person:woodrow wilson

  • View from Nowhere. Is it the press’s job to create a community that transcends borders?

    A few years ago, on a plane somewhere between Singapore and Dubai, I read Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1983). I was traveling to report on the global market for passports—how the ultrawealthy can legally buy citizenship or residence virtually anywhere they like, even as 10 million stateless people languish, unrecognized by any country. In the process, I was trying to wrap my head around why national identity meant so much to so many, yet so little to my passport-peddling sources. Their world was the very image of Steve Bannon’s globalist nightmare: where you can never be too rich, too thin, or have too many passports.

    Anderson didn’t address the sale of citizenship, which only took off in earnest in the past decade; he did argue that nations, nationalism, and nationality are about as organic as Cheez Whiz. The idea of a nation, he writes, is a capitalist chimera. It is a collective sense of identity processed, shelf-stabilized, and packaged before being disseminated, for a considerable profit, to a mass audience in the form of printed books, news, and stories. He calls this “print-capitalism.”

    Per Anderson, after the printing press was invented, nearly 600 years ago, enterprising booksellers began publishing the Bible in local vernacular languages (as opposed to the elitist Latin), “set[ting] the stage for the modern nation” by allowing ordinary citizens to participate in the same conversations as the upper classes. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the proliferation (and popularity) of daily newspapers further collapsed time and space, creating an “extraordinary mass ceremony” of reading the same things at the same moment.

    “An American will never meet, or even know the names of more than a handful of his 240,000,000–odd fellow Americans,” Anderson wrote. “He has no idea of what they are up to at any one time.” But with the knowledge that others are reading the same news, “he has complete confidence in their steady, anonymous, simultaneous activity.”

    Should the press be playing a role in shaping not national identities, but transnational ones—a sense that we’re all in it together?

    Of course, national presses enabled more explicit efforts by the state itself to shape identity. After the US entered World War I, for instance, President Woodrow Wilson set out to make Americans more patriotic through his US Committee on Public Information. Its efforts included roping influential mainstream journalists into advocating American-style democracy by presenting US involvement in the war in a positive light, or simply by referring to Germans as “Huns.” The committee also monitored papers produced by minorities to make sure they supported the war effort not as Indians, Italians, or Greeks, but as Americans. Five Irish-American papers were banned, and the German-American press, reacting to negative stereotypes, encouraged readers to buy US bonds to support the war effort.

    The US media played an analogous role in selling the public on the 2003 invasion of Iraq. But ever since then, in the digital economy, its influence on the national consciousness has waned. Imagined Communities was published seven years before the fall of the Berlin Wall, twenty-two years before Thomas Friedman’s The World Is Flat, and a couple of decades before the internet upended print-capitalism as the world knew it (one of Anderson’s footnotes is telling, if quaint: “We still have no giant multinationals in the world of publishing”).

    Since Trump—a self-described nationalist—became a real contender for the US presidency, many news organizations have taken to looking inward: consider the running obsession with the president’s tweets, for instance, or the nonstop White House palace intrigue (which the president invites readily).

    Meanwhile, the unprofitability of local and regional papers has contributed to the erosion of civics, which, down the line, makes it easier for billionaires to opt out of old “imagined communities” and join new ones based on class and wealth, not citizenship. And given the challenges humanity faces—climate change, mass migration, corporate hegemony, and our relationships to new technologies—even if national papers did make everyone feel like they shared the same narrative, a renewed sense of national pride would prove impotent in fighting world-historic threats that know no borders.

    Should the press, then, be playing an analogous role in shaping not national identities, but transnational ones—a sense that we’re all in it together? If it was so important in shaping national identity, can it do so on a global scale?

    Like my passport-buying subjects, I am what Theresa May, the former British prime minister, might call a “citizen of nowhere.” I was born in one place to parents from another, grew up in a third, and have lived and traveled all over. That informs my perspective: I want deeply for there to be a truly cosmopolitan press corps, untethered from national allegiances, regional biases, class divisions, and the remnants of colonial exploitation. I know that’s utopian; the international working class is hardly a lucrative demographic against which publishers can sell ads. But we seem to be living in a time of considerable upheaval and opportunity. Just as the decline of religiously and imperially organized societies paved the way for national alternatives, then perhaps today there is a chance to transcend countries’ boundaries, too.

    Does the US media help create a sense of national identity? If nationalism means putting the interests of one nation—and what its citizens are interested in—before more universal concerns, then yes. Most journalists working for American papers, websites, and TV write in English with a national audience (or regional time zone) in mind, which affects how we pitch, source, frame, and illustrate a story—which, in turn, influences our readers, their country’s politics, and, down the line, the world. But a news peg isn’t an ideological form of nationalism so much as a practical or methodological one. The US press feeds off of more pernicious nationalisms, too: Donald Trump’s false theory about Barack Obama being “secretly” Kenyan, disseminated by the likes of Fox and The Daily Caller, comes to mind.

    That isn’t to say that global news outlets don’t exist in the US. When coaxing subscribers, the Financial Times, whose front page often includes references to a dozen different countries, openly appeals to their cosmopolitanism. “Be a global citizen. Become an FT Subscriber,” read a recent banner ad, alongside a collage featuring the American, Chinese, Japanese, Australian, and European Union flags (though stories like the recent “beginner’s guide to buying a private island” might tell us something about what kind of global citizen they’re appealing to).

    “I don’t think we try to shape anyone’s identity at all,” Gillian Tett, the paper’s managing editor for the US, says. “We recognize two things: that the world is more interconnected today than it’s ever been, and that these connections are complex and quite opaque. We think it’s critical to try to illuminate them.”

    For Tett, who has a PhD in social anthropology, money serves as a “neutral, technocratic” starting point through which to understand—and tie together—the world. “Most newspapers today tend to start with an interest in politics or events, and that inevitably leads you to succumb to tribalism, however hard you try [not to],” Tett explains. “If you look at the world through money—how is money going around the world, who’s making and losing it and why?—out of that you lead to political, cultural, foreign-policy stories.”

    Tett’s comments again brought to mind Imagined Communities: Anderson notes that, in 18th-century Caracas, newspapers “began essentially as appendages of the market,” providing commercial news about ships coming in, commodity prices, and colonial appointments, as well as a proto–Vows section for the upper crust to hate-read in their carriages. “The newspaper of Caracas quite naturally, and even apolitically, created an imagined community among a specific assemblage of fellow-readers, to whom these ships, brides, bishops, and prices belonged,” he wrote. “In time, of course, it was only to be expected that political elements would enter in.”

