person:robert mugabe

  • What’s Driving the Conflict in Cameroon?
    Violence Is Escalating in Its Anglophone Regions.

    In recent months, political violence in the Northwest and Southwest regions of Cameroon has escalated dramatically. So far, at least 400 civilians and 160 state security officers have been killed in the conflict between the government and an armed separatist movement that, just two short years ago, started as a peaceful strike of lawyers and teachers. How did such upheaval come to a country that has prided itself for decades as a bulwark of stability in a region of violent conflict? And why has it escalated so quickly?


    The Northwest and Southwest regions of Cameroon have a special historical legacy that sets them apart from the country’s other eight regions: between 1922 and 1960, they were ruled as a British trust or protectorate while the rest of the territory was administered by France. This is why today, 3 million residents of the Northwest and Southwest regions—roughly 20 percent of the Cameroonian population—speak primarily English, not French. These two regions also use their own legal and educational systems, inherited from the British, and have a unique cultural identity.

    Many analysts argue that the current conflict stems from the intractable historical animosity between Cameroon’s Anglophones and Francophones. Yet if that is the case, it is strange that the violence is only occurring now. Why not in 1972, when Ahmadou Ahidjo, the first president of Cameroon, ended the federation between the Anglophone and Francophone regions, forcing the Anglophones to submit to a unitary state? Or in 1992, when current President Paul Biya held Cameroon’s first multi-party elections, and narrowly won a heavily rigged contest by four percentage points against Anglophone candidate John Fru Ndi? Furthermore, if differences in identity are the primary driver of the conflict, it is quite surprising that Cameroon—one of the most ethnically diverse countries in Africa—has largely avoided ethnic conflict.

    Most Anglophones themselves say that they would be happy to put their national identity above their linguistic one if they weren’t systematically neglected and repressed by Cameroon’s central government. According to a survey from the Afrobarometer, an independent polling and research network, when asked whether they identify more as Cameroonians or more with their ethnic group, the vast majority of respondents in the Northwest and Southwest regions said they identified with these categories equally. Less than five percent said they identified more with their ethnic group. Nonetheless, members of this population have long felt themselves to be treated as second-class citizens in their own country. Anglophones who go to the capital city of Yaoundé to collect government documents, for example, often report being ridiculed or turned away by public officials because they cannot speak French. Separatists argue that this mistreatment and discrimination by Yaoundé, and Francophone Cameroonians more broadly, is grounds for secession.

    Yet regional neglect and mistreatment are not enough to explain the current wave of violence. If they were the root cause, then we should also be seeing separatist movements in Cameroon’s North and Far North regions, where state violence has become endemic in the fight against Boko Haram over the past four years. Moreover, in the North and Far North regions, the poverty rate is higher (more than 50 percent in each, compared to 15 percent in the Southwest and 25 percent in the Northwest) and state investment in public goods such schools, health clinics, and roads is lower than anywhere else in the country.

    To be sure, the Anglophones’ unique linguistic and cultural identity has played a role in the rebellion. But in order to understand why the escalating violence is taking place where and when it is, we must consider not only the Anglophone regions’ exceptional political isolation and relative economic autonomy from the rest of Cameroon, but also the increasing impatience of Africans living under non-democratic regimes.

    Biya, who last month won his seventh term in office, has been in power since 1982, making him one of the longest ruling leaders in the world. In fact, Cameroon has only had two presidents since gaining independence in 1960. Because the country’s median age is 18, this means that the majority of Cameroonians have only ever known one president. Yet the decline of Africa’s strongmen over the past two decades—most recently Blaise Compaoré in Burkina Faso, Yahya Jammeh in the Gambia, Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, José Eduardo dos Santos in Angola, and even Jacob Zuma in South Africa—has made Biya’s continued rule increasingly untenable. Democracy may have begun to lose its appeal in many parts of the world, but it remains important to most sub-Saharan Africans. Many Cameroonians with an education and a smart phone consider their president’s extended rule increasingly illegitimate. The political tide currently washing away the strongmen of Africa has made this moment an exceptional one for mobilizing people against the regime.

