#réintégration

EU: Frontex splashes out: millions of euros for new technology and equipment (19.06.2020)

The approval of the new #Frontex_Regulation in November 2019 implied an increase of competences, budget and capabilities for the EU’s border agency, which is now equipping itself with increased means to monitor events and developments at the borders and beyond, as well as renewing its IT systems to improve the management of the reams of data to which it will have access.

In 2020 Frontex’s #budget grew to €420.6 million, an increase of over 34% compared to 2019. The European Commission has proposed that in the next EU budget (formally known as the Multiannual Financial Framework or MFF, covering 2021-27) €11 billion will be made available to the agency, although legal negotiations are ongoing and have hit significant stumbling blocks due to Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic and political disagreements.

Nevertheless, the increase for this year has clearly provided a number of opportunities for Frontex. For instance, it has already agreed contracts worth €28 million for the acquisition of dozens of vehicles equipped with thermal and day cameras, surveillance radar and sensors.

According to the contract for the provision of Mobile Surveillance Systems, these new tools will be used “for detection, identification and recognising of objects of interest e.g. human beings and/or groups of people, vehicles moving across the border (land and sea), as well as vessels sailing within the coastal areas, and other objects identified as objects of interest”. [1]

Frontex has also published a call for tenders for Maritime Analysis Tools, worth a total of up to €2.6 million. With this, Frontex seeks to improve access to “big data” for maritime analysis. [2] The objective of deploying these tools is to enhance Frontex’s operational support to EU border, coast guard and law enforcement authorities in “suppressing and preventing, among others, illegal migration and cross-border crime in the maritime domain”.

Moreover, the system should be capable of delivering analysis and identification of high-risk threats following the collection and storage of “big data”. It is not clear how much human input and monitoring there will be of the identification of risks. The call for tenders says the winning bidder should have been announced in May, but there is no public information on the chosen company so far.

As part of a 12-month pilot project to examine how maritime analysis tools could “support multipurpose operational response,” Frontex previously engaged the services of the Tel Aviv-based company Windward Ltd, which claims to fuse “maritime data and artificial intelligence… to provide the right insights, with the right context, at the right time.” [3] Windward, whose current chairman is John Browne, the former CEO of the multinational oil company BP, received €783,000 for its work. [4]

As the agency’s gathering and processing of data increases, it also aims to improve and develop its own internal IT systems, through a two-year project worth €34 million. This will establish a set of “framework contracts”. Through these, each time the agency seeks a new IT service or system, companies selected to participate in the framework contracts will submit bids for the work. [5]

The agency is also seeking a ’Software Solution for EBCG [European Border and Coast Guard] Team Members to Access to Schengen Information System’, through a contract worth up to €5 million. [6] The Schengen Information System (SIS) is the EU’s largest database, enabling cooperation between authorities working in the fields of police, border control and customs of all the Schengen states (26 EU member states plus Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland) and its legal bases were recently reformed to include new types of alert and categories of data. [7]

This software will give Frontex officials direct access to certain data within the SIS. Currently, they have to request access via national border guards in the country in which they are operating. This would give complete autonomy to Frontex officials to consult the SIS whilst undertaking operations, shortening the length of the procedure. [8]

With the legal basis for increasing Frontex’s powers in place, the process to build up its personnel, material and surveillance capacities continues, with significant financial implications.

▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2020/june/eu-frontex-splashes-out-millions-of-euros-for-new-technology-and-equipme

#technologie #équipement #Multiannual_Financial_Framework #MFF #surveillance #Mobile_Surveillance_Systems #Maritime_Analysis_Tools #données #big_data #mer #Windward_Ltd #Israël #John_Browne #BP #complexe_militaro-industriel #Software_Solution_for_EBCG_Team_Members_to_Access_to_Schengen_Information_System #SIS #Schengen_Information_System

EU : Guns, guards and guidelines : reinforcement of Frontex runs into problems (26.05.2020)

An internal report circulated by Frontex to EU government delegations highlights a series of issues in implementing the agency’s new legislation. Despite the Covid-19 pandemic, the agency is urging swift action to implement the mandate and is pressing ahead with the recruitment of its new ‘standing corps’. However, there are legal problems with the acquisition, registration, storage and transport of weapons. The agency is also calling for derogations from EU rules on staff disciplinary measures in relation to the use of force; and wants an extended set of privileges and immunities. Furthermore, it is assisting with “voluntary return” despite this activity appearing to fall outside of its legal mandate.

State-of-play report

At the end of April 2020, Frontex circulated a report to EU government delegations in the Council outlining the state of play of the implementation of its new Regulation (“EBCG 2.0 Regulation”, in the agency and Commission’s words), especially relating to “current challenges”.[1] Presumably, this refers to the outbreak of a pandemic, though the report also acknowledges challenges created by the legal ambiguities contained in the Regulation itself, in particular with regard to the acquisition of weapons, supervisory and disciplinary mechanisms, legal privileges and immunities and involvement in “voluntary return” operations.

The path set out in the report is that the “operational autonomy of the agency will gradually increase towards 2027” until it is a “fully-fledged and reliable partner” to EU and Schengen states. It acknowledges the impacts of unforeseen world events on the EU’s forthcoming budget (Multi-annual Financial Framework, MFF) for 2021-27, and hints at the impact this will have on Frontex’s own budget and objectives. Nevertheless, the agency is still determined to “continue increasing the capabilities” of the agency, including its acquisition of new equipment and employment of new staff for its standing corps.

The main issues covered by the report are: Frontex’s new standing corps of staff, executive powers and the use of force, fundamental rights and data protection, and the integration into Frontex of EUROSUR, the European Border Surveillance System.

The new standing corps

Recruitment

A new standing corps of 10,000 Frontex staff by 2024 is to be, in the words of the agency, its “biggest game changer”.[2] The report notes that the establishment of the standing corps has been heavily affected by the outbreak of Covid-19. According to the report, 7,238 individuals had applied to join the standing corps before the outbreak of the pandemic. 5,482 of these – over 75% – were assessed by the agency as eligible, with a final 304 passing the entire selection process to be on the “reserve lists”.[3]

Despite interruptions to the recruitment procedure following worldwide lockdown measures, interviews for Category 1 staff – permanent Frontex staff members to be deployed on operations – were resumed via video by the end of April. 80 candidates were shortlisted for the first week, and Frontex aims to interview 1,000 people in total. Despite this adaptation, successful candidates will have to wait for Frontex’s contractor to re-open in order to carry out medical tests, an obligatory requirement for the standing corps.[4]

In 2020, Frontex joined the European Defence Agency’s Satellite Communications (SatCom) and Communications and Information System (CIS) services in order to ensure ICT support for the standing corps in operation as of 2021.[5] The EDA describes SatCom and CIS as “fundamental for Communication, Command and Control in military operations… [enabling] EU Commanders to connect forces in remote areas with HQs and capitals and to manage the forces missions and tasks”.[6]

Training

The basic training programme, endorsed by the management board in October 2019, is designed for Category 1 staff. It includes specific training in interoperability and “harmonisation with member states”. The actual syllabus, content and materials for this basic training were developed by March 2020; Statewatch has made a request for access to these documents, which is currently pending with the Frontex Transparency Office. This process has also been affected by the novel coronavirus, though the report insists that “no delay is foreseen in the availability of the specialised profile related training of the standing corps”.

Use of force

The state-of-play-report acknowledges a number of legal ambiguities surrounding some of the more controversial powers outlined in Frontex’s 2019 Regulation, highlighting perhaps that political ambition, rather than serious consideration and assessment, propelled the legislation, overtaking adequate procedure and oversight. The incentive to enact the legislation within a short timeframe is cited as a reason that no impact assessment was carried out on the proposed recast to the agency’s mandate. This draft was rushed through negotiations and approved in an unprecedented six-month period, and the details lost in its wake are now coming to light.

Article 82 of the 2019 Regulation refers to the use of force and carriage of weapons by Frontex staff, while a supervisory mechanism for the use of force by statutory staff is established by Article 55. This says:

“On the basis of a proposal from the executive director, the management board shall: (a) establish an appropriate supervisory mechanism to monitor the application of the provisions on use of force by statutory staff, including rules on reporting and specific measures, such as those of a disciplinary nature, with regard to the use of force during deployments”[7]

The agency’s management board is expected to make a decision about this supervisory mechanism, including specific measures and reporting, by the end of June 2020.

The state-of-play report posits that the legal terms of Article 55 are inconsistent with the standard rules on administrative enquiries and disciplinary measures concerning EU staff.[8] These outline, inter alia, that a dedicated disciplinary board will be established in each institution including at least one member from outside the institution, that this board must be independent and its proceedings secret. Frontex insists that its staff will be a special case as the “first uniformed service of the EU”, and will therefore require “special arrangements or derogations to the Staff Regulations” to comply with the “totally different nature of tasks and risks associated with their deployments”.[9]

What is particularly astounding about Frontex demanding special treatment for oversight, particularly on use of force and weapons is that, as the report acknowledges, the agency cannot yet legally store or transport any weapons it acquires.

Regarding service weapons and “non-lethal equipment”,[10] legal analysis by “external experts and a regulatory law firm” concluded that the 2019 Regulation does not provide a legal basis for acquiring, registering, storing or transporting weapons in Poland, where the agency’s headquarters is located. Frontex has applied to the Commission for clarity on how to proceed, says the report. Frontex declined to comment on the status of this consultation and any indications of the next steps the agency will take. A Commission spokesperson stated only that it had recently received the agency’s enquiry and “is analysing the request and the applicable legal framework in the view of replying to the EBCGA”, without expanding further.

Until Frontex has the legal basis to do so, it cannot launch a tender for firearms and “non-lethal equipment” (which includes batons, pepper spray and handcuffs). However, the report implies the agency is ready to do so as soon as it receives the green light. Technical specifications are currently being finalised for “non-lethal equipment” and Frontex still plans to complete acquisition by the end of the year.

Privileges and immunities

The agency is also seeking special treatment with regard to the legal privileges and immunities it and its officials enjoy. Article 96 of the 2019 Regulation outlines the privileges and immunities of Frontex officers, stating:

“Protocol No 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union annexed to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to the TFEU shall apply to the Agency and its statutory staff.” [11]

However, Frontex notes that the Protocol does not apply to non-EU states, nor does it “offer a full protection, or take into account a need for the inviolability of assets owned by Frontex (service vehicles, vessels, aircraft)”.[12] Frontex is increasingly involved in operations taking place on non-EU territory. For instance, the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states, primarily in the Western Balkans, concerning Frontex activities in those countries. To launch operations under these agreements, Frontex will (or, in the case of Albania, already has) agree on operational plans with each state, under which Frontex staff can use executive powers.[13] The agency therefore seeks an “EU-level status of forces agreement… to account for the partial absence of rules”.

Law enforcement

To implement its enhanced functions regarding cross-border crime, Frontex will continue to participate in Europol’s four-year policy cycle addressing “serious international and organised crime”.[14] The agency is also developing a pilot project, “Investigation Support Activities- Cross Border Crime” (ISA-CBC), addressing drug trafficking and terrorism.

Fundamental rights and data protection

The ‘EBCG 2.0 Regulation’ requires several changes to fundamental rights measures by the agency, which, aside from some vague “legal analyses” seem to be undergoing development with only internal oversight.

