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    La chute du Heron blanc, ou la fuite en avant de l’agence #Frontex

    Sale temps pour Frontex, l’agence européenne de gardes-frontières : après le scandale des pushbacks dans les eaux grecques, qui a fait tomber son ex-directeur, l’un de ses drones longue portée de type Heron 1, au coût faramineux, s’est crashé fin août en mer ionienne. Un accident qui met en lumière la dérive militariste de l’Union européenne pour barricader ses frontières méridionales.

    Jeudi 24 août 2023, un grand oiseau blanc a fait un plongeon fatal dans la mer ionienne, à 70 miles nautiques au large de la Crète. On l’appelait « Heron 1 », et il était encore très jeune puisqu’il n’avait au compteur que 3 000 heures de vol. Son employeur ? Frontex, l’agence européenne de gardes-frontières et de gardes-côtes chargée depuis 2004 de réguler les frontières européennes, avec un budget sans cesse en hausse.

    Le Heron 1 est désigné dans la terminologie barbare du secteur de l’armement comme un drone MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) de quatrième génération, c’est-à-dire un engin automatisé de grande taille capable de voler sur de longues distances. Frontex disposait jusqu’au crash de seulement deux drones Heron 1. Le premier a été commandé en octobre 2020, quand l’agence a signé un contrat de 50 millions d’euros par an avec Airbus pour faire voler cet appareil en « leasing » – Airbus passant ensuite des sous-contrats, notamment avec le constructeur israélien IAISystem
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    – pour un total de 2 400 heures de vol, et avec des dépassements qui ont fait monter la facture annuelle. En clair, le coût de fonctionnement de ce drôle d’oiseau est abyssal. Frontex rechigne d’ailleurs à entrer dans les détails, arguant de « données commerciales sensibles », ainsi que l’explique Matthias Monroy, journaliste allemand spécialisé dans l’aéronautique : « Ils ne veulent pas donner les éléments montrant que ces drones valent plus cher que des aéroplanes classiques, alors que cela semble évident. »
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    La nouvelle de la chute de l’onéreux volatile n’a pas suscité beaucoup de réactions publiques – il n’en est quasiment pas fait mention dans les médias autres que grecs, hormis sur des sites spécialisés. On en trouve cependant une trace sur le portail numérique du Parlement européen, en date du 29 août 2023. Ce jour-là, Özlem Demirel, députée allemande du parti de gauche Die Linke, pose la question « E-002469/2023 » (une interpellation enregistrée sous le titre : « Crash of a second long-range drone operated on Frontex’s behalf »), dans laquelle elle interroge la fiabilité de ces drones. Elle y rappelle que, déjà en 2020, un coûteux drone longue distance opéré par Frontex s’était crashé en mer – un modèle Hermes 900 cette fois-ci, tout aussi onéreux, bijou de l’israélien Elbit Systems. Et la députée de demander : « Qui est responsable ? »

    Une question complexe. « En charge des investigations, les autorités grecques détermineront qui sera jugé responsable, explique Matthias Monroy. S’il y a eu une défaillance technique, alors IAI System devra sans doute payer. Mais si c’est un problème de communication satellite, comme certains l’ont avancé, ou si c’est une erreur de pilotage, alors ce sera à Airbus, ou plutôt à son assureur, de payer la note. »
    VOL AU-DESSUS D’UN NID D’EMBROUILLES

    Le Heron 1 a la taille d’un grand avion de tourisme – presque un mini-jet. D’une envergure de 17 mètres, censé pouvoir voler en autonomie pendant 24 heures (contre 36 pour le Hermes 900), il est équipé de nombreuses caméras, de dispositifs de vision nocturne, de radars et, semble-t-il, de technologies capables de localiser des téléphones satellites
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    . Détail important : n’étant pas automatisé, il est manœuvré par un pilote d’Airbus à distance. S’il est aussi utilisé sur des théâtres de guerre, notamment par les armées allemande et israélienne, où il s’est également montré bien peu fiable
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    , sa mission dans le cadre de Frontex relève de la pure surveillance : il s’agit de fournir des informations sur les embarcations de personnes exilées en partance pour l’Europe.

    Frontex disposait de deux drones Heron 1 jusqu’au crash. Airbus était notamment chargé d’assurer le transfert des données recueillies vers le quartier général de Frontex, à Varsovie (Pologne). L’engin qui a fait un fatal plouf se concentrait sur la zone SAR(Search and Rescue
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    ) grecque et avait pour port d’attache la Crète. C’est dans cette même zone SAR que Frontex a supervisé plus ou moins directement de nombreux pushbacks (des refoulements maritimes), une pratique illégale pourtant maintes fois documentée, ce qui a provoqué un scandale qui a fini par contraindre le Français Fabrice Leggeri à démissionner de la tête de l’agence fin avril 2022. Il n’est pas interdit de penser que ce Heron 1 a joué en la matière un rôle crucial, fournissant des informations aux gardes-côtes grecs qui, ensuite, refoulaient les embarcations chargées d’exilés.

    Quant à son jumeau, le Heron positionné à Malte, son rôle est encore plus problématique. Il est pourtant similaire à celui qui s’est crashé. « C’est exactement le même type de drone », explique Tamino Bohm, « tactical coordinator » (coordinateur tactique) sur les avions de Sea-Watch, une ONG allemande de secours en mer opérant depuis l’île italienne de Lampedusa. Si ce Heron-là, numéro d’immatriculation AS2132, diffère de son jumeau, c’est au niveau du territoire qu’il couvre : lui survole les zones SAR libyennes, offrant les informations recueillies à ceux que la communauté du secours en mer s’accorde à désigner comme les « soi-disant gardes-côtes libyens »
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    – en réalité, des éléments des diverses milices prospérant sur le sol libyen qui se comportent en pirates des mers. Financés en partie par l’Union européenne, ils sont avant tout chargés d’empêcher les embarcations de continuer leur route et de ramener leurs passagers en Libye, où les attendent bien souvent des prisons plus ou moins clandestines, aux conditions de détention infernales
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    .

    C’est ainsi qu’au large de Lampedusa se joue une sorte de guerre aérienne informelle. Les drones et les avions de Frontex croisent régulièrement ceux d’ONG telles que Sea-Watch, dans un ballet surréaliste : les premiers cherchant à renseigner les Libyens pour qu’ils arraisonnent les personnes exilées repérées au large ; les seconds s’acharnant avec leurs maigres moyens à documenter et à dénoncer naufrages et refoulements en Libye. Et Tamino d’asséner avec malice : « J’aurais préféré que le drone crashé soit celui opérant depuis Malte. Mais c’est déjà mieux que rien. »
    BUDGET GONFLÉ, MANDAT ÉLARGI

    Tant que l’enquête sur le crash n’aura pas abouti, le vol de drones Heron 1 est suspendu sur le territoire terrestre et maritime relevant des autorités grecques, assure Matthias Monroy (qui ajoute que cette interdiction s’applique également aux deux drones du même modèle que possède l’armée grecque). Le crash de l’un de ses deux Heron 1 est donc une mauvaise nouvelle pour Frontex et les adeptes de la forteresse Europe, déjà bien éprouvés par les arrivées massives à Lampedusa à la mi-septembre et l’hospitalité affichée sur place par les habitants. À l’image de ces murs frontaliers bâtis aux frontières de l’Europe et dans l’espace Schengen – un rapport du Parlement européen, publié en octobre 2022 « Walls and fences at EU borders » (▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2022)733692), précise que l’on en est à 2 035 kilomètres de barrières frontalières, contre 315 en 2014 –, matérialisation d’un coûteux repli identitaire clamant une submersion fantasmée, il est évident que la démesure sécuritaire ne freine en rien les volontés de rejoindre l’Europe.

    Ce ne sont pourtant pas les moyens qui manquent. Lors de sa première année d’opérations, en 2005, Frontex disposait d’un budget de 6 millions d’euros. Depuis, celui-ci n’a cessé d’enfler, pour atteindre la somme de 845,4 millions d’euros en 2023, et un effectif de plus de 2 100 personnels – avec un budget prévisionnel 2021-2027 de 11 milliards d’euros et un objectif de 10 000 gardes d’ici à 2027 (dont 7 000 détachés par les États membres).

    Depuis 2019, Frontex dispose d’un mandat élargi qui autorise l’acquisition et la possession d’avions, de drones et d’armes à feu. L’agence s’est aussi géographiquement démultipliée au fil de temps. Ses effectifs peuvent aussi bien patrouiller dans les eaux de Lampedusa que participer à des missions de surveillance de la frontière serbo-hongroise, alors que son rôle initial était simplement d’assister les pays européens dans la gestion de leurs frontières. L’agence européenne joue aussi un rôle dans la démesure technologique qui se développe aux frontières. Rien que dans les airs, l’agence se veut novatrice : elle a déjà investi plusieurs millions d’euros dans un projet de #zeppelin automatisé relié à un câble de 1 000 mètres, ainsi que dans le développement de drones « #quadcopter » pesant une dizaine de kilos. Enfin, Frontex participe aussi à la collecte généralisée de #données migratoires dans le but d’anticiper les refoulements. Elle soutient même des projets visant à gérer les flux humains par #algorithmes.

    Traversée comme les armées par une culture du secret, l’agence s’est fait une spécialité des zones grises et des partenariats opaques, tout en prenant une place toujours plus importante dans la hausse de la létalité des frontières. « Frontex est devenue l’agent de la #militarisation_des_frontières européennes depuis sa création, résume un rapport de la Fondation Jean-Jaurès sorti en juillet 2023. Fondant son fonctionnement sur l’#analyse_des_risques, Frontex a contribué à la perception des frontières européennes comme d’une forteresse assiégée, liant le trafic de drogue et d’êtres humains à des mouvements migratoires plus larges. »

    « VOUS SURVEILLEZ LES FRONTIÈRES, NOUS VOUS SURVEILLONS »

    Dans sa volonté d’expansion tous azimuts, l’agence se tourne désormais vers l’Afrique, où elle œuvre de manière plus ou moins informelle à la mise en place de politiques d’#externalisation des frontières européennes. Elle pèse notamment de tout son poids pour s’implanter durablement au #Sénégal et en #Mauritanie. « Grâce à l’argent des contribuables européens, le Sénégal a construit depuis 2018 au moins neuf postes-frontières et quatre antennes régionales de la Direction nationale de lutte contre le trafic de migrants. Ces sites sont équipés d’un luxe de #technologies de #surveillance_intrusive : outre la petite mallette noire [contenant un outil d’extraction des données], ce sont des #logiciels d’#identification_biométrique des #empreintes_digitales et de #reconnaissance_faciale, des drones, des #serveurs_numériques, des lunettes de vision nocturne et bien d’autres choses encore », révèle une enquête du journal étatsunien In These Times. Très impopulaire sur le continent, ce type de #néocolonialisme obsidional se déploie de manière informelle. Mais il porte bien la marque de Frontex, agence agrippée à l’obsession de multiplier les murs physiques et virtuels.

    Au Sénégal, pour beaucoup, ça ne passe pas. En août 2022, l’association #Boza_Fii a organisé plusieurs journées de débat intitulées « #Pushback_Frontex », avec pour slogan : « Vous surveillez les frontières, nous vous surveillons ». Une manifestation reconduite en août 2023 avec la mobilisation « 72h Push Back Frontex ». Objectif : contrer les négociations en cours entre l’Union européenne et le Sénégal, tout en appelant « à la dissolution définitive de l’agence européenne de gardes-frontières ». Sur RFI, son porte-parole #Saliou_Diouf expliquait récemment son point de vue : « Nous, on lutte pour la #liberté_de_circulation de tout un chacun. […] Depuis longtemps, il y a beaucoup d’argent qui rentre et est-ce que ça a arrêté les départs ? »

    Cette politique « argent contre muraille » est déployée dans d’autres États africains, comme le #Niger ou le #Soudan. Frontex n’y est pas directement impliquée, mais l’Europe verse des centaines de millions d’euros à 26 pays africains pour que des politiques locales visant à bloquer les migrations soient mises en place.

    « Nous avons besoin d’aide humanitaire, pas d’outils sécuritaires », assure Mbaye Diop, travailleur humanitaire dans un camp de la Croix-Rouge situé à la frontière entre le Sénégal et la Mauritanie, dans l’enquête de In These Times. Un constat qui vaut de l’autre côté de la Méditerranée : dans un tweet publié après le crash du Heron 1, l’ONG Sea-Watch observait qu’avec les 50 millions alloués à Airbus et à ses sous-traitants pour planter son Heron dans les flots, « on pourrait faire voler pendant 25 ans nos avions de secours Seabird 1 et Seabird 2 ».

    ▻https://afriquexxi.info/La-chute-du-Heron-blanc-ou-la-fuite-en-avant-de-l-agence-Frontex

    #drones #Heron_1 #frontières #surveillances_des_frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #migrations #asile #réfugiés #drone_MALE (#Medium_Altitude_Long_Endurance) #crash #Airbus #complexe_militaro-industriel #IAI_System #coût #prix #budget #chute #fiabilité #Hermes_900 #Elbit_Systems #données #push-backs #refoulements #AS2132 #Libye #guerre_aérienne_informelle #biométrie

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    „We were prisoners of the Polish state“

    https://www.cilip.de/files/2023/08/Police_PL-672x372.jpg

    Since the summer of 2021, many people from Middle East and Africa seeking protection have been entering Poland and thus the European Union via Belarus. This new migration route leads through forests and swamps and finally a frontier that is highly equipped and shielded by border troops from Poland. A lot of people die on this way, yet it is still perceived by many as safe to reach Europe. Those caught by Polish border guards, however, face two scenarios: Being illegally pushed back to Belarus or being locked up in Polish refugee prisons.

    ▻https://www.cilip.de/2023/08/28/we-were-prisoners-of-the-polish-state

    #film #documentaire #film_documentaire #Pologne #Biélorussie #forêt #migrations #réfugiés #emprisonnement #détention_administrative #rétention #frontières #push-backs #refoulements

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      Interim Resolution CM/ResDH(2023)260

      Execution of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights

      Ilias and Ahmed group against Hungary

      The Committee of Ministers, under the terms of Article 46, paragraph 2, of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which provides that the Committee supervises the execution of final judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “the Convention” and “the Court”);

      Recalling that this group of cases concerns a violation of the procedural obligation under Article 3 to assess the risks of ill-treatment before removing the asylum-seeking applicants to Serbia by relying on a general presumption of “safe third country” (Ilias and Ahmed; W.A. and others); it further concerns violations of the prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention following the application of the “apprehension and escort” measure introduced by the State Borders Act, authorising the police to remove the asylum-seeking applicants staying illegally in Hungarian territory to the external side of the border fence (on the border with Serbia) without a decision, as well as the lack of an effective remedy under Article 13 in respect of the applicants’ removal (Shahzad and H.K.);

      Taking note of the authorities’ information that the legislative presumption of “safe third country” in respect of Serbia has not been applied by the asylum authority or the domestic courts since
      26 May 2020;

      Considering nevertheless that sufficient guarantees against the reoccurrence of a violation similar to the one identified by the European Court in Ilias and Ahmed and W.A. and Others are necessary;

      Reiterating its grave concern that despite the authorities’ repeated indications that the reform of the asylum system is underway, no information on concrete measures has been communicated in this respect;

      Reiterating further its grave concern that, despite the concerns expressed in its previous decisions and notwithstanding the adoption of the Shahzad and H.K. judgments by the European Court, collective expulsions reportedly not only continue but that their numbers are increasing at a concerning rate;

      Emphasising the legal obligation of every State, under the terms of Article 46, paragraph 1, of the Convention to abide by the final judgments of the European Court in any case to which they are a party, fully, effectively and promptly;

      INVITED the authorities to submit an undertaking that, in the absence of a thorough and up-to-date reassessment of the asylum situation in Serbia, they will refrain from again applying the legislative presumption of “safe third country” to that country;

      STRONGLY URGED the authorities to intensify their efforts in reforming the asylum system in order to afford effective access to means of legal entry, in particular border procedures in line with Hungary’s international obligations, and invited them to establish a timeline for the legislative process, to present a draft legislative proposal and to keep the Committee informed of all relevant developments in the legislative process;

      EXHORTED the authorities to terminate, without further delay, the practice of removing asylum-seekers to Serbia pursuant to section 5 of the State Borders Act without their identification or examination of their individual situation;

      REITERATED its call on the authorities to introduce an effective remedy providing a person alleging that their expulsion procedure is “collective” in nature with an effective possibility of challenging the expulsion decision by having a sufficiently thorough examination of their complaints carried out by an independent and impartial domestic forum, in line with the Court’s case-law;

      INVITED the authorities to submit an updated action plan, including information on all the above issues, by 30 June 2024, and decided to resume consideration of this group, in the light of the information received, at their DH meeting in September 2024;

      ENVISAGED taking new action to ensure that Hungary abides by its obligations deriving from the Court’s judgments in this group of cases, should no tangible progress be achieved by that meeting as regards the issues mentioned above.

      ▻https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=0900001680aca0b9

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    #Alpes-Maritimes : à #Menton, près de 3 000 migrants interpellés en deux semaines

    Ce total porte à 32 000 le nombre d’#interpellations depuis le début de l’année le long de la #frontière dans le département, un chiffre en hausse de 20 % par rapport à l’an dernier sur la même période, a précisé vendredi la directrice départementale de la police aux frontières.

    Les renforts des forces de l’ordre ont permis d’interpeller près de 3 000 migrants depuis le 8 septembre à Menton, dans les Alpes-Maritimes, avant l’afflux possible de migrants débarqués en masse à Lampedusa, a annoncé, vendredi 22 septembre, Emmanuelle Joubert, directrice départementale de la police aux frontières.

    Ce total porte à 32 000 le nombre d’interpellations depuis le début de 2023 le long de la frontière dans ce département, un chiffre en hausse de 20 % par rapport à 2022 sur la même période alors que les arrivées en Italie ont plus que doublé par rapport à 2022, a expliqué Mme Joubert lors d’un point de presse.

    Parmi les migrants interpellés, 24 000 ont fait l’objet d’une procédure de non-admission et ont été remis aux autorités italiennes, soit 10 % de plus qu’en 2022. Mais beaucoup ont été comptabilisés plusieurs fois après avoir multiplié les tentatives. Les autres étaient des mineurs non accompagnés, qui ne peuvent être refoulés et dont le nombre a bondi de 50 %, pour atteindre 5 000 arrivées, et des majeurs interceptés au-delà de la bande de 20 kilomètres permettant les réadmissions en Italie.

    Rétablissement des contrôles aux frontières

    Les procédures ont été mises en place en 2015 avec le rétablissement des contrôles aux frontières à la suite des attentats : tous les trains passant par Menton sont contrôlés, des policiers filtrent les postes-frontières et patrouillent dans les montagnes de l’arrière-pays. Seuls les contrôles sur l’autoroute restent beaucoup plus aléatoires.

    Depuis le 1er juin, une force frontière (border force) est déployée, avec des renforts de personnel, l’appui des militaires de l’opération « Sentinelle » et de drones à caméras thermiques. Dans un arrêt rendu jeudi, la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne (CJUE) a estimé que la France ne pouvait pas procéder à des refoulements systématiques de cette manière. « Nous avons été informés. L’Etat réalise une analyse, nous aurons les instructions plus tard », a expliqué Mme Joubert.

    En attendant, les contrôles se sont intensifiés après l’arrivée de plus de 12 000 migrants en quelques jours la semaine dernière sur les côtes italiennes, pour la plupart sur la petite île de Lampedusa. Mais « il s’écoule souvent un délai de plusieurs semaines entre leur arrivée en Italie et le passage de la frontière », a expliqué Mme Joubert. Ainsi, les personnes interpellées jeudi étaient arrivées à la fin d’août ou au début de septembre en Italie. Seuls deux avaient débarqué la semaine dernière à Lampedusa.

    Lors d’un déplacement à Menton, le 12 septembre, le ministre de l’intérieur, Gérald Darmanin, avait annoncé des renforts dans la lutte contre l’immigration irrégulière à la frontière italienne, où la France constate « une augmentation de 100 % des flux », avait-il dit.

    ▻https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2023/09/22/alpes-maritimes-a-menton-pres-de-3-000-migrants-interpelles-en-deux-semaines

    #chiffres #statistiques #2023 #frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontière_sud-alpine #militarisation_des_frontières #non-admission #procédure_de_non-admission #réadmissions #push-backs #refoulements #contrôles_systématiques #Vintimille #contrôles_frontaliers #border_force #force_frontière #opération_Sentinelle #Sentinelle #anticipation (par rapport aux arrivées probables en lien avec le nombre important de personnes débarquées à Lampedusa...)

    Lien avec #Lampedusa...
    ►https://seenthis.net/messages/1017235

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      Militari, elicotteri, droni e cani contro i migranti: la Francia blinda il confine con l’Italia

      Parigi proroga ancora ancora una volta il ripristino dei controlli alle frontiere aboliti da Schengen. «Non accoglieremo migranti da Lampedusa»

      Il ministro dell’Interno Gérald Darmanin aveva chiarito già lunedì scorso, prima dell’incontro con il suo omologo italiano Matteo Piantedosi, che “la Francia non accoglierà migranti da Lampedusa”. 120 uomini a supporto della Géndarmerie, militari, droni, elicotteri e cani a controllare il confine. Parigi proroga ancora ancora una volta il ripristino dei controlli alle frontiere aboliti dal trattato di Schengen salvo casi particolari. È la tensione che sale per la pressione migratoria che nelle ultime settimane preme dall’Italia e allarma l’Europa. A Lampedusa intanto continuano gli arrivi. 13 in un’ora, 402 le persone sbarcate, oltre 1.800 gli ospiti dell’hotspot di Contrada Imbriacola. Attenzione alta anche sul lato est, a Trieste, sulla rotta balcanica.

      Il totale di migranti sbarcati in Italia nel 2023 ieri è salito a 131mila. A Ventimiglia ieri c’erano circa 400 migranti. Blindato il valico di Ponte San Ludovico per impedire il passaggio da Ventimiglia. I controlli sono molto fitti tra Garavano e Mentone. Parigi smentisce l’impegno sul campo contro i clandestini anche del “Vigipirate”, il reparto speciale collegato al piano di sicurezza anti-terrorismo strutturato nel 1978 dal Presidente Giscard d’Estaing. Proprio vicino alla frontiera si sta lavorando a una nuova struttura di identificazione che servirà a trattenere nelle ore serali i migranti irregolari individuati dalla parte francese del confine e che verranno riportati in Italia la mattina dopo.

      La pressione migratoria è percepita come una “minaccia” a Parigi. I migranti si inerpicano di notte su sentieri anche pericolosi, a strapiombo, per attraversare il confine. “Sono dispiegati 120 militari della Border Force che assicurano, notte e giorno, azioni di sorveglianza della frontiera – spiega la prefettura del dipartimento francese delle Alpes-Maritimes – con missione di dissuasione, raccolta di informazioni sul terreno e individuazione di stranieri in situazione irregolare nella striscia di confine”. Gli agenti del Vigipirate sono chiamati “chasseurs des Alpes”, i cacciatori delle Alpi.

      I migranti intanto “hanno ben compreso che sono aumentati i controlli – ha dichiarato all’Ansa Jacopo Colomba di We World – ma loro hanno vissuto frontiere molto più traumatiche di questa. Hanno capito che c’è più polizia ma non vivono questa cosa come un trauma eccessivo. Dalle prime testimonianze che ci hanno fornito comprendono che ci vorrà più di un tentativo per passare e il turn over sarà più lento ma alla fine passeranno“. Qualora dovesse aumentare il flusso di persone aumenterebbero anche i prezzi dei passeurs.

      ▻https://www.unita.it/2023/09/20/militari-elicotteri-droni-e-cani-contro-i-migranti-la-francia-blinda-il-confin

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    EU judges slam France’s migrant pushbacks

    Ruling examines decision to shut French border to non-EU nationals.

    The EU’s top court ruled against France’s policy of turning away migrants at its borders.

    The European Court of Justice announced on Thursday (▻https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2023-09/cp230145en.pdf) that those actions breached the EU’s rules on migrant returns.

    The ruling comes as France closed its border to Italy amid a recent surge in migrant arrivals to the Italian island of Lampedusa.

    France’s center-right Home Affairs Minister Gerard Darmanin had on Monday vowed that “France will not take in a single migrant from Lampedusa” after meeting his Italian counterpart Matteo Piantedosi in Rome (►https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/mondo/2023/09/18/darmanin-la-francia-non-accogliera-migranti-da-lampedusa_2f53eae6-e8f7-4b82-9d7).

    But EU rules compel member countries to initiate a formal procedure when expelling an irregular migrant, and give that person sufficient time to leave the country.

    So-called pushbacks of migrants, or forcing a migrant directly back across a border, may only be carried out as a last resort, the judges in Luxembourg ruled.

    They also noted that non-EU citizens who lack permission to stay may not be turned away at internal EU borders.

    Commenting on the ruling, the European Commission’s Home Affairs spokesperson Anitta Hipper told a daily media briefing that “reintroducing [internal EU] border controls must remain an exceptional measure.” (►https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-246319)

    She added that the EU executive is in consultations with countries that have sealed their borders.

    This ruling comes as the European Parliament’s home affairs committee on Wednesday backed legislation that allows EU countries to enact border controls only when faced with emergencies such as health or terrorism threats, and only for a limited time period.

    ▻https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-judges-slam-france-migrant-pushback

    #migrations #asile #réfugiés #frontière_sud-alpine #Italie #France #frontières #push-backs #refoulements #fermeture_des_frontières #Alpes #justice #C-143/22 #Cour_de_justice_de_l'Union_européenne (#CJUE) #frontières_intérieures

    CDB_77
    • @cdb_77
      CDB_77

      JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Fourth Chamber)

      (Reference for a preliminary ruling – Area of freedom, security and justice – Border control, asylum and immigration – Regulation (EU) 2016/399 – Article 32 – Temporary reintroduction of border control by a Member State at its internal borders – Article 14 – Refusal of entry – Equation of internal borders with external borders – Directive 2008/115/EC – Scope – Article 2(2)(a))

      In Case C‑143/22,

      REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Conseil d’État (Council of State, France), made by decision of 24 February 2022, received at the Court on 1 March 2022, in the proceedings

      Association Avocats pour la défense des droits des étrangers (ADDE),

      Association nationale d’assistance aux frontières pour les étrangers (ANAFE),

      Association de recherche, de communication et d’action pour l’accès aux traitements (ARCAT),

      Comité inter-mouvements auprès des évacués (Cimade),

      Fédération des associations de solidarité avec tou.te.s les immigré.e.s (FASTI),

      Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigré.e.s (GISTI),

      Ligue des droits de l’homme (LDH),

      Le paria,

      Syndicat des avocats de France (SAF),

      SOS – Hépatites Fédération

      v

      Ministre de l’Intérieur,

      intervening party :

      Défenseur des droits,

      THE COURT (Fourth Chamber),

      composed of C. Lycourgos (Rapporteur), President of the Chamber, L.S. Rossi, J.-C. Bonichot, S. Rodin and O. Spineanu-Matei, Judges,

      Advocate General : A. Rantos,

      Registrar : M. Krausenböck, Administrator,

      having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 19 January 2023,

      after considering the observations submitted on behalf of :

      – Association Avocats pour la défense des droits des étrangers (ADDE), Association nationale d’assistance aux frontières pour les étrangers (ANAFE), Association de recherche, de communication et d’action pour l’accès aux traitements (ARCAT), Comité inter-mouvements auprès des évacués (Cimade), Fédération des associations de solidarité avec tou.te.s les immigré.e.s (FASTI), Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigré.e.s (GISTI), Ligue des droits de l’homme (LDH), Le paria, Syndicat des avocats de France (SAF) and SOS – Hépatites Fédération, by P. Spinosi, lawyer,

      – the Défenseur des droits, by C. Hédon, Défenseure des droits, M. Cauvin and A. Guitton, acting as advisers, and by I. Zribi, lawyer,

      – the French Government, by A.-L. Desjonquères and J. Illouz, acting as Agents,

      – the Polish Government, by B. Majczyna, E. Borawska-Kędzierska and A. Siwek-Ślusarek, acting as Agents,

      – the European Commission, by A. Azéma, A. Katsimerou, T. Lilamand and J. Tomkin, acting as Agents,

      after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 30 March 2023,

      gives the following

      Judgment

      1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (OJ 2016 L 77, p. 1, ‘the Schengen Borders Code’), and of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98).

      2 The request has been made in proceedings between Association Avocats pour la défense des droits des étrangers (ADDE), Association nationale d’assistance aux frontières pour les étrangers (ANAFE), Association de recherche, de communication et d’action pour l’accès aux traitements (ARCAT), Comité inter-mouvements auprès des évacués (Cimade), Fédération des associations de solidarité avec tou.te.s les immigré.e.s (FASTI), Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigré.e.s (GISTI), Ligue des droits de l’homme (LDH), Le Paria, Syndicat des avocats de France (SAF), SOS – Hépatites Fédération, and Ministre de l’Intérieur (Minister of the Interior, France) regarding the legality of the ordonnance no 2020-1733 du 16 décembre 2020 portant partie législative du code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile (Order No 2020-1733 of 16 December 2020, laying down the legislative part of the Code on Entry and Residence of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum) (JORF of 30 December 2020, Text No 41).

      Legal context

      European Union law

      The Schengen Borders Code

      3 Pursuant to Article 2 of the Schengen Borders Code :

      ‘For the purposes of this Regulation the following definitions apply :

      1. “internal borders” means :

      (a) the common land borders, including river and lake borders, of the Member States ;

      (b) the airports of the Member States for internal flights ;

      (c) sea, river and lake ports of the Member States for regular internal ferry connections ;

      2. “external borders” means : the Member States’ land borders, including river and lake borders, sea borders and their airports, river ports, sea ports and lake ports, provided that they are not internal borders ;

      …’

      4 Title II of that code, which concerns ‘External Borders’, includes Articles 5 to 21.

      5 Article 14 of the code, entitled ‘Refusal of entry’, states :

      ‘1. A third-country national who does not fulfil all the entry conditions laid down in Article 6(1) and does not belong to the categories of persons referred to in Article 6(5) shall be refused entry to the territories of the Member States. This shall be without prejudice to the application of special provisions concerning the right of asylum and to international protection or the issue of long-stay visas.

      2. Entry may only be refused by a substantiated decision stating the precise reasons for the refusal. The decision shall be taken by an authority empowered by national law. It shall take effect immediately.

      The substantiated decision stating the precise reasons for the refusal shall be given by means of a standard form, as set out in Annex V, Part B, filled in by the authority empowered by national law to refuse entry. The completed standard form shall be handed to the third-country national concerned, who shall acknowledge receipt of the decision to refuse entry by means of that form.

      Data on third-country nationals whose entry for a short stay has been refused shall be registered in the EES in accordance with Article 6a(2) of this Regulation and Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2017 establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data and refusal of entry data of third-country nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States and determining the conditions for access to the EES for law enforcement purposes, and amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement and Regulations (EC) No 767/2008 and (EU) No 1077/2011 (OJ 2017 L 327, p. 20)].

      3. Persons refused entry shall have the right to appeal. Appeals shall be conducted in accordance with national law. A written indication of contact points able to provide information on representatives competent to act on behalf of the third-country national in accordance with national law shall also be given to the third-country national.

      Lodging such an appeal shall not have suspensive effect on a decision to refuse entry.

      Without prejudice to any compensation granted in accordance with national law, the third-country national concerned shall, where the appeal concludes that the decision to refuse entry was ill-founded, be entitled to the correction of the data entered in the EES or of the cancelled entry stamp, or both, and any other cancellations or additions which have been made, by the Member State which refused entry.

      4. The border guards shall ensure that a third-country national refused entry does not enter the territory of the Member State concerned.

      5. Member States shall collect statistics on the number of persons refused entry, the grounds for refusal, the nationality of the persons who were refused entry and the type of border (land, air or sea) at which they were refused entry and submit them yearly to the Commission (Eurostat) in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council [of 11 July 2007 on Community statistics on migration and international protection and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 311/76 on the compilation of statistics on foreign workers (OJ 2007 L 199, p. 23)].

      6. Detailed rules governing refusal of entry are given in Part A of Annex V.’

      6 Title III of the Schengen Borders Code, which concerns ‘Internal Borders’, includes Articles 22 to 35.

      7 Article 25 of that code, entitled ‘General framework for the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders’, provides :

      ‘Where, in the area without internal border control, there is a serious threat to public policy or internal security in a Member State, that Member State may exceptionally reintroduce border control at all or specific parts of its internal borders for a limited period of up to 30 days or for the foreseeable duration of the serious threat if its duration exceeds 30 days. The scope and duration of the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders shall not exceed what is strictly necessary to respond to the serious threat.’

      8 Article 32 of the Schengen Borders Code, entitled ‘Provisions to be applied where border control is reintroduced at internal borders’, provides :

      ‘Where border control at internal borders is reintroduced, the relevant provisions of Title II shall apply mutatis mutandis.’

      9 Annex V, Part A, of the Schengen Borders Code provides :

      ‘1. When refusing entry, the competent border guard shall :

      (a) fill in the standard form for refusing entry, as shown in Part B. The third-country national concerned shall sign the form and shall be given a copy of the signed form. Where the third-country national refuses to sign, the border guard shall indicate this refusal in the form under the section “comments” ;

      (b) for third-country nationals whose entry for a short stay has been refused, register in the EES the data on refusal of entry in accordance with Article 6a(2) of this Regulation and Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 ;

      (c) annul or revoke the visas, as appropriate, in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 34 of Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code) (OJ 2009 L 243, p. 1)] ;

      (d) for third-country nationals whose refusals of entry are not to be registered into the EES, affix an entry stamp on the passport, cancelled by a cross in indelible black ink, and write opposite it on the right-hand side, also in indelible ink, the letter(s) corresponding to the reason(s) for refusing entry, the list of which is given on the standard form for refusing entry as shown in Part B of this Annex. In addition, for these categories of persons, the border guard shall record every refusal of entry in a register or on a list stating the identity and nationality of the third-country national concerned, the references of the document authorising the third-country national to cross the border and the reason for, and date of, refusal of entry.

      The practical arrangements for stamping are set out in Annex IV.

      2. If a third-country national who has been refused entry is brought to the border by a carrier, the authority responsible locally shall :

      (a) order the carrier to take charge of the third-country national and transport him or her without delay to the third country from which he or she was brought, to the third country which issued the document authorising him or her to cross the border, or to any other third country where he or she is guaranteed admittance, or to find means of onward transportation in accordance with Article 26 of the Schengen Convention and Council Directive 2001/51/EC [of 28 June 2001 supplementing the provisions of Article 26 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 (OJ 2001 L 187, p. 45)] ;

      (b) pending onward transportation, take appropriate measures, in compliance with national law and having regard to local circumstances, to prevent third-country nationals who have been refused entry from entering illegally.

      …’

      10 Pursuant to Article 44 of that code, entitled ‘Repeal’ :

      ‘Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (OJ 2006 L 105, p. 1)] is repealed.

      References to the repealed Regulation shall be construed as references to this Regulation and shall be read in accordance with the correlation table in Annex X.’

      11 In accordance with that correlation table, Article 14 of the Schengen Borders Code corresponds to Article 13 of Regulation No 562/2006.

      Directive 2008/115

      12 Article 2(1) and (2) of Directive 2008/115 states :

      ‘1. This Directive applies to third-country nationals staying illegally on the territory of a Member State.

      2. Member States may decide not to apply this Directive to third-country nationals who :

      (a) are subject to a refusal of entry in accordance with Article 13 of [Regulation No 562/2006], or who are apprehended or intercepted by the competent authorities in connection with the irregular crossing by land, sea or air of the external border of a Member State and who have not subsequently obtained an authorisation or a right to stay in that Member State ;

      (b) are subject to return as a criminal law sanction or as a consequence of a criminal law sanction, according to national law, or who are the subject of extradition procedures.’

      13 Article 3 of that directive provides :

      ‘For the purpose of this Directive the following definitions shall apply :

      …

      2. “illegal stay” means the presence on the territory of a Member State, of a third-country national who does not fulfil, or no longer fulfils the conditions of entry as set out in Article 5 of [Regulation No 562/2006] or other conditions for entry, stay or residence in that Member State ;

      3. “return” means the process of a third-country national going back – whether in voluntary compliance with an obligation to return, or enforced – to :

      – his or her country of origin, or

      – a country of transit in accordance with Community or bilateral readmission agreements or other arrangements, or

      – another third country, to which the third-country national concerned voluntarily decides to return and in which he or she will be accepted ;

      …’

      14 Article 4(4) of the directive provides :

      ‘With regard to third-country nationals excluded from the scope of this Directive in accordance with Article 2(2)(a), Member States shall :

      (a) ensure that their treatment and level of protection are no less favourable than as set out in Article 8(4) and (5) (limitations on use of coercive measures), Article 9(2)(a) (postponement of removal), Article 14(1)(b) and (d) (emergency health care and taking into account needs of vulnerable persons), and Articles 16 and 17 (detention conditions) and

      (b) respect the principle of non-refoulement.’