    In spite of these democratic headwinds, Biya has managed to maintain his legitimacy in some quarters through his cooptation of Francophone elites and control of information by means of the (largely Francophone) state-owned media. He has masterfully brought Francophone leaders into government, offering them lucrative ministerial posts and control over various government revenue streams. Importantly, he has not been excessively repressive—at least not before the current outbreak of violence—and has gone out of his way to uphold the façade of democratic legitimacy through holding regular elections, allowing a relatively unfettered (although weak) independent media, and having a general laissez-faire attitude toward governing.

    The state media and elites within the ruling Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement are stalwart defenders of the president, operating whole-heartedly on the fictitious assumption that the regime is democratic. Many Cameroonians, especially those isolated from independent media, opposition parties, or information from outside of the country, earnestly believe this narrative. Another survey by the Afrobarometer conducted in 2015 before the outbreak of violence, showed that the presidency is the second most trusted institution of the state, after the army. It also showed that only ten percent of Cameroonian respondents believe that their country is not a democracy.

    In contrast, the Anglophone regions’ relative distance from both Biya’s networks of patronage and influence and the Francophone state media puts them in a unique position to see the autocratic nature of the regime and rebel against it. Although 75.4 percent of Francophone Cameroonian respondents said they trust Biya “somewhat” or “a lot,” in the Afrobarometer poll, only 45.5 percent of Anglophones felt the same way. Part of the reason for this is easier access to criticism of the Biya government. In electoral autocracies, opposition parties are often the only institutions that consistently voice the view that the regime is not truly democratic. The strongest opposition party in Cameroon—the Social Democratic Front (SDF)—is headquartered in the Northwest region, thus further exposing Anglophones to narratives of state repression. Other parts of Cameroon do not have occasion to become as familiar with opposition party politics. In the most recent 2013 elections for the National Assembly, for example, the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement ran completely unopposed in 13 of the country’s 83 electoral districts.

    In comparison to other parts of the country, such as the north, Cameroon’s Anglophone regions are also more economically autonomous from Yaoundé. They have a robust cross-border trade with Nigeria, successful plantations in the Southwest, and fertile farming land. They are not overly-reliant on the export of primary resources, such as oil or timber, which funnels through state-owned corporations. And they are not as poor as, for example, the northern regions, which face chronic food insecurity. The Anglophones thus have not only the will, but also the resources to rebel.


    Unfortunately, an end to the crisis is nowhere in sight. Last month, Biya won his seventh term as president with 71.3 percent of the vote. The already unfair election was marked by exceedingly low participation in the Anglophone regions—just five percent in the Northwest—due to security fears. Meanwhile, Biya has responded to the separatists with an iron fist. He refuses to negotiate with them, instead sending in his elite Rapid Intervention Battalion (trained by the United States and led by a retired Israeli officer), which has now been accused of burning villages and attacking civilians in the Northwest and Southwest. But as long as the violence does not spill over into the Francophone regions, the crisis will likely not affect the president’s legitimacy in the rest of the country. Moreover, Biya remains staunchly supported by the West—especially France, but also the United States, which relies strongly on Cameroon in the fight against Boko Haram. The separatists, meanwhile, remain fractured, weak, and guilty of their own atrocities against civilians. Apart from attacking security forces, they have been kidnapping and torturing teachers and students who refuse to participate in a school strike.

    It is extremely unlikely that Biya will make the concessions necessary for attacks from separatists to stop, and the fluid nature of the insurgency will make it difficult for state security forces to end the violence. The scorched earth tactics on both sides only work to further alienate the population, many of whom have fled to Nigeria. It seems likely that a resolution to the crisis can only happen once the questions of when Biya will step down and who will replace him are fully answered. Right now, there is only unsubstantiated speculation. Many assume he will appoint a successor before the next presidential elections, scheduled for 2025. But if there are any surprises in the meantime similar to the military move against Mugabe in Zimbabwe or the popular uprising against Compaoré in Burkina Faso, a transition may come sooner than expected. A post-Biya political opening might provide a way for Cameroon’ s Anglophones to claim their long-awaited autonomy.
    #Cameroun #conflit #Cameroun_anglophone #violence #différent_territorial #autonomie

    • Thousands sign petition asking Justice Minister to stop deportation of student facing threat of torture

      OVER 13,000 PEOPLE have signed an online petition calling for a halt to the deportation of a Dublin City University student facing the threat of torture if he returns home.