Firstly, to facilitate adequate independence of the Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO), special rules have to be established. The FRO was introduced under Frontex’s 2016 Regulation, but has since then been understaffed and underfunded by the agency.[15] The 2019 Regulation obliges the agency to ensure “sufficient and adequate human and financial resources” for the office, as well as 40 fundamental rights monitors.[16] These standing corps staff members will be responsible for monitoring compliance with fundamental rights standards, providing advice and assistance on the agency’s plans and activities, and will visit and evaluate operations, including acting as forced return monitors.[17]

During negotiations over the proposed Regulation 2.0, MEPs introduced extended powers for the Fundamental Rights Officer themselves. The FRO was previously responsible for contributing to Frontex’s fundamental rights strategy and monitoring its compliance with and promotion of fundamental rights. Now, they will be able to monitor compliance by conducting investigations; offering advice where deemed necessary or upon request of the agency; providing opinions on operational plans, pilot projects and technical assistance; and carrying out on-the-spot visits. The executive director is now obliged to respond “as to how concerns regarding possible violations of fundamental rights… have been addressed,” and the management board “shall ensure that action is taken with regard to recommendations of the fundamental rights officer.” [18] The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation.

The state-of-play report says that “legal analyses and exchanges” are ongoing, and will inform an eventual management board decision, but no timeline for this is offered. [19] The agency will also need to adapt its much criticised individual complaints mechanism to fit the requirements of the 2019 Regulation; executive director Fabrice Leggeri’s first-draft decision on this process is currently undergoing internal consultations. Even the explicit requirement set out in the 2019 Regulation for an “independent and effective” complaints mechanism,[20] does not meet minimum standards to qualify as an effective remedy, which include institutional independence, accessibility in practice, and capacity to carry out thorough and prompt investigations.[21]

Frontex has entered into a service level agreement (SLA) with the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) for support in establishing and training the team of fundamental rights monitors introduced by the 2019 Regulation. These monitors are to be statutory staff of the agency and will assess fundamental rights compliance of operational activities, advising, assisting and contributing to “the promotion of fundamental rights”.[22] The scope and objectives for this team were finalised at the end of March this year, and the agency will establish the team by the end of the year. Statewatch has requested clarification as to what is to be included in the team’s scope and objectives, pending with the Frontex Transparency Office.

Regarding data protection, the agency plans a package of implementing rules (covering issues ranging from the position of data protection officer to the restriction of rights for returnees and restrictions under administrative data processing) to be implemented throughout 2020.[23] The management board will review a first draft of the implementing rules on the data protection officer in the second quarter of 2020.

Returns

The European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN) – a network of 15 European states and the Commission facilitating cooperation over return operations “as part of the EU efforts to manage migration” – is to be handed over to Frontex. [24] A handover plan is currently under the final stage of review; it reportedly outlines the scoping of activities and details of “which groups of returnees will be eligible for Frontex assistance in the future”.[25] A request from Statewatch to Frontex for comment on what assistance will be provided by the agency to such returnees was unanswered at the time of publication.

Since the entry into force of its new mandate, Frontex has also been providing technical assistance for so-called voluntary returns, with the first two such operations carried out on scheduled flights (as opposed to charter flights) in February 2020. A total of 28 people were returned by mid-April, despite the fact that there is no legal clarity over what the definition “voluntary return” actually refers to, as the state-of-play report also explains:

“The terminology of voluntary return was introduced in the Regulation without providing any definition thereof. This terminology (voluntary departure vs voluntary return) is moreover not in line with the terminology used in the Return Directive (EBCG 2.0 refers to the definition of returns provided for in the Return Directive. The Return Directive, however, does not cover voluntary returns; a voluntary return is not a return within the meaning of the Return Directive). Further elaboration is needed.”[26]

On top of requiring “further clarification”, if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate. Statewatch has launched an investigation into the agency’s activities relating to voluntary returns, to outline the number of such operations to date, their country of return and country of destination.

Frontex is currently developing a module dedicated to voluntary returns by charter flight for its FAR (Frontex Application for Returns) platform (part of its return case management system). On top of the technical support delivered by the agency, Frontex also foresees the provision of on-the-ground support from Frontex representatives or a “return counsellor”, who will form part of the dedicated return teams planned for the standing corps from 2021.[27]

Frontex has updated its return case management system (RECAMAS), an online platform for member state authorities and Frontex to communicate and plan return operations, to manage an increased scope. The state-of-play report implies that this includes detail on post-return activities in a new “post-return module”, indicating that Frontex is acting on commitments to expand its activity in this area. According to the agency’s roadmap on implementing the 2019 Regulation, an action plan on how the agency will provide post-return support to people (Article 48(1), 2019 Regulation) will be written by the third quarter of 2020.[28]

In its closing paragraph, related to the budgetary impact of COVID-19 regarding return operations, the agency notes that although activities will resume once aerial transportation restrictions are eased, “the agency will not be able to provide what has been initially intended, undermining the concept of the EBCG as a whole”.[29]

EUROSUR

The Commission is leading progress on adopting the implementing act for the integration of EUROSUR into Frontex, which will define the implementation of new aerial surveillance,[30] expected by the end of the year.[31] Frontex is discussing new working arrangements with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL). The development by Frontex of the surveillance project’s communications network will require significant budgetary investment, as the agency plans to maintain the current system ahead of its planned replacement in 2025.[32] This investment is projected despite the agency’s recognition of the economic impact of Covid-19 on member states, and the consequent adjustments to the MFF 2021-27.

Summary

Drafted and published as the world responds to an unprecedented pandemic, the “current challenges” referred to in the report appear, on first read, to refer to the budgetary and staffing implications of global shut down. However, the report maintains throughout that the agency’s determination to expand, in terms of powers as well as staffing, will not be stalled despite delays and budgeting adjustments. Indeed, it is implied more than once that the “current challenges” necessitate more than ever that these powers be assumed. The true challenges, from the agency’s point of view, stem from the fact that its current mandate was rushed through negotiations in six months, leading to legal ambiguities that leave it unable to acquire or transport weapons and in a tricky relationship with the EU protocol on privileges and immunities when operating in third countries. Given the violence that so frequently accompanies border control operations in the EU, it will come as a relief to many that Frontex is having difficulties acquiring its own weaponry. However, it is far from reassuring that the introduction of new measures on fundamental rights and accountability are being carried out internally and remain unavailable for public scrutiny.

Jane Kilpatrick

Note: this article was updated on 26 May 2020 to include the European Commission’s response to Statewatch’s enquiries.

It was updated on 1 July with some minor corrections:

“the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states... under which” replaces “the agency has entered into working agreements with Balkan states, under which”
“The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in any detail in the Regulation beyond monitoring the agency’s ’compliance with fundamental rights, including by conducting investigations’” replaces “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation”
“if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it further exposes the haste with which legislation written to deny entry into the EU and facilitate expulsions was drafted” replaces “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate”

Endnotes

[1] Frontex, ‘State of play of the implementation of the EBCG 2.0 Regulation in view of current challenges’, 27 April 2020, contained in Council document 7607/20, LIMITE, 20 April 2020, ▻http://statewatch.org/news/2020/may/eu-council-frontex-ECBG-state-of-play-7607-20.pdf

[2] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

[3] Section 1.1, state of play report

[4] Jane Kilpatrick, ‘Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards’, Statewatch Analysis, March 2020, ▻http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-355-frontex-recruitment-standing-corps.pdf

[5] Section 7.1, state of play report

[6] EDA, ‘EU SatCom Market’, ▻https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/eu-satcom-market

[7] Article 55(5)(a), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex 2019 Regulation), ►https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

[8] Pursuant to Annex IX of the EU Staff Regulations, ▻https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:01962R0031-20140501

[9] Chapter III, state of play report

[10] Section 2.5, state of play report

[11] Protocol (No 7), ▻https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2016.202.01.0001.01.ENG#d1e3363-201-1

[12] Chapter III, state of play report

[13] ‘Border externalisation: Agreements on Frontex operations in Serbia and Montenegro heading for parliamentary approval’, Statewatch News, 11 March 2020, ▻http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/frontex-status-agreements.htm

[14] Europol, ‘EU policy cycle – EMPACT’, ▻https://www.europol.europa.eu/empact

[15] ‘NGOs, EU and international agencies sound the alarm over Frontex’s respect for fundamental rights’, Statewatch News, 5 March 2019, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/mar/fx-consultative-forum-rep.htm; ‘Frontex condemned by its own fundamental rights body for failing to live up to obligations’, Statewatch News, 21 May 2018, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/may/eu-frontex-fr-rep.htm

[16] Article 110(6), Article 109, 2019 Regulation

[17] Article 110, 2019 Regulation

[18] Article 109, 2019 Regulation

[19] Section 8, state of play report

[20] Article 111(1), 2019 Regulation

[21] Sergio Carrera and Marco Stefan, ‘Complaint Mechanisms in Border Management and Expulsion Operations in Europe: Effective Remedies for Victims of Human Rights Violations?’, CEPS, 2018, ▻https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Complaint%20Mechanisms_A4.pdf

[22] Article 110(1), 2019 Regulation

[23] Section 9, state of play report

[24] ERRIN, ▻https://returnnetwork.eu

[25] Section 3.2, state of play report

[26] Chapter III, state of play report

[27] Section 3.2, state of play report

[28] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

[29] State of play report, p. 19

[30] Matthias Monroy, ‘Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders’, Statewatch Analysis, February 2020, ►http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-354-frontex-drones.pdf

[31] Section 4, state of play report

[32] Section 7.2, state of play report
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Mediterranean: As the fiction of a Libyan search and rescue zone begins to crumble, EU states use the coronavirus pandemic to declare themselves unsafe

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/eu-guns-guards-and-guidelines-reinforcement-of-frontex-runs-into-problem

#EBCG_2.0_Regulation #European_Defence_Agency’s_Satellite_Communications (#SatCom) #Communications_and_Information_System (#CIS) #immunité #droits_fondamentaux #droits_humains #Fundamental_Rights_Officer (#FRO) #European_Return_and_Reintegration_Network (#ERRIN) #renvois #expulsions #réintégration #Directive_Retour #FAR (#Frontex_Application_for_Returns) #RECAMAS #EUROSUR #European_Aviation_Safety_Agency (#EASA) #European_Organisation_for_the_Safety_of_Air_Navigation (#EUROCONTROL)

Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards

On 4 January 2020 the Management Board of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) adopted a decision on the profiles of the staff required for the new “standing corps”, which is ultimately supposed to be staffed by 10,000 officials. [1] The decision ushers in a new wave of recruitment for the agency. Applicants will be put through six months of training before deployment, after rigorous medical testing.

What is the standing corps?

The European Border and Coast Guard standing corps is the new, and according to Frontex, first ever, EU uniformed service, available “at any time…to support Member States facing challenges at their external borders”.[2] Frontex’s Programming Document for the 2018-2020 period describes the standing corps as the agency’s “biggest game changer”, requiring “an unprecedented scale of staff recruitment”.[3]

The standing corps will be made up of four categories of Frontex operational staff:

Frontex statutory staff deployed in operational areas and staff responsible for the functioning of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) Central Unit[4];
Long-term staff seconded from member states;
Staff from member states who can be immediately deployed on short-term secondment to Frontex; and

A reserve of staff from member states for rapid border interventions.

These border guards will be “trained by the best and equipped with the latest technology has to offer”.[5] As well as wearing EU uniforms, they will be authorised to carry weapons and will have executive powers: they will be able to verify individuals’ identity and nationality and permit or refuse entry into the EU.

