#protocole_d'accord

Fewer boat crossings, visit to Frontex : EU and Tunisia implement migration pact

Despite an alleged repayment of funds for migration defence, Tunisia is cooperating with the EU. Fewer refugees are also arriving across the Mediterranean – a decrease by a factor of seven.

In June, the EU Commission signed an agreement on joint migration control with Tunisia. According to the agreement, the government in Tunis will receive €105 million to monitor its borders and “combat people smuggling”. Another €150 million should flow from the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) in the coming years for the purposes of border management and countering the “smuggling” of migrants.

Tunisia received a first transfer under the agreement of €67 million in September. The money was to finance a coast guard vessel, spare parts and marine fuel for other vessels as well as vehicles for the Tunisian coast guard and navy, and training to operate the equipment. Around €25 million of this tranche was earmarked for “voluntary return” programmes, which are implemented by the United Nations Refugee Agency and the International Organisation for Migration.

However, a few weeks after the transfer from Brussels, the government in Tunis allegedly repaid almost the entire sum. Tunisia “does not accept anything resembling favours or alms”, President Kais Saied is quoted as saying. Earlier, the government had also cancelled a working visit by the Commission to implement the agreement.

Successes at the working level

Despite the supposed U-turn, cooperation on migration prevention between the EU and Tunisia has got off the ground and is even showing initial successes at the working level. Under the agreement, the EU has supplied spare parts for the Tunisian coast guard, for example, which will keep “six ships operational”. This is what Commission President Ursula von der Leyen wrote last week to MEPs who had asked about the implementation of the deal. Another six coast guard vessels are to be repaired by the end of the year.

In an undated letter to the EU member states, von der Leyen specifies the equipment aid. According to the letter, IT equipment for operations rooms, mobile radar systems and thermal imaging cameras, navigation radars and sonars have been given to Tunisia so far. An “additional capacity building” is to take place within the framework of existing “border management programmes” implemented by Italy and the Netherlands, among others. One of these is the EU4BorderSecurity programme, which among other things provides skills in sea rescue and has been extended for Tunisia until April 2025.

The Tunisian Garde Nationale Maritime, which is part of the Ministry of the Interior, and the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre benefit from these measures. This MRCC has already received an EU-funded vessel tracking system and is to be connected to the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network. Through this, the EU states exchange information about incidents off their coasts. This year Tunisia has also sent members of its coast guards to Italy as liaison officers – apparently a first step towards the EU’s goal of “linking” MRCC’s in Libya and Tunisia with their “counterparts” in Italy and Malta.

Departures from Tunisia decrease by a factor of seven

Since the signing of the migration agreement, the departures of boats with refugees from Tunisia have decreased by a factor of 7, according to information from Migazin in October. The reason for this is probably the increased frequency of patrols by the Tunisian coast guard. In August, 1,351 people were reportedly apprehended at sea. More and more often, the boats are also destroyed after being intercepted by Tunisian officials. The prices that refugees have to pay to smugglers are presumably also responsible for fewer crossings; these are said to have risen significantly in Tunisia.

State repression, especially in the port city of Sfax, has also contributed to the decline in numbers, where the authorities have expelled thousands of people from sub-Saharan countries from the centre and driven them by bus to the Libyan and Algerian borders. There, officials force them to cross the border. These measures have also led to more refugees in Tunisia seeking EU-funded IOM programmes for “voluntary return” to their countries of origin.

Now the EU wants to put pressure on Tunisia to introduce visa requirements for individual West African states. This is to affect, among others, Côte d’Ivoire, where most of the people arriving in the EU via Tunisia come from and almost all of whom arrive in Italy. Guinea and Tunisia come second and third among these nationalities.

Reception from the Frontex Director

In September, three months after the signing of the migration agreement, a delegation from Tunisia visited Frontex headquarters in Warsaw, with the participation of the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs and Defence. The visit from Tunis was personally received by Frontex Director Hans Leijtens. EU officials then gave presentations on the capabilities and capacities of the border agency, including the training department or the deportation centre set up in 2021, which relies on good cooperation with destination states of deportation flights.