      Zimbabwean national Shepherd Machaya could be deported within days after his permission to remain in Ireland expired on 21 October.

      The former pastor fled his homeland after members of ZANU-PF, the party co-founded by Robert Mugabe, tortured and threatened to kill him in an attempt to force him to join the party.

      After he left Zimbabwe, Machaya’s sister told him that one of his best friends died after suffering catastrophic injuries when he was tortured by the party’s members.

      Machaya, a second year Management of Information Technology and Information Systems student at DCU, has been living in Direct Provision in Laois for the last nine years.

      He completed a Level 5 course in Software Development in Portlaoise College in 2017, before being admitted to DCU under the University of Sanctuary scholarship scheme, which allows refugees to study there.

      However, after his bid for asylum failed earlier this year, Machaya was told by the Department of Justice to leave Ireland by 21 October.

      “From this moment onwards, he could be deported,” DCU Students’ Union President Vito Moloney Burke tells

      “I think we have a few days, but that’s about it.”

      Campaigners say that although his family remains in Zimbabwe, Machaya has made friends in Ireland, which he calls his “second home”, and that he has contributed to the country.

      Burke added that despite contacting Charlie Flanagan and the Department of Justice on multiple occasions, he has received no response.

      “We’ve had growing support on a national level. The most heartening thing is that members of the public are getting involved and signing the petition.

      “Hopefully more attention is brought to Shepherd’s case and this is discussed in the Dáil tomorrow.”
      #Irlande #Dublin_City_University

    • The #Sanctuary_Students_Solidarity_and_Support (#S4) Collective

      The Sanctuary Students Solidarity and Support (S4) Collective is excited to announce our official launch! Please join us for an evening of community building and celebration. This event honours the work and aspirations of a group of precarious migrant students and allies toward increased and more equitable access to secondary and post-secondary education in #Ontario.

  • Does China have the power to change governments in Africa?

    The idea that China is influencing regime change in Africa, became popular in the wake of the military coup in Zimbabwe that ended Robert Mugabe’s 37-year rule there. Western media was particularly taken by this thesis. Zimbabwean Army Chief General Constantino Chiwenga, the man at the head of the coup, visited Beijing the prior week, presumably to get the approval of the Chinese Communist…

  • Is China, changing regimes in Africa?

    The idea that China is influencing regime change in Africa, became popular in the wake of the military coup in Zimbabwe that ended Robert Mugabe’s 37-year rule there. Western media was particularly taken by this thesis. Zimbabwean Army Chief General Constantino Chiwenga, the man at the head of the coup, visited Beijing the prior week, presumably to get the approval of the Chinese Communist…

  • When is a coup a coup?

    In recent times when militaries in Burkina Faso, Egypt, Madagascar and Mali suspended civilian rule, they were subsequently suspended by regional actors. From a continental standpoint, these suspensions were in line with the African Union’s (AU) mandate to challenge unconstitutional transitions of power. Then came Zimbabwe. On November 21st, 2017, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe stepped down from the presidency after 37 years in…

  • The folly of ‘wait-and-see’ politics in Zimbabwe

    Robert Mugabe’s face was a common feature in our household. To this day there’s an election sticker of Mugabe’s once youthful face (despite it having been used for the 2013 elections), stuck onto the side of our garage door. I peel a little of it off every time I go home, but it won’t come off without leaving a…

  • A man of the people: Morgan Tsvangirai

    “Come hell; come storm; come rains; come fire: please just go ahead and do things as we resolved here. Do not look back.” These words were said to Morgan Tsvangirai by his trade union colleague, Timothy Kondo, in 1999 when civic leaders decided to found the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The new party was to challenge Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF’s nineteen-year rule of Zimbabwe, which by then had begun an unpopular program of economic liberalization…

    #ESSAYS #Zimbabwe

  • Zimbabwe : terres promises | ARTE Info

    De nouvelles élections doivent avoir lieu d’ici à 6 mois. Mais le pays est ruiné et son avenir incertain.

