• The Next Great Migration. The Beauty and Terror of Life on the Move

    The news today is full of stories of dislocated people on the move. Wild species, too, are escaping warming seas and desiccated lands, creeping, swimming, and flying in a mass exodus from their past habitats. News media presents this scrambling of the planet’s migration patterns as unprecedented, provoking fears of the spread of disease and conflict and waves of anxiety across the Western world. On both sides of the Atlantic, experts issue alarmed predictions of millions of invading aliens, unstoppable as an advancing tsunami, and countries respond by electing anti-immigration leaders who slam closed borders that were historically porous.

    But the science and history of migration in animals, plants, and humans tell a different story. Far from being a disruptive behavior to be quelled at any cost, migration is an ancient and lifesaving response to environmental change, a biological imperative as necessary as breathing. Climate changes triggered the first human migrations out of Africa. Falling sea levels allowed our passage across the Bering Sea. Unhampered by barbed wire, migration allowed our ancestors to people the planet, catapulting us into the highest reaches of the Himalayan mountains and the most remote islands of the Pacific, creating and disseminating the biological, cultural, and social diversity that ecosystems and societies depend upon. In other words, migration is not the crisis—it is the solution.

    Conclusively tracking the history of misinformation from the 18th century through today’s anti-immigration policies, The Next Great Migration makes the case for a future in which migration is not a source of fear, but of hope.

    #adaptation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #mobilité #solution #problème #résilience #livre #changement_climatique #climat #réfugiés_environnementaux #migrations_environnementales #histoire #survie #crise #histoire_des_migrations

    ping @isskein @karine4 @_kg_ @reka

    • Climate migration is not a problem. It’s a solution.

      Climate migration is often associated with crisis and catastrophe, but #Sonia_Shah, author of “The Next Great Migration,” wants us to think differently about migration. On The World’s weekly look at climate change solutions, The Big Fix, Shah speaks to host Marco Werman about her reporting that considers how the world would be more resilient if people were given legal safe ways to move.



      Sonia Shah parle aussi de #musique métissée, dont celle de #Mulatu_Astatke, qui n’aurait pas pu voir le jour sans la migrations de populations au cours de l’histoire :


      #immobilité #fermeture_des_frontières

    • Migration as Bio-Resilience : On Sonia Shah’s “The Next Great Migration”

      DURING THE UNUSUALLY frigid winter of 1949, a breeding pair of gray wolves crossed a frozen-over channel onto Michigan’s Isle Royale, a narrow spit of land just south of the US-Canadian maritime border in Lake Superior. Finding abundant prey, including moose, the pair had pups, starting a small lupine clan. Over the next almost 50 years, without access to the mainland, the clan grew increasingly inbred, with over half the wolves developing congenital spinal deformities and serious eye problems. As the wolf population declined — scientists even found one mother dead in her den, with seven unborn pups in her — the moose population came thundering back, gobbling up and trampling the forest’s buds and shoots. The ecosystem’s food chain now had a few broken links.

      The Isle Royale wolf population was saved, however, by a lone migrant. In 1997, a male wolf made his way to the island. Within a generation — wolf generations are a little less than five years — 56 percent of the young wolves carried the newcomer’s genes. In the years since, thanks to ongoing conservation efforts, more wolves have been brought to the island to provide enough genetic diversity not only to save the wolves but preserve the ecosystem’s new balance.

      This is just one of many examples of the bio-benefits of migratory species provided by Sonia Shah in her new book, The Next Great Migration. Hers is an original take on the oft-stultifying debate about immigration, most frequently argued over by unbending stalwarts on opposite extremes, or sometimes quibbled over by noncommittal centrists. There are now more displaced humans than ever — around one percent of the total human population — and the climate crises together with humanity’s ceaseless creep are driving an increasing number of nonhuman species to search for more welcoming climes. That half of the story is popularly understood: the world is on the move. What is less often acknowledged, and what Shah convincingly fills out, is its biological necessity. “Migration’s ecological function extends beyond the survival of the migrant itself,” she writes. “Wild migrants build the botanical scaffolding of entire ecosystems.” Besides spreading pollen and seeds — upon which the survival of many plants depend — migrants also transport genes, thus bringing genetic diversity. Migration is not only a human fact but a biological one.

      But the understanding of migration’s critical import — whether broadly biological or specifically human — has been a long time coming.

      “The idea that certain people and species belong in certain fixed places has had a long history in Western culture,” Shah writes. By its logic, “migration is by necessity a catastrophe, because it violates the natural order.” The so-called “natural order” is actually a construct that has been buoyed for millennia by a broad coalition of scientists, politicians, and other ideologically inflected cavillers. As for the word “migrant,” it didn’t even appear in the English language until the 17th century — when it was coined by Thomas Browne — and it took another hundred years before it was applied to humans. One important migrant-denialist, as Shah details, was Swedish-born naturalist Carl Linnaeus, most famous for formalizing binomial nomenclature, the modern system of classifying organisms as, say, Canis lupus or Homo sapiens.

      Shah goes beyond Linnaeus’s contribution to taxonomy — which, notably, is itself subject to critique, as when essayist Anne Fadiman describes it as a “form of mental colonising and empire-building” — to illuminate his blinkered fealty to the dominant narratives of the day. More than just falling in line, he worked to cement the alleged differences between human populations — crudely exaggerating, for instance, features of “red,” “yellow,” “black,” or “white” skinned people. He sparred with competing theorists who were beginning to propose then-revolutionary ideas — for instance, that all humans originated in and migrated out of Africa. With the concept of the “Great Chain of Being,” he toadied to the reigning theological explanation for the world being as it was; this concept hierarchically categorized, in ascending order, matter, plants, animals, peasants, clergy, noblemen, kings, and, finally, God. To support his views, Linnaeus took a trip to northern Sweden where he “studied” the indigenous Sami people, all the while complaining of the climate and the locals not speaking Swedish. Robbing them of a few native costumes, he then freely fabricated stories about their culture and origins. He later tried to give credence to biological differences between Africans and Europeans by committing to the bizarre fantasy that black women had elongated labia minora, to which he referred using the Latin term sinus pudoris. The cultural backdrop to his explanations and speculations was the generally held view that migration was an anomaly, and that people and animals lived where they belonged and belonged where they lived — and always had.

      Ignorance — deliberate, political, or simply true and profound — of the realities of even animal migration went so far as pushing scientists to hatch myriad far-fetched theories to explain, for example, where migratory birds went in the winter. Leading naturalists at the time explained some birds’ seasonal disappearance by claiming that they hibernated in lakes — a theory first proposed by Aristotle — or hid in remote caves. Driving such assumptions was, in part, the idea of a stable and God-created “harmony of nature.” When some thinkers began to question such fixed stability, Linneaus doubled down, insisting that animals inhabited their specific climes, and remained there. The implication for humans was not only that they had not migrated from Africa, but that Africans — as well as Asians and Native Americans — were biologically distinct. This kind of racial essentialism was an important structural component of what would morph into race science or eugenics. Linnaeus divided Homo sapiens into Homo sapiens europaeus (white, serious, strong), Homo sapiens asiaticus (yellow, melancholy, greedy), Homo sapiens americanus (red, ill-tempered, subjugated), and Homo sapiens afer (black, impassive, lazy), as well as Homo caudatus (inhabitants of the Antarctic globe), and even Homo monstrosus (pygmies and Patagonian giants).

      “Scientific ideas that cast migration as a form of disorder were not obscure theoretical concerns confined to esoteric academic journals,” but, Shah writes, “theoretical ballast for today’s generation of anti-immigration lobbyists and policy makers.”

      Here Shah dredges up more vile fantasies, like that of the “Malphigian layer” in the late 17th century, which claimed that Africans had an extra layer of skin consisting of “a thick, fatty black liquid of unknown provenance.” While the Malphigian layer has been roundly dismissed, such invented differences between peoples continue to bedevil medical treatment: even today, black people are presumed to be able to tolerate more pain, and so it’s perhaps hardly surprising that more black women die in childbirth.

      The idea was “that people who lived on different continents were biologically foreign to one another, a claim that would fuel centuries of xenophobia and generations of racial violence.” Or, put more simply, Linnaeus and other believed: “We belong here. They belong there.”


      “The classifications of species as either ‘native’ or ‘alien’ is one of the organizing principles of conservation,” Shah writes, quoting a 2007 scientific study in Progress in Human Geography. The implications of that dichotomous classification are harmful to humans and nonhumans alike, setting the stage for xenophobia and white anthropomorphism. As a case in point, the son of author and conservationist Aldo Leopold recommended in 1963, that US national parks “preserve, or where necessary […] recreate the ecologic scene as viewed by the first European visitors.” The idea of a pristine, pre-colonial era presumes an ahistorical falsehood: that humans and others left no trace, or that those traces could be undone and the ecologic scene returned to a static Eden. While many indigenous cultures certainly live less disruptively within their environment, in the case of both the Americas and Australia for example, the arrival of the first Homo sapiens heralded the swift extinction of scores of native species — in the Americas, woolly mammoths, giant sloths, saber-toothed tigers, camelops, and the dire wolf. Yet the pull toward preservation persists.

      In 1999, Bill Clinton established the National Invasive Species Council, which was tasked with repelling “alien species.” This move was an outgrowth of the relatively recently created disciplines of conservation biology, restoration biology, and even invasion biology. I recall being a boy in northern Ohio and hearing of the horror and devastation promised by the zebra mussel’s inexorable encroachment into the ecosystems of the Great Lakes. One invasion biologist, writes Shah, “calculated that wild species moving freely across the planet would ravage large swaths of ecosystems. The number of land animals would drop by 65 percent, land birds by 47 percent, butterflies by 35 percent, and ocean life by 58 percent.” And while the globe is certainly losing species to extinction, blaming mobility or migration is missing the mark, and buoying up the old “myth of a sedentary planet,” as she puts it.

      For millennia, humans had hardly any idea of how some species could spread. They had neither the perspective nor technology to understand that creepy-crawlies have creeped and crawled vast distances and always been on the move, which is not, in the big picture, a bad thing. Zebra mussels, for example, were not the only, or even the greatest, threat to native clams in the Great Lakes. Besides disrupting the local ecosystems, they also contributed to those ecosystems by filtering water and becoming a new source of food for native fish and fowl. Shah notes that Canadian ecologist Mark Vellend has found that “wild newcomers generally increase species richness on a local and regional level.” Since the introduction of European species to the Americas 400 years ago, biodiversity has actually increased by 18 percent. In other words, Shah writes, “nature transgresses borders all the time.”

      In her last chapter, “The Wall,” she tackles the immunological implications of migration. While first acknowledging that certain dangers do uncontrovertibly exist, such as Europeans bringing smallpox to the Americas, or Rome spreading malaria to the outer regions of its empire, she metaphorizes xenophobia as a fever dream. To be sure, wariness of foreign pathogens may make sense, but to guide foreign policy on such grounds or let wariness morph into discrimination or violent backlash becomes, like a fever that climbs beyond what the host organism needs, “a self-destructive reaction, leading to seizures, delirium, and collapse.” It’s like a cytokine storm in the COVID-19 era. As Shah told me, “the reflexive solution to contagion — border closures, isolation, immobility — is in fact antithetical to biological resilience on a changing planet.”


      In 2017, a solo Mexican wolf loped through the Chihuahuan Desert, heading north, following a path that other wolves, as well as humans, have traveled for thousands of years. Scientists were especially interested in this lone wolf, known as M1425, because he represented a waning population of endangered Mexican wolves dispersing genes from a tiny population in Mexico to a slightly more robust population in the United States.

      Like the Isle Royale wolves, “[i]f the two wild populations of Mexican gray wolves can find and mate with each other, the exchange of genetic material could boost recovery efforts for both populations,” a New Mexico magazine reported. But the area where M1425 crossed the international boundary is now closed off by a border wall, and the Center for Biological Diversity counts 93 species directly threatened by the proposed expansion of the wall. This is what we should be worried about.

      #bio-résilience #résilience

      signalé par @isskein

  • Where Will Everyone Go ?

    ProPublica and The New York Times Magazine, with support from the Pulitzer Center, have for the first time modeled how climate refugees might move across international borders. This is what we found.

    #climate #climate_refugee #migration #international_migration #map

    ping @cdb_77


  • Migrazioni climatiche (prima parte)

    Un’analisi dei flussi migratori causati dai cambiamenti climatici, che superano quelli dovuti agli eventi bellici. Le normative sovranazionali non hanno ancora recepito il problema che pertanto genera clandestinità.
    Il genere umano, sin dall’epoca preistorica, è sempre stato interessato da spostamenti, su scala più o meno ampia, generati da una vasta gamma di motivazioni, fra le quali principalmente: la ricerca di nuove terre, l’aspirazione verso migliori condizioni di vita, l’espansione coloniale, la fuga da guerre, persecuzioni e discriminazioni varie ed anche da fenomeni naturali avversi quali catastrofi e cambiamenti climatici. Numerosi sono i casi storici di movimenti di interi popoli o di parte di essi sospinti da fenomeni naturali, in quanto le migrazioni hanno da sempre rappresentato una fondamentale strategia di adattamento ai mutamenti climatico-ambientali. Nonostante ciò, l’élite politica mondiale e i media internazionali non hanno, sino a pochi anni fa, prestato particolare attenzione a questo fenomeno. La comunità scientifica mondiale, invece, dalla fine del scorso secolo ha mostrato crescente interesse sia verso lo studio dei cambiamenti climatici che delle sue conseguenze, come l’impatto sui flussi migratori.

    Le problematiche metodologiche

    L’analisi del fenomeno ha tuttavia evidenziato criticità di carattere metodologico a seguito della sua complessità e della sua eterogeneità, pertanto, nonostante le pubblicazioni accademiche abbiano registrato un sensibile incremento nell’ultimo ventennio (Amato 2019 [1]), la sua conoscenza risulta ancora frammentaria e non del tutto esaustiva. Le difficoltà di indagine riguardano aspetti di diversa natura legati, in primis, alla peculiarità del fenomeno migratorio che si può manifestare in ampia gamma di variabili riconducibili alla durata, temporanea o definitiva, alle cause, volontarie o forzate, e al raggio di spostamento, interne, internazionali o intercontinentali.

