Trump told him he would not “not allow Turkey to kill the Kurds.”

    “We don’t think the Turks ought to undertake military action that’s not fully coordinated with and agreed to by the United States, at a minimum, so they don’t endanger our troops but also so that they meet the president’s requirement that the Syrian opposition forces that have fought with us are not endangered,” he said.

    The Turkish leader, on his part, stated that Ankara seeks only to kill “terrorists,” while actually protecting its “Kurdish brothers” in the neighboring country.

    “Those, who spread the lie that Turkey is killing Kurds in Syria, are trying to manipulate the international community’s opinion,” Erdogan stressed.

    #syrie #kurdes

  • Affaire Khashoggi : Washington envisage l’expulsion de Gülen pour calmer Ankara - France 24

    La Maison Blanche chercherait un moyen d’expulser l’imam turc Fethullah Gülen, exilé aux États-Unis depuis 1999, pour convaincre Ankara de cesser de faire pression sur Riyad au sujet de l’assassinat du journaliste Jamal Khashoggi, selon NBC News.

    L’administration Trump continue d’étudier la demande turque d’extradition du prédicateur Fethullah Gülen, honni par le président Recep Tayyip Erdogan et accusé par Ankara d’avoir orchestré le putsch manqué de 2016, a déclaré jeudi 15 novembre le département d’État américain.

    Selon NBC News, la Maison Blanche se penche sur les possibilités juridiques d’expulser le prédicateur islamiste, installé aux États-Unis depuis 1999. Une des options envisagées consisterait à le contraindre à s’installer en Afrique du Sud.

    Selon quatre sources citées par la chaîne, le ministère de la Justice et le FBI ont été invités à rouvrir le dossier. NBC News rapporte que cela s’inscrit dans un effort diplomatique pour que Recep Tayyip Erdogan relâche la pression sur l’Arabie saoudite après l’assassinat de l’éditorialiste saoudien Jamal Khashoggi.

    (...) Elle n’a en revanche pas clairement démenti les informations de NBC sur des réflexions au sein de l’administration de Donald Trump sur une possible solution pour faire partir le prédicateur.

    #mbs #usa #turquie

  • The Real Reasons Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Wanted Khashoggi ‘Dead or Alive’

    Christopher Dickey 10.21.18
    His death is key to understanding the political forces that helped turn the Middle East from a region of hope seven years ago to one of brutal repression and slaughter today.

    The mind plays strange tricks sometimes, especially after a tragedy. When I sat down to write this story about the Saudi regime’s homicidal obsession with the Muslim Brotherhood, the first person I thought I’d call was Jamal Khashoggi. For more than 20 years I phoned him or met with him, even smoked the occasional water pipe with him, as I looked for a better understanding of his country, its people, its leaders, and the Middle East. We often disagreed, but he almost always gave me fresh insights into the major figures of the region, starting with Osama bin Laden in the 1990s, and the political trends, especially the explosion of hope that was called the Arab Spring in 2011. He would be just the man to talk to about the Saudis and the Muslim Brotherhood, because he knew both sides of that bitter relationship so well.

    And then, of course, I realized that Jamal is dead, murdered precisely because he knew too much.

    Although the stories keep changing, there is now no doubt that 33-year-old Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the power in front of his decrepit father’s throne, had put out word to his minions that he wanted Khashoggi silenced, and the hit-team allegedly understood that as “wanted dead or alive.” But the [petro]buck stops with MBS, as bin Salman’s called. He’s responsible for a gruesome murder just as Henry II was responsible for the murder of Thomas Becket when he said, “Who will rid me of that meddlesome priest?” In this case, a meddlesome journalist.

    We now know that a few minor players will pay. Some of them might even be executed by Saudi headsmen (one already was reported killed in a car crash). But experience also tells us the spotlight of world attention will shift. Arms sales will go ahead. And the death of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi risks becoming just one more entry in the annals of intensifying, murderous repression of journalists who are branded the “enemy of the people” by Donald Trump and various two-bit tyrants around the world.

    There is more to Khashoggi’s murder than the question of press freedom, however. His death holds the key to understanding the political forces that have helped turn the Middle East from a region of hope seven years ago to one of brutal repression and ongoing slaughter today. Which brings us back to the question of the Saudis’ fear and hatred of the Muslim Brotherhood, the regional rivalries of those who support it and those who oppose it, and the game of thrones in the House of Saud itself. Khashoggi was not central to any of those conflicts, but his career implicated him, fatally, in all of them.

    The Muslim Brotherhood is not a benign political organization, but neither is it Terror Incorporated. It was created in the 1920s and developed in the 1930s and ‘40s as an Islamic alternative to the secular fascist and communist ideologies that dominated revolutionary anti-colonial movements at the time. From those other political organizations the Brotherhood learned the values of a tight structure, party discipline, and secrecy, with a public face devoted to conventional political activity—when possible—and a clandestine branch that resorted to violence if that appeared useful.

    In the novel Sugar Street, Nobel Prize-winning author Naguib Mahfouz sketched a vivid portrait of a Brotherhood activist spouting the group’s political credo in Egypt during World War II. “Islam is a creed, a way of worship, a nation and a nationality, a religion, a state, a form of spirituality, a Holy Book, and a sword,” says the Brotherhood preacher. “Let us prepare for a prolonged struggle. Our mission is not to Egypt alone but to all Muslims worldwide. It will not be successful until Egypt and all other Islamic nations have accepted these Quranic principles in common. We shall not put our weapons away until the Quran has become a constitution for all Believers.”

    For several decades after World War II, the Brotherhood’s movement was eclipsed by Arab nationalism, which became the dominant political current in the region, and secular dictators moved to crush the organization. But the movement found support among the increasingly embattled monarchies of the Gulf, including and especially Saudi Arabia, where the rule of the king is based on his custodianship of Mecca and Medina, the two holiest sites in Islam. At the height of the Cold War, monarchies saw the Brotherhood as a helpful antidote to the threat of communist-led or Soviet-allied movements and ideologies.

    By the 1980s, several of the region’s rulers were using the Brotherhood as a tool to weaken or destroy secular opposition. Egypt’s Anwar Sadat courted them, then moved against them, and paid with his life in 1981, murdered by members of a group originally tied to the Brotherhood. Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, then spent three decades in power manipulating the Brotherhood as an opposition force, outlawing the party as such, but allowing its known members to run for office in the toothless legislature, where they formed a significant bloc and did a lot of talking.

    Jordan’s King Hussein played a similar game, but went further, giving clandestine support to members of the Brotherhood waging a covert war against Syrian tyrant Hafez al-Assad—a rebellion largely destroyed in 1982 when Assad’s brother killed tens of thousands of people in the Brotherhood stronghold of Hama.

    Even Israel got in on the action, initially giving Hamas, the Brotherhood branch among the Palestinians, tacit support as opposition to the left-leaning Palestine Liberation Organization (although PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat once identified with the Brotherhood himself).

    The Saudi royals, too, thought the Brotherhood could be bought off and manipulated for their own ends. “Over the years the relationship between the Saudis and the Brotherhood ebbed and flowed,” says Lorenzo Vidino, an expert on extremism at George Washington University and one of the foremost scholars in the U.S. studying the Brotherhood’s history and activities.

    Over the decades factions of the Brotherhood, like communists and fascists before them, “adapted to individual environments,” says Vidino. In different countries it took on different characteristics. Thus Hamas, or its military wing, is easily labeled as terrorist by most definitions, while Ennahda in Tunisia, which used to be called terrorist by the ousted Ben Ali regime, has behaved as a responsible political party in a complex democratic environment. To the extent that Jamal Khashoggi identified with the Brotherhood, that was the current he espoused. But democracy, precisely, is what Mohammed bin Salman fears.

    Vidino traces the Saudis’ intense hostility toward the Brotherhood to the uprisings that swept through much of the Arab world in 2011. “The Saudis together with the Emiratis saw it as a threat to their own power,” says Vidino.

