position:❝president

Poroshenko says Ukraine, Luxembourg to sign agreement on avoiding double taxation
▻http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/poroshenko-says-ukraine-luxembourg-to-sign-agreement-on-avoiding-double-ta

President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko has announced that an agreement to avoid double taxation with Luxembourg will be signed in the near future.

(intégralité)

Je ne sais pas si c’est à cela qu’il pensait, mais voilà une bien belle réforme pour commencer : une convention pour éviter la double imposition avec le Luxembourg.

Certainement impatiemment attendue par les Ukrainiens.

Ah ben non !

Ukraine’s ban of foreign journalists ignites international ire
▻http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/ukraines-ban-of-foreign-journalists-ignites-international-ire-398113.html

Prominent foreign journalists briefly found themselves in the company of Kremlin cheerleader and Chechen strongman leader Ramzan Kadyrov in Ukraine’s recently released list of sanctioned individuals.

The move ignited such a furor that President Petro Poroshenko immediately reversed the decision.

The nearly 400 sanctioned individuals, announced on Sept. 16 by the presidential administration, face travel and financial restrictions for one year. Those on the list were said to represent an “actual or potential threat to national interests, national security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine,” according to the decree.

While figures like Kadyrov and separatist leaders Denis Pushilin and Igor Plotnitsky are justifiably on the list along with top Russian officials, several well-respected foreign journalists were inexplicably singled out.

Many expressed shock and anger that BBC journalists Emma Wells, Steven Rosenberg and Anton Chicherov were categorized as a threat to Ukraine’s national security – especially considering that Rosenberg had been attacked in Russia last year for investigating the deaths of Russian soldiers in Ukraine.

The Ukrainian authorities quickly switched to damage-control mode.

yssonkon, ou bien ?

In Reversal, Ukraine Removes 6 Journalists From Banned List
▻http://www.voanews.com/content/cpj-osce-blast-ukraine-on-foreign-journalists-entry-ban/2967882.html

Ukraine has removed six European journalists from its list of persons banned from the country, but a leading press freedom watchdog says all journalists should be removed from the list.
[…]
The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) welcomed the reversal, but said the Ukrainian government “should remove all journalists and bloggers from the list and allow them to cover the region freely.”

Earlier Thursday, The Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) in Europe called for Poroshenko “to amend his decree and exclude journalists from it,” adding that Ukrainian authorities “should facilitate the work of journalists and abstain from creating administrative obstacles to the entry.”

The OSCE called the ban “a severe threat to the rights of journalists to freely collect information.”

Poroshenko signed a decree Wednesday that imposed sanctions on 388 companies and individuals deemed to represent an “actual or potential threat to the national interests, national security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.”

The 34 journalists and seven bloggers originally included on the sanctions list come from Bulgaria, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, and Britain. All but one are OSCE participating states.

Le titre a été passablement adouci, puisque l’original était

CPJ, OSCE blast Ukraine on foreign journalist entry ban

Foreign Ministry under fire for ‘incompetent’ sanctions list
▻http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/foreign-ministry-under-fire-for-incompetent-sanctions-list-398216.html

The scandal over Ukraine’s now notorious blacklist of prominent international journalists has flared up yet again, as the Foreign Ministry digs itself in deeper in trying to justify the move.

Oksana Romaniuk of Reporters Without Borders on Sept. 18 published a list of journalists said to have been compiled by the Foreign Ministry in late February. The list, a photograph of which Romaniuk posted on Facebook after receiving the documents from an unknown source, apparently served as the basis for the sanctions list signed by President Petro Poroshenko on Sept. 16, which included BBC journalists Emma Wells and Steven Rosenberg, among others.

The Foreign Ministry responded publicly to Romaniuk’s post, reminding her on Facebook that the documents she published, under Ukrainian legislation, were meant to stay confidential – apparent confirmation that the documents were legitimate. The ministry also noted that the list in question had not served as the basis for the finalized sanctions list.