    Yesterday’s aristocracy is today’s passport-buying, globe-trotting one percent. The passport brokers I got to know also pitched clients with the very same promise of “global citizenship” (it sounds less louche than “buy a new passport”)—by taking out ads in the Financial Times. Theirs is exactly the kind of neoliberal “globalism” that nationalist politicians like Trump have won elections denouncing (often hypocritically) as wanting “the globe to do well, frankly, not caring about our country so much.” Isn’t upper-crust glibness about borders, boundaries, and the value of national citizenship part of what helped give us this reactionary nativism in the first place?

    “I suspect what’s been going on with Brexit and maybe Trump and other populist movements [is that] people. . . see ‘global’ as a threat to local communities and businesses rather than something to be welcomed,” Tett says. “But if you’re an FT reader, you see it as benign or descriptive.”

    Among the largest news organizations in the world is Reuters, with more than 3,000 journalists and photographers in 120 countries. It is part of Thomson Reuters, a truly global firm. Reuters does not take its mandate lightly: a friend who works there recently sent me a job posting for an editor in Gdynia, which, Google clarified for me, is a city in the Pomeranian Voivodeship of Poland.

    Reuters journalists cover everything from club sports to international tax evasion. They’re outsourcing quick hits about corporate earnings to Bangalore, assembling teams on multiple continents to tackle a big investigation, shedding or shuffling staff under corporate reorganizations. Perhaps unsurprisingly, “more than half our business is serving financial customers,” Stephen Adler, the editor in chief, tells me. “That has little to do with what country you’re from. It’s about information: a central-bank action in Europe or Japan may be just as important as everything else.”

    Institutionally, “it’s really important and useful that we don’t have one national HQ,” Adler adds. “That’s the difference between a global news organization and one with a foreign desk. For us, nothing is foreign.” That approach won Reuters this year’s international Pulitzer Prize for uncovering the mass murder of the Rohingya in Myanmar (two of the reporters were imprisoned as a result, and since freed); it also comes through especially sharply in daily financial stories: comprehensive, if dry, compendiums of who-what-where-when-why that recognize the global impact of national stories, and vice versa. A recent roundup of stock movements included references to the US Fed, China trade talks, Brexit, monetary policy around the world, and the price of gold.

    Adler has led the newsroom since 2011, and a lot has changed in the world. (I worked at Reuters between 2011 and 2013, first as Adler’s researcher and later as a reporter; Adler is the chair of CJR’s board.) Shortly after Trump’s election, Adler wrote a memo affirming the organization’s commitment to being fair, honest, and resourceful. He now feels more strongly than ever about judiciously avoiding biases—including national ones. “Our ideology and discipline around putting personal feelings and nationality aside has been really helpful, because when you think about how powerful local feelings are—revolutions, the Arab Spring—we want you writing objectively and dispassionately.”

    The delivery of stories in a casual, illustrated, highly readable form is in some ways more crucial to developing an audience than subject matter.

    Whether global stories can push communities to develop transnationally in a meaningful way is a harder question to answer; it seems to impugn our collective aptitude for reacting to problems of a global nature in a rational way. Reuters’s decision not to fetishize Trump hasn’t led to a drop-off in US coverage—its reporters have been especially strong on immigration and trade policy, not to mention the effects of the new administration on the global economy—but its stories aren’t exactly clickbait, which means ordinary Americans might not encounter them at the top of their feed. In other words, having a global perspective doesn’t necessarily translate to more eyeballs.

    What’s more, Reuters doesn’t solve the audience-class problem: whether readers are getting dispatches in partner newspapers like The New York Times or through the organization’s Eikon terminal, they tend to be the sort of person “who does transnational business, travels a good deal, is connected through work and media, has friends in different places, cares about what’s going on in different places,” Adler says. “That’s a pretty large cohort of people who have reason to care what’s going on in other places.”

    There are ways to unite readers without centering coverage on money or the markets. For a generation of readers around the world, the common ground is technology: the internet. “We didn’t pick our audience,” Ben Smith, the editor in chief of BuzzFeed, tells me over the phone. “Our audience picked us.” He defines his readers as a cohort aged 18–35 “who are on the internet and who broadly care about human rights, global politics, and feminism and gay rights in particular.”

    To serve them, BuzzFeed recently published a damning investigative report into the World Wildlife Fund’s arming of militias in natural reserves; a (not uncontroversial) series on Trump’s business dealings abroad; early exposés of China’s detention of Uighur citizens; and reports on child abuse in Australia. Climate—“the central challenge for every newsroom in the world”—has been harder to pin down. “We don’t feel anyone has cracked it. But the shift from abstract scientific [stories] to coverage of fires in California, it’s a huge change—it makes it more concrete,” Smith says. (My husband is a reporter for BuzzFeed.)

    The delivery of these stories in a casual, illustrated, highly readable form is in some ways more crucial to developing an audience than subject matter. “The global political financial elites have had a common language ever since it was French,” Smith says. “There is now a universal language of internet culture, [and] that. . . is how our stuff translates so well between cultures and audiences.” This isn’t a form of digital Esperanto, Smith insists; the point isn’t to flatten the differences between countries or regions so much as to serve as a “container” in which people from different regions, interest groups, and cultures can consume media through references they all understand.

    BuzzFeed might not be setting out to shape its readers’ identities (I certainly can’t claim to feel a special bond with other people who found out they were Phoebes from the quiz “Your Sushi Order Will Reveal Which ‘Friends’ Character You’re Most Like”). An audience defined by its youth and its media consumption habits can be difficult to keep up with: platforms come and go, and young people don’t stay young forever. But if Anderson’s thesis still carries water, there must be something to speaking this language across cultures, space, and time. Call it “Web vernacular.”

    In 2013, during one of the many recent and lengthy US government shutdowns, Joshua Keating, a journalist at Slate, began a series, “If It Happened There,” that imagined how the American media would view the shutdown if it were occurring in another country. “The typical signs of state failure aren’t evident on the streets of this sleepy capital city,” Keating opens. “Beret-wearing colonels have not yet taken to the airwaves to declare martial law. . . .But the pleasant autumn weather disguises a government teetering on the brink.”

    It goes on; you get the idea. Keating’s series, which was inspired by his having to read “many, many headlines from around the world” while working at Foreign Policy, is a clever journalistic illustration of what sociologists call “methodological nationalism”: the bias that gets inadvertently baked into work and words. In the Middle East, it’s sectarian or ethnic strife; in the Midwest, it’s a trigger-happy cop and a kid in a hoodie.

    His send-ups hit a nerve. “It was huge—it was by far the most popular thing I’ve done at Slate,” Keating says. “I don’t think that it was a shocking realization to anyone that this kind of language can be a problem, but sometimes pointing it out can be helpful. If the series did anything, it made people stop and be conscious of how. . . our inherent biases and perspectives will inform how we cover the world.”

    Curiously, living under an openly nationalist administration has changed the way America—or at the very least, a significant part of the American press corps—sees itself. The press is a de facto opposition party, not because it tries to be, but because the administration paints it that way. And that gives reporters the experience of working in a place much more hostile than the US without setting foot outside the country.