    Other regimes in the region thought they could use the Brotherhood to extend their influence. First among these was the powerful government in Turkey of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has such longstanding ties to the Islamist movement that some scholars refer to his elected government as “Brotherhood 2.0.” Also hoping to ride the Brotherhood wave was tiny, ultra-rich Qatar, whose leaders had used their vast natural gas wealth and their popular satellite television channel, Al Jazeera, to project themselves on the world stage and, they hoped, buy some protection from their aggressive Saudi neighbors. As one senior Qatari official told me back in 2013, “The future of Qatar is soft power.” After 2011, Jazeera’s Arabic channel frequently appeared to propagandize in the Brotherhood’s favor as much as, say, Fox News does in Trump’s.

    Egypt, the most populous country in the Arab world, and the birthplace of the Brotherhood, became a test case. Although Jamal Khashoggi often identified the organization with the idealistic hopes of the peaceful popular uprising that brought down the Mubarak dynasty, in fact the Egyptian Brotherhood had not taken part. Its leaders had a modus vivendi they understood with Mubarak, and it was unclear what the idealists in Tahrir Square, or the military tolerating them, might do.

    After the dictator fell and elections were called, however, the Brotherhood made its move, using its party organization and discipline, as well as its perennial slogan, “Islam is the solution,” to put its man Mohamed Morsi in the presidential palace and its people in complete control of the government. Or so it thought.

    In Syria, meanwhile, the Brotherhood believed it could and should lead the popular uprising against the Assad dynasty. That had been its role 30 years earlier, and it had paid mightily.

    For more than a year, it looked like the Brotherhood’s various branches might sweep to power across the unsettled Arab world, and the Obama administration, for want of serious alternatives, was inclined to go with the flow.

    But then the Saudis struck back.

    In the summer of 2013, Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sissi, the commander of the Egyptian armed forces, led a military coup with substantial popular support against the conspicuously inept Brotherhood government, which had proved quickly that Islam was not really the “solution” for much of anything.

    Al-Sissi had once been the Egyptian military attaché in Riyadh, where he had many connections, and the Saudis quickly poured money into Egypt to shore up his new regime. At the same time, he declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization, and launched a campaign of ruthless repression. Within weeks of the coup, the Egyptian military attacked two camps of Brotherhood protesters and slaughtered hundreds.

    In Syria, the efforts to organize a credible political opposition to President Bashar al-Assad proved virtually impossible as the Qataris and Turks backed the Brotherhood while the Saudis continued their vehement opposition. But that does not mean that Riyadh supported moderate secular forces. Far from it. The Saudis still wanted to play a major role bringing down the Syrian regime allied to another arch enemy, the government of Iran. So the Saudis put their weight behind ultra-conservative Salafis, thinking they might be easier to control than the Muslim Brothers.

    Riyadh is “okay with quietist Salafism,” says Vidino. But the Salafis’ religious extremism quickly shaded over into the thinking of groups like the al Qaeda spinoff called the Nusra Front. Amid all the infighting, little progress was made against Assad, and there to exploit the chaos was the so-called Islamic State (which Assad partially supported in its early days).

    Then, in January 2015, at the height of all this regional turmoil, the aged and infirm Salman bin Abdelaziz ascended to the throne of Saudi Arabia. His son, Mohammed bin Salman, began taking into his own hands virtually all the reins of power, making bold decisions about reforming the Saudi economy, taking small measures to give the impression he might liberalize society—and moving to intimidate or otherwise neutralize anyone who might challenge his power.

    Saudi Arabia is a country named after one family, the al Saud, and while there is nothing remotely democratic about the government, within the family itself with its thousands of princes there traditionally has been an effort to find consensus. Every king up to now has been a son of the nation’s founder, Abdelaziz ibn Saud, and thus a brother or half brother of the other kings.

    When Salman took over, he finally named successors from the next generation. His nephew Mohammed bin Nayef, then 57 and well known for his role fighting terrorism, became crown prince. His son, Mohammed bin Salman, became deputy crown prince. But bin Nayef’s position between the king and his favorite son clearly was untenable. As one Saudi close to the royals put it: “Between the onion and the skin there is only the stink.”

    Bin Nayef was pushed out in 2017. The New York Times reported that during an end-of-Ramadan gathering at the palace he “was told he was going to meet the king and was led into another room, where royal court officials took away his phones and pressured him to give up his posts as crown prince and interior minister. … At first, he refused. But as the night wore on, the prince, a diabetic who suffers from the effects of a 2009 assassination attempt by a suicide bomber, grew tired.” Royal court officials meanwhile called around to other princes saying bin Nayef had a drug problem and was unfit to be king.

    Similar pressure was brought to bear on many of the richest and most powerful princes in the kingdom, locked up in the Ritz Carlton hotel in 2017, ostensibly as part of an extra-legal fight against corruption. They were forced to give allegiance to MBS at the same time they were giving up a lot of their money.

    That pattern of coerced allegiance is what the Saudis now admit they wanted from Jamal Khashoggi. He was no prince, but he had been closely associated in the past with the sons of the late King Faisal, particularly Turki al-Faisal, who was for many years the head of the Saudi intelligence apparatus and subsequently served as ambassador to the United Kingdom, then the United States.

    Although Turki always denied he had ambitions to be king, his name often was mentioned in the past as a contender. Thus far he seems to have weathered the rule of MBS, but given the record of the crown prince anyone close to the Al Faisal branch of the family, like Khashoggi, would be in a potentially perilous position.

    Barbara Bodine is a former U.S. ambassador to Yemen, which has suffered mightily since MBS launched a brutal proxy war there against Iran. Both MBS and Trump have declared the regime in Tehran enemy number one in the region. But MBS botched the Yemen operation from the start. It was dubbed “Decisive Storm” when it began in 2015, and was supposed to last only a few weeks, but the war continues to this day. Starvation and disease have spread through Yemen, creating one of the world’s greatest humanitarian disasters. And for the moment, in one of those developments that makes the Middle East so rich in ironies, in Yemen the Saudis are allied with a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.

    “What drives MBS is a ruthless effort toward total control domestically and regionally; he is Putin of the Desert,” says Bodine. “He has basically broken the back of the princelings, the religious establishment and the business elite, brought all ministries and agencies of power under his sole control (’I alone can fix it’), and jailed, killed or put under house arrest activists and any and all potential as well as real opposition (including his mother).”

    In 2017, MBS and his backers in the Emirates accused Qatar of supporting “terrorism,” issuing a set of demands that included shutting down Al Jazeera. The Saudis closed off the border and looked for other ways, including military options, to put pressure on the poor little rich country that plays so many angles it has managed to be supportive of the Brotherhood and cozy with Iran while hosting an enormous U.S. military base.

    “It was Qatar’s independent streak—not just who they supported but that they had a foreign policy divorced from the dictates of Riyadh,” says Bodine. “The basic problem is that both the Brotherhood and Iran offer competing Islam-based governing structures that challenge the Saudi model.”

    “Jamal’s basic sin,” says Bodine,“was he was a credible insider, not a fire-breathing radical. He wrote and spoke in English for an American audience via credible mainstream media and was well regarded and highly visible within the Washington chattering classes. He was accessible, moderate and operated within the West. He challenged not the core structure of the Kingdom but the legitimacy of the current rulers, especially MBS.”

    “I do think the game plan was to make him disappear and I suspect the end game was always to make him dead,” said Bodine in a long and thoughtful email. “If he was simply jailed within Saudi there would have been a drumbeat of pressure for his release. Dead—there is certainly a short term cost, whether more than anticipated or longer than anticipated we don’t know yet, but the world will move on. Jamal will become a footnote, a talking point perhaps, but not a crusade. The dismembered body? No funeral. Taking out Jamal also sends a powerful signal to any dissident that there is no place safe.”

    #Arabie_Saoudite #Turquie #politique #terrorisme #putsch

  • Affaire Khashoggi : les dernières révélations turques qui accablent Riyad
    France 24 - Dernière modification : 22/10/2018 - Avec AFP et Reuters

    De nouveaux développements dans l’assassinat du journaliste saoudien jamal Khashoggi sont apparus, lundi, à la veille d’un discours très attendu de Recep Tayyip Erdogan, qui entend révéler « toute la vérité » sur cette affaire. (...)