    La grande réforme politique de Robert Mugabe, la #redistribution des #terres dans les années 2000, a détruit l’économie de ce grand pays agricole et bouleversé sa démographie. Aujourd’hui, plus de 90% de la population est au chômage et le pays connaît une pénurie de liquidités. Il n’y a plus d’argent au Zimbabwe.

    Que reste-t-il de son #agriculture, autrefois locomotive de l’économie ? Qui cultive encore les terres du #Zimbabwe ? Comment vit-on aujourd’hui dans ce pays en transition ?

  • Une nouvelle technique permet
    D’accompagner chaque passant
    D’un hologramme

    Cet hologramme
    Est issu de l’historique de navigation
    De chacune et chacun

    Ce progrès est présenté
    Comme une chance croissante
    De rencontrer son prochain

    Mais naturellement toutes et tous
    Se doutent bien
    Qu’il s’agit de surveillance

    Pourquoi mes rêves de science-fiction
    Sont toujours
    Des dystopies ?

    Quelques cafés
    Seul, silence, salon désert
    Dans la pénombre

    Encore très peu de réponses
    À mes offres de participation
    À Frôlé par un V1

    Je prends un peu les nouvelles
    Désordre en Allemagne
    Et démission de Robert Mugabe

    Je file chez l’orthophoniste avec Zoé
    Bilan. Je me sers de mon cerveau d’analyste
    Puis de celui de père pour rassurer Zoé

    L’orthophoniste de Zoé
    Est une jeune femme

    J’envoie Zoé faire provision
    De petits légumes
    Pour les nouilles sautées

    J’ai décidément bien du mal
    Avec Sarah à lui faire entendre raison
    Sur tout un tas de trucs en ce moment

    De nouilles sautées
    Et tendues

    Promenade en forêt
    Dans le Morvan
    Avec Oana, je rêve

    J’avoue, il m’arrive de rire
    De certaines de mes blagues
    À la relecture de Frôlé par un V1. Honte

    Les deux nécrologies
    Que je me suis inventées
    Font froid dans le dos

    Dans les deux cas, je meurs centenaire
    Pendu et dévoré par les sangliers
    Mais après deux parcours différents

    La nuit tombe tôt
    Sur mon tapuscrit
    De Frôlé par un V1

    Je pars chercher Sarah au cheval
    Je pars chercher Zoé à la céramique
    Je pars chercher Émile au rugby

    Gnocchis aux épinards et au four
    Omelette et petits pois
    Pour qui n’aime pas les épinards

    On est tous bien fatigués
    On rit quand même
    Je travaille un peu, un tout petit peu


  • This Poisonous Cult of Personality | by Pankaj Mishra | NYR Daily | The New York Review of Books

    Donald Trump’s election last year exposed an insidious politics of celebrity, one in which a redemptive personality is projected high above the slow toil of political parties and movements. As his latest tweets about Muslims confirm, this post-political figure seeks, above all, to commune with his entranced white nationalist supporters. Periodically offering them emotional catharsis, a powerful medium of self-expression at the White House these days, Trump makes sure that his fan base survives his multiple political and economic failures. This may be hard to admit but the path to such a presidency of spectacle and vicarious participation was paved by the previous occupant of the White House.

    Barack Obama was the first “celebrity president” of the twenty-first century—“that is,” as Perry Anderson recently pointed out, “a politician whose very appearance was a sensation, from the earliest days of his quest for the Democratic nomination onwards: to be other than purely white, as well as good-looking and mellifluous, sufficed for that,” and for whom “personal popularity” mattered more than the fate of own party and policies.