Briefings were also held on the cross-border surveillance system EUROSUR and the “Situation Centre”, where all threads from surveillance with ships, aircraft, drones and satellites come together. The armed “permanent reserve” that Frontex has been building up since 2021 was also presented to the Tunisian ministries. These will also be deployed in third countries, but so far only in Europe in the Western Balkans.

However, Tunisia still does not want to negotiate such a deployment of Frontex personnel to its territory, so a status agreement necessary for this is a long way off. The government in Tunis is also not currently seeking a working agreement to facilitate the exchange of information with Frontex. Finally, the Tunisian coast guard also turned down an offer to participate in an exercise of European coast guards in Greece.

Model for migration defence with Egypt

Aiding and abetting “smuggling” is an offence that the police are responsible for prosecuting in EU states. If these offences affect two or more EU states, Europol can coordinate the investigations. This, too, is now to get underway with Tunisia: In April, EU Commissioner Ylva Johansson had already visited Tunis and agreed on an “operational partnership to combat people smuggling” (ASOP), for which additional funds will be made available. Italy, Spain and Austria are responsible for implementing this police cooperation.

Finally, Tunisia is also one of the countries being discussed in Brussels in the “Mechanism of Operational Coordination for the External Dimension of Migration” (MOCADEM). This working group was newly created by the EU states last year and serves to politically bundle measures towards third countries of particular interest. In one of the most recent meetings, the migration agreement was also a topic. Following Tunisia’s example, the EU could also conclude such a deal with Egypt. The EU heads of government are now to take a decision on this.

▻https://digit.site36.net/2023/11/01/fewer-boat-crossings-visit-to-frontex-eu-and-tunisia-implement-migrati

#Europe #Union_européenne #EU #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #accord #gestion_des_frontières #aide_financière #protocole_d'accord #politique_migratoire #externalisation #Memorandum_of_Understanding (#MoU) #Tunisie #coopération #Frontex #aide_financière #Neighbourhood_Development_and_International_Cooperation_Instrument (#NDICI) #gardes-côtes_tunisiens #militarisation_des_frontières #retours_volontaires #IOM #OIM #UNHCR #EU4BorderSecurity_programme #Seahorse_Mediterranean #officiers_de_liaison #arrivées #départs #chiffres #statistiques #prix #Frontex #operational_partnership_to_combat_people_smuggling (#ASOP) #Mechanism_of_Operational_Coordination_for_the_External_Dimension_of_Migration (#MOCADEM)

–—
ajouté à la métaliste sur le Mémorandum of Understanding entre l’UE et la Tunisie :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/1020591

The EU-Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding : A Blueprint for Cooperation on Migration ?

On July 16, 2023, a memorandum of understanding, known as the “migrant deal”, was signed between the EU and Tunisia, at a time when the EU is trying to find ways to limit the arrival of irregular migrants into its territory. The memorandum, however, raises some concerns regarding its content, form, and human rights implications.

This past year, Tunisia became the primary country of departure for migrants attempting to reach the European Union via Italy through the Central Mediterranean route. With a sharp increase of arrivals in the first few months of 2023, which further accelerated during the summer, cooperation with Tunisia has turned into a key priority in the EU’s efforts to limit migration inflows.

On July 16, 2023, after complicated negotiations, Olivér Várhelyi, the EU Commissioner for Neighborhood and Enlargement, and Mounir Ben Rjiba, Secretary of State to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad, signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on “a strategic and global partnership between the European Union and Tunisia,” published in the form of a press release on the European Commission’s website. President Ursula von der Leyen labeled the deal as a “blueprint” for future arrangements, reiterating the commission’s intention to work on similar agreements with other countries. The MoU, however, in terms of its content, form, and the human rights concerns it raises, falls squarely within current trends characterizing EU cooperation on migration with third countries.
The content of the agreement