After the publication of the list of sanctioned journalists triggered international outrage, Poroshenko quickly backtracked and canceled the bans on six of them.

But now the entire list is under scrutiny, as the documents provided by Romaniuk exposed a worrying detail: several international journalists were apparently sanctioned for their “anti-Ukrainian coverage of events,” with nobody quite sure how such determinations about a reporter’s work are made.

The sanctioning of foreign journalists for “anti-Ukrainian coverage” follows “the Kremlin’s pattern of behavior all while they (Ukrainians) are declaring new principles,” Romaniuk told the Kyiv Post, saying the list was an “absolute embarrassment” for Ukraine at a time when Ukraine needs international support the most.

“We are having our lawyers prepare documents to send to the ministry to ask them who exactly decides what constitutes ‘anti-Ukrainian’ coverage, and what exactly the criteria are,” Romaniuk said.

“The best thing they could do now is admit that they made a mistake and promise that those responsible will be held to account,” she said, noting that she believed the list was hastily prepared at the last moment.

“Ukraine spent so much time preparing (to introduce) these sanctions … now they’ve released the sanctions and they are so badly prepared. I think they were designed for some internal reasons, to show that something big has been done ahead of elections,” she said.

The plan backfired, she said, because whoever prepared the list exhibited negligence, incompetence, and a complete lack of understanding of the media.

Sa fiche sur le site de la Cour constitutionnelle

Constitutional Court of Ukraine
▻http://www.ccu.gov.ua/en/publish/article/11784

Judge Shyshkin was born in 1952 in Tyraspol, Moldavian SSR.
 
He started to work in 1969. He served a regular term in the army.
 
In 1973 he finished Tyraspol technical school no. 2, and worked as a locksmith.
 
In 1981 he graduated from the Law Faculty of Odesa Illia Mechnykov State University. The same year he was elected people’s judge at Oleksandrivskyi district people’s court in Kirovohrad region.
 
1982-1985 - people’s judge of Kirovskyi regional people’s court in Kirovohrad.
 
1985-1990 - Judge of Kirovohrad regional court, Deputy Chairman of this court.
 
He was a People’s Deputy of Ukraine of the I, II and III convocations, Deputy Head of the Committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.
 
1991-1993 - Prosecutor General of Ukraine.
 
In November 2005 he was appointed Judge of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine by the President of Ukraine. He swore the oath on August 4, 2006.
 
Candidate of Legal Sciences (constitutional law). In 1987 he defended the thesis “The constitutional right of the Soviet citizens to appeal acts of officials, state and civil bodies”. Associate Professor. In 1996 Judge Shyshkin was awarded with the title “Distinguished Lawyer of Ukraine” for elaboration of the Constitution of Ukraine.
 
He is the author of over 100 publications in Ukraine and abroad (Poland, the United States of America, Hungary, Germany), in particular monographs “Constitutional Right to Challenge Acts of the Officials in Court” (1990), “Ensuring Human Rights in the US Justice (organisational and procedural principles)” (2000) and text-books “Judicial Systems of the World States”, (two volumes) (2001) “Principles of Administrative Justice and Administrative Law” (in co-authorship) (2006).

fiche maintenant complétée par la ligne suivante :

In July 2015 the President of Ukraine accepted the resignation of Viktor Shyshkin

Ah tiens, pour le fun, ce qu’écrivait un certain Viktor Shyshkin en 2010…

CCU judge : There are no grounds for pre-term dismissal of CCU judges - David Zhvaniya’s Personal Site
▻http://zhvaniya.com/en/article/sudya_ksu_net_osnovaniy_dlya_dosrochnogo_prekrascheniya_polnomochiy_sudey_

There are no grounds for pre-term dismissal of anyone of the CCCU [Constitutional Court of Ukraine] judges. That’s what Viktor Shyshkin, the CCU judge, stated to RBC-Ukraine commenting the initiative of people’s deputy Roman Zvarych to dismiss the CCU judges who had supported the decision on individual deputies’ membership in the coalition.