    #Khashoggi #Arabie_saoudite

  • Pourquoi Israël (et le lobby pro-Israël aux Etats-Unis) défend MBS

    Why we should go easy on the Saudi crown prince

    For 50 years we’ve prayed for a key Arab leader who agrees to sign a significant pact with Israel. Such a leader has finally arrived

    Tzvia Greenfield
    Oct 22, 2018 1:48 AM

    Turkey, a human rights champion under Erdogan, is accusing Saudi Arabia, another human rights champion, of the abhorrent murder of a Saudi journalist who entered the lion’s den in Istanbul and, as befits horror stories typical of places like Syria China, Iran, Russia and North Korea, disappeared from sight. Now we have recordings and videotapes, allegedly from the Saudi consulate, suggesting that his body was chopped into pieces.
    The underlying reason for this gruesome act, that evokes something conjured up by the Coen brothers, is not completely clear. One shouldn’t treat any death lightly, particularly not a murder committed by an evil government. However, because of the political ramifications involved, it’s worth contemplating this episode a bit more.
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    It’s possible that just like Putin, the Saudi royal house cannot tolerate any criticism, which is why it decided to eliminate the rogue journalist in an acid bath (a no less likely possibility that has not yet been suggested by the authorities in Ankara). It’s possible that Recep Tayyip Erdogan is gnashing his teeth over Saudi Arabia’s bolstered global status, particularly vis-à-vis U.S. President Donald Trump, and over the central role played by Mohammed bin Salman in a regional coalition meant to block Iranian influence in the Middle East — which is why Erdogan is bent on deflating the Crown Prince’s image.
    Erdogan may want to humiliate the Saudis, but his main goal is foiling the plan apparently devised by Trump and Mohammed to forge a regional alliance under the aegis of the United States, an alliance that includes Israel, the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt (and possibly Iraq). These countries will jointly try to block Iran, which endangers all of them. Turkey, which is struggling to find an as-yet-undetermined place within the Arab Muslim world, does not strive merely to lead the Sunni world. It also wants to depict Israel as a foreign colonialist implant in the Middle East. Any legitimization afforded Israel thanks to an alliance with Arab states has negative implications for Erdogan.
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    >> Why are some pro-Israel voices speaking out against Jamal Khashoggi? | Explained ■ Saudi Arabia, reeling from Khashoggi scandal, battles a new front: Arab media | Analysis
    But fate obviously has a sense of humor. It has embroiled the Turkish rivalry with Saudi Arabia in the U.S. midterm elections. Since Mohammed is currently Trump’s most important international ally, mainly for economic reasons, the campaign advocating a “liberal order,” espoused by international media assailing the Saudi leader, is buzzing with excitement. Its main objective is not the brushing aside of Saudi Arabia, but the delivery of a humiliating knockout blow to Trump and his economic plans.

    According to Time magazine, the level of public support for Trump remains stable at 43 percent, similar to that of Obama, Clinton and Reagan at comparative phases in their terms. It’s no wonder that after the failed attacks on Trump, who immerged unscathed from the intimidation of migrant children, the Stormy Daniels saga and the attempt to prevent the nomination of Brett Kavanaugh, the left is eager to pounce on the Saudi murder case as if it has found a treasure trove.
    However, this time it’s necessary to treat the suspect with kid gloves. Trump’s peace initiative, if it is ever put on the table, is apparently the direct result of pressure by Mohammed bin Salman, who wishes to legitimize Israel before embarking on open cooperation with it. For 50 years we’ve prayed for a key Arab leader who agrees to sign a significant pact with Israel. Such a leader has finally arrived, and calls to depose him, such as those by former U.S. Ambassador Dan Shapiro in an op-ed in Haaretz (October 21) are destructive and in keeping with the best Obama tradition. Anyone waiting for a world of the purely just will have to struggle all his life with the purely evil.

    Tzvia Greenfield

    • Israël est un état colonial par la décision qui l’a créé et par son racisme (dès l’origine les kibboutz, bien que laïques étaient « juifs only »). Les nationalistes sionistes étaient sans doute habités par l’idéologie raciste coloniale propre à la période.

      Cela n’aurait pas été un problème si Israël avait accepté plus tard de reconnaitre les souffrances infligées aux populations arabes autochtones et s’il avait cherché à les compenser.
      Au lieu de cela Israël n’a jamais envisagé de créer une société réellement multi-ethnique et n’a eu de cesse de s’étendre et de réprimer toujours plus massivement les arabes, crimes de guerre sur crimes de guerre ...

      Israël comme l’Arabie, bien que différents, sont deux créations de l’occident colonial, toutes deux structurées par le racisme.
      Leur rapprochement a une logique.

  • Khashoggi and the Jewish question - Middle East - Jerusalem Post

    Khashoggi and the Jewish question
    “It is certainly not in our interests to see the status of the Saudi government diminished in Washington.”
    By Herb Keinon
    October 12, 2018 04:24

    The disappearance of Saudi government critic and Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi in Turkey – and the very real possibility that the Saudis either kidnapped him, killed him, or both – is no exception.

    On the surface, this story seems distant from Jerusalem. Israel was not involved in any way, and even Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who never misses an opportunity to blast Israel, is not saying that Jerusalem had anything to do with it.

    As a New York Times headline read on Thursday, “Khashoggi’s disappearance puts Kushner’s bet on Saudi crown prince at risk.”

    US President Donald Trump’s son-in-law and senior adviser Jared Kushner has invested much in building a relationship with MBS, and Jerusalem – for its own interests – hopes that this particular bet does not turn sour.

    (...) As Dore Gold, the head of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and former Foreign Ministry director-general, said: “This problem could be used by the Iranians to drive a wedge between the West and Saudi Arabia.”

    That is bad for Israel, he added, because “anything that strengthens Iran’s posturing in the Middle East is bad for Israel,” and in the Mideast balance of power, a weakened Saudi Arabia means a strengthened Iran.

    It also means a strengthened Turkey, which could explain why Ankara is going the full monty on this issue, releasing surveillance tape and leaking information about the investigation.

    “Turkey is part of an axis with Qatar,” Gold said, “and that puts Saudi Arabia at odds with the Turkish government.

  • Can Islamist moderates remake the politics of the Muslim world? -

    By Taylor Luck Correspondent

    Alaa Faroukh insists he is the future. After nearly a decade in the Muslim Brotherhood, he says that he has finally found harmony between his faith and politics, not as a hardcore Islamist, but as a “Muslim democrat.”

    “We respect and include minorities, we fight for women’s rights, we respect different points of view, we are democratic both in our homes and in our politics – that is how we honor our faith,” Mr. Faroukh says.

    The jovial psychologist with a toothy smile, who can quote Freud as easily as he can recite the Quran, is speaking from his airy Amman clinic, located one floor below the headquarters of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, the very movement he left.

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    “The time of divisive politics of older Islamists is over, and everyone in my generation agrees,” says the 30-something Faroukh. “The era of political Islam is dead.”

    Faroukh is symbolic of a shift sweeping through parts of the Arab world. From Tunisia to Egypt to Jordan, many Islamist activists and some established Islamic organizations are adopting a more progressive and moderate tone in their approach to politics and governing. They are reaching out to minorities and secular Muslims while doing away with decades-old political goals to impose their interpretation of Islam on society.

    Taylor Luck
    “The time of divisive politics of older Islamists is over, and everyone in my generation agrees. The era of political Islam is dead,” says Alaa Faroukh, a young Jordanian who left the Muslim Brotherhood for a moderate political party.
    Part of the move is simple pragmatism. After watching the Muslim Brotherhood – with its call for sharia (Islamic law) and failure to reach out to minorities and secular Muslims – get routed in Egypt, and the defeat of other political Islamic groups across the Arab world, many Islamic activists believe taking a more moderate stance is the only way to gain and hold power. Yet others, including many young Muslims, believe a deeper ideological shift is under way in which Islamist organizations are increasingly recognizing the importance of religious tolerance and political pluralism in modern societies. 

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    While Islamist movements remain the largest and most potent political movement in the region, a widespread adoption of democratic principles by their followers could transform the discourse in a region where politics are often bound to identity and are bitterly polarized.