Known as the “migrant deal,” the MoU covers five areas of cooperation: macro-economic stability, economy and trade, green energy transition, people-to-people contacts, and migration and mobility. The EU agreed to provide €105 million to enhance Tunisia’s border control capabilities while facilitating entry to highly-skilled Tunisians, and €150 million in direct budgetary support to reduce the country’s soaring inflation. It further foresees an extra €900 million in macro-economic support conditioned on Tunisia agreeing to sign an International Monetary Fund bailout. In exchange, Tunisia committed to cooperate on the fight against the smuggling and trafficking of migrants, to carry out search and rescue operations within its maritime borders, and to readmit its own nationals irregularly present in the EU—an obligation already existent under customary international law. Much to Italy’s disappointment, and unlike what happened in the case of Turkey in 2016, Tunisia refused to accept the return of non-Tunisian migrants who transited through the country to reach the EU, in line with the position it has occupied since the onset of the negotiations.

What was agreed on seems to be all but new, seemingly reiterating past commitments

Overall, what was agreed on seems to be all but new, seemingly reiterating past commitments. As for funding, the EU had been providing support to Tunisia to strengthen its border management capabilities since 2015. More broadly, and despite its flaws, the MoU embeds the current carrot-and-stick approach to EU cooperation with third countries, systematically using other external policies of interest to these nations, such as development assistance, trade and investments, and energy—coupled with promises of (limited) opportunities for legal mobility—to induce third countries to cooperate on containing migration flows.
The legal nature of the agreement

The MoU embeds the broader trend of de-constitutionalization and informalization of EU cooperation with third countries, which first appeared in the 2005 “Global Approach to Migration” and the 2011 “Global Approach to Migration and Mobility”, and substantially grew in the aftermath of the 2015 refugee crisis, with the EU-Turkey Statement and the “Joint Way Forward on migration with Afghanistan” being the most prominent examples, in addition to several Mobility Partnerships. The common denominator among these informal arrangements consisted of the use of instruments outside the constitutional framework established for concluding international agreements, notably Article 218 on the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), to agree on bilateral commitments that usually consist in the mobilization of different EU policy areas to deliver on migration containment goals.

Recourse to informal arrangements can have its advantages, as they are capable of adapting quickly to new realities and allow for immediate implementation without requiring parliamentary ratification or authorization procedures, as highlighted by the EU Court of Auditors. However, they might fall short of constitutional guarantees, as they do not follow standard EU treaty-making rules. EU treaties are silent as to how non-binding agreements should be negotiated and concluded, and thus often lack democratic oversight, transparency, and legal certainty. They might also pose issues in terms of judicial review by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), in accordance with Article 263 of the TFEU.

In the much-debated judgment “NF”, the General Court—the jurisdiction of first instance of the CJEU—refused to assess the legality of the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement, which was published as a press release on the website of the European Council. Indeed, the Court concluded at the time that the deal was one of member states acting in their capacity as heads of state and government, and not as part of the European Council as an EU institution, rendering the deal unattributable to the EU. The Court did not specifically refer to the legal nature of the agreement, despite all EU institutions stressing that the document was “not intended to produce legally binding effects nor constitute an agreement or a treaty” (para. 27), it being “merely ‘a political arrangement’” (para. 29).

Overall, it is apparent that the lack of clarity regarding the procedure to be followed and the actors to be involved when it comes to the conclusion of non-binding agreements by the EU is problematic from a rule of law perspective

The EU-Tunisia MoU, on the other hand, was signed by the European Commission alone, making it fully attributable to the EU. This means that it could be potentially challenged before the CJEU, if there is reason to believe that the content of the agreement renders it a legally-binding one, infringing on the procedure foreseen by the EU treaties, or if the competencies of the Council and the Parliament, the two other EU institutions usually involved in the conclusion of international agreements, were otherwise breached. In another case, the CJEU indeed found that, while the treaties do not regulate the matter and thus Article 218 on the TFEU does not apply, the Commission should nonetheless seek prior approval of the Council before signing an MoU in the exercise of its competencies, pursuant to Article 17 (1) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), due to the Council’s “policy-making” powers provided by Article 16 of the TEU. The Court, however, did not clarify whether the Commission should have likewise involved the European Parliament in light of its power to exercise “political control,” provided by Article 14 TEU. With regard to the MoU with Tunisia, however, neither of the two institutions seemed to have been involved. Overall, it is apparent that the lack of clarity regarding the procedure to be followed and the actors to be involved when it comes to the conclusion of non-binding agreements by the EU is problematic from a rule of law perspective.
Concerns over protection of fundamental rights

