La France se caractérise encore aujourd’hui par la place accordée à la philosophie dans l’enseignement, celle-ci couronnant le parcours de l’élève en terminale. Cette place, mise à mal par les réformes en cours, tranche avec celle reconnue aux sciences qui étudient le monde social, en particulier la sociologie. L’enseignement des « sciences économiques et sociales » est en effet contesté dans son principe même depuis des décennies. Cette différence amène à interroger la philosophie comme garante du système actuel et non plus comme le lieu par excellence de la pensée critique.
Participation de Véronique Bonnet aux états généraux du numérique. Table ronde : Défendre l’Europe des libertés numériques contre l’économie de la surveillance. Espace Niemeyer. Place du colonel Fabien.
Début : 22 Mars 2019 - 16:00Fin : 22 Mars 2019 - 18:00
L’April, Association francophone pour la défense et la promotion du logiciel libre, mène, depuis 22 ans, un travail de veille pour que soit respectée l’autonomie des personnes, leur vie privée, la liberté d’utiliser, étudier, améliorer, copier les logiciels, redistribuer des copies améliorées. Voulant faire prévaloir une informatique de l’émancipation, elle s’inscrit dans une articulation entre informatique libre et société libre. Sa participation à une table ronde qui oppose libertés numériques et économie de la surveillance correspond à son cœur de métier : être force de vigilance et de proposition pour l’autonomie de l’utilisateur dans toutes ses dimensions. Table ronde : "Défendre une Europe des libertés (...)
le propre lien :
#Clément_Rosset, l’auteur du Réel et son double (1976), est décédé, huit ans après avoir cru mourir dans une crique de Majorque, épisode qu’il avait raconté dans Récit d’un noyé. Né en 1939 à Carteret en Normandie, le #philosophe, qui enseigna à la faculté de Nice entre 1967 et 1998, fin connaisseur de Schopenhauer et de Nietzsche, n’aura cessé de défendre un réalisme sans concession, décapant, mordant. Un réalisme rivé au sol du réel, et traqueur de tous les masques, illusions, doubles que l’homme s’invente pour échapper à cette insoutenable réalité, toujours trop idiote ou trop cruelle. En 2013, Clément #Rosset, féru de littérature, de cinéma, de bande dessinée et de musique, était notre invité à l’occasion d’un numéro double consacré au… mensonge. Voici cet entretien.
Que cachent ces masques ?
Si, comme la vérité, le mensonge n’avait qu’un visage, nous serions en meilleurs termes avec lui, note encore #Montaigne. Or, il existe une multiplicité de mensonges, affichant des facettes logiques et psychologiques très différentes. Dans son acception la plus simple, le mensonge est un déni de la vérité, de la réalité. Il nie ce qui est, ou affirme ce qui n’est pas. Un homme a tué, mais soutient qu’il n’a pas tué. Ainsi #Raskolnikov, dans Crime et châtiment, dira au juge d’instruction Porphyre qu’il n’a pas assassiné la vieille usurière. Il avance le faux, alors qu’il sait le vrai qu’il choisit de dissimuler. Mais, à partir du moment où le mensonge est enclenché, la vérité peut éclater à tout instant. Le menteur prend ainsi toujours le risque d’être démasqué, même si la fausse version a quelquefois la puissance d’instiller le doute, et d’encombrer les cours d’assises pendant de longues années. Le mensonge se révèle souvent plus plausible, plus vraisemblable que la réalité, parfois si rocambolesque qu’elle en devient peu crédible.
Comment le mensonge parvient-il à s’imposer ?
Toute sa force consiste à singer la vérité, à en prendre les couleurs. Le mensonge est un caméléon qui doit avoir l’apparence du vrai ; il doit pouvoir être cru, sans quoi il perd sa raison d’être. Et, pour être cru, il doit être consolidé par d’autres boniments. Le mensonge s’accompagne donc toujours d’une volonté de tromper. Celui qui énonce une proposition contraire à la vérité, sans vouloir tromper autrui, mais juste parce qu’il se trompe lui-même, est dans l’erreur, et non dans le mensonge. Le menteur, lui, est un charlatan, un spécialiste du faux qui, mieux que quiconque, sait reconnaître le vrai au premier coup d’oeil. Le menteur est au fait de la vérité, et c’est là tout le paradoxe du #mensonge.
Sur Castoriadis et la technique
Conférence, de date et de lieu inconnus, de François Bérard, auteur de « Réflexions sur l’autonomie de la technique. Autour de la triade nature/technique/société chez Cornelius Castoriadis » (Mémoire de maîtrise de #Philosophie sous la direction de Sophie Poirot-Delpech. Université de Paris-I (Panthéon-Sorbonne), 2004. 121pp). Nous cherchons à contacter l’auteur : nous écrire. Source Castoriadis est difficilement classable dans une discipline. Il parle de philosophie, d’histoire, d’anthropologie, de (...)