    Keating has “semi-retired” the series as a result of the broad awareness among American reporters that it is, in fact, happening here. “It didn’t feel too novel to say [Trump was] acting like a foreign dictator,” he says. “That was what the real news coverage was doing.”

    Keating, who traveled to Somaliland, Kurdistan, and Abkhazia to report his book Invisible Countries (2018), still thinks the fastest and most effective way to form an international perspective is to live abroad. At the same time, not being bound to a strong national identity “can make it hard to understand particular concerns of the people you’re writing about,” he says. It might be obvious, but there is no one perfect way to be internationally minded.

    Alan Rusbridger—the former editor of The Guardian who oversaw the paper’s Edward Snowden coverage and is now the principal at Lady Margaret Hall, a college at Oxford University—recognizes the journalistic and even moral merits of approaching news in a non-national way: “I think of journalism as a public service, and I do think there’s a link between journalism at its best and the betterment of individual lives and societies,” he says. But he doesn’t have an easy formula for how to do that, because truly cosmopolitan journalism requires both top-down editorial philosophies—not using certain phrasings or framings that position foreigners as “others”—and bottom-up efforts by individual writers to read widely and be continuously aware of how their work might be read by people thousands of miles away.

    Yes, the starting point is a nationally defined press, not a decentralized network, but working jointly helps pool scarce resources and challenge national or local biases.

    Rusbridger sees potential in collaborations across newsrooms, countries, and continents. Yes, the starting point is a nationally defined press, not a decentralized network; but working jointly helps pool scarce resources and challenge national or local biases. It also wields power. “One of the reasons we reported Snowden with the Times in New York was to use global protections of human rights and free speech and be able to appeal to a global audience of readers and lawyers,” Rusbridger recalls. “We thought, ‘We’re pretty sure nation-states will come at us over this, and the only way to do it is harness ourselves to the US First Amendment not available to us anywhere else.’”

    In employing these tactics, the press positions itself in opposition to the nation-state. The same strategy could be seen behind the rollout of the Panama and Paradise Papers (not to mention the aggressive tax dodging detailed therein). “I think journalists and activists and citizens on the progressive wing of politics are thinking creatively about how global forces can work to their advantage,” Rusbridger says.

    But he thinks it all starts locally, with correspondents who have fluency in the language, culture, and politics of the places they cover, people who are members of the communities they write about. That isn’t a traditional foreign-correspondent experience (nor indeed that of UN employees, NGO workers, or other expats). The silver lining of publishing companies’ shrinking budgets might be that cost cutting pushes newsrooms to draw from local talent, rather than send established writers around. What you gain—a cosmopolitanism that works from the bottom up—can help dispel accusations of media elitism. That’s the first step to creating new imagined communities.

    Anderson’s work has inspired many an academic, but media executives? Not so much. Rob Wijnberg is an exception: he founded the (now beleaguered) Correspondent in the Netherlands in 2013 with Anderson’s ideas in mind. In fact, when we speak, he brings the name up unprompted.

    “You have to transcend this notion that you can understand the world through the national point of view,” he says. “The question is, What replacement do we have for it? Simply saying we have to transcend borders or have an international view isn’t enough, because you have to replace the imagined community you’re leaving behind with another one.”

    For Wijnberg, who was a philosophy student before he became a journalist, this meant radically reinventing the very structures of the news business: avoiding covering “current events” just because they happened, and thinking instead of what we might call eventful currents—the political, social, and economic developments that affect us all. It meant decoupling reporting from national news cycles, and getting readers to become paying “members” instead of relying on advertisements.

    This, he hoped, would help create a readership not based on wealth, class, nationality, or location, but on borderless, universal concerns. “We try to see our members. . . as part of a group or knowledge community, where the thing they share is the knowledge they have about a specific structural subject matter,” be it climate, inequality, or migration, Wijnberg says. “I think democracy and politics answers more to media than the other way around, so if you change the way media covers the world you change a lot.”

    That approach worked well in the Netherlands: his team raised 1.7 million euros in 2013, and grew to include 60,000 members. A few years later, Wijnberg and his colleagues decided to expand into the US, and with the help of NYU’s Jay Rosen, an early supporter, they made it onto Trevor Noah’s Daily Show to pitch their idea.

    The Correspondent raised more than $2.5 million from nearly 50,000 members—a great success, by any measure. But in March, things started to get hairy, with the publication abruptly pulling the plug on opening a US newsroom and announcing that staff would edit stories reported from the US from the original Amsterdam office instead. Many of the reasons behind this are mundane: visas, high rent, relocation costs. And reporters would still be reporting from, and on, the States. But supporters felt blindsided, calling the operation a scam.

    Today, Wijnberg reflects that he should have controlled the messaging better, and not promised to hire and operate from New York until he was certain that he could. He also wonders why it matters.

    “It’s not saying people who think it matters are wrong,” he explains. “But if the whole idea of this kind of geography and why it’s there is a construct, and you’re trying to think about transcending it, the very notion of Where are you based? is secondary. The whole point is not to be based anywhere.”

    Still: “The view from everywhere—the natural opposite—is just as real,” Wijnberg concedes. “You can’t be everywhere. You have to be somewhere.”

    And that’s the rub: for all of nationalism’s ills, it does instill in its subjects what Anderson calls a “deep, horizontal comradeship” that, while imagined, blossoms thanks to a confluence of forces. It can’t be replicated supranationally overnight. The challenge for a cosmopolitan journalism, then, is to dream up new forms of belonging that look forward, not backward—without discarding the imagined communities we have.

    That’s hard; so hard that it more frequently provokes a retrenchment, not an expansion, of solidarity. But it’s not impossible. And our collective futures almost certainly depend on it.

    https://www.cjr.org/special_report/view-from-nowhere.php
    #journalisme #nationalisme #Etat-nation #communauté_nationale #communauté_internationale #frontières #presse #médias

  • The Great War is often depicted as an unexpected catastrophe. But for millions who had been living under imperialist rule, terror and degradation were nothing new.

    How colonial violence came home: the ugly truth of the first world war
    https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/nov/10/how-colonial-violence-came-home-the-ugly-truth-of-the-first-world-war?C

    With more than eight million dead and more than 21 million wounded, the war was the bloodiest in European history until that second conflagration on the continent ended in 1945. War memorials in Europe’s remotest villages, as well as the cemeteries of Verdun, the Marne, Passchendaele, and the Somme enshrine a heartbreakingly extensive experience of bereavement. In many books and films, the prewar years appear as an age of prosperity and contentment in Europe, with the summer of 1913 featuring as the last golden summer.

    But today, as racism and xenophobia return to the centre of western politics, it is time to remember that the background to the first world war was decades of racist imperialism whose consequences still endure. It is something that is not remembered much, if at all, on Remembrance Day.