The EU-Tunisia MoU has been harshly criticized by both civil society organizations and different members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in light of the Tunisian authorities’ documented abuses and hostilities against migrants, amidst a political climate of broader democratic crisis. While vaguely referring to “respect for human rights,” the MoU does not specify how the Commission intends to ensure compliance with fundamental rights. Concerns over the agreement led the European Ombudsman—a body of the EU that investigates instances of maladministration by EU institutions—to ask the EU’s executive arm whether it had conducted a human rights impact assessment before its conclusion, as well as if it intended to monitor its implementation, and if it envisaged the suspension of funding if human rights were not respected. This adds to the growing discontent over the EU’s prioritization of securing its borders over ensuring the protection of fundamental rights of migrants, through the externalization of border controls to third countries with poor human rights records and authoritarian governments, such as Libya, Turkey, Morocco, Egypt, and Sudan, among others.

These episodes exemplify the paradox of externalization, with the EU trying to shield itself from the risk of instrumentalization of migration by third countries on one hand, and making itself dependent upon these actors’ willingness to contain migratory flows, and thus vulnerable to forms of repercussion and bad faith tactics, on the other

In an unprecedented move, Tunisia denied entry to a group of MEPs who were due to visit the country on official duty on September 14. While no official explanation was given, the move was seen as a reaction for speaking out against the agreement. Despite this, and the fact that there is still a lack of clarity as to how compliance with fundamental rights will be guaranteed, the Commission announced that the first tranche of EU funding would be released by the end of September. However, Tunisia declared to have rejected the money precisely over the EU’s excessive focus on migration containment, although Várhelyi stated that the refusal related to budget support is unrelated to the MoU. These episodes exemplify the paradox of externalization, with the EU trying to shield itself from the risk of instrumentalization of migration by third countries on one hand, and making itself dependent upon these actors’ willingness to contain migratory flows, and thus vulnerable to forms of repercussion and bad faith tactics, on the other. Similar deals, posing similar risks, are currently envisaged with Egypt and Morocco. Moving forward, the EU should instead make efforts to create partnerships with third countries based on genuine mutually-shared interests, restoring credibility in its international relations which should be based on support for its founding values: democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

▻https://timep.org/2023/10/19/the-eu-tunisia-memorandum-of-understanding-a-blueprint-for-cooperation-on-mig
#Tunisie #EU #Europe #Union_européenne #EU #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #accord #gestion_des_frontières #aide_financière #protocole_d'accord #politique_migratoire #externalisation #memorandum_of_understanding #MoU

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ajouté à la métaliste sur le Mémorandum of Understanding entre l’UE et la Tunisie :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/1020591

#Métaliste sur le #Memorandum_of_Understanding (#MoU) avec la #Tunisie

#Europe #Union_européenne #EU #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #accord #gestion_des_frontières #aide_financière #protocole_d'accord #politique_migratoire #externalisation

En #Tunisie, l’#UE refait la même erreur, toujours aussi dangereuse

Alors que les représentant·e·s de la « Team Europe [2] » serraient la main du président tunisien Kaïs Saïed en juillet dernier, des centaines de réfugié·e·s et de migrant·e·s bloqués aux frontières terrestres désertiques du pays avec la Libye ont été rassemblés par ses forces de sécurité et abandonnés là, sans accès à de la nourriture ni à de l’eau, sans abri.

Le président du Parti populaire européen (PPE) Manfred Weber a par la suite évoqué ces informations, y compris les multiples décès près de la frontière, en parlant de « vidéos prises dans le désert ou quelque chose comme ça [3] ».

Les leaders européens se sont rendus en Tunisie pour signer un protocole d’accord visant à freiner l’immigration vers l’Europe. En échange, ils lui offrent environ 100 millions d’euros pour la « gestion des frontières » et près d’un milliard en prêts supplémentaires et soutien financier, dans le contexte de la crise économique sans précédent que traverse le pays.