“All that (Zvarych’s appeal) are populist steps and a matter of politics. There are no legal prospects of that”, – Shyshkin emphasized.

Le décret présidentiel
▻http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/4442015-19270

Відповідно до пункту 22 частини першої статті 106, пункту 9 частини п’ятої статті 126, статті 149 Конституції України постановляю:
Звільнити ШИШКІНА Віктора Івановича з посади судді Конституційного Суду України у зв’язку з поданням заяви про відставку.

Il s’agit donc de la démission de l’intéressé.

Les 14 Mars vont bien ?

A comparer avec l’extraordinaire manière de #Ignatius,

After the nuclear deal, how to contain Iran’s meddling in the Middle East - The Washington Post
▻http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/after-the-nuclear-deal-how-to-contain-irans-meddling-in-the-middle-east/2015/07/16/6197e560-2bf4-11e5-bd33-395c05608059_story.html

Obama spoke in his news conference Wednesday about including Iran in a diplomatic settlement in Syria. “We’re not going to solve the problems of Syria unless there’s buy-in from the Russians, the Iranians, the Turks, our Gulf partners. It’s too chaotic. . . . Iran is one of those players, and I think that it’s important for them to be part of that conversation.”

Will pressure convince Iran that its interests are served by diplomatic negotiations on Syria and Yemen? Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said in April that he would welcome such talks. And Zarif has told Secretary of State John F. Kerry that Iran wants to play a different and less menacing role in the region.

But here’s the heart of the problem: Zarif doesn’t control Iran’s covert-action campaigns. They’re run by Gen. Qasem Soleimani , head of the Revolutionary Guard’s Quds Force.

What will convince the hard-liners that it’s time to talk? Pressure, pressure, pressure . . . and then diplomacy. This crucial process will be much easier with the nuclear file closed.

Pour replacer ces infos très intéressantes dans un contexte historique plus large de la politisation de la question chiite à al-Azhar et en Egypte, depuis l’époque de Nasser jusqu’à nos jours, voici un intéressant article d’al-Ahram. Les critiques sur les qualités de l’article - qui dépasse mes connaissances limitées - sont plus que bienvenues :
Identity-politics , Egypt and the Shia / al-Ahram weekly 2013
▻http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/2376/21/Identity-politics,-Egypt-and-the-Shia.aspx
Sur la fatwa de Shaltoot en 1959 (grand imam d’al-Azhar) qui reconnaît la doctrine jaafarite (chiite duodécimaine), fatwa récusée en 2012 :

In 1959, the sheikh of Al-Azhar Mahmoud Shaltout, who had established that office, issued a fatwa, or religious edict, sanctioning worship in accordance with the rights of the Jaafari school of religious jurisprudence, to which the majority of Shia subscribe. His fatwa stated, “It is legally permissible to worship in accordance with the Jaafari doctrine, which is known to be the doctrine of the Twelver Shiites, as is the case with the Sunni doctrines. The Muslim people should know this and shed unwarranted bigotry against certain creeds. The religion of God and His Sharia have never been affiliated with or restricted to any one doctrinal order. All who strive to perfect their faith are acceptable to Almighty God, and those who are not qualified to engage in the disciplines of theological and jurisprudential inquiry may emulate and follow the rulings of those that are. There is no difference[between Muslims] in the [basic tenets of] worship and interaction.”

Une note dans wikipedia cite la biographie de Nasser par Said Aburish pour expliquer l’aspect politique de cette fatwa, Nasser espérait affaiblir l’alliance du général Qassem et des communistes en rendant la RAU et le nationalisme arabe plus atttractif pour les chiites irakiens :
▻https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Azhar_Shia_Fatwa

Aburish, Saïd K. (2004). Nasser: the last Arab (illustrated ed.). Duckworth. pp. 200–201. ISBN 9780715633007. “But perhaps the most far reaching change [initiated by Nasser’s guidance] was the fatwa commanding the readmission to mainstream Islam of the Shia, Alawis, and Druze. They had been considered heretics and idolaters for hundreds of years, but Nasser put an end to this for once and for all. While endearing himself to the majority Shia of Iraq and undermining Kassem [the communist ruler of Iraq at the time] might have played a part in that decision, there is no doubting the liberalism of the man in this regard.”