    “We believe that young Jordanians and young Arabs in general see that the future is not in partisan politics, but in cooperation, understanding, and putting the country above petty party politics,” says Rheil Gharaibeh, the moderate former head of the Jordanian Brotherhood’s politburo who has formed his own political party.

    Is this the beginning of a fundamental shift in the politics of the Middle East or just an expedient move by a few activists?


    Many Islamist groups say their move to the center is a natural step in multiparty politics, but this obscures how far their positions have truly shifted in a short time.

    Some 20 years ago, the manifesto of the Muslim Brotherhood – the Sunni Islamic political group with affiliates across the Arab world – called for the implementation of sharia and gender segregation at universities, and commonly employed slogans such as “Islam is the solution.”

    In 2011, the Arab Spring uprisings swept these Islamist movements into power or installed them as the leading political force from the Arab Gulf to Morocco, sparking fears of an Islamization of Arab societies.

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    But instead of rolling back women’s rights, the Tunisian Islamist party Ennahda pushed through gender equality laws and helped write the most progressive, gender-equal constitution in the Arab world. The Moroccan Justice and Development Party (PJD) has played down its Islamic rhetoric, abandoning talk of Islamic identity and sharia and instead speaking about democratic reform and human rights. And the Brotherhood in Jordan traded in its slogan “Islam is the solution” for “the people demand reform” and “popular sovereignty for all.”

    The past few years have seen an even more dramatic shift to the center. Not only have Islamist movements dropped calls for using sharia as a main source of law, but they nearly all now advocate for a “civil state”­ – a secular nation where the law, rather than holy scriptures or the word of God, is sovereign.

    Muhammad Hamed/Reuters
    Supporters of the National Alliance for Reform rally in Amman, Jordan, in 2016. They have rebranded themselves as a national rather than an Islamic movement.
    In Morocco and Jordan, Islamist groups separated their religious activities – preaching, charitable activities, and dawa (spreading the good word of God) – from their political branches. In 2016, Ennahda members in Tunisia went one step further and essentially eliminated their religious activities altogether, rebranding themselves as “Muslim democrats.”

    Islamist moderates say this shift away from religious activities to a greater focus on party politics is a natural step in line with what President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has done with his Justice and Development Party in Turkey, or even, they hope, with the Christian democrats in Europe: to become movements inspired by faith, not governing through faith.

    “While we are a Muslim country, we are aware that we do not have one interpretation of religion and we will not impose one interpretation of faith over others,” says Mehrezia Labidi, a member of the Tunisian Parliament and Ennahda party leader. “As Muslim democrats we are guided by Islamic values, but we are bound by the Constitution, the will of the people, and the rule of law for all.”

    Experts say this shift is a natural evolution for movements that are taking part in the decisionmaking process for the first time after decades in the opposition.

    “As the opposition, you can refuse, you can criticize, you can obstruct,” says Rachid Mouqtadir, professor of political science at Hassan II University in Casablanca, Morocco, and an expert in Islamist movements. “But when you are in a coalition with other parties and trying to govern, the parameters change, your approach changes, and as a result your ideology changes.”

    The trend has even gone beyond the borders of the Arab world. The Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement (ABIM), founded in 1971 by Malaysian university students inspired by the Brotherhood and now one of the strongest civil society groups in the country, is also shedding the “Islamist” label.

    In addition to running schools and hospitals, ABIM now hosts interfaith concerts, partners on projects with Christians and Buddhists, and even reaches out to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender activists in its campaign for social justice.

    “We are in the age of post-political Islam,” says Ahmad Fahmi Mohd Samsudin, ABIM vice president, from the movement’s headquarters in a leafy Kuala Lumpur suburb. “That means when we say we stand for Islam, we stand for social justice and equality for all – no matter their faith or background.”


  • German police use neo-Nazi codename amid Erdoğan visit - World News

    A Neo-nazi scandal has shaken German police on Sept. 28 during Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s state visit to Berlin.

    Special forces officers, deployed in Berlin to protect the Turkish president, used the codename of a prominent neo-Nazi figure “Uwe Bohnhardt” during their assignment, the police confirmed on Sept. 28.

    Uwe Boehnhardt was one of the three members of Neo-nazi terorist organization National Socialist Underground (NSU), which killed eight Turkish immigrants, a Greek citizen and a German police officer between 2000 and 2007.

    The police deportment of the eastern federal state of Saxony said in a statement that two officers from its special forces were immediately recalled and an internal investigation was launched on the incident.

    They could be suspended according to the result of the investigation, it said.

  • Qué busca Turquía en Venezuela – BBC Mundo

    Maduro viajó a Turquía en julio para asistir a la toma de poder del presidente turco

    A pesar de sus diferencias geopolíticas y la distancia que los separa, los vínculos económicos entre ambos países son cada vez más fuertes. Pero ¿qué intereses estratégicos comparten realmente?

    A pesar de las diferencias geopolíticas y la distancia, el presidente de Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, es una figura popular en Turquía.

    Tiene fieles seguidores turcos en las redes sociales y la gente en Turquía le presta mucha atención a sus opiniones sobre política internacional.

    Maduro visitó Turquía tres veces durante el último año y se reunió con su homólogo turco, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Sus intercambios amistosos también se han visto reflejados en acuerdos económicos.

    Erdogan y Maduro firmaron una serie de acuerdos en 2017 que van desde la cooperación comercial hasta la seguridad, incluyendo negocios agrícolas.

    El comercio bilateral entre Venezuela y Turquía alcanzó los 892,4 millones de dólares en los primeros cinco meses de 2018, según el Instituto de Estadística de Turquía.

    Las exportaciones de Turquía a Venezuela fueron de 52,2 millones de dólares y las importaciones fueron de 834,2 millones de dólares en un período de 5 meses.

    Aunque las cifras actuales constituyen solo una pequeña parte en el comercio exterior de Turquía, muestran claramente el rápido desarrollo de las relaciones bilaterales. En el período de cinco años entre 2013 y 2017, el intercambio entre los dos países había sido de 3,6 millones de dólares.

    El enfrentamiento con Estados Unidos obligó a Turquía a buscar nuevos socios y Ankara puso la mirada en Venezuela —rica en petróleo— para diversificar sus intercambios comerciales.

    Algunas de las cosas que Turquía exporta a Venezuela son harina de trigo, pasta, jabón, pañales, productos higiénicos y dentales, mármol, piezas automotrices, materiales de construcción y medicinas.

    Y Turquía importa mayormente de Venezuela piedras preciosas o semipreciosas, metales preciosos, productos de hierro o acero, ceras minerales, perlas y monedas.

    Venezuela tiene grandes dificultades para ofrecer bienes y servicios a su población. Millones de personas se han visto forzadas a abandonar el país por la pobreza y el FMI (Fondo Monetario Internacional) proyecta para Venezuela un índice de inflación de 1.000.000% en 2018.

  • Turquie : plus de 18 000 fonctionnaires limogés dans une nouvelle purge

    Une longue liste de 18 632 noms. Plus de 18 000 fonctionnaires ont été limogées en Turquie par un décret-loi, publié dans le Journal officiel dimanche 8 juillet. Plus de 9 000 fonctionnaires de police turcs et 6 000 membres des forces armées ont ainsi été renvoyés, mais aussi environ 1 000 employés du ministère de la Justice et 650 du ministère de l’Education. Douze associations, trois journaux et une chaîne de télévision ont également été fermés par ce décret.

    Bientôt la fin de l’état d’urgence et des purges ?

    Ce décret-loi est présenté par les médias turcs comme le dernier pris sous l’état d’urgence instauré au lendemain du putsch manqué de juillet 2016 et sans cesse renouvelé depuis. Les médias turcs affirment que ce régime d’exception sera levé lundi, après la prestation de serment du président Recep Tayyip Erdogan réélu le 24 juin pour un nouveau mandat, et dont la levée de l’état d’urgence était l’une des promesses de campagne.