Cependant, pendant que la Tunisie et l’Union européenne débattent de la manière de mettre en place ce protocole d’accord, ses coûts humains sont déjà évidents. Tandis que l’Europe ferme les yeux sur la répression croissante des droits humains en Tunisie, la population, y compris les personnes demandeuses d’asile, réfugiées et migrantes, paient le prix fort.
Les leaders de l’Europe et de l’Union européenne doivent tout de suite changer de cap.

Tout d’abord, même une fois l’accord conclu, les autorités tunisiennes ont continué d’amener de force les migrant·e·s à la frontière libyenne, où beaucoup ont déjà besoin d’une aide humanitaire d’urgence, les médias internationaux [4] faisant état de nombreux morts. Fait choquant, les leaders de l’UE n’ont pas encore condamné publiquement ces violations.

En revanche, la Commission européenne s’est engagée à coopérer avec les autorités tunisiennes pour empêcher les personnes demandeuses d’asile, réfugiées et migrantes d’atteindre l’Europe, sachant pertinemment que les mêmes violations se reproduiront – piégeant ces personnes dans des situations de violence et contribuant à l’hostilité qu’elles subissent en Tunisie.

Plus inquiétant, cet accord a été signé sans aucune condition relative aux droits humains, sans évaluation ni suivi de son impact sur les droits, et en l’absence de mécanisme permettant de suspendre la coopération en cas d’abus. La médiatrice européenne a annoncé la semaine dernière [5] avoir demandé à la Commission européenne de clarifier [6] comment elle veillera à ce que la Tunisie respecte les droits humains.

Il semble que personne n’ait tiré les leçons de la coopération de l’UE avec la Libye [7] : le soutien du bloc apporté aux forces de sécurité libyennes l’a rendu complice d’une infrastructure de violations infligées aux réfugié·e·s et migrant·e·s – actes de torture, viols, disparitions forcées, homicides illégaux et détentions arbitraires. Une récente enquête de l’ONU [8] a conclu que ces actes pouvaient s’apparenter à des crimes contre l’humanité.

Les accords visant à contenir les personnes dans des pays ne faisant pas partie de l’UE ne sauvent pas des vies et ne les empêchent pas d’emprunter des itinéraires clandestins. Au contraire, les personnes en mouvement sont contraintes d’entreprendre des périples encore plus dangereux afin de ne pas se faire intercepter par les autorités, tandis que les passeurs en profitent puisqu’elles dépendent encore plus de leurs services. En outre, ces accords ne résolvent en rien les problèmes qui poussent les gens à émigrer en quête de sécurité, et qui vont de toute façon perdurer. Aussi est-il décevant que, dans son « Plan en 10 points pour Lampedusa [9] », la présidente Ursula Von der Leyen renforce l’accord avec la Tunisie.

L’accord de l’UE avec la Tunisie risque aussi de légitimer l’attaque du président Kaïs Saïed contre l’état de droit et sa répression toujours plus forte de la dissidence. En amont de l’accord, le silence des leaders européens s’est épaissi tandis qu’il démantelait quasiment tous les contrôles institutionnels du pouvoir exécutif, publiait des décrets restreignant la liberté d’expression et s’octroyait des pouvoirs sur le système judiciaire. De très nombreux détracteurs, opposant·e·s, avocat·e·s, journalistes et juges ont fait l’objet de poursuites pénales arbitraires et de mesures restrictives, allant jusqu’à l’incarcération.

La Tunisie a récemment refusé l’entrée à cinq députés européens qui devaient se rendre dans le pays dans le cadre d’une visite officielle. Parmi eux se trouvaient les eurodéputés Mounir Satouri et Michael Gahler qui avaient auparavant critiqué l’accord [10] en raison de la répression en Tunisie. Le refus de les laisser entrer sur le territoire a été largement perçu comme une mesure de représailles.