The decision made this January is limited to the definition of profiles and requirements for the operational staff that are to be recruited. The Management Board (MB) will have to adopt a new decision by March this year to set out the numbers of staff needed per profile, the requirements for individuals holding those positions, and the number of staff needed for the following year based on expected operational needs. This process will be repeated annually.[6] The MB can then further specify how many staff each member state should contribute to these profiles, and establish multi-annual plans for member state contributions and recruitment for Frontex statutory staff. Projections for these contributions are made in Annexes II – IV of the 2019 Regulation, though a September Mission Statement by new European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen urges the recruitment of 10,000 border guards by 2024, indicating that member states might be meeting their contribution commitments much sooner than 2027.[7]

The standing corps of Frontex staff will have an array of executive powers and responsibilities. As well as being able to verify identity and nationality and refuse or permit entry into the EU, they will be able to consult various EU databases to fulfil operational aims, and may also be authorised by host states to consult national databases. According to the MB Decision, “all members of the Standing Corps are to be able to identify persons in need of international protection and persons in a vulnerable situation, including unaccompanied minors, and refer them to the competent authorities”. Training on international and EU law on fundamental rights and international protection, as well as guidelines on the identification and referral of persons in need of international protection, will be mandatory for all standing corps staff members.

The size of the standing corps

The following table, taken from the 2019 Regulation, outlines the ambitions for growth of Frontex’s standing corps. However, as noted, the political ambition is to reach the 10,000 total by 2024.

–-> voir le tableau sur le site de statewatch!

Category 2 staff – those on long term secondment from member states – will join Frontex from 2021, according to the 2019 Regulation.[8] It is foreseen that Germany will contribute the most staff, with 61 expected in 2021, increasing year-by-year to 225 by 2027. Other high contributors are France and Italy (170 and 125 by 2027, respectively).

The lowest contributors will be Iceland (expected to contribute between one and two people a year from 2021 to 2027), Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg. Liechtenstein is not contributing personnel but will contribute “through proportional financial support”.

For short-term secondments from member states, projections follow a very similar pattern. Germany will contribute 540 staff in 2021, increasing to 827 in 2027; Italy’s contribution will increase from 300 in 2021 to 458 in 2027; and France’s from 408 in 2021 to 624 in 2027. Most states will be making less than 100 staff available for short-term secondment in 2021.

What are the profiles?

The MB Decision outlines 12 profiles to be made available to Frontex, ranging from Border Guard Officer and Crew Member, to Cross Border Crime Detection Officer and Return Specialist. A full list is contained in the Decision.[9] All profiles will be fulfilled by an official of the competent authority of a member state (MS) or Schengen Associated Country (SAC), or by a member of Frontex’s own statutory staff.

Tasks to be carried out by these officials include:

border checks and surveillance;
interviewing, debriefing* and screening arrivals and registering fingerprints;
supporting the collection, assessment, analysis and distribution of information with EU member and non-member states;
verifying travel documents;
escorting individuals being deported on Frontex return operations;
operating data systems and platforms; and
offering cultural mediation

*Debriefing consists of informal interviews with migrants to collect information for risk analyses on irregular migration and other cross-border crime and the profiling of irregular migrants to identify “modus operandi and migration trends used by irregular migrants and facilitators/criminal networks”. Guidelines written by Frontex in 2012 instructed border guards to target vulnerable individuals for “debriefing”, not in order to streamline safeguarding or protection measures, but for intelligence-gathering - “such people are often more willing to talk about their experiences,” said an internal document.[10] It is unknown whether those instructions are still in place.

Recruitment for the profiles

Certain profiles are expected to “apply self-safety and security practice”, and to have “the capacity to work under pressure and face emotional events with composure”. Relevant profiles (e.g. crew member) are required to be able to perform search and rescue activities in distress situations at sea borders.

Frontex published a call for tender on 27 December for the provision of medical services for pre-recruitment examinations, in line with the plan to start recruiting operational staff in early 2020. The documents accompanying the tender reveal additional criteria for officials that will be granted executive powers (Frontex category “A2”) compared to those staff stationed primarily at the agency’s Warsaw headquarters (“A1”). Those criteria come in the form of more stringent medical testing.

The differences in medical screening for category A1 and A2 staff lie primarily in additional toxicology screening and psychiatric and psychological consultations. [11] The additional psychiatric attention allotted for operational staff “is performed to check the predisposition for people to work in arduous, hazardous conditions, exposed to stress, conflict situations, changing rapidly environment, coping with people being in dramatic, injure or death exposed situations”.[12]

Both A1 and A2 category provisional recruits will be asked to disclose if they have ever suffered from a sexually transmitted disease or “genital organ disease”, as well as depression, nervous or mental disorders, among a long list of other ailments. As well as disclosing any medication they take, recruits must also state if they are taking oral contraceptives (though there is no question about hormonal contraceptives that are not taken orally). Women are also asked to give the date of their last period on the pre-appointment questionnaire.

“Never touch yourself with gloves”

Frontex training materials on forced return operations obtained by Statewatch in 2019 acknowledge the likelihood of psychological stress among staff, among other health risks. (One recommendation contained in the documents is to “never touch yourself with gloves”). Citing “dissonance within the team, long hours with no rest, group dynamic, improvisation and different languages” among factors behind psychological stress, the training materials on medical precautionary measures for deportation escort officers also refer to post-traumatic stress disorder, the lack of an area to retreat to and body clock disruption as exacerbating risks. The document suggests a high likelihood that Frontex return escorts will witness poverty, “agony”, “chaos”, violence, boredom, and will have to deal with vulnerable persons.[13]

For fundamental rights monitors (officials deployed to monitor fundamental rights compliance during deportations, who can be either Frontex staff or national officials), the training materials obtained by Statewatch focus on the self-control of emotions, rather than emotional care. Strategies recommended include talking to somebody, seeking professional help, and “informing yourself of any other option offered”. The documents suggest that it is an individual’s responsibility to prevent emotional responses to stressful situations having an impact on operations, and to organise their own supervision and professional help. There is no obvious focus on how traumatic responses of Frontex staff could affect those coming into contact with them at an external border or during a deportation. [14]

The materials obtained by Statewatch also give some indication of the fundamental rights training imparted to those acting as deportation ‘escorts’ and fundamental rights monitors. The intended outcomes for a training session in Athens that took place in March 2019 included “adapt FR [fundamental rights] in a readmission operation (explain it with examples)” and “should be able to describe Non Refoulement principle” (in the document, ‘Session Fundamental rights’ is followed by ‘Session Velcro handcuffs’).[15] The content of the fundamental rights training that will be offered to Frontex’s new recruits is currently unknown.

Fit for service?

The agency anticipates that most staff will be recruited from March to June 2020, involving the medical examination of up to 700 applicants in this period. According to Frontex’s website, the agency has already received over 7,000 applications for the 700 new European Border Guard Officer positions.[16] Successful candidates will undergo six months of training before deployment in 2021. Apparently then, the posts are a popular career option, despite the seemingly invasive medical tests (especially for sexually active women). Why, for instance, is it important to Frontex to know about oral hormonal contraception, or about sexually transmitted infections?

When asked by Statewatch if Frontex provides in-house psychological and emotional support, an agency press officer stated: “When it comes to psychological and emotional support, Frontex is increasing awareness and personal resilience of the officers taking part in our operations through education and training activities.” A ‘Frontex Mental Health Strategy’ from 2018 proposed the establishment of “a network of experts-psychologists” to act as an advisory body, as well as creating “online self-care tools”, a “psychological hot-line”, and a space for peer support with participation of psychologists (according to risk assessment) during operations.[17]

One year later, Frontex, EASO and Europol jointly produced a brochure for staff deployed on operations, entitled ‘Occupational Health and Safety – Deployment Information’, which offers a series of recommendations to staff, placing the responsibility to “come to the deployment in good mental shape” and “learn how to manage stress and how to deal with anger” more firmly on the individual than the agency.[18] According to this document, officers who need additional support must disclose this by requesting it from their supervisor, while “a helpline or psychologist on-site may be available, depending on location”.

Frontex anticipates this recruitment drive to be “game changing”. Indeed, the Commission is relying upon it to reach its ambitions for the agency’s independence and efficiency. The inclusion of mandatory training in fundamental rights in the six-month introductory education is obviously a welcome step. Whether lessons learned in a classroom will be the first thing that comes to the minds of officials deployed on border control or deportation operations remains to be seen.

Unmanaged responses to emotional stress can include burnout, compassion-fatigue and indirect trauma, which can in turn decrease a person’s ability to cope with adverse circumstance, and increase the risk of violence.[19] Therefore, aside from the agency’s responsibility as an employer to safeguard the health of its staff, its approach to internal psychological care will affect not only the border guards themselves, but the people that they routinely come into contact with at borders and during return operations, many of whom themselves will have experienced trauma.

Jane Kilpatrick

Endnotes

[1] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

[2] Frontex, ‘Careers’, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

[3] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

[4] The ETIAS Central Unit will be responsible for processing the majority of applications for ‘travel authorisations’ received when the European Travel Information and Authorisation System comes into use, in theory in late 2022. Citizens who do not require a visa to travel to the Schengen area will have to apply for authorisation to travel to the Schengen area.

[5] Frontex, ‘Careers’, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

[6] Article 54(4), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, ►https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

[7] ‘European Commission 2020 Work Programme: An ambitious roadmap for a Union that strives for more’, 29 January 2020, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_124; “Mission letter” from Ursula von der Leyen to Ylva Johnsson, 10 September 2019, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/mission-letter-ylva-johansson_en.pdf

[8] Annex II, 2019 Regulation

[9] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

[10] ‘Press release: EU border agency targeted “isolated or mistreated” individuals for questioning’, Statewatch News, 16 February 2017, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/feb/eu-frontex-op-hera-debriefing-pr.htm

[11] ‘Provision of Medical Services – Pre-Recruitment Examination’, ▻https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-documents.html?cftId=5841

[12] ‘Provision of medical services – pre-recruitment examination, Terms of Reference - Annex II to invitation to tender no Frontex/OP/1491/2019/KM’, ▻https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-document.html?docId=65398

[13] Frontex training presentation, ‘Medical precautionary measures for escort officers’, undated, ▻http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-presentation-medical-precautionary-measures-deportation-escor

[14] Ibid.

[15] Frontex, document listing course learning outcomes from deportation escorts’ training, ▻http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-deportation-escorts-training-course-learning-outcomes.pdf

[16] Frontex, ‘Careers’, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

[17] Frontex, ‘Frontex mental health strategy’, 20 February 2018, ▻https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/89c168fe-e14b-11e7-9749-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

[18] EASO, Europol and Frontex, ‘Occupational health and safety’, 12 August 2019, ▻https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/17cc07e0-bd88-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-103142015

[19] Trauma Treatment International, ‘A different approach for victims of trauma’, ▻https://www.tt-intl.org/#our-work-section

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/frontex-launches-game-changing-recruitment-drive-for-standing-corps-of-b
#gardes_frontières #staff #corps_des_gardes-frontières

Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders (27.02.2020)

Instead of providing sea rescue capabilities in the Mediterranean, the EU is expanding air surveillance. Refugees are observed with drones developed for the military. In addition to numerous EU states, countries such as Libya could also use the information obtained.

It is not easy to obtain majorities for legislation in the European Union in the area of migration - unless it is a matter of upgrading the EU’s external borders. While the reform of a common EU asylum system has been on hold for years, the European Commission, Parliament and Council agreed to reshape the border agency Frontex with unusual haste shortly before last year’s parliamentary elections. A new Regulation has been in force since December 2019,[1] under which Frontex intends to build up a “standing corps” of 10,000 uniformed officials by 2027. They can be deployed not just at the EU’s external borders, but in ‘third countries’ as well.