    Per quanto riguarda il rapporto tra fenomeni naturali e migrazioni, che in questo contesto ci proponiamo di indagare, i primi possono essere distinti, in base alla dinamica temporale in cui si manifestano, in eventi a «insorgenza lenta» come i cambiamenti climatico-ambientali (riscaldamento globale, desertificazione, innalzamento del livello dei mari, erosione dei suoli ecc.) e ad «insorgenza rapida» come uragani, tempeste, bombe d’acqua e inondazioni oltre alle calamità naturali (terremoti, tsunami ed eruzioni vulcaniche). La diversa natura e tipologia di fenomeno scatenante genera inevitabili riflessi sulle caratteristiche dei flussi migratori, infatti mentre i fenomeni ad «insorgenza lenta» spesso generano migrazioni volontarie mosse da motivi economici, le risposte ad eventi ad «insorgenza rapida» risultano invece prevalentemente involontarie e di breve durata.

    Nell’intento di effettuare una classificazione delle migrazioni riconducibili a soli fattori climatici e ambientali, escludendo quindi i fenomeni geofisici come terremoti e tsunami, una corrente di studiosi ha identificato 4 tipologie distinte, equamente ripartite fra processi progressivi ed eventi improvvisi: 1) perdita di territorio dovuto a innalzamento del livello del mare, 2) siccità e desertificazione, 3) disastri naturali come alluvioni, cicloni e tempeste e 4) conflitti per le scarse risorse che possono portare a tensioni e violenze.

    Opera abbastanza complessa si presenta quindi la l’individuazione, la quantificazione e la classificazione degli spostamenti generati da fenomeni naturali che, nella sostanza a causa della comune origine involontaria, vanno ad aggiungersi alle altre tipologie di migrazioni forzate, riconducibili a guerre, conflitti, persecuzioni personali e calamità naturali. Nonostante il riscaldamento globale, la cui origine antropica sia ormai ampiamente comprovata dalla comunità scientifica mondiale, e i conseguenti cambiamenti climatico-ambientali (siccità, desertificazione, piogge intense, inondazioni, innalzamento del livello dei mari ecc) siano alla base di un numero crescente di spostamenti di persone in tutte le aree del pianeta (Amato, 2019), è opportuno evidenziare come alle migrazioni climatiche non sia stata ancora attribuita una precisa definizione, sia in campo semantico che in quello giuridico.

    Elementi di criticità ad oggi restano oltre all’identificazione del fenomeno, anche la sua estensione territoriale, le cause e la terminologia da utilizzare per identificarlo. I soggetti interessati dal fenomeno vengono definiti indistintamente come: profughi ambientali, migranti ambientali, profughi climatici, rifugiati climatici o rifugiati ambientali. Quest’ultimo termine, che risulta il più utilizzato, non viene però adottato dalle Nazioni Unite in quanto lo status di rifugiato viene riconosciuto dal diritto internazionale (Convenzione di Ginevra sullo statuto dei rifugiati del 1951) ai perseguitati per motivi razziali, religiosi, politici e a chi in fuga da guerre ma non per cause climatiche o ambientali (Amato, 2019). Un vulnus nell’architettura normativa sovranazionale che rappresenta elemento di discriminazione e che necessita di essere colmato, appurato il consistente numero di persone costrette ad abbandonare le proprie case a seguito di fenomeni naturali avversi.

    Sullo sfondo dell’ambito metodologico, si staglia, in veste di problematica principale, la determinazione della causa che, sia nel caso di spostamenti interni che internazionali, si presenta non di rado in forma non univoca. Frequentemente sussistono infatti molteplici cause, spesso interagenti fra loro, riconducibili a fattori di natura sociale, economica, demografica, politica, bellica e ambientale che rendono difficile ricondurne l’origine ad una in particolare. Ad esempio risulta problematico identificare l’origine della migrazione, fra economica e climatica, nel caso in cui il surriscaldamento globale, comportando una riduzione delle rese agricole, spinge i piccoli produttori nella povertà estrema costringendoli ad abbandonare le proprie terre.

    L’origine del termine «migranti climatici» venne coniato nel 1976 dall’ambientalista statunitense Lester Brown, tuttavia, il «padre» della corrente di pensiero viene considerato l’ambientalista inglese, professore ad Oxford, Norman Myers il quale già alla metà degli anni ’90 affermava che a livello mondiale erano presenti circa 25 milioni di “rifugiati climatici” prevedendo che nel 2050 avrebbero raggiunto quota 200 milioni. L’espressione “rifugiato ambientale”, invece, venne utilizzato per la prima volta in un report delle Nazioni Unite del 1985 e, successivamente, inserita nel 1997 nel Glossario di Statistiche Ambientali in riferimento a “una persona sfollata per cause ambientali, in particolare degrado ambientale”.

    Tutt’oggi non è stata ancora trovata né una definizione condivisa, né il suo inquadramento giuridico a causa dell’inerzia politica, in quanto un accordo a livello intergovernativo che modifichi il diritto internazionale introducendo il riconoscimento dello status di «rifugiato ambientale o climatico», con il conseguente obbligo di non respingimento degli stessi alle frontiere, amplierebbe la platea delle persone da accogliere, aumentando le problematiche sociali e logistiche ed i costi per gli stati di arrivo. Pertanto, l’immobilismo della leadership politica internazionale, che peraltro non tiene in considerazione l’aggravarsi degli effetti della crisi climatico-ambientale sulle condizioni di vita delle persone, si concretizza nel fatto che i soggetti coinvolti, non avendo riconosciuto il loro status dal punto di vista giuridico e adeguata protezione internazionale, finiscono per ingrossare le file dell’immigrazione irregolare internazionale.

    Una panoramica globale

    Le emissioni antropogeniche di gas climalteranti, che già alla fine del 2018 avevano fatto salire la concentrazione di CO2 nell’atmosfera a 410 ppm (parti per milione), con aumento di circa 100 punti solo negli ultimi 60 anni (grafico 1), rappresentano la causa principale dell’aumento della temperatura media globale che, rispetto al periodo pre industriale, è aumentata di 1,1° con un’impennata nel quinquennio 2014-2019 di ben 0,2° a conferma dell’aggravamento del trend in atto.

    Il fenomeno, tuttavia, evidenzia elementi di complessità e di difformità geografica accertato che il riscaldamento globale, da un lato, non si presenta in forma omogenea nell’atmosfera terrestre, vista ad esempio la maggior intensità registrata alle alte latitudini (carta 1), dall’altro, innesca un ampio spettro di mutamenti climatici dai connotati locali talvolta molto diversi, che stanno assumendo negli ultimi anni frequenza e intensità crescenti, con inevitabili riflessi sulle condizioni di vita delle popolazioni.

    Dal rapporto pubblicato nel 2017 dal Carbon Disclosure Project emerge come le maggiori responsabilità del fenomeno siano riconducibili alle principali 100 società mondiali, sia pubbliche che private, del settore energetico, le quali tra il 1988 e il 2015 avrebbero rilasciato oltre il 70% delle emissioni globali e che anche a livello dei singoli paesi risultano gravi squilibri visto che solo Cina, Ue e Usa provocano oltre la metà del totale delle emissioni. Fuoriesce un quadro abbastanza nitido rispetto alle responsabilità che non sono attribuibili all’umanità in toto bensì a determinati stati, alle grandi imprese ed ai gruppi finanziari che vi investono.

    Le difficoltà metodologiche precedentemente rilevate rendono problematico da quantificare un fenomeno che, come visto, risulta complesso, spesso multicausale [2] e, soprattutto, riguardante soggetti il cui status non è stato ancora precisamente definito e tanto meno tutelato dal diritto internazionale. In considerazione di ciò, lo studio del fenomeno presenta un certo grado di complessità e di difficoltà oggettive in quanto, nonostante la lunga ricerca, non è risultato possibile attingere dati da fonti ufficiali circa l’entità del fenomeno globale, composto sia dalle migrazioni internazionali che da quelle interne: per le prime sono state diffuse solo stime, mentre per le seconde l’istituto più autorevole impegnato a monitorare, l’Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (Centro di monitoraggio degli spostamenti interni), è attivo solamente dal 2008.

    Un arco di tempo non lungo ma sufficiente a comprenderne le dimensioni e le tendenze visto che, in base a questa fonte, solo le persone costrette a spostarsi all’interno dello stesso paese (internally displaced persons) a causa di fenomeni climatico-ambientali fra il 2008 e il 2014 sono risultate oltre 150 milioni, un numero superiore rispetto a quello causato da guerre e conflitti e addirittura, nello stesso periodo, oltre 170 milioni secondo i dati dell’Unione Europea (tabella 1).

    In base a recenti pubblicazioni sul tema emerge come gli effetti dei cambiamenti climatici e dei fenomeni estremi inneschino prevalentemente mobilità forzate interne invece che internazionali, ciò a seguito sia della scelta prioritaria di non spostarsi al di fuori del proprio paese, dove le condizioni di vita diventano più difficili, sia per l’impossibilità delle persone in stato di fragilità estrema a muoversi (trapped population) (Amato, 2019). Nell’ambito di questa analisi, risulta utile supporto uno studio [3] che ha indagato il rapporto tra l’aumento della temperatura globale e la migrazione internazionale prendendo in esame 116 paesi, suddivisi fra paesi a basso e a medio reddito, nel periodo compreso fra il 1960 e il 2000.

    L’indagine parte dall’ipotesi che nel lungo termine il riscaldamento atmosferico impoverendo le popolazioni rurali e peggiorando le loro condizioni di vita, influenzi la migrazione, ma con modalità diverse a seconda del reddito delle popolazioni. I risultati delle analisi confermano questa ipotesi: da un lato l’aumento graduale della temperatura contribuisce ad un aumento dei flussi migratori dai paesi a medio reddito. Al contrario, lo stesso fenomeno contribuisce a ridurre l’emigrazione da paesi più poveri. Questo risultato mette in luce l’esistenza di una relazione di costo-opportunità fra gli alti incentivi a migrare e le risorse per farlo. L’aumento della temperatura, infatti, provocando un calo della produttività agricola, genera un maggiore spinta migratoria. Pur rappresentando un significativo input, questo calo del reddito riduce la possibilità di emigrare da paesi meno sviluppati, dove un’elevata percentuale di persone vivono con un misero reddito addirittura sotto la soglia di povertà estrema di 1,90 $ al giorno, in particolare in Africa Sub-Sahariana dove nel 2015 in tale condizione si trovava ancora il 41.2% della popolazione totale [4]. Il riscaldamento globale tende quindi ad intrappolare le popolazioni povere nei loro territori di appartenenza a causa dell’elevato costo degli spostamenti internazionali che i potenziali migranti hanno raramente capacità di finanziare.

    Un secondo importante risultato emerso dall’analisi è che i flussi migratori da paesi a medio reddito causati dell’aumento della temperatura, sono principalmente diretti verso destinazioni limitrofe, in genere nel raggio di 1.000 km, come ci confermano i dati dell’Unhcr [5].

    Procedendo quindi all’analisi degli unici dati attendibili e completi, vale a dire quelli relativi agli sfollati o ai dislocamenti interni, secondo il Global Report on Internal Displacement (2019) pubblicati dall’Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), i nuovi spostamenti interni a livello globale a fine 2018 (tabella 2) raggiungevano i 28 milioni di unità che interessavano 148 paesi dei quali, 17,2 milioni a causa di calamità naturali e 10,8 per conflitti. Le migrazioni interne sono dunque per il 61% legate a eventi naturali e di queste la stragrande maggioranza è rappresentata da persone costrette a fuggire da eventi climatici estremi: 16,1 milioni per alluvioni, cicloni e tempeste, mentre solamente 1,1 milioni riconducibili a fenomeni geofisici, principalmente terremoti [6].

    Il rapporto indica che il totale mondiale degli sfollati interni, a causa sia di fenomeni naturali che di violenze, aveva raggiunto a fine 2018, i 41,3 milioni di persone, la cifra più elevata mai registrata secondo la direttrice dell’IDMC Alexandra Bilac. Un fenomeno che appare fortemente concentrato in specifiche aree, appurato che 3/4, ovvero 30,9 milioni di persone, si trovano in soli dieci paesi, principalmente Siria (6,2), Colombia (5,8), Repubblica Democratica del Congo (3,1), Somalia (2,6) e Afghanistan (2,6) che da sole ne ospitano quasi la metà.

    Premettendo che di anno in anno il quadro mondiale degli sfollati interni appare in sensibile mutamento a causa sia dell’improvvisa esplosione di conflitti che dall’imprevedibilità temporale e geografica dei fenomeni climatici, dall’analisi dei dati macroregionali disaggregati, in base alle cause dei nuovi ricollocati interni del solo 2018, suddivisi fra eventi naturali e conflitti, fuoriesce un quadro eterogeneo (tabella 3): mentre i primi superano i secondi in Asia orientale e Pacifico (9,3 milioni contro 236.000), Asia meridionale (3,3 milioni contro 544.000), Americhe (1,7 milioni contro 404.000), Europa e Asia centrale (41.000 contro 12.000), in Africa Sub-sahariana (2,6 e 7,4 milioni) e nell’area Medio Oriente e Nord-Africa (214.000 contro 2,1 milioni), a causa dell’elevato numero di guerre e scontri armati, la situazione era invertita.

    L’intensificarsi dei fenomeni meteorologici estremi, come visto, ha determinato la maggior parte dei nuovi spostamenti innescando, nel 2018, 17,2 milioni di nuovi ricollocamenti su 28 milioni; dislocamenti interni che geograficamente hanno interessato, soprattutto, l’Asia meridionale e orientale, accertato che Filippine (3,8), Cina (3,8) e India (2,7) hanno assorbito circa il 60% del totale di nuovi sfollati, principalmente sotto forma di evacuazioni. Al quarto posto seguono gli Stati Uniti, unico paese ad economia avanzata fra i primi 10, con 1,2 milioni di sfollati confermando da un lato che i fenomeni naturali estremi colpiscono soprattutto le zone tropicali asiatiche e il Sud del mondo in generale, dall’altro che i paesi sviluppati, anche che se localizzati prevalentemente nella fascia temperata, non ne sono di certo al riparo.