      15 Article 5 of Directive 2008/115 provides :

      ‘When implementing this Directive, Member States shall take due account of :

      (a) the best interests of the child ;

      (b) family life ;

      (c) the state of health of the third-country national concerned,

      and respect the principle of non-refoulement.’

      16 Article 6 of that directive provides :

      ‘1. Member States shall issue a return decision to any third-country national staying illegally on their territory, without prejudice to the exceptions referred to in paragraphs 2 to 5.

      2. Third-country nationals staying illegally on the territory of a Member State and holding a valid residence permit or other authorisation offering a right to stay issued by another Member State shall be required to go to the territory of that other Member State immediately. In the event of non-compliance by the third-country national concerned with this requirement, or where the third-country national’s immediate departure is required for reasons of public policy or national security, paragraph 1 shall apply.

      3. Member States may refrain from issuing a return decision to a third-country national staying illegally on their territory if the third-country national concerned is taken back by another Member State under bilateral agreements or arrangements existing on the date of entry into force of this Directive. In such a case the Member State which has taken back the third-country national concerned shall apply paragraph 1.

      …’

      17 The first subparagraph of Article 7(1) of that directive provides :

      ‘A return decision shall provide for an appropriate period for voluntary departure of between seven and thirty days, without prejudice to the exceptions referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4. Member States may provide in their national legislation that such a period shall be granted only following an application by the third-country national concerned. In such a case, Member States shall inform the third-country nationals concerned of the possibility of submitting such an application.’

      18 Article 15(1) of that directive provides :

      ‘Unless other sufficient but less coercive measures can be applied effectively in a specific case, Member States may only keep in detention a third-country national who is the subject of return procedures in order to prepare the return and/or carry out the removal process, in particular when :

      (a) there is a risk of absconding or

      (b) the third-country national concerned avoids or hampers the preparation of return or the removal process.

      Any detention shall be for as short a period as possible and only maintained as long as removal arrangements are in progress and executed with due diligence.’

      French law

      19 Article L. 213-3-1 of the Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile (Code on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum), in the version resulting from the loi no 2018-778, du 10 septembre 2018, pour une immigration maîtrisée, un droit d’asile effectif et une intégration réussie (Law No 2018-778 of 10 September 2018 for controlled immigration, an effective right of asylum and successful integration) (JORF of 11 September 2018, Text No 1) (‘the former Ceseda’), stated :

      ‘In the event of the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders provided for in Chapter II of Title III of the [Schengen Borders Code], the decisions referred to in Article L. 213-2 may be taken in respect of foreign nationals who have arrived directly from the territory of a State party to the Schengen Convention signed on 19 June 1990, who have entered the territory of Metropolitan France crossing an internal land border without being authorised to do so and were checked in an area between the border and a line drawn 10 kilometres behind it. The procedures for these checks are defined by decree in the Conseil d’État [(Council of State, France)].’

      20 Order No 2020-1733 recast the legislative part of the Code on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum. Article L. 332-2 of that code, as amended (‘the amended Ceseda’) provides :

      ‘The decision refusing entry, which shall be in writing and substantiated, shall be taken by an officer belonging to a category prescribed by regulations.

      The notification of the decision refusing entry shall state that the foreign national has the right to inform, or cause to be informed, the person he or she has indicated that he or she intended to visit, his or her consulate or the adviser of his or her choice. It shall state that the foreign national has the right to refuse to be repatriated before one clear day has passed, under the conditions laid down in Article L. 333-2.

      The decision and the notification of rights which accompanies it shall be provided to him in a language he or she understands.

      Particular attention shall be paid to vulnerable persons, especially minors whether accompanied by an adult or not.’

      21 Article L. 332-3 of the amended Ceseda provides :

      ‘The procedure laid down in Article L. 332-2 is applicable to the decision to refuse entry taken against the foreign national pursuant to Article 6 of the [Schengen Borders Code]. It shall also apply to checks carried out at an internal border in the event of the temporary reintroduction of checks at internal borders under the conditions laid down in Chapter II of Title III of the [Schengen Borders Code].’

      The dispute in the main proceedings and the question referred for a preliminary ruling

      22 The associations referred to in paragraph 2 of the present judgment are challenging the validity of Order No 2020-1733 before the Conseil d’État (Council of State), in an action for annulment of that order, on the grounds, inter alia, that Article L. 332-3 of the amended Ceseda resulting from it infringes Directive 2008/115 in that it allows decisions to refuse entry at internal borders where checks have been reintroduced.

      23 The referring court observes that the Court held, in its judgment of 19 March 2019, Arib and Others (C‑444/17, EU:C:2019:220), that Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2008/115, read in conjunction with Article 32 of the Schengen Borders Code, does not apply to the situation of an illegally staying third-country national who was apprehended in the immediate vicinity of an internal border of a Member State, even where that Member State has reintroduced border control at that border, pursuant to Article 25 of that code, on account of a serious threat to public policy or to internal security in that Member State.

      24 The Conseil d’État (Council of State) points out that, in its Decision No 428175 of 27 November 2020, it held that the provisions of Article L. 213-3-1 of the former Ceseda, which provided that in the event of the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders, a foreign national arriving directly from the territory of a State party to the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, signed in Schengen on 19 June 1990 and which entered into force on 26 March 1995 (OJ 2000 L 239, p. 19, ‘the Schengen Convention’), could be refused entry under the terms of Article L. 213-2 of the former Ceseda if he or entered the territory of Metropolitan France crossing an internal land border without being authorised to do so and was checked in an area between the border and a line drawn 10 kilometres inside that border, were contrary to Directive 2008/115.

      25 Admittedly, according to the Conseil d’État (Council of State), Article L. 332-3 of the amended Ceseda does not repeat the provisions of Article L. 213-3-1 of the former Ceseda. However, Article L. 332-3 of the amended Ceseda again provides only for the adoption of a refusal of entry while carrying out border checks at internal borders in the event of the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders under the conditions laid down in Chapter II of Title III of the Schengen Borders Code.

      26 That court therefore considers it necessary to determine whether, in such a case, a third-country national arriving directly from the territory of a State party to the Schengen Convention who presents themselves at an authorised stationary or mobile border crossing point, without being in possession of documents justifying an authorisation to enter or right to stay in France, may be refused entry on the basis of Article 14 of the Schengen Borders Code, without Directive 2008/115 being applicable.

      27 In those circumstances, the Conseil d’État (Council of State) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling :

      ‘In the event of the temporary reintroduction of border controls at internal borders, under the conditions laid down in Chapter II of Title III of [the Schengen Borders Code], can foreign nationals arriving directly from the territory of a State party to the Schengen Convention … be refused entry, when entry checks are carried out at that border, on the basis of Article 14 of that [code], without [Directive 2008/115] being applicable ?’

      Consideration of the question referred

      28 By its question referred for a preliminary ruling, the national court asks, in essence, whether the Schengen Borders Code and Directive 2008/115 must be interpreted as meaning that, where a Member State has reintroduced checks at its internal borders, it may adopt, in respect of a third-country national who presents himself or herself at an authorised border crossing point where such checks are carried out, a decision refusing entry, within the meaning of Article 14 of that code, without being subject to compliance with that directive.

      29 Article 25 of the Schengen Borders Code allows, exceptionally and under certain conditions, a Member State to reintroduce temporarily border control at all or specific parts of its internal borders where there is a serious threat to public policy or internal security in that Member State. Under Article 32 of the code, where border control at internal borders is reintroduced, the relevant provisions of the Title II of the code relating to external borders shall apply mutatis mutandis.

      30 That is the case with Article 14 of the Schengen Borders Code, which provides that a third-country national who does not fulfil all the entry conditions laid down in Article 6(1) and does not belong to the categories of persons referred to in Article 6(5) shall be refused entry to the territories of the Member States.

      31 However, it is important to remember that a third-country national who, after entering the territory of a Member State illegally is present on that territory without fulfilling the conditions for entry, stay or residence is, therefore, staying illegally, within the meaning of Directive 2008/115. Under Article 2(1) of that directive, and without prejudice to Article 2(2) of the directive, that third-country national falls within the scope of the directive, without his or her presence in the territory of the Member State concerned being subject to a condition as to minimum duration or intention to remain in that territory. He or she must therefore, in principle, be subject to the common standards and procedures laid down by the directive for the purpose of his or her removal, as long as his or her stay has not, as the case may be, been regularised (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 March 2019, Arib and Others, C‑444/17, EU:C:2019:220, paragraphs 37 and 39 and the case-law cited).

      32 This also applies where the third-country national has been apprehended at a border crossing point, provided that the border crossing point is on the territory of that Member State. In that respect, it should be noted that a person may have entered the territory of a Member State even before crossing a border crossing point (see, by analogy, judgment of 5 February 2020, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Signing-on of seamen in the port of Rotterdam), C‑341/18, EU:C:2020:76, paragraph 45).

      33 It should also be specified, by way of example, that when checks are carried out on board a train between the time when the train leaves the last station located on the territory of a Member State sharing an internal border with a Member State that has reintroduced checks at its internal borders, and the moment when that train enters the first station situated on the territory of the latter Member State, the check on board that same train must, unless otherwise agreed between those two Member States, be regarded as a check carried out at a border crossing point situated on the territory of the Member State which has reintroduced such checks. A third-country national who has been checked on board this train will necessarily remain on the territory of the latter Member State following the check, within the meaning of Article 2(1) of Directive 2008/115.

      34 However, it should also be noted that Article 2(2) of Directive 2008/115 allows Member States to exclude, exceptionally and under certain conditions, third-country nationals who are staying illegally on their territory from the scope of that directive.

      35 Thus, on the one hand, Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2008/115 allows Member States not to apply that directive, subject to the provisions of Article 4(4) thereof, in two specific situations, namely that of third-country nationals who are the subject to a refusal of entry at an external border of a Member State, in accordance with Article 14 of the Schengen Borders Code, or that of third-country nationals who are apprehended or intercepted in connection with the irregular crossing of such an external border and who have not subsequently obtained authorisation or a right to reside in that Member State.

      36 However, it is clear from the Court’s case-law that those two situations relate exclusively to the crossing of an external border of a Member State, as defined in Article 2 of the Schengen Borders Code, and do not therefore concern the crossing of a border common to Member States forming part of the Schengen area, even where checks have been reintroduced at that border, pursuant to Article 25 of that code, on account of a serious threat to public policy or the internal security of that Member State (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 March 2019, Arib and Others, C‑444/17, EU:C:2019:220, paragraphs 45 and 67).

      37 It follows, as the Advocate General pointed out in point 35 of his Opinion, that Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2008/115 does not authorise a Member State which has reintroduced checks at its internal borders to derogate from the common standards and procedures laid down by that directive in order to remove a third-country national who has been intercepted, without a valid residence permit, at one of the border crossing points situated in the territory of that Member State where such checks are carried out.

      38 On the other hand, although Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2008/115 authorises Member States not to apply that directive to third-country nationals who are subject to a criminal penalty providing for or resulting in their return, in accordance with national law, or who are subject to extradition proceedings, it must be noted that such a case is not the one referred to by the provision at issue in the main proceedings.

      39 It follows from the foregoing, first, that a Member State which has reintroduced checks at its internal borders may apply, mutatis mutandis, Article 14 of the Schengen Borders Code and paragraph 1 of Part A of Annex V to that code in respect of a third-country national who is intercepted, without a legal residence permit, at an authorised border crossing point where such checks are carried out.

      40 On the other hand, where the border crossing point is located on the territory of the Member State concerned, the latter must ensure that the consequences of such application, mutatis mutandis, of the provisions referred to in the previous point do not result in disregard of the common standards and procedures laid down in Directive 2008/115. The fact that this obligation on the Member State concerned is likely to render ineffective to a large extent any decision to refuse entry to a third-country national arriving at one of its internal borders is not such as to alter that finding.

      41 With regard to the relevant provisions of that directive, it should be recalled, in particular, that it follows from Article 6(1) of Directive 2008/115 that any third-country national staying illegally on the territory of a Member State must, without prejudice to the exceptions provided for in paragraphs 2 to 5 of that article and in strict compliance with the requirements laid down in Article 5 of that directive, be the subject of a return decision, which must identify, among the third countries referred to in Article 3(3) of that directive, the country to which he or she must return (judgment of 22 November 2022, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Removal – Medicinal cannabis), C‑69/21, EU:C:2022:913, paragraph 53).

      42 In addition, a third-country national who is the subject of such a return decision must still, in principle, be given, under Article 7 of Directive 2008/115, a certain period of time in which to leave the territory of the Member State concerned voluntarily. Forced removal is to take place only as a last resort, in accordance with Article 8 of that directive, and subject to Article 9 thereof, which requires Member States to postpone removal in the cases it sets out (judgment of 17 December 2020, Commission v Hungary (Reception of applicants for international protection), C‑808/18, EU:C:2020:1029, paragraph 252).

      43 Furthermore, it follows from Article 15 of Directive 2008/115 that the detention of an illegally staying third-country national may only be imposed in certain specific cases. However, as the Advocate General pointed out, in essence, in point 46 of his Opinion, that article does not preclude a national from being detained, pending his or her removal, where he or she represents a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to public policy or domestic security, provided that such detention complies with the conditions set out in Articles 15 to 18 of that directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 July 2020, Stadt Frankfurt am Main, C‑18/19, EU:C:2020:511, paragraphs 41 to 48).

      44 Furthermore, Directive 2008/115 does not rule out the possibility for Member States to impose a prison sentence for offences other than those relating solely to illegal entry, including in situations where the return procedure established by that directive has not yet been completed. Consequently, that directive also does not preclude the arrest or placing in police custody of an illegally staying third-country national where such measures are adopted on the ground that that national is suspected of having committed an offence other than simply entering the national territory illegally, and in particular an offence likely to threaten public policy or the internal security of the Member State concerned (judgment of 19 March 2019, Arib and Others, C‑444/17, EU:C:2019:220, paragraph 66).

      45 It follows that, contrary to what the French Government maintains, the application, in a case such as that referred to in the reference for a preliminary ruling, of the common standards and procedures laid down by Directive 2008/115 is not such as to make it impossible to maintain public order and safeguard internal security within the meaning of Article 72 TFEU.

      46 In light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question referred for a preliminary ruling is that the Schengen Borders Code and Directive 2008/115 must be interpreted as meaning that, where a Member State has reintroduced controls at its internal borders, it may adopt, in respect of a third-country national who presents himself or herself at an authorised border crossing point situated on its territory and where such controls are carried out, a decision refusing entry, by virtue of an application mutatis mutandis of Article 14 of that code, provided that the common standards and procedures laid down by that directive are applied to that national with a view to his or her removal.

      Costs

      47 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

      On those grounds, the Court (Fourth Chamber) hereby rules :

      Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) and Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals,

      must be interpreted as meaning that, where a Member State has reintroduced controls at its internal borders, it may adopt, in respect of a third-country national who presents himself or herself at an authorised border crossing point situated on its territory and where such controls are carried out, a decision refusing entry, by virtue of an application mutatis mutandis of Article 14 of that regulation, provided that the common standards and procedures laid down in that directive are applied to that national with a view to his or her removal.

      ▻https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62022CJ0143

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      Contrôle des frontières : le gouvernement contraint de sortir de l’illégalité

      Communiqué commun signé par la LDH

      Après 8 ans de pratiques illégales du gouvernement français en matière de contrôle et d’enfermement des personnes en migration aux frontières intérieures, la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne (CJUE) confirme, dans un arrêt du 21 septembre, qu’elles sont contraires au droit.

      La CJUE rappelle à la France qu’elle doit se conformer au droit de l’Union européenne, et il appartient au gouvernement français de prendre des mesures immédiates sans attendre que le Conseil d’État en tire toutes les conséquences.

      Associations signataires : Avocats pour la Défense des Droits des Etrangers (ADDE), Alliance-DEDF, Amnesty International France, Anafé (association nationale d’assistance aux frontières pour les personnes étrangères), Bizi migrant.es, Emmaüs Roya, Federation Etorkinekin Diakité, Gisti, La Cimade, LDH (Ligue des droits de l’Homme), Médecins du Monde, Roya citoyenne, Syndicat des avocats de France (Saf), Syndicat de la magistrature (SM), Tous Migrants, Tous Migrants 73, Utopia 56 (antenne Toulouse)

      Paris, le 21 septembre 2023

      ▻https://www.ldh-france.org/controle-des-frontieres-le-gouvernement-contraint-de-sortir-de-lillegali

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      Corte di giustizia UE: vietato il respingimento sistematico alle frontiere interne

      La sentenza della Corte nella causa #C-143/22 promossa da diverse associazioni francesi

      https://www.meltingpot.org/app/uploads/2020/10/900x450_mp_03.jpg

      Il 21 settembre 2023 una sentenza della Corte di giustizia dell’Unione europea (CGUE) ha dichiarato che, anche se un Paese UE ha introdotto controlli alle sue frontiere, non ha il diritto di effettuare respingimenti sistematici. Deve rispettare la direttiva europea «rimpatri» che prevede che a un cittadino extraeuropeo possa “essere concesso un certo periodo di tempo per lasciare volontariamente il territorio“.

      Tutto era partito dal ricorso di varie associazioni francesi 1 che hanno contestato dinanzi al Consiglio di Stato francese la legittimità di un’ordinanza che ha modificato il codice sull’ingresso e sul soggiorno degli stranieri e sul diritto d’asilo (Ceseda).

      Esse hanno sostenuto che, consentendo alle autorità francesi di rifiutare l’ingresso di cittadini di paesi terzi alle frontiere con altri Stati membri (ossia le «frontiere interne»), alle quali sia stato temporaneamente ripristinato un controllo di frontiera in forza del codice frontiere Schengen in ragione di una minaccia grave per l’ordine pubblico o la sicurezza interna della Francia, il Ceseda contravverrebbe alla direttiva «rimpatri». Secondo tale direttiva, qualsiasi cittadino di un paese terzo il cui soggiorno è irregolare deve, di norma, essere oggetto di una decisione di rimpatrio. Tuttavia, l’interessato deve, in linea di principio, beneficiare di un certo termine per lasciare volontariamente il territorio. L’allontanamento forzato avviene solo in ultima istanza.

      Il Consiglio di Stato ha quindi interrogato la CGUE sulla questione dichiarando che «in una situazione del genere, un provvedimento di respingimento può essere adottato sulla base del codice frontiere #Schengen ma che, ai fini dell’allontanamento dell’interessato, devono comunque essere rispettate le norme e le procedure comuni previste dalla direttiva “rimpatri” (▻https://openmigration.org/glossary-term/direttiva-rimpatri), il che può condurre a privare di una larga parte della sua utilità l’adozione di un siffatto provvedimento di respingimento».

      https://pixelfed.zoo-logique.org/storage/m/_v2/578583396227231930/ea59ea880-d2aad0/UwtdGtLShNvI/IZ9C1sEHlr7m0yBLujHX3yoE5FagF1HXZJnsZqyP.png

      «La sentenza della CGUE impone la giurisprudenza a tutti gli Stati membri dell’Unione europea, ma in particolare è rivolta alla Francia, che dal 2015 ha reintrodotto i controlli alle frontiere interne.»

      Negli ultimi otto anni, tutti i treni che passano per #Menton sono stati controllati, gli agenti di polizia hanno controllato i passaggi di frontiera e pattugliato i valichi alpini. Dal 1° giugno è ulteriormente stata dispiegata un militarizzazione delle frontiere con personale aggiuntivo, il supporto dell’esercito, droni con termocamere.

      La Francia è stata accusata di respingere le persone migranti che cercano di entrare nel Paese, anche quelli che chiedono asilo e perfino i minorenni. Diversi rapporti di organizzazioni e collettivi hanno messo in luce queste pratiche violente e illegali, soprattutto nella zona di Ventimiglia. Secondo le testimonianze raccolte, si tratta di respingimenti “sistematici”.

      «In poche parole, questa decisione dice che la Francia sta perseguendo una politica illegale di chiusura delle frontiere», riassume Flor Tercero, dell’Association pour le Droit des Etrangers (ADDE) intervistato da Infomigrants. Questa decisione «è chiaramente una vittoria» e «significa che il governo non può ignorare il diritto dell’Unione europea».

      ▻https://www.meltingpot.org/2023/09/corte-di-giustizia-ue-vietato-il-respingimento-sistematico-alle-frontier

      #frontières_intérieures #directive_retour #illégalité

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      European Court of Justice rules systematic pushbacks are illegal

      European countries do not have the right to refuse entry to irregular migrants even if they have border controls in place, the ECJ has ruled. Activists say the decision means that France has been violating EU law by pushing back migrants coming from Italy.

      When a member state decides to reintroduce checks at its internal borders, can it systematically refuse entry to all irregular foreign nationals? No, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) ruled earlier this month. It must comply with the “Return Directive,” a law which says that a non-European national can “be granted a certain period of time to voluntarily leave the territory.”

      “A decision to refuse entry may be decided but, when seeking the removal of the person concerned, the common standards and procedures provided for by the Return Directive must still be respected,” the Luxembourg court stated.

      It also said that “excluding from the scope of this directive foreign nationals who are staying irregularly in the territory” can only be done “exceptionally.”

      The ruling on September 21 is at odds with the policy pursued by France, which re-established controls at its internal EU borders in 2015. For the past eight years, all trains passing through the French coastal city of Menton have been checked, and police have monitored border posts and patrolled the Alps.

      Activist groups say France has been taking advantage of the temporary border controls in order to turn back migrants who try to enter the territory — even those who come to ask for asylum. In an August report, Doctors Without Borders (MSF) teams in Ventimiglia documented practices of pushbacks at the border between Italy and France. “Systematic” pushbacks target unaccompanied minors, even sometimes separating families, according to the report.
      ’An illegal policy’

      “In a nutshell, this decision means that France is pursuing an illegal policy of closing borders,” Flor Tercero, of the Association for Foreigners’ Rights (ADDE), told InfoMigrants. ADDE is one of the associations involved in bringing the lawsuit to court.

      “Pushing back means, in a way, refusing these people the possibility of coming to France to apply for asylum or to cross France to go elsewhere in the EU. France for eight years has decided to carry out border checks. And as it re-established checks, it considered itself entitled to be able to push back migrants coming from Italy, in particular,” he added.

      “After eight years of illegal practices by the French government controlling and detaining migrants at internal borders, the CJEU confirms (...) that [these practices] are contrary to the law,” a joint press release of twenty organizations added.

      ▻https://twitter.com/anafeasso/status/1704893792266969108

      For Flor Tercero, this decision is a clear victory. “This means that the government cannot forego European law,” he said.
      France ’will not welcome migrants’ from Lampedusa

      The court decision came at a time when attention was focused on the French-Italian border. Following the recent arrival of a very large number of people on the Italian island of Lampedusa, the French interior minister, Gérald Darmanin, announced that 200 additional police officers would be sent to the border between the two countries, in the expectation that the migrants would eventually make their way from Italy to France.

      France “will not welcome migrants” from the Italian island, the minister stated.

      Meanwhile the departmental director of the border police, Emmanuelle Joubert, announced that more than 3,000 migrants had been arrested in Menton within a fortnight. This brings to 32,000 the number of arrests since the start of the year along the Franco-Italian border. Of those, 24,000 were rejected and handed over to the Italian authorities

      Joubert said she had been informed about the judgment by the CJEU. “The State is carrying out an analysis, we will have instructions later,” she said, adding that migrants who had recently arrived in Lampedusa should not arrive at the French border for “several weeks.”

      ▻https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/52117/european-court-of-justice-rules-systematic-pushbacks-are-illegal

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    #Frontex wants to do things differently on the Mediterranean : ’The ambition is zero deaths, otherwise you’re not worth a damn’

    (INTERVIEW FRONTEX DIRECTOR IN DUTCH NEWSPAPER : Volkskrant / 9 augustus 2023 / Deepl translation from dutch)

    After fierce criticism over illegal pushbacks, a soured culture and failures in the recent shipwreck in Greece, the new boss, Hans Leijtens, is trying to bring order to Europe’s border surveillance agency Frontex.

    by Peter Giesen

    On the internet, you can buy a ’Fuck Frontex’ T-shirt for three tens. For activists, Frontex, the European border protection agency, is the symbol of what they see as a cruel and repressive European migration and asylum policy that forces refugees and migrants to make the life-threatening crossing of the Mediterranean.

    Frontex is growing fast because Europe considers the surveillance of its external borders important. By 2027, there should be 10 thousand Frontex border guards, while its annual budget will be €1 billion. But Frontex is also under fire. In 2022, the agency found itself in crisis after a scathing report by Olaf, the European Union’s anti-fraud agency. According to Olaf, the culture at its headquarters in Warsaw had soured. Moreover, Olaf confirmed what media and human rights organisations had been saying for years: Frontex was involved in illegal pushbacks, ’pushing back’ refugees and migrants without giving them the chance to apply for asylum. Information about this was covered up at headquarters. The director of Frontex, Frenchman Fabrice Leggeri, had to resign.

    His successor is Dutchman Hans Leijtens (60), previously commander of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (typ., military police / border guards), among others. He took office in March 2023 to bring order, improve culture in Warsaw and ensure Frontex improves the rights of refugees and migrants. Frontex must change, he says, in his boardroom in a shiny, post-communist tower block in a Warsaw suburb.

    Are you on a charm offensive?
    ’No, I wouldn’t put it that way. The biggest mistake I could make is to suggest that we are already there, that there is no problem. In fact, there is. People should expect us to adhere to professional standards. That transcends respecting the law. It is also about the question: how do you deal with migrants? But I don’t expect to be taken at my word. Words are empty if they are not followed by actions.’

    So no more pushback under your leadership?
    ’I can’t say that because I don’t have everyone on a string.’

    Surely in the past it has often been the case that a country like Greece sent migrants back, while Frontex looked the other way?
    ’No, I dispute that. We never looked the other way.’

    But according to Olaf, Frontex deliberately directed a plane to another area so it did not have to witness Greek pushbacks.
    ’I don’t know, that was before my time. The Olaf report was not about the pushbacks themselves, but how Frontex handled the information about them. Olaf said: there was manipulation, there was unauthorised behaviour by managers, people were put under pressure.’

    You say: incidents are always possible, but Frontex must deal with them decently.
    ’We have to be very transparent, even when we have made mistakes. We have to win trust. You don’t get that, you earn it. When I was commander of the Marechaussee, I fired an average of 50 people every year.
    Not because I liked it, but because I saw things that could not be done. I set that example to show that there are consequences when things go wrong.’
    On a screen in Frontex’s situation room, a tanker sails across the Mediterranean. The eyes of Europe’s border surveillance are in Warsaw. Planes, drones and cameras take images of the Mediterranean, the Balkans and other border areas 24 hours a day. In Warsaw, they are viewed and analysed.
    In case of incidents - such as a ship in distress or a suspicious transport - local authorities are alerted. On 14 June, for example, Frontex staff were the first to spot the trawler Adriana in trouble off the coast near Greek Pylos. They alerted the Greek coastguard, but it waited a long time before intervening. Eventually, the Adriana sank, drowning an estimated 750 migrants and refugees.

    The EU Ombudsman will investigate Frontex’s role in the disaster. Shouldn’t you have put more pressure on Greece so that the Greek coastguard would have acted more quickly?
    ’A plane of ours saw the ship, but had to turn back because it ran out of fuel. Then we were sent by Greece to another incident, south of Crete, where eighty people were floating around on an overcrowded ship. These were later rescued by the Greeks. When that was under control, we still flew to Pylos, but by then the ship had sunk.’

    You do not feel that Frontex made mistakes.
    ’If I had that feeling, I would have said it earlier. But I’m not going to say anything now, because the investigation is in the hands of the Ombudsman.’
    In the past, Frontex has often defended itself by pointing the finger at member states, especially Greece. National coastguards were guilty of pushbacks, not Frontex itself. But if member states systematically violate the fundamental rights of migrants, Frontex can withdraw from that country. Last month, Frontex’s fundamental rights officer, who monitors compliance with the fundamental rights of refugees and migrants, advocated a departure from Greece. His advice was based in part on a reconstruction by The New York Times in May 2023, which showed how the Greek coast guard put a group of migrants on Lesbos in a boat and handed them over to the Turkish coast guard.

    You have not followed that advice as yet. Why not?
    ’The fundamental rights officer approaches this issue from the point of view of fundamental rights. He does not look at the rest: what would that mean for the effectiveness of our operation? We have people there, we have planes, they would then have to leave.’

    This could also put human lives at risk, you said in the European Parliament. But how long can you continue working with Greece without becoming jointly responsible for violating fundamental rights?
    ’I said to the Greek minister responsible: you do have to deal with something called credibility. I think we are slowly approaching a point where we have to say: okay, but that credibility is a bit under strain now. We are now really talking very intensively with the Greeks. I do need to see results. Because otherwise credibility and even legality will come under pressure.’

    If Greece does not mend its ways, withdrawal is possible?
    ’Definitely.’

    According to French newspaper Le Monde, Frontex’s management board, which includes member states, tacitly supported Greece on the grounds that Greeks do the dirty work and stop migrants.
    ’It’s not like everyone is nodding there. Discussions about the legitimacy and legality of performances take place there too.’

    But aren’t you running into a tension? On the one hand, you have to respect fundamental rights of migrants; on the other, EU member states want to get migration rates down.
    ’This is often seen as a kind of competing interest, but it is not. It’s not that you want or are allowed to stop people at all costs. There are just rules for that.’

    What do you think of the deal between the EU and Tunisia?
    ’If we don’t get guarantees that fundamental rights will be respected, it will be very complicated for us to work with Tunisia. With any country, for that matter.’

    According to Human Rights Watch, you do cooperate with Libya. Boats carrying migrants are intercepted by the Libyan coast guard, following a report from Frontex, Human Rights Watch said. This is how migrants were brought back to a country that is not safe even according to Frontex itself.
    ’We only pass on the positions of ships that are in trouble. If that is in the Libyan search and rescue zone, we pass that on to Libya. That is also our duty, otherwise we would be playing with human lives. Other cases are not known to me.’

    Human Rights Watch gives an example of an NGO rescue ship, the Sea Watch, that received no signal, even though the Libyan coast guard was notified.
    ’If a ship is in trouble, only the government departments are informed. Only if a ship is in immediate danger of sinking, a mayday call goes out to all nearby ships. That is simply how it is regulated, not only in Europe, but in international maritime law.’
    The debate about rescuing migrants in the Mediterranean has become highly politicised in recent years. Aid agencies are blamed for their ships acting as ’ferry services’ to Europe, while Frontex and national coastguards are seen by some as the heartless face of ’Fortress Europe’. The reality is nuanced, Italian figures, among others, show. In 2022, when migrants arrived by sea, 54 per cent were rescued by coastguards, and 14 per cent by NGO vessels. Frontex was involved in almost 24 thousand rescues from January to June 2023, according to agency figures.
    ’Rescuing people at sea is not a migration issue. Of course it is triggered by migration, but the moment people are at sea, it doesn’t matter what their status is. Then you just have to rescue them. I also think the NGO ships make an important contribution because they save a lot of lives. I don’t think anyone should be against that.’

    Zero deaths on the Mediterranean is your ambition, you have said.
    ’Maybe that is impossible, but I do think you have to have that ambition, otherwise you are not worth a damn.’

    Reçu via la mailing-list Migreurop, le 17.08.2023

    Le lien vers l’article (#paywall) :
    ▻https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/frontex-wil-het-anders-gaan-doen-op-de-middellandse-zee-de-ambitie-is-nul

    #mourir_aux_frontières #morts_aux_frontières #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #ambition #zéro_morts #Hans_Leijtens #push-backs #refoulements #transparence #droits_fondamentaux #interview #droits_humains #crédibilité #légitimité #légalité #ONG #sauvetage

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    Video choc dell’intervento della polizia francese sul treno Ventimiglia-Cuneo per far scendere una famiglia ivoriana a #Breil

    https://pixelfed.zoo-logique.org/storage/m/_v2/578583396227231930/c51ea9690-856390/WgoFUUJNkZkK/veu3XSx1zr0CeHIXFcRhMiBUzpHMO5TXhgYE2pUW.png

    Grida, urla, il pianto di un bambino. Spropositato intervento di una pattuglia della polizia francese ieri sera (22 agosto) sul treno Ventimiglia-Cuneo, alla stazione di Breil, per far scendere dal convoglio una famiglia di ivoriani (una donna incinta di 7 mesi, un uomo e un bambino di un anno) che secondo i gendarmi non avevano documenti in regola. Le modalità dell’intervento ha suscitato la reazione di diversi passeggeri che hanno iniziato a riprendere la scena con i cellulari, tra questi l’insegnante cuneese Paolo Bogo: "Continuavano a sostenere di avere il diritto di rimanere a bordo perché erano su un treno che li conduceva in Italia. I gendarmi allora, come dimostrano i video che ho ripreso e diffuso in diretta, hanno iniziato a chieder loro di scendere dal treno anche usando parecchia violenza, sia verbale che fisica. Eravamo tutti sconvolti. Abbiamo iniziato a urlare di smetterla. Ma non si fermavano. La donna piangeva, con lei il bambino. Non ho mai visto nulla del genere, scene non accettabili in un Paese democratico. I gendarmi hanno iniziato a chiedere di non opporre resistenza perché gli altri passeggeri avevano fretta di tornare a casa. Come se quel ritardo fosse stata la nostra preoccupazione principale in un momento di tale violenza e choc. Sempre più persone hanno iniziato a fare filmati, spronati da me. Alcuni erano davvero sconvolti, in particolare una ragazza giovane che poi ha proseguito per Torino. Era allibita e sofferente da tutta quella crudeltà, per di più rivolta ad un bambino piccolissimo. Scene che fino ad ora avevo solo visto nelle scene di violenza poliziesca americana. Ad un certo punto volevano che ci spostassimo per poterli prelevare con la forza. Erano in 6 gendarmi. Alla fine la famiglia si è arresa e sono scesi. Quando siamo ripartiti alcuni passeggeri hanno iniziato ad ipotizzare che potesse essere una situazione costruita ad hoc per riuscire a fermarsi in Francia. Anche fosse stato così, non aveva molto senso perché avrebbero avuto tutto il tempo di scendere mentre facevano i controlli. E comunque hanno subìto violenza, questo è provato ed non è tollerabile umanamente in un Paese democratico”. Giulia Marro

    ▻https://www.lastampa.it/cuneo/2023/08/23/video/video_choc_dellintervento_della_polizia_francese_sul_treno_ventimiglia-cune

    #frontière_sud-alpine #frontières #Alpes #Alpes_maritimes #Vintimille #asile #migrations #réfugiés #vidéo #violence #gendarmerie #push-backs #refoulements #train

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    Bulgaria migrant pushbacks: What’s behind the rise in violence at the Bulgarian-Turkish border? (1/4)

    https://scd.infomigrants.net/media/resize/my_image_big/ab6f0bde894aef2f63a420de2a32765c608b789e.jpg

    The Bulgarian-Turkish border is seeing an upsurge in pushbacks and violence against migrants. InfoMigrants uncovers the reasons why and who are the most at risk.

    This article is the first in a four-part series. All research and interviews were conducted between June and August 2023, with field reporting in Bulgaria carried out between June 18 and 24, 2023.

    Pushbacks are “a very serious problem” in Bulgaria, Krassimir Kanev, chair of the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, a non-profit dedicated to protecting human rights, told InfoMigrants.

    “We even had people who were killed, who were seriously injured, who were pushed back and they died in the snow in Turkey…There have been many such cases, cases of physical ill treatment, sometimes resulting in death…use of firearms sometimes resulting in death…” he said.

    Last year alone, an estimated 5,200 migrants were subject to pushbacks at the Bulgarian-Turkish border, according to the Committee.

    Similarly, the European Council on Refugees and Exiles recorded 5,268 alleged pushbacks in Bulgaria in 2022 affecting 87,647 persons – but the actual figure is believed to be much higher.

    Pushbacks are prohibited under European Union (EU) and international law. They violate the 1951 Refugee Convention principle of non-refoulement, which provides that refugees should not be returned to a country where they face serious threats to their life or freedom.

    In interviews carried out between June and August 2023, migrants, humanitarian workers, human rights experts and lawyers told InfoMigrants violence against migrants and pushbacks at the Bulgarian-Turkish border have increased in the last two years.

    The Bulgarian government, however, has maintained that “Checks have been carried out of formal pushback signals made by foreigners who tried to illegally cross the state border of Bulgaria. The checks ended with the finding that there was no evidence of physical violence.”