    At the time of the first world war, all western powers upheld a racial hierarchy built around a shared project of territorial expansion. In 1917, the US president, Woodrow Wilson, baldly stated his intention, “to keep the white race strong against the yellow” and to preserve “white civilisation and its domination of the planet”. Eugenicist ideas of racial selection were everywhere in the mainstream, and the anxiety expressed in papers like the Daily Mail, which worried about white women coming into contact with “natives who are worse than brutes when their passions are aroused”, was widely shared across the west. Anti-miscegenation laws existed in most US states. In the years leading up to 1914, prohibitions on sexual relations between European women and black men (though not between European men and African women) were enforced across European colonies in Africa. The presence of the “dirty Negroes” in Europe after 1914 seemed to be violating a firm taboo.

  • When Dissent Became Treason
    http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/09/28/world-war-i-when-dissent-became-treason

    As our newspapers and TV screens overflow with choleric attacks by President Trump on the media, immigrants, and anyone who criticizes him, it makes us wonder: What would it be like if nothing restrained him from his obvious wish to silence, deport, or jail such enemies? For a chilling answer, we need only roll back the clock one hundred years, to the moment when the United States entered not just a world war, but a three-year period of unparalleled censorship, mass imprisonment, and anti-immigrant terror.

    When Woodrow Wilson went before Congress on April 2, 1917, and asked it to declare war against Germany, the country, as it is today, was riven by discord. Even though millions of people from the perennially bellicose Theodore Roosevelt on down were eager for war, President Wilson was not sure he could count on the loyalty of some nine million German-Americans, or of the 4.5 million Irish-Americans who might be reluctant to fight as allies of Britain. Also, hundreds of officials elected to state and local office belonged to the Socialist Party, which strongly opposed American participation in this or any other war. And tens of thousands of Americans were “Wobblies,” members of the militant Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), and the only battle they wanted to fight was that of labor against capital.

    The moment the United States entered the war in Europe, a second, less noticed war began at home. Staffed by federal agents, local police, and civilian vigilantes, it had three main targets: anyone who might be a German sympathizer, left-wing newspapers and magazines, and labor activists. The war against the last two groups would continue for a year and a half after World War I ended.

  • Accords Sykes-Picot : Aux origines du chaos au Moyen-Orient. Par Jonathan Lefèvre — 15 novembre 2016 - RipouxBlique des CumulardsVentrusGrosQ
    http://slisel.over-blog.com/2016/11/accords-sykes-picot-aux-origines-du-chaos-au-moyen-orient.par-jona

    La « nouvelle » carte post-Empire ottoman signée par Mark Sykes et François Georges-Picot en 1916. La France s’approprie la partie en bleu, la Grande-Bretagne celle en rouge.
    Dessinez un cercle sur du sable avec un ami. Tracez avec lui une ligne au milieu de ce cercle. Décidez que ce qui est au nord vous appartient et que ce qui est au sud lui revient. Vous êtes la France et votre ami est la Grande-Bretagne. Nous sommes en 1916 et vous venez d’entériner les accords dits de Sykes-Picot qui dépècent l’Empire ottoman.
    « La ligne de partage n’avait pas de rationalité autre qu’une idée simpliste : tout ça, c’est du sable, on trace un trait, on ne tient pas compte des territoires des tribus, des tracés de fleuves, des voies de communication, de la géographie. C’est une ligne purement géométrique. Tout a été fait avec désinvolture. » Voici en résumé les accords Sykes-Picot selon l’historien James Barr.1
    L’Empire ottoman (1299-1923) connait son apogée à la fin du 17e siècle. A l’époque, il compte, outre la Turquie (son cœur), les Balkans, la péninsule arabique, l’Afrique du Nord et une partie de l’Europe centrale. Il n’a rien à envier aux États européens.
    « Bien avant les révolutions industrielles du 19e siècle en Europe du Nord, l’Empire ottoman était très avancé sur le plan agricole et sur le plan commercial, ses réseaux s’étendant jusqu’en Chine, contrôlant l’Afrique du Nord, disposant de bases militaires dans la mer Rouge… », explique Mohammed Hassan, ancien diplomate éthiopien et spécialiste du Moyen-Orient.2
    Mais cette puissance n’allait pas durer éternellement. Depuis 1830, l’Empire perd des territoires. La Grèce déclare son indépendance. La Serbie devient autonome. La France occupe l’Algérie. L’Egypte se soulève… « Depuis un certain temps, ce même Empire ottoman devait se battre pour une politique de centralisation. (…) Cette lutte entre pouvoir central et régions séparatistes a affaibli l’Empire face aux autres grandes puissances. Or, de son côté, la Grande-Bretagne s’était industrialisée très rapidement, elle était même devenue une sorte de superpuissance. (…) De plus en plus endetté, l’Empire ottoman s’est retrouvé étranglé par les prêts accordés par les puissances française et britannique. Alors est apparu un nouvel acteur puissant sur la scène impérialiste : l’Empire allemand », continue Mohammed Hassan.
    Colère sociale au sein de l’Empire
    Qui poursuit : « Le rapport de force évoluait au désavantage des autorités ottomanes : l’augmentation des dettes, la montée d’une bourgeoisie compradore (par opposition à la bourgeoisie nationale, la compradore est entièrement liée aux intérêts extérieurs, NdlR) et l’accroissement du pouvoir financier du système bancaire international, tout cela faisait perdre à l’Empire ottoman son indépendance économique et politique. (…) Tout ceci a augmenté la pauvreté dans l’Empire ottoman, provoquant une véritable colère sociale. » 
    En 1914, c’est donc un empire en déclin qui entre en guerre aux côtés de l’Allemagne lors de la Première Guerre mondiale. Des nationalistes arabes s’activent depuis un siècle à combattre l’empire de l’intérieur et rêvent d’un État démocratique qui s’étendrait sur toute l’Arabie.
    Les autorités de l’empire veulent à tout prix le sauvegarder et reprendre des territoires perdus au fil des ans. Mais même au sein du peuple turc, des divisions sont là. Des nationalistes, qui porteront Mustafa Kemal Atatürk au pouvoir de la toute nouvelle République de Turquie en 1923, se font de plus en plus nombreux.
    Alors que la bataille de Verdun fait rage (700 000 morts entre Français et Allemands en 9 mois), les Français et les Britanniques pensent déjà à l’après-guerre. Deux diplomates, Mark Sykes et François Georges-Picot, travaillent à un projet qui tient très à cœur aux deux puissances de la Manche : le partage du Moyen-Orient.
    Les deux pays ont depuis longtemps des convoitises sur la région. La France avait été avec les puissances européennes à l’origine du statut spécial de semi-autonomie dont bénéficiait depuis 1864 le Mont Liban (chaîne de montagnes qui traverse le pays et une partie de la Syrie). Ce statut fut mis en place à la suite des massacres de chrétiens en 1860 dans la montagne libanaise. Sous Napoléon III, Paris avait alors dépêché une force navale pour les secourir. Du moins, c’était là la raison officielle de cette première « ingérence humanitaire »…
    Les Britanniques, eux, veulent à tout pris consolider « leur » route des Indes et s’inquiètent de « leurs » frontières égyptiennes et du Canal de Suez.
    Les capitalistes britanniques et français ont donc leurs propres intérêts dans la région. « Les Britanniques exercent une hégémonie stratégique, tandis que les Français ont une implication principalement territoriale et sont à la manœuvre dans les chemins de fer turcs, les ports, les routes, l’électricité. Le modèle français s’exprime dans l’éducation et la culture des élites locales, ce qui induit un autre niveau d’exigence que celui des Anglais. Avant même la guerre, en 1912, la Grande-Bretagne renonce à toute ambition sur la Syrie et le Liban, qui n’ont pas, à ses yeux, d’importance stratégique ; la France, elle, estime avoir sur cette zone des droits historiques qui remontent aux Croisades. En revanche, les Britanniques tiennent tout particulièrement à contrôler la rive orientale du canal de Suez, qu’ils détiennent », explique James Barr.3
    Pour un État arabe indépendant