    Selon l’ONG Human Rights Joint Platform (Ihop), 112 679 personnes avaient été limogées au 20 mars 2018, dont plus de 8 000 dans les forces armées, environ 33 000 parmi le personnel du ministère de l’Education et 31 000 au sein du ministère de l’Intérieur, dont 22 600 au sein de la Direction générale de la Sûreté. Des milliers d’autres ont été suspendues. Ces purges sont vivement critiquées par l’opposition et les organisations de défense des droits de l’homme, qui y voient une tentative de faire taire toute voix critique.

  • Erdoğan’s Persistent Popularity - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

    On the eve of early parliamentary and presidential elections on June 24, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan appears poised to claim yet another victory, with enduring popularity even beyond Turkey’s borders. What is more surprising is that Erdoğan managed to sustain his appeal in the face of Turkey’s growing authoritarianism and rapidly deteriorating human rights record.

    A recent survey sheds some empirical light on the various dynamics that underlie Erdoğan’s regional popularity, with notable implications for the relationship between religion and politics.1 The survey data show Erdoğan’s popularity is particularly strong among some segments of the population. Respondents who ideologically self-identified as Islamist, favored a prominent role for religious leaders in politics, and considered religion to be important in their lives trusted Erdoğan the most as an authority on religious matters. By contrast, respondents with a college education or who had a monthly income over $1,000 were less likely to trust Erdoğan.

  • ’Nothing is ours anymore’: Kurds forced out of #Afrin after Turkish assault

    Many who fled the violence January say their homes have been given to Arabs.
    When Areen and her clan fled the Turkish assault on Afrin in January, they feared they may never return.

    Six months later, the Kurdish family remain in nearby villages with other Afrin locals who left as the conquering Turks and their Arab proxies swept in, exiling nearly all its residents.

    Recently, strangers from the opposite end of Syria have moved into Areen’s home and those of her family. The few relatives who have made it back for fleeting visits say the numbers of new arrivals – all Arabs – are rising each week. So too is a resentment towards the newcomers, and a fear that the steady, attritional changes may herald yet another flashpoint in the seven-year conflict.

    Unscathed through much of the Syrian war, and a sanctuary for refugees, Afrin has become a focal point of a new and pivotal phase, where the ambitions of regional powers are being laid bare and a coexistence between Arabs and Kurds – delicately poised over decades – is increasingly being threatened.

    The small enclave in northwestern Syria directly reflects the competing agendas of four countries, Turkey, Syria, Russia and the US – though none more so than Ankara, whose creeping influence in the war is anchored in Afrin and the fate of its peoples.

    Turkey’s newfound stake has given it more control over its nearby border and leverage over its arch foe, the Kurdistan Workers’ party (PKK), which had used its presence in Afrin to project its influence northwards.

    But the campaign to oust Kurdish militias has raised allegations that Ankara is quietly orchestrating a demographic shift, changing the balance of Afrin’s population from predominantly Kurdish to majority Arab, and – more importantly to Turkish leaders – changing the composition of its 500-mile border with Syria.

    Ahead of the January assault, the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, said: “We will return Afrin to its rightful owners.”

    Erdoğan’s comments followed a claim by US officials that it would help transform a Kurdish militia it had raised to fight Islamic State in northeastern Syria into a more permanent border force. The announcement incensed Turkish leaders, who had long feared that Syria’s Kurds would use the chaos of war to advance their ambitions – and to move into a 60-mile area between Afrin and the Euphrates river, which was the only part of the border they didn’t inhabit.

    Ankara denies it is attempting to choreograph a demographic shift in Afrin, insisting it aimed only to drive out the PKK, not unaffiliated Kurdish locals.

    “The people of Afrin didn’t choose to live under the PKK,” said a senior Turkish official. “Like Isis, the PKK installed a terrorist administration there by force. Under that administration, rival Kurdish factions were silenced violently. [The military campaign] resulted in the removal of terrorists from Afrin and made it possible for the local population to govern themselves. The vast majority of the new local council consists of Kurds and the council’s chairperson is also Kurdish.”

    Many who remain unable to return to Afrin are unconvinced, particularly as the influx from elsewhere in Syria continues. Both exiles and newcomers confirmed to the Guardian that large numbers of those settling in Afrin came from the Damascus suburb of Ghouta, where an anti-regime opposition surrendered to Russian and Syrian forces in April, and accepted being transferred to northern Syria

    Between bandits, militiamen, and wayfarers, Afrin is barely recognisable, say Kurdish locals who have made it back. “It’s not the Afrin we know,” said Areen, 34. “Too many strange faces. Businesses have been taken over by the Syrians, stores changed to Damascene names, properties gone. We feel like the Palestinians.

    “The Syrian government couldn’t care less to help us reclaim our property, they won’t even help us get back into Afrin. We want to go back, we couldn’t care less if we’re governed by the Kurds or Turks or Assad, we just want our land back.”

    A second Afrin exile, Salah Mohammed, 40, said: “Lands are being confiscated, farms, wheat, furniture, nothing is ours anymore; it’s us versus their guns. It’s difficult to come back, you have to prove the property is yours and get evidence and other nearly impossible papers to reclaim it.

    “There is definitely a demographic change, a lot of Kurds have been forcibly displaced on the count that they’re with the PKK when in fact they weren’t. There are barely any Kurds left in Afrin, no one is helping us go back.”

    Another Afrin local, Shiyar Khalil, 32, said: “When the Kurds try to get back to their house they have to jump through hoops. You cannot deny a demographic change, Kurds are not able to go back. Women are veiled, bars are closed; it’s a deliberate erasing of Kurdish culture.”

    Umm Abdallah, 25, a new arrival from Ghouta said some Kurds had returned to Afrin, but anyone affiliated with Kurdish militias had been denied entry. “I’ve seen about 300 Kurds come back to Afrin with their families in the past month or so. I don’t know whose house I am living in honestly, but it’s been registered at the police station.”

    She said Afrin was lawless and dangerous, with Arab militias whom Turkey had used to lead the assault now holding aegis over the town. “The Turks try to stop the looting but some militias are very malicious,” she said. “They mess with us and the Kurds, it’s not stable here.”

    Both Umm Abdallah and another Ghouta resident, Abu Khaled Abbas, 23, had their homes confiscated by the Assad regime before fleeing to the north. “The Assad army stole everything, even the sinks,” said Abbas.

    “These militias now are not leaving anyone alone [in Afrin], how do you think they will treat the Kurds? There are bad things happening, murder, harassment, rapes, and theft. They believe they ‘freed’ the land so they own it now.”
    #Kurdes #Kurdistan #occupation #dépossession #Syrie #déplacés_internes #IDPs #destruction
    cc @tchaala_la

  • Turkey suspends migrant readmission deal with Greece : Hurriyet

    Turkey has suspended its migrant readmission deal with Greece, Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu was quoted as saying by the Hurriyet daily, days after Greece released from prison four Turkish soldiers who fled there after the 2016 attempted coup.
    #Turquie #asile #migrations #réfugiés #accord_UE-Turquie #accord_de_réadmission #externalisation #suspension #Grèce
    cc @isskein @i_s_

    • Ankara suspend un accord sur les migrants avec la Grèce

      La Turquie a suspendu son accord passé avec la Grèce pour la réadmission des migrants, en réaction à la remise en liberté par la Grèce de quatre soldats turcs ayant fui leur pays après la tentative de putsch de juillet 2016.

      ISTANBUL (Reuters) - La Turquie a suspendu son accord passé avec la Grèce pour la réadmission des migrants, en réaction à la remise en liberté par la Grèce de quatre soldats turcs ayant fui leur pays après la tentative de putsch de juillet 2016.

      La décision a été annoncée jeudi par le ministre turc des Affaires étrangères Mevlüt Cavusoglu, cité par le quotidien Hurriyet. Le chef de la diplomatie turque a jugé « inacceptable » la libération, lundi, des quatre militaires, dont la demande d’asile en Grèce est toujours à l’étude.

      Un accord similaire passé entre la Turquie et l’Union européenne est toujours en vigueur, a ajouté Cavusoglu.

      Aux termes de l’accord conclu entre Athènes et Ankara, 1.209 étrangers ont été expulsés de Grèce vers la Turquie ces deux dernières années, selon le gouvernement grec.

      Pour Mevlüt Cavusoglu, « le gouvernement grec voulait régler cette question (des soldats turcs) mais il y a eu de fortes pressions occidentales, particulièrement sur les juges ».