    #migrations #asile #réfugiés #réfugiés_environnementaux #réfugiés_climatiques #chiffres #statistiques #flux_migratoires

    ping @reka

    • Migrazioni climatiche (seconda parte)

      Le conseguenze dei cambiamenti climatici verranno pagate di più da chi ne ha meno responsabilità. Giustizia ambientale e giustizia climatica sono inscindibili.

      Le preoccupanti proiezioni future

      Appurata l’aggravarsi della crisi climatico-ambientale con i suoi riflessi sempre più rilevanti sulle condizioni di vita delle persone, il mondo scientifico, le istituzioni e le organizzazioni nazionali e internazionali vi stanno focalizzando in maniera crescente la loro attenzione con studi, dossier e convegni nel tentativo di indurre la leadership politica mondiale ad implementare efficaci strategie di contenimento del riscaldamento globale. Fra i vari, anche il rapporto dell’Ipcc [1], gruppo intergovernativo sul cambiamento climatico delle Nazioni Unite dell’8 agosto 2019, “Cambiamento climatico e territorio”, conferma che a seguito di fenomeni naturali sempre più frequenti e intensi aumenteranno sia la fame che le migrazioni. Le zone più vulnerabili saranno quelle tropicali e subtropicali: si prevede che in Asia e Africa si registri ad esempio il maggior numero di persone colpite dalla desertificazioni. Nell’area del Mediterraneo, come anche in Nord e Sud America, nell’Africa meridionale e nell’Asia centrale osserveremo invece un preoccupante aumento degli incendi. Conseguentemente, conclude il rapporto, il fenomeno delle migrazioni subirà gli effetti dei cambiamenti climatici, sia all’interno dei Paesi che fra paesi diversi, presagendo un inevitabile incremento degli spostamenti oltre frontiera.

      Della crescente rilevanza e gravità del fenomeno delle migrazioni ambientali sembra che stiano prendendo atto anche gli Stati che hanno iniziato, seppur recentemente, a discutere di inserire nelle politiche migratorie anche la sfera climatica e ambientale. In questa direzione deve essere interpretata la «Dichiarazione di New York su rifugiati e migranti», adottata il 19 settembre 2016 nell’ambito della 71°’Assemblea Generale delle Nazioni Unite, che ha formalmente riconosciuto l’impatto dei cambiamenti climatici e ambientali quali fattori significativi nelle migrazioni forzate.

      Un fenomeno destinato in futuro ad assumere maggiore consistenza, sia nella sua dimensione interna che internazionale, come denunciato anche dal rapporto emesso 19 marzo 2018 dalla Banca Mondiale, in base al quale entro il 2050, fino a 143 milioni di persone che attualmente vivono nei paesi dell’Africa Sub-sahariana (86 milioni), dell’Asia meridionale (40 milioni) e dell’America Latina (17 milioni), potrebbero infatti essere costrette a muoversi all’interno dei propri paesi, fuggendo dalle aree meno vitali con minore disponibilità idrica e produttività delle colture, o da zone che saranno colpite dall’innalzamento del livello del mare e dalle mareggiate, creando inevitabili problemi di gestione del fenomeno a governi già afflitti da rilevanti difficoltà economiche e sociali. Preoccupante scenario che, a grandi linee, ricalca quello previsto da Norman Myers negli anni ’90.

      Il razzismo ambientale

      Gli effetti della crisi climatico-ambientale non si declinano esclusivamente attraverso l’alterazione e la distruzione degli ecosistemi naturali ma anche tramite gli aspetti economici e sociali dell’ingiustizia ambientale. Un gruppo di studiosi che ha indagato le correlazioni fra cambiamenti climatici erazzismo ambientale,fra i quali l’autorevole ambientalista statunitense William Ernest «Bill» McKibben [2], osservando che la crisi sta incidendo, e probabilmente continuerà ad incidere, su alcuni gruppi sociali maggiormente che su altri, sono arrivati a comprovare che gli effetti più gravosi vengono subiti da coloro che hanno minori responsabilità in termini di emissioni e di consumi. Secondo le loro ricerche la traiettoria della disuguaglianza sociale si sviluppa conseguentemente a quella del degrado ambientale, pertanto più lasciamo che l’emergenza climatica si aggravi, più le disparità sociali ed economiche si amplieranno. Ad analoghe conclusioni sono giunti anche gli scienziati dell’Ipcc, i quali, sempre nel rapporto “Cambiamento climatico e territorio” evidenziano la dimensione sociale dei cambiamenti climatici affermando che «gli impatti del cambiamento climatico saranno più severi non solo per i più poveri, ma anche per (…) gli anziani, i giovani, i più vulnerabili, gli indigeni e gli immigrati recenti».

      Tale dinamica discriminatoria ha alimentato sin degli anni ‘80 il movimento di giustizia ambientale, che si è concentrato su una sfera particolare del degrado ambientale: il razzismo ambientale, o eco razzismo (eco racism). Termine che sta ad indicare il meccanismo in base al quale le comunità socialmente marginalizzate hanno accessibilità limitata, se non addirittura alcuna, ad acqua, aria e terra non contaminata.
      Il razzismo ambientale benché agisca su due dimensioni distinte, quella sociale e quella territoriale, evidenzia correlazioni fra i due ambiti. Infatti, da un lato, le discariche e gli impianti inquinanti tendono ad essere costruiti nelle aree di comunità marginalizzate, popolate da famiglie a basso reddito e da minoranze sociali con elevati tassi di disoccupazione, come ad esempio in Italia gli impianti siderurgici di Bagnoli e Taranto. Negli Stati Uniti esiste, invece, una dinamica declinata in particolare su una discriminazione di tipo razziale. Uno studio ventennale, condotto da Robert Bullard, noto come il padre della giustizia ambientale americana, ha analizzato le caratteristiche razziali e socio-economiche delle comunità che vivono nelle vicinanze di discariche di rifiuti tossici concludendo che un numero sproporzionato di afroamericani risiede in aree con strutture per lo smaltimento di rifiuti chimici. D’altra parte, nelle aree più colpite dagli effetti del cambiamento climatico vi risiedono le comunità marginalizzate dove la povertà aggrava la loro vulnerabilità, come confermato anche dal rapporto «Tendenze minoritarie e indigene 2019» del Minority Rights Group che affronta gli effetti del cambiamento climatico su minoranze e popolazioni indigene e dal quale si evince che a causa dell’ancestrale rapporto con la terra e l’ambiente in cui vivono (addirittura definita Pachamama, Madre Terra, dalle comunità amerindie), queste risultano le comunità più vulnerabili in assoluto.

      La nuova frontiera dell’Apartheid climatico

      Al concetto di razzismo ambientale o eco razzismo, si sta recentemente affiancando quello più articolato di Apartheid climatico poiché alle crescenti disparità socio-economiche globali si sovrappone, acuendone gli effetti, la differente capacità di risposta delle comunità di fronte alle conseguenze del riscaldamento globale. Come abbiamo precedentemente rilevato, tutte le aree geografiche terrestri risultano interessate, seppur con intensità e forme diverse, dagli effetti del riscaldamento globale e dei cambiamenti climatici, ma ciò che differenzia i vari stati e gruppi sociali interni appare la capacità di risposta a tali fenomeni che, infatti, risulta proporzionale alle risorse a disposizione per difendersene e contrastarle. Mentre gli stati a basso reddito, i gruppi sociali marginali ed i popoli autoctoni ne subiscono i maggiori effetti in quanto privi di capacità di adattamento e di mitigazione – come visto anche la sola migrazione – viceversa, come afferma anche il rapporto presentato lunedì 24 giugno 2019 al Consiglio per i Diritti Umani dell’Onu da Philip Alston [3], solo i paesi più sviluppati «riusciranno ad operare gli aggiustamenti necessari ad affrontare temperature sempre più estreme». Lo studio in questione, che supporta le proprie affermazioni su dati oggettivi, afferma che i cambiamenti climatici rischiano di annullare i progressi conseguiti a livello globale negli ultimi 50 anni per lo sviluppo, la salute e la lotta alla fame. Tali mutamenti produrranno, entro il 2030, almeno 120 milioni di nuovi poveri, mentre «i benestanti potranno pagare per sfuggire al surriscaldamento, alla fame e ai conflitti, il resto del pianeta sarà lasciato a soffrire». A tal proposito è stato introdotto dalla comunità scientifica il concetto di vulnerabilità che l’Ipcc definisce come “la propensione o predisposizione ad essere affetti negativamente” dai cambiamenti climatici, e “la mancanza di capacità di far fronte e adattarsi” a tali cambiamenti. Alla vulnerabilità è contrapposta la resilienza, vale a dire “la capacità dei sistemi sociali, economici e ambientali di far fronte a un evento, tendenza o disturbo pericoloso”.

      L’entità dell’impatto degli eventi climatici estremi risulta sovente proporzionale alle condizioni economiche e sociali, delle comunità colpite che, se in condizioni di fragilità, subiscono un aumento della vulnerabilità e una riduzione della capacità di adattamento a situazioni in fase di mutamento. Frequentemente i cambiamenti climatici amplificano, infatti, condizioni preesistenti di vulnerabilità socio-economica fungendo da acceleratori della povertà e dell’ingiustizia sociale. Le persone malate e ferite, i bambini, i disabili, gli anziani, sono spesso tra i sopravvissuti più gravemente colpiti dagli eventi estremi, soprattutto nei paesi meno sviluppati. Sono infatti principalmente le comunità dei Sud del mondo a subire le conseguenze degli effetti del degrado ambientale e dei cambiamenti climatici, vittime da un lato di fenomeni a cui hanno scarsamente contribuito, e dall’altro anche di attività di sfruttamento di risorse o della costruzione di infrastrutture figlie di un modello di sviluppo imposto con poca attenzione ai fabbisogni delle popolazioni locali. In molti casi, soprattutto in società rurali del Sud del mondo, tale vulnerabilità è stata prodotta o amplificata da politiche neocoloniali o di “sviluppo” e globalizzazione capitalista che hanno ridotto la varietà di colture, ridotto la fertilità dei suoli, creato dipendenza economica dall’esportazione di pochi prodotti, indebolito le strutture sociali tradizionali di reciprocità e mutuo supporto a livello locale, così come la capacità degli stati di rispondere a situazioni di emergenza e provvedere a servizi sociali di base come infrastrutture sanitarie e mediche. (D. Andreucci e A. Orlandi 2019). [4]

      In sintesi, riconducendo l’analisi a scala globale, il Sud del mondo che è responsabile del solo 10% delle emissioni, si prevede che dovrà subirne il 75% delle ricadute negative, precipitando di fatto in una situazione di “apartheid ambientale”. La riduzione delle emissioni non risulta pertanto una questione prettamente di carattere ambientale ma una strategia funzionale al rispetto dei diritti umani e sociali, in quanto giustizia sociale e giustizia climatica sono concetti interdipendenti ed i movimenti che le sostengono non possono agire separatamente se aspirano ad ottenere risultati tangibili.

      Dall’Antropocene al Capitalocene

      Il concetto di Antropocene, proposto per la prima volta negli anni ’80 dal biologo Eugene Stroener, ha iniziato a diffondersi, travalicando i confini disciplinari ed accademici, ad opera del premio Nobel per la chimica, Paul Crutzen, per rimarcare l’intensità e la pervasività che l’attività umana aveva assunto nei confronti del processi biologici terrestri (Crutzen, 2005). In ambito ambientalista il concetto evidenza invece il passaggio di stato del nostro Pianeta causato dal manifestarsi su scala globale della crisi climatico-ambientale di origine antropogenica, assurta ad elemento caratterizzante di una nuova era geologica. Tale accezione del concetto di Antropocene risulta tuttavia avulsa da significative connotazioni storico-politiche poiché rapporta il cambiamento climatico all’azione umana, nel suo complesso, senza distinzioni.

      La pluricausalità alla base dei flussi migratori contemporanei riconduce invece a fattori economici e sociali, oltre che a quelli ambientali, chiamando in causa le relazioni fra il Nord e il Sud del mondo e i concetti di giustizia sociale e ambientale legati, come visto, alla vulnerabilità e all’accesso alle risorse e, dunque, alle classi sociali di appartenenza.

      Una corrente accademica di pensiero e alcuni contesti scientifici sostengono che la crisi climatico-ambientale in atto sia il frutto del sistema economico dominante a livello mondiale, nel cui ambito la volontà di una parte nettamente minoritaria di popolazione mondiale di perpetrare lo sfruttamento delle risorse nell’intento di salvaguardare il proprio, ormai insostenibile, livello di consumi [5] (Bush figlio docet), si concretizza in un forte deficit ecologico che impatta, sotto varie forme, prevalentemente nelle aree geografiche economicamente e socialmente meno sviluppate. Prendere in considerazione esclusivamente gli aspetti climatici come causa migratoria significa di fatto rimuovere il ruolo e le responsabilità del sistema dominante di produzione e consumo, che secondo quest’area di studiosi, può assumere più opportunamente una denominazione di matrice geologica diversa: il Capitalocene (Moore, 2017).

      Questo nuovo concetto mette maggiormente in risalto gli aspetti degenerativi della struttura capitalistica che, in modo sempre più «classista», polarizza le vulnerabilità non solo intergenerazionali, in ottica futura, ma soprattutto quelle odierne all’interno e fra società diverse (Amato, 2019).

      Il sistema economico globalizzato, neoliberista e sviluppista, funziona da garanzia per il capitale transnazionale nell’ambito di un modello di sviluppo lineare fondato sul ciclo estrazione, produzione, consumo, sulla concentrazione di immensi profitti e la socializzazione dei costi ambientali. Tuttavia, l’adozione di politiche indirizzate verso un modello economico circolare (Circular economy) in grado parzialmente di rigenerarsi riducendo l’impatto sull’ecosistema terrestre può, a nostro avviso, non essere sufficiente a risolvere la triplice crisi in atto (ambientale, economica e sociale) in quanto non vengono messi in discussione i paradigmi della crescita economica infinita e dell’accumulazione capitalistica.