    A spokesperson from the ministry told InfoMigrants, “It should be noted that many of the claims of ’pushbacks’ are unfounded.”

    https://gw.infomigrants.net/media/resize/my_image_big/643998f05515000c29f6c968ab629f0d97a2be3a.jpg

    Greek migrant repression marks turning point in Bulgaria

    Hamid Khoshseiar, a translator and coordinator at the Mission Wings Foundation in Harmanli near to the Bulgarian-Turkish border, works with migrants from the town’s refugee reception center. He said more migrants started trying to enter the EU via the Bulgarian-Turkish border after the Greek government’s swing to the right in 2019. Those numbers have climbed even higher in the last year.

    “Around a year ago, we started to see a new practice. People were coming in our office to be registered…because of the increase of the number of pushbacks at the border…” Khoshseiar told InfoMigrants.

    In August 2022, a bus carrying at least 47 migrants collided with a police car in Bulgaria, leaving two officers dead.

    “After that, the border escalated and became very intensive,” with “more forces,” Khoshseiar explained. “Even the army started to help border police and the gendarmerie [military police]. And also the number of pushbacks and violence increased a lot… people give themselves the right to interpret the law,” he added.

    Bulgarian authorities have been stripping migrants at the border before “pushing them back (into Turkey) without any clothes,” Khoshseiar said.

    “We also heard a lot about beatings on the border. Some of them (migrants) were sharing that when they (Bulgarian authorities) caught a group, there were six, seven officers opening one small door in the border. And like a tunnel they were hitting everyone who was crossing.”

    Khoshseiar added that many migrants told him it was their fifth or sixth time attempting to enter Bulgarian territory.

    In order to find out which forces are involved in pushbacks, Khoshseiar also asks his clients about the color of their clothing.

    “[The] forces ... involved [are] technically all of them. Border police with green, gendarmerie with dark blue, and police with blue – it’s not specifically one,” he said.

    Khoshseiar is also concerned about chain pushbacks, a practice often initiated by European countries where people are pushed back through multiple consecutive countries.

    “We heard from people… ’Bulgarian police arrested us, they started beating us. They sent us back to Greece. After that, the Greece police started beating us and send us back to Turkey,’ – chain pushbacks.”

    https://gw.infomigrants.net/media/resize/my_image_big/fa43d0dae41df873ed3be4f126472f55192cf506.jpg

    Bulgarian-Turkish border sees jump in migrant arrivals

    Boris Cheshirkov, an external relations officer at the UN refugee agency UNHCR in Sofia, told InfoMigrants that Bulgaria received some 20,000 asylum applications last year – “the highest number in a single year over 30 years of recorded statistics.”

    He said the main countries of origin were Syria, Afghanistan and Morocco, adding that this trend has largely continued in 2023. The number of refugees, asylum seekers and stateless persons at the end of 2022 was almost double than that of the year before.

    The Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021 and ongoing conflict in Syria are pushing citizens to journey to Bulgaria, while continued economic and political instability in neighboring Turkey – as well as the devastating aftermath of the February earthquake – are driving Syrians previously living in Turkey to cross the border into Bulgaria.

    Migration activities have also resumed following the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, slow and inefficient application processes across the EU have prompted many more to search for unofficial ways to enter the bloc, usually through the use of people smugglers.

    https://gw.infomigrants.net/media/resize/my_image_big/bb0eb97a9613a0ed9962abd367258c7499d2e5fd.jpg

    The trilateral Bulgaria-Greece-Turkey contact center at the Kapitan Andreevo border checkpoint confirmed that the Bulgarian-Turkish border has seen another strong wave of irregular migration in the past year, and is making prevention their top priority.

    “The first and biggest issue is cross-border crime related to illegal migration – foremost in terms of volume,” a Bulgarian border police spokesperson at the trilateral center told InfoMigrants. The center was established in 2016 soon after refugee arrivals in Europe peaked in 2015.

    Higher migrant numbers arguably increase the probability of pushbacks. Migrants are also increasingly aiming for the Bulgarian-Turkish border as other European countries beef up security.

    “In the past, much more migration has been through Greece than through Bulgaria,” Kanev from the Helsinki Committee said. “But the Greek government introduced some measures of patrolling the sea. Their border is very well protected. Their land border with Turkey is shorter. Also, the Bulgarian border is very difficult to protect because it goes through a mountain. And it’s quite big and therefore it is very hard to install appropriate technology and supervision throughout this border,” he explained.

    Migrants are also increasingly opting for the Bulgarian-Turkish border after hearing stories about violent pushbacks and aggressive behavior from Greek authorities at the Greek-Turkish border or experiencing violence firsthand in a previous failed crossing at the Greek border.

    https://gw.infomigrants.net/media/resize/my_image_big/ef8e6f403865985128985915030ca46e3a078eb3.jpg

    Authorities beat, stripped, robbed and shot at migrants

    Diana Dimova, head of the Bulgarian human rights organization Mission Wings, said nearly 700 migrants who crossed the Bulgarian-Turkish border have passed through her consultation center in Stara Zagora city in the last year.

    “The practices they (migrants) share are: being stripped, robbing of personal belongings, phones and money, beatings with police batons, harassment with police dogs, and illegal detention for 24-72 hours in unregulated premises,” Dimova told InfoMigrants.

    She and her colleagues have also traveled to Turkey to film the testimonies of scores of refugees who recount being abused and pushed back.

    “The resistance from the authorities to cover up these crimes is great,” she said.

    Many migrants walk through dense forested areas, crossing the Strandja Nature Park at the border with Turkey. They typically walk four to eight days without food or water, and smugglers “give them pills to endure the journey,” Dimova said. “Many are dehydrated and exhausted to the limit. Huge numbers of people are dying in the forests, mostly in the area of Sredets municipality.”

    GPS coordinates given by migrants in distress to hotlines in Europe “are rarely responded to by border police,” she said.

    “Usually we call 112 who forward the signal to the border police. We have found that in many cases the border police do not look for them at all or leave them to their fate. In most cases, when 112 is called insistently and help is sought, they arrive at the scene of the tragedy, load those who have survived and send them back onto Turkish territory,” Dimova told InfoMigrants.

    “Bulgaria does not have a working system for rescuing refugees in distress – many of these people are left to perish in the forests,” she said.

    Her foundation is funded by various foreign organizations as the Bulgarian government does not provide them with financial support.

    “There are very few organizations in Bulgaria helping refugees. Most do not want to engage in this topic because of negative public opinion” and are pressured by various institutions to stop their activities, Dimova explained. A number of organizations focusing on refugees in Bulgaria are under investigation – including Mission Wings.

    “For more than 10 months, we have been under investigation for suspicions expressed by the State Agency for Refugees that we are involved in the trafficking and smuggling of unaccompanied refugee children. The national security services pressured and harassed us for nearly a year, trying to stop us from helping those arriving from the Bulgarian-Turkish border,” she told InfoMigrants.

    https://gw.infomigrants.net/media/resize/my_image_big/1ba2b11945349f53ca469a829b6b28cb61984afe.jpg

    Journalists expose migrant shooting

    Sofia Bahudela, an Arabic language worker at Caritas Bulgaria, said the charity is very familiar with migrants who are “extremely traumatized when entering the country.”

    “Everything is very dependent on the people serving as border guards,” she told InfoMigrants.

    Recounting the story of Ali Husseini, a young man who had been granted protection status in Bulgaria, Bahudela explains how when he traveled to the border to find his brother in 2022, he was stripped, beaten, robbed and then pushed into Turkey. After a week of talks with a lawyer and a trip to Istanbul, he was able to return to Bulgaria, but had to wait a further five months to have his ID reissued. His brother, meanwhile, was deported from Turkey to Afghanistan.

    In another case, the Bulgarian government repeatedly rejected accusations that its border guards shot a Syrian refugee in October 2022 after a video released two months after the incident showed a man being fired at on the Bulgarian-Turkish border.

    The video was part of a joint investigation by several European media outlets led by the Netherlands-based Lighthouse Reports. In a separate video captured days later, the man identified himself as 19-year-old Abdullah El Rustum of Syria. He said he was shot by Bulgarian border officers after his group was caught trying to enter Bulgaria irregularly. The Lighthouse investigation found that unarmed refugees were fired at from the same position on the Bulgarian side, where the border police were seen to be located.

    Maria Cheresheva, a Bulgarian journalist based in the capital Sofia, participated in the Lighthouse probe. She has since been denied access to the Bulgarian-Turkish border on numerous occasions, and said she rarely receives comments from the government on her work.

    “There has been no information or progress on this investigation,” Cheresheva told InfoMigrants. The border is a “heavily monitored area. So we are curious why after the rejection of the authorities of both countries (Turkey and Bulgaria), no progress has been done in terms of this report, which was broadly broadcasted around big European media.”

    Testimonies of migrants who were pushed back and suffered violence at the border “are rarely taken into account” Cheresheva explained, adding that she has dealt with a number of similar cases, but noted it’s “extremely difficult to prove who caused the violence and how did those people end up in such a situation.”

    The stressful and violent situations of pushbacks also make it difficult for migrants to identify the people responsible for the illegal acts: Are they Bulgarian border police, gendarmerie, European Border and Coast Guard Agency (#Frontex) officers, or vigilantes.

    Women and children face increased risks at border crossing

    Women who attempt to enter Europe via the Bulgarian-Turkish border face heightened risks of sexual violence.

    “We have cases of women who say they have experienced violence, including sexual violence, on the way to Bulgaria at the hands of traffickers or police officers in Turkey. Some women have had to pay for their journey to Europe with sex due to lack of financial means,” said Dimova of Mission Wings.

    Cases of rape and abuse are difficult to record because “many of the women do not recognize the violence that has been perpetrated against them as a problem or are ashamed to share,” she told InfoMigrants.

    The Bulgarian Helsinki Committee also confirmed it received reports of sexual harassment and rape from migrants. Chairman Kanev cited a female migrant who informed the Committee that she was stripped naked and subjected to sexual harassment by Bulgarian authorities.

    “I suspect that she was also raped, maybe, but she didn’t say that. And then from third parties, you also hear cases of women who were raped,” Kanev said.

    Unaccompanied minors also face greater risks at the Bulgarian-Turkish border, journalist Cheresheva said, because there is “nobody to protect them on the way.” Many problems can arise because the “mistreatment and violence happens outside of the system.”

    Cheresheva said she has interviewed many migrants who experienced violence at the border as minors. One boy she interviewed was kept in a detention center in Bulgaria and was expecting his asylum procedure to start, but instead he was sent back to Turkey where he was kidnapped. The last Cheresheva heard about the child was that he had been rescued by other refugees living in Turkey.

    “With all this violence happening along the borders, not only by authorities but through all kinds of criminal groups, I’m very concerned about the fate of these kids,” Cheresheva said.

    Khoshseiar from Mission Wings said he had come across two unaccompanied migrant children in Harmanli, a brother and sister aged 12 and 14.

    “I just showed them the way how to get to the reception center, because the reception center should register them. After that we understood that they put them into the car and pushed them back into Turkey,” he said.

    https://gw.infomigrants.net/media/resize/my_image_big/0b7283d26163fca94796ce3a51f1baea4b54db1a.jpg

    Bulgaria is a ’peaceful country,’ says Syrian barber

    Several migrants InfoMigrants spoke to recounted positive stories of how Bulgaria had welcomed them, and said they had not experienced violence on Bulgarian territory.

    Ahmed is a Syrian barber in Sofia. He journeyed to Bulgaria with a group of friends in 2015, when their country was being torn apart by war and conflict.

    “I came through the mountains for three days on the border between Turkey and Bulgaria – the situation was very difficult, very difficult indeed,” he told InfoMigrants from his barbershop in the bustling center of the Bulgarian capital.

    https://gw.infomigrants.net/media/resize/my_image_big/95a313dea8718dd573755780a1ad2d1ef773d9a3.jpg

    “For me personally, there were no issues with the (asylum) documents,” he said.

    When asked if he had any issues with border police during the journey, he responded: “No, very good people, really. I swear. I lived in Turkey for nine months. The police there were bad people. In Turkey, not here. I came to Bulgaria because of the police in Turkey, very bad people.”

    All of Ahmed’s friends continued on to Germany, except for him.

    “I love Bulgaria…I like it, good, peaceful country…” he beamed.

    *Name changed

    ▻https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/51197/bulgaria-migrant-pushbacks-whats-behind-the-rise-in-violence-at-the-bu

    #Bulgarie #Turquie #push-backs #refoulements #frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #montagne #violence #violence_sexuelle #murs #barrières_frontalières

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      Tra le persone respinte e lasciate senza soccorsi in Bulgaria, frontiera d’Europa

      Al confine tra Turchia e Bulgaria le persone in movimento sono sottoposte a continue violazioni dei loro diritti, dall’omissione di soccorso ai respingimenti illegali. A denunciare dal campo queste violenze, che ancora una volta evidenziano un ruolo problematico dell’Agenzia Frontex, c’è il Collettivo rotte balcaniche Alto vicentino

      Di quanto accade alla frontiera tra Turchia e Bulgaria si sa poco. Eppure si tratta di una delle porte dell’Unione europea sulla quale le persone in movimento sono sottoposte a continue violenze. Secondo i dati diffusi dalla stessa polizia di frontiera bulgara -una polizia a tutti gli effetti europea, avendo Sofia aderito all’Ue nel 2007- sarebbero stati 46.940 i tentativi di attraversamento cosiddetto “illegale” del confine solo nei mesi di giugno e luglio di quest’anno. Tantissime delle persone intercettate dalle autorità, dopo essere state catturate, vengono respinte in Turchia attraverso pratiche totalmente illegittime.

      Chi svolge un prezioso lavoro di documentazione e testimonianza di quanto succede in questi luoghi è il Collettivo rotte balcaniche Alto vicentino, impegnato nel Sud della Bulgaria, nella città di Harmanli, dove si trova il più grande campo del Paese, e Svilengrad, nelle vicinanze del campo di Pastrogor. Da metà luglio gli attivisti hanno cominciato a rispondere a chiamate di aiuto da parte di migranti in difficoltà, che hanno poi raggiunto nei punti in cui si erano fermati. Questo gli ha permesso di essere testimoni delle omissioni di soccorso e delle violenze da parte delle autorità bulgare, che spesso non avviano nemmeno le ricerche di chi si trova in situazione di urgenza.

      “Pensiamo alle tante persone che ogni notte muoiono senza nemmeno poter chiedere aiuto, oltre alle poche che lo chiedono invano. Lungo le frontiere di terra come di mare, l’omissione di soccorso è una precisa strategia delle autorità -ha scritto il collettivo in un report su quanto avvenuto nel caso del salvataggio di una donna incinta e delle sue due bambine-. […] Ci è chiara l’urgenza di agire in prima persona e disobbedire a chi uccide lasciando morire”. Tra gli attivisti del collettivo che si spendono quotidianamente per portare aiuto a chi si trova in difficoltà ci sono anche Giuseppe Pederzolli e Giovanni Marenda.

      Che cosa sta succedendo in Bulgaria oggi?
      GM Il confine con la Turchia ultimamente è diventato un buco nero dal punto di vista informativo. Da poco abbiamo cominciato a occuparci di casi di emergenza, che ormai sono quasi quotidiani. Abbiamo un numero di telefono e un network con altre organizzazioni europee. Ci arrivano segnalazioni di persone in stato di urgenza o di stress durante il viaggio dalla Turchia. Fin dalle prime volte siamo andati di persona, oltre a dare segnalazione ufficiale al 112, perché ci siamo accorti che spesso le autorità omettono il soccorso. Mentono rispetto a quello che fanno: sostengono di stare conducendo una ricerca anche se non è vero. In alcuni casi, quando hanno capito che noi ci stavamo recando sul posto, hanno iniziato a uscire per arrivare prima di noi per sfruttare l’occasione per respingere illegalmente le persone. In sostanza, quindi, cerchiamo di arrivare sul luogo per “metterci in mezzo”, costringendo la polizia, per esempio, a far venire anche l’ambulanza o a far fare richiesta di asilo. Le autorità non possono respingere davanti ai nostri occhi.

      Ci sono segnalazioni che ritenete particolarmente emblematiche rispetto a quanto accade sul confine turco-bulgaro?
      GP Una questione importante con la quale ci stiamo misurando anche dal punto di vista emotivo è quella delle persone morte lungo i confini; anche a noi che siamo una piccola realtà arrivano segnalazioni di familiari da mezza Europa che dicono di non avere più notizie di un loro caro. Qui, al confine con la Turchia, è un problema molto rilevante. Decine di persone muoiono nella foresta. Oltre al ritrovamento c’è anche la questione della restituzione del corpo alla famiglia, che spesso non avviene. In un caso, quello di H., un migrante siriano di trent’anni, la morte ci è stata segnalata dai compagni di viaggio, che in tempi rapidi l’hanno detto anche alla famiglia. Tre attiviste sono partite verso la posizione che ci era stata mandata -e che abbiamo trasmesso più volte anche al 112-, una zona a due ore di distanza da noi. Il luogo era abbastanza difficile da raggiungere, una quarantina di minuti a piedi dalla strada principale. La polizia è arrivata circa 12 ore dopo; noi siamo rimasti lì, perché volevamo essere sicuri che la salma sarebbe stata raccolta e anche capire dove sarebbe stata portata, per darne notizia alla famiglia. Abbiamo poi coinvolto anche un’avvocata per fare da tramite ai parenti per la questione del funerale.

      Tra le testimonianze che avete fornito, anche la storia di una donna incinta, soccorsa con le sue due bambine.
      GM Si è trattato del nostro primo soccorso. Appena è arrivata la segnalazione abbiamo chiamato il 112; poi abbiamo capito che le autorità ci stavano mentendo: ci dicevano che c’era un’unità di ricerca sul posto, che c’era anche un’ambulanza, ma noi eravamo in contatto diretto con la donna, che per fortuna aveva con sé il telefono carico, e sapevamo che non c’era nessuno che la stava cercando, perché lei si trovava a pochi metri dalla strada. A un certo punto abbiamo deciso di andare noi, rendendo sempre noti al 112 i nostri movimenti. L’abbiamo trovata, quando siamo arrivati sul posto, semplicemente urlando per far sentire la nostra voce. Al mattino è arrivata la prima pattuglia della polizia di frontiera, che si è fermata perché ci ha visti lungo una strada molto delicata, in cui ci sono molti passaggi. Hanno iniziato a importunarci, a minacciarci. Non sapevano assolutamente nulla delle segnalazioni che avevamo fatto. Abbiamo chiesto un’ambulanza, che non è mai arrivata. Successivamente siamo stati portati alla stazione di polizia, dove è venuto un dottore, che ha fatto una visita sommaria di cinque minuti, al termine della quale ha consigliato alla donna di bere molta acqua. Poi ci hanno allontanati: per 20 giorni non abbiamo saputo più nulla della persona che abbiamo soccorso, anche se quotidianamente abbiamo cercato di rintracciarla. Alla fine avevamo quasi paura, ci eravamo convinti l’avessero respinta in Turchia. Poi abbiamo saputo, per fortuna, che era stata trasferita al campo aperto di Harmanli e che aveva potuto fare domanda d’asilo.

      Avete avuto ripercussioni legali per la vostra attività?
      GM Per ora non siamo mai stati denunciati o accusati di nulla, perché ci siamo sempre coperti attraverso le segnalazioni al 112. Ci sono state minacce in diverse occasioni, ci hanno detto “Vi arresteremo la prossima volta che fate cose del genere”, ma alla fine non hanno potuto farci nulla. Di certo, tuttavia, non siamo noi ad avere il coltello dalla parte del manico, è anche un discorso politico, rispetto a quanto spazio riesci a guadagnarti. La polizia di frontiera qui fa quello che vuole; abbiamo visto poliziotti con la maglietta del fascio littorio, insieme ad agenti di Frontex. L’Agenzia e l’Unione europea nei documenti ufficiali continuano a negare di essere coinvolte e sostengono di non sapere nulla di quanto succede. Nella stazione di Sredets -paese vicino al luogo di ritrovamento della donna incinta-, però, tra gli armadietti ce ne sono due riservati proprio a Frontex.

      Il collettivo non si occupa solo del soccorso e della documentazione delle violenze. Qual è la vostra storia?
      GP Il collettivo è nato tra il 2018 e il 2019, dall’esigenza di stare in alcuni luoghi sui confini, innanzitutto per una questione di cura delle persone in movimento. Poi abbiamo iniziato a collaborare con diverse realtà internazionali, per esempio in Serbia, in Bosnia ed Erzegovina, in Grecia e a Trieste. Negli anni le nostre attività sono state diverse. Abbiamo iniziato, soprattutto in Bosnia, sistemando gli squat dove stavano le persone, costruendo stufe, aiutando in maniera molto pratica. Poi nel tempo ci siamo interessati alla questione igienica, quindi abbiamo costruito e diffuso ai vari gruppi internazionali dei kit doccia portatili.

      ▻https://altreconomia.it/tra-le-persone-respinte-e-lasciate-senza-soccorsi-in-bulgaria-frontiera

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    “Ogni giorno ci sono migranti respinti al confine dalla Francia. Spesso famiglie”. Viaggio in Valsusa nel rifugio costretto alle brandine in corridoio

    Il confine alpino tra l’Italia e la Francia passa in mezzo a un campo da golf. Non si vede ma c’è. Una pallina può attraversarlo, ma una bambina di un anno no. Viene fermata dalla polizia francese mentre insieme ai suoi genitori prova a passare la frontiera camminando sui sentieri a oltre 1700 metri d’altitudine. Vorrebbero chiedere asilo in Francia ma la polizia li intercetta nei boschi e li rispedisce indietro. Un destino che riguarda sempre più persone.

    Da qualche settimana il numero dei migranti lungo la rotta alpina che passa da Claviere è aumentato. “Siamo arrivati a contare anche 150 persone in una sola notte” racconta Elena, una delle operatrici del Rifugio Fraternità Massi di Oulx. Un “porto sicuro” nato nel dicembre 2021 grazie a tante realtà come Talitá kun, Rainbow4Africa, la diaconia valdese, On Borders, Medu, Croce Rossa e grazie a 170 volontari che si alternano per garantire un aiuto alle persone in transito. Nel solo mese di luglio più di mille migranti sono stati ospitati qui. Il 10 per cento sono minori stranieri non accompagnati che per il diritto europeo dovrebbero poter passare il confine, ma non gli viene consentito.

    “Rispetto agli anni scorsi, nel 2023 abbiamo visto che la maggior parte delle persone proviene non più dalla rotta balcanica ma direttamente da Lampedusa – spiega l’antropologo Piero Gorza di On Borders – non più afghani e iraniani, ma arrivano per lo più dall’Africa Subsahariana e sono sbarcati in Italia da poche settimane”. Un cambio che comporta delle nuove difficoltà per queste persone. “Non sono abituati a camminare in montagna sui sentieri di notte e per di più continua la ‘caccia all’uomo’ da parte della polizia di frontiera francese”. Il risultato è che la rotta alpina diventa sempre più difficile per i migranti che per evitare i gendarmi si spingono su sentieri sempre più in alto. E i rischi aumentano. “Siamo partiti in sei ma quando abbiamo visto la polizia siamo scappati sparpagliandoci tra i boschi – racconta un ragazzo che ha poco più di vent’anni e che proviene dalla Costa d’Avorio – mi sono perso, ero in mezzo alla neve e presto le mani mi si sono congelate. Non riuscivo più a camminare. Ho avuto paura di morire”. Ma è riuscito a chiamare la Croce Rossa che lo ha salvato riportandolo al rifugio.

    L’elenco di chi non ce l’ha fatta a salvarsi continua però ad allungarsi. Lunedì mattina il corpo di un migrante morto è stato trovato sui sentieri tra Monginevro e Briancon, sul lato francese. L’ennesima vittima che si aggiunge a quelle degli scorsi anni. “Non siamo di fronte ad un fatto tragico ed eccezionale, ma ad una concreta eventualità che si ripropone ogni giorno ad ogni respingimento”, spiega l’associazione On borders che ha contato dieci morti accertati negli ultimi anni. Persone a cui è difficile dare un volto e un nome. Nel 2018 Blessing è morta mentre scappava dalla polizia, nel 2022 Fahtallah è stato trovato morto nella diga vicino a Modane, nello stesso anno il 14enne Aullar è morto stritolato dal treno a Salbeltrand. “Non è la montagna che uccide ma il sistema di frontiera – scrive On Borders – i morti nel Mediterraneo, a Cutro, a Ventimiglia e sulle Alpi sono il risultato di una stessa pianificata politica dell’orrore”.

    Le attività di soccorso e accoglienza su questo confine non si fermano mai, neanche d’estate. E quando c’è bisogno di letti aggiuntivi perché il rifugio di Oulx è pieno, i corridoi del polo logistico Cri di Bussoleno si riempiono di brandine per ospitare le persone in transito. “In Valsusa viviamo il riflesso della situazione che sta vivendo l’Italia – racconta Michele Belmondo del Comitato della Croce Rossa di Susa facendo riferimento ai 2 mila sbarchi del mese di luglio – ma non si può parlare di emergenza perché quello della migrazione è ormai un fenomeno strutturale che va avanti da anni”. Piuttosto sul lato italiano si va “un pochino più in difficoltà quando la frontiera diventa impermeabile per le condizioni meteo avverse o per i maggiori controlli da parte della polizia di frontiera”. E i governi italiani che si sono succeduti continuano “a lavarsene le mani” come spiega Gorza. “I decreti Cutro, la legge 50 e gli accordi con la Tunisia finiranno solo con il rendere più pericoloso il cammino dei migranti – conclude l’antropologo – dunque il risultato sarà la clandestinizzazione di queste persone e l’arricchimento dei trafficanti oltre a un costo umano altissimo perché puoi bloccare un accesso, ma si apriranno nuove rotte più pericolose con più morti. La gente non può né tornare indietro né restare, l’unica possibilità per loro andare avanti”. La migrazione, del resto, come spiega il ragazzo ivoriano “è un fenomeno naturale e non si può fermare. Proprio per questo occorre cambiare le leggi”.

    ▻https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2023/08/09/ogni-giorno-ci-sono-migranti-respinti-al-confine-dalla-francia-spesso-famiglie-viaggio-in-valsusa-nel-rifugio-costretto-alle-brandine-in-corridoio/7254891

    #frontières #frontière_sud-alpine #Val_de_Suse #Italie #France #refoulements #Alpes #montagne #push-backs #migrations #asile #réfugiés #film #reportage #vidéo #Croix-Rouge #urgence #Oulx #rifugio_fraternità_massi #fraternità_massi #chasse_à_l'homme #danger

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    Ventimiglia: persone bloccate e respinte alla frontiera franco-italiana

    https://pixelfed.zoo-logique.org/storage/m/_v2/578583396227231930/c51ea9690-856390/xsUJLJlSyfU6/bRG1Mtk1Ih3ZY0ZtEnesOyJQv0HPMfo4jQKKDPjd.png

    “#Vietato_Passare – La sfida quotidiana delle persone in transito respinte e bloccate alla frontiera franco-italiana” è il titolo del nostro nuovo rapporto pubblicato oggi sulle condizioni di centinaia di persone migranti in transito nella città di Ventimiglia, che cercano ogni giorno di attraversare il confine italo-francese e raggiungere altri paesi europei.

    Adulti e bambini sistematicamente respinti dalla polizia francese – talvolta con violenza, trattamenti inumani e privazione temporanea della libertà personale – e lasciati senza un’adeguata assistenza sul territorio italiano.

    Vietato passare in Francia

    Tra i 320 pazienti visitati tra febbraio e giugno 2023 durante le nostre attività di clinica mobile e le 684 persone in transito che hanno partecipato ad attività di promozione della salute e orientamento ai servizi socio-sanitari, il 79,8% ha dichiarato di aver tentato più di una volta di raggiungere la Francia e di essere stato respinto.

    Persone che dopo aver lasciato il loro paese di origine per sfuggire a violenze, morte, soprusi e povertà e dopo aver affrontato viaggi estremamente pericolosi, si ritrovano nuovamente esposte a violenze, umiliazioni e abusi nel cuore dell’Unione Europea.

    Molte delle persone in transito che abbiamo incontrato e assistito, hanno raccontato di violazioni da parte delle autorità francesi durante le procedure di notifica del refus d’entré (rifiuto d’ingresso), menzionando ad esempio trascrizioni imprecise dei dati personali, la fornitura imparziale o insufficiente di informazioni da parte delle autorità o l’assenza di mediatori interculturali.

    https://www.medicisenzafrontiere.it/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/MSB161187_Medium-1.jpg

    Tra loro ci sono anche persone vulnerabili, come minori non accompagnati, donne incinte o con bambini, anziani e individui con patologie mediche. Più di un terzo dei 48 minori non accompagnati ha riferito di essere stato respinto, mentre diverse persone hanno raccontato di essere state detenute arbitrariamente dalla polizia francese e trattenute in container durante la notte, in condizioni di promiscuità e senza alcuna protezione specifica per donne e minori.

    Secondo quanto riferito al nostro team, nelle notti trascorse nei container non sempre sono stati forniti cibo e acqua, l’assistenza medica è stata spesso negata, i servizi igienici ritenuti inadeguati e le persone sono state costrette a dormire a terra in spazi ridotti e spesso sovraffollati.

    Inoltre, solo nella prima metà dell’anno, abbiamo registrato almeno quattro casi di separazione familiare durante i respingimenti.

    Assistenza inadeguata sul territorio italiano

    Sul territorio di Ventimiglia, d’altro canto, le persone in transito hanno un accesso estremamente limitato ad alloggi adeguati, all’assistenza sanitaria, all’acqua potabile o ai servizi igienici, con conseguenze dirette sulle loro condizioni di salute.

    Tra i 320 pazienti che abbiamo assistito da febbraio a giugno, 215 persone hanno riportato problemi dermatologici, infezioni respiratorie e gastrointestinali, ferite e dolori articolari – condizioni causate o aggravate dalla vita in strada – mentre 14 soffrivano di malattie croniche come diabete e malattie cardiovascolari con necessità di terapia continuativa e a lungo termine.

    Nonostante siano stati recentemente aperti due nuovi PAD (Punto Assistenza Diffusa) dove i migranti più vulnerabili respinti dalla Francia possono trovare riparo per la notte, decine di persone in transito sono ancora costrette a dormire in strada o in accampamenti di fortuna. Due dei quattro PAD promessi dalle autorità locali non sono ancora operativi e i servizi essenziali come alloggi, assistenza sanitaria e legale vengono forniti dalle associazioni locali e dalla società civile.

    https://www.medicisenzafrontiere.it/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/MSB161184_Medium-1-600x337.jpg

    ▻https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QoMbUmD8yuM&embeds_referring_euri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.medicisenzafron

    ▻https://www.medicisenzafrontiere.it/news-e-storie/news/ventimiglia-assistenza-migranti

    #Vintimille #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #push-backs #refoulements #accès_aux_soins #rapport #MSF #Medici_senza_frontiere #frontière_sud-alpine #Alpes

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      “Vietato passare”: il report di Msf sui soprusi contro i migranti alla frontiera franco-italiana

      Bloccati e respinti dalla polizia francese -con violenza, trattamenti inumani e temporanea privazione della libertà-, centinaia di uomini, donne, bambini, persone vulnerabili si ritrovano a Ventimiglia senza un riparo adeguato e con un accesso limitato all’assistenza sanitaria. Il rapporto di Medici Senza Frontiere

      “Siamo stati fermati ieri a Nizza dalla polizia. Mia moglie è incinta. È stata portata in ospedale perché è svenuta mentre la ammanettavano. Io e mio figlio di due anni siamo stati condotti alla stazione di polizia di frontiera di Mentone. Abbiamo passato la notte al freddo e questa mattina siamo stati respinti e portati in Italia, ma non abbiamo notizie di mia moglie. Mio figlio piange, vuole la sua mamma e io non posso contattarla perché non ha il telefono”.

      La testimonianza di questa famiglia originaria della Costa d’Avorio è solo una delle storie di soprusi che si verificano quotidianamente al confine italo-francese di Ventimiglia (IM) e raccolte da Medici Senza Frontiere (Msf) nel nuovo report intitolato “Vietato passare” e pubblicato a inizio agosto 2023.

      “Vediamo persone estremamente vulnerabili che vengono respinte dalla polizia francese in maniera indiscriminata, senza che le loro specifiche condizioni individuali vengano adeguatamente valutate, per poi ritrovarsi sul territorio italiano senza un’adeguata assistenza da parte delle istituzioni”, spiega Sergio Di Dato, coordinatore del progetto di Msf nella cittadina ligure. “Molte delle persone in transito incontrate e assistite da Msf, hanno raccontato di violazioni da parte delle autorità francesi durante le procedure di notifica del refus d’entré (rifiuto d’ingresso), menzionando ad esempio trascrizioni imprecise dei dati personali, la fornitura imparziale o insufficiente di informazioni da parte delle autorità o l’assenza di mediatori interculturali”.

      Il rapporto si basa sui dati raccolti durante l’attività medica dell’équipe di Msf tra febbraio e giugno 2023 a cui si aggiungono 14 interviste semistrutturate con pazienti e membri del personale sanitario. Proprio all’inizio del 2023 l’organizzazione, già presente sul territorio di confine ligure nel 2016, ha deciso di tornare con il proprio staff in risposta al crescente numero di persone bloccate al confine.

      Delle 320 persone assistite la maggioranza proviene da Costa d’Avorio (28,1%), Guinea (27,5%) e Camerun (4,9%) ed è arrivata a Ventimiglia principalmente da Lampedusa (82,2%) e Trieste (5,3%). L’età media dei pazienti è di 23 anni con il gruppo più numeroso compreso tra i 16 e i 20: il 21% del totale, infatti, si è dichiarato minorenne al momento della visita. Oltre un terzo delle persone incontrate (37%) è donna.

      “Entrambi i miei genitori sono morti -racconta una di queste, originaria della Guinea-. Sono rimasta con mia zia che mi ha detto che era arrivato il momento di sposarmi. Avevo 15 anni. Non conoscevo l’uomo che avrei sposato; fu lei a trovarlo. Non ho scelto di sposarmi. L’uomo che è diventato mio marito ha iniziato a picchiarmi, ogni giorno. Era sempre violento con me. Sono finita in ospedale molte volte. Non avevo nessuno che mi proteggesse da lui. Sono passati quattro anni e ne porto ancora le cicatrici sul corpo […]. Ho deciso di andarmene per allontanarmi da quella vita”. Una storia di violenza non isolata. Quasi una persona su due di quelle visitate era infatti portatrice di “bisogni specifici e di estrema vulnerabilità a causa di caratteristiche o vissuti personali particolarmente complessi, correlati al genere, all’etnia, all’orientamento sessuale, alle convinzioni politiche o religiose e alle violazioni subite nei loro Paesi d’origine”.

      Il 38,8% ha impiegato più di un anno per raggiungere l’Italia, per alcuni il percorso è durato oltre cinque anni. Ma il “sogno europeo” sbatte contro l’ennesima frontiera sigillata.

      Su un campione di un migliaio di persone intercettate da Msf, l’80% ha dichiarato di aver già tentato di attraversare il confine tra Italia e Francia; il 25% riportava di essere stato respinto più di una volta “affrontando innumerevoli difficoltà ed esponendosi a rischi sempre maggiori fino a compromettere, a volte, la propria incolumità”, scrive Msf. E questo vale anche per le donne in gravidanza o che stanno allattando, per le persone anziane o gravemente malate e per i minori non accompagnati. Un terzo di quelli incontrati da Msf era stato respinto al confine, “tra cui due sopravvissuti a violenze e naufragi e una madre di 16 anni con un neonato”.

      Emblematica è la storia di A., 17 anni, originario di un Paese dell’Africa subsahariana. In Libia è stato rinchiuso in un centro di detenzione dove ha subito violenze e maltrattamenti di ogni tipo “che gli hanno lasciato cicatrici ancora visibili sulla schiena e un dolore cronico al ginocchio”. Ha deciso di raggiungere la Tunisia ma dopo i rastrellamenti operati dal presidente Kaïs Saïed ai danni delle persone migranti, ha deciso di partire per l’Europa.

      A 35 chilometri da Lampedusa un’imbarcazione, “probabilmente tunisina”, li ha abbordati pretendendo il loro motore. Li ha affiancati sempre di più, minacciandoli con toni aggressivi e creando forti onde che hanno fatto imbarcare acqua al piccolo natante, che alla fine è affondato. Nonostante le grida, le suppliche e le richieste di soccorso, l’altra nave ha abbandonato i passeggeri della barca di A. al loro destino. Lui, è tra i 22 tratti in salvo. “Da Lampedusa A. è arrivato a Ventimiglia. Vuole raggiungere la Francia perché parla francese e pensa che lì potrebbe avere più possibilità per costruirsi un futuro -si legge nel rapporto-. Tuttavia, è stato respinto due volte dalle autorità francesi, anche se è vittima di naufragio, ha subito innumerevoli violenze, si dichiara minore e non è accompagnato”.