      Les soldats se sont enfuis en Grèce à la suite du coup d’Etat manqué de la nuit du 15 au 16 juillet 2016 contre le gouvernement de Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

      Le gouvernement turc les accuse de participation à cette tentative de putsch et a demandé à la Grèce de les lui remettre.

      La justice grecque a rejeté les demandes d’extradition.

    • Turkey reportedly suspends migrant readmission deal with Greece

      Turkey has suspended its migrant readmission deal with Greece, Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu was quoted as saying by state-run Anadolu agency, days after Greece released from prison four Turkish soldiers who fled there after a 2016 attempted coup.

      The four soldiers were released on Monday after an order extending their custody expired. A decision on their asylum applications is still pending.

      “We have a bilateral readmission agreement. We have suspended that readmission agreement,” Cavusoglu was quoted as saying, adding that a separate migrant deal between the EU and Turkey would continue.

      Under the bilateral deal signed in 2001, 1,209 foreign nationals have been deported to Turkey from Greece in the last two years, data from the Greek citizens’ protection ministry showed.

      Cavusoglu was quoted as saying he believed the Greek government wanted to resolve the issue about the soldiers but that Greek judges were under pressure from the West.

      “The Greek government wants to resolve this issue. But we also see there is serious pressure on Greece from the West. Especially on Greek judges,” Cavusoglu was quoted as saying.

      The eight soldiers fled to Greece following the July 2016 failed coup in Turkey. Ankara has demanded they be handed over, accusing them of involvement in the abortive coup. Greek courts have rejected the extradition request and the soldiers have denied wrongdoing and say they fear for their lives.

      In May, Greece’s top administrative court rejected an appeal by the Greek government against an administrative decision by an asylum board to grant asylum to one of the Turkish soldiers.

    • La Commission Européenne appelle à la poursuite de l’accord sur les migrants entre la Turquie et la Grèce

      La Turquie a suspendu son accord de réadmission des migrants avec la Grèce après le refus d’Athènes d’extrader des ex-soldats turcs recherché par la Justice.

      La Commission européenne a appelé à la poursuite de l’accord bilatéral de réadmission des migrants entre la Turquie et la Grèce.

      "La position de la commission est qu’elle devrait être mise en œuvre de manière continue afin de respecter tous les critères restants dans le cadre de la feuille de route de libéralisation des visas avec la Turquie", a déclaré, vendredi, Natasha Bertaud, la porte-parole de la Commission.

      Ses remarques sont intervenues après que le ministre turc des Affaires étrangères, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu a annoncé jeudi qu’Ankara suspendait son accord bilatéral de réadmission des migrants avec la Grèce.

      La suspension a suivi le refus des autorités grecques d’extrader des ex-soldats turcs qui sont accusés par la Justice turque d’avoir pris part au coup d’état manqué de 2016.

      Bertaud a précisé que la décision concernait un accord bilatéral entre la Grèce et la Turquie, et non l’accord UE-Turquie.

      "Nous sommes en contact avec les autorités grecques et turques pour enquêter davantage. Cela concerne un accord bilatéral entre la Grèce et la Turquie ", a-t-elle déclaré.

      Cavusoglu a précisé : « Il y a un accord de migration avec l’UE, c’est en vigueur et il y a un accord bilatéral de réadmission avec la Grèce, nous avons maintenant suspendu cet accord.

      Un protocole de réadmission entre la Grèce et la Turquie a été signé en 2002 pour lutter contre la migration illégale.

      Fin mai, le Conseil d’Etat grec a accordé l’asile à l’ex-soldat turc Suleyman Ozkaynakci, que la Turquie accuse d’être impliqué dans le coup d’Etat de 2016.

      En janvier, la Cour suprême grecque s’est prononcée contre l’extradition des anciens soldats - une décision que la Turquie a qualifiée de « politiquement motivée ».

      Cette dernière a demandé à plusieurs reprises l’extradition des putschistes présumés, notamment lors de la visite officielle du président Recep Tayyip Erdogan en Grèce en décembre dernier.

    • Les réfugiés ne doivent pas servir d’instrument de pression politique en Turquie, selon la rapporteure

      « Je suis consternée par l’annonce des autorités turques indiquant que l’accord de réadmission avec la Grèce a été suspendu, à la suite de la libération de soldats turcs demandeurs d’asile en Grèce. Cette décision montre que les accords migratoires font courir aux réfugiés le risque d’être utilisés comme instrument dans les conflits politiques.

      J’appelle toutes les parties à ce conflit à donner la priorité aux intérêts et aux droits des réfugiés », a déclaré Tineke Strik (Pays-Bas, SOC), rapporteure de l’APCE sur les conséquences pour les droits de l’homme de la dimension extérieure de la politique d’asile et de migration de l’Union européenne.

      « Bien que les conséquences de l’accord UE-Turquie pour les réfugiés et les demandeurs d’asile en Grèce et en Turquie soient inquiétantes, la Turquie ne devrait pas utiliser le sort tragique des réfugiés pour faire pression sur les autorités grecques à la suite de l’échec du coup d’État en Turquie. La vie des réfugiés ne doit pas être un objet de négociation politique », a-t-elle souligné.

      « Le gel de la réadmission en Turquie ajoute à leur insécurité et peut prolonger leurs conditions d’accueil dégradantes, ce qui doit être évité. Si cette décision est maintenue, le gouvernement grec devrait accorder aux réfugiés des îles de la mer Égée l’accès à un logement d’accueil adéquat sur le continent, et examiner leurs demandes d’asile sur le fond ».

      En mars 2016, face à l’arrivée d’un nombre sans précédent de réfugiés, à la suite du conflit armé en Syrie, l’Union européenne et la Turquie ont convenu que la Turquie prendrait toutes les mesures nécessaires pour empêcher la migration irrégulière par voie terrestre ou maritime de la Turquie vers l’UE. En vertu de l’accord, les migrants en situation irrégulière qui traversent la Turquie vers les îles grecques seraient renvoyés en Turquie et, pour chaque Syrien renvoyé des îles vers la Turquie, un autre Syrien serait réinstallé dans l’UE.

      En outre, l’UE s’est engagée à consacrer trois milliards d’euros à la gestion des migrations et à l’aide aux réfugiés en Turquie en 2016-2017, et trois autres milliards d’euros en 2018.

      Le rapport de Mme Strik doit être débattu lors de la prochaine session plénière de l’Assemblée (25-29 juin 2018).

  • Macron’s Fake News Solution Is a Problem – Foreign Policy

    point de vue d’une juriste doctorante à Toulouse, mis en avant dans FP
    la manchette d’appel dans la newsletter : #The_solution_is_the_problem (tout simplement)
    (la conclusion)

    France’s fake news law will most likely pass with flying colors, though it will almost certainly be challenged constitutionality by political opponents or private citizens. A better approach to the problem would have been to strengthen the formidable legal arsenal already in place. As there is no legal definition of fake news under French law, it remains unclear how magistrates will be able to judge what is false or true in political matters. Implementing such a law would require judges to be extremely creative and subjective in interpreting what exactly constitutes fake news. Second, such provisions could lead to self-censorship as online publishers, fearing legal action, might curtail what is perfectly legitimate speech. The questions remains: How would this law be implemented if, for example, a French politician goes too far in publicly deriding his or her opponents or a foreign leader, as British Foreign Minister Boris Johnson famously did when he published a poem insinuating that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan fornicated with goats?

    Macron’s proposed legislation has no answer. It will not solve the problem of fake news and may indeed amplify it.

  • #Ankara authorities rename ‘Gülenist’ streets

    The Ankara Metropolitan Municipality has changed the names of streets and avenues that bear the last name of Islamic cleric Fethullah Gülen, who is accused by the Turkish government of mounting a botched coup attempt on July 15, 2016.

    According to Anadolu News Agency, seven streets and avenues in various districts of the capital Ankara have been renamed after a decision by the Municipal Council and approval of the governor’s office.

    Streets and avenues named “Gülen” were renamed “Homeland,” “Crescent,” “Redflag,” “Motherland,” “Flag,” “Resurrection” and “Kayı.”