    Fayçal (à l’avant-plan), fils du chérif de la Mecque, Hussein, mène la « Grande révolte arabe » contre l’Empire ottoman en 1916 mais sera trahi par la Grande-Bretagne. Après avoir été défait par la France, il est nommé roi d’Irak.
    Face au nationalisme turc, les nationalistes arabes pensent pouvoir se servir des volontés britanniques de combattre l’Empire ottoman pour revendiquer un État indépendant. Pour cela, il leur faut un chef qui les représente afin de négocier un tel État avec la superpuissance britannique. « Les leaders nationalistes arabes de Damas et de Bagdad craignent que leurs pays n’échappent à l’oppression ottomane que pour subir un partage entre la France et l’Angleterre. Par le Protocole de Damas (mai 1915), ils précisent leur revendication d’un État arabe unique et indépendant et se placent, pour y parvenir, sous la bannière de la famille Hachémite, dont le chef est le chérif de La Mecque, Hussein ben Ali. Il s’agit de monnayer leur appui total dans la guerre contre la promesse de leur indépendance. De son côté, la Grande-Bretagne, soucieuse de trouver des alliés dans la lutte contre l’armée ottomane appuyée par les Allemands, accepte sur le papier la constitution d’un Empire arabe, sous la conduite de Hussein. L’accord se réalise, tant bien que mal, sous la forme d’échanges de lettres entre Hussein, qui expose ses demandes le 14 juillet 1915, et le Haut-Commissaire britannique au Caire, Mac-Mahon, qui précise ses intentions notamment dans une lettre du 24 octobre 1915. La correspondance se poursuivra afin de limiter les points de divergence. »4
    Chérif Hussein et Lawrence d’Arabie

    Sir Mark Sykes. Ce conseiller diplomatique signera les accords pour la Grande-Bretagne.
    Les accords Sykes-Picot sont conclus le 16 mai 1916. Ils tiennent en fait en un échange de lettres entre les ministres des Affaires étrangères des deux pays : Paul Cambon et Edward Grey. L’Italie et la Russie tsariste sont tenus au courant de ces accords secrets, qui prévoient deux zones d’influence, dites bleue et rouge, qui seront confiées à la France et à la Grande-Bretagne pour qu’elles y créent des États sous administration directe ou indirecte. L’accord prévoit aussi deux autres zones où serait édifié le futur État arabe indépendant, avec des conseillers français et anglais.
    Le chérif Hussein accepte donc d’engager la lutte. Conduites par l’un de ses fils, Fayçal, et conseillées par Thomas Edward Lawrence (ou Lawrence d’Arabie, voir encadré), des services de renseignement britanniques, les troupes du chérif Hussein entrent dans la bataille le 5 juin 1916. Connue comme la « Grande révolte arabe », la guérilla a pour but de refouler l’armée ottomane vers le nord et de faciliter les manœuvres britanniques dans la même direction, mais à partir de l’Égypte.
    L’URSS dénonce les accords
    Les accords Sykes-Picot, secrets, trahissent la promesse faite aux Arabes qui s’étaient soulevés contre les Turcs. C’est Moscou qui brise le silence diplomatique. Dès leur arrivée au Kremlin en 1917, les communistes découvrent ces accords et les rendent publics.
    L’annonce de ces accords secrets qui tuent dans l’œuf toute possibilité d’indépendance pour les nationalistes arabes met ces derniers en colère.
    Après la fin de la guerre, en 1919, la Conférence de la paix de Paris entérine ces accords. La Société des nations (SDN, ancêtre de l’ONU) confie la Syrie et le Liban à la France pendant que les Britanniques« reçoivent » l’Irak, la Transjordanie et la Palestine. Un an plus tard, le traité de Sèvres confirme le partage au profit des deux puissances occidentales.
    Fayçal, mis au courant de l’accord par la France et la Grande-Bretagne avant que l’URSS ne le rende public, ne peut accepter. Poussé par l’élan de la « Grande révolte », il déclare la guerre à la France qui, en 1920, a pris possession des terres qui lui revenaient selon les termes de l’accord. En juillet, les troupes de Fayçal sont défaites aux portes de Damas (Syrie). Cet échec signe la fin de l’appui des Britanniques à sa famille, les Hachémites, au profit des Saoud, famille encore au pouvoir aujourd’hui en Arabie saoudite. En compensation, les Hachémites reçoivent l’Irak (Fayçal) et la Transjordanie (Abdallah, un autre fils d’Hussein) de la part de la Grande-Bretagne.
    La source de nombreuses turbulences
    « Sykes-Picot appartient au passé. Cependant, les règles qui ont sous-tendu sa rédaction et les conduites qui ont présidé à son application sont plus que jamais à l’œuvre », observe le professeur de sociologie politique et de relations internationales Joseph Maïla.5
    Le peuple irakien, parmi tant d’autres exemples, peut en témoigner. Le 17 janvier 1991, 29 pays (dont la Belgique) envahissent l’Irak. Le but était de chasser l’armée irakienne du Koweït, qu’elle avait envahi en août 1990… et de préserver les intérêts stratégiques des Occidentaux dans la région.
    En 43 jours, cette coalition internationale effectue 100 000 bombardements aériens, lance 450 roquettes Tomahawk et largue 265 000 bombes. Une grande partie des infrastructures sociales et économiques d’Irak sont détruites. Le pays est rejeté dans l’ère pré-industrielle pour une très longue période. Après le retrait irakien du Koweït, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies décrète un embargo jusqu’en mai 2003, après la chute du président Saddam Hussein.
    Le nombre de morts dus à l’embargo est énorme. D’après les chiffres du ministère irakien de Santé publique (chiffre pour fin 2002), 1 806 915 civils, dont 750 000 enfants de moins de 5 ans, sont morts à cause de l’étranglement économique.
    Aujourd’hui encore, des plans américains ou autres pour « refaire » les frontières du Moyen-Orient sont à l’œuvre. Le peuple syrien, irakien, libyen ou palestinien peut en témoigner.
    Lawrence d’Arabie (1888-1935)