    Public life routinely features such sensations, figures in whom people invest great expectations based on nothing more than a captivation with their radiant personas. Youthful good looks, an unconventional marriage, and some intellectual showmanship helped turn Emmanuel Macron, virtually overnight, into the savior not just of France, but of Europe, too. Until the approval ratings of this dynamic millionaire collapsed, a glamour-struck media largely waived close scrutiny of his neoliberal faith in tax breaks for rich compatriots, and contempt for “slackers.”

    Another example is Aung San Suu Kyi who, as a freedom fighter and prisoner of conscience, precluded any real examination of her politics, which have turned out to be abysmally sectarian, in tune with her electoral base among Myanmar’s Buddhist ethnic majority. Her personal sacrifices remained for too long the basis for assessing her political outlook, though the record of Robert Mugabe, among many other postcolonial leaders, had already proved that suffering for the cause of freedom is no guarantee of wise governance, and that today’s victims are likely to be tomorrow’s persecutors.

  • How Chinese See the Fall of Their Country’s Old Friend Robert Mugabe in #Zimbabwe · Global Voices

    As political and military forces in Zimbabwe moved to push longtime President Robert Mugabe from power, Chinese were watching the path of removal of a man many described as a dictator with interest.

    #Mugabe, 93, has ruled Zimbabwe for more than 30 years since the country’s independence from British colonial rule until today. When the majority of western countries started to sanction Zimbabwe for Mugabe’s land seizure policy and human rights abuses in the early 2000s, China stepped in and became Mugabe’s most important ally.

    #chine #chinafrique

  • Zimbabwe : Harare dans la rue pour une manifestation « historique » anti-Mugabe

    Les organisateurs espéraient un message. C’est un coup de poing. Des centaines de milliers de personnes sont descendues dans la rue samedi 18 novembre à Harare, bourrées d’espoir et d’enthousiasme, dans une manifestation colossale anti-Robert Mugabe. Dès le matin, la mobilisation apparaissait comme exceptionnelle. Des hommes, des femmes, de tous les âges, arrivent vers le centre déserté et se constituent en cortèges improvisés, tournant dans les rues, brandissant des drapeaux du Zimbabwe et chantant des slogans anti-Mugabe.

    Depuis la fin des années 1990, ce genre de manifestation est typiquement organisé par l’opposition, et cela se termine par des coups, du sang, des morts et des arrestations. Les forces de sécurité, l’armée, la police, les services de renseignement parfois aidés par l’association des vétérans, ont tellement opéré de violences contre les protestataires, à Harare, que la capitale, résolument anti-Mugabe, avait presque renoncé à la rue par instinct de survie. Samedi, il y a une différence de taille qui en dit long sur la situation extraordinaire qui prévaut au Zimbabwe.

    La manifestation est organisée, cette fois, à l’appel des vétérans (l’Association des vétérans de la guerre de libération nationale du Zimbabwe), pour féliciter les militaires d’avoir chassé du pouvoir celui qu’ils ont passé tant de temps à défendre. Et l’opposition, calculant qu’il vaut mieux se débarrasser d’abord de Mugabe, pour espérer ensuite percer dans le nouveau paysage politique, s’est associée à la manœuvre.

  • Revue de presse du 11.11 au 17.11.17

    Charlie Hebdo contre Médiapart : l’affrontement entre deux gauches irréconciliables

    L’appel de 100 élus locaux contre « l’abandon » des territoires par Macron

    Pour éviter la guerre civile, divisons la France

    Le progrès n’a pas encore tout à fait disparu !

    « Il faut neutraliser les religions dans l’entreprise ! »

    Zimbabwe : fin de route pour Robert Mugabe ?