In this way, Frontex will become a “European border police force” with powers that were previously reserved for the member states alone. The core of the new Regulation includes the procurement of the agency’s own equipment. The Multiannual Financial Framework, in which the EU determines the distribution of its financial resources from 2021 until 2027, has not yet been decided. According to current plans, however, at least €6 billion are reserved for Frontex in the seven-year budget. The intention is for Frontex to spend a large part of the money, over €2 billion, on aircraft, ships and vehicles.[2]

Frontex seeks company for drone flights

The upgrade plans include the stationing of large drones in the central and eastern Mediterranean. For this purpose, Frontex is looking for a private partner to operate flights off Malta, Italy or Greece. A corresponding tender ended in December[3] and the selection process is currently underway. The unmanned missions could then begin already in spring. Frontex estimates the total cost of these missions at €50 million. The contract has a term of two years and can be extended twice for one year at a time.

Frontex wants drones of the so-called MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) class. Their flight duration should be at least 20 hours. The requirements include the ability to fly in all weather conditions and at day and night. It is also planned to operate in airspace where civil aircraft are in service. For surveillance missions, the drones should carry electro-optical cameras, thermal imaging cameras and so-called “daylight spotter” systems that independently detect moving targets and keep them in focus. Other equipment includes systems for locating mobile and satellite telephones. The drones will also be able to receive signals from emergency call transmitters sewn into modern life jackets.

However, the Frontex drones will not be used primarily for sea rescue operations, but to improve capacities against unwanted migration. This assumption is also confirmed by the German non-governmental organisation Sea-Watch, which has been providing assistance in the central Mediterranean with various ships since 2015. “Frontex is not concerned with saving lives,” says Ruben Neugebauer of Sea-Watch. “While air surveillance is being expanded with aircraft and drones, ships urgently needed for rescue operations have been withdrawn”. Sea-Watch demands that situation pictures of EU drones are also made available to private organisations for sea rescue.

Aircraft from arms companies

Frontex has very specific ideas for its own drones, which is why there are only a few suppliers worldwide that can be called into question. The Israel Aerospace Industries Heron 1, which Frontex tested for several months on the Greek island of Crete[4] and which is also flown by the German Bundeswehr, is one of them. As set out by Frontex in its invitation to tender, the Heron 1, with a payload of around 250 kilograms, can carry all the surveillance equipment that the agency intends to deploy over the Mediterranean. Also amongst those likely to be interested in the Frontex contract is the US company General Atomics, which has been building drones of the Predator series for 20 years. Recently, it presented a new Predator model in Greece under the name SeaGuardian, for maritime observation.[5] It is equipped with a maritime surveillance radar and a system for receiving position data from larger ships, thus fulfilling one of Frontex’s essential requirements.

General Atomics may have a competitive advantage, as its Predator drones have several years’ operational experience in the Mediterranean. In addition to Frontex, the European Union has been active in the central Mediterranean with EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia. In March 2019, Italy’s then-interior minister Matteo Salvini pushed through the decision to operate the EU mission from the air alone. Since then, two unarmed Predator drones operated by the Italian military have been flying for EUNAVFOR MED for 60 hours per month. Officially, the drones are to observe from the air whether the training of the Libyan coast guard has been successful and whether these navy personnel use their knowledge accordingly. Presumably, however, the Predators are primarily pursuing the mission’s goal to “combat human smuggling” by spying on the Libyan coast. It is likely that the new Operation EU Active Surveillance, which will use military assets from EU member states to try to enforce the UN arms embargo placed on Libya,[6] will continue to patrol with Italian drones off the coast in North Africa.

Three EU maritime surveillance agencies

In addition to Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) are also investing in maritime surveillance using drones. Together, the three agencies coordinate some 300 civil and military authorities in EU member states.[7] Their tasks include border, fisheries and customs control, law enforcement and environmental protection.

In 2017, Frontex and EMSA signed an agreement to benefit from joint reconnaissance capabilities, with EFCA also involved.[8] At the time, EMSA conducted tests with drones of various sizes, but now the drones’ flights are part of its regular services. The offer is not only open to EU Member States, as Iceland was the first to take advantage of it. Since summer 2019, a long-range Hermes 900 drone built by the Israeli company Elbit Systems has been flying from Iceland’s Egilsstaðir airport. The flights are intended to cover more than half of the island state’s exclusive economic zone and to detect “suspicious activities and potential hazards”.[9]

The Hermes 900 was also developed for the military; the Israeli army first deployed it in the Gaza Strip in 2014. The Times of Israel puts the cost of the operating contract with EMSA at €59 million,[10] with a term of two years, which can be extended for another two years. The agency did not conclude the contract directly with the Israeli arms company, but through the Portuguese firm CeiiA. The contract covers the stationing, control and mission control of the drones.

New interested parties for drone flights

At the request of the German MEP Özlem Demirel (from the party Die Linke), the European Commission has published a list of countries that also want to use EMSA drones.[11] According to this list, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal and also Greece have requested unmanned flights for pollution monitoring this year, while Bulgaria and Spain want to use them for general maritime surveillance. Until Frontex has its own drones, EMSA is flying its drones for the border agency on Crete. As in Iceland, this is the long-range drone Hermes 900, but according to Greek media reports it crashed on 8 January during take-off.[12] Possible causes are a malfunction of the propulsion system or human error. The aircraft is said to have been considerably damaged.

Authorities from France and Great Britain have also ordered unmanned maritime surveillance from EMSA. Nothing is yet known about the exact intended location, but it is presumably the English Channel. There, the British coast guard is already observing border traffic with larger drones built by the Tekever arms company from Portugal.[13] The government in London wants to prevent migrants from crossing the Channel. The drones take off from the airport in the small town of Lydd and monitor the approximately 50-kilometre-long and 30-kilometre-wide Strait of Dover. Great Britain has also delivered several quadcopters to France to try to detect potential migrants in French territorial waters. According to the prefecture of Pas-de-Calais, eight gendarmes have been trained to control the small drones[14].

Information to non-EU countries

The images taken by EMSA drones are evaluated by the competent national coastguards. A livestream also sends them to Frontex headquarters in Warsaw.[15] There they are fed into the EUROSUR border surveillance system. This is operated by Frontex and networks the surveillance installations of all EU member states that have an external border. The data from EUROSUR and the national border control centres form the ‘Common Pre-frontier Intelligence Picture’,[16] referring to the area of interest of Frontex, which extends far into the African continent. Surveillance data is used to detect and prevent migration movements at an early stage.

Once the providing company has been selected, the new Frontex drones are also to fly for EUROSUR. According to the invitation to tender, they are to operate in the eastern and central Mediterranean within a radius of up to 250 nautical miles (463 kilometres). This would enable them to carry out reconnaissance in the “pre-frontier” area off Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Within the framework of EUROSUR, Frontex shares the recorded data with other European users via a ‘Remote Information Portal’, as the call for tender explains. The border agency has long been able to cooperate with third countries and the information collected can therefore also be made available to authorities in North Africa. However, in order to share general information on surveillance of the Mediterranean Sea with a non-EU state, Frontex must first conclude a working agreement with the corresponding government.[17]

It is already possible, however, to provide countries such as Libya with the coordinates of refugee boats. For example, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates that the nearest Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) must be informed of actual or suspected emergencies. With EU funding, Italy has been building such a centre in Tripoli for the last two years.[18] It is operated by the military coast guard, but so far has no significant equipment of its own.

The EU military mission “EUNAVFOR MED” was cooperating more extensively with the Libyan coast guard. For communication with European naval authorities, Libya is the first third country to be connected to European surveillance systems via the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network[19]. Information handed over to the Libyan authorities might also include information that was collected with the Italian military ‘Predator’ drones.

Reconnaissance generated with unmanned aerial surveillance is also given to the MRCC in Turkey. This was seen in a pilot project last summer, when the border agency tested an unmanned aerostat with the Greek coast guard off the island of Samos.[20] Attached to a 1,000 metre-long cable, the airship was used in the Frontex operation ‘Poseidon’ in the eastern Mediterranean. The 35-meter-long zeppelin comes from the French manufacturer A-NSE.[21] The company specializes in civil and military aerial observation. According to the Greek Marine Ministry, the equipment included a radar, a thermal imaging camera and an Automatic Identification System (AIS) for the tracking of larger ships. The recorded videos were received and evaluated by a situation centre supplied by the Portuguese National Guard. If a detected refugee boat was still in Turkish territorial waters, the Greek coast guard informed the Turkish authorities. This pilot project in the Aegean Sea was the first use of an airship by Frontex. The participants deployed comparatively large numbers of personnel for the short mission. Pictures taken by the Greek coastguard show more than 40 people.

Drones enable ‘pull-backs’

Human rights organisations accuse EUNAVFOR MED and Frontex of passing on information to neighbouring countries leading to rejections (so-called ‘push-backs’) in violation of international law. People must not be returned to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Frontex does not itself return refugees in distress who were discovered at sea via aerial surveillance, but leaves the task to the Libyan or Turkish authorities. Regarding Libya, the Agency since 2017 provided notice of at least 42 vessels in distress to Libyan authorities.[22]

Private rescue organisations therefore speak of so-called ‘pull-backs’, but these are also prohibited, as the Israeli human rights lawyer Omer Shatz argues: “Communicating the location of civilians fleeing war to a consortium of militias and instructing them to intercept and forcibly transfer them back to the place they fled from, trigger both state responsibility of all EU members and individual criminal liability of hundreds involved.” Together with his colleague Juan Branco, Shatz is suing those responsible for the European Union and its agencies before the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Soon they intend to publish individual cases and the names of the people accused.

Matthias Monroy

An earlier version of this article first appeared in the German edition of Le Monde Diplomatique: ‘Drohnen für Frontex Statt sich auf die Rettung von Bootsflüchtlingen im Mittelmeer zu konzentrieren, baut die EU die Luftüberwachung’.

Note: this article was corrected on 6 March to clarify a point regarding cooperation between Frontex and non-EU states.

Endnotes

[1] Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard, ►https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-33-2019-INIT/en/pdf

[2] European Commission, ‘A strengthened and fully equipped European Border and Coast Guard’, 12 September 2018, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-factsheet-coast-guard_en.pdf

[3] ‘Poland-Warsaw: Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) for Medium Altitude Long Endurance Maritime Aerial Surveillance’, ▻https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:490010-2019:TEXT:EN:HTML&tabId=1

[4] IAI, ‘IAI AND AIRBUS MARITIME HERON UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM (UAS) SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED 200 FLIGHT HOURS IN CIVILIAN EUROPEAN AIRSPACE FOR FRONTEX’, 24 October 2018, ▻https://www.iai.co.il/iai-and-airbus-maritime-heron-unmanned-aerial-system-uas-successfully-complet

[5] ‘ European Maritime Flight Demonstrations’, General Atomics, ▻http://www.ga-asi.com/european-maritime-demo

[6] ‘EU agrees to deploy warships to enforce Libya arms embargo’, The Guardian, 17 February 2020, ▻https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/17/eu-agrees-deploy-warships-enforce-libya-arms-embargo

[7] EMSA, ‘Heads of EMSA and Frontex meet to discuss cooperation on European coast guard functions’, 3 April 2019, ▻http://www.emsa.europa.eu/news-a-press-centre/external-news/item/3499-heads-of-emsa-and-frontex-meet-to-discuss-cooperation-on-european-c

[8] Frontex, ‘Frontex, EMSA and EFCA strengthen cooperation on coast guard functions’, 23 March 2017, ▻https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-emsa-and-efca-strengthen-cooperation-on-coast-guard-functions

[9] Elbit Systems, ‘Elbit Systems Commenced the Operation of the Maritime UAS Patrol Service to European Union Countries’, 18 June 2019, ▻https://elbitsystems.com/pr-new/elbit-systems-commenced-the-operation-of-the-maritime-uas-patrol-servi

[10] ‘Elbit wins drone contract for up to $68m to help monitor Europe coast’, The Times of Israel, 1 November 2018, ▻https://www.timesofisrael.com/elbit-wins-drone-contract-for-up-to-68m-to-help-monitor-europe-coast

[11] ‘Answer given by Ms Bulc on behalf of the European Commission’, ▻https://netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/2019/12/E-2946_191_Finalised_reply_Annex1_EN_V1.pdf

[12] ‘Το drone της FRONTEX έπεσε, οι μετανάστες έρχονται’, Proto Thema, 27 January 2020, ▻https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/968869/to-drone-tis-frontex-epese-oi-metanastes-erhodai

[13] Morgan Meaker, ‘Here’s proof the UK is using drones to patrol the English Channel’, Wired, 10 January 2020, ▻https://www.wired.co.uk/article/uk-drones-migrants-english-channel

[14] ‘Littoral: Les drones pour lutter contre les traversées de migrants sont opérationnels’, La Voix du Nord, 26 March 2019, ▻https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/557951/article/2019-03-26/les-drones-pour-lutter-contre-les-traversees-de-migrants-sont-operation

[15] ‘Frontex report on the functioning of Eurosur – Part I’, Council document 6215/18, 15 February 2018, ▻http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6215-2018-INIT/en/pdf

[16] European Commission, ‘Eurosur’, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/border-crossing/eurosur_en

[17] Legal reforms have also given Frontex the power to operate on the territory of non-EU states, subject to the conclusion of a status agreement between the EU and the country in question. The 2016 Frontex Regulation allowed such cooperation with states that share a border with the EU; the 2019 Frontex Regulation extends this to any non-EU state.