    President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his ruling AKP government have been pursuing a crackdown on the Gülen grup since the failed coup attempt in Turkey on July 15, 2016.

    The group denies any involvement in the attempt.

    According to a report issued by European Commission (EC) on April 17, 2018, over 150,000 people have been taken into custody, 78,000 arrested and over 110,000 civil servants have been dismissed since July 2016.

    Turkish Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu stated last year that 234,419 passports have been revoked, eight holdings and 1,020 companies were seized as part of investigations into the group since the failed coup.
    #toponymie #Gülen #nom_de_rue #Turquie #coup

  • Erdogan Threatens to Expand Syria Offensive as the U.S. Establishes New Front-Line Positions

    ❞Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan said on Wednesday that his forces would press on with a campaign to drive Kurdish fighters from northern Syria, the Associated Press reported.

    Speaking at a joint news conference with his Iranian and Russian counterparts in Ankara, Erdogan said that Turkish forces would first push eastward into Manbij, which is held by the Kurdish militia known as the Peoples’ Protection Units (YPG).

    “I say here once again that we will not stop until we have made safe all areas controlled by the (YPG), starting with Manbij,” Erdogan said.

    This is not the first time Erdogan has threatened to attack the area, where U.S.-led coalition forces are based. However, his comments come at a time when U.S. forces are said to be establishing new front-line positions outside Manbij in anticipation of a potential attack, according to the AP.

    A front-line commander in Manbij, a member of the Manbij Military Council, told the AP that fortified U.S. positions were meant to deter attacks. “It is to protect the area and to ensure that there is no attack from Turkey or from the mercenaries in the area,” said the official on the condition of anonymity.❞

  • Israël refuse toute enquête indépendante sur la mort de manifestants dans la bande de Gaza
    Le avec AFP | 01.04.2018

    (...) Le premier ministre, Benyamin Nétanyahou, a également rejeté toutes les critiques et a exprimé samedi dans un communiqué son soutien à l’armée : « Bravo à nos soldats. » Dimanche, il a aussi dénoncé les « leçons de morale » du président turc, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, qui avait accusé la veille Israël d’avoir commis une « attaque inhumaine ».

    הצבא המוסרי בעולם לא יקבל הטפות מוסר ממי שבמשך שנים מפציץ אוכלוסיה אזרחית ללא אבחנה. כנראה שכך מציינים באנקרה את ה-1 באפריל.
    — netanyahu (@ Benjamin Netanyahu)

    (« L’armée la plus éthique du monde n’a pas de leçons de morale à recevoir de la part de celui qui bombarde des civils sans discernement depuis des années. »)

    « Hé, Nétanyahou ! Tu es un occupant ! Et c’est en tant qu’occupant que tu es sur ces terres. En même temps, tu es un terroriste », lui a rétorqué dans la foulée M. Erdogan, lors d’un discours télévisé devant ses partisans à Adana (sud de la Turquie). « Ce que tu fais aux Palestiniens opprimés sera inscrit dans l’histoire et nous ne l’oublierons jamais », a-t-il poursuivi, ajoutant que « le peuple israélien est mal à l’aise avec ce que tu fais ». (...)


  • Orgies, blackmail and anti-Semitism: Inside the Islamic cult whose leader is embraced by Israeli figures

    He has a harem of scantily clad ’kittens,’ claims the U.K. ’deep state’ brought Hitler to power and is accused of sex slavery. What draws Israeli politicians and rabbis to Turkish cult leader Adnan Oktar?
    By Asaf Ronel Mar 29, 2018

    ISTANBUL – Fulya is a Turkish woman of 36. Tall, thin, with short, oxidized hair, hazel eyes, penciled eyebrows and full lips. When she enters a fancy restaurant on the European banks of the Bosporus in Istanbul’s fashionable Bebek neighborhood, almost all eyes turn to look at her. Even though Fulya (not her real name), who’s the daughter of the CEO of a large Turkish company, seems to leave a trail of stardust behind her, her work is not especially glitzy. She organizes delegations of foreign dignitaries who visit Turkey, part of the burgeoning array of nonprofit organizations doing diplomatic work under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
    Before that, Fulya was a journalistic commentator on Turkey and the Middle East, appearing both in print and on-air. She held those jobs while she was, for more than a decade, a member of a religious sex cult led by a person named Adnan Oktar. According to Fulya, for the last four years she pursued her career as a journalist even though she was a captive of the idiosyncratic cult, following a failed first attempt to escape. She’d made an appointment with a doctor in a hospital in an effort to flee, but Oktar’s people seized her as she was entering the hospital and forced her into a car. After that, she relates, she was imprisoned in a room in one of the Istanbul compounds owned by the cult, managing her career mostly via computer and under close scrutiny, and leaving the room only to take part in the cult’s activities.
    Fulya says she knew she would never escape if she remained in the cult’s central walled-in, high-surveillance compound. Accordingly, she quarreled repeatedly with Oktar, until, less than a year ago, he ordered her to be moved to another compound he owns. There, after managing to get a message out to her father, she organized a getaway. At a prearranged moment, she ran out to the yard with only her ID card and the pajamas she was wearing, got into her father’s waiting car and fled, as the cult’s staff tried to catch her.
    According to the story told by Fulya and by her partner, Sedat (also a pseudonym), who also escaped from the cult two years ago, Oktar is a combination of the type of evangelical preachers one sees on American television and the head of a sex cult that objects in principle to bringing children into the world. The cover for all this is a singular interpretation of Islam.

  • Syrie : les motifs et les enjeux de la bataille d’Afrin

    Les Turcs veulent bloquer la montée en puissance des Kurdes, pourtant soutenus par la coalition internationale, dans cette région.

    L’entrée des forces syriennes favorables à Assad dans l’enclave d’Afrin, dans le nord-ouest de la Syrie, pour appuyer les forces kurdes des Unités de protection du peuple (YPG), aurait de « graves conséquences », a prévenu, mercredi 21 février, le porte-parole du président turc, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. « Toute tentative visant à soutenir (…) l’organisation terroriste YPG signifiera qu’ils se rangent directement au côté d’organisations terroristes et deviendront donc des cibles légitimes à nos yeux », a insisté Ibrahim Kalin lors d’une conférence de presse.
    La crise d’Afrin concentre sur un territoire réduit l’ensemble des acteurs du conflit syrien et leurs alliés. Enjeux locaux, régionaux et internationaux s’y télescopent. Pour les forces kurdes, la défense d’Afrin est une question vitale. Si elles cèdent et font aveu de faiblesse, c’est tout leur édifice dans l’Est syrien qui se trouve menacé. Il faut donc tenir et, à défaut d’autre soutien extérieur, tenter d’arracher au régime de Damas un accord qui permettrait de ralentir les avancées turques.

    L’envoi de détachements miliciens vers Afrin, mardi 20 février, est un signal allant en ce sens. Le régime syrien voit, en effet, d’un mauvais œil l’émergence d’une présence forte et durable de la Turquie à Afrin. Damas et Ankara partagent un passé lourd de disputes territoriales qui influence la position du régime.

    L’Iran est réputé avoir en la matière une position proche de celle de ses protégés syriens. La position de la Russie, autre alliée du régime, diverge cependant. Sans le feu vert tacite de Moscou, qui contrôle l’espace aérien syrien dans cette partie du pays, l’opération turque sur Afrin n’aurait pas pu voir le jour. En accédant aux velléités anciennes d’Ankara sur Afrin, Vladimir Poutine ménage sa relation avec le président Erdogan et fait d’une pierre deux coups, en prouvant aux Kurdes l’inefficacité de leur alliance avec Washington, tout en semant un peu plus la discorde entre les Etats-Unis et la Turquie, alliés au sein de l’OTAN.

    (fin de l’article)

    Ben, finalement, Afrin, c’est la faute à Poutine.

  • En Turquie, anatomie d’une purge

    Accusé d’appartenir au réseau du prédicateur Fethullah Gülen, le cerveau du putsch, selon les autorités turques, le policier Kürsat Cevik comparaît mardi 13 février. Son épouse, franco-irlandaise, se bat depuis la France pour prouver son innocence.