      La tematica del superamento delle strutture economiche e sociali del Capitalocene, con i suoi insostenibili modelli di produzione, di consumo e di ripartizione della ricchezza, si propone, alla luce della crisi ambientale sull’orlo del punto del non ritorno e delle disuguaglianze sociali sempre più marcate, in modo ancor più attuale, a causa dei suoi effetti degenerativi sempre più pervasivi, arrivati ormai a mettere a repentaglio il futuro del Pianeta e dell’intera umanità.


      [1] Intergovernmental Panel On Climate Change è il principale organismo internazionale per la valutazione dei cambiamenti climatici. È stato istituito nel 1988 dalla World Meteorological Organization (WMO) e dall’United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) come uno sforzo da parte delle Nazioni Unite per fornire ai governi di tutto il mondo una chiara visione scientifica dello stato attuale delle conoscenze sul cambiamento climatico e sui suoi potenziali impatti ambientali e socio-economici. Migliaia di scienziati di tutto il mondo contribuiscono al lavoro dell’IPCC, su base volontaria.

      [2] Bill McKibben autore primo libro sul cambiamento climatico (pubblicato nel 1989) e co-fondatore di «350.org».

      [3] Esperto di diritto internazionale e relatore speciale per le Nazioni Unite sulla povertà estrema.

      [4] Migranti e cambiamenti climatici. Chi emigra, perché e come intervenire per porvi rimedio?, 26 giugno 2019.

      [5] Come certificano i dati dell’impronta ecologica. L’impronta ecologica media pro capite mondiale sostenibile è 1,8 ha mente quella effettiva è invece di 2,7 ha. Fra i singoli paesi: Qatar (11,68), Kuwait (9,72), Emirati Arabi Uniti (8,44), Usa (8,1).


  • MOHAMED’S STORY. Escaping the #climate_conflict_trap

    MOHAMED’S STORY is based on more than 200 targeted interviews with a variety of religious, occupational and ethno-linguistic groups living around Lake Chad as well as satellite data-based long-term observation studies of the hydrology and climate variability of the lake. The research took place in Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Nigeria from November 2017 to June 2019.

    #BD #climat #asile #migrations #réfugiés #réfugiés_climatiques #réfugiés_environnementaux #lac_Tchad #changement_climatique #hydrologie #Niger #Tchad #Cameroun #Nigeria #conflit_climatique #guerre #conflits #bande_dessinée #piège

    Pour lire la BD complète et la télécharger :

    ping @karine4 @reka

  • New pact paves way for innovative solutions to disaster and climate change displacement in Africa

    People fleeing disasters and climate change will be able to seek safety in neighbouring countries under the pioneering deal.

    A breakthrough agreement to assist people fleeing natural hazards, disasters and climate change in eastern Africa was concluded this week. The deal not only allows those forced to flee disaster-affected countries to seek safety in neighbouring countries, but also ensures they will not be sent home until it safe and reasonable to return.

    The new agreement – the #IGAD_Free_Movement_Protocol – was endorsed by all seven Member States of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Khartoum on 26 February. The Protocol follows years of negotiations and consultations. It marks a significant step in addressing the protection gap for growing numbers of people worldwide displaced by disasters, who often do not qualify for refugee status or other forms of international protection.

    It is all the more poignant that the IGAD Free Movement Protocol takes in a region that includes some of the countries worst affected by drought, flooding and environmental degradation, including Somalia, Ethiopia and South Sudan. The combination of natural hazards and disasters with other challenges – including conflict, poverty and weak governance – makes dealing with displacement in this region a complex and multifaceted issue.

    The IGAD Protocol’s protection for people affected by disasters and climate change is broad. It facilitates entry and lawful stay for those who have been displaced. It also allows those at risk of displacement to move pre-emptively as a way of avoiding, or mitigating, the impacts of a disaster.

    It specifically provides for citizens of IGAD Member States to cross borders ‘in anticipation of, during or in the aftermath of disaster’, and enables disaster-affected people to remain in another country as long as return to their country of origin ‘is not possible or reasonable’.

    The IGAD Protocol could provide inspiration and impetus for the use of free movement elsewhere in Africa as well. In the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the East African Community (EAC), free movement agreements are already in place. But it is not yet clear how disaster-affected communities in these regions will access free movement arrangements, or be protected from rejection or return when crossing an international border.

    The need for African governments to further consider the role of free movement in addressing disaster and climate change displacement in Africa was the subject of a regional meeting in South Africa last year. Policymakers and experts agreed that free movement could provide some of the communities most vulnerable to climate change access to safety and opportunities for more sustainable livelihoods.

    One of the advantages of using free movement arrangements to address displacement is that it obviates the need to impose specific, and sometimes artificial, distinctions between those who move. While refugee protection depends on a person meeting the technical, legal criteria of a refugee, free movement is generally available to all citizens of Member States of the same region. In some cases, a passport is not even required – possession of a national identity card may be enough to facilitate entry and stay elsewhere.

    The progressive realisation of free movement is a continent-wide goal in Africa. The African Union (AU) ‘Agenda 2063’ sets out a vision of an integrated Africa, where people and goods move freely between countries. In 2018, the AU adopted the continent-wide Protocol Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment. The IGAD Protocol could provide a first step in supporting the other African regions and countries to develop specific frameworks and guidelines for the use of free movement in the context of disaster and climate change.

    For the potential of the IGAD Free Movement Protocol to be realised in reality, implementation is key. At present, regional and sub-regional free movement agreements across Africa’s various RECs may be undermined by restrictive laws and policies at the national level, or by onerous documentation requirements for those who move. The IGAD Roadmap to Implementation, adopted together with the Protocol, sets out specific measures to be taken by IGAD Member States when putting free movement arrangements into practice.

    The adoption of the IGAD Protocol presents a cause for celebration. It also presents a timely opportunity to further consider how countries in Africa can provide avenues to safety and security for the large, and increasing, numbers of people who move in the context of natural hazards, disasters and climate change. Action taken now could ensure the benefits of free movement for vulnerable communities well into the future.


    #réfugiés #réfugiés_climatiques #réfugiés_environnementaux #asile #migrations #changement_climatique #climat #pacte #accord #Afrique #sécheresse #inondations #dégradations_environnementales #Somalie #Ethiopie #Soudan_du_Sud #liberté_de_mouvement #liberté_de_circulation

    ping @karine4

  • The #Climate-Migration-Industrial_Complex

    Thirty years ago there were fifteen border walls around the world. Now there are seventy walls and over one billion national and international migrants. International migrants alone may even double in the next forty years due to global warming. It is not surprising that over the past two decades, we have also seen the rise of an increasingly powerful global climate-security market designed to profit from (and help sustain) these crises. The construction of walls and fences to block rising sea levels and incoming people has become one of the world’s fastest growing industries, alongside the detention and deportation of migrants, and is projected to reach $742 billion by 2023. I believe we are witnessing the emergence of what we might call a “climate-migration-industrial complex.”

    This complex is composed of private companies who profit by securitizing nation-states from the effects of climate-related events, including migration. This includes private detention centers, border construction companies, surveillance technology consultants and developers, deportation and transportation contractors, and a growing army of other subcontractors profiting from insecurity more broadly. Every feature of this crisis complex is an opportunity for profit. For example, even when security measures “fail” and migrants cross borders illegally, or remain beyond their visas to live without status as “criminals,” there is an entire wing of private companies paid to hunt them down, detain them, and deport them just across the border, where they can return and begin the market cycle all over again. Each step in the “crimmigration” process now has its own cottage industry and dedicated army of lobbyists to perpetuate the laws that support it.

    Here is the incredible double paradox that forms the backbone of the climate-migration-industrial complex: right-wing nationalists and their politicians claim they want to deport all undocumented migrants, but if they did, they would destroy their own economy. Capitalists, on the other hand, want to grow the economy with migrant labor (any honest economist will tell you that immigration almost always leads to growth in GDP), but if that labor is too expensive, then it’s not nearly as profitable.

    Trump is the Janus-faced embodiment of this anti-immigrant, pro-economy dilemma and the solution to it — not that he necessarily knows it. With one hand, migrant labor is strategically criminalized and devalorized by a xenophobic state, and with the other, it is securitized and hyper-exploited by the economy. It is a win-win situation for right-wing capitalists but a crucial element is still missing: what will continue to compel migrants to leave their homes and work as exploited criminals in an increasingly xenophobic country?

    This is where the figure of the climate migrant comes in. What we call “climate migrants” or “climate refugees” are not the victims of merely “natural disasters,” because climate change is not a strictly natural process — it is also highly political. The causes of climate-related migration are disproportionately produced by rich Western countries and the effects are disproportionately suffered by poorer countries. The circumstances that determine who is forced to migrate are also influenced by the history of colonialism, global inequality, and the same conditions that have propelled economic migration for decades. In short, the fact that climate change benefits the perpetrators of climate destruction by producing an increasing supply of desperate, criminalized, physically and economically displaced laborers is no coincidence. In fact, it is the key to the Trump “solution.”

    Another key is the use of climate change to acquire new land. When people are forced to migrate out of a territory, or when frozen territories thaw, new lands, waters, and forests become open to extractive industries like mining, drilling, fishing, and logging. Trump’s recent (and ridiculous) bid to buy the thawing territory of Greenland for its oil and gas reserves is one example of this. Climate-stricken urban areas open up new real estate markets, as the gentrification of New Orleans after hurricane Katrina illustrated. In other words, climate change might not mean the end of capitalism, but rather could actually signal its resurgence from current falling rates of ecological profit. During colonialism, everything and everyone that could be easily appropriated (oil, slaves, old-growth forests, etc.), was gobbled up. The workers who are left today under post-colonialism demand more money and more rights. The minerals left are more expensive to extract. This is why capitalists have increasingly retreated to financial speculation, and now to monetizing their own crises.

    If only there were new ways, the capitalist dreams, to kick start the economy and cheaply dislodge huge numbers of people from their land, devalorize their labor, and then appropriate that labor extremely cheaply. In other words, if climate change did not exist, capitalism would have to create it. Luckily for the capitalists, it does exist, because they did create it. Climate migrants now form what we might call a “disposable climate labor army,” conscripted out of a standing reserve of global poverty from wherever the next climate-related disaster strikes, and deployed wherever capitalism demands precarious, securitized, and criminalized labor to be exploited.

    We need to rethink the whole framing of the climate migration “crisis.” Among other things, we need a more movement-oriented political theory to grapple better with the highly mobile events of our time — what I call a “kinopolitics.” The advent of the Capitalocene/Kinocene makes possible today the insight that nature, humans, and society have always been in motion. Humans are and have always been fundamentally migratory, just as the climate and the earth are. These twin insights might sound obvious today, but if taken seriously, they offer a complete inversion of the dominant interpretive paradigms of the climate and migration crises.

    Humans and Earth have always been in motion, but not all patterns of motion are the same. There is no natural, normal, or default state of the earth or of human society. Therefore, we have to study the patterns of circulation that make possible these metastable states and not take them as given. This is what I have tried to work out in The Figure of the Migrant (2015) and Theory of the Border (2016). Unfortunately, the dominant framework for thinking about the climate and migrant crises is currently upside down. It starts from the perspective of a triple stasis: 1) that the earth and human society are in some sense separable and static, or at least stable, structures; 2) that the future should continue to be stable as well; and 3) that if there is not stability, then there is a “crisis.” Mobility, then, is a crisis only if we assume that there was or should be stasis in the first place. For example, migrants are said to destabilize society, and climate change is said to destabilize the earth.

    From a kinopolitical perspective, we can see that the opposite is, in fact, true: Humans were first migratory, and only later settled into more metastable patterns of social-circulation (made historically possible by the social expulsion and dispossession of others). Migrants are not outside society but have played a productive and reproductive role throughout history. Migrant movements are constitutive and even transformative elements of society, rather than exceptional or marginal phenomena. The real question is how we ever came to act and think as if societies were not processes of social circulation that relied on migration as their conditions of reproduction. The earth, too, was first migratory, and only later did it settle into metastable patterns of geological and atmospheric circulation (e.g. the Holocene). Why did we ever think of the earth as a stable surface, immune from human activity in the first place?

    The problem with the prevailing interpretation of climate change and migration is that the flawed paradigm that has defined the “crisis,” the notion of stasis, is also proposed as the solution “Let’s just get things back to normal stability again.” In short, I think a new paradigm is needed that does not use the same tools that generated the “crisis” to solve it — i.e. capitalism, colonialism, and the nation-state.

    Today’s migrant “crisis” is a product of the paradox at the heart of the capitalist, territorial nation-state form, just as the climate crisis is an expression of the paradox at the heart of anthropocentrism. The solutions, therefore, will not come from the forms in crisis but only from the birth of new forms-in-motion that begin with the theoretical primacy of the very characteristic that is dissolving the old forms: the inherent mobility of the migrant climate and the climate migrant.


    #complexe_militaro-industriel #réfugiés_environnementaux #réfugiés_climatiques #murs #barrières_frontalières #business #climat #changement_climatique #sécurité #rétention #détention_administrative #privatisation #contrôles_frontaliers #kinopolitics #kinopolitique #kinocène #mobilité #circulation #crise #stabilité #philosophie #ressources_pédagogiques #Etat-nation


    #catastrophes_naturelles :

    What we call “climate migrants” or “climate refugees” are not the victims of merely “natural disasters,” because climate change is not a strictly natural process — it is also highly political. The causes of climate-related migration are disproportionately produced by rich Western countries and the effects are disproportionately suffered by poorer countries. The circumstances that determine who is forced to migrate are also influenced by the history of colonialism, global inequality, and the same conditions that have propelled economic migration for decades. In short, the fact that climate change benefits the perpetrators of climate destruction by producing an increasing supply of desperate, criminalized, physically and economically displaced laborers is no coincidence.

    –-> @karine4

    #terres #accaparement_des_terres :

    Another key is the use of climate change to acquire new land. When people are forced to migrate out of a territory, or when frozen territories thaw, new lands, waters, and forests become open to extractive industries like mining, drilling, fishing, and logging.