[18] ‘Helping the Libyan Coast Guard to establish a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre’, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-000547_EN.html

[19] Matthias Monroy, ‘EU funds the sacking of rescue ships in the Mediterranean’, 7 July 2018, ▻https://digit.site36.net/2018/07/03/eu-funds-the-sacking-of-rescue-ships-in-the-mediterranean

[20] Frontex, ‘Frontex begins testing use of aerostat for border surveillance’, 31 July 2019, ▻https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-begins-testing-use-of-aerostat-for-border-surveillance-ur33N8

[21] ‘Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission’, 7 January 2020, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002529-ASW_EN.html

[22] ‘Answer given by Vice-President Borrell on behalf of the European Commission’, 8 January 2020, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002654-ASW_EN.html

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/drones-for-frontex-unmanned-migration-control-at-europe-s-borders

#drones

Monitoring “secondary movements” and “hotspots”: Frontex is now an internal surveillance agency (16.12.2019)

The EU’s border agency, Frontex, now has powers to gather data on “secondary movements” and the “hotspots” within the EU. The intention is to ensure “situational awareness” and produce risk analyses on the migratory situation within the EU, in order to inform possible operational action by national authorities. This brings with it increased risks for the fundamental rights of both non-EU nationals and ethnic minority EU citizens.

The establishment of a new ’standing corps’ of 10,000 border guards to be commanded by EU border agency Frontex has generated significant public and press attention in recent months. However, the new rules governing Frontex[1] include a number of other significant developments - including a mandate for the surveillance of migratory movements and migration “hotspots” within the EU.

Previously, the agency’s surveillance role has been restricted to the external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or “selected third-country ports.”[2] New legal provisions mean it will now be able to gather data on the movement of people within the EU. While this is only supposed to deal with “trends, volumes and routes,” rather than personal data, it is intended to inform operational activity within the EU.

This may mean an increase in operations against ‘unauthorised’ migrants, bringing with it risks for fundamental rights such as the possibility of racial profiling, detention, violence and the denial of access to asylum procedures. At the same time, in a context where internal borders have been reintroduced by numerous Schengen states over the last five years due to increased migration, it may be that he agency’s new role contributes to a further prolongation of internal border controls.

From external to internal surveillance

Frontex was initially established with the primary goals of assisting in the surveillance and control of the external borders of the EU. Over the years it has obtained increasing powers to conduct surveillance of those borders in order to identify potential ’threats’.

The European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) has a key role in this task, taking data from a variety of sources, including satellites, sensors, drones, ships, vehicles and other means operated both by national authorities and the agency itself. EUROSUR was formally established by legislation approved in 2013, although the system was developed and in use long before it was subject to a legal framework.[3]

The new Frontex Regulation incorporates and updates the provisions of the 2013 EUROSUR Regulation. It maintains existing requirements for the agency to establish a “situational picture” of the EU’s external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or the ports of non-EU states – which is then distributed to the EU’s member states in order to inform operational activities.[4]

The new rules also provide a mandate for reporting on “unauthorised secondary movements” and goings-on in the “hotspots”. The Commission’s proposal for the new Frontex Regulation was not accompanied by an impact assessment, which would have set out the reasoning and justifications for these new powers. The proposal merely pointed out that the new rules would “evolve” the scope of EUROSUR, to make it possible to “prevent secondary movements”.[5] As the European Data Protection Supervisor remarked, the lack of an impact assessment made it impossible: “to fully assess and verify its attended benefits and impact, notably on fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to privacy and to the protection of personal data.”[6]

The term “secondary movements” is not defined in the Regulation, but is generally used to refer to journeys between EU member states undertaken without permission, in particular by undocumented migrants and applicants for internal protection. Regarding the “hotspots” – established and operated by EU and national authorities in Italy and Greece – the Regulation provides a definition,[7] but little clarity on precisely what information will be gathered.

Legal provisions

A quick glance at Section 3 of the new Regulation, dealing with EUROSUR, gives little indication that the system will now be used for internal surveillance. The formal scope of EUROSUR is concerned with the external borders and border crossing points:

“EUROSUR shall be used for border checks at authorised border crossing points and for external land, sea and air border surveillance, including the monitoring, detection, identification, tracking, prevention and interception of unauthorised border crossings for the purpose of detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime and contributing to ensuring the protection and saving the lives of migrants.”

However, the subsequent section of the Regulation (on ‘situational awareness’) makes clear the agency’s new internal role. Article 24 sets out the components of the “situational pictures” that will be visible in EUROSUR. There are three types – national situational pictures, the European situational picture and specific situational pictures. All of these should consist of an events layer, an operational layer and an analysis layer. The first of these layers should contain (emphasis added in all quotes):

“…events and incidents related to unauthorised border crossings and cross-border crime and, where available, information on unauthorised secondary movements, for the purpose of understanding migratory trends, volume and routes.”

Article 26, dealing with the European situational picture, states:

“The Agency shall establish and maintain a European situational picture in order to provide the national coordination centres and the Commission with effective, accurate and timely information and analysis, covering the external borders, the pre-frontier area and unauthorised secondary movements.”

The events layer of that picture should include “information relating to… incidents in the operational area of a joint operation or rapid intervention coordinated by the Agency, or in a hotspot.”[8] In a similar vein:

“The operational layer of the European situational picture shall contain information on the joint operations and rapid interventions coordinated by the Agency and on hotspots, and shall include the mission statements, locations, status, duration, information on the Member States and other actors involved, daily and weekly situational reports, statistical data and information packages for the media.”[9]

Article 28, dealing with ‘EUROSUR Fusion Services’, says that Frontex will provide national authorities with information on the external borders and pre-frontier area that may be derived from, amongst other things, the monitoring of “migratory flows towards and within the Union in terms of trends, volume and routes.”

Sources of data

The “situational pictures” compiled by Frontex and distributed via EUROSUR are made up of data gathered from a host of different sources. For the national situational picture, these are:

national border surveillance systems;
stationary and mobile sensors operated by national border agencies;
border surveillance patrols and “other monitoring missions”;
local, regional and other coordination centres;
other national authorities and systems, such as immigration liaison officers, operational centres and contact points;
border checks;
Frontex;
other member states’ national coordination centres;
third countries’ authorities;
ship reporting systems;
other relevant European and international organisations; and
other sources.[10]

For the European situational picture, the sources of data are:

national coordination centres;
national situational pictures;
immigration liaison officers;
Frontex, including reports form its liaison officers;
Union delegations and EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions;
other relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies and international organisations; and
third countries’ authorities.[11]

The EUROSUR handbook – which will presumably be redrafted to take into account the new legislation – provides more detail about what each of these categories may include.[12]

Exactly how this melange of different data will be used to report on secondary movements is currently unknown. However, in accordance with Article 24 of the new Regulation:

“The Commission shall adopt an implementing act laying down the details of the information layers of the situational pictures and the rules for the establishment of specific situational pictures. The implementing act shall specify the type of information to be provided, the entities responsible for collecting, processing, archiving and transmitting specific information, the maximum time limits for reporting, the data security and data protection rules and related quality control mechanisms.” [13]

This implementing act will specify precisely how EUROSUR will report on “secondary movements”.[14] According to a ‘roadmap’ setting out plans for the implementation of the new Regulation, this implementing act should have been drawn up in the last quarter of 2020 by a newly-established European Border and Coast Guard Committee sitting within the Commission. However, that Committee does not yet appear to have held any meetings.[15]

Operational activities at the internal borders

Boosting Frontex’s operational role is one of the major purposes of the new Regulation, although it makes clear that the internal surveillance role “should not lead to operational activities of the Agency at the internal borders of the Member States.” Rather, internal surveillance should “contribute to the monitoring by the Agency of migratory flows towards and within the Union for the purpose of risk analysis and situational awareness.” The purpose is to inform operational activity by national authorities.

In recent years Schengen member states have reintroduced border controls for significant periods in the name of ensuring internal security and combating irregular migration. An article in Deutsche Welle recently highlighted:

“When increasing numbers of refugees started arriving in the European Union in 2015, Austria, Germany, Slovenia and Hungary quickly reintroduced controls, citing a “continuous big influx of persons seeking international protection.” This was the first time that migration had been mentioned as a reason for reintroducing border controls.

Soon after, six Schengen members reintroduced controls for extended periods. Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway cited migration as a reason. France, as the sixth country, first introduced border checks after the November 2015 attacks in Paris, citing terrorist threats. Now, four years later, all six countries still have controls in place. On November 12, they are scheduled to extend them for another six months.”[16]

These long-term extensions of internal border controls are illegal (the upper limit is supposed to be two years; discussions on changes to the rules governing the reintroduction of internal border controls in the Schengen area are ongoing).[17] A European Parliament resolution from May 2018 stated that “many of the prolongations are not in line with the existing rules as to their extensions, necessity or proportionality and are therefore unlawful.”[18] Yves Pascou, a researcher for the European Policy Centre, told Deutsche Welle that: “"We are in an entirely political situation now, not a legal one, and not one grounded in facts.”

A European Parliament study published in 2016 highlighted that:

“there has been a noticeable lack of detail and evidence given by the concerned EU Member States [those which reintroduced internal border controls]. For example, there have been no statistics on the numbers of people crossing borders and seeking asylum, or assessment of the extent to which reintroducing border checks complies with the principles of proportionality and necessity.”[19]

One purpose of Frontex’s new internal surveillance powers is to provide such evidence (albeit in the ideologically-skewed form of ‘risk analysis’) on the situation within the EU. Whether the information provided will be of interest to national authorities is another question. Nevertheless, it would be a significant irony if the provision of that information were to contribute to the further maintenance of internal borders in the Schengen area.