    T.E. Lawrence, plus connu sous le nom de Lawrence d’Arabie, à gauche. (Photo Thomas Lowell)
    Des millions de personnes ont entendu parler des accords Sykes-Picot sans le savoir. En effet, dans la superproduction hollywoodienne de 1963, Lawrence d’Arabie, le héros se sent trahi par ces accords.
    Thomas Edward Lawrence est un jeune officier britannique passionné d’architecture et d’archéologie qui a passé quelques années en Orient avant le début de la Première Guerre mondiale. Envoyé là-bas, il va rejoindre Fayçal dans son combat pour un État arabe indépendant. Du moins dans le film qui l’a rendu célèbre au monde entier.
    Car, dans les faits, Lawrence d’Arabie, s’il a bien combattu les Turcs aux côtés des Arabes, ne voulait pas d’un État arabe indépendant, mais d’une Syrie indépendante.
    Pour celui qui voua une admiration sans bornes à l’armée britannique jusqu’à sa mort, son pays ne devait pas se désengager de la région.
    Néanmoins, il est resté dans l’histoire comme un des rares Occidentaux à comprendre la révolte dirigée par Fayçal, et il prendra les accords Sykes-Picot comme une trahison de sa hiérarchie.
    La Palestine et la déclaration Balfour
    Dans les accords Sykes-Picot, il y a une zone bleue et une zone rouge. Il y a aussi une zone brune. Cette zone, c’est celle de la Palestine. La « déclaration Balfour », qui suivra en 1917, amorce la création d’un État juif.
    Pour revenir à la naissance d’Israël, il faut retourner au début du 19e siècle. « Quels facteurs expliquent la convergence entre les objectifs de l’Organisation sioniste mondiale, présidée par le Dr Chaïm Weizmann, et les buts de l’Angleterre impériale au Moyen-Orient ? (…) Les sionistes qui, comme Weizmann et ses amis, misent sur la victoire alliée, font le siège du Premier ministre britannique Lloyd George et de son ministre des Affaires étrangères Lord Balfour. Ceux-ci semblent avoir été sensibles à l’argument selon lequel promettre aux juifs un foyer national constitue le moyen le plus efficace pour aider Wilson, fort de l’appui de la communauté juive américaine, à engager les Etats-Unis dans la guerre aux côtés des Alliés ; de plus la création de ce “foyer juif” en Palestine permettrait de renforcer la sécurité de l’accès au canal de Suez et à l’Egypte. Assuré ensuite de l’acquiescement de Paris, Rome et Washington, Lord Balfour cherche une formule acceptable pour ses collègues du gouvernement », explique l’historien et spécialiste du Moyen-Orient Jacques Thobie.6

    « Weizmann avait suggéré à Londres de reconnaître la Palestine “en temps que patrie du peuple juif” qui aurait le droit “d’y établir une vie nationale”. A l’intérieur du Cabinet, Lord Curzon insiste sur les dangers de la réaction des Arabes. Finalement, la lettre de Balfour – dite improprement “déclaration” – à Lord Rothschild, représentant le comité politique de l’Organisation sioniste, se contente d’“envisager favorablement l’établissement en Palestine d’un foyer national pour le peuple juif”, étant entendu que seront sauvegardés les “droits civils et religieux des collectivités non juives existant en Palestine”. (…) La relative prudence britannique est liée à ses objectifs mêmes : en offrant des garanties aux immigrants juifs, l’Angleterre s’assure dans la guerre le soutien de nombreux juifs de Russie et d’Europe centrale, alors que se développe en Russie un processus révolutionnaire où des juifs jouent un rôle actif, affermit son implantation dans la province de Palestine, prépare entre Arabes et sionistes d’inévitables conflits imposant la présence de l’arbitre anglais dans cette région charnière des possessions africaines et asiatiques de l’Empire.
    Sykes utilise dans ce sens le mouvement sioniste, ce qui conduira à la déclaration Balfour du 2 novembre 1917 annonçant l’établissement “en Palestine” d’un Foyer national juif. La stratégie britannique va reposer sur l’occupation du terrain avec l’encouragement donné à la révolte arabe de s’étendre à la Syrie (mais non à la Palestine) et sur une succession de déclarations officielles allant dans le sens de l’autodétermination. Pour Londres, le droit des peuples signifie le droit de choisir la tutelle britannique ».7
    Et les États-Unis dans tout ça ?
    Officiellement, les États-Unis du président Woodrow Wilson se sont tenus à l’écart du morcellement du Moyen-Orient et des accords Sykes-Picot en raison d’une politique étrangère basée sur la « liberté des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes ». Hum…
    « Quand Wilson appelle au droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes, il parle des peuples blancs. C’est quelqu’un de raciste. Un des pires présidents ségrégationnistes de l’histoire des États-Unis. Donc les Arabes poseront problème parce qu’il ne sait pas s’ils sont blancs ou pas », constate l’historien français Henry Laurens.8
    « Le président Woodrow Wilson ne se sent aucunement lié par les accords “secrets” contractés par ses partenaires. Il se pose en défenseur du droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes, bien qu’il ne soit pas très clair dans son esprit si cela vaut aussi pour les peuples non blancs, comme les “bruns” (les Arabes) et les “jaunes” – pour les “noirs”, il n’en est pas question. »9
    Surtout, durant ses deux mandats (1913-1921), il va justement sortir de la logique « isolationniste » pour occuper le Mexique (1914-1917), Haïti (une occupation qui durera de 1915 à 1934), la République dominicaine (1916-1924) ou le Nicaragua(tout au long de son mandat).
    « Aucune nation ne peut vivre longtemps refermée sur elle-même et l’Ouest finirait nécessairement par dominer l’Est. L’Est doit être ouvert et transformé, qu’on le veuille ou non ; les standards de l’Ouest doivent lui être imposés. »10
    Bref, ce défenseur du Klu Klux Klan et du ségrégationnisme défend le « droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes »… quand ça l’arrange …
    Jonathan Lefèvre | 18 octobre 2016
    1.« A line in the sand », James Barr, Simon & Schuster, 2011. Citation parue dans L’Obs le 16 mai 2016 •
    2. « La stratégie du chaos, impérialisme et Islam », Grégoire Lalieu et Michel Collon, entretiens avec Mohammed Hassan, Investig’Action et Couleur Livres, 2011, p. 63 •
    3. « La division du Moyen-Orient fut un calcul stratégique », L’Express, 23 décembre 2014 •
    4. « Ali et les 40 voleurs », Jacques Thobie, éditions Messidor, Paris, 1985, p. 42 •
    5. « Les accords Sykes-Picot, cent ans après », Joseph Maïla, Études mai 2016 
    6. « Ali et les 40 voleurs », Jacques Thobie, éditions Messidor, Paris, 1985, pages 45-46 •
    6. Idem .
    8. « Les Français et les Anglais ont dessiné les frontières, et les Arabes ont colorié la carte », L’Orient-Le Jour, 16 mai 2016 •
    9. « Comment l’Empire ottoman fut dépecé », Henry Laurens, Le Monde Diplomatique, avril 2003 •
    10. Cité dans « American colonial Empire : The limit of power’s reach », Items & Issues (Social Science Research Council)
    Source : Pour la Palestine