      La condizione sanitaria delle persone incontrate dagli operatori presenti a Ventimiglia è pessima. “Tra le persone assistite, 215 pazienti (67,2%) hanno riportato una condizione acuta, tra cui malattie dermatologiche, patologie respiratorie, disturbi gastrointestinali, problemi muscoloscheletrici o lesioni -si legge nel report-. In totale, sono stati segnalati 31 episodi di traumi accidentali acuti, di cui il 90,3% (28) tra la popolazione di sesso maschile e tre (9,7%) tra i minori. Inoltre, 32 individui (10%) hanno presentato sintomi neurologici, la maggior parte dei quali riconducibili a mal di testa o emicrania (25, 78,1%), e per 14 persone (4,4%) sono state individuate patologie croniche con necessità di terapia continuativa e a lungo termine”.

      Sono stati raccolti dati anche rispetto alle vittime di violenza intenzionale (in totale 12, il 3,8%) e alle persone che presentavano sintomi associati a problemi di salute mentale (15, ovvero il 4,7%). Ma su queste stime gli operatori sottolineano la “difficoltà di stabilire relazioni di fiducia con pazienti transitanti che sono concentrati sul proseguimento del loro viaggio, sulla ricerca di sicurezza o sul soddisfacimento dei bisogni primari”.

      Anche la soddisfazione dei bisogni primari a Ventimiglia è un miraggio. “Con la chiusura del campo Roja nel 2020, che rappresentava l’unico centro ufficiale di accoglienza di emergenza nella zona, e gli sgomberi forzati effettuati nel maggio 2023 dalle autorità italiane presso l’insediamento informale sulle rive del fiume Roja -si legge nel rapporto- le persone in transito si trovano costrette a dormire per strada, in edifici abbandonati o in ripari di fortuna. Questa situazione le espone a marginalizzazione, soprusi, condizioni climatiche avverse, rischi per la salute privandole dell’accesso a servizi igienici, all’acqua pulita o a un riparo adeguato”.

      Molti bisogni restano, così, senza risposta. E lo staff di Msf che fornisce assistenza medica a Ventimiglia “misura quotidianamente” l’impatto della mancanza di alloggi e servizi igienici: “Malattie della pelle (48 persone; il 15,8%), infezioni gastrointestinali (25, il 18,2%), infezioni urinarie e del tratto respiratorio superiore (35, l’11,5%) sono solo alcuni dei disturbi che spesso derivano direttamente dalle pessime condizioni di vita e di marginalizzazione sociale in cui è costretta a vivere la popolazione in transito”.

      E di cui soffrono soprattutto donne e minori, i più vulnerabili. L’accesso alle cure per chi dichiara di avere meno di 18 anni è complesso: per richiedere la tessera sanitaria è necessario coinvolgere chi esercita la potestà genitoriale o il responsabile della struttura di accoglienza in cui sono ospitati i minori. Struttura da cui però, nella maggior parte dei casi, è scappato chi arriva a Ventimiglia desideroso di raggiungere altri Paesi europei. Anche per le donne e ragazze, “che presentano bisogni e rischi sanitari specifiche” l’accesso alle cure mediche ginecologiche è difficoltoso. “Sia perché sono riluttanti a interrompere il loro percorso migratorio, sia perché hanno sfiducia nei confronti del sistema sanitario”, spiegano i curatori del report. “Tutto questo si traduce in un’interruzione della continuità delle cure mediche e in un aumento dei rischi di complicazioni e morbilità durante la gravidanza”.

      Salute calpestata, diritti negati. Chi è respinto al confine è spesso vittima di violenza e detenzione arbitraria nei container in cui le persone, una volta intercettate, aspettano di essere riportate sul territorio italiano. Secondo i dati raccolti da Msf dalla prefettura di Nizza, più di 13.395 persone tra il primo gennaio e il 15 giugno 2023 sono state soggette a “respingimenti o trattenimenti al confine italo-francese, con un aumento del 30% rispetto all’anno precedente”. Una media di 80 persone al giorno costrette a tornare indietro, tra cui sempre più minori.

      Le raccomandazioni di Msf che chiudono il report sono così rivolte ai tre principali protagonisti di questa paradossale situazione: alle autorità di Ventimiglia e al governo italiano di garantire l’accesso ai servizi di base e un’accoglienza dignitosa per le persone che transitano dal confine; alle autorità francesi di assicurare il rispetto delle garanzie procedurali durante i controlli di frontiera al confine italo-francese, proteggere i minori e porre fine alla detenzione arbitraria dei migranti. Infine, all’Unione europea, di “impedire i respingimenti alle frontiere interne” e “impedire le espulsioni collettive dagli Stati membri e stabilire meccanismi per valutare le situazioni individuali delle persone in transito”. Per provare a salvare quel che resta di quello spazio Schengen dove, a oggi, le merci attraversano più facilmente i confini di (alcune) persone.

      ▻https://altreconomia.it/vietato-passare-il-report-di-msf-sui-soprusi-contro-i-migranti-alla-fro

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  • @cdb_77
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    @_kg_ @rhoumour

    En #Algérie, l’#errance des migrants subsahariens menacés d’expulsion

    Ni le rejet violent dont ils sont victimes en #Tunisie ni le #racisme qu’ils subissent de la part des Algériens ne les dissuadent de transiter par le pays pour rallier l’Europe.

    Assis au milieu d’un amas de tissus, le visage d’Osman Issa brille de sueur. Un ventilateur rafraîchit à peine son atelier de 8 mètres carrés en cette journée d’été étouffante du mois de juillet. De sa table de couture, un karakou (tenue algéroise traditionnelle) au-dessus de la tête, Osman se remémore sa traversée du désert pour venir en Algérie voilà vingt-six ans. « J’ai décidé de quitter le Niger sous les encouragements de mon frère qui avait fait la traversée avant moi », raconte-t-il dans un dialecte algérien presque parfait. A son arrivée en 1997, Osman, brodeur de qualité, s’était lancé avec un certain succès dans le commerce de tenues traditionnelles. Désormais, il possède cet atelier de couture dans un quartier populaire d’Alger.

    Alors que le débat sur la place des migrants subsahariens dans les pays nord-africains a été relancé par les événements en Tunisie et les opérations de refoulement à la frontière des autorités algériennes, lui affirme avoir trouvé sa place. « En trois décennies, je n’ai pas été victime d’un acte raciste qui m’a fait regretter d’être venu », promet-il. Comme la plupart des migrants subsahariens, Osman ne considérait pas l’Algérie comme un point d’ancrage, mais un lieu de transit vers l’Europe. « J’ai tenté de traverser à trois reprises, mais j’ai échoué. » Désormais marié à une Algérienne et père de trois enfants, il bénéficie d’une carte de résidence et n’envisage plus de partir vers l’Europe ou de rentrer au Niger, sauf pour les visites familiales.

    « J’avoue qu’il m’a été très difficile de régulariser ma situation, même après mon mariage. Je me compare souvent à mon frère qui est parti en Belgique bien après moi. Il a déjà sa nationalité. Moi, je sais que je ne l’aurai pas. La nationalité algérienne ? Il ne faut pas demander l’impossible », reconnaît-il, sans nier le racisme ambiant. Quand il n’en est pas témoin lui-même, des récits lui arrivent des migrants qu’il emploie : « Ils ont pour but de partir en Europe. Les passeurs demandent jusqu’à 3 000 euros. Ce qui représente trois ans de travail acharné pour un migrant. D’autres préfèrent rentrer dans leur pays avec cette somme et tenter le visa pour l’Europe. Dans les deux cas, cet argent ne peut être amassé qu’en Algérie. C’est ici qu’il y a du travail. »

    « Pour l’amour de Dieu ! »

    A la sortie de l’atelier d’Osman, le wagon climatisé du tramway offre une échappatoire à la canicule. « Une aumône pour l’amour de Dieu ! », supplie une jeune migrante subsaharienne depuis le fond du train. Alors que l’enfant fraie son chemin, certains passagers piochent dans leurs poches pour lui tendre quelques sous, d’autres ne masquent pas leur exaspération. La scène fait désormais partie du quotidien algérois. Les migrants sont d’ailleurs désormais qualifiés par les locaux de sadaka (aumône).

    A #Alger, la vie des #migrants_subsahariens n’a pas été perturbée par les événements récents en Tunisie. Depuis le 3 juillet, après la mort à Sfax d’un Tunisien dans une bagarre avec des migrants, des autochtones ont fait la chasse aux Subsahariens et les autorités en ont expulsé par centaines de la ville où le drame a eu lieu. Même ceux en situation régulière ne sont pas épargnés. Depuis plusieurs semaines, de nombreux Sfaxiens manifestaient contre l’augmentation du nombre de candidats à l’exil vers l’Europe arrivés d’Algérie.

    Ceux-ci franchissaient majoritairement la frontière au niveau de la région montagneuse de #Kasserine, dans le centre ouest de la Tunisie. Un trajet périlleux : neuf migrants y ont perdu la vie à la mi-mai, « morts de soif et de froid », selon la justice tunisienne.

    C’est dans cette même zone que 150 à 200 personnes ont été refoulées par les autorités tunisiennes, selon les estimations de Human Rights Watch (HRW), en plus des 500 à 700 migrants abandonnés dans la zone frontalière avec la Libye. « Ce sont des estimations que nous avons établies après être entrés en contact avec les migrants et après avoir identifié leur localisation, explique Salsabil Chellali, la directrice de HRW pour la Tunisie. Les migrants expulsés du côté algérien se sont dispersés après avoir été contraints à marcher pendant plusieurs kilomètres. »

    « Propos racistes »

    Ces groupes de migrants comptent des enfants et des femmes enceintes. L’une d’elles a accouché aux portes de l’Algérie, comme en atteste une vidéo reçue par Le Monde. D’après HRW, un groupe de migrants, refoulés à la frontière libyenne, a été secouru et pris en charge dans des villes du sud tunisien. D’autres, aux frontières libyennes et algériennes, errent encore dans le #désert, attendant aide et assistance.

    Les propos du président tunisien Kaïs Saïed en février, dénonçant des « hordes de migrants clandestins », source de « violence, de crimes et d’actes inacceptables », ont eu un effet désinhibant, notamment sur des influenceurs et des artistes populaires en Algérie. La
    chanteuse de raï Cheba Warda a ainsi dit soutenir le plan d’expulsion du président Tebboune alors qu’aucun discours n’avait été tenu par ce dernier.

    En juin, l’influenceuse algérienne Baraka Meraia, suivie par plus de 275 000 personnes, a dénoncé le racisme anti-Noirs dont elle a aussi été victime. Originaire d’In Salah, à plus de mille kilomètres au sud d’Alger, la jeune femme a dit avoir été prise à plusieurs reprises pour une migrante subsaharienne. Dans une vidéo, elle est apparue en larmes pour raconter le comportement d’un contrôleur de tramway algérois. « Ce n’est pas la première fois que j’entends des propos racistes, relatait-elle. Parmi toutes les personnes qui ont assisté à la scène, aucune n’a réagi. »

    « Ils errent dans le désert »

    En plus des actes et des propos racistes auxquels ils sont exposés, les migrants vivent sous la menace des opérations d’expulsion. Selon l’ONG Alarm Phone Sahara, qui leur vient en aide, l’Algérie a renvoyé plus de 11 000 personnes vers le #Niger entre janvier et avril 2023. Les opérations sont toujours en cours, d’après la même source, et s’opèrent au rythme minimum d’un convoi par semaine depuis 2018. « Ces expulsions s’opèrent sur la base d’un accord avec le Niger. Toutefois, l’Algérie ne prend pas en considération la nationalité des migrants qu’elle refoule », raconte Moctar Dan Yayé, le responsable de communication d’Alarm Phone Sahara.

    Selon lui, les migrants sont acheminés jusqu’à #Tamanrasset, à l’extrême sud algérien, puis à la frontière avec le Niger. De ce no man’s land, les refoulés doivent marcher environ 15 km pour atteindre le village d’#Assamaka, où l’opération de tri commence. « Nous sommes tombés sur des Yéménites et même sur un migrant du Costa Rica. Ceux-là, comme les autres Africains, ne sont pas pris en charge par le Niger. Parfois, l’Organisation mondiale des migrations (OIM) se charge de les renvoyer chez eux. Dans le cas contraire, ils errent dans le désert en essayant de rentrer en Algérie », rapporte Moctar Dan Yayé. Selon Alarm Phone Sahara, plus de 7 500 migrants expulsés restent bloqués à Assamaka.

    Malgré cette menace de reconduite et les discours incendiaires du président tunisien, ceux-ci gardent les yeux rivés sur la Méditerranée, comme ces deux jeunes Sénégalais, Aliou et Demba*, rencontrés en avril à Tamanrasset. Après avoir traversé le Mali et le Niger, leur errance les a amenés dans cet îlot urbain, planté en plein désert, où ils n’ont trouvé que quelques labeurs sur des chantiers, payés tout juste 1 000 dinars la journée, à peine 7 euros. Demba espérait alors rejoindre la Tunisie, sans crainte que les propos de son dirigeant n’affecte son ambition. Il y a seulement trois mois, il était persuadé que les migrants ne risquaient pas l’expulsion de la Tunisie, contrairement à l’Algérie. Le seul problème qui se posait alors à ses yeux et à ceux de son ami était de trouver l’argent pour payer les passeurs.

    *Les prénoms ont été changés à la demande des interviewés.

    ▻https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2023/07/12/en-algerie-l-errance-des-migrants-subsahariens-menaces-d-expulsion_6181703_3
    #migrations #réfugiés #refoulements #push-backs

    ping @_kg_ @rhoumour

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    Il ministero dell’Interno condannato a risarcire un respinto a catena in Bosnia

    Il Tribunale di Roma ha accertato l’illegittimità delle “riammissioni” al confine orientale, ricostruendo il “nesso causale” tra respingimenti e trattamenti inumani. Il Viminale deve farsi carico del danno inflitto a un cittadino pakistano richiedente asilo. Decisivo il lavoro di rete tra attivisti, Ong e avvocati. Una decisione attualissima

    Il ministero dell’Interno è stato condannato dal Tribunale di Roma a pagare 18.200 euro a titolo di risarcimento nei confronti di A., cittadino originario del Pakistan in fuga dal Paese, per averlo prima fermato a Trieste e poi respinto in Slovenia e a catena verso la Croazia e la Bosnia ed Erzegovina. Nonostante avesse manifestato la volontà di domandare protezione internazionale. Cento euro per ogni giorno trascorso tra la “riammissione” in Slovenia avvenuta a metà ottobre 2020 e il rientro in Italia nell’aprile 2021, come prevede la giurisprudenza comunitaria e nazionale su casi assimilabili.

    La decisione della giudice Damiana Colla del 9 maggio è estremamente rilevante non soltanto perché “accerta e dichiara l’illegittimità” delle riammissioni informali attive da parte italiana ma soprattutto perché inchioda l’”evidente nesso di causalità” tra l’operato della polizia italiana e il “danno subito” da A.. “La lesione del diritto d’asilo e i trattamenti inumani -scrive infatti la giudice- sono stati la diretta conseguenza della riammissione informale del ricorrente in Slovenia da parte delle autorità di frontiera di Trieste”.

    La decisione ottenuta dalle avvocate Caterina Bove e Anna Brambilla dell’Asgi, commenta la stessa Associazione per gli studi giuridici sull’immigrazione, “è stata il frutto di un lavoro di rete che ha visto coinvolti diversi soggetti attivi nel contrasto alle violenze verso le persone in movimento attivi lungo la rotta balcanica, tra i quali la rete RiVolti ai Balcani (in particolare Gianfranco Schiavone e Agostino Zanotti), la giornalista Elisa Oddone, la Ong ‘Lungo la rotta balcanica’, l’associazione Pravni center za varstvo človekovih pravic in okolja – Legal Centre for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment (Pic, in particolare Ursa Regvar), il progetto Medea dell’Asgi, Ics Ufficio Rifugiati, Linea d’ombra, il Centro per la Pace di Zagabria, Anela Dedic e tutti gli attivisti e attiviste che agiscono per la tutela per i diritti umani in Bosnia ed Erzegovina e lungo le rotte percorse dalla persone in transito”.

    Nuove ombre si allungano su una prassi che i governi europei intendono invece elevare sempre più a norma “guida” della brutale gestione delle frontiere, come dimostra l’accordo al Consiglio europeo Giustizia e Affari interni dello scorso 8 giugno sui regolamenti in tema di gestione dell’asilo e della migrazione e delle procedure.

    Non si tratta di un’ordinanza che guarda a un passato ormai superato o a una pagina triste nel frattempo voltata: se è vero infatti che l’Italia ha condotto i respingimenti verso la Slovenia per tutto il 2020 e li ha sospesi nel 2021, è noto che da fine 2022 il nuovo governo abbia annunciato di volerli riprendere (con “risultati” incerti di cui abbiamo già scritto). Il tutto nonostante il precedente dell’ordinanza cautelare del Tribunale di Roma a firma della giudice Silvia Albano, emessa nel gennaio 2021 a fronte del ricorso promosso sempre dalle avvocate e socie Asgi Caterina Bove e Anna Brambilla (la vicenda è ben raccontata nel film “Trieste è bella di notte” dei registi Andrea Segre, Stefano Collizzolli e Matteo Calore).

    La storia di A. ricostruita nella decisione di Roma è tanto forte quanto emblematica. La sua fuga dal Pakistan inizia nel 2018, quand’è ferito in un attacco del gruppo terroristico Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. Sopravvissuto, e temendo ritorsioni da ambo le parti (estremisti ed esercito cui apparteneva), decide di scappare. Resta per un anno in Turchia e per tre volte prova a entrare in Grecia, nell’Unione europea. Al terzo tentativo riesce, attraversando poi la Macedonia del Nord, la Serbia e arrivando nell’estate 2019 in Bosnia ed Erzegovina.

    Per nove volte è respinto dalle polizie croate e per tre da quelle slovene. Il primo ottobre 2020, a “riammissioni informali attive” ormai a pieno regime da parte italiana, gli riesce il “game” che lo porterà a Trieste nella mattinata del 17 ottobre. Qui però alcuni militari lo fermano quasi subito insieme ad altre quattro persone. Finiscono tutti in una stazione di polizia dove sono visitati e gli vengono fatti firmare fogli non tradotti dal contenuto oscuro. A. riferisce però agli agenti di voler chiedere asilo ma questi lo “affidano” alla polizia slovena. Non ha niente in mano: “informale” vuol dire infatti respinto senza lo straccio di un provvedimento scritto, motivato, impugnabile, cioè senza convalida dell’autorità giudiziaria, senza diritto a un ricorso effettivo. A riprova di quanto sia basso e surreale il dibattito sul garantismo in Italia.

    È così che A., con l’etichetta fasulla di “cittadino extraeuropeo entrato irregolarmente” e non invece di richiedente asilo, si fa una notte in una stazione di polizia slovena e il giorno dopo si vede “consegnato alle autorità croate e da queste respinto in Bosnia con metodi violenti, comprese percosse”, sempre per citare il giudice di Roma.

    Alla fine della catena lo attende la Bosnia ed Erzegovina. Nel caso di A. è l’insediamento informale di Vedro Polje, poco distante da Bihać, nel Nord-Ovest del Paese. Per via delle “degradanti condizioni di vita al campo”, come si legge nell’ordinanza che ha condannato il Viminale, A. decide di riprovarci. Lì non può rimanere. Ce la fa, di nuovo, perché “frontiere chiuse” è uno slogan vuoto, e ad aprile del 2021 torna nell’Italia che lo aveva illegalmente respinto. Tre mesi prima, come detto, la giudice Albano del Tribunale di Roma aveva già sanzionato il ministero dell’Interno per le stesse riammissioni (caso specifico diverso, naturalmente). A., memore del precedente respingimento, abbandona in fretta Trieste e raggiunge Brescia. Il 10 maggio fa quella domanda d’asilo che gli era stata negata dalla polizia italiana qualche mese prima e a tre giorni da Natale si vede riconoscere lo status di rifugiato. Ma non gli suona come un lieto fine quanto lo sprone a chieder giustizia per quel respingimento illegale subìto.

    Il 31 dicembre 2021 fa perciò ricorso. Il ministero dell’Interno si costituisce in giudizio il 27 settembre 2022 sostenendo che no, non si sarebbe trattato di un’espulsione collettiva vietata dal diritto internazionale ed europeo, che l’intera procedura si sarebbe svolta nel rispetto dei diritti umani fondamentali delle persone coinvolte, che la pratica sarebbe stata pienamente legittima e che il danno subito dal ricorrente (cioè A.) non sarebbe stato dimostrato.

    Il Tribunale di Roma dà però torto a Roma e ragione ad A. e alle avvocate Bove e Brambilla, facendo così squagliare la tesi difensiva del Viminale come il sole fa con la neve. “Il trattamento che il ricorrente ha descritto di aver subito da parte delle autorità di frontiera italiane al momento del suo primo ingresso a Trieste […] è stato pienamente provato in giudizio”, scrive la giudice Colla. Dalla manifestazione della volontà di chiedere protezione alla presa in consegna da parte delle autorità slovene. È documentata anche la catena: la detenzione in Slovenia al Centro per stranieri di Veliki Otok, nella Postumia (Carniola interna), e la successiva riammissione in Croazia. Fino alla Bosnia. Nessun alibi quindi per il Viminale, che della mancata prova dell’arrivo in Italia dei respinti ne ha fatto fino a oggi un leitmotiv. Questa volta non gli è riuscito nascondere la mano.

    Nella “jungle” di Vedro Polje, dove si trova a inizio 2021, A. ha per fortuna incontrato la giornalista Elisa Oddone e l’operatore sociale Diego Saccora dell’associazione “Lungo la rotta balcanica” (e tra le anime della rete RiVolti ai Balcani). Oddone, che stava curando un reportage per Al Jazeera ed NPR, raccoglie la testimonianza di A. e fa da primo contatto-ponte con le avvocate Bove e Brambilla. Anche Saccora confermerà in Tribunale più incontri con A.. A Vedro Polje infatti l’operatore sociale e ricercatore sul campo portava assistenza e beni di prima necessità. Non solo: lo accompagna di persona presso uno studio notarile di Bihać “per conferire mandato agli attuali difensori al fine di esperire ricorso avverso la riammissione in Slovenia”. A dimostrazione che il supporto incisivo alle persone in transito calpestate dai governi europei alle frontiere può assumere le forme più svariate, e che l’aiuto più distante dalla solidarietà istituzionalizzata può passare persino dalla ceralacca di un notaio. Quante pagine gravi e paradossali faranno scrivere ancora le politiche europee?

    Oddone e Saccora raccontano per filo e per segno al giudice le condizioni proibitive in cui si trovava all’epoca A. insieme ad altri. Riparati nei boschi, con la temperatura fino a venti gradi sotto zero di un inverno bosniaco, senz’acqua, senza accoglienza per via della chiusura dei due campi locali più grandi, praticamente senza cibo, stretti tra “ronde” di cittadini locali ostili e “possibili furti da parte di altri gruppi di richiedenti asilo, alla ricerca di quanto necessario alla sopravvivenza”.

    Secondo il Tribunale di Roma la riammissione “informale” di A. da parte dell’Italia avrebbe “contraddetto” le “norme di rango primario, costituzionale e sovranazionale, le quali, evidentemente, non possono essere derogate da un accordo bilaterale intergovernativo (del 1996, ndr) non ratificato con legge”.

    “La Direttiva 2008/115/CE non legittima affatto, anzi contrasta con la descritta pratica di riammissione informale posta in essere dal governo italiano -chiarisce la giudice Colla-. Infatti, sebbene tale direttiva (al suo art. 6, par. 3) consenta agli Stati membri di riammettere nello Stato confinante di provenienza senza una specifica decisione di rimpatrio, qualora sussistano accordi bilaterali tra gli Stati interessati già vigenti alla data di entrata in vigore della direttiva stessa (essendo tali accordi invece non più consentiti nella vigenza della stessa), tuttavia, nell’esecuzione dell’accordo, lo Stato italiano è comunque vincolato dalla normativa interna anche costituzionale (art 13 Cost.), nonché dal diritto sovranazionale, alla stregua del quale lo Stato ha il dovere di accertare la situazione concreta nella quale la persona riammessa verrà a trovarsi, con particolare riferimento all’eventualità di una violazione dei suoi diritti fondamentali (che si prospettava nel caso di specie secondo le informazioni largamente disponibili). Soprattutto poi, la riammissione informale non può mai essere applicata nei confronti di una persona che manifesti l’intenzione di chiedere asilo, come nella specie accaduto”.

    Oltre al regolamento 604/2013 (Dublino III), l’Italia, nella foga di respingere, avrebbe persino violato lo stesso accordo bilaterale con la Slovenia. L’articolo due prevede infatti che ciascuna parte, su richiesta dell’altra, “si impegna a riammettere sul proprio territorio il cittadino di uno Stato terzo che non soddisfa le condizioni di ingresso o di soggiorno nel territorio dello Stato richiedente, non potendosi evidentemente considerare in tale situazione chi abbia espresso la volontà di chiedere protezione”. Proprio come A..

    A titolo di aggravante per le autorità italiane, segnala poi il Tribunale elencando corposa bibliografia, c’è anche il fatto che queste erano “perfettamente” a conoscenza -“o almeno trovandosi nella condizione di avere perfetta conoscenza”- “delle violazioni cui i respinti sarebbero stati esposti in Slovenia”, così come in Croazia, per non parlare delle condizioni orribili in Bosnia ed Erzegovina, denunciate anche dalla commissaria per i diritti umani del Consiglio d’Europa Dunja Mijatović.

    A maggior ragione dopo le tredici pagine dell’ordinanza del Tribunale di Roma nessuno potrà dire “non sapevo”. Nel buio spicca il “lavoro di rete per contrastare le violazioni”, come lo chiamano le avvocate Bove e Brambilla. “La decisione è un importante risultato non solo perché ribadisce l’illegittimità della condotta posta in essere dalle autorità italiane -concludono- ma perché valorizza, anche attraverso l’assunzione della testimonianza diretta di Saccora e Oddone, l’impegno di tante persone che si impegnano a denunciare e contrastare le violazioni dei diritti delle persone in transito”.

    ▻https://altreconomia.it/il-ministero-dellinterno-condannato-a-risarcire-un-respinto-a-catena-in

    #justice #Italie #frontière_sud-alpine #Slovénie #frontières #migrations #asile #réfugiés #condamnation #refoulements #refoulements_en_chaîne #push-backs #tribunal #réadmissions #Trieste #réadmissions_informelles_actives #Bihać #Bihac #Vedro_Polje #Veliki_Otok #Croatie #Bosnie #Bosnie-Herzégovine #forêt #hostile_environment #environnement_hostile #accord_bilatéral

    –—

    ajouté à la #Métaliste sur les #refoulements_en_chaîne sur la #route_des_Balkans:
    ►https://seenthis.net/messages/1009117

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    Respingimenti e ostacoli all’asilo. Ritorno sulla frontiera Italia-Svizzera

    Da gennaio ad aprile 2023 a Como-Ponte Chiasso oltre 1.300 persone migranti sono state “riammesse” indietro dalle autorità elvetiche. È il confine terrestre italiano con i dati più alti. Quattro su 10 sono afghani: la protezione è un miraggio

    Ahmed, diciassettenne afghano, è partito da Kabul nell’autunno del 2021 per non finire tra le fila dell’esercito talebano. A un anno e mezzo dalla partenza, dopo aver percorso una delle diramazioni della rotta balcanica, passa per la stazione di Milano, dove non si ferma neanche una notte: la prossima tappa da raggiungere è Zurigo, l’obiettivo ultimo la Germania. Che cosa lo aspetta al confine italo-svizzero? Seppur poco raccontato, secondo i dati del ministero dell’Interno, su questa frontiera nei primi quattro mesi del 2023 sono state registrate 1.341 riammissioni passive, ovvero le pratiche di polizia a danno di persone straniere considerate irregolari che, a un passo dall’arrivo sul territorio elvetico, vengono costrette a ritornare in Italia.

    A far da contraltare all’approccio di frontiera finalizzato al respingimento, una parte della società civile su entrambi i lati del confine testimonia ormai da anni un’accoglienza possibile ma sempre più difficile nei confronti dei transitanti. La collaborazione tra i due Paesi si rifà all’accordo italo-svizzero del 1998 “sulla riammissione delle persone in situazione irregolare”, mai ratificato dal Parlamento italiano. Il 31 maggio scorso quell’impegno bilaterale è stato ribadito nell’incontro tra il ministro dell’Interno Matteo Piantedosi e la sua omologa svizzera, Elisabeth Baume-Schneider, per contrastare, parole del Viminale, la “criminalità organizzata”, il “terrorismo internazionale” e monitorare i “foreign fighters di rientro dai teatri di guerra”. Il tutto, ha assicurato la consigliera elvetica, garantendo “sempre il rispetto dei diritti umani dei migranti”. Retorica politica che propone un concetto di sicurezza e promette di proteggere tutti, ma poi nella pratica minaccia le stesse persone in cerca di una maggior sicurezza.

    Già nel 2016 l’Associazione per gli studi giuridici sull’Immigrazione (Asgi) aveva evidenziato l’illegittimità delle riammissioni previste dall’accordo bilaterale per diversi motivi: ostacolano la domanda di asilo, implicano controlli sistemici e discriminatori lungo una frontiera Schengen e sono considerabili espulsioni collettive; infine, essendo procedure informali, non permettono di presentare un eventuale ricorso.

    Nonostante le rassicurazioni sul “rispetto dei diritti umani” di Baume-Schneider, le riammissioni, con le annesse criticità sottolineate nel 2016, continuano anche oggi. I dati relativi ai primi mesi dell’anno, comunicati dal Viminale dopo un’istanza di accesso civico di Altreconomia, sono eloquenti. Per quanto riguarda il settore terrestre di Como-Ponte Chiasso, da gennaio ad aprile 2023 sono state registrate 1.341 riammissioni verso l’Italia (numeri alti, basti pensare che per il più conosciuto accordo bilaterale tra Italia e Slovenia erano state 1.240 le persone riammesse nel 2020, anno di picco).

    Quello con la Svizzera si conferma quindi il confine terrestre italiano dove vengono registrate più riammissioni passive (si veda, a questo proposito, l’articolo sui respingimenti ai confini italiani nel numero di febbraio di Altreconomia). Dal gennaio 2022, infatti, in media, 330 persone ogni mese sono costrette dalla polizia svizzera a ritornare sui propri passi. Quattro su dieci sono afghani, proprio come Ahmed. Seguono siriani, turchi, marocchini e poi bengalesi e tunisini.

    Entrare nel merito di ciascun episodio è impossibile, ma si può ipotizzare che in molti casi la riammissione abbia ostacolato l’accesso alla domanda di protezione internazionale per persone provenienti da zone di conflitto. Ciò che permette un così alto numero di riammissioni è l’esteso sistema di controllo elvetico. “Il Ticino ha il più alto numero di poliziotti pro-capite di tutta la Svizzera”, spiega Donato Di Blasi di Casa Astra, centro di prima accoglienza per persone in emergenza abitativa nella Svizzera italiana. Nel territorio, infatti, si conta un agente ogni 305 abitanti, a fronte della media nazionale di uno ogni 466 secondo i dati della Radiotelevisione svizzera. “I pattugliamenti della polizia svizzera si estendono sui treni fino a Lugano, a 30 chilometri dalla stazione di confine di Ponte Chiasso”, continua Di Blasi.

    Spesso i controlli avverrebbero sistematicamente nei confronti di persone con caratteristiche somatiche apparentemente non di origine europea, in violazione delle normative che vietano la profilazione etnica (racial profiling). Un ragazzo egiziano di 16 anni che vive attualmente a Como racconta: “Una volta rientrando da Milano mi sono addormentato sul treno, superando per sbaglio la fermata di Como. Alla stazione di Chiasso mi hanno svegliato i poliziotti, mi hanno perquisito fino a lasciarmi in mutande, poi mi hanno riportato in Italia. Ero l’unico sul treno a cui è successo così”. Il monitoraggio frontaliero delle forze dell’ordine si inoltra anche nelle zone di transito percorribili in auto o a piedi. Per sorvegliare al meglio queste aree, l’ufficio federale dell’armamento (Armasuisse) aveva annunciato già nel 2015 l’acquisto di sei droni di fabbricazione israeliana che entreranno a pieno regime entro la fine del 2024.

    Nonostante la fitta rete di controlli e i numeri delle riammissioni, le realtà comasche che supportano le persone transitanti concordano nel dire che la situazione per le strade di Como non è minimamente paragonabile a quella dell’estate del 2016, quando fino a 500 persone dormivano nei pressi della stazione di San Giovanni in attesa di superare il confine. “Sono sporadici i casi di persone riammesse dalla Svizzera presenti sulle strade di Como”, racconta Anna Merlo di Porta Aperta, sportello di Caritas per i senza dimora. “Dato l’alto numero delle riammissioni, ci chiediamo: dove vanno le persone una volta riportate in Italia?”, si domanda don Giusto Della Valle, parroco di Rebbio, realtà solidale con le persone transitanti e attualmente luogo di accoglienza per decine di minori stranieri non accompagnati in attesa di una sistemazione definitiva. L’impressione è che chi viene riammesso non si fermi in città, provando a continuare il viaggio in altre zone di frontiera, vicine e lontane.

    Ahmed ha avuto fortuna, è riuscito a superare l’ennesimo confine, ma questo non significa la fine degli ostacoli. Infatti, dalle informazioni raccolte, è frequente che le persone transitanti, intercettate dalle forze dell’ordine sul territorio svizzero, dopo aver provato a fare domanda di asilo vengano riportate in Italia alla centrale di polizia di Ponte Chiasso. “Per essere certi che la domanda di asilo venga presa in carico e le persone non vengano respinte, l’unico modo è accompagnarle fisicamente alla questura di Chiasso per contestare un’eventuale riammissione; lo abbiamo fatto più volte in passato -spiega Gabriela Giuria Tasville di Azione posti liberi, fondazione che segue dal punto di vista legale i richiedenti asilo in Ticino-. A peggiorare il quadro, inoltre, è impossibile, per le persone in transito, soggiornare anche temporaneamente in Svizzera, perché dal 2008 è entrata in vigore una legge federale che vieta qualsiasi forma di accoglienza e penalizza chiunque aiuti le persone transitanti in situazione di irregolarità”. Questa legge infatti punisce “con una pena detentiva sino a un anno o con una pena pecuniaria chiunque […] facilita o aiuta a preparare l’entrata, la partenza o il soggiorno illegali di uno straniero” (articolo 116, 1.a). Le autorità, da una parte, non permettono alle persone transitanti di regolarizzare la loro posizione sul territorio e quindi di accedere alle strutture di accoglienza; dall’altra, puniscono chiunque aiuti il soggiorno di una persona che è in una situazione di irregolarità a causa del mancato accesso alla procedura di asilo.

    Questa legge, ormai arrivata al suo quindicesimo anno d’età, ha fatto sì che realtà come Casa Astra, che già nel 2004 accoglieva sans papier provenienti dall’Ecuador, non possano più supportare persone in situazione di emergenza abitativa senza documenti. Ancora più eclatante è il caso del centro sociale autogestito il Molino a Lugano, unica realtà che fino al 2021 accoglieva apertamente le persone transitanti. Nel maggio di due anni fa è stato raso al suolo su provvedimento della polizia cantonale. Al contrario della solida collaborazione tra le autorità di frontiera dei due Paesi, costruire e mantenere una rete solidale a livello locale e transfrontaliero di supporto alle persone in transito, in questo contesto, sembra quasi impossibile.

    ▻https://altreconomia.it/respingimenti-e-ostacoli-allasilo-ritorno-sulla-frontiera-italia-svizze

    #Italie #Suisse #frontières #push-backs #refoulements #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontière_sud-alpine #réadmissions #réadmissions_passives #foreign_fighters #terrorisme #statistiques #chiffres #2023 #2022 #profilage_racial #drones #criminalisation_de_la_solidarité

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    The Great Robbery: during illegal pushbacks in Greece, refugees are robbed by border guards

    Solomon’s investigation, in collaboration with the Spanish newspaper El País, reveals that Greek security forces have stolen more than €2 million from refugees during pushbacks.

    https://wearesolomon.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/i-megali-listeia-featured-1024x576.jpg

    In January 2022, two Cuban citizens, Lino Antonio Rojas Morell and Yudith Pérez Álvarez, presented themselves to the Greek authorities in the Evros region to request asylum, after entering the country illegally.

    The police officers who the couple approached, didn’t just ignore their request. They forced the couple into a van, and transported them to the police station where they confiscated their backpacks and mobile phones.

    The next day, before the couple was deported to the Turkish side of the border along with dozens of other people of different nationalities, they were again searched by the police.