    Une espèce de mammifère sur trois en péril en France métropolitaine

    Lettre ouverte aux fossoyeurs de l’émancipation féminine

    Un monde de choses

    L’islamisme s’empare de l’université

    Des militants du Hamas et du Hezbollah seraient entrés en Allemagne parmi les réfugiés

    Écriture inclusive : l’idéologisation du langage fait déjà des ravages au Québec




  • Après « l’affaire Mugabe », l’OMS a un peu plus terni son image - RFI

    Même s’il l’ont finalement jeté, ils restent quand même impardonnables d’avoir pensé à le nommer. Quel énorme gâchis quand même, connaissant un peu la maison, et l’excellence de certaines et certains y travaillant.

    L’OMS fait volte-face et annule la nomination de Robert Mugabe au poste d’ambassadeur de bonne volonté en Afrique pour aider à lutter contre les maladies non transmissibles. Dans un communiqué diffusé dimanche 22 octobre, le directeur général de l’OMS, l’ancien ministre des Affaires étrangères en Ethiopie, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, explique avoir « entendu les inquiétudes » de la communauté internationale. Cette nomination a en effet provoqué un tollé généralisé et terni l’image de l’OMS, déjà écornée ces dernières années.

  • Les fermiers zimbabwéens abandonnés à leur sort

    Il y a dix ans, alors qu’il travaillait comme maçon, Samuel Musengi a reçu une parcelle de neuf hectares. Dans le cadre d’une réforme foncière accélérée, des dizaines de milliers de familles zimbabwéennes noires comme la sienne ont été réinstallées sur ce qui était autrefois de vastes exploitations commerciales appartenant essentiellement à des Blancs.
    #agriculture #Zimbabwe #foncier #réforme_foncière
    cc @odilon

  • La honte | Entre les lignes entre les mots

    Corée du Sud, Allemagne, Brésil, Guatemala… nombreux sont les pays où la corruption a un prix. Tou-te-s ont été soupçonné-e-s de malversation : Park Geun-hye, Christian Wulff, Dilma Rousseff, Otto Pérez, respectivement président-e de la République de Corée du Sud, d’Allemagne, du Brésil, du Guatemala, démissionnent après quelques années d’exercice du pouvoir. En Roumanie, la guerre des citoyens contre la corruption est déclarée et est devenue une ligne de conduite dans les affaires politiques. Au Nigeria, des tentatives du même type voient le jour. Il y a bien évidemment des réfractaires : Jacob Zuma en Afrique du Sud, Teodoro Obiang en Guinée Équatoriale, Alpha Condé en Guinée, Omar Al Bashir au Soudan, Robert Mugabe au Zimbabwe, Paul Biya au Cameroun, et ceux qui les ont précédés, qui restent impunis.❞

  • ’Yes, I Was Dead:’ Zimbabwe’s Mugabe Back After Disappearing - The New York Times

    Zimbabwe’s 92-year-old President Robert Mugabe arrived home Saturday after an overseas absence that led to rumors about a health crisis, joking to reporters that “Yes, I was dead.

    It is true that I was dead,” the world’s oldest head of state said. “And I resurrected. As I always do.

    Are we speaking to a ghost?” someone asked him.

    Once I get back to my country, I am real,” Mugabe said.

    The president had not been seen since leaving a regional summit early on Tuesday. Flight data showed his plane went to Dubai after the original flight path indicated a course toward Asia. Mugabe has received treatment in Singapore in the past.
    Recently, his wife, Grace, said Mugabe would rule from the grave.

  • Across Africa, the worst famine since 1985 looms for 50 million | Global development | The Guardian

    Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Madagascar, Angola and Swaziland have already declared national emergencies or disasters, as have seven of South Africa’s nine provinces. Other countries, including Botswana and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, have also been badly hit. President Robert Mugabe has appealed for $1.5bn to buy food for Zimbabwe and Malawi is expected to declare that more than 8 million people, or half the country, will need food aid by November.

    More than 31 million people in the region are said by the UN to need food now, but this number is expected to rise to at least 49 million across almost all of southern Africa by Christmas. With 12 million more hungry people in Ethiopia, 7 million in Yemen, 6 million in Southern Sudan and more in the Central African Republic and Chad, a continent-scale food crisis is unfolding.