Three Theses on Neoliberal Migration and Social Reproduction
Today there are more than 1 billion regional and international migrants, and the number continues to rise: within 40 years, it might double because of climate change. While many of these migrants might not cross a regional or international border, people change residences and jobs more often, while commuting longer and farther to work. This increase in human mobility and expulsion affects us all. It should be recognized as a defining feature of our epoch: The twenty-first century will be the century of the migrant.
The argument of this paper is that the migrant is also a defining figure of neoliberal social reproduction. This argument is composed of three interlocking theses on what I am calling the “neoliberal migrant.”
Thesis 1 : The first thesis argues that the migrant is foremost a socially constitutive figure. That is, we should not think of the migrant as a derivative or socially exceptional figure who merely travels between pre- constituted states. The movement and circulation of migrants has always played an important historical role in the social and kinetic production and reproduction of society itself.1
Thesis 2 : The second thesis therefore argues that social reproduction itself is a fundamentally kinetic or mobile process. The fact that a historically record number of human beings are now migrating and commuting between countries, cities, rural and urban areas, multiple part time precarious jobs, means that humans are now spending a world historical record amount of unpaid labor-time just moving around. This mobility is itself a form of social reproduction.
Thesis 3 : The third thesis is that neoliberalism functions as a migration regime of social reproduction. Under neoliberalism, the burden of social reproduction has been increasingly displaced from the state to the population itself (health care, child care, transportation, and other traditionally social services). At the same time, workers now have less time than ever before to do this labor because of increasing reproductive mobility regimes (thesis two). This leads then to a massively expanded global market for surplus reproductive laborers who can mow lawns, clean houses, and care for children so first world laborers can commute longer and more frequently. Neoliberalism completes the cycle by providing a new “surplus reproductive labor army” in the form of displaced migrants from the global South.
We turn now to a defense of these theses.
Thesis 1 : The Migrant is Socially Constitutive
This is the case, in short, because societies are themselves defined by a continual movement of circulation, expansion, and expulsion that relies on the mobility of migrants to accommodate its social expansions and contractions.
The migrant is the political figure who is socially expelled or dispossessed, to some degree as a result, or as the cause, of their mobility. We are not all migrants, but most of us are becoming migrants. At the turn of the twenty- first century, there were more regional and international migrants than ever before in recorded history—a fact that political theory has yet to take seriously.2
If we are going to take the figure of the migrant seriously as a constitutive, and not derivative, figure of Western politics, we have to change the starting point of political theory. Instead of starting with a set of pre-existing citizens, we should begin with the flows of migrants and the ways they have circulated or sedimented into citizens and states in the first place—as well as emphasizing how migrants have constituted a counterpower and alternative to state structures.
This requires first of all that we take seriously the constitutive role played by migrants before the 19th century, and give up the arbitrary starting point of the nation-state. In this way we will be able to see how the nation-state itself was not the origin but the product of migration and bordering techniques that existed long before it came on the scene.3
Second of all, and based on this, we need to rethink the idea of political inclusion as a fundamentally kinetic process of circulation, not just as a formal legal, economic, or other kind of status. In other words, instead of a formal political distinction between inclusion/exclusion or a formal economic distinc- tion between productive/unproductive, we need a material one of circulation/ recirculation showing how social activity is defined by lived cycles of socially reproductive motions.
One way to think about the constitutive role played by migrants is as a kinetic radicalization of Karl Marx’s theory of primitive accumulation.
Marx develops this concept from a passage in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations: “The accumulation of stock must, in the nature of things, be previous to the division of labour.”4 In other words, before humans can be divided into owners and workers, there must have already been an accu- mulation such that those in power could enforce the division in the first place. The superior peoples of history naturally accumulate power and stock and then wield it to perpetuate the subordination of their inferiors. For Smith, this process is simply a natural phenomenon: Powerful people always already have accumulated stock, as if from nowhere.
For Marx, however, this quote is perfectly emblematic of the historical obfuscation of political economists regarding the violence and expulsion required for those in power to maintain and expand their stock. Instead of acknowledging this violence, political economy mythologizes and naturalizes it just like the citizen-centric nation state does politically. For Marx the concept of primitive accumulation has a material history. It is the precapitalist condition for capitalist production. In particular, Marx identifies this process with the expulsion of peasants and indigenous peoples from their land through enclosure, colonialism, and anti-vagabond laws in sixteenth-century England. Marx’s thesis is that the condition of the social expansion of capitalism is the prior expulsion of people from their land and from their legal status under customary law. Without the expulsion of these people, there is no expansion of private property and thus no capitalism.