    “The one who seemed to be the leader put my money, €375, in his pocket,” explains Rojas Morell, adding that “the police were obviously looking for money.”

    “One man wanted to look down my pants. They touched my chest and between my legs,” says Pérez Álvarez, in a claim she recently submitted to the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC).

    A year later, they are still traumatized by the violence they experienced during their alleged deportation to Turkey. Despite it being uncommon for Cubans to enter the EU in this way, their case is far from unprecedented — and highlights a practice that has become more frequent in recent years in the landlocked southeastern tip of the European Union.

    From September 2022 to March 2023, Solomon, in collaboration with El País, conducted interviews with more than a dozen sources, including employees of various institutions connected to the Greek asylum system, active and retired members of the security forces, Frontex officials, lawyers, experts, and residents of the Evros region.

    We also collected the testimonies of eight victims of pushbacks and analyzed each of the 374 claims, as they were recorded by multiple agencies, describing the pushbacks of over 20,000 asylum seekers from Greece to Turkey via Evros during 2017-2022.

    The findings of our investigation indicate a clear modus operandi of the Greek authorities in recent years:

    - asylum seekers are arrested when they enter Greece illegally, without being given the opportunity to apply for asylum (as required by both Greek and international law)

    – sometimes they are arrested in various parts of the mainland, although they may already be registered or have already been granted asylum

    - they are brought to various places (police stations, barracks, abandoned warehouses), where often people in uniform or civilian clothing physically assault them and take their belongings before they are transported to Turkey in inflatable boats

    The data collected allows us to conclude that, during the last six years, members of the Greek security forces have stolen more than €2 million in cash (at least €2.2 – 2.8 million) from asylum seekers.

    This amount is based on conservative estimations, without taking into account the value of mobile phones and other valuables (rings, bracelets) taken from victims. In addition, it is highly likely that these cases are just the tip of the iceberg, as the vast majority of pushbacks go unreported.

    A second key point that our joint investigation revealed, is that a few years ago, the practice of stealing money and personal belongings was not as prevalent, but it has progressively become a systematic tactic.

    “When you confiscate their phones, you eliminate any evidence that they were there. When you confiscate their money, you make their lives more difficult. When you strip them naked, another trend that’s on the rise, you humiliate and demoralize them,” comments Eva Cossé, senior researcher at Human Rights Watch in Greece.

    “It’s part of a strategy to prevent them from trying to cross the border again,” she adds.

    A systematic practice

    “We’re not talking about some isolated incidents, because in recent years they’ve become part of a systematic operational practice,” comments Hope Barker, representative of the Border Violence Monitoring Network (BVMN), which consists of twelve organizations that collect testimonies about illegal pushbacks of asylum seekers at EU borders.

    Barker says that BVMN initially noticed the practice of confiscating the belongings of asylum seekers at the Croatian border around 2017. In that context, however, the clothes, phones, and money that were taken, were thrown into fires to be destroyed.

    “In Greece, around 2019, it was a more random practice. Some were stripped of their possessions, others were not. But in recent years it has become an established tactic. Phones are sometimes kept, sometimes destroyed — but money is definitely kept. And it’s common for them to beat someone even more as punishment if they find out they’ve hidden their money,” Barker says.

    https://pixelfed.zoo-logique.org/storage/m/_v2/578583396227231930/bf0f52ff2-92677b/9hUPD8Q20ktq/BVJgmrlPByzpiRqj0Y8os5FOkh7OnDrd2pRi2rG0.png

    This happened to two young Moroccans, who on November 1, 2022 were deported along with fifty others.

    They were in a detention center, then were transferred to Evros, where they were registered again. The two young men said that “at the detention center the officers had already taken all our belongings, so the [other] officers should have known, at this stage, that we had nothing else on us.”

    When they stated that “we [told them] we had no items left,” the officers then became violent towards them, the BVMN report affirmed.
    Frontex sources confirm the illegal pushbacks

    In a case against the Greek state being heard at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has provided evidence of 311 incidents in which “at least 6,680 people” were pushed back through Evros to Turkey.

    Two sources from Frontex, (the European Border and Coast Guard Agency) that have an increased presence in Greece, confirmed to Solomon and El País that pushbacks are now a normalized reality.

    “We do it, just like [other countries] do it. Except that they’re not as hostile [toward asylum seekers] as we are,” acknowledges one of the two sources.

    An institutional source who spoke on the condition of anonymity stated that “asylum seekers who enter Greece and follow the asylum procedure have said that it’s their second or third attempt. Some make even more attempts, because they were previously pushed back to Turkey.”

    The same source adds that there is now a “great escalation in the use of violence and humiliating practices. It’s the lowest level of respect for human life.”
    2022: confiscating their money in 92% of cases

    We asked the Greek authorities specific questions, asking to be informed regarding any ongoing investigations into the recorded pushbacks, and what procedure is being followed in terms of the money and personal belongings that are confiscated from the asylum seekers.

    In its reply to our queries, the Ministry of Migration & Asylum reaffirmed its commitment to the protection of human rights, but did not offer any specific answers.

    From the analysis of the recorded pushbacks of the last six years, an increasingly disturbing pattern emerges: the culmination of the Greek border guards’ interest in stealing money from asylum seekers.

    While in 2017 stealing money was reported just in 11% of pushback cases, by 2022 that figure skyrocketed to 92%.

    https://pixelfed.zoo-logique.org/storage/m/_v2/578583396227231930/bf0f52ff2-92677b/dYPm78ZziadD/JYbCzsjzSl1HT78879fqW3xzvpXYb54lK8y4W81H.png

    The data from our analysis is confirmed by the interim report of the relevant Recording Mechanism created by Greece’s National Commission for Human Rights (GNCHR ). It is noted that the GNCHR is an official, independent advisory body of the Greek state.

    Based on the incidents recorded by the GNCHR alone (which do not include those recorded by UNHCR), the report estimates the minimum number of people pushed back between 2020-2022 to be 2,157 people.

    During the presentation of the report in January 2023, the GNCHR confirmed to Solomon and El País that in 88% of the cases the victims stated that they had suffered violence, and in 93% of the cases that their possessions and money had been taken.

    According to the report, the victims of the pushbacks come from countries with high rates of asylum (Syria, Afghanistan, Turkey, Iran).
    Minors kidnapped from the mainland

    The GNCHR report confirms a trend that has also been highlighted by journalistic investigations in recent years: the abduction and pushback to Turkey of people who were living in Greece, already registered or who were already granted asylum.

    Solomon and El País recorded the testimony of Amir, an unaccompanied minor from Afghanistan who, in the summer of 2020, lived in a hostel in Thessaloniki.

    On August 25, 2020, as Amir waited at the bus station, a group of plainclothes men surrounded him and forced him into a black van with tinted windows.

    Twenty other refugees and migrants were in the van, which traveled eastward for about 350 kilometers, arriving near the Evros River. There they were detained and, hours later, their belongings were confiscated and they were taken by boat to Turkish soil.

    “I tried to explain to them that I had papers, but they were very aggressive. Every time you tried to talk to them, they would hit you,” explains Amir.

    His name has been changed to protect his identity, but his testimony was confirmed by a social worker at the hostel as well as two of his friends. In photos shown to Solomon, Amir is pictured smiling by their side, in Greece.
    Planned operations

    Hope Barker, from the BVMN, comments that since the crisis on the Greek-Turkish border in March 2020, not only have “hot pushbacks” (i.e. pushbacks of people found at the border) taken place. Operations have extended inland for hundreds of kilometers.

    “People are being arrested in different cities, in many cases even though they have valid documents or are in the process of seeking asylum,” she says. “They are detained in these kinds of secret places, unable to communicate, until enough people are rounded up, 80 or 100, and then transported to Turkish soil. This is a large state operation.”

    The range of operations underscores the indications that it’s an organized plan.

    “If raids are carried out in different parts of Greece, there is definitely a government order. Because this requires the mobilization of resources, the existence of detention facilities and the participation of different police units, not just some police officers from the Evros region,” comments Eva Cossé of Human Rights Watch.

    The GNCHR report records seven instances of pushbacks in which the victims were located inland, compared to 24 cases in which they were located in the Evros region.
    The isolation of border residents

    During Byzantine times, “Akrítes”, or citizens who lived in border areas, guarded the borders of the empire from raids from the east.

    Today, the residents of Evros are often compared to the Akrítes, and historically, politicians have always viewed them in special regard. For example, Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis recently announced that in the upcoming elections he will (also) be a candidate in Evros.

    But today, Evros exudes abandonment. It is not difficult to see that the region’s opportunities are extremely limited.

    A source in the city of Orestiada explains that many young people, who haven’t tried their luck in Thessaloniki or Athens, dream of a job in the border guard or the army: “they earn more than the minimum wage and have a secure job for life.”

    In November 2022, when we visited the village of Nea Vyssa, four kilometers from the Turkish border, the streets were deserted. Activity was minimal, and was limited to the cafe in the village square.

    In the cafe’s courtyard, protected from the cold by a plastic sheet, patrons chatted as they slowly sipped their coffees. They all had gray hair.

    One of them was proud that the village once “was one of the largest villages in Greece” and reminded us that the great mathematician Konstantinos Karatheodoris has roots from Vyssa.

    The village’s population today has dwindled to less than 3,000 residents and many buildings are deteriorating. Another patron explained that during the most recent announcement of job placements, three boys from the village were accepted into the border guard unit.

    In 2020, the president of the European Commission, Ursula Von der Leyen, promised Greece €700 million to protect its borders. Nearby on the Egnatia highway, new Nissan Qashqai police vehicles sped by every few minutes.

    In addition to the military, 1,800 border guards serve in Evros, of which 650 were hired last year (2022) with priority given to locals. In January 2023, the opening of another 400 border guard positions were announced.

    The institutional source who spoke to Solomon and El País asserted that there are also differences between them: while some border guards simply “follow orders” and send the asylum seekers back, others decide to “exploit” the situation.

    “There are police officers who only want to serve along the river,” he comments. “Imagine how much a group can earn if they get €100 or €200 from 100 people. They can make an entire salary in a single shift.”
    Mobile phones for the police officers’ kids

    On April 3, 2022, police officers in balaclavas arrested a 22-year-old Syrian man in a forest near Evros.

    According to the victim’s testimony, (recorded by Josoor, an organization that used to document human rights abuses before it had to disband due to pressure it experienced in Greece and Turkey), the police beat him with clubs and took all his belongings, including his phone, which he was forced to unlock. He was then sent back to Turkey with other asylum seekers.

    “When they put me in the car I realized they had a lot of phones and power banks in there. When one of the men took a cigarette out of his pocket, I saw that he had a wad of bills. I think they were taken from others earlier,” he said.

    https://pixelfed.zoo-logique.org/storage/m/_v2/578583396227231930/bf0f52ff2-92677b/Sr7V2EU8Ulwv/GHOTvz8Lm42XY4n7cR7DAaL7A4r0ZZmJZ0X5QSPe.png

    It remains unknown where all the phones taken from asylum seekers in recent years have ended up. But sources from Orestiada explain that the police officers keep the best devices.

    “The border guards give them to their kids. They show up at school with new phones and proudly say their parents took them from ‘illegal immigrants’,” they comment, expressing concern about young people who join the security forces and end up adopting “the far-right narrative” that considers refugees to be invaders who threaten the security of the country.
    Refugees adapt

    Both before and during their journey, asylum seekers share information via WhatsApp, Telegram, and Facebook — so news spreads quickly.

    The expectation of their [poor] treatment by the Greek border guards means that they carry less and less money on them. While they used to carry larger amounts, a source from the asylum system explains that now “€50, €100, €150 is the norm”.

    A 2021 report on the Balkan corridor by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime states that “unlike 2015-2016, asylum seekers and migrants now appear wary of carrying large amounts of cash for fear of being robbed by thieves or the police. They tend to access money along the way using money transfer services.”

    Differences also exist based on the nationality of the asylum seekers.

    In recent years, Cubans (who fly to Russia, then to Serbia, arrive in Greece with the intention of applying for asylum in another country) are the unluckiest: without knowing what awaited them, they often each carried with them several thousand euros.

    “Groups of North Africans tend to travel alone or in small groups of two or three, and carry less money. Groups that include families, Syrians and Afghans, tend to be led by traffickers and carry more money,” explains Barker.

    “But, certainly, in the last 1-2 years people are more aware of the risks and no one expects to reach Greece on the first try,” she adds.

    “They know they will be pushed back to Turkey more than once.”

    Methodology

    We examined the testimonies of the victims of 374 illegal pushbacks that were collected between 2017-2022 by the following: Border Violence Monitoring Network (188), Human Rights Watch (76), the Greek Council for Refugees (55), Amnesty International (4), other NGOs and local reports (43), as well as by the journalists of this investigation (8).

    Some testimonies were rejected because they overlapped in dates or did not include sufficient evidence. In 2022, far fewer incidents were recorded than in the previous two years, because the NGO Josoor, which had collected the most testimonies, decided to disband, due to the judicial and police pressure they experienced by Greek and Turkish authorities.

    Testimonies were organized into structured data to be classified by date, place, nationalities and number of people pushed back. It was also ascertained whether the victims reported theft (232 incidents) or not (142). Using this data, the estimated number of asylum seekers present during the pushbacks where theft occurred was more than 13,500.

    Although migrants are systematically recorded, sometimes there are some who manage to hide their money, also, not all migrants have cash with them (this is especially true for families traveling together, so only one family member has been counted as a target for theft). Therefore, using the demographic profiles of migrant groups developed by UNHCR and the PRAB initiative (which includes various NGOs and foundations), a 30% deflator was applied to the theft victim base.

    Not all testimonies of theft specified the amount stolen but 62 testimonies did specify amounts (five were rejected for the calculation because the amounts stolen were so large that they could be misleading). With this data, a statistical distribution was created, of the most frequently confiscated amounts. The distribution was applied to the deflated victim base in order to derive an estimate of the money stolen from migrants. The results show that between 2017 and 2022, between €2.2 and €2.8 million were stolen – these estimates are conservative, as many victims do not report being deported or robbed.

    ▻https://wearesolomon.com/mag/format/investigation/the-great-robbery-during-illegal-pushbacks-in-greece-refugees-are-robb
    #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #push-backs #refoulements #vol #argent #Grèce #Evros #téléphones_portables #confiscation #chiffres #statistiques

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    • @cdb_77
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      Greek Border Guards call on Solomon to retract investigation which reveals they stole more than €2 million from refugees

      The Union of Evros Border Guards demands that Solomon removes from its website the investigation that revealed how in recent years members of the Greek security forces have stolen more than €2 million from refugees during pushbacks.

      On March 9, 2023, in collaboration with Spanish newspaper El País, Solomon published the findings of a months-long investigation, which sheds light on the extent of a practice, that in recent years, Greek border guards have allegedly engaged in: confiscating money and personal belongings from refugees during illegal pushbacks.

      To document the research, we conducted interviews with several sources. Among them were employees of the Greek asylum system, active and retired members of the security forces, Frontex officials, lawyers, experts, as well as residents of Evros.

      We collected testimonies from the victims of pushbacks, some of which have been submitted to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and analyzed 374 published testimonies that were recorded by a variety of agencies, which describe the pushbacks of over 20,000 asylum seekers from Greece to Turkey via Evros during the period of 2017-2022.

      The publication of the investigation caused the immediate reaction of MEPs, including the president of the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), who addressed questions to the Commission.

      But these were not the only reactions that followed.

      We received a legal notice from the Union of Evros Border Guards (ESYFNE), which refutes the findings of our investigation, which it characterizes as “slanderous and untrue” and calls on us “to retract the article and publish a correction”.

      The legal notice, signed by a lawyer in Alexandroupoli on May 23, has a delivery date of May 29. However, during that time, our staff was traveling abroad for professional obligations, and we only became aware of the legal notice on June 15.

      In an interesting turn of events, we found that the delivery date coincided with a remarkable news story: on the very same day, five border guards from the Border Unit of Isaaki Didymotihos were accused of being involved in a refugee smuggling ring and were arrested.

      According to the Hellenic Police, the five border guards had in their possession: €26,550, 59 mobile phones, 12 power banks, 2,120 USD, 850 Turkish lire, 23 GBP, 77 Romanian Leu, a number of banknotes from Asian countries, and a bank card.

      In other words, on the same day that the Evros border guards were calling for the withdrawal of our investigation which described how Greek border guards were taking money and mobile phones from refugees during pushbacks, five of their colleagues were arrested, and large sums of foreign currency and 59 mobile phones were found in their possession.

      The legal notice also refers to the “arbitrary use” of a photo (depicting an ESYFNE member) which was used as a central illustration in our article, which they claim was used to “publicly and brutally insult the honor and dignity” of the said border guard “in the most arbitrary and abusive manner”.

      This reference causes a real doubt, as:

      - the photos that were used were obtained online (specifically from the website of the Ministry of Citizen Protection), and are also used in a multitude of other publications,

      - the photographs were processed by Solomon (to such a degree that the features of the border guard are not distinguishable), to create an artistic composition of the illustration which reflects the various elements of the subject,

      – and above all, a simple reading of the article is enough to make it clear that no mention is made of specific persons.

      In any case, as our purpose is to highlight an alarmingly widespread phenomenon that has also been recorded by a multitude of organisations (eg Human Rights Watch), we will replace the photo in question from our central illustration.

      Therefore, we will defend our work and the belief that it serves the public interest.

      We are at ESYFNE’s disposal for an in-depth interview, and even bring to their attention the recently published interim report of the Greek National Commission for Human Rights (GNCHR).

      The report by GNCHR, an official advisory body of the Greek state, estimates the minimum number of people who were forced back between 2020-2022 at 2,157 persons (without taking into account cases recorded by other organisations, e.g. the High Commission).

      In addition, the report states that in 88% of the cases the victims suffered violence, and in 93% their belongings and money were confiscated.

      In recent years, Solomon has consistently covered migration issues, highlighting human rights violations both on the mainland and on the islands. And we will continue to do so.

      ▻https://wearesolomon.com/mag/our-news/greek-border-guards-call-on-solomon-to-retract-investigation-which-rev
      #pression

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    Verloren in Europas letztem Urwald : Fotos von der polnisch-belarussischen Grenze

    „Der Weg übers Mittelmeer ist gefährlich. Doch die Leute haben gar keine Vorstellung davon, wie gefährlich der Urwald sein kann.“

    An der Grenze zwischen Polen und Belarus liegt der Belowescher Wald, einer der letzten Urwälder Europas. Seit einigen Jahren verstecken sich Flüchtende in diesem Wald vor der Grenzpolizei. Auf dem Weg in die EU durchqueren sie Sümpfe und Flüsse. Sie verirren sich und harren mitunter tagelang im Wald aus. Humanitäre Hilfe hat die polnische Regierung verboten. Trotzdem helfen Freiwillige den Flüchtenden. Die Fotojournalistin Hanna Jarzabek hat sie monatelang begleitet.

    VICE: An der polnischen Grenze zur Ukraine gibt es viel Hilfe für Flüchtende. Menschen aus Deutschland brachten Wasser, Kleidung, Essen und fuhren mit Ukrainerinnen und Ukrainern nach Deutschland. Du hast an einer anderen Grenze Polens recherchiert: die zu Belarus. Warum?
    Hanna Jarzabek: Ich wurde in Polen geboren. Von Anfang an fiel mir auf, wie unterschiedlich die Regierung mit den Flüchtenden aus der Ukraine umgeht und jenen, die Belarus durchqueren. Während es an der ukrainischen Grenze humanitäre Hilfe gibt, müssen Hilfsorganisationen an der belarussischen Grenze ihr Tun geheim halten. Polen wendet dort eine scharfe Einwanderungspolitik an.

    https://video-images.vice.com/_uncategorized/1687447518581-jungle003.jpeg

    Was bedeutet „scharfe Einwanderungspolitik“?
    Man muss sich klar machen: Aus der Ukraine kamen 1,5 Millionen Menschen nach Polen. Ich finde es großartig, dass sie Hilfe bekommen. Von Belarus kamen etwa 40.000 Menschen. Sie werden auf die belarussische Seite zurückgetrieben und ihre Handys werden zertrümmert. Die polnische Regierung hat dort eine Mauer gebaut.

    Warum wird den einen geholfen und den anderen nicht?
    Ich denke, das hat etwas mit Ethnien, Kultur und religiösem Hintergrund zu tun. Über die belarussische Grenze fliehen Menschen aus afrikanischen Ländern und dem Mittleren Osten.

    Heißt das: Die polnische Regierung handelt rassistisch?
    Ja, das würde ich schon sagen.

    An der Grenze liegt einer der letzten Urwälder Europas: der Belowesche Wald. Du hast viele Monate dort mit Menschen gesprochen und Fotos gemacht. Wem bist du begegnet?
    Ich erinnere mich an eine Frau aus dem Iran. Sie hat an den Demonstrationen für Frauenrechte teilgenommen. Daraufhin hat die iranische Regierung sie auf eine schwarze Liste gesetzt und sie musste fliehen. Eigentlich stünde ihr politisches Asyl zu.

    Das hat sie nicht bekommen?
    Sie wurde von polnischen Grenzbeamten zurück auf die belarussische Seite getrieben. Sie war mit einer Freundin und ihrem Mann unterwegs. Beim zweiten Versuch, nach Polen zu gelangen, schlugen die Beamten die drei Flüchtenden und sprühten mit Tränengas. Die Frau wachte in einem polnischen Krankenhaus auf, aber ihr Mann und ihre Freundin waren weg.

    Wo waren sie?
    Wieder in Belarus. Es dauerte Monate, bis die Frau eine Botschaft an ihren Mann senden konnte und erfuhr, dass er noch lebt.

    Ist sie dann auch zurück nach Belarus gegangen?
    Nein. Als ich mit ihr sprach, hatte jemand sie in Polen bei sich zu Hause aufgenommen. Das ist verboten. Einige machen es trotzdem. Wir haben den Google Übersetzer genutzt, um einander zu verstehen. Ihre Erzählungen waren schlimm. Doch ich erinnere mich vor allem an ihre Augen: Die waren voller Angst.

    Politische Verfolgung ist ein valider Fluchtgrund. Aber wahrscheinlich nicht der einzige, oder?
    Viele fliehen auch vor Krieg oder Armut. Auch das sind meiner Meinung nach sehr nachvollziehbare Gründe. Der Weg übers Mittelmeer ist gefährlich. Doch ich glaube, die Leute haben gar keine Vorstellung davon, wie gefährlich der Urwald sein kann.

    Wie gelangen Menschen vom afrikanischen Kontinent eigentlich nach Belarus?
    Sie fliegen erst nach Russland und dann weiter nach Belarus. Belarus vergibt Visa. Für die Flüchtenden sind diese Visa einfach zu bekommen – und die belarussische Regierung verdient Geld damit. Dann fahren sie von Minsk zur belarussisch-polnischen Grenze und es heißt: Von hier müsst ihr noch zehn Kilometer durch den Wald laufen. Ihr Ziel ist oft gar nicht Polen, sondern Deutschland. Es geht darum, in die Europäische Union zu gelangen und dort einen Asylantrag zu stellen. Doch die polnischen Grenzbeamte halten sie davon ab.

    Wie?
    Die Grenzbeamten fragen gar nicht, ob jemand Asyl beantragen will. Wenn es jemand von sich aus anspricht, ignorieren sie es. Es gibt weder Zeugen, noch Übersetzer. Die Flüchtenden bekommen nie die Chance, einen Antrag zu stellen.

    Sondern?
    Sie werden zurück nach Belarus gedrängt. Die Grenzbeamten trampeln ihre Telefone kaputt. Dann treiben die Beamten die Flüchtenden zurück in den Wald. Ohne GPS ist man dort verloren. Man könnte sagen: Die Grenzpolizei schickt Leute in den Tod.

    Diese Push Backs kennt man vor allem aus dem Mittelmeer.
    An der europäischen Landgrenze passieren sie genauso: Polen schickt Flüchtende nach Belarus und Belarus schickt sie nach Polen. Viele haben mir erzählt, dass sie mehrfach hin und zurück geschickt wurden. Eine Person sagte, sie habe schon 17 Mal die Grenze überqueren müssen. Das verstößt gegen internationales Recht.

    Du sagtest schon, dass Helferinnen und Helfer sich im Geheimen organisieren müssen. Wie machen sie das?
    Ich kann keine Details verraten. Das würde die Helfenden in Gefahr bringen. Nur so viel: Das Rote Kreuz oder andere Organisationen gibt es nicht. Wenn man einen Krankenwagen ruft, kommt auch die Grenzpolizei. Darum gibt es eine Notrufnummer, mit der die Flüchtenden die freiwilligen Helfer erreichen.

    Du bist von August 2022 bis März 2023 mehrmals dorthin gereist. Wie hat sich die Lage verändert?
    Der Winter war schlimm. Einmal bin ich mit zwei Freiwilligen drei Stunden lang durch den Urwald gelaufen. Wir kamen schließlich bei einem syrischen Flüchtenden an, der stark unterkühlt war. Eine Freiwillige war Ärztin. Wir wechselten seine nassen Sachen. Aber es ging ihm immer schlechter. Nach zwei Stunden entschied die Ärztin, einen Krankenwagen zu rufen.

    Obwohl ihr wusstet, dass die Grenzbeamten dann kommen?
    Wir waren nicht sicher, ob er die Nacht überleben würde.

    Und dann?
    Dann warteten wir vier Stunden lang. Es waren minus elf Grad Celsius. Die Rettungsstelle hatte unsere Koordinaten. Als sie endlich ankamen, war kein medizinisches Personal dabei: nur Grenzbeamten und Feuerwehr.

    Kam der Flüchtende trotzdem ins Krankenhaus?
    Sie haben ihn ins Auto gebracht, aber sind nie in ein Krankenhaus gefahren.

    Woher weißt du das?
    Ich war wirklich besorgt und habe ich mich an das Parlament gewandt, um herauszufinden, wo er ist. So ist meine Identität als Fotojournalistin aufgeflogen. Aber ich hatte keine andere Möglichkeit. Immer wenn ich bei der Grenzpolizei anrief, hieß es: Man könne mir nichts sagen – wegen des Datenschutzes.

    Hat er überlebt?
    Ja, die Beamten haben ihn in eine Ausländerunterkunft gebracht.

    Haben dich die Grenzbeamten auch mal aufgegriffen?
    Ja, als ich die Mauer fotografiert habe. Sie steht seit Sommer vergangenen Jahres: 186 Kilometer Stahl und Stacheldraht. Ich kann es gar nicht fassen, dass sich etwa 30 Jahre nach dem Mauerfall wieder eine Mauer durch Europa zieht.

    Hält die Mauer eigentlich Flüchtende auf?
    Nun, sie ist fünfeinhalb Meter hoch und hat eine Krone aus Stacheldraht. Aber die Leute klettern trotzdem drüber. Auf der polnischen Seite fallen sie runter, brechen sich Beine und Füße. Polen hat sich damit mehr Kosten geschaffen. Denn die Menschen müssen ins Krankenhaus.

    Hast du auch Geschichten mit gutem Ende erlebt?
    Ich habe von Menschen gehört, die an sicheren Orten sind. Von Menschen, die es nach Deutschland geschafft haben. Von Menschen, die ihre Verwandten in der EU wiedergefunden haben.

    ▻https://www.vice.com/de/article/xgwwe3/verloren-in-europas-letztem-urwald-fotos-von-der-polnisch-belarussischen-grenz
    #forêt #Pologne #Biélorussie #migrations #réfugiés #asile #frontières #push-backs #refoulements #mourir_aux_frontières #morts_aux_frontières #photographie #murs #barrières_frontalières #GPS #téléphones_portables #smartphone #Bohoniki #cimetière

    voir aussi ce fil de discussion :
    ►https://seenthis.net/messages/948199

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    @_kg_ @kaparia

    Who profits from brutal and muderous Pushbacks?

    The podcast is in English

    Anlässlich des World Refugee Days am 20. Juni hört ihr einen Podcast von unserem Kooperationsradio Radio Mytilini auf Lesvos. Es geht um die brutalen und mörderischen Pushbacks an den Außengrenzen der EU und wer davon finanziell profitiert. Die Menschen die solche Pushbacks durchführen werden dafür bezahlt, wo das Geld herkommt erfahrt ihr in dieser Sendung.

    ▻https://de.cba.fro.at/624115
    #asile #migrations #réfugiés #push-backs #refoulements #frontières #profit #Grèce #responsabilité #mer_Egée #Evros #frontières_terrestres #frontières_maritimes #violence #complexe_militaro-industriel #integrated_border_management_fund #technologie #Thales #Frontex #european_peace_facility #visa #industrie_militaire #consultants #McKinzie #accord_UE-Turquie

    #podcast #audio

    ping @_kg_ @kaparia

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    1
    @stephane_m
    1

    UK provided £3m to Turkish border forces to stop migrants, FOI reveals

    Investigation shows Home Office funds ‘return and reintegration assistance’ and provides equipment and training to Turkish police

    The Home Office has provided more than £3m in funding to Turkish border forces in the last year to prevent migrants reaching the UK, an investigation for the Guardian has found.

    Funding to Turkey’s border force operations has increased substantially from 2019, when £14,000 was given to Turkish police and coastguard for maritime border security training, according to documents obtained through freedom of information (FOI) requests. That figure rose to £425,000 in 2021-22 for training and equipment and up to £3m this year for “return and reintegration assistance”, training and personnel.

    The funding was diverted from the official development assistance (ODA) budget and delivered through Home Office International Operations, part of the department’s Intelligence Directorate.

    In addition to funding, the Home Office has also supplied Turkish border forces, including the National Police and the coastguard, with equipment and training. In June 2022, nine vehicles were handed over by the UK’s deputy high commissioner to the Turkish National Police on the border with Iran.

    Last year Turkey said it “turned back” 238,448 migrants at its eastern border with Iran. Video evidence seen by the Guardian shows cases of extreme violence and force used against Afghan migrants attempting to cross the border into Turkey. This includes the authorities firing live bullet rounds as people flee, including at the feet of children; beatings using rifle butts; robberies; humiliation tactics and pushing people back to the other side of the border.

    Mahmut Kaçan, a Turkish lawyer working on asylum and human rights abuses, said the deaths and pushbacks on the border began escalating two years ago. “The UNHCR never criticises or mentions what Turkey is doing at the border. They are complicit in the deaths of these people, as are the EU and other countries that are giving money to Turkey for border security.”

    A source with knowledge of the Home Office International Operations team said Turkey had become “a country of emerging importance [to the UK government] in the last two to three years and is now seen as strategically crucial to border securitisation”.

    “We offer our expertise and provide officials [locally] with evidence, showing the routes we think illegal migrants or gangs are operating along,” the source said. “It’ll probably be along the lines of: ‘This is a route smugglers and illegal migrants use to get to the UK, we need to do more to stop it.’ The Turkish government will then respond by saying: ‘This is what we need to be able to do that’, and then we fund it, basically.”

    The source added: “We don’t tend to hold local forces to account with any targets but certainly if we say: ‘We need to bolster X area of border security’, Turkey might respond by saying they need Y in order to boost border officer numbers and we’ll help them to do that.”

    Another source familiar with the work of the Home Office International Operations unit said: “Us paying for stuff like that builds our soft power credentials in other areas, such as possible returns agreements. It’s like a mini FCDO [Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office] inside the Home Office.”

    Sources added that Home Office operations overseas involved intelligence gathering through interviews with migrants who had arrived in the UK. Information from those interviews is then passed on to border forces locally to “put an operational plan in place to stop it”.

    Documents obtained through an FOI request also show that the Home Office has increased the number of its staff deployed to work at post, with sources from the FCDO saying Home Office staff now outnumbers diplomats working in Turkey.

    “The Home Office is seen by international partners as quite hostile, quite adversarial,” said a senior government source with knowledge of the department’s operations in Turkey. “The FCDO, on the other hand, is viewed as relatively collegiate and collaborative. In this context, there are obvious tensions in the approach and the culture among staff.”

    The department’s 2025 Border Strategy states that one of its key priorities is to “improve our use of upstream illegal migration countermeasures to prevent irregular entry into the UK”.

    It also stipulates the department will “prevent entry into the UK through improved border security and through work with source and transit countries to support them in addressing irregular migration challenges within their region”.

    Mary Atkinson, campaigns and networks manager at JCWI, said: “This government has shown that it will break international law to prevent people from exercising the fundamental human right to seek safety.

    “Whether on the border between Turkey and Iran, or those of France or Belgium, this government is covertly funding others to do its dirty work, while at the same time ramping up its xenophobic rhetoric against the few that do finally make it here.”

    In response to the findings of the investigation, a spokesperson for the Home Office said: “Like many other European states, the UK works tirelessly at home and abroad on a range of priorities, including tackling illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and modern slavery. This includes mutually beneficial close working with our operational counterparts in a range of partner countries, like Turkey, to tackle these and wider socially damaging issues.”

    ▻https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2023/jun/07/uk-provided-3m-to-turkish-border-forces-to-stop-migrants-foi-reveals

    #externalisation #contrôles_frontaliers #UK #Angleterre #Turquie #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #renvois #réintégration #financement #aide_financière #militarisation_des_frontières #aide_au_développement #développement #coopération_au_développement #refoulements #push-backs #complexe_militaro-industriel #2025 _Border_Strategy #Home_Office

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    Frontex mette a bando un servizio di traghetti per riportare i migranti in Turchia

    A metà maggio l’Agenzia europea ha indetto una gara da due milioni di euro per un servizio di “trasferimento” via mare dalla Grecia di minimo 100 persone alla volta in forza del patto tra Ue e Turchia del 2016. Una fase inedita che segna l’avvio di respingimenti alla luce del sole e ignora le gravi e documentate violazioni dei diritti

    A metà maggio di quest’anno l’Agenzia europea Frontex ha pubblicato un bando dal valore di due milioni di euro per organizzare il trasferimento di “passeggeri via mare”, almeno 100 per volta, dall’isola greca di Lesbo alla località di Dikili, sulle coste turche. La documentazione di gara consultata da Altreconomia segna l’inizio di una nuova fase alla luce del sole per la “strategia” di respingimento dei migranti verso la Turchia, a pochi giorni dalla rielezione del presidente turco Recep Tayyip Erdoğan e dagli inquietanti video pubblicati dal New York Times sulle brutali modalità di respingimento della Guardia costiera greca.

    È in questo contesto dunque che Frontex è pronta a prendere direttamente in mano la questione, assumendo un ruolo centrale nell’ambito del cosiddetto accordo Ue-Turchia del marzo 2016 sotto il quale “formalmente” dovrebbe rientrare questa nuova attività. “L’Agenzia avrà il monopolio della gestione di queste operazioni assumendo un ruolo che, in questi termini, non ha mai avuto in passato”, spiega Martina Tazzioli, ricercatrice al Goldsmiths College di Londra.

    Le operazioni sono parte del meccanismo “1:1” previsto dall’intesa da sei miliardi di euro annunciata tra le istituzioni comunitarie (Consiglio europeo) e il governo di Ankara nel marzo 2016. Con l’obiettivo dichiarato di scoraggiare le persone ad affidarsi ai trafficanti, lo schema prevedeva che per ogni migrante giunto “irregolarmente” in Grecia e perciò respinto in Turchia, un altro sarebbe dovuto essere ricollocato tramite vie legali in un Paese europeo.

    In realtà non è mai stato implementato in modo significativo: dal 2016 al 2022 sarebbero stati respinti “ufficialmente” indietro, dati dell’International rescue committee, 2.140 rifugiati mentre i reinsediati dal territorio turco verso l’Ue ammonterebbero a 36.763, tutti siriani (fonte è il ministero dell’Intero turco). La “sostanza” di quell’accordo era però quella di bloccare le partenze e, soprattutto, puntare tutto sui respingimenti informali: secondo la Ong Agean boat report, dal 2017 al giugno 2023 più di 284mila persone sarebbero state fermate dalla guardia costiera turca e 60mila respinte da quella greca.

    E la citata inchiesta del New York Times di fine maggio ha ricostruito, con tanto di video in alta definizione, le procedure di respingimento messe in atto dalle autorità di Atene che, dopo aver prelevato a forza i naufraghi arrivati sul territorio, li riportano in mare su assetti della Guardia costiera per poi abbandonarli al largo delle coste turche su “barche di fortuna” per l’ultimo tratto. Una procedura definita “assolutamente inaccettabile” da parte della commissaria europea agli Affari interni Ylva Johansson che però in tutta risposta, attraverso Frontex, investe sui nuovi respingimenti alla luce del sole rispolverando lo zoppicante meccanismo del patto Ue-Turchia.

    “Questi ricollocamenti sono stati sospesi nel marzo 2020 prima con la giustificazione della diffusione del Covid-19 poi perché il presidente Erdoğan ha smesso di accettare i ‘respinti’ di fronte al rifiuto delle istituzioni europee di fornire ulteriori finanziamenti -ricorda Tazzioli-. Evidentemente Frontex ha annunciato che presto queste operazioni riprenderanno”.