    #climat #famine #Afrique #El_Nino #sécheresse

  • #Zimbabwe : l’ex-vice présidente Joyce Mujuru défie Mugabe - RFI

    Quelle image...

    Suite de notre série consacrée au Zimbabwe, tenu d’une main de fer par Robert Mugabe depuis 36 ans. Il aura 92 ans dimanche. La Zanu-PF l’a désigné comme candidat pour la présidentielle de 2018, mais la bataille pour sa succession fait déjà rage. Elle oppose le vice-président et ancien commandant des armées Emmerson Mnangagwa, et l’épouse de Mugabe, Grace, de quarante ans sa cadette, que les Zimbabwéens détestent. L’ex-vice présidente, Joyce Mujuru, chassée du parti en 2014, a le vent en poupe, elle vient de lancer sa formation « We are people first », nous sommes le peuple d’abord. Elle souhaite former une grande coalition.

  • #Zimbabwe declares ’state of disaster’ due to drought | World news | The Guardian

    Zimbabwe’s president, Robert Mugabe, has declared a state of disaster in rural areas hit by a severe drought, as more than a quarter of the population face food shortages.

    A regional drought worsened by the #El_Niño weather phenomenon has affected South Africa, Malawi and Zambia as well as Zimbabwe, leaving tens of thousands of cattle dead, reservoirs depleted and crops destroyed.

    Formerly known as the breadbasket of Africa, Zimbabwe has suffered perennial shortages in recent years and has relied on importing grain from neighbouring countries to meet its needs.

    #sécheresse #Afrique_australe #silence_on_meurt

  • #Mongolie

    Is Mongolia really in danger of changing its national currency ? | The UB Post

    While wandering through Facebook, I saw a post from Minister of Mongolia M.Enkhsaikhan which said, “If we deny foreign investments and if foreigners turn away from us, the Mongolian tugrug will be replaced by Chinese yuan.
    In late December, international media reported that yuan was set to become Zimbabwe’s official currency after Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Zimbabwe to meet President Robert Mugabe. Zimbabwe has already made #yuan legal tender, but the announcement was made after Beijing officials said that Zimbabwe’s 40 million USD in debts to China would be cancelled.
    This was huge news for the world, but some Mongolians consider this news a message of warning for Mongolia.

    Nous, Mongols, ne suivons pas les traces du Zimbabwe (ou pire, cf. suivant…)

  • Trente éléphants seront tués pour l’anniversaire de Robert Mugabe au #Zimbabwe !

    « 19/02/2015, Harare, Zimbabwe : Le président du Zimbabwe voit décidément les choses en grand. Après s’être offert 90 vaches pour son 90e anniversaire l’an dernier, Robert Mugabe envisage de tuer une trentaine de pachydermes pour son festin d’anniversaire cette année. »

  • La Chine fabrique des éléphants maintenant ?

    Pour ses 91 ans, Robert Mugabe mangera des éléphants

    Pour son 91e anniversaire, le président du Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe a vu les choses en grand : cette année, il a invité pas moins de 20.000 personnes à festoyer le 28 février prochain dans un hôtel spa luxueux situé non loin des chutes Victoria. Au menu notamment : deux éléphants, deux buffles, cinq impalas et un lion, pour la somme de 78.000 livres, soit 105.000 euros, révèle le quotidien britannique The Guardian. Ces animaux seront offerts par un fermier local, et viendront s’ajouter aux 27 éléphants qui devrait arriver tout droit de Chine pour l’occasion.

    Ce n’est pas la première fois que Robert Mugabe, qui dirige le Zimbabwe d’une main de fer depuis l’indépendance en 1980, organise une fête gargantuesque pour son anniversaire, (...)

  • Maybe-meeting Mugabe, a quirky #FILM in progress

    When South African filmmaker Samora Sekhukhune asked her father what he wanted for his 70th birthday, he replied, “I want to meet President #Robert_Mugabe”. Amused at first, Sekhukhune realised.....

    #AFRICA_IS_A_COUNTRY #South_Africa #Zimbabwe