Il me semble avoir lu (est-ce dans la biographie de Saddam Hussein par le même Aburish ?) que Saddam Hussein (alors réfugié en Egypte) avait joué un rôle pour l’édiction de cette fatwa. J’avais souvenir aussi que le grand mufti d’Arabie saoudite s’était opposé à cette fatwa. Si des seenthissiens éclairés ont des infos et des sources...
A l’époque de Sadate et dans le cadre de son opposition à la révolution iranienne puis de son engagement auprès de l’Irak contre l’Iran :

President Sadat, who had opposed the Iranian Revolution, hosted the deposed Shah in Egypt, initiating a decades-long rupture in relations between Cairo and Tehran. Yet, in that very year, he closed down the Society of the Ahl Al-Bayt (the House of the Prophet Mohamed), the main Shia institute in Egypt. Henceforward, the Egyptian-Iranian conflict would acquire a salient sectarian dimension. This development was aggravated by the Shia insularism that had begun to permeate Iran’s theocratic regime under the system of vilayet-e faqih (rule by clergy) and that rendered the Shia affiliation virtually synonymous with Iranian identity. When Egypt became involved on the Iraqi side of the Iraq-Iran war, Egyptian security services became acutely sensitive to this identity and began to clamp down on all forms of Shia associations in Egypt, regardless of the fact that this community exists on the margins of society which, in turn, was geographically and emotionally remote from that conflict. At the same time, the state had begun to allow the Salafist tide to penetrate society, giving rise to the spread of ultraconservative doctrinal rigidity and the onset of mounting sectarian tensions between Muslims and Copts.

Après la victoire du Hezbollah en 2006 et l’enthousiasme qu’elle génère y compris dans les masses sunnites arabes, qui mettent en difficulté les alliances de Moubarak, les salafistes égyptiens relancent le discours sectaire sur le « danger » de la pénétration chiite en Egypte, tout cela en lien avec les pétromonarchies du Golfe :

Although initially the Shia question had not featured strongly in Salafist rhetoric, it was not remote. When Egyptians rejoiced at the Hizbullah victory over the Israeli army in 2006, Salafi sheikhs moved to avert the perceived threat to Sunni Egypt from the admiration of the victory, and produced a battery of recordings and lectures warning of the looming Shia tide. This drive coincided with an official rhetoric on the part of the Egyptian government, which at the time was engaged in a war of strategic balances against Iran and its allies, in alliance with the governments of the Gulf that are the chief sponsors of the Salafist movements in the Arab world.

Après la chute de Moubarak et dans le cadre de la rivalité FM/salafistes les FM et le pouvoir de Morsi ne sont pas en reste selon l’auteur - je me demande si ce passage ne manque pas un peu de nuance car l’attitude de Morsi face à l’Iran fut très ambivalente et versatile :

The decision to restore relations with Iran was taken by the regime that the Muslim Brotherhood now controls. In view of its totalitarian nature and the fact that it is an expression of the religious characteristics of Egyptian society, the Muslim Brotherhood did not originally define itself on the basis of Muslim doctrinal divides. Nevertheless, since the 1970s when it found itself in competition with the Salafis over the apportionment of the Egyptian societal pie, it also began to veer toward Salafism. The sensitivity of the doctrinal conflict with the Shia was one of the reasons it had severed connections with the Iranian regime with which it had initially established ties immediately following the victory of the Iranian Revolution. The speech that Morsi delivered in Tehran last August and that alluded heavily to the Sunni-Shia divide was clearly intended to outbid the Salafis at home by playing on the mounting sectarian sensitivities in Egyptian society.