At the same time, there is a more pressing concern related to these new powers. Many discussions on the reintroduction of internal borders revolve around the fact that it is contrary to the idea, spirit (and in these cases, the law) of the Schengen area. What appears to have been totally overlooked is the effect the reintroduction of internal borders may have on non-EU nationals or ethnic minority citizens of the EU. One does not have to cross an internal Schengen frontier too many times to notice patterns in the appearance of the people who are hauled off trains and buses by border guards, but personal anecdotes are not the same thing as empirical investigation. If Frontex’s new powers are intended to inform operational activity by the member states at the internal borders of the EU, then the potential effects on fundamental rights must be taken into consideration and should be the subject of investigation by journalists, officials, politicians and researchers.

Chris Jones

Endnotes

[1] The new Regulation was published in the Official Journal of the EU in mid-November: Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, ►https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

[2] Article 12, ‘Common application of surveillance tools’, Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), ▻https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013R1052

[3] According to Frontex, the Eurosur Network first came into use in December 2011 and in March 2012 was first used to “exchange operational information”. The Regulation governing the system came into force in October 2013 (see footnote 2). See: Charles Heller and Chris Jones, ‘Eurosur: saving lives or reinforcing deadly borders?’, Statewatch Journal, vol. 23 no. 3/4, February 2014, ▻http://database.statewatch.org/article.asp?aid=33156

[4] Recital 34, 2019 Regulation: “EUROSUR should provide an exhaustive situational picture not only at the external borders but also within the Schengen area and in the pre-frontier area. It should cover land, sea and air border surveillance and border checks.”

[5] European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action no 98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) no 1052/2013 and Regulation (EU) no 2016/1624’, COM(2018) 631 final, 12 September 2018, ▻http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/sep/eu-com-frontex-proposal-regulation-com-18-631.pdf

[6] EDPS, ‘Formal comments on the Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard’, 30 November 2018, p. p.2, ▻https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-11-30_comments_proposal_regulation_european_border_coast_guard_en.pdf

[7] Article 2(23): “‘hotspot area’ means an area created at the request of the host Member State in which the host Member State, the Commission, relevant Union agencies and participating Member States cooperate, with the aim of managing an existing or potential disproportionate migratory challenge characterised by a significant increase in the number of migrants arriving at the external borders”

[8] Article 26(3)(c), 2019 Regulation

[9] Article 26(4), 2019 Regulation

[10] Article 25, 2019 Regulation

[11] Article 26, 2019 Regulation

[12] European Commission, ‘Commission Recommendation adopting the Practical Handbook for implementing and managing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)’, C(2015) 9206 final, 15 December 2015, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-borders/legal-documents/docs/eurosur_handbook_annex_en.pdf

[13] Article 24(3), 2019 Regulation

[14] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

[15] Documents related to meetings of committees operating under the auspices of the European Commission can be found in the Comitology Register: ▻https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=Search.Search&NewSearch=1

[16] Kira Schacht, ‘Border checks in EU countries challenge Schengen Agreement’, DW, 12 November 2019, ▻https://www.dw.com/en/border-checks-in-eu-countries-challenge-schengen-agreement/a-51033603

[17] European Parliament, ‘Temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders’, ▻https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2017/0245(COD)&l=en

[18] ‘Report on the annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area’, 3 May 2018, para.9, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0160_EN.html

[19] Elpseth Guild et al, ‘Internal border controls in the Schengen area: is Schengen crisis-proof?’, European Parliament, June 2016, p.9, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571356/IPOL_STU(2016)571356_EN.pdf

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2019/monitoring-secondary-movements-and-hotspots-frontex-is-now-an-internal-s

#mouvements_secondaires #hotspot #hotspots

A Hard Lesson for Migrants Who Give Up: There May Be No Welcome Mat Back Home

https://static01.nyt.com/images/2019/09/12/world/xxafrica-migrants6/merlin_157516566_c7bebbe2-a07a-4996-985c-793f06c0e4a0-articleLarge.jpg?quality=75&auto=webp&disable=upscale

Jessica Kablan, 27, came back to Ivory Coast seven months pregnant by a man she had turned to for protection on the road.Credit...Yagazie Emezi for The New York Times

THIAROYE-SUR-MER, Senegal — The fishing village has long sent its men to sea, but after foreign trawlers scraped the bottom clean, the men began coming back empty-handed. It has long sent its men abroad for work, too, but their luck is often no better.

Last November, when El Hadji Macoura Diop, a 37-year-old fisherman, failed to reach Europe by boat, he could not bring himself to call his wife and tell her he was giving up. “I knew it would just destroy her,” he said.

Hard as it is to leave home for an unknown land and an uncertain future, coming back, migrants say, can be even harder. Often, they feel ashamed to admit defeat, especially to families that may have scrimped to raise money for their trip. And they struggle to reintegrate into the societies they left behind.

In 2010, when he was 19, Yaya Guindo fled his life herding cattle in a small farming village in Ivory Coast. Last winter, after eight years on the road working in construction and at restaurants, he returned, broken and defeated, from a detention center in Libya.

He tried to go home, he said, but his friends mocked him. “I didn’t have anything,” he said. “I was embarrassed.”

The experiences of Mr. Diop and Mr. Guindo are far from unusual. Researchers estimate that one out of four people who migrate in search of opportunity return to their country of birth — some by choice, others not.

Just since 2017, the International Organization for Migration has helped more than 62,000 migrants return to 13 countries in West and Central Africa, transported on charter flights and buses arranged by the agency. Many said they wanted to go home after being detained in abysmal conditions in Libyan detention centers, like one in Tajoura that was bombed in early July, killing more than 50 people.

Once back, they are offered help reintegrating, including temporary shelter, pocket money, job training and psychological counseling.

“These people left for a reason, and if you don’t address that, they will keep dying at sea,” said Florence Kim, a spokeswoman for the International Organization for Migration, which runs the program. “If you give people what they needed in the first place, they don’t need to take the risks.”

The organization placed Mr. Guindo in a training program as a restaurant worker in a trendy neighborhood of Abidjan, the largest city in Ivory Coast. Other returning migrants have been given training as carpenters, tailors or shopkeepers.

But after the initial support, the migrants are on their own.

“We’re trying not to create a parallel system where migrants who are coming back to their country would have better service than Ivorians who chose not to leave,” Lavinia Prati, a reintegration officer for the International Organization for Migration.

The transition can be rocky.

Mr. Guindo, for example, has angered his employers by skipping work to play basketball for a local club. He says he needs to maintain good relations with the club because it is giving him housing in exchange for playing.

Yet as hard as it is to adjust, Mr. Guindo said he was staying put.

“I saw people dying of hunger, I saw women raped, men beheaded,” he said. “What I saw, what I lived, what I heard — I would not leave again.”

Another returnee to Ivory Coast, Jessica Kablan, 27, came back seven months pregnant by a man she had turned to for protection on the road. Although the nature of the relationship was intrinsically coercive, it seemed to her the best choice she could make under the circumstances. When her boyfriend back home — who had helped pay for her trip — realized she was pregnant, he ended the relationship.

She does not blame him.

“I came back with a child,” she said. “How could he accept that?”

Meliane Lorng, a psychologist who counsels returning migrants through the International Organization for Migration, says the women with children often don’t tell their families that they are back, “because the infant is the living testimony that they were raped.”

Uncounted other migrants, like the fisherman, have returned on their own, without the help of humanitarian agencies.

Thiaroye-sur-Mer has been a major source of migration for more than a decade. Hundreds of men have tried to reach Europe — mainly Spain. Everyone knows the migrant motto, “Barca ou barzakh”: Wolof for “Barcelona or die.”

Some make it. Some die trying. And some return, said Moustapha Diouf, himself a returned migrant, who created a community center for them.

To the outsider, Thiaroye-sur-Mer can seem like an idyllic place, not somewhere people would be eager to leave: Men sit on the beach, mending their nets, while children play in the surf. But when they do come back home, migrants often get a stark reminder of why they left in the first place.

One recent day, Mr. Diop, the fisherman who abandoned his attempt to reach Europe, and his five partners came back to shore with about 100 small silver fish called sardinella in their nets. Once the owner of the boat got his share, they would earn about a dollar each, he said.

There was a time when some migrants setting off in hopes of a better life left right from the shores of the village by pirogue, the colorfully painted wooden canoes used for fishing. More recently, the grapevine has advised them to go by air to Morocco, where Senegalese do not need visas, and then catch passage across the Mediterranean with a smuggler.

From the roofs of the village houses, the view of the ocean goes on forever. It is easy to imagine that Europe might be just beyond the horizon. And it is possible to forget, if only for a moment, the many dangers of the journey.

Often, it is the women who encourage the men to migrate.

Mr. Diop’s mother, Fatou Ndaw, 55, chose him to go because he was the oldest of three brothers, and a fisherman. “He was the one who knows how to read the signs of the ocean,” she said.

Mr. Diop tried twice.

On his first attempt, in 2006, he headed for the Canary Islands. Along the way, he watched as six people from his village died after bouts of vomiting and dehydration, their bodies tossed overboard with a prayer.

Mr. Diop landed, but he was deported two days before an uncle living in Spain arrived to claim him, he said.

To pay for his second attempt, last fall, Mr. Diop’s mother sold her jewelry; his wife, Mbayang Hanne, saved the money that she earned frying doughnuts under a tent on the beach and selling them with coffee.

Mr. Diop bought a round-trip plane ticket to Casablanca, where he did not need a visa and could stay with a childhood friend. From there, he took a bus to Tangier and boarded a boat for Spain.

This time, his boat was stopped before it reached international waters. Mr. Diop says he was fingerprinted and dropped at the Algerian border. He walked 16 hours with other migrants until a car picked them up and took them to Casablanca.

In Casablanca, the weather was bad and the boats were not running. He slept on the street in the rain. His round-trip ticket on Royal Air Maroc was expiring in two days. Homesick and miserable, Mr. Diop called his parents. They advised him to use the ticket to return home.

He spent some sleepless nights agonizing over whether to call his wife, and decided not to.

At the airport back in Dakar, he did not even have enough money for a taxi. A stranger took pity on him and drove him home.

To Mr. Diop’s relief, his wife was out when he got there — but all that did was put off the inevitable. When she returned, she was shocked to find him in the house.

It was hard to explain why he had failed when so many others had succeeded. Some of his neighbors, Mr. Diop felt, were judging him. But others told him it was not his fault.

“Europe doesn’t belong to anybody,” he recalled their telling him. “If God decides, one day you’ll have breakfast in Europe. Never give up.”

And he has not. Mr. Diop says he is not discouraged by deaths he has seen on the migrant path. It is simply part of the risk, he says.

He and his family are saving for him to leave again.

▻https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/15/world/africa/africa-migrants-return-home.html

Video: Sent back to Ivory Coast, illegal migrants face stigma, rejection

▻https://youtu.be/n3moMpBDD64

It’s the contradiction of Ivory Coast. While its economy is one of the most dynamic in Africa, more and more of its people are setting out into the desert towards the Mediterranean in a bid to reach Europe. Some succeed, but for others, the journey is cut short and they are sent back to Ivory Coast. Returning home is often difficult as it comes with a sense of failure and rejection from their loved ones. Our Abidjan correspondents report.

▻https://www.france24.com/en/20180905-focus-ivory-coast-returnees-illegal-migrants-europe-libya-mediter

Ivory Coast: the migration challenge

Ivory Coast is one of the major departure points for migrants travelling illegally to Europe. Without a job or a tangible future in their country, many risk their lives seeking a better one abroad. To combat this pattern, the European Union is working in conjunction with the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Collective reintegration projects, such as business partnerships between returning migrants and members of their community, aim to discourage risky irregular migration through sustainable work and dialogue at home. To see how it works, Euronews travels to Ivory Coast, which recently hosted the African Union-European Union summit.