  • #Woodrow_Wilson Was Awful—So Let’s Keep His Name at Princeton. - POLITICO Magazine
    http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/12/woodrow-wilson-center-princeton-foreign-policy-213419

    From the genteel halls of Princeton University, students are trying to pull another American hero from his pedestal. It turns out that Woodrow Wilson, who was president of Princeton before becoming president of the United States in 1913, was an outspoken racist. Therefore, the reasoning goes, Princeton should change the name of its Woodrow Wilson School for International and Public Affairs.

    This would be a lamentable mistake. Wilson is the ideal person for whom to name such a school. He perfectly represents the duplicity that lies at the heart of much American foreign policy. Removing his name from the school at Princeton would be a way of hiding or downplaying his legacy. Instead, we should study and learn from it.

    #Etats-Unis #duplicité #politique_etrangere

  • Chris #Hedges Interviews Noam #Chomsky (1/3)

    Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Chris Hedges speaks with Professor Noam Chomsky about working-class resistance during the Industrial Revolution, propaganda, and the historical role played by intellectuals in times of war - June 17, 14

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bwRf5HHm2Mo

    – chez TRNN avec une trace écrite: http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=12006

    [...]

    [I]n the early 19th century, the business world recognized, both in England and the United States, that sufficient freedom had been won so that they could no longer control people just by violence. They had to turn to new means of control. The obvious ones were control of opinions and attitudes. That’s the origins of the massive public relations industry, which is explicitly dedicated to controlling minds and attitudes.

    The first—it partly was government. The first government commission was the British Ministry of Information. This is long before Orwell—he didn’t have to invent it. So the Ministry of Information had as its goal to control the minds of the people of the world, but particularly the minds of American intellectuals, for a very good reason: they knew that if they can delude American intellectuals into supporting British policy, they could be very effective in imposing that on the population of the United States. The British, of course, were desperate to get the Americans into the war with a pacifist population. Woodrow Wilson won the 1916 election with the slogan “Peace without Victory”. And they had to drive a pacifist population into a population that bitterly hated all things German, wanted to tear the Germans apart. The Boston Symphony Orchestra couldn’t play Beethoven. You know. And they succeeded.

    Wilson set up a counterpart to the Ministry of Information called the Committee on Public Information. You know, again, you can guess what it was. And they’ve at least felt, probably correctly, that they had succeeded in carrying out this massive change of opinion on the part of the population and driving the pacifist population into, you know, warmongering fanatics.

    And the people on the commission learned a lesson. One of them was Edward Bernays, who went on to found—the main guru of the public relations industry. Another one was Walter Lippman, who was the leading progressive intellectual of the 20th century. And they both drew the same lessons, and said so.

    The lessons were that we have what Lippmann called a “new art” in democracy, “manufacturing consent”. That’s where Ed Herman and I took the phrase from. For Bernays it was “engineering of consent”. The conception was that the intelligent minority, who of course is us, have to make sure that we can run the affairs of public affairs, affairs of state, the economy, and so on. We’re the only ones capable of doing it, of course. And we have to be—I’m quoting—"free of the trampling and the roar of the bewildered herd", the “ignorant and meddlesome outsiders”—the general public. They have a role. Their role is to be “spectators”, not participants. And every couple of years they’re permitted to choose among one of the “responsible men”, us.

    And the John Dewey circle took the same view. Dewey changed his mind a couple of years later, to his credit, but at that time, Dewey and his circle were writing that—speaking of the First World War, that this was the first war in history that was not organized and manipulated by the military and the political figures and so on, but rather it was carefully planned by rational calculation of “the intelligent men of the community”, namely us, and we thought it through carefully and decided that this is the reasonable thing to do, for all kind of benevolent reasons.

    And they were very proud of themselves.

    There were people who disagreed. Like, Randolph Bourne disagreed. He was kicked out. He couldn’t write in the Deweyite journals. He wasn’t killed, you know, but he was just excluded.

    And if you take a look around the world, it was pretty much the same. The intellectuals on all sides were passionately dedicated to the national cause—all sides, Germans, British, everywhere.

    There were a few, a fringe of dissenters, like Bertrand Russell, who was in jail; Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, in jail; Randolph Bourne, marginalized; Eugene Debs, in jail for daring to question the magnificence of the war. In fact, Wilson hated him with such passion that when he finally declared an amnesty, Debs was left out, you know, had to wait for Warren Harding to release him. And he was the leading labor figure in the country. He was a candidate for president, Socialist Party, and so on.

    But the lesson that came out is we believe you can and of course ought to control the public, and if we can’t do it by force, we’ll do it by manufacturing consent, by engineering of consent. Out of that comes the huge public relations industry, massive industry dedicated to this.

    Incidentally, it’s also dedicated to undermining markets, a fact that’s rarely noticed but is quite obvious. Business hates markets. They don’t want to—and you can see it very clearly. Markets, if you take an economics course, are based on rational, informed consumers making rational choices. Turn on the television set and look at the first ad you see. It’s trying to create uninformed consumers making irrational choices. That’s the whole point of the huge advertising industry. But also to try to control and manipulate thought. And it takes various forms in different institutions. The media do it one way, the academic institutions do it another way, and the educational system is a crucial part of it.

    This is not a new observation. There’s actually an interesting essay by—Orwell’s, which is not very well known because it wasn’t published. It’s the introduction to Animal Farm. In the introduction, he addresses himself to the people of England and he says, you shouldn’t feel too self-righteous reading this satire of the totalitarian enemy, because in free England, ideas can be suppressed without the use of force. And he doesn’t say much about it. He actually has two sentences. He says one reason is the press “is owned by wealthy men” who have every reason not to want certain ideas to be expressed.

