Qu’on la trouve pertinente ou non en définitive, l’analyse de James Dorsey sur le management du foot et la possibilité pour l’Arabie saoudite de se réformer mérite d’être lue.
The resignation of Prince Nawaf and the campaign against Prince Faisal gained added significance in a nation in which the results of premier league clubs associated with various members of the kingdom’s secretive royal family are seen as a barometer of their relative status, particularly at a time that its septuagenarian and octogenarian leaders have initiated a generational transition and are seeking to restructure the economy and recast the social contract without granting political concessions.
“The Saudis are extremely worried. Soccer clubs rather than the mosque are likely to be the centre of any revolution. Kids go more to stadiums than to mosques. They are not religious, they are not ruled by religious dogma,” said Washington-based Saudi dissident Ali al-Ahmad, who heads the Gulf Institute.
Mr. Al-Ahmad was referring to the power of clerics preaching Wahhabism, the puritan interpretation of Islam developed by 18th century preacher Mohammed ibn Abdul Al-Wahhab. Saudi Arabia’s ruling Al Saud family established the kingdom with the help of the Wahhabis who in return were granted the right to ensure that their views would dominate public life.
Similarly, the federation’s ban on the hiring of foreign talent came as Prince Mohammed was seeking to force employers to replace foreign labour with Saudi nationals. The effort that predates last year’s accession to the throne of King Salman and the instalment of Prince Mohammed as one of the kingdom’s most powerful men provoked soccer opposition already in late 2014.
Clubs resisted the application of a quota system to soccer and warned that it would put them at a disadvantage in international competitions. The problem of Saudi clubs was compounded by the kingdom’s reluctance to encourage Saudi players to garner experience by playing abroad for foreign clubs.
Saudi Arabia has long had a complex relationship with soccer because it evokes passions similar to those sparked by religion. Saudi clerics rolled out mobile mosques during the 2010 World Cup in South Africa in an effort to persuade fans gathered in cafes to watch matches to observe obligatory prayer times.
A senior Saudi soccer executive highlighted a key Saudi soccer problem, saying that “we are funded by the government to serve the country.” With oil prices strongly reduced, Saudi Arabia, like other countries is seeking to cut costs and control spending, making less money available to soccer clubs.
Equally importantly, serving the country in Saudi Arabia means the government’s desire to control soccer because it provides popular entertainment and often deviates attention from more political concerns, yet constitutes a potentially powerful venue for the expression of dissent.
To achieve Vision 2030’s goals of greater Saudi competitiveness and transparency, Prince Mohammed and the federation will have to square those goals with dealing with the corrosive effect of political interference in the sport, particularly by members of the ruling family. Dealing publicly with match fixing and debt suggests the government and the federation may have taken a first step.
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