Jadis saluée comme la réussite du mouvement du Printemps arabe et comme un refuge pour les défenseur·e·s des droits humains de toute l’Afrique du Nord, la Tunisie risque aujourd’hui d’emboîter le pas à l’Égypte, qui a vu son président Abdelfattah al Sissi transformer son pays en une prison à ciel ouvert, tout en supervisant l’appauvrissement de millions d’Égyptiens. Les leaders de l’UE ont majoritairement gardé le silence face à cette répression brutale, lorsqu’Abdelfattah al Sissi a bloqué les routes migratoires depuis l’Égypte vers l’Europe, forçant des milliers de personnes à emprunter l’itinéraire meurtrier via la Libye.

Enfin, tout en sachant sans doute que l’accord augmenterait le risque de violations des droits humains à l’encontre des personnes migrantes et réfugiées, la Commission a choisi de négocier le protocole d’accord en secret. Les négociations se sont déroulées sans le regard aiguisé du Parlement européen et des Parlements nationaux, et loin de toute implication de la société civile.
Ce manque de transparence sape la légitimité de la politique migratoire de l’UE.

Pour éviter que l’UE ne se rende complice d’atteintes aux droits et de répression, son engagement avec des partenaires concernant la migration doit s’accompagner de conditions strictes, d’évaluations d’impact et de suivi en matière de droits humains. Nous avons besoin d’une approche équilibrée qui déploie un plus grand nombre d’itinéraires migratoires sûrs et s’attache à protéger plutôt que contenir.

L’accord avec la Tunisie ne respecte aucune de ces conditions et doit donc être suspendu.
L’UE doit promouvoir l’indépendance de la justice, la liberté de la presse et une société civile dynamique dans le pays.

Notes

[1] ►https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-lawmakers-parliament-fumed-by-the-european-commission-tunisia-migration-

[2] ►https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-lawmakers-parliament-fumed-by-the-european-commission-tunisia-migration-

[3] ▻https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/brussels-playbook/weber-calls-on-tunisia-to-bring-down-migrant-numbers

[4] ▻https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/20/world/africa/tunisia-african-migrants.html

[5] ▻https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-ethics-watchdog-ombudsman-question-commission-tunisia-migrant-deal

[6] ▻https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/opening-summary/en/175102

[7] ▻https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/29/video-woman-dead-floor-migrant-detention-centre-libya

[8] ▻https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/03/libya-urgent-action-needed-remedy-deteriorating-human-rights-situation-un

[9] ▻https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fr/ip_23_4503

[10] ▻https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/12/tunisia-should-not-get-1bn-on-a-silver-plate-in-migration-deal-says-mep

▻https://www.amnesty.be/infos/blogs/blog-paroles-chercheurs-defenseurs-victimes/article/tunisie-refait-erreur-dangereuse

ping @_kg_

#Europe #Union_européenne #EU #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #accord #gestion_des_frontières #aide_financière #protocole_d'accord #politique_migratoire

Qu’est-ce que l’entrée de la #Croatie dans #Schengen peut changer à la route migratoire des Balkans ?

https://scd.infomigrants.net/media/resize/my_image_big/8fbf028ab419173b6f016d21b11ec9318f9d863c.jpeg

La Croatie a fait son entrée, le 1er janvier 2023, dans l’espace Schengen. L’intégration de ce pays des Balkans dans la zone de libre circulation pourrait changer la donne à la frontière croate, où les #refoulements de migrants sont fréquents, observe la chercheuse Camille Le Coz. Par un effet de dominos, la situation en Bosnie voisine pourrait se durcir.

La Croatie a fait son entrée, le 1er janvier 2023, dans l’espace de libre circulation européen Schengen alors que la route migratoire des Balkans connaît une forte hausse de fréquentation depuis l’été. Zagreb a enregistré 30 000 migrants irréguliers dans le pays au cours des dix premiers mois de 2022, soit une augmentation de 150% par rapport à la même période de l’année précédente.

Pour Camille Le Coz, analyste au Migration policy institute, l’entrée de la Croatie dans Schengen permet d’"acter quelque chose qui était déjà en place sur le terrain". « La Croatie a été récompensée pour ses bons et loyaux services en faisant en sorte de limiter les arrivées de migrants [dans l’UE] », affirme-t-elle.