Abidjan, Ivory Coast’s economic capital, is one of West Africa’s most highly urbanised cities. But behind its apparent success story, and despite being among the world’s biggest exporters of cacao, coffee and bananas, Ivory Coast is still plagued by poverty, which affected nearly half the population in 2015. Many young people faced with unemployment try to reach Europe. According to the IOM and the EU, among the 155.000 migrants who reached Europe between January and November 2017, most came from West Africa.

Europe isn’t the Eldorado

We meet Jean-Marie in the capital Abidjan. He is one of many who was seduced by the prospect of a better life beyond his country’s borders. A promising football talent, he was lured to Tunisia by a so-called “sports agent” who took his money and disappeared.

“In the first weeks everything went well, I only understood it was a scam after a while because I never saw that person again, he disappeared with the 2.500 euros I gave him,” Jean-Marie Gbougouri tells us. “So, in the end, I was stuck over there, I had nothing left. So for me, Eldorado is not necessarily Europe. Of course, we all dream of going to Europe, but not in those conditions. I’m in good shape, but taking a boat to Italy isn’t going to change my situation. So I’d rather go home and invest my energy in my own country and see what happens.”

The IOM helped Jean-Marie return home and set up a business as a chicken farmer. Voluntary return and its follow-up are priorities for the EU, which funds the IOM’s projects. According to the EU’s foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini, interviewed by Euronews, the EU has helped 14,000 people return home this year.

Once home, the migrants need assistance says the IOM’s director in Ivory Coast, Marina Schramm: “There is this point of failure which is why it is extremely important for us to work on the psychological and psychosocial support, create an identity again, build self-confidence. And I think therefore training is extremely important, having a diploma makes someone out of you again, not just someone that came back with nothing.”

Boosting cacao revenue

To prevent Ivory Coast’s youth from leaving, there need to be jobs for them. The country is the world’s biggest producer of cacao, most of which is consumed as chocolate in Europe and North America. But cocoa farmers in Africa are deeply affected by the fluctuating prices of cocoa. Overproduction this year caused prices to drop.

Moreover, what Ivory Coast lacks, says Euronews’ Isabel Marques da Silva, is the processing industry.

“A cooperative working in the fair trade business gets better prices for its cacao. But the added value is in the transformation process, which does not takes place in Ivory Coast. So in the end, the farmers get less than 10 percent of the price of a chocolate bar made and sold in Europe,” she says.

There are exceptions like the Société Coopérative Equitable du Bandama, in the town of M’Brimbo, northeast of Abidjan. It brings together Ivory Coast’s first certified organic and fair trade cocoa producers.

Thanks to this certification they have developed their own trade channels and are therefore spared the price fluctuations of the regular market. The next step would be to make the chocolate locally.

“We’ll need funding, or at least someone to help train us locally so that we can make the chocolate here,” says SCEB president Jean Evariste Salo. “In Europe, people are tired of eating toxic food, they’re starting to ask for organic produce: organic is the future.”

Boosting digital growth

Entrepreneurship in Africa is booming as is the digital economy.

Computer engineer Guiako Obin is the co-founder of Babylab, a Fab Lab where local children in the deprived neighbourhood of Abobo in Abidjan can come and learn about computers, upcycling and coding.

“What we need is to lobby local authorities in order to copy what’s being done in other parts of Ivory Coast and Africa,” Guiako tells us.

The development of digital opportunities was at the heart of the recent EU-Africa Business Forum in Abidjan.

According to Stefano Manservisi, head of International Cooperation and Development at the EU, “(The priority is) interconnectivity, access to basic information, and access to services which are more transparent, more affordable, in terms also of the relationships between people and the administration, but also people and the market.”

The forum took place ahead of the EU-African summit, where leaders agreed on four key priorities for the coming years including economic opportunities for youth, peace and security, mobility and migration, and cooperation on governance.

–-> #vidéo on:

▻https://www.euronews.com/2017/12/05/ivory-coast-the-migration-challenge

Migrants de retour en Côte d’Ivoire (1/6) : Ibrahim raconte l’enfer libyen

http://s.rfi.fr/media/display/2e3c9c38-10c4-11ea-9c66-005056bf7c53/w:1240/p:16x9/migrant_benghazi_0.jpg

Des migrants dans un centre de détention, en Libye, avant d’être rapatriés dans leur pays, le 2 décembre 2017

RFI vous propose une série de reportages sur ces Ivoiriens qui ont tenté de migrer vers l’Europe en partant de la grande ville de l’ouest de la Côte d’Ivoire, Daloa. Si le phénomène a ralenti aujourd’hui, il y a encore deux ans, ce sont des centaines de jeunes hommes, de jeunes femmes et même d’enfants qui tentaient chaque mois de prendre la très dangereuse route de la Libye dans l’espoir d’embarquer sur un radeau en direction de l’Italie. Ibrahim Doumbia, 31 ans, est l’un d’entre eux. Pour lui, l’enfer a duré plus d’un an.
Publicité

Dans son petit atelier de couture en bord de route à Daloa, Ibrahim Doumbia raconte un rêve d’Europe qui a viré au cauchemar, dès le désert nigérien. « Tu sais, les gens parlent beaucoup de la mer, la mer. Mais là où les gens restent beaucoup, c’est dans le désert. Le désert, c’est un cimetière, confie-t-il. S’il y a un problème d’eau qui arrive à un moment, même à ton frère, le peu d’eau qu’il te reste, tu ne peux pas lui donner. Celui qui nous transporte, souvent, il veut même sortir avec une de nos sœurs, mais la fille ne peut pas refuser, parce que si elle refuse, nous restons tous bloqués dans le désert. »

En Libye, l’enfer continue. A Bani Walid d’abord. La captivité, le travail forcé, les coups, le viol pour les femmes. Puis une évasion. Arrivé à Tripoli, il tente la traversée vers l’Italie avec des dizaines d’autres, sur deux radeaux de fortune. « Il y avait la tempête. Ce n’était pas facile. Il y avait trop de vagues. Et ils ont commencé à couler. Nous, on était obligés de nous éloigner un peu. Parce que, si d’autres essayaient de plonger dans la mer pour les remonter, nous tous risquions de couler. On les a regardés mourir. On ne pouvait pas. »

Neuf mois dans un camp pour migrants assimilé à une « prison »

Après cet échec : de nouveau la détention dans un camp pour migrants. « Moi, je suis resté dans cette prison pendant neuf mois. Chaque jour que Dieu fait, on voyait l’un de nos frères qui mourait. Souvent, vers trois heures du matin, ils venaient et frappaient tout le monde. Chacun essayait d’appeler ses parents, pour qu’ils essaient de tout faire pour les libérer de cette prison-là. »

Rapatrié il y a deux ans, Ibrahim est un survivant. Hanté chaque nuit par les images de cette aventure dramatique, il s’estime chanceux de s’en être sorti. Aujourd’hui, il tente de dissuader les candidats au départ.

▻http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20190313-migrants-retour-cote-ivoire-16-ibrahim-raconte-conditions-periple-libye

Migrants de retour en Côte d’Ivoire (2/6) : une réinsertion incertaine

http://s.rfi.fr/media/display/19bbbf4c-1212-11ea-b58a-005056a99247/w:1240/p:16x9/ivorycoast-migrants_0.jpg

RFI vous propose une série de reportages sur ces Ivoiriens qui ont tenté de migrer vers l’Europe en partant de la grande ville de l’ouest de la Côte d’Ivoire, Daloa. Chaque mois, des jeunes hommes, des jeunes femmes et même des enfants décident de prendre la très dangereuse route de la Libye dans l’espoir d’embarquer sur un radeau en direction de l’Europe. Des jeunes qui travaillent pour économiser un pécule pour partir, souvent avec l’aide de leur famille. Malheur à ceux qui doivent rentrer au pays où l’emploi stable se fait rare.
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Jean Martial vient d’obtenir un petit local ou il peut vendre ses fripes. A 35 ans, il a déjà tenté une fois de « partir à l’aventure », mais il s’est cassé les dents en Libye. Pour prendre la route, Jean Martial avait travaillé afin d’économiser 800 000 francs CFA, environ 1 200 euros. Et pour lui permettre de revenir, sa famille lui a envoyé de l’argent.

Pour autant, cet échec n’a pas fait disparaître son envie d’Europe. « L’Europe, c’est le rêve de chaque personne ici. Si vous voyiez la misère et la souffrance que nous traversons. Aujourd’hui, si tu es en Europe, par la grâce de Dieu tu trouves un petit boulot, tu peux t’occuper de ta famille. Là-bas, au moins, le fonctionnaire est bien payé, le petit débrouillard est bien payé. »

« Ce qui manque ici, ce sont les opportunités pour les jeunes »

L’ONG italienne CeVi (Centro di volontariato internazionale) est arrivée en 2006 à Daloa, ville considérée il y a encore deux ou trois ans commela plaque tournante ivoirienne des départs vers l’Europe. CeVi fait notamment de la sensibilisation, auprès des populations et des autorités, et aide ceux qui sont revenus, les « retournés » à se réinsérer.

« Ce qui manque ici, ce sont les opportunités pour les jeunes et surtout une perspective de stabilité. Parce que, quand on est commerçant, on ne sait jamais combien on va gagner dans le mois, si on va pouvoir envoyer les enfants à l’école, explique Laura Visentin de CeVi. Daloa, c’est vrai, est une grande ville. Mais au final, c’est comme si c’était un village, parce qu’il n’y a pas d’usine. Au-delà de la fonction publique, il n’y a pas d’entreprises. Et le problème c’est que, si un enfant demande un million pour partir, la famille cotise. Mais si un enfant demande un million pour commencer un petit business ici, la famille ne donne pas. »

Ces dernières années, les stratégies des ONG, des autorités ou des grandes agences semblent porter leurs fruits. Les départs de Daloa ont manifestement baissé, mais le phénomène existe toujours.

▻http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20190314-migrants-retour-cote-ivoire-26-reinsertion-avenir-cevi

Migrants de retour en Côte d’Ivoire (3/6) : le récit de Junior, 9 ans

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Migrants au large des côtes libyennes, le 19 juin 2017.

RFI vous propose une série de reportages sur ces Ivoiriens qui ont tenté de migrer vers l’Europe en partant de la grande ville de l’Ouest de la Côte d’Ivoire, Daloa. Si le phénomène a un peu ralenti aujourd’hui, il y a encore deux ans, ce sont des centaines de personnes qui tentaient chaque mois de prendre la très dangereuse route de la Libye dans l’espoir d’embarquer sur un radeau en direction de l’Italie. Des hommes, des femmes, et même des enfants, souvent seuls. Junior avait neuf ans quand il a tenté de rejoindre l’Europe avec le rêve de devenir ingénieur.
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Junior a désormais onze ans et un regard d’acier. Dans son quartier, tout le monde le considère comme un petit génie de l’électronique. Quand il est parti, il n’avait que neuf ans. L’aventure a duré douze mois. Son âge ne lui a pas épargné la faim, la soif, les coups ou la captivité. Ni même d’assister à des meurtres pour rien ou presque. « Il y a le désert, pour le traverser aussi c’était dur. On peut venir là, prendre une lame, te tuer parce que tu as bu l’eau ou bien parce que tu as payé le pain et mangé. On peut arracher ton argent, prendre une lame, te tuer... »

Un beau matin, Junior a volé l’argent que cachait son père et est parti sans le dire à personne. Direction l’Europe pour devenir ingénieur. « Si j’avais réussi, j’aurais pu aider ma famille, parce que j’ai des petits frères. Il y a beaucoup de mes amis qui sont partis, c’est pour ça que j’ai pris la route. Je peux partir, si je vois que ça ne va pas encore. Je peux retenter. Ou bien je prends une autre route, si je vois qu’il y a une autre route, je peux prendre ça. Ma famille n’a rien, je peux l’aider. »

« Tu partais pour aller faire quoi là-bas, à ton âge ? »

Vendeur de pneus rechapés, M. Amossa, le père de junior, a des yeux pleins d’admiration pour ce petit garçon qui lui a donné des mois d’angoisse. « Quand il est revenu, je lui ai demandé : "Tu partais pour aller faire quoi là-bas, à ton âge ?" Il m’a répondu qu’il partait pour développer sa connaissance. Comme lui-même, il aime faire les fabrications. S’il y a délestage, il y a des trucs qu’il fabrique, il donne à sa grand-mère et puis ça alimente la maison. Je ne sais pas comment il a fabriqué tout ça. Au début, c’est vrai, je lui ai dit de rester tranquille, de continuer son étude… S’il veut aller à l’aventure pour se chercher, ça viendra avec le temps. »

▻http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20190315-migrants-retour-cote-ivoire-3-6-junior-9-ans-recit

Migrants de retour en Côte d’Ivoire (4/6) : la honte et la gêne après l’échec

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Migrants ivoiriens rapatriés de Libye à leur arrivée à l’aéroport d’Abidjan, lundi 20 novembre 2017.