    L’appalto da due milioni di euro prevede la fornitura di traghetti che devono garantire “la capacità di imbarcare un minimo di cento passeggeri in aree chiuse [a cui si aggiungono] i ponti aperti e sedili al di fuori delle aree chiuse”. Deve essere prevista la possibilità di “limitare l’accesso al ponte esterno della nave” e i sedili dei “passeggeri” devono essere “singoli, fissi (senza panche) e disposti in file”. I bagni, inoltre, devono essere accessibili direttamente dall’area dei passeggeri senza la necessità di attraversare l’area “aperta”. Almeno uno dei traghetti messi a disposizione deve essere “interamente riservato al personale di Frontex”. Sulla nave deve essere poi garantito un servizio catering per tutti i “passeggeri di Frontex”: nello specifico “due panini confezionati senza carne di maiale: vegetariani o halal”, come se fossero “scontate” le nazionalità dei passeggeri, e soft drinks. Inoltre si sottolinea che è necessaria la presenza di un medico che deve disporre di un “kit di rianimazione di base comprendente farmaci di uso comune”. L’Agenzia sottolinea però che “il servizio medico può non essere richiesto in tutti i trasferimenti”. La stessa tipologia di traghetto utilizzata per i trasferimenti deve essere infine messa a disposizione di Frontex nel porto di Mitilene, a Lesbo, per “permettere all’Agenzia di svolgere esercitazioni per gli ufficiali di scorta al fine di prepararli alle operazioni di ritorno in uno scenario di ‘vita reale’”. Queste esercitazioni dureranno fino a due giorni.

    L’Agenzia stima due servizi di trasporto andata e ritorno al mese e un’esercitazione. Ma queste indicazioni “non sono vincolanti” e possono variare durante i due anni di contratto, rinnovabili per un periodo di 12 mesi e per un massimo di due volte. Appena cinque righe vengono dedicate nel bando al “contesto in cui si rende necessario il servizio” e che quindi giustifica la possibilità di svolgere questi “trasferimenti”. Viene specificato come detto che si tratta di operazioni che avvengono sotto il cappello del mai stipulato accordo Ue-Turchia e che “più informazioni sulla dichiarazione congiunta Ue-Turchia e sul piano per porre fine all’immigrazione irregolare sono disponibili nel comunicato stampa siglato il 18 marzo 2016”.

    Viene citato un “comunicato stampa” perché giuridicamente non è stato firmato nulla di vincolante: come ricordato da Chiara Favilli, professoressa di Diritto dell’Unione europea all’Università di Firenze, è il “paradosso di un accordo che viene definito dichiarazione e sul piano materiale svanisce impedendo che sia contestato sul piano giuridico”. Quello che non c’è nella nota stampa, invece, sono i Paesi di provenienza che nel frattempo sono stati aggiunti tra coloro che vengono ricollocati in forza di quell’accordo: Afghanistan, Siria, Somalia, Bangladesh e Pakistan. “Le persone di queste nazionalità che arrivano in Grecia vivono di fatto in un limbo: la loro richiesta d’asilo viene dichiarata inammissibile ma dal marzo 2020 non venivano neanche riportati sulle coste turche. Una sorta di elefante nella stanza per le autorità greche che non sapevano cosa fare con queste persone”. Ora l’indirizzo dato sembra essere chiaro.

    Il modus operandi è sintetizzato al settimo punto del capitolato. Sono infatti previste condizioni molto rigide per il contraente che deve seguire “prontamente e diligentemente le istruzioni di Frontex e delle autorità greche”, “applicare discrezione e riservatezza in relazione all’attività” con l’impossibilità di “documentare o condividere informazioni sull’attività con mezzi quali foto, video, commenti o condivisioni sui social media” e non può consentire “la presenza a bordo di passeggeri che non siano partecipanti alle attività non espressamente autorizzati da Frontex”.

    Il neo direttore esecutivo Hans Leijtens, che si è insediato all’inizio di aprile di quest’anno, sembra così seguire la via tracciata dal suo predecessore, Fabrice Leggeri. A nulla vale il fatto che il 9 marzo di quest’anno l’Agenzia per la prima volta sia stata costretta a comparire dinanzi alla Corte di giustizia dell’Unione europea: il caso promosso dall’avvocata tedesca Lisa-Marie Komp riguarda il rimpatrio nel 2016 di una famiglia siriana con quattro bambini piccoli che, pochi giorni dopo aver presentato richiesta d’asilo in Grecia è stata caricata su un aereo e riportata in Turchia su un volo gestito proprio da Frontex sempre nell’ambito dell’accordo Ue-Turchia.

    La stessa “dinamica” che si vorrebbe replicare per mezzo dei traghetti: l’Agenzia, in altri termini, non si fa problemi nel non attendere l’esito di un procedimento che ha come oggetto proprio la stessa attività che verrebbe riproposta con i ferry. Altreconomia ha domandato a Frontex, a seguito dell’inchiesta del New York Times, quali azioni intenda intraprendere in merito alle pratiche della polizia di frontiera greca chiedendo espressamente se sia in discussione l’attivazione dell’articolo 46 del regolamento dell’Agenzia che prevede il ritiro degli agenti da un Paese qualora non vengano rispettati i diritti umani durante le operazioni di “controllo” dei confini. Nessuna risposta anche se il nuovo bando per traghettare centinaia di persone verso la Turchia parla da sé.

    Le offerte per aggiudicarsi la commessa devono giungere a Frontex entro il 29 giugno, il 30 verranno aperte le buste per aggiudicare la gara e assegnare il servizio. I contraenti così come l’affidatario (cioè l’Agenzia) devono garantire che “si comporteranno in conformità con l’ordine pubblico, nel pieno rispetto dei diritti fondamentali sanciti dalla Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione europea”. Una clausola che sa di farsa.

    ▻https://altreconomia.it/frontex-mette-a-bando-un-servizio-di-traghetti-per-riportare-i-migranti

    #Grèce #Turquie #refoulements #push-backs #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Frontex #Dikili #Lesbos #accord_UE-Turquie #ferry #limbe

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    France sending unaccompanied minors back to Italy, MSF

    France is pushing back even unaccompanied minor migrants at the Italian border at Ventimiglia, the head of the Doctors Without Borders (MSF) mobile clinic assisting migrants in transit between the two countries told ANSA in an interview. This kind of pushback is a violation of regulations in place, Sergio Di Dato noted.

    In recent days, even unaccompanied minors are among the foreigners pushed back to the Italian border town of Ventimiglia by French gendarme, ANSA was told in an interview last week with Sergio Di Dato, the head of the Doctors Without Borders (MSF) mobile clinic assisting migrants in transit between Italy and France.

    French authorities, Di Dato said, “are no longer able to absorb unaccompanied minors into their reception system and so have started to send them back to Italy, something they should not do according to the regulations in place. ... They are obliged to take care of them.”
    Pushbacks may rise after 150 more police sent to borders

    “On average,” MSF’s Di Dato , “there are 20-25 pushbacks of people from France to Italy every day. There is concern that this number may rise after 150 additional border police were sent to the borders.”

    The activities of the mobile clinic were started in the second half of February and, Di Dato said, “unlike in the past, when in the winter months there was a slowdown in pushbacks at the Menton border by the French police, this year a steady stream has been seen.”

    Di Dato underscored that there had been a “reduction at the same time as protests against pension reform, which probably led to a drop in the number of police deployed for border control.However, afterwards the number returned to about 20-25 [pushbacks] per day.”

    The MSF mobile clinic provides assistance to those pushed back from Menton with a “refusal of entry” document and transferred to containers while waiting to be handed over to the Italian police.

    The vulnerable face risks and deprivation

    “Some have told us that they were left without water for several hours. It also happened that young girls are left in containers alone with several men. These are situations that can be difficult,” Di Dato said, adding that the situation is complicated “also in Ventimiglia, where some of the migrants pushed back — women, children and the vulnerable — are taken care of by associations focusing on these things, while others end up under the Roia Bridge in camps without washing facilities and amid rats.”

    The crackdown by French authorities has now raised concern among humanitarian aid workers in the Italian-French border area.

    “If the unaccompanied minors are sent back systematically and in an arbitrary manner, there is the issue of how to protect these individuals - who are the weakest - in an effective manner, especially since [migrant] facilities in Italy are full,” Di Dato said.

    ▻https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/48774/france-sending-unaccompanied-minors-back-to-italy-msf
    #refoulements #push-backs #mineurs #MNA #France #Italie #frontières #frontière_sud-alpine #migrations #réfugiés #France #asile #Italie #Vintimille #Alpes_Maritimes #refus_d'entrée

    –—

    Sur l’annonce du renforcement des contrôles frontaliers dans les Alpes Maritimes :

    Immigration : 150 policiers et gendarmes supplémentaires dès la semaine prochaine à la frontière de #Menton

    ►https://seenthis.net/messages/1002209#message1002211

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      Migrants : des associations dénoncent les « traitements inadmissibles » des mineurs dans les Alpes-Maritimes

      https://www.francebleu.fr/s3/cruiser-production/2023/08/3a5e5699-0b3a-4c6d-a62d-4ea091d31bcf/1200x680_sc_maxmatinnews549725.jpg

      Une dizaine d’associations co-signent un communiqué ce samedi pour dénoncer « les refoulements, enfermement, et l’absence de prise en charge » des mineurs non-accompagnés à Menton et Nice. Selon elles, la situation se dégrade dans les Alpes-Maritimes.

      Alors que le président du Département des Alpes-Maritimes écrit au gouvernement pour demander des mesures « face à une situation migratoire explosive » à la frontière franco-italienne, les associations dénoncent une dégradation de la situation. Plus de quinze associations co-signent un communiqué ce samedi, pour pointer du doigt les « enfermements, refoulements illégaux et absences de prises en charge » des mineurs non-accompagnés, en particulier à Nice et Menton.

      Selon les signataires, dont Roya citoyenne, et le Secours catholique, de « nombreux·ses jeunes subissent des traitements inadmissibles ». Ces associations demandent « la prise en charge effective de tous les Mineur·es Non Accompagné·es, l’arrêt immédiat des refoulements en Italie sans évaluation préalable et réglementaire par l’ASE, et l’arrêt des enfermements abusifs au poste frontière (...) le respect intégral de la convention internationale des droits de l’enfant dans le département des Alpes-Maritimes ».
      À Menton, « 68 mineurs enfermés » dans les locaux de la PAF

      Selon le communique de presse interassociatif, à Menton "de nombreux·ses jeunes se déclarant mineur·es sont refoulé·es en Italie de façon totalement illégale alors qu’ils et elles doivent être admis·es systématiquement et sans délai sur le territoire français. C’est à l’Aide Sociale à l’Enfance (ASE), service du Département 06, de procéder ensuite à leur évaluation de minorité, et non aux forces de l’ordre. Or ces jeunes sont refoulé·es par la police sans évaluation préalable par l’ASE. De nombreux témoignages font état de fausses dates de naissance enregistrées par les policiers pour justifier ces refoulements. De plus, des mineur·es sont refoulé·es avec une obligation de quitter le territoire français et une interdiction de retour sur le territoire français sans être informé·es de leurs droits, ce qui rend toute contestation très difficile et constitue une atteinte grave à leurs droits.

      « Comme en avril dernier, des mineur·es sont enfermé·es dans les locaux de la police aux frontières (PAF) dans l’attente que le Département 06 vienne les chercher, poursuit le communiqué. 68 mineur·es étaient enfermé·s ce lundi 21 août, dans des locaux totalement inadaptés et dans des conditions sanitaires déplorables : en pleine canicule, entassé·es, dormant à même le sol avec uniquement un lavabo et un WC. Ils et elles étaient jusqu’à 78 le 23 août ! Plusieur·es mineur·es ont été privé·es de liberté durant 3 à 5 jours ce qui constitue une violation manifeste de la convention internationale des droits de l’enfant, dont la France est signataire. »

      « Actuellement de nombreux·ses jeunes seraient encore détenu·es en toute illégalité dans les locaux de la PAF, sans avoir accès ni à un·e avocat·e, ni à un·e traducteur·ice. D’autres sont évacué·es et livré·es à eux·elles-mêmes, sans aucune prise en charge », conclut le communiqué.
      À Nice, les associations pointent du doigt le « traitement des mineurs non accompagnés par les forces de l’ordre »

      À Nice, les associations parlent de mineurs "contraint·es de se rendre au Commissariat Auvare pour demander la protection de l’ASE. Les temps d’attente pour certain·es jeunes au service du « Quart » d’Auvare se sont prolongés jusqu’à 25h sans manger, avant qu’un·e éducateur·ice ne vienne les chercher. Désormais, le commissariat ne laisse même plus entrer les mineur·es : sous prétexte d’être saturé et de ne pouvoir ouvrir de nouveaux locaux, les jeunes sont priés d’attendre dans le jardin public voisin, et de revenir le soir ou le lendemain. Le 23 août, une dizaine d’entre eux·elles attendaient leur prise en charge, certain·es dormant dehors depuis plusieurs jours. Beaucoup partent sans pouvoir faire valoir leur droit à la protection de l’enfance."

      "À Nice, c’est désormais la police qui empêche les mineurs non accompagnés d’être placé·es : en ne les laissant pas entrer, les signalements de « mineur·es en danger » ne sont pas envoyés au procureur et à l’ASE qui ne sont même pas informés de leurs situations. Le traitement des MNA par les forces de l’ordre dans les Alpes-Maritimes est inadmissible. La police manque à ses obligations légales envers ces personnes vulnérables, tout comme le Département 06 qui ne vient pas les chercher dans les locaux de la police dans des délais suffisamment rapides pour une mise à l’abri. Les délaissements de mineur·es et la non-assistance à personne en danger sont manifestes."

      ▻https://www.francebleu.fr/infos/societe/immigration-des-associations-denoncent-des-traitement-inadmissibles-de-mi

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    La frontera infinita

    https://img2.rtve.es/v/6884457/vertical/?h=400#.jpg

    La mayoría de inmigrantes que quieren viajar a otros países de Europa utilizan el paso fronterizo de #Irún con Francia para hacerlo. Es un tránsito que no es fácil, porque la policía francesa los intercepta y los devuelve a España. Diferentes asociaciones lo califican de controles racistas, porque solo interceptan a las personas que provienen del continente africano.
    En el programa Repor hemos acompañado a diferentes emigrantes en su paso hacia la frontera francesa y hemos sido testigo de diferentes devoluciones por parte de las autoridades francesas.

    ▻https://www.rtve.es/play/videos/repor/frontera-infinita/6884457
    #frontières #Espagne #France #migrations #réfugiés #asile #refoulements #push-backs #racisme #contrôles_au_faciès #reportage #vidéo

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    “Like We Were Just Animals”. Pushbacks of People Seeking Protection from Croatia to Bosnia and Herzegovina

    https://i.imgur.com/nmeUwDk.png

    Laila R. fled Afghanistan with her parents and her two brothers in 2016, when she was 11 or 12 years old. They sought international protection in Iran, then Turkey, and then Greece. Increasingly desperate for stability, they travelled through North Macedonia and arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina in early 2021. When Laila first spoke to Human Rights Watch in November 2021, she and her family had tried to enter Croatia dozens of times. Croatian police apprehended her and her family each time, ignored their repeated requests for asylum, drove them to the border, and forced them to return to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    When Croatian police carry out such pushbacks—broadly meaning official operations intended to physically prevent people from reaching, entering, or remaining in a territory and which either lack any screening for protection needs or employ summary screening—they do not contact authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina to arrange for people’s formal return. Instead, Croatian police simply order people to wade across one of the rivers that mark the international border.

    Laila and many others interviewed by Human Rights Watch said Croatian authorities frequently pushed them back to Bosnia and Herzegovina in the middle of the night. She and others told Human Rights Watch Croatian police sometimes pushed them back near Velika Kladuša or other towns in Bosnia and Herzegovina. But on many occasions, the Croatian police took them somewhere far from populated areas.

    Describing the first pushback she experienced, Laila said, “We had no idea where we were. It was the middle of the night, and the police ordered us to go straight ahead until we crossed the river to Bosnia. We spent that night in the forest.”

    Croatian police had destroyed the family’s phones, so they had no easy way of navigating to safety. The next morning, she and her family eventually came across a road. They walked some 30 kilometers to reach Velika Kladuša.

    As with Laila and her family, many of the people who spoke to Human Rights Watch told us they had first sought asylum in Greece as well as in countries outside the European Union before they attempted to enter Croatia. Laila and her family spent one month in Iran, six months in Turkey, and more than three years in Greece, leaving each country after concluding that authorities in each did not intend to respond to their requests for international protection. They did not seek international protection in Bosnia and Herzegovina because they had heard that the country’s authorities rarely granted asylum.

    Croatia became an increasingly important point of entry to the European Union in 2016, after Hungary effectively closed its borders to people seeking asylum. Croatian police have responded to the increase in the number of people entering Croatia irregularly—without visas and at points other than official border crossings—by pushing them back without considering international protection needs or other individual circumstances. In April 2023, for instance, Farooz D. and Hadi A., both 15 years old, told Human Rights Watch Croatian police had apprehended them the night before, driven them to the border, and ordered them to walk into Bosnia and Herzegovina, disregarding their request for protection and their statements that they were under the age of 18.

    Pushbacks from Croatia to the non-European Union countries it borders are now common. Between January 2020 and December 2022, the Danish Refugee Council recorded nearly 30,000 pushbacks from Croatia to Bosnia and Herzegovina, almost certainly an underestimate. Approximately 13 percent of pushbacks recorded in 2022 were of children, alone or with families. Human rights groups have also recorded pushbacks from Croatia to Serbia and to Montenegro.

    Croatian pushbacks have often included violent police responses, including physical harm and deliberate humiliation. Video images captured by Lighthouse Reports, an investigative journalism group, for a 2021 investigation it conducted in collaboration with Der Spiegel, the Guardian, Libération, and other news outlets showed a group of men in balaclavas forcing a group of people into Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although the men did not wear name tags or police badges, the investigation identified them as Croatian police based on characteristic clothing items, the gear they carried, and the corroboration of other police officers. Der Spiegel recounted, “One of the masked men repeatedly lashes out with his baton, letting it fly at the people’s legs so that they stumble into the border river, where the water is chest-high. Finally, he raises his arm threateningly and shouts, ‘Go! Go to Bosnia!’”[1]

    In most of the accounts Human Rights Watch heard, Croatian police wore uniforms, drove marked police vans, and identified themselves as police, leaving no doubt that they were operating in an official capacity.

    Men and teenage boys have told Human Rights Watch and other groups that Croatian police made them walk back to Bosnia and Herzegovina barefoot and shirtless. In some cases, Croatian police forced them to strip down to their underwear or, in a few cases, to remove their clothing completely. In one particularly egregious case documented by the Danish Refugee Council, a group of men arrived at a refugee camp in Bosnia and Herzegovina with orange crosses spray-painted on their heads by Croatian police, an instance of humiliating and degrading treatment the Croatian ombudswoman concluded was an act of religious hatred.

    Younger children have seen their fathers, older brothers, and other relatives punched, struck with batons, kicked, and shoved. Croatian border police have also discharged firearms close to children or pointed firearms at children. In some cases, Croatian police have also shoved or struck children as young as six.

    Croatian police commonly take or destroy mobile phones. Human Rights Watch also heard frequent reports that Croatian police had burned, scattered, or otherwise disposed of people’s backpacks and their contents. In some cases, people reported that police had taken money from them. “The last time we went to Croatia, the police took everyone’s money and all our telephones. Why are they like this?” asked Amira H., a 29-year-old Kurdish woman from Iraq travelling with her husband and 9-year-old son.[2]

    Pushbacks inflict abuse on everyone. In particular, many people said pushbacks took a toll on their mental well-being. Hakim F., a 35-year-old Algerian man who said Croatian police had pushed him back four times between December 2022 and January 2023, commented, “These pushbacks are so stressful, so very, very stressful.”[3] Stephanie M., a 35-year-old Cameroonian woman, told Human Rights Watch in May 2022, “These pushbacks have been so traumatizing. I find I cannot sleep. I am always thinking of the things that have happened, replaying them in my head. There are days I cry, when I ask myself why I am even living. I find myself thinking, ‘Let everything just end. Let the world just end.’”[4]

    For children and their families, who frequently cannot travel as fast on foot as single adults can, pushbacks may add considerably to the time spent in difficult, often squalid, and potentially unsafe conditions before they are able to make a claim for asylum in an EU country. They increase the time children spend without access to formal schooling. For unaccompanied children in particular, pushbacks can increase the risk that they will be subject to trafficking. Family separation may also result from pushbacks: the nongovernmental organization Are You Syrious has reported cases of women allowed to seek asylum in Croatia with their children while their husbands are pushed back to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    Croatian police continued to carry out pushbacks throughout 2022, although in the second half of the year police increasingly employed an alternative tactic of issuing summary expulsion orders directing people to leave the European Economic Area within seven days. These summary expulsion orders did not consider protection needs and did not afford due process protections. By late March 2023, Croatian police appeared to have abandoned this practice and resumed their reliance on pushbacks.

    Croatian authorities regularly deny the overwhelming evidence that Croatian police have regularly carried out pushbacks, sometimes inflicting serious injuries, frequently destroying or seizing phones, and nearly always subjecting people to humiliating treatment in the process. The Croatian government did not respond to Human Rights Watch’s request for comment on this report.

    On the initiative of and with funding from the European Union, Croatia has established a border monitoring mechanism, with the ostensible purpose of preventing and addressing pushbacks and other abuses at the border. The mechanism’s parameters and track record have so far not been promising. Its members cannot make unannounced visits and cannot go to unofficial border crossing points. It is not clear how the members are appointed and how the mechanism’s priorities are defined. It has had its reports revised to remove criticism of Croatian police and the Croatian Ministry of the Interior.

    Croatia’s consistent and persistent use of pushbacks violates several international legal norms, including the prohibitions of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, collective expulsion, and refoulement—the sending of people to places where they would face ill-treatment or other irreparable harm or would be at risk of return to harm. Pushbacks of children violate the international norm that states take children’s best interests into account, including by taking particular care to ensure that returns of children are in their best interests. Excessive force, other ill-treatment, family separation, and other rights violations may also accompany pushback operations.

    Slovenia and other European Union member states are also implicated in the human rights violations committed by Croatian authorities against people transferred to Croatia under “readmission agreements”—arrangements under which states return people to the neighbouring countries through which they have transited, with few, if any, procedural safeguards. For instance, under Slovenia’s readmission agreement with Croatia, Slovenian police summarily transferred irregular migrants to Croatia if they have entered Slovenia from Croatia, regardless of whether they requested asylum in Slovenia. In turn, Croatian authorities generally immediately pushed them on to Bosnia and Herzegovina or to Serbia.

    EU institutions have effectively disregarded the human rights violations committed by Croatian border authorities. The European Union has contributed substantial funds to Croatian border management without securing meaningful guarantees that Croatia’s border management practices will adhere to international human rights norms and comply with EU law.

    Moreover, the European Union’s decision in December 2022 to permit Croatia to join the Schengen area, the 27-country zone where internal border controls have generally been removed, sends a strong signal that it tolerates pushbacks and other abusive practices.

    Croatia should immediately end pushbacks to Bosnia and Herzegovina and to Serbia and instead afford everybody who expresses an intention to seek international protection the opportunity to do so. Croatia should also reform its border monitoring mechanism to ensure that it is a robust and independent safeguard against pushbacks and other official abuse.

    Until such time as Croatia definitively ends pushbacks and other collective expulsions, ensures that people in need of international protection are given access to asylum, and protects the rights of children, Slovenia should not seek to carry out returns under its readmission agreement with Croatia. Austria, Italy, and Switzerland, in turn, should not send people to Slovenia under their readmission agreements as long as Slovenia continues to apply its readmission agreement with Croatia.

    Through enforcement of EU law and as a condition of funding, the European Commission should require Croatian authorities to end pushbacks and other human rights violations at the border and provide concrete, verifiable information on steps taken to investigate reports of pushbacks and other human rights violations against migrants and asylum seekers.

    The European Union and its member states should also fundamentally reorient their migration policy to create pathways for safe, orderly, and regular migration.

    ▻https://www.hrw.org/report/2023/05/03/we-were-just-animals/pushbacks-people-seeking-protection-croatia-bosnia-and
    #renvois #expulsions #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Balkans #route_des_Balkans #frontières #push-backs #refoulements #expulsions_de_masse #Croatie #Bosnie #Bosnie-Herzégovine

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      Migrants’ Mass Expulsions from Croatia Raise Legal Doubts

      Croatia and Bosnia say the expulsion of hundreds of migrants and refugees from the first to the second country are regulated by a bilateral agreement – but NGOs, rights groups and a legal expert question its legality.

      Since the end of March 2023, hundreds of migrants and refugees have been returned from Croatia back to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

      Differently from the illegal pushbacks that saw thousands of people being violently sent back from Croatia to Bosnia between 2018 and 2022, these recent operations are happening with cooperation between the two countries and with the open approval of European institutions.

      NGOs and rights groups were the first to condemn this new phenomenon, referring to it as “mass expulsions” implemented by Croatia. With information gathered by direct testimonies and documents collected from the expelled people, they have voiced concerns regarding alleged degrading treatments and human rights violations by Croatian police.

      Besides such abuses, experts also say the procedure could be illegal. “There are some doubts over the legality of what we are seeing happening between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in terms of European law,” Italian jurist and migration expert Gianfranco Schiavone told BIRN.
      Not allowed to seek asylum

      https://balkaninsight.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/11412031-1280x833.jpg

      A few weeks after the first migrants and refugees were returned to Bosnia’s northwest Una-Sana Canton, Mustafa Ruznic, the canton’s Prime Minister, sent an open letter to Bosnia’s state security and foreign ministers, as well as to the head of the Foreigners Affairs Service, SPS, demanding an explanation for the increased number of migrants and refugees reportedly returned from Croatia to Bosnia based on a bilateral readmission agreement.

      Ruznic said a significant number of them were unknown to the authorities and might present security risks, and complained of not being informed about the ongoing construction of a detention centre in the Lipa Temporary Reception Centre, situated in the Canton’s administrative centre, Bihac.

      Croatian and Bosnian authorities later explained that the mass returns were taking place on the basis of a bilateral agreement between the two states signed in 2002 and annexed again in September 2011 with a specific plan for its implementation, but never actually put into use.

      Nenad Nesic, Bosnia’s Minister of Security, denied a new possible crisis in Bosnia’s parliament on April 19, a day after he met Ruznic in Bihac.

      Presenting data for the first three months of 2023, he stated that a total of 768 foreign citizens had been accepted back under the Readmission Agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.

      He added that, during the same period, 1,816 requests for the admission of foreigners under readmission were rejected because Croatian authorities couldn’t prove they came from Bosnia.

      “This clearly shows that our Foreigners Service is responsibly doing its job and there is no influx of migrants into Bosnia and Herzegovina. Migrants are evenly distributed and currently most of them are in the Sarajevo Canton, where 630 migrants are accommodated,” Nesic stated.

      Sara Kekus, from the Zagreb-based Center for Peace Studies, CMS, who has been monitoring the situation with migrants, told BIRN that they do not have specific data on readmissions, but that the number is clearly increasing.

      “According to the testimonies of our associates, organisations, volunteers, and activists who are present in BiH, the persons returned from Croatia testified that they tried to seek asylum [there], but they were not allowed to do so, or they did not even know who to ask for asylum,” Kekus said.

      According to Kekus, people reported not having access to translators and that they were issued documents mostly in Croatian, which they signed without knowing what they were signing.

      “Complaints are that persons were kept in detention for several days and that the meals were rather meagre, one a day, bread and cheese and water,” he said.

      Among the expelled people, Kekus notes, there were not only adults but also unaccompanied children and families with small children, which is “especially problematic”.

      The Border Violence Monitoring Network, a grassroot watchdog network of NGOs and rights groups, collected testimonies from people subjected to the pushbacks and denounced the lack of translations and the fact that the internationally guaranteed right to ask for asylum was not respected by the Croatian authorities.

      “The police there [in Croatia] asked us to pay for accommodation, food and transport to the border, as if we were in a hotel and not in a prison. We didn’t ask to be taken there. We feel as if we were robbed,” one of the men expelled from Croatia told them. Documents collected by BVMN support this last claim.

      In a written response to BIRN’s inquiry, the Croatian Ministry of Interior, MUP, said that “the BVMN report is not based on information about actual treatment”.

      It said that “every illegal migrant caught by the Croatian police has the right and is adequately informed about the possibility of expressing an intention to seek international protection. If he/she expresses such an intention, an appropriate procedure is initiated.”
      Expulsions or ‘returns’?

      In the same letter, the Croatian MUP stated that implementation of the bilateral agreement had been discussed at several meetings prior to this, and that at the Joint EU-BiH Readmission Committee meeting on March 28 in Brussels, the European Commission reminded Bosnia’s authorities of their obligation to implement the agreement.

      The MUP also said these procedures cannot be called expulsions, but are instead returns of persons as regulated by the bilateral agreement.

      Italian jurist and migration expert Gianfranco Schiavone has a different opinion. “This type of procedure needs to be verified carefully because the notion of readmission applies currently in light of a directive, 115 of 2008, that regulates readmissions, but only among member countries of the European Union.”

      That is not the case for the two countries in question. Croatia is a European Union member since 2015, and it joined the visa-free Schengen zone at the start of 2023. Bosnia, on the other hand, has only recently been granted the status of EU candidate country.

      “This is de facto an expulsion of an alien citizen who irregularly arrived in a European country and should happen under the guarantee of the same European directive,” stated Schiavone.

      Meanwhile, Human Rights Watch published a report on May 3, saying “Croatian police regularly and often violently push back refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants to Bosnia and Herzegovina without assessing their asylum requests or protection needs”. The 94-page report, titled “‘Like We Were Just Animals’: Pushbacks of People Seeking Protection from Croatia to Bosnia and Herzegovina,” finds that Croatian authorities engage in pushbacks, including of unaccompanied children and families with young children.

      “The practice is ongoing despite official denials, purported monitoring efforts, and repeated – and unfulfilled – commitments to respect the right to seek asylum and other human rights norms. Border police frequently steal or destroy phones, money, identity documents, and other personal property, and often subject children and adults to humiliating and degrading treatment, sometimes in ways that are explicitly racist,” the report says.

      “Pushbacks have long been standard operating procedure for Croatia’s border police, and the Croatian government has bamboozled European Union institutions through deflection and empty promises,” said Michael Garcia Bochenek, senior children’s rights counsel at Human Rights Watch and the author of the report. “These abhorrent abuses – and the official duplicity that facilitates them – should end.”

      Croatian authorities have mostly disclaimed responsibility for pushbacks, and the Croatian Ministry of the Interior did not respond to Human Rights Watch’s requests for a meeting or for comment on its findings, it says in the report.

      ▻https://balkaninsight.com/2023/05/05/migrants-mass-expulsions-from-croatia-raise-legal-doubts

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      Croatia accused of new mass expulsions of migrants to Bosnia

      The investigative journalism project BIRN reports that Croatia has been carrying out mass expulsions of migrants to its neighbor, Bosnia. The two countries claim the returns are lawful under a bilateral agreement.

      Migrants are being expelled from Croatia to Bosnia and Herzegovina under a formal agreement between the two countries, rights groups say. Their claims are based on testimonies from migrants who said they were pushed back over the border by Croatian police, sometimes violently.

      In a recent report, the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) says these alleged pushbacks are a “new phonemenon” and are not the same as the expulsions that took place from Croatia to Bosnia between 2018 and 2022, which have already been documented.

      According to the BIRN report, Croatian authorities have been sending migrants back across the border to Bosnia, which is outside EU territory, under a revived bilateral agreement between the two countries. This was only discovered by the premier of the canton of Una-Sana, in Bosnia’s northwest, after more than 760 migrants returned under the deal had already arrived in his canton.

      Bosnia’s security minister, Nenad Nesic, has denied that there is an influx of migrants into the country. But Sara Kekus, from the Center for Peace Studies in Zagreb, told BIRN that the number is increasing. He also said that those returned from Croatia had testified that they had tried to seek asylum there but had not been allowed to do so, or had not known who to ask. In some cases they had been given documents mostly in Croatian which they signed without understanding what they were.

      According to Kekus, some of the migrants, who included unaccompanied minors and families with young children, said they had been mistreated by Croatian authorities: “Complaints are that persons were kept in detention for several days and that the meals were rather meagre, one a day, bread and cheese and water,” he is quoted as saying.
      ’Illegal practice’

      The pushbacks were also confirmed by the Border Violence Monitoring Networ (BVMN), another NGO, which condemned the fact that Croatian authorities had acted in breach of the internationally guaranteed right to request asylum.

      The Croatian interior ministry denied this, telling BIRN, “every illegal migrant caught by the Croatian police has the right and is adequately informed about the possibility of expressing an intention to seek international protection.” The ministry also said its operations were not “expulsions” but returns, carried out under the bilateral agreement.

      But all returns of migrants from EU countries to ’third countries’ outside the bloc have to happen according to an EU law, Directive 2008/115. As Bosnia is not yet in the EU, these procedures need to be followed for returns from Croatia, as Italian lawyer and migration expert Gianfranco Schiavone told BIRN. “This is de facto an expulsion of an alien citizen who irregularly arrived in a European country and should happen under the guarantee of the same European directive.”

      Migrants ’treated like animals’

      The BIRN investigation into illegal practices being carried out by an EU member state at the bloc’s external border follows a report by Human Rights Watch (HRW), which includes very recent testimonies of migrants who were pushed back from Croatia. In April, 2023, according to the report, two 15-year-old boys, Farooz D. and Hadi A., said Croatian police had caught them, driven them to the border and ordered them to walk into Bosnia, “disregarding their request for protection and their statements that they were under the age of 18.”

      HRW claims that in continuing to expel migrants, often using violent tactics, Croatia is acting in violation of international laws, including the prohibition against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, and against refoulement – sending people to places where they would face harm. The Croatian government did not respond to HRW’s request for comment.

      ▻https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/48806/croatia-accused-of-new-mass-expulsions-of-migrants-to-bosnia

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      Croazia: manganelli anche contro i bambini migranti

      La Croazia respinge i migranti, tra i quali molti minori non accompagnati e famiglie con bambini, e rende impossibile l’accesso all’asilo. È ciò che emerge dall’ultimo rapporto di Human Rights Watch, mentre il ministro dell’Interno Božinović continua a smentire.

      A distanza di meno di un mese dalla conferenza stampa in cui il ministro dell’Interno croato Davor Božinović – cercando di giustificare se stesso e i suoi sottoposti di fronte alle prove di violazioni della polizia croata nei confronti dei migranti emerse nell’ambito di un’inchiesta giornalistica – ha dichiarato che la Croazia rispetta i diritti umani e che la polizia croata non effettuai respingimenti di migranti, il titolare del dicastero dell’Interno per l’ennesima volta è stato smentito dalla realtà, nella fattispecie da un rapporto di Human Rights Watch (HRW) che riporta le testimonianze dei migranti e dei rifugiati respinti dalla Croazia verso la Bosnia Erzegovina.

      Il rapporto intitolato “Come se fossimo animali: respingimenti di persone in cerca di protezione”, pubblicato lo scorso 3 maggio, conferma che negli ultimi anni le autorità croate hanno partecipato a respingimenti violenti dei migranti, compresi i minori non accompagnati e intere famiglie con bambini piccoli. Dal rapporto emerge chiaramente che i respingimenti continuano, nonostante le costanti smentite da parte degli alti funzionari dello stato e le ripetute promesse (mai mantenute) di voler garantire l’accesso all’asilo.

      “Da tempo ormai i respingimenti sono diventati una prassi consueta della polizia di frontiera croata, e il governo croato continua a ingannare le istituzioni europee distogliendo l’attenzione dalla questione e facendo vane promesse. Questi deplorevoli abusi, così come l’ambiguità istituzionale che li facilita, devono cessare”, ha dichiarato Michael Garcia Bochenek, consulente senior di Human Rights Watch per i diritti dei bambini e autore del rapporto.

      Nel periodo compreso tra novembre 2021 e aprile 2023 i ricercatori di HRW hanno intervistato oltre cento rifugiati e richiedenti asilo perlopiù provenienti da Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran e Pakistan. La maggior parte delle persone intervistate sostiene di aver subito respingimenti violenti – anche decine di volte – da parte della polizia croata, che ha sempre ignorato le loro richieste di asilo. Ad esempio, il diciassettenne Rozad N., proveniente dal Kurdistan iracheno, racconta che negli ultimi due anni lui e la sua famiglia, compreso suo fratello di sette anni e sua sorella di nove anni, sono stati respinti 45-50 volte. Un ragazzo iraniano, Darius M., oggi diciottenne, tra il 2020 e il 2021, quindi quando era ancora minorenne, è stato rimandato dalla Croazia verso la Bosnia Erzegovina ben 33 volte, mentre un suo connazionale, Farhad K., ventuno anni, insieme ai genitori e alla sorella di quattordici anni, è stato respinto dalla polizia croata più di 20 volte.