    But the second reason, and the more important one in my view, is a good education, so that if you’ve gone to all the good schools, you know, Oxford, Cambridge, and so on, you have instilled into you the understanding that there are certain things it wouldn’t do to say—and I don’t think he went far enough: wouldn’t do to think. And that’s very broad among the educated classes. That’s why overwhelmingly they tend to support state power and state violence, and maybe with some qualifications, like, say, Obama is regarded as a critic of the invasion of Iraq. Why? Because he thought it was a strategic blunder. That puts him on the same moral level as some Nazi general who thought that the second front was a strategic blunder—you should knock off England first. That’s called criticism.

    [...]

    #industrialisation
    #media #histoire #Geschichte #institution
    #USA #England #Angleterre
    #Grande-Bretagne #Great_Britain #Großbritannien
    #Allemagne #Germany #Deutschland

    #contrôle #Kontrolle
    #résistance #Widerstand
    #working_class #ouvriers #Arbeiterklasse
    #éducation #Bildung
    #intellectuels

    • Chris Hedges Interviews Noam Chomsky (2/3)

      http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=12016

      [...]

      Like a lot of people, I’ve written a lot about media and intellectual propaganda, but there’s another question which isn’t studied much: how effective is it? And that’s—when you brought up the polls, it’s a striking illustration. The propaganda is—you can see from the poll results that the propaganda has only limited effectiveness. I mean, it can drive a population into terror and fear and war hysteria, like before the Iraq invasion or 1917 and so on, but over time, public attitudes remain quite different. In fact, studies even of what’s called the right-wing, you know, people who say, get the government off my back, that kind of sector, they turn out to be kind of social democratic. They want more spending on health, more spending on education, more spending on, say, women with dependent children, but not welfare, no spending on welfare, because Reagan, who was an extreme racist, succeeded in demonizing the notion of welfare. So in people’s minds welfare means a rich black woman driving in her limousine to the welfare office to steal your money. Well, nobody wants that. But they want what welfare does.

      Foreign aid is an interesting case. There’s an enormous propaganda against foreign aid, ’cause we’re giving everything to the undeserving people out there. You take a look at public attitudes. A lot of opposition to foreign aid. Very high. On the other hand, when you ask people, how much do we give in foreign aid? Way beyond what we give. When you ask what we should give in foreign aid, far above what we give.

      And this runs across the board. Take, say taxes. There’ve been studies of attitudes towards taxes for 40 years. Overwhelmingly the population says taxes are much too low for the rich and the corporate sector. You’ve got to raise it. What happens? Well, the opposite.

      [...]

      #propagande
      #effectiveness #efficacité #Effizienz

    • Chris Hedges Interviews Noam Chomsky (3/3)

      http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=12018

      #ows #occupy
      #cooperatives

      [...]

      Well, I think it’s a little misleading to call it a movement. Occupy was a tactic, in fact a brilliant tactic. I mean, if I’d been asked a couple of months earlier whether they should take over public places, I would have said it’s crazy. But it worked extremely well, and it lit a spark which went all over the place. Hundreds and hundreds of places in the country, there were Occupy events. It was all over the world. I mean, I gave talks in Sydney, Australia, to the Occupy movement there. But it was a tactic, a very effective tactic. Changed public discourse, not policy. It brought issues to the forefront.I think my own feeling is its most important contribution was just to break through the atomization of the society. I mean, it’s a very atomized society. There’s all sorts of efforts to separate people from one another, as if the ideal social unit is, you know, you and your TV set.

      HEDGES: You know, Hannah Arendt raises atomization as one of the key components of totalitarianism.

      CHOMSKY: Exactly. And the Occupy actions broke that down for a large part of the population. People could recognize that we can get together and do things for ourselves, we can have a common kitchen, we can have a place for public discourse, we can form our ideas and do something. Now, that’s an important attack on the core of the means by which the public is controlled. So you’re not just an individual trying to maximize your consumption, but there are other concerns in life, and you can do something about them. If those attitudes and associations and bonds can be sustained and move in other directions, that’ll be important.

      But going back to Occupy, it’s a tactic. Tactics have a kind of a half-life. You can’t keep doing them, and certainly you can’t keep occupying public places for very long. And was very successful, but it was not in itself a movement. The question is: what happens to the people who were involved in it? Do they go on and develop, do they move into communities, pick up community issues? Do they organize?

      Take, say, this business of, say, worker-owned industry. Right here in Massachusetts, not far from here, there was something similar. One of the multinationals decided to close down a fairly profitable small plant, which was producing aerospace equipment. High-skilled workers and so on, but it wasn’t profitable enough, so they were going to close it down. The union wanted to buy it. Company refused—usual class reasons, I think. If the Occupy efforts had been available at the time, they could have provided the public support for it.

      [...]

      Well, you know, a reconstituted auto industry could have turned in that direction under worker and community control. I don’t think these things are out of sight. And, incidentally, they even have so-called conservative support, because they’re within a broader what’s called capitalist framework (it’s not really capitalist). And those are directions that should be pressed.

      Right now, for example, the Steelworkers union is trying to establish some kind of relations with Mondragon, the huge worker-owned conglomerate in the Basque country in Spain, which is very successful, in fact, and includes industry, manufacturing, banks, hospitals, living quarters. It’s very broad. It’s not impossible that that can be brought here, and it’s potentially radical. It’s creating the basis for quite a different society.

      [...]

      #militarisation
      #Militarisierung #Aufrüstung

      #war_crime #Iraq
      #crime_de_guerre
      #Kriegsverbrechen
      #Nürnberg

      [...]

      Go back to the #Nuremberg judgments. I’m not telling you anything you don’t know, but in Nuremberg aggression was defined as “the supreme international crime,” differing from other war crimes in that it includes, it encompasses all of the evil that follows. Well, the U.S.-British invasion of Iraq is a textbook case of aggression. By the standards of Nuremberg, they’d all be hanged. And one of the things it did, one of the crimes was to ignite a Sunni-Shiite conflict which hadn’t been going on. I mean, there was, you know, various kinds of tensions, but Iraqis didn’t believe there could ever be a conflict. They were intermarried, they lived in the same places, and so on. But the invasion set it off. Took off on its own. By now it’s inflaming the whole region. Now we’re at the point where Sunni jihadi forces are actually marching on Baghdad.

      HEDGES: And the Iraqi army is collapsing.

      CHOMSKY: The Iraqi army’s just giving away their arms. There obviously is a lot of collaboration going on.And all of this is a U.S. crime if we believe in the validity of the judgments against the Nazis.

      And it’s kind of interesting. Robert Jackson, the chief prosecutor, a U.S. justice, at the tribunal, addressed the tribunal, and he pointed out, as he put it, that we’re giving these defendants a “poisoned chalice”, and if we ever sip from it, we have to be treated the same way, or else the whole thing is a farce and we should recognize this as just victor’s justice.

      [...]