    –-> @odilon
    #extractivisme #colonialisme


    @sinehebdo, un nouveau mot :
    –-> #crimmigration
    #mots #terminologie #vocabulaire

    Et aussi... la #kinocène


    Lien avec le #capitalisme :

    If only there were new ways, the capitalist dreams, to kick start the economy and cheaply dislodge huge numbers of people from their land, devalorize their labor, and then appropriate that labor extremely cheaply. In other words, if climate change did not exist, capitalism would have to create it. Luckily for the capitalists, it does exist, because they did create it. Climate migrants now form what we might call a “disposable climate labor army,” conscripted out of a standing reserve of global poverty from wherever the next climate-related disaster strikes, and deployed wherever capitalism demands precarious, securitized, and criminalized labor to be exploited.

    #expoitation #travail #disposable_climate_labor_army #pauvreté

    signalé par @isskein

    ping @fil @reka

  • Weak links: Challenging the climate & migration paradigm in the Horn of Africa & Yemen

    When mobility drivers are scrutinised and climate change is found to play a role in movement, it remains difficult to determine the extent of its influence. This paper will show that although conditions in the Horn of Africa and Yemen are variously characterised by conflict, authoritarian regimes, poor governance, poverty, and mass displacement, along with harsh environments that produce negative climate change impacts, there is scant evidence that these impacts cause intercontinental and interregional mixed migration. The linkages are hard to locate. Climate change and environmental stressors cannot easily be disaggregated from the wide range of factors affecting populations, and even where some disaggregation is evident the results are not seen in the volume, direction, or destination choices of those affected.

    #rapport #immobilité #immobilité_involontaire #mobilité #migrations #réfugiés_climatiques #réfugiés_environnementaux #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Corne_de_l'Afrique #Yémen #changement_climatique #climat #mixed_migration_centre

    –-> citation:
    “There is a strong likelihood that involuntary immobility will become the biggest and most relevant issue in the Horn of Africa when it comes to the link between environmental stress and mobility”

    –-> Cette idée de “involuntary immobility” me semble très intéressante à amener car le discours ambiant se focalise sur “migration subie/choisie” "migration volontaire/forcée"...
    #catégorie #catégorisation (ping @karine4)
    #migration_subie #migration_choisie #migration_volontaire #migration_forcée

    ping @reka

  • Davos: World needs to prepare for ’millions’ of climate refugees

    Richer countries may become a rising source of refugees as climate change forces people to flee their countries.

    The world needs to prepare for a surge in refugees with potentially millions of people being driven from their homes by the impact of climate change, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees said on Tuesday.

    Speaking to Reuters at the #World_Economic_Forum in Davos, Switzerland, UN Commissioner Filippo Grandi said a UN ruling this week meant those fleeing as a result of climate change had to be treated by recipient countries as refugees, with broad implications for governments.

    The UN Human Rights Committee made the landmark ruling on Monday in relation to refugee-status applicant #Ioane_Teitiota, a man from the Pacific nation of #Kiribati who brought a case against New Zealand after authorities denied his claim of asylum.

    “The ruling says if you have an immediate threat to your life due to climate change, due to the climate emergency, and if you cross the border and go to another country, you should not be sent back because you would be at risk of your life, just like in a war or in a situation of persecution,” Grandi said.

    “We must be prepared for a large surge of people moving against their will,” he said. “I wouldn’t venture to talk about specific numbers. It’s too speculative, but certainly we’re talking about millions here.”

    Potential drivers of migration include wildfires like those seen in Australia, rising sea levels affecting low-lying islands, the destruction of crops and livestock in sub-Saharan Africa, and floods worldwide, including in parts of the developed world.

    For most of its 70 years, UNHCR, the UN’s refugee agency, has worked to assist those fleeing poorer countries as a result of conflict. But climate change is more indiscriminate, meaning richer countries may become a rising source of refugees.

    “It is further proof that refugee movements and the broader issue of migration of populations ... is a global challenge that cannot be confined to a few countries,” said Grandi.

    The UNHCR’s budget has risen from $1bn a year in the early 1990s to $8.6bn in 2019 as conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria have forced civilians to flee, and the agency now assists more than 70 million forcibly displaced people globally.

    Turkey is the largest recipient of this aid, with more than four million refugees and asylum seekers, the vast majority from Syria. This has strained Turkey’s public finances and led President Tayyip Erdogan to demand more assistance from Europe.

    Last November, Erdogan threatened to open the door for Syrian refugees to head to Europe unless the European Union stepped up. He is now calling for the “resettlement” of up to one million Syrians in the north of their homeland.

    Grandi said European governments needed to think hard about solutions to the migrant crisis that has affected them since 2015 - but also show more understanding of Turkey’s situation.

    “We must recognise that for the past several years [Turkey] has been hosting the largest refugee population in the world,” he said. “There’s a lot of political talk. I concentrate on the substance of this, which is ’let’s strengthen Turkey’s ability to host refugees until they can go back safely, voluntarily to their countries’.”

    #réfugiés_climatique #réfugiés_environnementaux #Davos #HCR #WEF

  • Historic UN Human Rights case opens door to climate change asylum claims

    In its first ruling on a complaint by an individual seeking asylum from the effects of climate change, the UN Human Rights Committee* has stated that countries may not deport individuals who face climate change-induced conditions that violate the right to life.

    In 2015, #Ioane_Teitiota ’s asylum application in New Zealand was denied, and he was deported with his wife and children to his home country of #Kiribati. He filed a complaint to the UN Human Rights Committee, arguing that by deporting him, New Zealand had violated his right to life. Mr. Teitiota argued that the rise in sea level and other effects of climate change had rendered Kiribati uninhabitable for all its residents. Violent land disputes occurred because habitable land was becoming increasingly scarce. Environmental degradation made subsistence farming difficult, and the freshwater supply was contaminated by salt water.

    The Committee determined that in Mr. Teitiota’s specific case, New Zealand’s courts did not violate his right to life at the time of the facts, because the thorough and careful evaluation of his testimony and other available information led to the determination that, despite the serious situation in Kiribati, sufficient protection measures were put in place. “Nevertheless,” said Committee expert Yuval Shany, “this ruling sets forth new standards that could facilitate the success of future climate change-related asylum claims.”

    The Committee also clarified that individuals seeking asylum status are not required to prove that they would face imminent harm if returned to their countries. The Committee reasoned that climate change-induced harm can occur both through sudden-onset events (such as intense storms and flooding), and slow-onset processes (such as sea level rise, salinization and land degradation). Both sudden-onset events and slow-onset processes can prompt individuals to cross borders to seek protection from climate change-related harm.

    The Committee also highlighted the role that the international community must play in assisting countries adversely affected by climate change. The Committee stated that without robust national and international efforts, the effects of climate change in sending states may trigger the #non-refoulement obligations of receiving states and that – given that the risk of an entire country becoming submerged under water is such an extreme risk – the conditions of life in such a country may become incompatible with the right to life with dignity before the risk is realized.

    The ruling marks the first decision by a UN human rights treaty body on a complaint by an individual seeking asylum protection from the effects of climate change.

    See the full Human Rights Committee ruling here: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016&Lang=en


    #réfugiés #asile #migrations #réfugiés_climatiques #réfugiés_environnementaux #UN #ONU #renvois #expulsions #refoulement #Nouvelle_Zélande #justice #droit_à_la_vie #inhabitabilité #dignité

    Sur ce cas, déjà signalé sur seenthis:
    En 2015: https://seenthis.net/messages/391645
    En 2013: https://seenthis.net/messages/187732

    ping @isskein @karine4 @reka

  • Climate change ’impacts women more than men’ - BBC News

    Women are more likely than men to be affected by climate change, studies show.

    UN figures indicate that 80% of people displaced by climate change are women.

    Roles as primary caregivers and providers of food and fuel make them more vulnerable when flooding and drought occur.

  • “You can’t make a living here anymore.” The Honduran climate-movers

    Te espero como la lluvia de mayo. I wait for you like the rain of May — a popular refrain among farmers in Central America, where the first rainfall in May long signaled the end of the dry season. But over the past decade, in what is known as the Central American Dry Corridor — a vast swath that stretches, unbroken, from Guatemala to northern Costa Rica — the rain is no longer guaranteed. Farmers who used to count on two harvests every year are now fortunate to get one.

    In southern Honduras, valleys that were once lush and fertile are now filled with stunted cornstalks and parched riverbeds. Adobe shacks erode on mountainsides, abandoned by those who left with no intention of returning.

    The droughts have forced entire generations to migrate in search of jobs; left behind are the elderly, who often care for grandchildren when their parents depart. “You can’t make a living here anymore,” says José Tomás Aplicano, who is 76 and a lifelong resident of Apacilagua, a village in southern Honduras. Aplicano has watched as countless neighbors, and his own children, moved away. His youngest daughter, Maryori, is the last to stay behind, but he knows she will leave as soon as she finishes high school. “She has to look for another environment to see if she finds work to survive,” he says.

    Many head north; U.S. Customs and Border Patrol data shows that migration from the Dry Corridor has spiked over the past few years. Some spend seasons harvesting coffee or sugar cane in less affected areas of the country. Others move to the city, lured by the prospect of a factory job with steady pay.

    #photographie #changement_climatique #migrations #réfugiés_environnementaux #réfugiés_climatiques #réfugiés #asile #sécheresse

    Et un nouveau mot, en anglais:
    #terminologie #mots #vocabulaire
    ping @sinehebdo


    see as well:
    Why the Migrant Caravan Story Is a Climate Change Story

  • Let’s Talk About Climate Migrants, Not Climate Refugees

    “At first, we woke up to the sound of the wind and right after that the water came streaming into our house. We only managed to grab our children and run away to an area which lies on higher ground,” explains Rafael Domingo, a father of four in Mozambique, where Cyclone Idai left more than 73,000 people homeless in March 2019.

    In 2018 alone, 17.2 million new displacements associated with disasters in 148 countries and territories were recorded (IDMC) and 764,000 people in Somalia, Afghanistan and several other countries were displaced following drought (IOM).

    “Many people who were displaced cannot return home. The drought in Somalia is happening all the time. People have no way to recover,” said Halima, a 30-year-old mother of three displaced in Somalia because of the drought.

    Climate migrants have been invisible for many years on the migration and climate debates. Our work at IOM has been focused for over 10 years on bringing climatic and environmental factors to the light and on building a body of evidence proving that climate change affects – directly and indirectly – human mobility.

    Hence, it might seem paradoxical in this context not to encourage the establishment of a climate specific legal status, parallel to the existing refugees’ status.

    However, while the available evidence on how climate change and environmental degradation affect human mobility is growing and is uncontested, the current focus of the debate on establishing a climate refugee status can lead to a narrow and biased debate and would provide only partial solutions to address the complexity of human mobility and climate change.

    Media are pushing again and again for features on “climate refugees” and request projections on how many climate refugees there will be in twenty years. In contrast, some emblematic small island States, among others, speak out that they do not wish to become climate refugees; they want to be able to stay in their homes, or to move in dignity and through regular channels without abandoning everything behind.

    “When the grass is not enough, movement increases. In the spring, many migrants moved from the south to the north. There is no other way to overcome climate change. All the people wish to survive with their animals and come to a place where they can fatten their livestock,” said Mr. Chinbat, a herder of Sergelen soum in Mongolia, where the adverse effects of climate change are impacting the migration of herders.

    The image of “climate refugees” resonates metaphorically to all as it mirrors the current images we see of those escaping wars and conflicts. With the threat of climate change we imagine millions becoming refugees in the future.

    Yet reducing the issue of migration in the context of climate change to the status of “climate refugees” fails to recognize a number of key aspects that define human mobility in the context of climate change and environmental degradation. Here are 10 of these aspects:

    Climate migration is mainly internal: when migration is internal, people moving are under the responsibility of their own state, they do not cross borders and are not seeking protection from a third country or at the international level.
    Migration is not necessarily forced, especially for very slow onset processes migration is still a matter of choice, even if constrained, so countries need to think first migration management and agreements rather than refugee protection.
    Isolating environment/climatic reasons is difficult, in particular from humanitarian, political, social, conflict or economic ones. It can sometimes be an impossible task and may lead to long and unrealistic legal procedures.
    Creating a special refugee status for climate change related reasons might unfortunately have the opposite effects of what is sought as a solution: it can lead to the exclusion of categories of people who are in need of protection, especially the poorest migrants who move because of a mix of factors and would not be able to prove the link to climate and environmental factors.
    Opening the 1951 Refugee Convention might weaken the refugee status which would be tragic given the state of our world where so many people are in need of protection because of persecution and ongoing conflicts.
    Creating a new convention might be a terribly lengthy political process and countries might not have an appetite for it. Many responses can come from migration management and policy as highlighted already in the 2011 International Dialogue on Migration and the recently adopted Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. The Nansen Initiative that was launched to look at gaps in protection for people being displaced across borders by disasters, after undertaking thematic and regional consultations also concluded with a document that proposes a “toolkit” of migration policies rather than recommending the establishment of a new status for these people.
    Climate migration discussions should not lose their focus on preventive measures: the key objective of our generation is to invest in climate and environmental solutions for our planet so that people will not have to leave their homes in a forced way in the future. The Paris Agreement offers anchorage for climate action that considers human mobility to avert, minimize and address displacement in the context of climate change.
    IOM encourages the full use of all already existing bodies of laws and instruments, both hard and soft law in humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, instruments on internal displacement, disaster management, legal migration and others.
    Human rights-based approaches are key for addressing climate migration: states of origin bear the primary responsibility for their citizens’ protection even if indeed their countries have not been the main contributors to global warming; they should therefore apply human rights-based approaches for their citizens moving because of environmental or climatic drivers.
    Regular migration pathways can provide relevant protection for climate migrants and facilitate migration strategies in response to environmental factors. Many migration management solutions are available to respond to challenges posed by climate change, environmental degradation and disasters in terms of international migratory movements and can provide a status for people who move in the context of climate change impacts, such as humanitarian visas, temporary protection, authorization to stay, regional and bilateral free movements’ agreements, among several others.