While some scholars argue that primitive accumulation was merely a single historical event in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, others argue that it plays a recurring logical function within capitalism itself: In order to expand, capitalism today still relies on non-capitalist methods of social expulsion and violence.5
The idea of expansion by expulsion broadens the idea of primitive accumulation in two ways. First, the process of dispossessing people of their social status (expulsion) in order to further develop or advance a given form of social motion (expansion) is not at all unique to the capitalist regime of social motion. We see the same social process in early human societies whose progressive cultivation of land and animals (territorial expansion) with the material technology of fencing also expelled (territorial dispossession) a part of the human population. This includes hunter-gatherers whose territory was transformed into agricultural land, as well as surplus agriculturalists for whom there was no more arable land left to cultivate at a certain point. Thus social expulsion is the condition of social expansion in two ways: It is an internal condition that allows for the removal of part of the population when certain internal limits have been reached (carrying capacity of a given territory, for example) and it is an external condition that allows for the removal of part of the population outside these limits when the territory is able to expand outward into the lands of other groups (hunter gatherers). In this case, territorial expansion was only possible on the condition that part of the population was expelled in the form of migratory nomads, forced into the surrounding mountains and deserts.
We later see the same logic in the ancient world, whose dominant polit- ical form, the state, would not have been possible without the material tech- nology of the border wall that both fended off as enemies and held captive as slaves a large body of barbarians (through political dispossession) from the mountains of the Middle East and Mediterranean. The social conditions for the expansion of a growing political order, including warfare, colonialism, and massive public works, were precisely the expulsion of a population of barbarians who had to be walled out and walled in by political power. This technique occurs again and again throughout history, as I have tried to show in my work.
The second difference between previous theories of primitive accumulation and the more expansive one offered here is that this process of prior expulsion or social deprivation Marx noted is not only territorial or juridical, and its expansion is not only economic.6 Expulsion does not simply mean forcing people off their land, although in many cases it may include this. It also means depriving people of their political rights by walling off the city, criminalizing types of persons by the cellular techniques of enclosure and incarceration, or restricting their access to work by identification and checkpoint techniques.
Expulsion is the degree to which a political subject is deprived or dispossessed of a certain status in the social order. Accordingly, societies also expand and reproduce their power in several major ways: through territorial accumulation, political power, juridical order, and economic
profit. What is similar between the theory of primitive accumulation and the kinetic theory of expansion by expulsion is that most major expan- sions of social kinetic power also require a prior or primitive violence of kinetic social expulsion. The border is the material technology and social regime that directly enacts this expulsion. The concept of primitive accu- mulation is merely one historical instance of a more general kinopolitical logic at work in the emergence and reproduction of previous societies.
Marx even makes several general statements in Capital that justify this kind of interpretive extension. For Marx, the social motion of production in general strives to reproduce itself. He calls this “periodicity”: “Just as the heavenly bodies always repeat a certain movement, once they have been flung into it, so also does social production, once it has been flung into this movement of alternate expansion and contraction. Effects become causes in their turn, and the various vicissitudes of the whole process, which always reproduces its own conditions, take on the form of periodicity.”7 According to Marx, every society, not just capitalist ones, engages in some form of social production. Like the movements of the planets, society expands and contracts itself according to a certain logic, which strives to reproduce and expand the conditions that brought it about in the first place. Its effects in turn become causes in a feedback loop of social circulation. For Marx, social production is thus fundamentally a social motion of circulation or reproduction.
In short, the material-kinetic conditions for the expansion of societies re- quires the use of borders (fences, walls, cells, checkpoints) to produce a system of marginalized territorial, political, legal, and economic migrants that can be more easily recirculated elsewhere as needed. Just as the vagabond migrant is dispossessed by enclosures and transformed into the economic proletariat, so each dominant social system has its own structure of expansion by expulsion and reproduction as well.
Expansion by Expulsion
Expulsion is therefore a social movement that drives out and entails a deprivation of social status.8 Social expulsion is not simply the deprivation of territorial status (i.e., removal from the land); it includes three other major types of social deprivation: political, juridical, and economic. This is not a spatial or temporal concept but a fundamentally kinetic concept insofar as we understand movement extensively and intensively, that is, quantitatively and qualitatively. Social expulsion is the qualitative transformation of deprivation in status, resulting in or as a result of extensive movement in spacetime.
The social expulsion of migrants, for example, is not always free or forced. In certain cases, some migrants may decide to move, but they are not free to determine the social or qualitative conditions of their movement or the degree to which they may be expelled from certain social orders. Therefore, even in this case, expulsion is still a driving-out insofar as its conditions are not freely or individually chosen but socially instituted and compelled. Expulsion is a fundamentally social and collective process because it is the loss of a socially determined status, even if only temporarily and to a small degree.9
Expansion, on the other hand, is the process of opening up that allows something to pass through. This opening-up also entails a simultaneous extension or spreading out. Expansion is thus an enlargement or exten- sion through a selective opening. Like the process of social expulsion, the process of social expansion is not strictly territorial or primarily spatial; it is also an intensive or qualitative growth in territorial, political, juridical, and economic kinopower. It is both an intensive and extensive increase in the conjunction of new social flows and a broadening of social circulation. Colonialism is a good example of an expansion which is clearly territorial as well as political, juridical, and economic.