Depuis son intégration dans l’Union européenne en 2013, la Croatie est chargée de protéger les frontières extérieures de l’UE, dont la majeure partie est partagée avec la Bosnie. Si les chiffres n’ont rien à voir aujourd’hui avec ceux de 2015, des milliers d’exilés tentent encore chaque année ce passage par la route des Balkans, via la Serbie ou la Bosnie.

Depuis 2018, le nord de la Bosnie, à la frontière croate, s’est transformé en cul-de-sac pour ces migrants. Voulant montrer à Bruxelles sa capacité à protéger les frontières de l’Union, la Croatie a en effet déployé de nombreux garde-frontières sur la zone. Les refoulements se sont multipliés et, dans la plupart des cas, ils se sont accompagnés de graves violences, tortures et vols, régulièrement dénoncés. Depuis des années, les rapports d’ONG se multiplient sur les exactions commises contre les exilés à la frontière bosno-croate.
Vers davantage de respect des droits humains ?

Mais cela pourrait changer à la faveur de cette nouvelle situation, explique la chercheuse Camille Le Coz. « Le respect des droits de l’Homme fait partie des obligations liées à l’entrée dans Schengen. Il est donc possible que l’entrée de la Croatie mette plus de pression sur les policiers et les garde-frontières croates », pointe-t-elle. Les cas de non-respect des droits humains pourraient ainsi être davantage contrôlés.

Cette entrée pourrait aussi s’accompagner d’aides pour améliorer le système d’asile dans le pays et d’une coopération sur les retours volontaires de migrants. À condition que les garde-frontières ne refoulent pas systématiquement les exilés qui entrent dans le pays pour demander une protection internationale.

A contrario, et par un effet de dominos, la situation en Bosnie voisine, qui a récemment obtenu le statut de candidat à l’entrée dans l’Union européenne, pourrait se durcir.
« Éviter à la Croatie d’avoir à pratiquer des pushbacks »

Le 28 novembre, le commissaire européen Olivér Várhelyi a annoncé le financement d’un protocole d’accord entre l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) et le ministère bosnien de la Sécurité à hauteur de 500 000 euros. Cette somme doit servir à augmenter le nombre de « retours volontaires et forcés » des migrants vers leur pays d’origine. Le commissaire a également indiqué que le camp de Lipa, situé dans le nord de la Bosnie serait amené à devenir un centre de détention. « Les faux demandeurs d’asile doivent être détenus jusqu’à leur retour dans leur pays », a-t-il déclaré.

Barbara Becares, chargée des relations avec la presse de l’ONG No Name Kitchen, qui vient en aide aux exilés en Bosnie et en Serbie, voit dans ce projet la volonté de Bruxelles d’"éviter à la Croatie d’avoir à pratiquer des pushbacks […] en gardant les personnes en Bosnie".

Sur le terrain, les polices bosniennes et serbes œuvrent déjà à retenir les personnes le plus loin possible des frontières de l’UE, selon elle. « Les expulsions sont très courantes, autant en Bosnie qu’en Serbie, observe-t-elle. La police va chercher très tôt le matin les personnes qui dorment à l’extérieur des camps et les emmène dans des endroits éloignés des frontières ». En Bosnie, elles sont généralement emmenées dans le camp de Lipa, alors qu’en Serbie, elles sont conduites dans le sud du pays.

Pour freiner les arrivées via la route des Balkans, Bruxelles compte aussi sur l’aide de la Serbie. Le pays est, lui aussi, candidat à l’adhésion à l’Union européenne et son intégration dépendra sans doute largement, comme pour la Bosnie, de sa capacité à montrer à Bruxelles qu’il contrôle ses frontières.

En octobre, Belgrade a déjà, à la demande de Bruxelles, mis fin à l’exemption de visas pour les ressortissants tunisiens et burundais. L’obligation de détenir un visa pour entrer dans le pays a été étendue, le 1er janvier, aux ressortissants d’Inde et de Guinée-Bissau.

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