    #migrants_environnementaux #réfugiés_environnementaux
    #terminologie #vocabulaire #mots #terminologie #déplacés_internes #IDPs

    ping @sinehebdo @reka @karine4 @isskein

  • El clima cambiante obliga a emigrar a los guatemaltecos desesperados

    Eduardo Méndez López alza la vista al cielo esperando ver nubes cargadas de lluvia.

    Tras meses subsistiendo casi exclusivamente a base de tortillas de maíz y sal, sus ojos y sus mejillas parecen hundidos, y solo una piel fina se extiende sobre el hueso. La mayoría de sus vecinos tienen ese mismo aspecto.

    Es el punto álgido de la estación lluviosa en Guatemala, pero en la aldea de Conacaste, Chiquimula, las precipitaciones llegaron meses más tarde y, a continuación, se detuvieron. Los cultivos de Méndez López se marchitaron y murieron antes de poder producir maíz. Ahora, con un suministro de alimentos menguante y sin fuentes de ingresos, se pregunta cómo podrá alimentar a sus seis hijos pequeños.

    «Es la peor sequía que hemos tenido», afirma Méndez López, tocando la tierra seca con la punta de la bota. «Lo hemos perdido absolutamente todo. Si las cosas no mejoran, tendremos que emigrar a otra parte. No podemos seguir así».

    Guatemala suele aparecer en la lista de los 10 países más vulnerables del mundo a los efectos del cambio climático. Los patrones climáticos cada vez más erráticos han provocado pérdidas de cosechas año tras año y la disminución de las oportunidades laborales en el país, haciendo que cada vez más personas como Méndez López piensen en la emigración como medida desesperada para huir de los niveles disparados de inseguridad alimentaria y pobreza.

    De media, en la última década, 24 millones de personas al año se han visto desplazadas por los fenómenos meteorológicos en el mundo y, aunque no está claro cuántos desplazamientos pueden atribuirse al cambio climático antropogénico, los expertos prevén que esta cifra seguirá aumentando.

    Cada vez más, los desplazados intentan trasladarse a otros países como «refugiados del cambio climático», pero existe un problema: la Convención sobre el Estatuto de los Refugiados de 1951, que define los derechos de las personas desplazadas, aporta una lista de elementos de los que deben huir las personas para que se les garantice asilo o refugio. El cambio climático no figura en la lista.

    Los datos de la Oficina de Aduanas y Protección Fronteriza de los Estados Unidos muestran un gran aumento de la cantidad de inmigrantes guatemaltecos, sobre todo familias y menores no acompañados, interceptados en la frontera estadounidense a partir de 2014. No es una coincidencia que este repunte haya tenido lugar junto con la aparición de condiciones graves de sequía relacionadas con El Niño en el Corredor Seco de Centroamérica, que se extiende por Guatemala, Honduras y El Salvador.

    Para entender la tendencia alcista en la emigración de esta región, un gran estudio interinstitucional dirigido por el Programa Mundial de Alimentos (PMA) de la ONU ha entrevistado a familias de distritos fundamentales del Corredor Seco acerca de las presiones que les obligan a marcharse. El principal «factor impulsor» identificado no fue la violencia, sino la sequía y sus consecuencias: falta de alimento, de dinero y de trabajo.

    Sus hallazgos sugieren una relación clara entre la variabilidad climática, la inseguridad alimentaria y la migración, y aportan una perspectiva alarmante de lo que está por venir al empezar a observar efectos reales del cambio climático en el mundo.
    ¿Un país en crisis?

    Para Diego Recalde, director de la FAO en Guatemala, la tendencia actual de migración masiva ante la inseguridad alimentaria y la sequía supone un claro indicador de que el país lleva un tiempo acercándose a una crisis inducida por el cambio climático.

    Las condiciones climáticas adversas en Guatemala afectan a la seguridad alimentaria reduciendo la producción agrícola tanto en la agricultura comercial como en la de subsistencia, limitando las oportunidades laborales en la agricultura que también suponen una parte importante de la economía nacional. Las crecientes tasas de pobreza y el hundimiento de los indicadores sociales pintan una perspectiva funesta para el país, que posee el cuarto nivel más alto de desnutrición crónica en el mundo y el más alto en Latinoamérica. Según el Programa Mundial de Alimentos, se considera que casi el 50 por ciento de los niños menores de cinco años sufren desnutrición crónica en Guatemala, porcentaje que alcanza el 90 por ciento o más en muchas zonas rurales.

    Para los agricultores de subsistencia como Méndez López, que dependen de las precipitaciones para producir los alimentos que comen, solo hacen falta unos pocos meses de patrones climáticos erráticos para limitar u obstaculizar por completo su capacidad de poner comida sobre la mesa. Con el aumento de la frecuencia y la gravedad de las sequías, a Recalde le preocupa que, en el caso de los sectores de población más vulnerables, lo peor esté aún por llegar.

    «Es un desastre nacional», afirma. «Debería haber banderas rojas por todas partes».

    Los científicos atribuyen las inusuales sequías que comenzaron en 2014 y que han acelerado el éxodo de familias hacia el norte a los efectos de El Niño, parte de un ciclo climático natural conocido como El Niño-Oscilación del Sur (ENOS), que provoca oscilaciones entre periodos más fríos y húmedos y otros más cálidos y secos en todo el mundo.
    La erupción del volcán Fuego cubre Guatemala de ceniza y roca

    Este tipo de variabilidad climática natural ha afectado a Guatemala y a otros países Centroamericanos durante cientos —si no miles— de años, llegando a desempeñar un papel en las sequías que acompañaron al derrumbe de la antigua civilización maya.

    «El clima siempre ha sido muy variable aquí», explica Edwin Castellanos, director del Centro para el Estudio del Medio Ambiente y la Biodiversidad en la Universidad del Valle en Guatemala. «Ahora, el problema es que El Niño y La Niña se han vuelto más fuertes e intensos, pero también más erráticos».
    ¿Es culpa del cambio climático?

    Aunque puede parecer que el cambio climático es el impulsor de estas bruscas oscilaciones meteorológicas, es importante distinguir los periodos de variabilidad climática y las modificaciones a largo plazo del cambio climático. Este último se convierte enseguida en una cuestión de política, negociaciones internacionales y reclamaciones por daños y pérdidas según el Acuerdo de París.

    Aunque los científicos saben que El Niño contribuye a los aumentos de la temperatura global, todavía no está claro si el cambio climático antropogénico hace que El Niño se intensifique y ocurra con más frecuencia.

    «Por definición, el cambio climático debería modelarse en periodos de 50 años. Pero lo que los modelos dicen que debería ocurrir en 2050 ya ocurre ahora», afirma Castellanos, refiriéndose a las alteraciones de los patrones de precipitaciones y los niveles de aridez en Guatemala. «La pregunta es: ¿es la variabilidad más alta de lo normal?».

    La falta de datos meteorológicos históricos hace que sea más difícil demostrar la existencia de un vínculo claro entre el cambio climático antropogénico y un aumento de la variabilidad climática. Sin embargo, Castellanos, uno de los principales expertos en cambio climático de Guatemala, cree que es complicado ignorar la transformación que ha visto de primera mano a lo largo de su vida.

    «Todavía nos queda mucho camino por recorrer antes de concluir científicamente que lo que observamos ahora está fuera de lo normal. Pero si sales al campo y preguntas a cualquiera si esto es normal, todo el mundo te dice que no».

    Ya se atribuya a El Niño o al calentamiento global, la situación en Guatemala pinta una perspectiva vívida de las vulnerabilidades que quedan expuestas cuando las sociedades carecen de la capacidad para hacer frente y adaptarse al clima cambiante.
    Economía vulnerable, aldeas vulnerables

    En años anteriores, las familias afectadas por un mal año de cosechas buscaban trabajo como temporeros en explotaciones comerciales y ganaban el dinero suficiente para comprar alimentos básicos como maíz y judías. Pero este año no hay trabajo. Hasta las explotaciones agrícolas comerciales consolidadas se han visto afectadas por la sequía de este año, un presagio de que surgirán mayores problemas a medida que los cultivos sensibles al clima que componen la mayor parte de las exportaciones agrícolas fundamentales (y del mercado laboral nacional) de Guatemala sufren los efectos del aumento de las temperaturas y los desastres vinculados al clima, cada vez más frecuentes.

    Hoy, hacia el final de otra «estación lluviosa» que no ha traído lluvias, muchas comunidades rurales parecen estar atrapadas en una vorágine catastrófica vertiginosa. Años de meteorología errática, cosechas perdidas y una escasez crónica de oportunidades de empleo han erosionado poco a poco las estrategias que las familias guatemaltecas habían conseguido usar para hacer frente a uno o dos años de sequías sucesivas y cosechas perdidas. Pero ahora, aldeas enteras parecen estar derrumbándose desde dentro a medida que cada vez más comunidades se quedan aisladas, a horas de la ciudad más cercana, sin alimento, trabajo o forma de buscar ayuda.

    «No hay transporte. La gente se ha quedado sin dinero para pagar las tarifas, de forma que los autobuses ya no pasan por aquí», afirma José René Súchite Ramos de El Potrerito, Chiquimula. «Queremos irnos, pero no podemos».

    Muchos describen la situación actual como la más desesperada que han vivido nunca. En el asentamiento de Plan de Jocote, Chiquimula, los cultivos de Gloria Díaz no han producido maíz.

    «Aquí, al 95 por ciento nos han afectado las sequías que comenzaron en 2014, pero este año lo hemos perdido todo, hasta las semillas», afirma Díaz. «Nos hemos quedado atrapados, sin salida. No podemos planificar la segunda cosecha y nos hemos quedado sin los recursos que teníamos para poder comer».

    Como otros miembros de su comunidad, Díaz ha recurrido a buscar raíces de malanga en la naturaleza en un intento por mantener a raya el hambre, pero estas también escasean. Sin una fuente fiable de agua potable, los brotes de diarrea y sarpullidos son cada vez más habituales, sobre todo entre los niños.

    En el departamento vecino de El Progreso, la hermana Edna Morales pasa muchos días recorriendo en burro las montañas secas que rodean la pequeña localidad de San Agustín Acasaguastlán en busca de niños desnutridos cuyas familias son demasiado pobres o estén demasiado débiles para buscar ayuda. En la actualidad, el centro de alimentación nutricional que dirige funciona a plena capacidad.

    «Estos niños tienen muchos problemas de salud que se ven agravados por una grave desnutrición crónica. Se les cae el pelo o son incapaces de caminar», explica. «Cuando vives aquí, se oye hablar de muchos casos de niños que mueren de desnutrición. Ni siquiera aparecen en las noticias».

    No son solo los niños quienes sufren las consecuencias de la grave escasez de alimento y la pobreza aplastante. En Chiquimula, Díaz muestra una antigua fotografía de grupo de la organización comunitaria que preside, la Asociación de Mujeres Progresistas del Sector Plan del Jocote. Señala una por una a las mujeres que han fallecido o que están muriendo lentamente por causas evitables que la pobreza extrema y la desnutrición han vuelto intratables.

    Cuando los agricultores de subsistencia pierden sus cosechas, se ven obligados a comprar los alimentos básicos que acostumbran a cultivar —normalmente a precios muy inflados— para dar de comer a sus familias. Sin una fuente de ingresos, este gasto adicional deja a muchos sin los recursos económicos para permitirse otras necesidades básicas como las medicinas o el transporte a centros médicos.

    A medida que el hambre obliga a padres desesperados a recurrir a medidas desesperadas para alimentar a sus familias, los robos y los ataques violentos se han disparado.

    «Gente de nuestra propia comunidad empieza a robar a otras personas porque es la única opción que tienen», afirma Marco Antonio Vásquez, líder comunitario de la aldea de El Ingeniero en Chiquimula.
    Migraciones masivas

    Muchos consideran la emigración la última opción, por sus enormes riesgos para la seguridad personal y las consecuencias impensables si son incapaces de completar su viaje.

    «Mucha gente se marcha, mucha más que nunca», afirma Vásquez. «Se van a Estados Unidos en busca de un nuevo futuro, llevándose consigo a los niños pequeños porque tienen la presión de arriesgarlo todo».

    Quienes tienen casas o pequeñas parcelas de tierra las usan como aval para pagar a los contrabandistas humanos conocidos como «coyotes» entre 8.800 y 13.000 euros a cambio de tres oportunidades para atravesar la frontera hacia Estados Unidos. Pero familias de las regiones más pobres del país suelen verse obligadas a escoger la opción con las mínimas garantías y los mayores riesgos: ir solos, normalmente con niños pequeños a cuestas.

    En Ciudad de Guatemala, dos o tres aviones aterrizan cada día en la base de la Fuerza Aérea guatemalteca, cada uno con unos 150 ciudadanos guatemaltecos que han sido deportados o interceptados mientras intentaban cruzar a Estados Unidos. Muchos huyen del hambre y la pobreza extrema de su país natal.

    Ernesto, que nos pidió que cambiáramos su nombre, parecía agotado mientras esperaba en la fila para recoger una pequeña bolsa que contiene las pertenencias que le arrebataron cuando le interceptaron en la frontera estadounidense: sus cordones, un teléfono móvil maltrecho y una pequeña biblia. Su familia en Guatemala había puesto en juego su hogar y su subsistencia con la esperanza de que lograra cruzar y encontrara trabajo en Estados Unidos, lo que le permitiría apoyar a su familia. Era la segunda vez que lo deportaban.

    «Me queda una oportunidad. Si no lo consigo, estaré en graves problemas».


    #climat #changement_climatique #migrations #émigrations #Guatemala #réfugiés_climatiques #réfugiés_environnementaux

  • Bangladesh’s disappearing river lands

    ‘If the river starts eroding again, this area will be wiped off’.

    Every year in Bangladesh, thousands of hectares of land crumble into the rivers that wind through this South Asian nation, swallowing homes and pushing families away from their rural villages.

    This land erosion peaks during the June-to-October monsoon season, which brings torrential rains and swells the country’s rivers. This year, erosion destroyed the homes of at least 8,000 people in Bangladesh’s northern districts during heavy July floods that swept through the region and displaced at least 300,000 people across the country. Hundreds more households have been stranded in recent days.