Kinopower is thus defined by a constitutive circulation, but this circulation functions according to a dual logic of reproduction. At one end, social circulation is a motion that drives flows outside its circulatory system: expulsion. This is accomplished by redirecting and driving out certain flows through exile, slavery, criminalization, or unemployment. At the other end of circulation there is an opening out and passing in of newly conjoined flows through a growth of territorial, political, juridical, and economic power. Expansion by expulsion is the social logic by which some members of society are dispossessed of their status as migrants so that social power can be expanded elsewhere. Power is not only a question of repression; it is a question of mobilization and kinetic reproduction.
For circulation to open up to more flows and become more powerful than it was, it has historically relied on the disjunction or expulsion of mi- grant flows. In other words, the expansion of power has historically relied on a socially constitutive migrant population.
Thesis 2: Mobility is a form of Social Reproduction
People today continually move greater distances more frequently than ever before in human history. Even when people are not moving across a regional or international border, they tend to have more jobs, change jobs more often, commute longer and farther to their places of work,10 change their residences repeatedly, and tour internationally more often.11
Some of these phenomena are directly related to recent events, such as the impoverishment of middle classes in certain rich countries after the financial crisis of 2008, neoliberal austerity cuts to social-welfare programs, and rising unemployment. The subprime-mortgage crisis, for example, led to the expul- sion of millions of people from their homes worldwide (9 million in the United States alone). Globally, foreign investors and governments have acquired 540 million acres since 2006, resulting in the eviction of millions of small farmers in poor countries, and mining practices have become increasingly destructive around the world—including hydraulic fracturing and tar sands.
In 2006, the world crossed a monumental historical threshold, with more than half of the world’s population living in urban centers, compared with just fifteen percent a hundred years ago. This number is now expected to rise above seventy-five percent by 2050, with more than two billion more people moving to cities.12 The term “global urbanization,” as Saskia Sassen rightly observes, is only another way of politely describing large-scale human migration and displacement from rural areas, often caused by corporate land grabs.13 What this means is not only that more people are migrating to cities but now within cities and between suburban and urban areas for work. This general increase in human mobility and expulsion is now widely recognized as a defining feature of the twenty-first century so far.14
Accordingly, this situation is having and will continue to have major social consequences for social relations in the twenty-first century. It there- fore demands the attention of critical theory. In particular, it should call our attention to the fact that this epic increase in human mobility and migration around the world is not just a minor or one-time “inconvenience” or “eco- nomic risk” that migrants make and then join the ranks of other “settled” urban workers. It is a continuous, ongoing, and nearly universal massive ex- traction of unpaid reproductive labor.
Urban workers have become increasingly unsettled and mobile.The world average commuting time is now 40 minutes, one-way.15 This unpaid transport time is not a form of simply unproductive or unpaid labor. It is actually the material and kinetic conditions for the reproduction of the worker herself to arrive at work ready for labor. Not only this, but unpaid transport labor also continuously reproduces the spatial architecture of capitalist urban centers and suburban peripheries.16 The increasing neoliberal privatization of roadway construction and tollways is yet another way in which unpaid transport labor is not “unproductive” at all but rather continues to reproduce a massive new private transport market.This goes hand in hand with the neoliberal decline of affordable public transportation, especially in the US.
Unfortunately, transport mobility has not traditionally been considered a form of social reproductive activity, but as global commute times and traffic increase, it is now becoming extremely obvious how important and constitu- tive this migratory labor actually is to the functioning of capital. If we define social reproduction as including all the conditions for the worker to arrive at work, then surely mobility is one of these necessary conditions. Perhaps one of the reasons it has not been recognized as such is because transport is an activity that looks least like an activity, since the worker is typically just sitting in a vehicle. Or perhaps the historical identification of vehicles and migration as sites of freedom (especially in America) has covered over the oppressive and increasingly obligatory unpaid labor time they often entail.
The consequences of this new situation appeared at first as merely tempo- ral inconveniences for first-world commuters or what we might call BMWs (bourgeoise migrant workers).This burden initially fell and still falls dispropor- tionally on women who are called on to make up for the lost reproductive labor of their traveling spouses (even if they themselves also commute). Increasingly, however, as more women have begun to commute farther and more often this apparently or merely reproductive neoliberal transport labor has actually pro- duced a growing new market demand for a “surplus reproductive labor army” to take up these domestic and care labors. This brings us to our third thesis.