      Il Danish Refugee Council solo nel periodo tra gennaio 2020 e dicembre 2022 ha registrato quasi trentamila respingimenti dalla Croazia verso la Bosnia Erzegovina. In molti casi (12% nel 2020, 13% nel 2021) tra i bersagli della polizia croata c’erano anche bambini.

      Nel rapporto di HRW si sottolinea che il numero effettivo di persone respinte dalla Croazia è indubbiamente superiore a quello stimato, soprattutto considerando che gli agenti croati, con il sostegno dell’agenzia Frontex, pattugliano anche il confine con la Serbia e quello con il Montenegro.

      Il copione è quasi sempre lo stesso: quando intercetta i migranti la polizia croata li riporta verso luoghi difficilmente raggiungibili lungo il confine, ordinando loro di allontanarsi dal territorio croato. Nel loro ritorno verso i paesi confinanti, i migranti respinti spesso si trovano costretti ad attraversare fiumi e torrenti, a inerpicarsi sulle rocce e camminare tra fitti boschi. Gli agenti croati non di rado costringono i migranti a ritornare in Bosnia Erzegovina scalzi, indossando solo biancheria intima, o persino completamente spogliati. Secondo la stragrande maggioranza delle testimonianze, ad effettuare i respingimenti sono persone in divisa che guidano veicoli della polizia e si identificano come agenti, lasciando così chiaramente intendere di agire in veste di pubblici ufficiali.

      Quasi tutti i migranti respinti affermano di essere stati picchiati almeno una volta dagli agenti croati o di aver assistito a scene di violenza perpetrate dalla polizia croata. “Ti guardano come se non fossi un essere umano, la violenza semplicemente è parte integrante della procedura”, racconta Zafran R., ventotto anni, descrivendo le percosse che gli sono state inflitte dagli agenti croati. “La prima volta che la mia famiglia ha cercato di attraversare il confine, nell’ottobre 2020, la polizia ci ha catturati, prendendo a botte me e mio padre. Ho detto agli agenti che mia madre era molto malata e che doveva andare in ospedale. Uno di loro ha risposto duramente: ‘Siamo poliziotti, non medici. Vattene in Bosnia, pezzo di merda! Perché siete venuti in Croazia?!’”, racconta un altro giovane migrante. “Alcune persone sono state brutalmente picchiate. La polizia croata si è impossessata dei loro cellulari, per poi distruggerli. Hanno bruciato i nostri effetti personali davanti ai nostri occhi, gridando: ‘Non vi vogliamo nel nostro paese, ritornate in Bosnia!’”, ricorda Laila, sedici anni, fuggita dall’Afghanistan.

      I racconti dei migranti respinti sono corroborati da testimonianze di molti operatori umanitari. Un volontario dell’associazione italiana Strada SiCura spiega che nella primavera del 2022, durante una visita in Bosnia Erzegovina, ha visto molte ferite che corrispondevano ai racconti che aveva sentito in precedenza. “Ho visto costole fratturate, diverse ferite alle gambe, lividi sul viso e altre parti della testa corrispondenti alle testimonianze delle vittime. Una persona riportava un’ustione sul petto che sembrava essere stata causata da un dispositivo elettrico”.

      I ricercatori di HRW hanno raccolto anche numerose testimonianze dei migranti che sono finiti in ospedale dopo essere stati picchiati dalla polizia croata affrontando poi un lungo periodo di convalescenza. Così il diciannovenne Ibrahim F., proveniente dal Camerun, ha spiegato che alla fine del 2021 gli agenti croati lo avevano picchiato così fortemente che non poteva camminare per due mesi.

      “Abbiamo sentito anche alcune testimonianze secondo cui le donne migranti avrebbero subito molestie e abusi sessuali da parte degli agenti croati. Così ad esempio un migrante ghanese, Emmanuel J., ha raccontato che quando, nel maggio 2022, la polizia croata aveva intercettato un grande gruppo di migranti con cui lui viaggiava e tra i quali c’erano anche otto donne, alcuni agenti avevano ‘molestato le donne’ palpeggiandole nelle parti intime”, scrive HRW, ricordando che anche in precedenza alcuni rifugiati avevano riferito di essere stati stuprati con rami e costretti dalla polizia croata a spogliarsi completamente e sdraiarsi l’uno sopra l’altro.

      I ricercatori sono venuti a conoscenza anche di diversi episodi di violenza nei confronti dei bambini. “Molti bambini piccoli sono stati costretti ad assistere a scene in cui i loro padri, fratelli maggiori e cugini venivano pestati a pugni e calci e presi a manganellate. Gli agenti della polizia di frontiera croata più volte hanno sparato vicino ai bambini e puntato le armi contro di loro. Sono stati registrati anche alcuni episodi che hanno visto gli agenti croati spintonare e picchiare bambini di sei anni”.

      Nel suo rapporto, HRW riporta anche la testimonianza di una donna proveniente dall’Afghanistan che nel febbraio del 2021 è stata respinta dalla Croazia insieme alla sua famiglia. “Ad un certo punto [gli agenti croati] hanno iniziato a prendere a schiaffi e picchiare i bambini. Poi hanno ordinato loro di addentrarsi in un bosco. Quando poi li ho raggiunti, i bambini erano sdraiati a terra. Un agente ha detto loro di alzarsi e togliersi i vestiti. La polizia li picchiava con manganelli mentre si spogliavano”, ha raccontato la donna, spiegando che dopo le prime violenze e umiliazioni gli agenti hanno ordinato alla sua famiglia di ritornare a piedi in Bosnia Erzegovina. “Per tutto il percorso ci colpivano con bastoni alla schiena e alle gambe, scagliandosi in particolare contro i bambini”.

      Lorena Fornasir, medico in pensione e una delle fondatrici dell’organizzazione umanitaria Linea d’Ombra di Trieste, conferma che simili violenze comportano conseguenze psicologiche incommensurabili per le vittime, conseguenze che di solito si manifestano come disturbo da stress post-traumatico. Le osservazioni di Lorena Fornasir corroborano i dati emersi da una recente ricerca sulla situazione dei rifugiati in Serbia, secondo cui le persone respinte dalla Croazia mostrano sintomi più pronunciati di depressione, ansia e stress post-traumatico rispetto ad altri migranti.

      Nel frattempo, come si sottolinea anche nel rapporto di HRW, le autorità croate continuano a negare qualsiasi responsabilità dei respingimenti alle frontiere, sforzandosi di confutare le prove, ormai indiscutibili, di violenze della polizia che spesso infligge gravi lesioni ai migranti, confisca e distrugge i loro effetti personali e li sottopone a trattamenti umilianti e degradanti. Michael Garcia Bochenek ha confermato a Novosti, che il governo croato non ha voluto commentare i dati emersi dal rapporto, né tanto meno ha voluto rispondere alle domande di HRW che ha chiesto un incontro con i rappresentanti del governo per discutere anche del controverso meccanismo indipendente di monitoraggio dell’operato della polizia.

      Si tratta di uno strumento creato su iniziativa della Commissione europea nell’ambito del nuovo Patto sulla migrazione e l’asilo. Pur trattandosi formalmente di un meccanismo indipendente, è stato il ministero dell’Interno croato a decidere a chi affidare il monitoraggio e quali metodi utilizzare. Il primo rapporto, pubblicato nel 2022, ha confermato i dubbi sull’effettiva indipendenza del meccanismo creato dal governo croato. È infatti emerso che l’unico scopo di questo strumento, peraltro finanziato con risorse europee, è quello di legittimare l’attuale stato delle cose alle frontiere esterne dell’UE, completamente ignorando le violenze nei confronti dei migranti.

      Che anche l’UE continui a chiudere un occhio di fronte alle violazioni dei diritti umani alle sue frontiere esterne, lo conferma il fatto che nel dicembre 2022 gli stati membri hanno dato il via libera all’ingresso di Zagabria nell’area Schengen, inviando così un forte messaggio che l’Europa tollera respingimenti e altri abusi. C’è però ancora tempo per invertire la tendenza. HRW ritiene infatti che la Commissione europea debba sollecitare le autorità croate affinché pongano fine ai respingimenti e forniscano informazioni attendibili sulle azioni intraprese per indagare sulle violazioni dei diritti dei migranti.

      “I respingimenti non devono diventare una consuetudine. Le istituzioni europee devono dimostrare fermezza nel chiedere alla Croazia di assumersi la propria responsabilità delle sistematiche violazioni del diritto dell’UE e delle norme internazionali”, conclude HRW.

      ►https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/aree/Croazia/Croazia-manganelli-anche-contro-i-bambini-migranti-225073

      aussi ici:
      ▻https://seenthis.net/messages/1002500

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    Respingimenti alla frontiera con la Slovenia: i dati che smontano gli annunci del governo

    A fine 2022 il Viminale aveva prefigurato la ripresa delle riammissioni dei migranti, già dichiarate illegittime. Lubiana si è però rifiutata di accettarle nel 90% dei casi. Le autorità di frontiera hanno dovuto perciò virare sui provvedimenti di espulsione: oltre 650 in pochi mesi, di cui 500 a carico di cittadini afghani tecnicamente inespellibili

    Le “riammissioni” dei migranti verso la Slovenia annunciate dal governo italiano a fine 2022 sono state un flop. Dati inediti trasmessi dal Viminale ad Altreconomia mostrano infatti che quasi tutte quelle “proposte” dall’Italia tra dicembre 2022 e metà marzo 2023 sono state rifiutate da Lubiana: ben 167 sulle 190 “tentate” dalle autorità di frontiera italiane.
    “L’annuncio trionfale delle riammissioni rivela la sua autentica natura -commenta Gianfranco Schiavone, presidente del Consorzio italiano di solidarietà di Trieste e membro della rete RiVolti ai Balcani-: un annuncio politico volutamente vago che celava la consapevolezza che quelle pratiche erano e restano illegali”.

    https://i.imgur.com/Xs8W2Ah.png

    Per comprendere ragioni e proporzioni della bolla propagandistica “esplosa” alla frontiera orientale occorre fare un passo indietro al dicembre del 2022, quando cioè il Viminale diffonde tramite agenzie la notizia di una nuova direttiva finalizzata al “rafforzamento dei controlli sui flussi della rotta balcanica”. Viene prefigurata la ripresa delle riammissioni -cioè dei respingimenti- verso la Slovenia, con tanto di invito rivolto ai prefetti di Trieste, Gorizia e Udine di “adottare iniziative volte a dare ulteriore impulso all’attività di vigilanza sulla fascia di confine”.

    Non è il ministro Piantedosi a firmare quella “direttiva” ma la sua capa di gabinetto, la prefetta Maria Teresa Sempreviva. Lo schema sembra voler replicare quanto già visto nella primavera 2020, quando al Viminale c’era Luciana Lamorgese, il suo capo di gabinetto era Piantedosi e il prefetto di Trieste si chiamava Valerio Valenti, appena nominato Commissario governativo “all’emergenza migranti”. Sappiamo come è andata a finire: quasi 1.300 persone riammesse “informalmente” (▻https://altreconomia.it/rotta-balcanica-nel-2020-record-di-respingimenti-dallitalia-verso-la-sl), cioè senza avere in mano alcun provvedimento scritto, tra maggio e dicembre di quell’anno, in forza di una circolare ministeriale a firma di Piantedosi -mai resa pubblica- che si richiamava al contestato accordo bilaterale tra Italia e il Paese di confine datato 1996, mai ratificato dal Parlamento, in contrasto con la Costituzione. Dietro l’espressione burocratica delle “riammissioni” c’erano in realtà veri e propri respingimenti a catena, con le persone, richiedenti asilo inclusi, spostate come pacchi tra le polizie di frontiera, per finire poi scaricate nell’arco di poche ore in Bosnia ed Erzegovina. Nel gennaio 2021, con un’ordinanza di capitale importanza, il tribunale di Roma, per mano della giudice Silvia Albano e sulla base di un ricorso presentato dalle avvocate e socie Asgi Caterina Bove e Anna Brambilla, dichiarò la grave illegittimità di quelle riammissioni-respingimenti (►https://altreconomia.it/i-respingimenti-italiani-in-slovenia-sono-illegittimi-condannato-il-min), costringendo il Viminale a fare un’imbarazzata marcia indietro: l’Italia aveva consapevolmente esposto le persone a “trattamenti inumani e degradanti” lungo la rotta balcanica e a “torture” in Croazia. E nessuno dei governi che si sono succeduti da allora ha mai riconosciuto il carattere illegale di quelle procedure, come ben racconta anche il film “Trieste è bella di notte” dei registi Andrea Segre, Stefano Collizzolli e Matteo Calore.

    Trascorsi nemmeno due anni dall’ordinanza di Roma, a dicembre 2022 arriva come detto l’annuncio della nuova “circolare Sempreviva”, tanto pubblicizzata a bocconi e virgolettati estratti sui media quanto sottratta nella sua interezza all’opinione pubblica. L’accesso civico presentato da Altreconomia nei mesi scorsi è stato infatti negato dal gabinetto del ministro dell’Interno per presunte ragioni di cooperazione di polizia e del “concreto pregiudizio” alla “integrità dei rapporti internazionali” con Slovenia e Austria. Ancora una volta rifacendosi al decreto ministeriale Lamorgese del marzo 2022 che ha dato un colpo durissimo alla trasparenza lungo le frontiere.

    I dati ottenuti oggi chiariscono la natura propagandistica di quegli annunci. Ma c’è di più. In questo scenario prossimo alla farsa si inserisce infatti anche Lubiana. Interpellata sulle ragioni del “no” opposto alle riammissioni tentate dall’Italia, la polizia slovena, per bocca del rappresentante Drago Menegalija, ci ha fatto sapere che il “motivo principale del rifiuto di riammissione […] è la mancanza di prove presentate nella richiesta di riammissione alla polizia slovena in relazione al fatto che i migranti avrebbero (precedentemente) soggiornato nel territorio della Slovenia”. Aggiungendo poi che “in base all’accordo tra i Paesi, i rimpatri avvengono continuamente” e che “l’accordo definisce chiaramente i criteri in base ai quali possiamo accogliere solo i migranti che sono entrati in Italia attraverso la Slovenia, che sono stati fermati nella fascia di confine e che non hanno fatto richiesta di protezione internazionale in Italia”.

    L’avvocata Caterina Bove aiuta a capire le ragioni del mutato atteggiamento della Slovenia: “Quel Paese non ha alcun interesse a riammettere sul proprio territorio coloro che sono giunti in Italia -spiega-. Il cambio di governo da un lato e l’ingresso della Croazia nell’area Schengen (avvenuto il primo gennaio 2023) dall’altro, consentono ora alla Slovenia di ricoprire un ruolo più ‘leggero’ nel contrasto ai flussi, ricevendo una minore pressione dall’Europa. Questo escamotage le consente di tenere anche i buoni rapporti con l’Italia, senza troppo colpo ferire. Tanto sa che le persone non intendono fermarsi lì”.

    La risposta della polizia slovena, pur orientata a preservare le relazioni diplomatiche con l’Italia (“The relations between the police forces of both countries are very good”, si legge nella risposta), fa però trasparire alcuni aspetti importanti. Il primo, secondo Gianfranco Schiavone, è l’”evidente preoccupazione rispetto all’operato della polizia italiana”. “La nota slovena evidenzia infatti come le riammissioni, secondo il diritto interno di quello Stato, non possono avere seguito quando non sia stata provata la provenienza degli stranieri dal territorio sloveno né soprattutto quando gli stranieri abbiano manifestato l’intenzione di chiedere protezione internazionale in Italia. Con tale risposta le autorità slovene mettono una pietra tombale sulla questione, lampante dal punto di vista giuridico, ma mai ammessa formalmente dalle autorità italiane, che è tassativamente proibita la riammissione degli stranieri che intendono chiedere asilo in Italia. L’abnorme numero delle tentate riammissioni chieste da parte italiana, pressoché tutte rigettate, fa emergere un quadro oscuro sull’operato italiano poiché, a seconda degli ordini politici del momento, stranieri che si trovano nella medesima condizione giuridica finiscono per subire trattamenti completamente diversi; così al medesimo cittadino afghano può accadere di accedere alla domanda di asilo oppure di vedersi oggetto di una tentata la riammissione illegittima in Slovenia, o infine essere espulso dall’Unione europea con provvedimento delle autorità italiane benché inespellibile”.

    Quella di Schiavone non è una forzatura. Non potendo compiere le riammissioni ordinate dall’alto perché palesemente illegali ma essendo costrette al contempo a dar l’idea del “pugno duro”, le autorità di frontiera hanno dovuto così virare sui provvedimenti di espulsione. Lo dimostrano i dati relativi ai provvedimenti di espulsione e allontanamento trasmessi ad Altreconomia dalla prefettura di Trieste: tra la fine del 2022 e il primo trimestre 2023 ne sono stati adottati oltre 650, di cui oltre 500 a carico di persone in fuga dall’Afghanistan e giunte a Trieste dalla “rotta balcanica”. Un numero impressionante se confrontato con i mesi precedenti e che risponde appunto alla necessità di dar seguito, anche solo sulla carta, alle indicazioni governative. Indicazioni disposte a tutto, anche a negare l’evidente bisogno di protezione di persone tecnicamente inespellibili, e che sollevano forti dubbi sulla corretta attività informativa in tema di diritto d’asilo condotta dalle autorità di frontiera.

    https://i.imgur.com/I5b04uY.png

    Schiavone parla di una dinamica “sconcertante”. “In primo luogo va evidenziata la radicale illegittimità dei provvedimenti di espulsione che sono stati emanati”. Il Testo unico sull’immigrazione prevede infatti che “in nessun caso può disporsi l’espulsione o il respingimento verso uno Stato in cui lo straniero possa essere oggetto di persecuzione per motivi di razza, di sesso, di lingua, di cittadinanza, di religione, di opinioni politiche, di condizioni personali o sociali, ovvero possa rischiare di essere rinviato verso un altro Stato nel quale non sia protetto dalla persecuzione”. Di più: la norma aggiunge che “Non sono ammessi il respingimento o l’espulsione o l’estradizione di una persona verso uno Stato qualora esistano fondati motivi di ritenere che essa rischi di essere sottoposta a tortura o a trattamenti inumani o degradanti”. “Questa disposizione è di inequivoca interpretazione dal momento che l’espressione ‘in nessun caso’ rappresenta un divieto assoluto che non ammette eccezioni di sorta -chiarisce Schiavone-. L’indiscutibile condizione di estremo pericolo in cui si trova oggi qualsiasi cittadino afghano che sia fuggito dal suo Paese configura l’assoluta proibizione di emettere nei suoi confronti un provvedimento di espulsione verso il suo Paese. Tutto ciò era pienamente noto alla prefettura di Trieste che però ha agito in contrasto con la normativa e alla quale andrebbe dunque chiesto di fornire precise spiegazioni di tale condotta”.

    “Una motivazione che immagino potrebbe essere avanzata da quella amministrazione al fine di sostenere le proprie scelte -non si nasconde Schiavone- è che i cittadini afghani, pur essendo palesemente persone con chiaro bisogno di protezione, non avevano manifestato alle autorità di frontiera la loro volontà di chiedere protezione internazionale in Italia e che, fallita la loro tentata riammissione in Slovenia, l’unica ‘via d’uscita’ per le autorità italiane era stata quella di emettere nei confronti di questi stranieri un provvedimento di espulsione confidando che tutti gli interessati si sarebbero dispersi, come in effetti è accaduto. Una simile motivazione è radicalmente infondata e semmai solleva ulteriori gravi interrogativi su che cosa sia accaduto ancora una volta alla sempre inquieta frontiera italo-slovena nell’inverno 2022-2023. Oltre ai già evidenziati profili di illegittimità dei provvedimenti per inespellibilità degli stranieri verso il loro Paese appare necessario sapere se a quegli stranieri sia stata fornita o no l’assistenza e l’informazione sull’esercizio dei loro diritti che il diritto dell’Unione europea prevede”.

    Il presidente dell’Ics di Trieste si rifà al “Manuale comune ad uso delle autorità competenti degli Stati membri per lo svolgimento del controllo di frontiera sulle persone” diramato dalla Commissione europea. È lì dentro, nel cosiddetto Manuale Schengen, che si evidenzia come “un cittadino di Paese terzo deve essere considerato un richiedente asilo/protezione internazionale se esprime in un qualsiasi modo il timore di subire persecuzioni o danni gravi facendo ritorno al proprio Paese di origine o nel paese in cui aveva precedentemente la dimora abituale”. È una sottolineatura importante perché “l’intenzione di chiedere protezione internazionale non deve essere manifestata in una forma particolare”. Non occorre dunque che la parola “asilo” sia pronunciata espressamente: “l’elemento determinante è l’espressione del timore di quanto potrebbe accadere in caso di ritorno”.

    Non si può strumentalmente fraintendere l’eventuale silenzio delle persone in transito: “L’attività della polizia di frontiera deve essere orientata perciò a escludere ogni ragionevole dubbio sull’esistenza di una situazione di pericolo verso persone che potrebbero non formulare in modo esplicito la domanda di protezione in modo diretto, perché vogliono ad esempio proseguire il viaggio per raggiungere famigliari o parenti in altri Paesi, come è noto accade per gran parte dei rifugiati che entrano in Italia”, aggiunge ancora Schiavone.

    Affinché sia effettivo il diritto di chiedere asilo o protezione alla frontiera (dovrebbe valere via terra così come via mare) e di presentare la relativa domanda il prima possibile, continua il Manuale Schengen, “le autorità di frontiera devono informare i richiedenti, in una lingua che possa essere da loro sufficientemente compresa, delle procedure da seguire (come e dove presentare la domanda), nonché dei loro diritti e doveri, incluse le conseguenze possibili dell’inosservanza dei loro obblighi e di una mancata collaborazione con le autorità”.

    Gli fa eco l’avvocata Anna Brambilla: “Che tipo di informativa legale viene fatta a queste persone in arrivo dalla Slovenia e per le quali è adottato un provvedimento di espulsione? Dai dati ottenuti possiamo concludere che delle due l’una: o le autorità italiane non fanno un’informativa adeguata oppure tentano di riammettere nell’altro territorio persone che non dovrebbero essere espulse”.

    “Il riferimento all’obbligo di informare gli stranieri delle possibili conseguenze dell’inosservanza dei loro obblighi di cooperazione con le autorità è un elemento cruciale per valutare la corretta condotta delle forze di polizia di frontiera -riprende Schiavone-. Ci sono chiari motivi per ritenere che la condotta della polizia di frontiera terrestre a Trieste nella gestione dell’ammissione al territorio degli stranieri con chiaro bisogno di protezione sia stata impostata su un modus operandi assai lontano rispetto a quello prescritto dalle indicazioni sopra riportate. Non sappiamo come sono stati condotti i colloqui con gli stranieri, se e quanti erano i mediatori in servizio nelle diverse lingue e quale informazione sia stata fornita agli stranieri. Ciò che sappiamo è che nessun osservatore terzo indipendente è mai stato ammesso a quella frontiera e che anche la presenza di funzionari dell’Alto commissariato delle Nazioni Unite per i rifugiati è stata, almeno in alcuni periodi, assai intermittente”.

    Quello che è certo è che centinaia di persone alla frontiera hanno affrontato in questi mesi le sorti più diverse. Ma non per l’applicazione di norme -e delle loro relative garanzie- quanto per l’obbedienza a ordini e umori del governo: “La certezza del diritto è totalmente assente -denuncia Schiavone-. Siamo in una sorta di terra di nessuno dove ogni irregolarità diviene sempre possibile e l’arbitrio diventa l’unica certezza”.

    ▻https://altreconomia.it/respingimenti-alla-frontiera-con-la-slovenia-i-dati-che-smontano-gli-an
    #asile #migrations #frontières #frontière_sud-alpine #Alpes #Slovénie #Italie #push-backs #refoulements #chiffres #statistiques #réadmissions #réfugiés_afghans #Maria_Teresa_Sempreviva #refoulements_en_chaîne #circolare_Sempreviva

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    Lithuania: Legalizing illegal pushbacks gives green-light to torture

    Responding to the passing of amendments to the Lithuanian Law on the State Border and its Protection which effectively enshrine in domestic legislation the ongoing practice of border pushbacks, Amnesty International’s Europe Director, Nils Muižnieks, said:

    “Today is a dark day for justice as Lithuania’s Parliament has voted to enshrine in law illegal and abusive practices. By codifying what is illegal and forcibly returning refugees and migrants to places where they face a risk of torture and other ill-treatment, the government is trampling on their rights and on Lithuania’s own international obligations.

    “Rather than taking the urgent steps necessary to stop these unlawful returns to widespread violence, intimidation and ill-treatment in Belarus, this law effectively green-lights pushing people back to torture.

    “By passing this law, Lithuania has set itself on a collision course with EU law and the EU Court of Justice, which has already censured the member state over previous legislation. Lithuania cannot claim to be a rights-abiding country when it circumvents the rule of law.”

    Background

    The amendment was passed 69 votes to 7 with 24 abstentions. There will be a final formal approval given by the Parliament next Tuesday.

    The vote comes just weeks after Europe’s top anti-torture body, the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture, published a report that found that authorities in countries across Europe have used practices that amount to torture when targeting refugees and migrants who tried to cross Europe’s borders.

    Research by Amnesty International published in June 2022 found that Lithuanian border guards subjected non-European refugees and migrants arriving from Belarus to thousands of violent pushbacks to Belarus, despite the risk of torture and other ill-treatment by Belarusian authorities, as well as to arbitrary detention and other violations.

    International law prohibits collective expulsions and the return of anyone to a country where they could face serious human rights violations.

    ▻https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/04/lithuania-legalizing-illegal-pushbacks-gives-green-light-to-torture
    #Lituanie #frontières #push-backs #frontières #refoulements #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Biélorussie

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      Lithuania law to allow ’volunteer’ border guards to use violence

      https://media.euobserver.com/87e7b29f2d236bc804fbdeecf6ff664d-800x.jpg

      Lithuania’s parliament passed a controversial new law allowing volunteers from around Europe to join its national border guard force — while giving them the right to use violence against asylum seekers and migrants crossing in from Belarus.

      ▻https://euobserver.com/migration/156944
      #volontaires #bénévoles #milices

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      La Lituanie s’apprête à légaliser les refoulements de migrants

      Le projet d’amendement à la loi sur les frontières prévoit d’expulser les demandeurs d’asile arrivés illégalement sur le territoire, et de créer une force civile en soutien des gardes-frontières.

      Selon le ministère de l’intérieur à Vilnius, le texte qui devrait être adopté définitivement par les députés lituaniens, mardi 25 avril, a pour but de garantir la sécurité du petit Etat balte contre d’éventuelles tentatives de déstabilisation menées par son voisin biélorusse. Les ONG y voient surtout un moyen de pérenniser les « pushbacks », qui consistent à refouler illégalement les migrants sans leur donner la possibilité de déposer une demande d’asile, pratiqués par la Lituanie depuis l’été 2021.

      Voté en seconde lecture par une grosse majorité des parlementaires, jeudi 20 avril, l’amendement à la loi sur les frontières de l’Etat prévoit qu’en « situation d’urgence », face à l’afflux massif de ressortissants étrangers aux frontières du pays, le gouvernement pourra limiter l’accès au territoire. Les gardes-frontières seront alors autorisés à expulser les migrants entrés illégalement et se trouvant dans une zone large de 5 kilomètres depuis la frontière. Une exception a été ajoutée par les députés pour les personnes fuyant un conflit armé, des persécutions, ou nécessitant une assistance humanitaire.

      « A première vue, la proposition semble assez équilibrée et inclut même des garanties », note Viktor Ostrovnoj, en charge de l’asile et de l’immigration à la Croix-Rouge lituanienne. Il rappelle cependant que l’état d’urgence − le premier décret déclarant l’urgence à la frontière avec la Biélorussie est entré en vigueur le 3 août 2021 − est toujours en place. Avec le vote des députés, « ce qui était censé être une mesure temporaire, permettant de faire face à des crises de courte durée, risque de devenir un nouveau statu quo », remarque Viktor Ostrovnoj.

      Plus de 20 000 « pushbacks »

      Directrice du bureau du Défenseur des droits au Parlement, à Vilnius, Erika Leonaite critique elle aussi le texte. Celui-ci crée, selon elle, « l’illusion » que la Lituanie pourra continuer de garantir le droit d’asile. Or, objecte-t-elle, « c’est un service de l’immigration et non pas les gardes-frontières dans la forêt qui est compétent pour déterminer si une personne fuit des persécutions, telles qu’elles sont définies par la Convention relative au statut des réfugiés ».

      A titre d’exemple, Mme Leonaite mentionne le cas de quatre ressortissants cubains, refoulés en avril 2022 alors qu’ils tentaient d’entrer en Lituanie. Ils ont finalement obtenu l’asile en mars, après l’intervention de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme. « C’est la preuve que le système ne fonctionne pas », affirme la Défenseure des droits.

      Selon les statistiques officielles, les gardes-frontières ont mené 20 150 « pushbacks » depuis le 3 août 2021 et le premier décret ministériel autorisant les refoulements. Des chiffres difficiles à vérifier car peu d’observateurs sont autorisés sur place. En août 2022, la Lituanie a achevé la construction d’une barrière d’environ 550 kilomètres sur sa frontière commune avec la Biélorussie, longue de 700 kilomètres. Les demandeurs d’asile ne peuvent entrer qu’aux postes-frontières, à condition de disposer de papiers d’identité.

      « De très gros risques de dérapage »

      A plusieurs occasions, les ONG ont dénoncé les conditions désastreuses dans lesquelles vivent les migrants. Plusieurs ont dû être amputés à cause du froid. Le 6 avril, les gardes-frontières lituaniens ont découvert le corps sans vie d’un Indien d’une quarantaine d’années près de la ligne de séparation avec la Biélorussie. En août 2022, un homme originaire du Sri Lanka avait déjà été trouvé mort à la frontière.

      La violence et les mauvais traitements risquent aussi de s’intensifier avec la nouvelle loi, qui prévoit d’embaucher des civils pour venir en aide aux gardes-frontières, sur le modèle des « chasseurs frontaliers » recrutés par la Hongrie en 2017. « Il y a de très gros risques de dérapage car ces personnes, qui ne sont pas bien formées, ni entraînées, devraient être armées », révèle Lina Vosyliute, de l’association Global Lithuanian Leaders.

      Depuis le 18 avril, plus d’une trentaine d’organisations européennes et 140 universitaires originaires du monde entier ont signé une lettre ouverte, adressée aux députés lituaniens et à la première ministre, Ingrida Simonyte. Ils dénoncent une loi qui « viole non seulement le droit à une procédure d’asile équitable et efficace et le principe de non-refoulement, mais restreint également l’aide humanitaire et les activités indépendantes de surveillance des droits de l’homme par les ONG ».

      ▻https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2023/04/21/la-lituanie-s-apprete-a-legaliser-les-refoulements-de-migrants_6170474_3210.

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      Lithuania’s border protection law to allow ‘volunteer’ patrols to use violence against asylum seekers

      A controversial law on border protection, which is making its way in the Lithuanian parliament, may allow volunteers from around Europe to join border guard service and use violence against migrants, EUObserver reports.

      The bill, which legalises the controversial practise of forcing irregular migrants back into Belarus, passed the first reading on Thursday with 69 votes in favour, seven against and 24 abstentions. The legislation is being pushed via a fast-track procedure and is scheduled for the final vote on April 25.

      Among other things, it institutes border guard service “sponsors” – volunteers who can patrol and use coercion against migrants and asylum seekers, help make arrests, and perform other patrol guard-like duties.

      “There is no restriction for people from abroad to come,” Emilija Švobaitė, a lawyer and rights campaigner at the Sienos Grupė (Border Group) NGO, told EUobserver ahead of Thursday’s vote.

      She said it means that, for example, radical right-wing groups from Germany could come and patrol alongside national border guards.

      Meanwhile, journalists and independent monitors will be banned from the border, she said.

      Sponsors can be citizens of any EU member state so long as they speak some Lithuanian and have declared their residence in the country, are at least 18 years old, and are not currently serving as a border guard somewhere else.

      Rights groups have also criticised the practice of Lithuanian border guard service to force people back into Belarus. The policy was performed under a decree by the Interior Ministry, but is now being transposed into law.

      “Basically they are legalising the pushbacks at the border,” EUObserver quotes Monika Guliakaitė-Danisevičienė of the Lithuanian Human Rights Centre NGO.

      Similar comments were made by Amnesty International earlier this week, which described the Lithuanian bill as a green-light to torture.

      According to EUObserver, the European Commission said it was not yet able to comment on the draft law.

      ▻https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1968329/lithuania-s-border-protection-law-to-allow-volunteer-patrols-to-use-violence-aga

      CDB_77
    • @cdb_77
      CDB_77

      Le texte légal :

      Projektas Nr. XIVP-2383(2)

      LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS

      VALSTYBĖS SIENOS IR JOS APSAUGOS ĮSTATYMo Nr.VIII-1666 1, 2, 4, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 18, 23, 26 straipsnių pakeitimo ir ĮSTATYMO PAPILDYMO 231 straipsniu ir NAUJU IX SKYRIUMI

      įstatymas

      2023 m. d. Nr.

      Vilnius

      1 straipsnis. 1 straipsnio pakeitimas

      Pakeisti 1 straipsnio 1 dalį ir ją išdėstyti taip :

      „1. Šis įstatymas nustato Lietuvos Respublikos valstybės sienos ir pasienio teisinius režimus, pasienio kontrolės punktų veiklą, valstybės sienos apsaugos organizavimą, Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos prie Lietuvos Respublikos vidaus reikalų ministerijos (toliau – Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnyba) struktūrą, jos organizavimo pagrindus, finansavimą, funkcijas, bendradarbiavimą su kitomis valstybės ir savivaldybių institucijomis ir įstaigomis bei visuomene, pareigūnų teises ir pareigas, taip pat prievartos panaudojimo teisėtumo sąlygas, Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos rėmėjų veiklos teisinius pagrindus.“

      2 straipsnis. 2 straipsnio pakeitimas

      1. Pakeisti 2 straipsnio 8 dalies nuostatą iki dvitaškio ir ją išdėstyti taip :

      „8. Lietuvos Respublikos valstybės sienos apsauga (toliau – valstybės sienos apsauga) –veikla, kuria siekiama :“.