    Rita Begum understands the dangers. Last year, she was one of some 44,000 people in Shariatpur, an impoverished district south of the capital, Dhaka, who lost their homes in what people here say was the worst erosion in seven years. Over four months, the Padma River gobbled up two square kilometres of silt land in Naria, a sub-district.

    Rita, a 51-year-old widow, saw her home and garden destroyed. Now, she lives on rented land in a makeshift shed pieced together with iron sheeting from the remnants of her old house.

    “I have no soil beneath my feet,” she said. “My relatives’ homes are now under water too.”

    Erosion has long been a part of life in Bangladesh, which sits on a massive river delta. The Padma’s rushing waters constantly shift and transform the shape of the river, eating away at its sandy banks. Deforestation, weather extremes, strong currents, and the accumulation of silt all contribute to erosion. But researchers say a warming climate is accelerating today’s risks by intensifying rains and floods – sinking communities deeper into poverty.

    The UN says Bangladesh is one of the world’s most vulnerable to climate change – and one of the least prepared for the rising sea levels, weather extremes, and food security threats that could follow.

    And the World Bank estimates there could be 13 million climate migrants here halfway through this century.

    Now, she lives on rented land in a makeshift shed pieced together with iron sheeting from the remnants of her old house.

    Bangladesh already faces frequent disasters, yet the yearly crises ignited by erosion see little of the spotlight compared to monsoon floods, landslides, and cyclones.

    “Even our policymakers don’t care about it, let alone the international community,” said Abu Syed, a scientist and a contributing author of a report by the UN body assessing climate research.

    But erosion is quietly and permanently altering Bangladesh’s landscape. From 1973 through 2017, Bangladesh’s three major rivers – the Padma, the Meghna, and the Jamuna – have engulfed more than 160,000 hectares of land, according to statistics provided by the UN. That’s roughly five times the land mass of the country’s capital.

    And the Centre for Environmental and Geographic Information Services, a government think-tank, forecasts that erosion could eat up another 4,500 hectares by the end of 2020, potentially displacing another 45,000 people.

    Experts who study Bangladesh’s rivers say the government response to erosion, while improving, has largely been ad hoc and temporary – sandbags thrown against already crumbling land, for example, rather than forward-looking planning to better adapt to the waterways.

    And many who have already lost their homes to erosion, like Rita, have struggled to rebuild their lives without land, or have been forced to join the 300,000 to 400,000 people each year estimated to migrate to teeming Dhaka driven in part by environmental pressures.

    Disaster deepens poverty, fuels migration

    Today Rita shares her shed with her three sons; she’s just scraping by, earning the equivalent of less than $4 a month as a maid. There is no running water or sanitation: Rita treks down a steep slope to fetch water from the same river that devoured her home.

    In nearby Kedarpur village, Aklima Begum, 57, lost not only her home, but her rickshaw-puller husband, who died when a chunk of earth crumpled from beneath a riverside market last August. The sudden collapse washed away 29 people, though some were later rescued.

    “We didn’t find his body,” Aklima said.

    Last year’s disaster has had a lasting impact on both rich and poor here. Year Baksh Laskar, a local businessman, saw most of his house vanish into the river, but he invited 70 neighbouring families to set up makeshift homes on his remaining land.

    “They are helpless,” he said. “Where will these people go?”

    With homes and farmland disappeared, many in the area have left for good, according to Hafez Mohammad Sanaullah, a local government representative.

    “This erosion is severe. People got scattered,” he said.

    Humanitarian aid helped to prevent hunger in the disaster’s aftermath last year, but emergency support doesn’t fix longer-term problems faced by a landless community. Sanaullah singled out housing and jobs as the two biggest problems: “People who used to do farming can’t do it any longer,” he said.

    Babur Ali, the municipality’s mayor, estimated at least 10 percent of the people displaced by last year’s erosion have moved to Dhaka or other urban areas in Bangladesh.

    The government’s Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief, which oversees response and recovery programmes, is building three projects in the area to house some 5,000 erosion survivors, an official told The New Humanitarian.

    The Bangladesh Red Crescent Society said it has asked district officials for land to set up a “cluster village” – barrack-like housing where people share common facilities. But the land has not yet been granted, said Nazmul Azam Khan, the organisation’s director.
    Preparing for future threats

    The Bangladesh Water Development Board – the government agency that oversees the management of rivers – in December started a $130-million project intended to shield a nine-kilometre stretch of Naria from further erosion.

    This includes the dredging of waterways to remove excess sediment – which can divert a river’s flow and contribute to erosion – and installing sandbags and concrete blocks to buttress the steep riverbanks.

    There are also plans to erect structures in the river that would redirect water away from the fragile banks, said project head Prakash Krishna Sarker.

    But these changes are part of a three-year project; the bulk of the work wasn’t ready in time for this year’s monsoon season in Naria, and it won’t be finished by next year’s either.

    “People are concerned. If the river starts eroding again, this area will be wiped off,” said Sanaullah.Bangladesh’s government last year approved a multi-billion-dollar infrastructure plan to better manage the country’s rivers, including tackling erosion. AKM Enamul Hoque Shameem, the deputy minister for water resources, said the plans include dredging, river training, and bank protection. He told The New Humanitarian that erosion-vulnerable areas like Shariatpur are a “top priority”.
    Climate pressures

    But this work would be carried out over decades – the current deadline is the year 2100.

    By then, researchers say, the impacts of climate change will be in full force. A 2013 study published in the International Journal of Sciences forecasts that the amount of land lost annually due to erosion along Bangladesh’s three main rivers could jump by 18 percent by the end of the century.

    As with floods, drought, storms, and other disasters that strike each year, erosion is already pushing displaced Bangladeshis to migrate.

    Rabeya Begum, 55, was a resident of Naria until last August. After her home washed away, she packed up and fled to a Dhaka slum – the destination for most migrants pushed out by disasters or other environmental pressures.

    “I don’t feel good staying at my son-in-law’s house,” said Rabeya, who lost her husband to a stroke months after the erosion uprooted her.

    Life without her own land, she said, is like being “afloat in the water”.

    #Bangladesh #érosion #réfugiés_climatiques #réfugiés_environnementaux #migrations #inondations #climat #changement_climatique #Shariatpur #Dhaka #Padma_River #Naria #destruction #terre #sécurité_alimentaire #pauvreté

  • What is a ‘climate refugee’ and how many are there? | Grist

    There are pros and cons to calling those forced to move due to climate change “refugees.” On the one hand, it certainly communicates the urgency of the climate situation — ecosystems are changing so quickly and so unprecedentedly that many people don’t recognize the places they once called home. (And not in a “this neighborhood’s been taken over by yuppies!” way; in a, “wow, it’s too hot to breathe” way.) The word “refugee” fits the idea of millions of people being forced to leave their homes due to climate change, and that is certainly a convincing argument that we are facing a dire, global emergency.

    But then there’s the way that the word “refugee” is used to stir up xenophobia. In fact, all you have to do is turn on cable news to hear some politician or pundit avidly fearmongering about Salvadoran or Syrian or Sudanese refugees pounding at the borders of wealthier (read: whiter) nations. Instead of inspiring people to do something proactive about climate change, like vote, or roll your car into a ditch, the idea of so many people displaced by global warming can be weaponized into a rationale for border walls, military action, or other forms of protectionism.

    In other words, we’re at a very, very weird moment in the trajectory of climate change awareness. With many people already suffering from climate consequences and many, many more poised to join them, we must convince those in resource-chugging countries to take action without inflaming their, at times misinformed, sense of self-preservation. The scale of action that must be taken is both overwhelming and overdue, and it requires seeing ourselves as a global community. But it’s an incredibly complicated thing to do, and we must choose our words wisely, as pedantic as that can seem.

    Now to the numbers part of your question: The Institute for Economics and Peace, an Australian think tank, recently estimated that in 2017 alone, 18 million people — 61.5 percent of global displacements — were forced to move due to natural disasters. (Those natural disasters are not universally caused by climate change, but global warming is predicted to cause more frequent and intense disasters.) And while projections vary, sources agree that those numbers are going to get a whole lot higher. That same report noted that nearly 1 billion people currently live in areas of “very high” or “high” climate exposure, which could result in millions of people displaced by climate change in the future. A 2018 World Bank report estimated that by 2050, there would be 143 million climate change-driven migrants from the regions of Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and southeast Asia alone.

    But, if we’re talking about legally designated “climate refugees,” there’s a much different number being thrown around: zero.

    That’s because “refugee” has a specific legal definition with certain criteria that need to be met to be able to apply for asylum in a new country, including religious and/or social persecution. And most legal scholars and international lawyers will say that most people who move or are forced to move due to climate disasters are not technically refugees because most of those criteria don’t apply to them.

    #terminologie #réfugiés #climat #asile

  • What do we know about data on environmental migration?

    Disaster displacement forces millions of people away from their homes every year. Many more move in the context of environmental changes. Estimating the number of people affected remains a challenge for the international community. #Atle_Solberg, Head of the Platform on Disaster Displacement and #Francois_Gemenne, specialist of environmental geopolitics and migration dynamics, share their views on this topic.


    #statistiques #chiffres #réfugiés_environnementaux #migrations #réfugiés #asile #données #catastrophes #climat #changement_climatique #vitesse #rapidité #fiabilité #IDPs #déplacés_internes #collecte_de_données

    ping @reka @simplicissimus

  • 7 idées reçues sur les #migrations climatiques

    Chaque année, plusieurs millions de personnes sont contraintes de quitter leur lieu de vie à cause des dégradations environnementales ou des catastrophes naturelles. Ces déplacés climatiques sont de plus en plus nombreux, et pourtant on les connaît encore mal.


  • After the Quake

    #Gyumri, the city symbol of the quake that 21 years ago struck Armenia. The stories of the homeless, the #domiks, the migrants, waiting for the opening of the borders with Turkey. Reportage.

    December 7, 1988, 11.41 am – An earthquake measuring 6.9 on the Richter scale hits northern Armenia, killing 25,000 and leaving many more homeless. Mikhail Gorbachev, then General Secretary of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. cuts short an official visit to the United States to travel to the small South Caucasus Soviet republic as news of the catastrophe makes headlines the world over. Poverty skyrockets as a nation mourned its dead.

    Hundreds of millions of dollars flooded into the country for relief and reconstruction efforts, but two other events of as much significance soon frustrated efforts to rebuild the disaster zone. In 1991, Armenia declared independence from the former Soviet Union, and in 1993, in support of Azerbaijan during a de facto war with Armenia over the disputed territory of Nagorno Karabakh, Turkey closed the land border with its eastern neighbor.

    Meanwhile, as corruption skyrocketed, the conflict as well as two closed borders and an economic blockade by Azerbaijan and Turkey only added to Armenia’s woes. Yet, despite strong economic growth in the mid-2000s, albeit from a low base, and promises from then President Robert Kocharyan to completely rebuild Gyumri, Armenia’s second largest city and the main urban center to be hit by the earthquake, the outlook appears as bleak as ever.

    Once Gyumri had been known for its architecture, humor and cultural importance, but now it has become synonymous with the earthquake and domiks – “temporary” accommodation usually amounting to little more than metal containers or dilapidated shacks. Hot in the summer and bitterly cold in the winter, others more fortunate found refuge in abandoned buildings vacated during the economic collapse following independence.

    Vartik Ghukasyan, for example, is 71 and alone. An orphan, she never married and now struggles to survive on a pension of just 25,000 AMD (about $65) a month in a rundown former factory hostel in Gyumri. However, that might all change as more buildings are privatized or their existing owners seek to reclaim them.

    According to the 2001 census, the population of Gyumri stands at 150,000 although some claim that it has since grown to 160-170,000. Nevertheless, few local residents take such figures seriously. Pointing to low school attendance figures, they estimate the actual population might be no more than 70,000. Even so, despite the exodus, there are as many as 4-7,000 families still living in temporary shelter according to various estimates.

    Anush Babajanyan, a 26-year-old photojournalist from the Armenian capital, is one of just a few media professionals who remain concerned by their plight. Having spent the past year documenting the lives of those still waiting for proper housing, the anniversary might have been otherwise low-profile outside of Gyumri, but Babajanyan attempted to focus attention on the occasion by exhibiting her work in Yerevan.

    “When I started this project, 20 years had passed since the earthquake and there were families still living in domiks who were not receiving enough attention,” she told Osservatorio. “ The government and other organizations promised to solve the issue of their housing, but their actions were not enough. Since then I have seen very little improvement.”

    “If this issue wasn’t solved in 20 years, it probably isn’t surprising that not much has changed in just a year. However, it has been two years since Serge Sargsyan, then Armenian prime minister and now president, said that the issue of these residents will be solved by now. But, although some districts are being reconstructed, this is not enough to resolve the issue.”

    As the center of Shirak, an impoverished region that most in Armenia and its large Diaspora appear to have largely forgotten, Gyumri suffers from unemployment higher than the national average. Travel agents continue to advertise flights from the local airport to parts of Russia. As elsewhere in the region, the only hope for a better life lies outside. But, with a global economic crisis hitting the CIS hard, there are now also fewer opportunities even there.

    This year GDP per capita has already plummeted by over 14 percent nationwide, far in excess of the decline registered in Azerbaijan and Georgia, while poverty and extreme poverty - already calculated with a low yardstick - has reportedly increased from 25.6 and 3.6 percent respectively in 2008 to 28.4 and 6.9 percent today. Local civil society activists claim that the figures might be twice as high in Gyumri.

    But, some believe, the city could benefit greatly from an open border with Turkey , transforming itself into a major economic and transit hub for direct trade between the two countries. Just 8 km away lies the village of Akhurik, one of two closed border crossings. Repair work had been conducted on the railway connecting Gyumri to the Turkish city of Kars prior to last year’s World Cup qualifying match with Turkey held in Yerevan.

    With Turkish President Abdullah Gül making a historic visit to Armenia for the match, villagers were once again given hope that a border opening would be imminent. “It will be very good if it opens,” one resident told RFE/RL at the time. “We used to work in the past — 40 families benefited from work related to the railway. Now they sit idle without work or have to choose migrant work in Russia. It will be good when the line is opened.”