Thesis: 3: Neoliberal Migration is a Regime of Social Reproduction
The third thesis is that neoliberalism functions as a migration regime of social reproduction. This is the case insofar as neoliberalism expands itself in the form of a newly enlarged reproductive labor market, accomplished through the relative expulsion of the workers from their homes (and into
vehicles) and the absolute expulsion of a migrant labor force from the global south to fill this new market.
Migration therefore has and continues to function as a constitutive form of social reproduction (thesis one). This is a crucial thesis because it stresses the active role migrants play in the production and reproduction of society, but it is not a new phenomenon. Marx was of course one of the first to identify this process with respect to the capitalist mode of production. The proletariat is always already a migrant proletariat. At any moment an employed worker could be unemployed and forced to relocate according to the demands of capitalist valorization. In fact, the worker’s mobility is the condition of modern industry’s whole form of motion. Without the migration of a surplus population to new markets, from the rural to the city, from city to city, from country to country (what Marx calls the “floating population”) capitalist accumulation would not be possible at all. “Modern industry’s whole form of motion,” Marx claims, “therefore depends on the constant transformation of a part of the working population into unemployed or semi-employed ‘hands.’”17 As capitalist markets expand, contract, and multiply “by fits and starts,” Marx says, capital requires the possibility of suddenly adding and subtracting “great masses of men into decisive areas without doing any damage to the scale of production. The surplus population supplies these masses.”18
What is historically new about the neoliberal migration regime is not merely that it simply expels a portion of the population in order to put it into waged labor elsewhere. What is new is that late-capitalist neoliberalism has now expelled one portion of the workers from a portion of their ownun-waged reproductive activity in order open up a new market for the waged activity of an as yet unexploited productive population of migrants from the global South. In other words reproductive labor itself has become a site of capitalist expansion. Wherever objects and activities have not yet been commodified, there we will find the next frontier of capitalist valorization.
The consequence of this is a dramatic double expulsion. On the one hand, the bourgeois migrant worker is expelled from her home in the form of unpaid reproductive transport labor so that on the other hand the proletarian migrant worker can be expelled from her home as an international migrant and then expelled from her home again as a commuting worker to do someone else’s reproductive activity. The burden of social reproduction then falls disproportionately on the last link in the chain: the unpaid reproductive labor that sustains the domestic and social life of the migrant family. This is what must be ultimately expelled to expand the market of social reproduction at another level. This expulsion falls disproportionally on migrant women from the global south who must somehow reproduce their family’s social conditions, commute, and then reproduce someone else’s family’s conditions well.19
Neoliberalism thus works on both fronts at the same time. On one side it increasingly withdraws and/or privatizes state social services that aid in social reproductive activities (child care, health care, public transit, and so on) while at the same increasing transport and commute times making a portion of those activities increasingly difficult for workers. On the other side it introduces the same structural adjustment policies (curtailed state and increased privatization) into the global South with the effect of mass economic migration to Northern countries where migrants can become waged producers in what was previously an “unproductive” (with respect to capital) sector of human activity: social reproduction itself.
This is the sense in which migrants play a constitutive role in the kinopolitics of social reproduction and neoliberal expansion. In other words, neoliberal migration has made possible a new level of commodification of social reproduction itself. Waged domestic labor is not new, of course, but what is new is the newly expanded nature of this sector of labor and its entanglement with a global regime of neoliberal expulsion and forced migration.
One of the features that defines the uniquely neoliberal form of social reproduction today is the degree to which capitalism has relied directly on economically liberal trade policies and politically liberal international governments in order to redistribute record-breaking numbers of “surplus migrant reproductive labor” into Western countries. Global migration is therefore not the side-effect of neoliberal globalization; it is the main effect. Neoliberalism should thus be understood as a migration regime for expanding Western power through the expulsion and accumulation of migrant reproductive labor.
Mise en exergue d’une citation (fin de l’article) :
Global migration is therefore not the side-effect of neoliberal globalization; it is the main effect. Neoliberalism should thus be understood as a migration regime for expanding Western power through the expulsion and accumulation of migrant reproductive labor.
Article publié ici :
Eine Philosophie, der es ums Ganze geht – warum man Karl Jaspers lesen ll nzz.ch 2019-02-24
Wer entschieden und ernsthaft wissen will, weiss umso mehr auch um die Grenzen, an denen unser Nichtwissen beginnt. Auf die erste aufmerksam gemacht wurde Jaspers durch seinen Lehrer, den Soziologen Max Weber: Wissenschaft kann zwar erkennen, was der Fall ist, aber sie wird uns nie sagen können, was wir wollen sollen. So kann keine Wissenschaft uns sagen, warum überhaupt Wissenschaft sein soll.
Eine zweite, und wohl die entscheidendste, ist die Grenze, die ihm Kant eröffnet hat: Wissenschaft ist stets partikular und perspektivisch, sie erkennt immer nur bestimmte Gegenstände in der Welt, aber nie die Welt als ganze. Hinter jedem Horizont öffnet sich ein weiterer Horizont, so ins Unendliche. (...)