    La vie sans nuage d’Elaine Ryan, mère de famille franco-irlandaise de 37 ans, s’est assombrie après le putsch raté du 15 juillet 2016, lorsque son mari turc, Kürsat Cevik, commissaire de police, a été arrêté avec une quinzaine de ses collègues.

    Accusé d’appartenir à « une organisation terroriste armée » (le réseau du prédicateur Fethullah Gülen, le cerveau du putsch, selon les autorités turques), Kürsat Cevik a été incarcéré à la prison de Sanliurfa, non loin de la frontière syrienne, où il partage une cellule prévue pour dix avec vingt-quatre autres prisonniers. La dernière audience de son procès aura lieu mardi 13 février.

    Elaine ne sera pas présente, « l’ambassade de France me l’a déconseillé ». Rentrée en France avec leurs deux enfants en bas âge, elle a très peu de contacts avec son conjoint. Pas de correspondance, c’est interdit. Ils se parlent dix minutes chaque quinze jours par téléphone.

    Comme la plupart des 50 000 personnes arrêtées depuis le coup d’Etat manqué, l’officier de police est accusé d’avoir chargé sur son portable l’application mobile ByLock, décrite par Ankara comme l’outil de communication des conjurés du 15 juillet, ce qu’il nie.

    La justice maintient l’accusation alors qu’« en dix-huit mois d’instruction, le procureur n’a pas pu apporter une seule preuve allant dans ce sens », déplore Elaine, qui se bat depuis la France pour prouver l’innocence de son époux.

    « En deux ans, il a été muté sept fois »

    Avoir l’application sur un téléphone suffit-elle à faire de son détenteur un putschiste ? Tous les doutes sont permis, surtout depuis que le parquet d’Ankara a reconnu, le 27 décembre 2017, que ByLock pouvait être installée sur un smartphone à l’insu de son propriétaire. C’est le cas pour 11 480 téléphones portables, reconnaît le parquet.

    Par ailleurs, ByLock est une preuve seulement « s’il est établi techniquement et de façon irréfutable que la communication a eu lieu dans le cadre de l’organisation [le mouvement Gülen] », a statué la Cour suprême en juin 2017. Débordés, soumis aux pressions politiques, les tribunaux n’en tiennent pas compte. Les dossiers d’accusation sont tous bâtis sur le même modèle.

    « Dans ce genre d’affaires, les procès-verbaux d’interrogatoires comportent sept questions-type systématiquement posées à l’accusé », explique une avocate soucieuse d’anonymat. Avoir eu ByLock sur son téléphone portable, un compte à la banque Asya, des enfants scolarisés dans les écoles du réseau Gülen, une bourse d’études pour une université étrangère, sont autant d’éléments à charge.

    La bourse d’études obtenue en 2008 par Kürsat Cevik, officier de police bien noté qui mena à bien une thèse de doctorat à l’université de Nottingham en Grande-Bretagne, est une tache noire dans son dossier. Proposées alors de façon tout à fait légale aux policiers, ces bourses, constatent aujourd’hui les juges, étaient « monopolisées par les membres du FETÖ », selon l’acronyme utilisé par les autorités pour désigner le mouvement gülen.

    « Les purges ont visé essentiellement des personnes éduquées qui, pour la plupart, avaient fait des études dans des universités étrangères. Les collègues de mon mari les plus diplômés sont aujourd’hui derrière les barreaux », assure Elaine. Avant de partir à l’étranger, l’officier travaillait à direction pour la lutte contre le crime organisé (KOM) à Ankara mais à son retour en Turquie, il en a été écarté.

    Cette direction était notoirement l’une des plus noyautées par le mouvement Gülen. Réelle, l’infiltration des organes de police et de justice par le mouvement a eu lieu avec le plein aval du gouvernement islamo-conservateur. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, alors premier ministre, et Fethullah Gülen, l’imam turc installé en Pennsylvanie (Etats-Unis), furent longtemps les meilleurs associés avant de devenir les pires ennemis. En 2013, leur alliance vole en éclats.

    C’est à ce moment-là que Kürsat Cevik rentre au pays. « Les purges ont commencé. En deux ans, il a été muté sept fois », raconte Elaine, certaine que son mari n’a jamais été güleniste.

    Un verdict inversé après un tweet du gouvernement

    Elle a frappé à toutes les portes, en vain. « Les avocats qui acceptent de défendre des accusés gülenistes demandent des honoraires exorbitants. J’ai tenté d’en trouver par le biais d’ONG, mais je n’ai reçu aucun soutien car mon mari est officier de police, et, en Turquie, les ONG se consacrent à la défense des militants des droits de l’homme et à celle des Kurdes. »

    En avril 2017, le groupe de travail sur les détentions arbitraires des Nations unies (WGAD) a qualifié le cas de son mari d’« arbitraire ». Ankara est restée sourde à cette exhortation.

    « En représailles, les médias pro-gouvernementaux ont accusé Kürsat d’être un espion français. »
    Vers qui se tourner ? La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme (CEDH), qui a vu les requêtes venues de Turquie augmenter de 276 % en 2016, a déclaré irrecevables les dossiers liés à l’état d’urgence imposé après le putsch raté. Le requérant doit d’abord épuiser les voies de recours internes. La Cour constitutionnelle turque en est une, ou plutôt elle l’était avant le 4 février.

    Ce jour-là, ses juges ont ordonné le maintien en prison des journalistes Mehmet Altan (66 ans) et Sahin Alpay (73 ans), en détention provisoire depuis 2016. Le 11 janvier, les mêmes juges s’étaient prononcés pour leur remise en liberté. Il aura suffi d’un tweet de Bekir Bozdag, le porte-parole du gouvernement, dénonçant « un mauvais verdict », de la part d’une Cour ayant « outrepassé ses pouvoirs législatifs et constitutionnels », pour que la décision soit inversée dans le sens voulu par le pouvoir politique.

  • Géopolitique de #Chypre : un lieu de tensions en #Méditerranée orientale

    Alors que nous assistons à la mise en scène des « Jeux de la Paix » entre la Corée du Sud et la Corée du Nord, l’Union européenne compte depuis 2004 un pays membre – Chypre - occupé en partie par un pays supposé candidat depuis 2005 – la Turquie. Patrice Gourdin offre ici une analyse géopolitique de ce lieu de tensions en mer Méditerranée. Un texte de référence sur une question souvent méconnue.

    FIN janvier 2018, à Lefkosia (nom turc de Nicosie), à l’instigation du président turc Recep Tayyip Erdogan, des nationalistes ont attaqué le journal Afrika qui avait critiqué l’offensive contre les Kurdes de Syrie (opération Rameau d’olivier) et établi un parallèle avec l’intervention à Chypre en 1974. Cette violence illustre les rivalités qui affligent l’île. Sur le territoire de Chypre, la répartition du pouvoir est complexe : au nord, la #République_turque_de_Chypre_du_Nord-#RTCN, une zone peuplée de Chypriotes turcs, occupée par l’armée turque depuis 1974 ; au sud, un espace contrôlé par la République de Chypre, où le pouvoir est exercé par des Chypriotes grecs. Issues d’un conflit, ces deux entités sont séparées par une zone tampon où se trouve stationnée depuis 1974 une force d’interposition de l’ONU, la Force des Nations Unies chargée du maintien de la paix à Chypre (UNFICYP). Ajoutons qu’après l’indépendance de Chypre en 1960, la Grande-Bretagne a conservé deux bases militaires (Dhekelia, Akrotiri), sur la côte sud. La proximité de cet espace insulaire avec le Proche-Orient contribue à expliquer cet état de fait. Le poids de l’histoire est considérable et plusieurs acteurs extérieurs ont influé ou continuent d’influer sur l’évolution de l’île.

  • #Burkina_Faso : un méga-projet turc de 343 millions d’euros pour le textile

    La société turque #Ayka_Textile, soutenue par les autorités burkinabè, a annoncé son intention de construire un complexe industriel pour la fabrication de #vêtements au Burkina Faso, avec un lancement de la production fin 2020.
    #turquafrique #Turquie #Afrique #textile #industrie_textile #investissement