    But, with pressure from Azerbaijan on Turkey not to sign two protocols aimed at establishing diplomatic relations and opening the border until the Karabakh conflict is resolved, such a breakthrough appears as elusive as ever while unemployment and poverty increases. Nowhere is that more evident than the city of Ashotsk, just 30 minutes outside of Gyumri. Karine Mkrtchyan, public relations officer for the Caritas Armenia NGO says conditions are typical.

    “Everywhere you will see abandoned places, especially public spaces,” she says. “They are ruined. There are no facilities, there is a lack of drinking water, and irrigation. People are on their own to solve their problems. We had a loss of life during the earthquake and then massive migration which stopped in the late 1990s before starting again in early 2000. Now there are even more people who decide to migrate.”

    Last week, on the 21st anniversary of the earthquake, the government attempted to counter criticism of what many consider to be inaction and a lack of concern with the socioeconomic situation in Gyumri. Opening a sugar refinery owned by one of the country’s most notorious oligarchs at the same time, the Armenian president visited Gyumri and promised that 5,300 new homes would allocated to those still without by 2013.

    The $70 million construction project has been made possible through a $500 million anti-crisis loan from the Russian Federation.

    However, whether such promises come to fruition remains to be seen and government critics remain unimpressed. Indeed, they point out, even if the apartments are built and allocated on time, it would have taken a quarter of a century to do so. Moreover, for Gyumri natives such as Mkrtchyan, the need for economic investment and development in the regions of Armenia remains as urgent as ever.

    #tremblement_de_terre #post-catastrophe #Arménie #histoire #logement #réfugiés_environnementaux #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières

  • #ILO Global Estimates on International Migrant Workers – Results and Methodology

    If the right policies are in place, labour migration can help countries respond to shifts in labour supply and demand, stimulate innovation and sustainable development, and transfer and update skills. However, a lack of international standards regarding concepts, definitions and methodologies for measuring labour migration data still needs to be addressed.

    This report gives global and regional estimates, broken down by income group, gender and age. It also describes the data, sources and methodology used, as well as the corresponding limitations.

    The report seeks to contribute to the 2018 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and to achieving SDG targets 8.8 and 10.7.


    Le résumé:


    #OIT #statistiques #chiffres #monde #genre #âge #2017 #migrations #travailleurs_migrants #travail #femmes

    • Global migrant numbers up 20 percent

      Migrants of working age make up 4.2 percent of the global population, and the number is growing. A UN report notes how poorer countries are increasingly supplying labor to richer ones to their own detriment.

      There are 277 million international migrants, 234 million migrants of working age (15 and older) and 164 million migrant workers worldwide, according to a UN report.

      Figures for 2017 from the United Nations’ Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN/DESA) published on Wednesday show that migrants of working age make up 4.2 percent of the global population aged 15 and older, while migrant workers constitute 4.7 percent of all workers.

      The numbers rose by almost 20 percent between 2013 and 2017 for international migrants, 13 percent for migrants of working age and 9 percent for migrant workers.


      Of the 164 million migrant workers worldwide, 111.2 million (67.9 percent) are employed in high-income countries, 30.5 million (18.6 percent) in upper middle-income countries, 16.6 million (10.1 percent) in lower middle- income countries and 5.6 million (3.4 percent) in low-income countries.

      From 2013 to 2017, the concentration of migrant workers in high-income countries fell from 74.7 to 67.9 percent, while their share in upper middle-income countries increased, suggesting a shift in the number of migrant workers from high-income to lower-income countries.

      The report noted that this growing number could be attributed to the economic development of some lower-income nations, particularly if these countries are in close proximity to migrant origin countries with close social networks.

      The share of migrant workers in the labor force of destination countries has increased in all income groups except for lower middle-income countries.

      In high-income countries, falling numbers of migrant workers were observed simultaneously with a higher share in the labor force as a result of the sharp fall in the labor force participation of non-migrants, due to a variety of factors such as changes in demographics, technology and immigration policies.

      “Stricter migration policies in high-income countries and stronger economic growth among upper middle-income countries may also contribute to the trends observed,” the report noted.


      Some 60.8 percent of all migrant workers are found in three subregions: Northern America (23.0 percent), Northern, Southern and Western Europe (23.9 percent) and Arab States (13.9 percent). The lowest number of migrant workers is hosted by Northern Africa (less than 1 percent).

      The subregion with the largest share of migrant workers as a proportion of all workers is Arab States (40.8 percent), followed by Northern America (20.6 percent) and Northern, Southern and Western Europe (17.8 percent).

      In nine out of 11 subregions, the labor force participation rate of migrants is higher than that of non-migrants. The largest difference is in the Arab States, where the labor force participation rate of migrants (75.4 percent) is substantially higher than that of non-migrants (42.2 percent).


      Among migrant workers, 96 million are men and 68 million are women. In 2017, the stock of male migrant workers was estimated to be 95.7 million, while the corresponding estimate for female migrant workers was 68.1 million.

      “The higher proportion of men among migrant workers may also be explained by...the higher likelihood of women to migrate for reasons other than employment (for instance, for family reunification), as well as by possible discrimination against women that reduces their employment opportunities in destination countries,” the report noted.

      It added that societal stigmatization, the discriminatory impacts of policies and legislation and violence and harassment undermine women’s access to decent work and can result in low pay, the absence of equal pay and the undervaluation of female-dominated sectors.


      Prime-age adults (ages 25-64) constitute nearly 87 percent of migrant workers. Youth workers (aged 15-24) and older workers (aged 65 plus) constitute 8.3 percent and 5.2 percent, respectively, of migrant workers. This age composition holds for male and female migrant workers alike.

      “The fact that the overwhelming majority of migrant workers consist of prime-age adults suggests that some countries of origin are losing the most productive part of their workforce, which could have a negative impact on their economic growth,” the report noted, but it added that emigration of prime-age individuals may also provide a source of remittances for countries of origin.

      Destination countries, meanwhile, benefit from receiving prime-age workers as they are increasingly faced with demographic pressures.

      Labor shortage in Germany

      Germany’s BDI industry association said skilled labor from abroad was key to Germany’s future economic success. “The integration of skilled workers from other countries contributes significantly to growth and jobs,” BDI President Dieter Kempf said.

      The country’s VDE association of electrical, electronic and IT engineering was the latest group in Germany to point to the growing need for foreign experts. Emphasizing that Germany itself was training too few engineers, VDE said there would be a shortage of 100,000 electrical engineers over the next 10 years.

      “We will strive to increase the number of engineers by means of migration,” VDE President Gunther Kegel noted.


    • Al menos uno de cada cuatro movimientos migratorios son retornos a los países de origen

      Un estudio estima que entre el 26% y el 31% de los flujos de migración mundiales consisten en regresos a los lugares de partida. En los últimos 25 años apenas ha habido cambios en la proporción de población migrante mundial

      source: https://www.pnas.org/content/116/1/116


      Préparé par le Centre mondial d’analyse des données sur la migration (CMADM) de l’OIM, le rapport 2018 sur les indicateurs de la migration dans le monde résume les principales tendances mondiales en fonction des dernières statistiques, présentant 21 indicateurs dans 17 domaines relatifs à la migration.

      Le rapport s’appuie sur des statistiques provenant de sources diverses facilement accessibles sur le Global Migration Data Portal.

      Le rapport regroupe les statistiques les plus récentes dans des domaines comme la migration de main-d’œuvre, les réfugiés, les étudiants internationaux, les envois de fonds, le trafic illicite de migrants, la gouvernance des migrations et bien d’autres, permettant aux responsables politiques et au grand public d’avoir un aperçu de l’ampleur et des dynamiques de la migration à travers le monde.

      Par ailleurs, le rapport est le premier à faire le lien entre le programme mondial de gouvernance des migrations et les débats sur les données migratoires. Les thèmes choisis sont particulièrement pertinents pour le Pacte mondial pour des migrations sûres, ordonnées et régulières et pour les Objectifs de développement durable (ODD). Le rapport fait un état des lieux des données sur chaque thème et propose des solutions pour les améliorer.

      « Bien que le Pacte mondial sur la migration et les ODD soient des cadres importants pour améliorer la façon dont nous gérons les migrations, des données plus précises et fiables sur les sujets relatifs à la migration sont nécessaires pour tirer parti de cette opportunité. Ce rapport donne un aperçu global de ce que nous savons et ne savons pas sur les tendances de la migration dans le monde », a déclaré Frank Laczko, Directeur du CMADM. 

      « La communauté internationale prend des mesures pour renforcer la collecte et la gestion des données sur la migration mais il reste beaucoup à faire. Une base de données solide est essentielle pour éclairer les politiques nationales sur la migration et seront plus que jamais nécessaires à la lumière du Pacte mondial pour des migrations sûres, ordonnées et régulières », a déclaré Antonio Vitorino, le nouveau Directeur général de l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations.


      Pour télécharger le rapport :


      Quelques éléments-clé :

      #indicateurs #femmes #travailleurs_étrangers #étudiants #réfugiés #migrations_forcées #étudiants_étrangers #remittances #trafic_d'êtres_humains #mourir_aux_frontières #esclavage_moderne #exploitation #smuggling #smugglers #passeurs #retours_volontaires #retour_volontaire #renvois #expulsions #IOM #OIM #économie #PIB #femmes #migrations_environnementales #réfugiés_environnementaux #catastrophes_naturelles #attitude #attitude_envers_les_migrants #opinion_publique #environnement

  • Why the Migrant Caravan Story Is a Climate Change Story

    Drought, crop failure, storms, and land disputes pit the rich against the poor, and Central America is ground zero for climate change.

    #asile #migrations #réfugiés #réfugiés_environnementaux #Amériques #caravane #Mexique #Amérique_centrale #Amérique_latine #réfugiés_climatiques #climat #changement_climatique #Honduras

    Countries, like the U.S., that have emitted the most CO2 are fortifying their borders against people from countries who have emitted the least.


  • “If the water finishes, we will leave”: Drought is forcing hundreds of thousands of Afghans from their homes

    Afghanistan is besieged by decades of conflict, but more people this year have been displaced by drought than war.

    The severe drought has dried up riverbeds and water sources, withered crops, and forced 250,000 people from their homes.

    Journalist Stefanie Glinski spent a week between Herat and Badghis – two of the hardest-hit provinces in western Afghanistan. As these images show, she found parched fields, abandoned homes, and families struggling to cope.

    In the barren hills of Badghis, a gravel road winds through a dusty landscape, where wells and rivers have dried up completely.

    As desperation rises, some families have turned to selling off their daughters, through child marriage, in order to pay off swelling debt.

    Tens of thousands have fled to urban centres, living under simple tents. Available water, food, and healthcare fall far short of what’s needed. Aid groups have stepped in with limited emergency aid, but they acknowledge it hasn’t been enough to reach all the estimated 1.4 million people who require help.

    The Famine Early Warning Systems Network, which tracks food security around the world, is warning of more difficulties ahead: it predicts that the combination of a stumbling economy, instability, and failing crops will increase the need for food aid into next year.

    In remote Qapchiq, a village in Badghis’ Abkamari district, community leader Saskidad says his family has already lost their entire harvest.

    This year’s drought, he says, is “the worst I’ve ever seen”.

    #sécheresse #Afghanistan #eau #migrations #réfugiés #asile #réfugiés_environnementaux #désertification

    cc @albertocampiphoto

  • Changement climatique et #migrations humaines au #Sénégal : une approche en termes de #vulnérabilité du système socio-écologique

    Résumé : le changement climatique et les migrations humaines constituent deux problématiques majeures de notre époque. Et, partant du constat d’une connaissance fragmentée entre maximalistes et minimalistes, qui s’est traduite par une capacité limitée de la recherche scientifique à prendre en compte les interactions complexes entre le climat et les migrations humaines, cette thèse propose, à travers une approche renouvelée (celle de la vulnérabilité du système socio-écologique), une meilleure compréhension et explication des relations climat- migrations. Elle cherche à répondre à deux objectifs. D’une part, produire des connaissances nouvelles en nous appropriant de façon sélective et ordonnée les apports empiriques produits par les approches précédentes. Et, d’autre part, par une analyse instrumentée des interactions mises en évidence, générer des informations chiffrées pertinentes permettant un ciblage plus efficace des politiques. Cette thèse insiste en premier lieu sur une certaine difficulté à mettre en évidence une relation robuste entre changement climatique et migrations à l’échelle Sahélienne. Contrairement aux idées reçues sur l’image type du « migrant/réfugié climatique » sahélien véhiculée par les médias et reprise, sans un recul critique, dans la littérature grise et certaines études scientifiques, la région, souvent vue et analysée comme une entité relativement homogène, présente de fortes hétérogénéités spatiales physico-climatiques, outre celles socio-économiques. Et, ces dernières ne permettent pas une compréhension des migrations, une des expressions des transformations sociétales. Il convient de repenser la problématique sur des échelles plus homogènes (Sénégal des zones agro-écologiques et régions administratives). Nos résultats montrent un effet climatique accélérateur/amplificateur des migrations interrégionales sous-jacent aux conditions de vie des populations. Généralement, le climat ne suffit pas, à lui seul, à « produire » des migrations. Il transite par les variables socio-économiques (vulnérabilité initiale). Ce qui nous a amené à retenir l’appellation de « #migrants_éco-climatiques ». Ainsi, les politiques devraient aller à la fois vers : (i) des questions de développement en réduisant des vulnérabilités socio-économiques (pauvreté et inégalités) en agissant sur l’environnement d’action et les acteurs respectivement de manière cohérente et extensive ; mais, également, (ii) des questions d’économie du climat par la réduction de la vulnérabilité physico-climatique à travers des politiques d’atténuation et d’adaptation du milieu et des populations face au changement climatique.

    #thèse #doctorat #thèse_de_doctorat #changement_climatique #réfugiés_climatiques #réfugiés_environnementaux #Sahel #climat

    @sinehebdo : #migrants_éco-climatiques —> ça existe déjà dans ta liste ?