Zum 50. Todestag von Karl JaspersPhilosophischer Störenfried, dessen Kritik bis heute trifft | deutschlandfunkkultur.de 2019-02-24
« Neige » conte philosophique et musical d’après Maxence FERMINE
La Simplesse présente « Neige » Conte Musical pour Tout Public à partir de 7 ans. L’association tourangelle a vu le jour en 2016 pour organiser le festival « 37° à l’ombre ». Le 29 juin 2018, au Château d’Azay-le-Rideau a été créé « Neige » inspiré de Maxence Fermine. Mis en scène par Mario Gonzalez, ce conte philosophique et musical réunit une comédienne, un artiste mime, une harpiste et une chanteuse soprano, dans une scénographie d’ombres chinoises et porté par des mélodies japonaises traditionnelles ainsi que des pièces de Claude-Achille Debussy... ▻https://www.silencecommunity.com/shop/fr/spectacles-pour-organisateurs-fr/75-spectaclespourorganisateurs-neige-fr.html
Bernard Charbonneau (1910-1996) a eu dès sa jeunesse la conviction que son siècle serait en même temps et pour les mêmes raisons celui du totalitarisme et du saccage de la nature. Pas de liberté sans puissance d’agir ; mais dans un monde fini le développement indéfini de la puissance matérielle et de l’organisation sociale risque d’anéantir la liberté de l’homme. A partir des années trente et jusqu’à sa mort, Charbonneau a réfléchi sur les dangers qui résultent, pour la nature et pour la liberté de ce qu’il appelait la Grande mue, c’est-à-dire de la montée en puissance de plus en plus rapide du progrès technique, scientifique et industriel. Mais on se fourvoierait en réduisant l’œuvre de Charbonneau à une réflexion sur l’écologie politique. Il ne s’est pas intéressé seulement à la question écologique ; son œuvre nous propose une analyse plus vaste des coûts de la modernisation et des contradictions du monde moderne. Pendant longtemps cette préoccupation a fait de lui un marginal dans le monde intellectuel. Cependant, Charbonneau voyait juste lorsqu’il annonçait la crise écologique, l’aggravation de la bureaucratisation de l’existence et la technocratisation de la vie sociale. Plus le temps passe et plus son œuvre s’avère pertinente et actuelle.
Une conférence présentée par Daniel Cérézuelle, dans le cadre de notre cycle Ecologie(s) critique(s).
Sortir ses griffes face à la fin du monde
3 février 2019
Le futur sera catastrophique. Les signes se multiplient en ce sens, les modèles scientifiques, aussi différents soient-ils, convergent vers le même résultat. Les terribles dérèglements climatiques annoncent la fin de l’humanité, si des événements politiques ou guerriers ne les précèdent pas.
Face à cette situation, Pierre-Henri Castel1 suggère que nous avons au moins une chance : pour une fois, nous pouvons faire l’effort de penser en-dehors de notre présent, et à partir de ce sombre futur. Dans cette optique, son petit livre Le Mal qui vient s’efforce de questionner la nature complètement nouvelle du Mal qui ne manquera pas de s’imposer dans un monde où l’horizon de l’humanité se restreint à celui des survivants. Ce qui ne va pas sans la nécessité de penser à ce que pourrait être un Bien « avec des crocs et des griffes » qui viendrait s’y opposer. L’auteur a bien voulu répondre à nos questions.
Nombre de discours contemporains associent le libéralisme à la démocratie, en particulier à la démocratie représentative. En revenant aux origines de la raison libérale, il apparaît pourtant que loin d’être le fondement philosophique de la démocratie moderne, le libéralisme pourrait être la condition fondamentale de son impossibilité.
Les langues dans sa poche - Libération
Le philosophe sénégalais #Souleymane_Bachir_Diagne démonte, via le langage, les clichés qui font de l’Afrique un continent rétif à la raison et réconcilie particularismes et universel
Je n’avais jamais entendu parlé de Souleymane Bachir Diagne mais je sens que ça va me plaire et que je vais pas savoir par ou commencer la lecture !
Le philosophe oppose la pensée d’Emmanuel Levinas qui craignait que le monde « désoccidentalisé » d’après Bandung soit un monde « désorienté » par une « sarabande de cultures innombrables », à Maurice Merleau-Ponty, « le philosophe qui a le mieux pris la mesure de ce qu’était un monde décolonisé », et dont il prédit le grand retour dans le champ de la pensée. « Merleau-Ponty a compris que l’universel de surplomb, représenté par l’Europe, ne tenait plus. Qu’il fallait construire un universel de rencontres, de traductions. » Le philosophe sénégalais, lui, distingue l’universel, un but à atteindre, de l’universalisme, qu’il faut combattre. « On parlera d’universalisme pour marquer la position de celui qui déclare universelle sa propre particularité en disant : "J’ai la particularité d’être universel." On est alors parfaitement fondé à demander à cet universalisme : "En vertu de quoi ? de quel droit ?" » écrit-il dans En quête d’Afrique(s).