      2. Pakeisti 2 straipsnio 20 dalį ir ją išdėstyti taip :

      „20. Prievarta – veiklos metodas, kuris taikomas, kai nevykdomi Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos pareigūno ar Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos rėmėjo reikalavimai ar nurodymai arba siekiama išvengti pavojaus, ir kuriuo siekiama įgyvendinti Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybai pavestas funkcijas.“

      3. Papildyti 2 straipsnį 221 dalimi :

      „221. Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos rėmėjas (toliau – rėmėjas) – šiame įstatyme nustatytus reikalavimus atitinkantis fizinis asmuo, savo noru padedantis Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybai vykdyti šiame įstatyme jai nustatytas funkcijas.“

      4. Pakeisti 2 straipsnio 26 dalį ir ją išdėstyti taip :

      „26. Kitos šiame įstatyme vartojamos sąvokos suprantamos taip, kaip jos apibrėžiamos Lietuvos Respublikos asmens duomenų, tvarkomų nusikalstamų veikų prevencijos, tyrimo, atskleidimo ar baudžiamojo persekiojimo už jas, bausmių vykdymo arba nacionalinio saugumo ar gynybos tikslais, teisinės apsaugos įstatyme (toliau – Asmens duomenų, tvarkomų teisėsaugos ar nacionalinio saugumo tikslais, įstatymas), Lietuvos Respublikos civiliniame kodekse, Lietuvos Respublikos atliekų tvarkymo įstatyme, Lietuvos Respublikos aviacijos įstatyme, Lietuvos Respublikos cheminių medžiagų ir preparatų įstatyme, Lietuvos Respublikos krizių valdymo ir civilinės saugos įstatyme, Lietuvos Respublikos ginklų ir šaudmenų kontrolės įstatyme, Lietuvos Respublikos įstatyme „Dėl užsieniečių teisinės padėties“, Lietuvos Respublikos jūros aplinkos apsaugos įstatyme, Lietuvos Respublikos krašto apsaugos sistemos organizavimo ir karo tarnybos įstatyme, Lietuvos Respublikos narkotinių ir psichotropinių medžiagų kontrolės įstatyme, Lietuvos Respublikos nuodingųjų medžiagų priežiūros įstatyme, Lietuvos Respublikos policijos įstatyme, Lietuvos Respublikos sprogmenų apyvartos kontrolės įstatyme, Lietuvos Respublikos saugios laivybos įstatyme, Lietuvos Respublikos vidaus tarnybos statute, Lietuvos Respublikos valstybės ir savivaldybių turto valdymo, naudojimo ir disponavimo juo įstatyme ir Reglamente (ES) Nr. 2016/399, 2016 m. balandžio 27 d. Europos Parlamento ir Tarybos reglamente (ES) 2016/679 dėl fizinių asmenų apsaugos tvarkant asmens duomenis ir dėl laisvo tokių duomenų judėjimo ir kuriuo panaikinama Direktyva 95/46/EB (Bendrasis duomenų apsaugos reglamentas), 1951 m. Konvencijoje dėl pabėgėlių statuso, 1982 m. Jungtinių Tautų jūrų teisės konvencijoje.“

      3 straipsnis. 4 straipsnio pakeitimas

      1. Pakeisti 4 straipsnio 6 dalies 2 punktą ir jį išdėstyti taip :

      „2) Vyriausybės nustatyta tvarka laikinai atnaujinus patikrinimus prie vidaus sienos siekiant užtikrinti viešąją tvarką, Lietuvos Respublikos nacionalinį saugumą.“

      2. Papildyti 4 straipsnį 13 dalimi :

      „13. Esant paskelbtai valstybės lygio ekstremaliajai situacijai dėl masinio užsieniečių antplūdžio ir siekiant užtikrinti Lietuvos Respublikos nacionalinį saugumą ir viešąją tvarką, Vyriausybė Nacionalinio saugumo komisijos pasiūlymu gali priimti sprendimą, kad užsieniečiai, ketinantys kirsti ar kirtę valstybės sieną tam nenustatytose vietose arba tam nustatytose vietose, tačiau pažeidę valstybės sienos kirtimo tvarką, ir esantys pasienio ruože, į Lietuvos Respublikos teritoriją neįleidžiami. Ši nuostata taikoma individualiai kiekvienam minėtam užsieniečiui. Jeigu nustatoma, kad užsienietis traukiasi nuo Vyriausybės sprendime nurodytų ginkluotų konfliktų, taip pat persekiojimo, kaip jis apibrėžtas Konvencijoje dėl pabėgėlių statuso, arba siekia patekti į Lietuvos Respublikos teritoriją humanitariniais tikslais, nuostata dėl užsieniečių neįleidimo į Lietuvos Respubliką netaikoma. Užsieniečių, kirtusių valstybės sieną tam nenustatytose vietose arba tam nustatytose vietose, tačiau pažeidusių valstybės sienos kirtimo tvarką, buvimas pasienio ruože nelaikomas buvimu Lietuvos Respublikos teritorijoje. Į Lietuvos Respublikos teritoriją neįleidžiamiems užsieniečiams turi būti atliktas pagalbos poreikio įvertinimas ir, esant pagalbos poreikiui, šiems užsieniečiams suteikiama reikalinga neatidėliotina medicinos ar humanitarinė pagalba. Šioje dalyje nurodyto Vyriausybės sprendimo neįleisti užsieniečių į Lietuvos Respublikos teritoriją vykdymo ir pagalbos poreikio įvertinimo tvarką nustato Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos vadas.“

      4 straipsnis. 10 straipsnio pakeitimas

      Pakeisti 10 straipsnį ir jį išdėstyti taip :

      „10 straipsnis. Valstybės sienos kirtimo laikinas apribojimas arba nutraukimas

      Vyriausybė, užtikrindama Lietuvos Respublikos nacionalinį saugumą, visuomenės rimtį, siekdama apsaugoti gyventojus ir aplinką nuo pavojingų ir ypač pavojingų užkrečiamųjų ligų ar jų sukėlėjų įvežimo ir išplitimo, esant paskelbtai ekstremaliajai situacijai, taip pat gretimos valstybės prašymu gali laikinai apriboti arba nutraukti vykimą per valstybės sieną ar tam tikrus pasienio kontrolės punktus.“

      5 straipsnis. 11 straipsnio pakeitimas

      1. Pakeisti 11 straipsnio 3 dalį ir ją išdėstyti taip :

      „3. Pasienio ruožas nustatomas iki 5 km pločio į Lietuvos Respublikos teritorijos gilumą nuo valstybės sienos, einančios sausuma, pasienio vandenimis. Pasienio ruožo ribas tvirtina Vyriausybė vidaus reikalų ministro teikimu.“

      2. Papildyti 11 straipsnį 10 dalimi :

      „10. Esant paskelbtai valstybės lygio ekstremaliajai situacijai dėl masinio užsieniečių antplūdžio, asmenys į pasienio ruožą gali patekti tik turėdami Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos išduotą leidimą. Šis leidimas išduodamas Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos vado nustatytais atvejais. Reikalavimas turėti Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos išduotą leidimą netaikomas asmenims :

      1) gyvenantiems pasienio ruože ir (ar) esantiems nekilnojamojo turto, kuris yra pasienio ruože, savininkais ar naudotojais ;

      2) dirbantiems ar besimokantiems pasienio ruože ;

      3) vykdantiems ūkinę, komercinę veiklą ar kelių, ryšio linijų ir kitų viešojo intereso objektų priežiūros veiklą pasienio ruože ;

      4) vykstantiems magistraliniais, krašto ar rajoniniais keliais arba geležinkeliais, esančiais pasienio ruože ar kertančiais pasienio ruožą ;

      5) kertantiems valstybės sieną per pasienio kontrolės punktus ar vykstantiems į darbo vietą, esančią pasienio kontrolės punkte ;

      6) vykdantiems valstybės sienos apsaugos objektų ir įrenginių statybą, įrengimą ir (ar) priežiūrą.“

      6 straipsnis. 14 straipsnio pakeitimas

      1. Pakeisti 14 straipsnio 2 dalį ir ją išdėstyti taip :

      „2. Sąrašas sudaromas Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos vado nustatyta tvarka. Į sąrašą gali būti įrašyti motyvuotą prašymą pateikę fiziniai ir juridiniai asmenys, juridinių asmenų filialai, atstovybės bei juridinio asmens statuso neturintys asmenys. Šioje dalyje nurodyti subjektai į sąrašą negali būti įrašyti, jeigu :

      1) fizinis asmuo, juridinio asmens, juridinio asmens filialo, atstovybės ar juridinio asmens statuso neturinčio asmens vadovas arba kitas atsakingas asmuo turi neišnykusį ar nepanaikintą teistumą už tyčinį nusikaltimą ;

      2) nėra praėję vieneri metai nuo fiziniam asmeniui, juridinio asmens, juridinio asmens filialo, atstovybės ar juridinio asmens statuso neturinčio asmens vadovui arba kitam atsakingam asmeniui paskirtos administracinės nuobaudos ar administracinio poveikio priemonės už teisės aktų, reglamentuojančių valstybės sienos kirtimą ir patikrinimą arba pasienio teisinį režimą, pažeidimą, kontrabandą arba akcizais apmokestinamų prekių įsigijimą, laikymą, gabenimą, naudojimą ar realizavimą pažeidžiant nustatytą tvarką, neteisėtą valstybės sienos perėjimą dėl neatsargumo įvykdymo dienos ;

      3) juridiniam asmeniui yra įsiteisėjęs apkaltinamasis teismo nuosprendis dėl tyčinio nusikaltimo ir yra bent viena iš šių sąlygų :

      a) po bausmės atlikimo nėra praėję treji metai, kai padarytas nusikaltimas pagal Lietuvos Respublikos baudžiamąjį kodeksą priskiriamas nesunkiems arba apysunkiams nusikaltimams ;

      b) po bausmės atlikimo nėra praėję penkeri metai, kai padarytas nusikaltimas pagal Baudžiamąjį kodeksą priskiriamas sunkiems nusikaltimams ;

      c) po bausmės atlikimo nėra praėję aštuoneri metai, kai padarytas nusikaltimas pagal Baudžiamąjį kodeksą priskiriamas labai sunkiems nusikaltimams.“

      2. Pakeisti 14 straipsnio 3 dalį ir ją išdėstyti taip :

      „3. Sprendimas atsisakyti įrašyti fizinius ir juridinius asmenis, juridinių asmenų filialus, atstovybes bei juridinio asmens statuso neturinčius asmenis į sąrašą gali būti priimamas, kai :

      1) fizinis ir juridinis asmuo, juridinio asmens filialas, atstovybė bei juridinio asmens statuso neturintis asmuo, pateikdamas prašymą, jame ar kartu su prašymu pateiktuose dokumentuose sąmoningai nurodė tikrovės neatitinkančius duomenis ;

      2) fizinis ir juridinis asmuo, juridinio asmens filialas, atstovybė bei juridinio asmens statuso neturintis asmuo pateikė ne visus reikiamus dokumentus, nurodytus sąrašo sudarymo tvarkos apraše ;

      3) fizinis ir juridinis asmuo, juridinio asmens filialas, atstovybė bei juridinio asmens statuso neturintis asmuo kartu su prašymu pateikė negaliojančius dokumentus ;

      4) nustatomos šio straipsnio 2 dalyje nurodytos aplinkybės, dėl kurių fizinis asmuo, juridinis asmuo, juridinio asmens filialas, atstovybė ar juridinio asmens statuso neturintis asmuo negali būti įrašytas į sąrašą ;

      5) asmuo, kurio buvimas valstybės sienos apsaugos zonoje, pasienio juostoje, pasienio vandenyse, kurių vandenimis arba krantais eina išorės siena, gali kelti grėsmę viešajai tvarkai ar visuomenės saugumui ;

      6) fizinio ir juridinio asmens, juridinio asmens filialo, atstovybės bei juridinio asmens statuso neturinčio asmens vykdoma veikla pasienio juostos dalyje, kuri yra sausumoje, nesusijusi su valstybės sienos apsaugos objektų bei įrenginių statyba, įrengimu ir (ar) priežiūra.“

      3. Pakeisti 14 straipsnio 5 dalies 1 punktą ir jį išdėstyti taip :

      „1) paaiškėja šio straipsnio 3 dalies 1, 3, 4 ir 5 punktuose nurodytos aplinkybės arba, kad fizinis ir juridinis asmuo, juridinio asmens filialas, atstovybė bei juridinio asmens statuso neturintis asmuo kartu su prašymu pateikė suklastotus dokumentus ;“

      4. Papildyti 14 straipsnio 5 dalį 6 punktu :

      „6) paaiškėja, kad nebevykdoma veikla pasienio juostos dalyje, kuri yra sausumoje, susijusi su valstybės sienos apsaugos objektų bei įrenginių statyba, įrengimu ir (ar) priežiūra.“

      7 straipsnis. 15 straipsnio pakeitimas

      Pakeisti 15 straipsnio 3 dalį ir ją išdėstyti taip :

      „3. Draudžiama gadinti, naikinti valstybės sienos ženklus, kitus valstybės sienos apsaugos objektus ir įrenginius ar kitaip daryti žalą pasienio juostai. Valstybės sienos apsaugos objektų ir įrenginių apsaugos zonos ir jose taikomos specialiosios žemės naudojimo sąlygos nustatytos Lietuvos Respublikos specialiųjų žemės naudojimo sąlygų įstatyme.“

      8 straipsnis. 16 straipsnio pakeitimas

      1. Pakeisti 16 straipsnio 4 dalį ir ją išdėstyti taip :

      „4. Juridiniai asmenys, juridinių asmenų filialai, atstovybės ar juridinio asmens statuso neturintys asmenys, kurių teritorijoje yra steigiamas ar įsteigtas pasienio kontrolės punktas, privalo patikrinimų įstaigoms suteikti patikrinimams atlikti reikalingą infrastruktūrą. Už naudojimąsi juridiniams asmenims, juridinių asmenų filialams, atstovybėms ar juridinio asmens statuso neturintiems asmenims priklausančia infrastruktūra, išskyrus šio straipsnio 41 dalyje nurodytą infrastruktūrą, atlyginama Vyriausybės nustatytomis sąlygomis ir tvarka.“

      2. Papildyti 16 straipsnį 41 dalimi :

      „41. Jeigu valstybės ir savivaldybių institucijų ir įstaigų, valstybės ir savivaldybės valdomų įmonių, valstybės ir savivaldybės valdomų bendrovių dukterinių akcinių ir uždarųjų akcinių bendrovių, kaip šios bendrovės suprantamos Lietuvos Respublikos akcinių bendrovių įstatyme, kurių teritorijoje yra steigiamas ar įsteigtas pasienio kontrolės punktas, patikėjimo teise valdomos, naudojamos ir disponuojamos valstybės infrastruktūros ar jos dalies reikia patikrinimų įstaigoms patikrinimams atlikti, tokia valstybės infrastruktūra ar jos dalis atitinkamų patikrinimų įstaigų prašymu ir vadovaujantis Valstybės ir savivaldybių turto valdymo, naudojimo ir disponavimo juo įstatymu perduodama panaudos pagrindais neatlygintinai valdyti ir naudotis patikrinimų įstaigoms patikrinimams atlikti.“

      3. Pakeisti 16 straipsnio 6 dalį ir ją išdėstyti taip :

      „6. Pasienio kontrolės punkto teritorijos schemą ir pasienio kontrolės punkto darbo nuostatus tvirtina Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos vadas ir Muitinės departamento generalinis direktorius. Pasienio kontrolės punkto, kuriame nėra muitinės įstaigos, teritorijos schemą ir darbo nuostatus tvirtina Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos vadas.“

      9 straipsnis. 18 straipsnio pakeitimas

      Pakeisti 18 straipsnį ir jį išdėstyti taip :

      „18 straipsnis. Valstybės sienos apsaugos subjektai, kitų subjektų pasitelkimas, valstybės sienos apsauga ginkluoto užpuolimo, karo, nepaprastosios padėties ar ekstremaliosios situacijos atveju

      1. Valstybės sienos apsaugą atlieka Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnyba.

      2. Valstybės sienos apsauga sustiprinama vadovaujantis valstybės sienos apsaugos priedangos planu, kurį tvirtina Vyriausybė.

      3. Siekiant sustiprinti valstybės sienos apsaugą, į pagalbą Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybai pasitelkiami :

      1) vidaus reikalų ministro nustatyta tvarka – vidaus reikalų ministro valdymo srities statutinių įstaigų vidaus tarnybos sistemos pareigūnai ;

      2) Krašto apsaugos sistemos organizavimo ir karo tarnybos įstatymo nustatyta tvarka – Lietuvos kariuomenė ;

      3) Lietuvos Respublikos Lietuvos šaulių sąjungos įstatymo nustatyta tvarka – Lietuvos šaulių sąjunga ;

      4) valstybės sienos apsaugos priedangos plane nustatyta tvarka – patikrinimų įstaigos, Aplinkos apsaugos departamentas prie Aplinkos ministerijos ir kiti subjektai.

      4. Ginkluoto užpuolimo, karo ar nepaprastosios padėties atveju valstybės siena saugoma šio įstatymo, Lietuvos Respublikos karo padėties įstatymo, Lietuvos Respublikos ginkluotos gynybos ir pasipriešinimo agresijai įstatymo, Lietuvos Respublikos nepaprastosios padėties įstatymo nustatyta tvarka.“

      10 straipsnis. 23 straipsnio pakeitimas

      1. Pripažinti netekusia galios 23 straipsnio 5 dalį.

      2. Pakeisti 23 straipsnio 6 dalį ir ją išdėstyti taip :

      „6. Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnyba vidaus reikalų ministro valdymo srities centrinių statutinių įstaigų vadovų prašymu padeda atlikti vidaus reikalų ministro valdymo srities statutinėms įstaigoms pavestas funkcijas. Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos pareigūnų pasitelkimo tvarką ir konkrečias užduotis nustato vidaus reikalų ministras.“

      11 straipsnis. Įstatymo papildymas 231 straipsniu

      Papildyti Įstatymo VI skyrių 231 straipsniu :

      „231 straipsnis. Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos bendradarbiavimas su kitomis valstybės ir savivaldybių institucijomis ir įstaigomis bei visuomene

      1. Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnyba, įgyvendindama šio įstatymo 23 straipsnyje nustatytas funkcijas, bendradarbiauja su kitomis valstybės ir savivaldybių institucijomis ir įstaigomis, asociacijomis bei kitais asmenimis.

      2. Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnyba bendradarbiauja su viešosios informacijos rengėjais ir skleidėjais. Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnyba gali rengti ir leisti visuomenės informavimo priemones, kuriose teikiama informacija apie valstybės sienos apsaugai užtikrinti skirtas priemones, nusikalstamų veikų ir administracinių nusižengimų prevencijos priemonių, Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos funkcijų įgyvendinimą ir skelbiama kita su Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos veikla susijusi informacija.

      3. Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnyba remia ir inicijuoja prevencines ir teisinio švietimo programas, skleidžia teisines, ekspertines, profesines žinias mokymo įstaigose, visuomenės informavimo priemonėse.“

      12 straipsnis. 26 straipsnio pakeitimas

      Pakeisti 26 straipsnio 1 dalies 12 punktą ir jį išdėstyti taip :

      „12) vidaus reikalų ministro nustatyta tvarka konvojuoti sulaikytus ir suimtus asmenis.“

      13 straipsnis. Įstatymo papildymas nauju IX skyriumi

      Papildyti Įstatymą nauju IX skyriumi :

      „IX SKYRIUS

      RĖMĖJŲ VEIKLOS TEISINIAI PAGRINDAI

      31 straipsnis. Rėmėjų veiklos organizavimas

      1. Rėmėjų veikla organizuojama vadovaujantis šiuo įstatymu ir Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos vado patvirtintais Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos rėmėjų nuostatais.

      2. Rėmėjui išduodamas pažymėjimas, atpažinimo ženklas, liemenė su užrašu „Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos rėmėjas“. Jų išdavimo, nešiojimo ir grąžinimo tvarką, pažymėjimo blanko ir atpažinimo ženklo pavyzdį bei liemenės su užrašu „Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos rėmėjas“ formą nustato Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos vadas.

      3. Rėmėjų veikla finansuojama iš Lietuvos Respublikos valstybės biudžete Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybai skirtų lėšų.

      32 straipsnis. Priėmimas į rėmėjus

      1. Rėmėju gali tapti ne jaunesnis kaip 18 metų mokantis lietuvių kalbą Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnyboje netarnaujantis ir neatliekantis tikrosios karo tarnybos Lietuvos Respublikos pilietis ar Lietuvos Respublikoje nuolat gyvenantis kitos Europos Sąjungos valstybės narės pilietis, turintis ne žemesnį kaip vidurinį ar jam prilygintą išsilavinimą. Europos Sąjungos valstybės narės pilietis yra laikomas nuolat gyvenančiu Lietuvos Respublikoje, jeigu jis deklaravo gyvenamąją vietą Lietuvos Respublikoje ir kurio duomenys apie gyvenamąją vietą Lietuvos Respublikoje įrašyti į Lietuvos Respublikos gyventojų registrą.

      2. Norintis tapti rėmėju asmuo pateikia prašymą Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybai. Lietuvos šaulių sąjungos, kitų asociacijų, kurių įstatuose viena iš funkcijų numatytas viešojo saugumo užtikrinimas, vadovai gali pateikti Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybai rekomenduojamų būti rėmėjais asmenų sąrašus kartu su šiuose sąrašuose esančių asmenų prašymais tapti rėmėjais.

      3. Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnyba, gavusi šio straipsnio 2 dalyje nurodytus prašymus, tikrina, ar norintis tapti rėmėju asmuo atitinka šio straipsnio 1 dalyje nustatytus reikalavimus ir ar nėra šio straipsnio 4 dalyje nustatytų aplinkybių. Jeigu norintis tapti rėmėju asmuo atitinka šio straipsnio 1 dalyje nustatytus reikalavimus ir nėra šio straipsnio 4 dalyje nustatytų aplinkybių, jam Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnyba organizuoja mokymą, kurį baigęs, šis asmuo laiko egzaminą. Reikalavimas dėl mokymo baigimo ir egzamino laikymo netaikomas buvusiems Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos pareigūnams, kitiems einantiems pareigas ir buvusiems vidaus tarnybos sistemos pareigūnams, šauliams ir buvusiems tikrosios karo tarnybos kariams. Norintis tapti rėmėju asmuo, išlaikęs šioje dalyje nurodytą egzaminą, Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos vado ar jo įgalioto asmens sprendimu įrašomas į rėmėjų sąrašą. Jeigu norintis tapti rėmėju asmuo neatitinka šio straipsnio 1 dalyje nustatytų reikalavimų arba yra šio straipsnio 4 dalyje nustatytų aplinkybių arba neišlaikomas šioje dalyje nurodytas egzaminas, asmens prašymas tapti rėmėju netenkinamas. Rėmėjų mokymo organizavimo tvarką, mokymo programai taikomus reikalavimus ir egzamino organizavimo, laikymo, vertinimo tvarką nustato Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos vadas.

      4. Rėmėju negali būti :

      1) asmuo, turintis teistumą už nusikaltimą, taip pat už baudžiamąjį nusižengimą nuteistas asmuo, jeigu nuo teismo nuosprendžio įsiteisėjimo dienos nepraėjo 1 metai, taip pat asmuo, kuriam Lietuvos Respublikos organizuoto nusikalstamumo prevencijos įstatymo nustatyta tvarka taikomi teismo įpareigojimai ;

      2) asmuo, kuris anksčiau dirbo statutiniu valstybės tarnautoju, teisėju, notaru, prokuroru, advokatu, antstoliu ar atliko tikrąją karo tarnybą ir buvo atleistas atitinkamai už pareigūno vardo pažeminimą, teisėjo vardą žeminantį poelgį, notarų profesinės etikos ir tarnybinius nusižengimus, prokuroro vardą žeminantį poelgį, advokato profesinės etikos bei profesinės veiklos pažeidimus, antstolio profesinės ar tarnybinės veiklos pažeidimus ar kario vardą žeminančias arba krašto apsaugos sistemos institucijas diskredituojančias veikas ir nuo šio atleidimo dienos nepraėjo 5 metai ;

      3) asmuo, kuris yra įstatymų nustatyta tvarka uždraustos organizacijos narys.

      5. Į rėmėjų sąrašą įrašytas asmuo pasirašo 3 metų sutartį su Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnyba, kurioje įsipareigoja neatlygintinai padėti Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybai vykdyti šio įstatymo 23 straipsnio 1 dalies 1–5 punktuose nustatytas funkcijas (toliau – sutartis). Praėjus 3 metų laikotarpiui, jeigu rėmėjas be pažeidimų vykdė jam keliamas užduotis, sutarties galiojimas šalių sutarimu pratęsiamas tam pačiam laikotarpiui. Sutarties sudarymo tvarką ir sutarties sąlygas nustato Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos vadas.

      6. Apie nepatenkintą asmens prašymą tapti rėmėju, šio sprendimo apskundimo galimybę ir asmens įrašymą į rėmėjų sąrašą Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnyba informuoja prašymą pateikusį asmenį ir jį rekomendavusią asociaciją Viešojo administravimo įstatymo nustatyta tvarka. Sprendimas netenkinti asmens prašymo tapti rėmėju gali būti Lietuvos Respublikos administracinių bylų teisenos įstatymo nustatyta tvarka skundžiamas apygardos administraciniam teismui.

      33 straipsnis. Išbraukimas iš rėmėjų sąrašo ir sutarties su rėmėju nutraukimas

      1. Rėmėjas Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos vado ar jo įgalioto asmens sprendimu išbraukiamas iš rėmėjų sąrašo ir su juo nutraukiama sutartis :

      1) rėmėjo prašymu ;

      2) dėl rėmėjo vardo diskreditavimo ;

      3) jei rėmėjas nebeatitinka šio įstatymo 32 straipsnio 1 dalyje nustatytų reikalavimų arba atsiranda, paaiškėja šio įstatymo 32 straipsnio 4 dalyje nustatytos aplinkybės ;

      4) jei rėmėjas ilgiau negu 6 mėnesius iš eilės nedalyvauja rėmėjų veikloje.

      2. Šio straipsnio 1 dalyje nurodytas Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos vado ar jo įgalioto asmens sprendimas gali būti Administracinių bylų teisenos įstatymo nustatyta tvarka skundžiamas apygardos administraciniam teismui.

      34 straipsnis. Rėmėjų funkcijos, teisės ir pareigos

      1. Rėmėjai padeda Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybai vykdyti šio įstatymo 23 straipsnio 1 dalies 1–5 punktuose nustatytas funkcijas, kurias atlieka kartu su Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos pareigūnais.

      2. Rėmėjai, atlikdami jiems pavestas funkcijas, turi teisę :

      1) šio įstatymo nustatyta tvarka ir atvejais panaudoti prievartą bei specialiąsias priemones ;

      2) nustatyti pažeidėjo asmens tapatybę ;

      3) padėti sulaikyti asmenį, įtariamą padariusį pažeidimą ;

      4) padėti stabdyti transporto priemones, kai įtariama, kad yra daroma ar padaryta nusikalstama veika ;

      5) padėti atlikti asmens apžiūrą ir daiktų, krovinių, dokumentų, patalpų patikrinimą ;

      6) siekiant užkirsti kelią daromiems nusikaltimams, persekiojant ir sulaikant teisės pažeidėjus, įeiti į fiziniams ir juridiniams asmenims, juridinių asmenų filialams, atstovybėms bei juridinio asmens statuso neturintiems asmenims priklausiančias gyvenamąsias ir negyvenamąsias patalpas, teritorijas ;

      7) padėti pristatyti administracinėn atsakomybėn traukiamą asmenį šio sutikimu į Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos, policijos tarnybines patalpas ar seniūnijos patalpas kaimo gyvenamosiose vietovėse ;

      8) reikalauti, kad asmenys vykdytų teisėtus reikalavimus ir nurodymus.

      3. Rėmėjai, atlikdami jiems pavestas funkcijas, privalo :

      1) gerbti ir ginti žmogaus orumą, užtikrinti ir saugoti žmogaus teises ir laisves ;

      2) suteikti nukentėjusiems asmenims, taip pat į Lietuvos Respublikos teritoriją neįleidžiamiems užsieniečiams neatidėliotiną medicinos ar kitą būtinąją pagalbą ;

      3) imtis priemonių asmenų, valstybės ir savivaldybės turtui gelbėti įvykių, ekstremaliųjų įvykių ar ekstremaliųjų situacijų atvejais ;

      4) saugoti jiems patikėtas ar sužinotas valstybės, tarnybos ar komercines paslaptis ;

      5) nešioti atpažinimo ženklą, liemenę su užrašu „Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos rėmėjas“, prisistatyti, parodyti rėmėjo pažymėjimą ;

      6) gavę pranešimą apie rengiamą ar daromą teisės pažeidimą, pastebėję rengiamą ar daromą teisės pažeidimą, imtis neatidėliotinų priemonių užkirsti kelią rengiamam arba daromam teisės pažeidimui ;

      7) gavę pranešimą apie padarytą teisės pažeidimą, nedelsdami pranešti apie tai policijai arba kitai kompetentingai institucijai ar įstaigai, imtis neatidėliotinų priemonių įvykio vietai apsaugoti, liudytojams nustatyti ;

      8) vadovautis teisės aktais, pavestas užduotis atlikti laiku ir tiksliai.

      35 straipsnis. Rėmėjų įgaliojimai

      1. Rėmėjai, atlikdami jiems pavestas funkcijas, vadovaujasi Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucija, šiuo ir kitais įstatymais.

      2. Teisėti rėmėjų reikalavimai ir nurodymai yra privalomi asmenims.

      3. Už rėmėjų teisėtų reikalavimų ir nurodymų nevykdymą asmenys atsako įstatymų, reglamentuojančių teisinę atsakomybę, nustatyta tvarka.

      36 straipsnis. Rėmėjų socialinės ir kitos garantijos

      1. Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnyba išmoka vienkartinę išmoką rėmėjui, jeigu atliekant jam pavestas funkcijas rėmėjas buvo sužalotas ir dėl šio sužalojimo nustatytas :

      1) sunkus sveikatos sutrikdymo mastas − 60 bazinių socialinių išmokų dydžio ;

      2) nesunkus ar nežymus sveikatos sutrikdymo mastas − 40 bazinių socialinių išmokų dydžio.

      2. Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnyba 120 bazinių socialinių išmokų dydžio vienkartinę išmoką lygiomis dalimis išmoka :

      1) rėmėjo, kuris žuvo atlikdamas jam pavestas funkcijas, šeimos nariams – vaikams (įvaikiams) (įskaitant vaikus, gimusius po rėmėjo mirties), ne vyresniems kaip 18 metų, taip pat vyresniems vaikams (įvaikiams), kurie mokosi įregistruotose bendrojo ugdymo mokyklose ir statutinėse profesinio mokymo įstaigose pagal bendrojo ugdymo ir profesinio mokymo programas grupinio mokymosi forma kasdieniu, neakivaizdiniu ir nuotoliniu mokymo proceso organizavimo būdais ar pavienio mokymosi forma savarankišku ir nuotoliniu mokymo proceso organizavimo būdais arba studijuoja Lietuvos aukštojoje mokykloje pagal nuolatinės formos studijų programas, ne vyresniems kaip 24 metai, sutuoktiniui, sugyventiniui (partneriui), tėvui (įtėviui), motinai (įmotei) ;

      2) asmenims, kuriems nustatytas neįgalumo lygis, 0–25 procentų darbingumo lygis arba senatvės pensijos amžių sukakusiems asmenims, kuriems nustatytas didelių specialiųjų poreikių lygis, jeigu jie buvo rėmėjo, kuris žuvo atlikdamas jam pavestas funkcijas, išlaikomi ar jo žuvimo dieną turėjo teisę gauti jo išlaikymą.

      3. Šiame straipsnyje nustatytos išmokos nemokamos, jeigu :

      1) rėmėjas žuvo ar susižalojo darydamas tyčinę nusikalstamą veiką ;

      2) rėmėjo žuvimo ar susižalojimo priežastis buvo apsvaigimas nuo alkoholio, narkotinių ir kitų psichiką veikiančių medžiagų ;

      3) rėmėjas nusižudė, kėsinosi nusižudyti ar tyčia susižalojo ;

      4) rėmėjo žuvimo ar susižalojimo priežastis buvo transporto priemonės vairavimas neturint teisės ją vairuoti arba perdavimas vairuoti transporto priemonę asmeniui, apsvaigusiam nuo alkoholio, narkotinių ir kitų psichiką veikiančių medžiagų arba neturinčiam teisės ją vairuoti ;

      5) rėmėjo sveikata sutriko ar jis mirė dėl ligos ar karo veiksmų ir tai nesusiję su rėmėjų funkcijų atlikimu.

      4. Šiame straipsnyje nustatytų išmokų mokėjimo rėmėjams tvarką nustato Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos vadas.

      5. Kai dėl teisės pažeidėjo veikos rėmėjas sužalojamas, Lietuvos Respublikos civilinio kodekso nustatyta tvarka jam atlyginama turtinė ir neturtinė žala.

      6. Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos vado nustatyta tvarka ir sąlygomis rėmėjams gali būti atlygintos transporto, ryšių ir kitos išlaidos, patirtos atliekant jiems pavestas funkcijas.

      37 straipsnis. Prievartos naudojimo sąlygos

      1. Rėmėjai, atlikdami jiems pavestas funkcijas, kartu su Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos pareigūnais turi teisę panaudoti prievartą šio įstatymo nustatytais atvejais ir tvarka. Rėmėjai turi teisę panaudoti prievartą tik tarnybinio būtinumo atveju ir tik tiek, kiek to reikia jiems pavestoms funkcijoms atlikti. Rėmėjai naudoti prievartą privalo adekvačiai esamoms aplinkybėms ir proporcingai esamam pavojui, atsižvelgdami į konkrečią situaciją, teisės pažeidimo pobūdį, intensyvumą ir individualias teisės pažeidėjo savybes. Fizinė prievarta naudojama tik tada, kai psichinė prievarta buvo neveiksminga arba kai bet koks delsimas kelia pavojų rėmėjo ar kito asmens gyvybei ar sveikatai.

      2. Psichinę ar fizinę prievartą rėmėjas turi teisę panaudoti šiais atvejais :

      1) apsisaugodamas ar apsaugodamas kitus asmenis nuo gresiančio pavojaus gyvybei ar sveikatai ;

      2) asmenims vengiant vykdyti rėmėjo ar Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos pareigūno reikalavimus ir nurodymus (siekdamas priversti asmenis paklusti) ;

      3) padėdamas sulaikyti asmenis (jeigu jie priešinasi) ;

      4) atremdamas kėsinimąsi į Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos pareigūno šaunamąjį ginklą, sprogmenis, specialiąsias bei ryšio priemones ir siekiamas šiuos objektus susigrąžinti ;

      5) atremdamas statinių (įskaitant patalpas), transporto priemonių ar kito turto, teritorijų užpuolimą ;

      6) padėdamas stabdyti transporto priemonę ;

      7) užkirsdamas kelią administraciniams nusižengimams ar nusikalstamoms veikoms.

      3. Rėmėjas turi teisę naudoti antrankius ir surišimo priemones šio įstatymo 28 straipsnio 4 dalyje nustatytais atvejais.

      4. Specialiąsias priemones (išskyrus antrankius ir surišimo priemones) naudoti draudžiama šio įstatymo 28 straipsnio 7 dalyje nustatytais atvejais.

      5. Rėmėjas, panaudojęs psichinę ar fizinę prievartą ir taip sukėlęs pavojų asmens gyvybei ar sveikatai, turi suteikti asmeniui reikalingą neatidėliotiną medicinos ar kitą būtinąją pagalbą ir imtis kitų reikalingų priemonių pavojingiems savo veiksmų padariniams pašalinti. Apie rėmėjo panaudotą psichinę ar fizinę prievartą, jei tai lėmė asmens mirtį arba gyvybei pavojingą sveikatos sutrikdymą, nedelsiant pranešama prokurorui.

      6. Rėmėjai turi būti specialiai parengti ir reguliariai tikrinami, ar jie geba veikti situacijomis, susijusiomis su psichinės ar fizinės prievartos panaudojimu. Specialiosios priemonės gali būti išduodamos rėmėjams atlikti jiems pavestas funkcijas tik kartu su Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos pareigūnais. Rėmėjų parengimo, tikrinimo bei specialiųjų priemonių išdavimo rėmėjams tvarką nustato Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos vadas.

      38 straipsnis. Rėmėjų skatinimas ir atsakomybė

      1. Rėmėjai, pasižymėję saugant valstybės sieną, gali būti Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos vado ar kitų institucijų paskatinti (apdovanoti).

      2. Rėmėjai gali būti teikiami valstybiniam apdovanojimui Lietuvos Respublikos valstybės apdovanojimų įstatymo nustatyta tvarka.

      3. Rėmėjai už neteisėtas veikas atsako įstatymų, reglamentuojančių teisinę atsakomybę, nustatyta tvarka.“

      14 straipsnis. Buvusio IX skyriaus ir 31 straipsnio pernumeravimas

      1. Buvusį IX skyrių laikyti X skyriumi.

      2. Buvusį 31 straipsnį laikyti 39 straipsniu.

      15 straipsnis. Įstatymo įsigaliojimas, įgyvendinimas ir taikymas

      1. Šis įstatymas, išskyrus šio straipsnio 2 dalį, įsigalioja 2023 m. gegužės 3 d.

      2. Lietuvos Respublikos Vyriausybė, Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnybos prie Lietuvos Respublikos vidaus reikalų ministerijos vadas ir Muitinės departamento prie Lietuvos Respublikos finansų ministerijos generalinis direktorius iki 2023 m. gegužės 2 d. priima šio įstatymo įgyvendinamuosius teisės aktus.

      3. Šio įstatymo 8 straipsnio 2 dalyje išdėstyto Lietuvos Respublikos valstybės sienos ir jos apsaugos įstatymo 16 straipsnio 41 dalies nuostatos taikomos valstybės infrastruktūrai ar jos daliai, kuri toje dalyje nurodytiems juridiniams asmenims perduota patikėjimo teise valdyti, naudoti ir disponuoti pagal sutartis, sudarytas iki šio įstatymo įsigaliojimo dienos.

      4. 2024 m. sausio 1 d. įsigalioja tokia šio įstatymo 13 straipsnyje išdėstyto Lietuvos Respublikos valstybės sienos ir jos apsaugos įstatymo 36 straipsnio 2 dalies 2 punkto redakcija :

      „2) asmenims, kuriems nustatytas neįgalumo lygis, 0–25 procentų dalyvumo lygis arba senatvės pensijos amžių sukakusiems asmenims, kuriems nustatytas 15 procentų dalyvumo lygis, jeigu jie buvo rėmėjo, kuris žuvo atlikdamas jam pavestas funkcijas, išlaikomi ar jo žuvimo dieną turėjo teisę gauti jo išlaikymą.“

      Skelbiu šį Lietuvos Respublikos Seimo priimtą įstatymą.

      Respublikos Prezidentas

      ▻https://e-seimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalAct/lt/TAP/69c45250dd1c11eda305cb3bdf2af4d8

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