Let’s all stop beating Basil’s car
C’est brillant, mais RD oublie que derrière ces jugements aberrants se cache toujours un intérêt de classe sociale. Les jugements ne sont pas la conséquence d’un atavisme humian.
RICHARD DAWKINS - Evolutionary Biologist, Charles Simonyi Professor For The Understanding Of Science, Oxford University; Author, The Ancestor’s Tale
Ask people why they support the death penalty or prolonged incarceration for serious crimes, and the reasons they give will usually involve retribution. There may be passing mention of deterrence or rehabilitation, but the surrounding rhetoric gives the game away. People want to kill a criminal as payback for the horrible things he did. Or they want to give "satisfaction’ to the victims of the crime or their relatives. An especially warped and disgusting application of the flawed concept of retribution is Christian crucifixion as "atonement’ for "sin’.
Retribution as a moral principle is incompatible with a scientific view of human behaviour. As scientists, we believe that human brains, though they may not work in the same way as man-made computers, are as surely governed by the laws of physics. When a computer malfunctions, we do not punish it. We track down the problem and fix it, usually by replacing a damaged component, either in hardware or software.
Basil Fawlty, British television’s hotelier from hell created by the immortal John Cleese, was at the end of his tether when his car broke down and wouldn’t start. He gave it fair warning, counted to three, gave it one more chance, and then acted. “Right! I warned you. You’ve had this coming to you!” He got out of the car, seized a tree branch and set about thrashing the car within an inch of its life. Of course we laugh at his irrationality. Instead of beating the car, we would investigate the problem. Is the carburettor flooded? Are the sparking plugs or distributor points damp? Has it simply run out of gas? Why do we not react in the same way to a defective man: a murderer, say, or a rapist? Why don’t we laugh at a judge who punishes a criminal, just as heartily as we laugh at Basil Fawlty? Or at King Xerxes who, in 480 BC, sentenced the rough sea to 300 lashes for wrecking his bridge of ships? Isn’t the murderer or the rapist just a machine with a defective component? Or a defective upbringing? Defective education? Defective genes?
Concepts like blame and responsibility are bandied about freely where human wrongdoers are concerned. When a child robs an old lady, should we blame the child himself or his parents? Or his school? Negligent social workers? In a court of law, feeble-mindedness is an accepted defence, as is insanity. Diminished responsibility is argued by the defence lawyer, who may also try to absolve his client of blame by pointing to his unhappy childhood, abuse by his father, or even unpropitious genes (not, so far as I am aware, unpropitious planetary conjunctions, though it wouldn’t surprise me).
But doesn’t a truly scientific, mechanistic view of the nervous system make nonsense of the very idea of responsibility, whether diminished or not? Any crime, however heinous, is in principle to be blamed on antecedent conditions acting through the accused’s physiology, heredity and environment. Don’t judicial hearings to decide questions of blame or diminished responsibility make as little sense for a faulty man as for a Fawlty car?
Why is it that we humans find it almost impossible to accept such conclusions? Why do we vent such visceral hatred on child murderers, or on thuggish vandals, when we should simply regard them as faulty units that need fixing or replacing? Presumably because mental constructs like blame and responsibility, indeed evil and good, are built into our brains by millennia of Darwinian evolution. Assigning blame and responsibility is an aspect of the useful fiction of intentional agents that we construct in our brains as a means of short-cutting a truer analysis of what is going on in the world in which we have to live. My dangerous idea is that we shall eventually grow out of all this and even learn to laugh at it, just as we laugh at Basil Fawlty when he beats his car. But I fear it is unlikely that I shall ever reach that level of enlightenment.
Cette conférence a été présentée par Christophe Pébarthe, professeur d’histoire grecque à l’université de Bordeaux Montaigne, et se tiendra dans le cadre de la chaire Démocratie et sciences sociales dont les prochaines dates sont les jeudi 7 février, 7 mars, 4 avril et 16 mai.
Parce qu’elle est détentrice d’un savoir scientifique sur le monde social, la science sociale pose un problème à la démocratie. Comment envisager la possibilité d’une délibération, entre des citoyens et des citoyennes, si le monde social est déjà connu ? En outre, en faisant apparaître l’existence de déterminations sociales pesant les individus, elle interroge aussi la nature de la citoyenneté. Si le libre arbitre n’existe pas, quelle raison éclaire les débats démocratiques ? Par l’invention du terme « post-vérité », certain.e.s pensent avoir identifié un phénomène nouveau qui poserait un problème à la démocratie. En réalité, la question de la vérité est inscrite au cœur de l’action de gouverner. Comme le rappelle Michel Foucault, « il ne peut y avoir de gouvernement sans que ceux qui gouvernent n’indexent leurs actions, leurs choix, leurs décisions à un ensemble de connaissances vraies, de principes rationnellement fondés ou de connaissances exactes, lesquels ne relèvent pas simplement de la sagesse en général du prince ou de la raison tout court, mais d’une structure rationnelle qui est propre à un domaine d’objets possible ». Mais est-il possible de débattre de la vérité lorsque celle-ci est établie ?
Biblioteca Gino Bianco
Una biblioteca e una emeroteca digitale
per riandare al passato e riflettere sul presente.
La Biblioteca Gino Bianco con la sua emeroteca digitale di riviste, opuscoli, libri di storia e di politica, dagli ultimi decenni dell’800 al secondo dopoguerra del 900, si propone in particolare di far conoscere, innanzitutto ai giovani, le tradizioni di pensiero e di impegno sociale, italiane ed europee, del socialismo umanitario, del libertarismo, del liberalsocialismo, del socialismo democratico, del repubblicanesimo, del liberalismo democratico e del federalismo, rimaste minoritarie, spesso calunniate, per lo più dimenticate, a cui la Storia, e solo lei, col tempo, ha dato ragione.
The Philosopher Redefining Equality | The New Yorker
At fifty-nine, Anderson is the chair of the University of Michigan’s department of philosophy and a champion of the view that equality and freedom are mutually dependent, enmeshed in changing conditions through time. Working at the intersection of moral and political philosophy, social science, and economics, she has become a leading theorist of democracy and social justice. She has built a case, elaborated across decades, that equality is the basis for a free society. Her work, drawing on real-world problems and information, has helped to redefine the way contemporary philosophy is done, leading what might be called the Michigan school of thought. Because she brings together ideas from both the left and the right to battle increasing inequality, Anderson may be the philosopher best suited to this awkward moment in American life. She builds a democratic frame for a society in which people come from different places and are predisposed to disagree.
As the students listened, she sketched out the entry-level idea that one basic way to expand equality is by expanding the range of valued fields within a society. Unlike a hardscrabble peasant community of yore in which the only skill that anyone cared about might be agricultural prowess, a society with many valued arenas lets individuals who are good at art or storytelling or sports or making people laugh receive a bit of love.
As a rule, it’s easy to complain about inequality, hard to settle on the type of equality we want. Do we want things to be equal where we start in life or where we land? When inequalities arise, what are the knobs that we adjust to get things back on track? Individually, people are unequal in countless ways, and together they join groups that resist blending. How do you build up a society that allows for such variety without, as in the greater-Detroit real-estate market, turning difference into a constraint? How do you move from a basic model of egalitarian variety, in which everybody gets a crack at being a star at something, to figuring out how to respond to a complex one, where people, with different allotments of talent and virtue, get unequal starts, and often meet with different constraints along the way?
In 1999, Anderson published an article in the journal Ethics, titled “What Is the Point of Equality?,” laying out the argument for which she is best known. “If much recent academic work defending equality had been secretly penned by conservatives,” she began, opening a grenade in the home trenches, “could the results be any more embarrassing for egalitarians?”
The problem, she proposed, was that contemporary egalitarian thinkers had grown fixated on distribution: moving resources from lucky-seeming people to unlucky-seeming people, as if trying to spread the luck around. This was a weird and nebulous endeavor. Is an heir who puts his assets into a house in a flood zone and loses it unlucky—or lucky and dumb? Or consider a woman who marries rich, has children, and stays at home to rear them (crucial work for which she gets no wages). If she leaves the marriage to escape domestic abuse and subsequently struggles to support her kids, is that bad luck or an accretion of bad choices? Egalitarians should agree about clear cases of blameless misfortune: the quadriplegic child, the cognitively impaired adult, the teen-ager born into poverty with junkie parents. But Anderson balked there, too. By categorizing people as lucky or unlucky, she argued, these egalitarians set up a moralizing hierarchy.
To be truly free, in Anderson’s assessment, members of a society had to be able to function as human beings (requiring food, shelter, medical care), to participate in production (education, fair-value pay, entrepreneurial opportunity), to execute their role as citizens (freedom to speak and to vote), and to move through civil society (parks, restaurants, workplaces, markets, and all the rest). Egalitarians should focus policy attention on areas where that order had broken down. Being homeless was an unfree condition by all counts; thus, it was incumbent on a free society to remedy that problem. A quadriplegic adult was blocked from civil society if buildings weren’t required to have ramps. Anderson’s democratic model shifted the remit of egalitarianism from the idea of equalizing wealth to the idea that people should be equally free, regardless of their differences. A society in which everyone had the same material benefits could still be unequal, in this crucial sense; democratic equality, being predicated on equal respect, wasn’t something you could simply tax into existence. “People, not nature, are responsible for turning the natural diversity of