Toute la semaine, RFI vous propose une série de reportages sur ces Ivoiriens qui ont tenté de migrer vers l’Europe, en partant de Daloa. Cette ville, la troisième du pays, est la plus grande de l’ouest de la Côte d’Ivoire. Elle a longtemps été considérée comme un point de départ majeur des Ivoiriens vers l’Europe mais, pour beaucoup, le voyage s’est arrêté avant, souvent en Libye. Pour ces hommes et ces femmes, le retour à Daloa est alors synonyme de honte.
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Elle souhaite se faire appeler Mimi. Partie pour la Libye afin de gagner l’Europe, elle n’a jamais pu traverser la Méditerranée. Au bout de sept mois de calvaire, elle a été rapatriée à Abidjan par l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM).

« La manière dont tu rentres au pays, ce n’est pas celle que tu as décidée, ce n’est pas cette manière-là que tu as voulue. On est rentré avec désespoir. On s’est dit qu’on a vraiment perdu du temps, notre argent… On a perdu plein, plein de choses. On n’a vraiment pas le moral. Je me disais que je préférais encore la mort que de revenir comme ça », se confie-t-elle.

La honte d’avoir menti à sa mère et d’avoir pris son argent. La honte de l’échec, aussi. Les premières semaines, Mimi se cache chez une de ses sœurs, à Abidjan. Puis elle fait un accident vasculaire cérébral (AVC). « Trop de pensées », dit-elle.

Soignée, elle finira, plusieurs mois après, par retourner à Daloa garder la maison de sa mère qui, à son tour, est partie à Abidjan suivre des soins. A Daloa, le sentiment de honte est encore plus fort et elle ne quitte quasiment pas sa cour.

« Comme je suis moi-même de Daloa, c’est mon voyage qui m’empêchait de venir m’installer ici à cause de la honte, de la gêne. Le fait de partir et de ne pas avoir réussi le voyage, les gens vont mal l’interpréter. Voilà pourquoi je suis dans mon coin. Je suis là, je ne fais rien pour le moment et tout cela me stresse encore plus. Je suis malade depuis mon retour. Je prends des médicaments pour éviter trop de stress et, par conséquent, je suis renfermée, trop renfermée. Avant, ce n’était pas ça ma vie », témoigne-t-elle.

Malgré tout, Mimi a un projet, celui d’ouvrir une échoppe de jus de fruits sur la rue qui passe devant sa cour. Plus une thérapie qu’un business.

▻http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20190316-cote-ivoire-migrants-retour-libye-daloa-mediterranee-oim-europe-echec-h

Migrants de retour en Côte d’Ivoire (5/6) : sensibilisation auprès des « mamans »

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Des migrants africains secourus au large de la Libye en août 2018.

Toute la semaine RFI vous propose une série de reportages sur ces Ivoiriens qui ont tenté de migrer vers l’Europe en partant de Daloa. Cette ville, la troisième du pays, est la plus grande de l’ouest de la Côte d’Ivoire a longtemps été considérée comme un point de départ majeur des Ivoiriens vers l’Europe. Aujourd’hui, du constat de tous, le phénomène a fortement ralenti. La répression de quelques passeurs et la sensibilisation de masse sont passées par là. Sensibilisation mieux ciblée aussi, notamment envers les « mamans ».
Publicité

Dans cette cour du quartier Orly, de Daloa, comme chaque mercredi, une douzaine de mamans du quartier se retrouvent pour discuter, boire le thé et manger des bonbons. Parmi ces femmes, Awa Touré.

« Il y a beaucoup de mamans dont les enfants sont partis. Toutes les mamans se décarcassent pour avoir l’argent pour donner aux enfants qui s’en vont. Mais, moi, mon enfant n’est pas parti. C’est mon seul garçon. Il est commerçant et vend des pneus. Je lui ai dit : « il ne faut pas partir ». Il est resté. Je veux qu’il reste à côté de moi et puis, je me débrouille. L’argent que je touche, je le lui donne. Je veux qu’il ait un magasin à lui », raconte-t-elle.

La famille, et les mères en particulier, sont souvent pourvoyeuses de fonds pour les candidats au départ. Du coup, ces mamans sont, depuis quelque temps, la cible de la sensibilisation de la part d’ONG. Laura Visentin de l’organisation italienne CeVi, est présente à Daloa, depuis douze ans.

« On faisait de la sensibilisation avec les jeunes parce que l’on pensait que c’était nos cibles dans la mesure où ce sont eux qui partent. Mais après, on a compris que souvent, ce sont les mamans elles-mêmes qui poussent les enfants à partir et là, nous avons commencé à faire de la sensibilisation avec elles, à montrer des documentaires sur le désert et sur la traversée de la mer. Il y a beaucoup de mamans qui ont commencé à pleurer. Elles ont dit : « Mais moi, j’ai envoyé mon enfant comme ça. Je ne savais pas que c’était comme ça. Personne ne nous a dit ». Et c’est à partir de là que la pression de la famille a diminué un peu et aujourd’hui, les mamans, au lieu d’encourager, elles découragent », explique Laura Visentin.

Si ce facteur n’est pas le seul qui explique la baisse du nombre de départs de Daloa depuis deux ans, « c’en est un », estiment les acteurs sur le terrain.

▻http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20190317-cote-ivoire-migrants-retour-daloa-ong-cevi-laura-visentin-sensibilisati

Migrants de retour en Côte d’Ivoire (6/6) : la lutte contre les passeurs

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Une centaine de migrants ivoiriens rapatriés de Libye, le 20 novembre 2017 (photo d’illustration).

RFI vous propose une série de reportages sur ces Ivoiriens qui ont tenté de migrer vers l’Europe en partant de Daloa. Cette ville, la troisième du pays, est la plus grande de l’ouest de la Cote d’Ivoire a longtemps été considérée comme un point de départ majeur des Ivoiriens vers l’Europe. Aujourd’hui, du constat de tous, le phénomène a fortement ralenti. La sensibilisation est passée par là. Mais la répression aussi. Aujourd’hui selon le gouvernement, une cinquantaine de passeurs dans tout le pays ont été condamnés.
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Adama est un repenti. Arrivé d’Abidjan il y a environ cinq ans, il a été pendant deux ans et demi un passeur. Lui préfère le terme de « démarcheur », qui aidait les candidats au départ à atteindre l’Europe, en moyenne une quinzaine par mois.

« A cette époque-là, j’étais à Daloa. Quand je prenais quelqu’un, bien avant qu’il décolle, je discutais avec la famille. Si on finissait par tomber d’accord, on donnait le chemin au niveau des différents correspondants qu’on avait dans les différentes villes. Quand il arrivait à Agadez, la famille payait le restant d’argent. A l’époque, de la Côte d’Ivoire à la Libye, on prenait 600 000 francs CFA. De la Côte d’Ivoire en Italie, on prenait 900-950 000. »

Adama a passé un an en prison à cause de son activité. Aujourd’hui, il fait de la sensibilisation lorsqu’il n’est pas dans sa petite menuiserie ouverte aux quatre vents. Il y a quelques années encore, Daloa comptait une trentaine de passeurs, selon lui. La plupart se serait volatilisée.

La migration ralentit. Conséquence de la politique des autorités, estime Yaya Sylla, premier adjoint au maire, à commencer par la lutte contre ces passeurs.

« Dans un premier temps, il s’agit de récupérer celui qui le fait. C’est plus facile de le repérer s’il n’est pas de Daloa. Ensuite, nous jouons au niveau de la sensibilisation. Et en tant qu’autorité, nous faisons en sorte de pouvoir mettre la jeunesse au travail. Parce que tout part de là. Nous avons mis beaucoup de programmes en place pour l’emploi des jeunes. »

Depuis des années, ce sont les ONG et les organisations de jeunesse qui sont en première ligne pour dissuader les candidats au départ de prendre la route, et leurs familles de les soutenir.

▻http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20190318-cote-ivoire-serie-migrants-passeurs-daloa

Côte d’Ivoire : retour de Libye de migrants ivoiriens

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Migrants ivoiriens rapatriés de Libye à leur arrivée à l’aéroport d’Abidjan, lundi 20 novembre 2017.

Quelque 155 migrants ivoiriens en Libye ont été rapatriés lundi soir à Abidjan. Ces candidats à l’émigration en Europe, dont le voyage s’est arrêté en Libye, ont été accueillis par la direction des Ivoiriens de l’étranger et l’Organisation internationale pour les Migrations.
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Dans la zone charter de l’aéroport d’Abidjan les enfants courent et s’amusent sur les tapis à bagages à l’arrêt. Les parents souvent épuisés par leur périple, parfois gênés de revenir sous les objectifs des appareils photos ou de caméras de télévision, aimeraient que les formalités d’enregistrement soient expédiées pour pouvoir aller se reposer.

▻http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20171121-cote-ivoire-migrants-libye-retour-abidjan-reportage

#Côte_d'Ivoire #renvois #expulsions #asile #migrations #réfugiés #réfugiés_ivoiriens #rapatriement #Libye #rejet #stigmatisation #réinsertion #réintégration

#business #xenophobie_business

#cartographie_animée #cartographie #sémiologie #design_cartographique

ping @deka

Résumé en français par Jasmine Caye (@forumasile) :

Pour freiner la migration en provenance d’Afrique les dépenses européennes explosent

Maite Vermeulen est une journaliste hollandaise, cofondatrice du site d’information The Correspondent et spécialisée dans les questions migratoires. Avec deux autres journalistes, l’italien Giacomo Zandonini (Italie) et le nigérian Ajibola Amzat, elle a tenté de comprendre les raisons derrières la flambée des dépenses européennes sensées freiner la migration en provenance du continent africain.

Depuis le Nigéria, Maite Vermeulen s’est intéressée aux causes de la migration nigériane vers l’Europe et sur les milliards d’euros déversés dans les programmes humanitaires et sécuritaires dans ce pays. Selon elle, la politique sécuritaire européenne n’empêchera pas les personnes motivées de tenter leur chance pour rejoindre l’Europe. Elle constate que les fonds destinés à freiner la migration sont toujours attribués aux mêmes grandes organisations gouvernementales ou non-gouvernementales. Les financements européens échappent aussi aux évaluations d’impact permettant de mesurer les effets des aides sur le terrain.

Le travail de recherche des journalistes a duré six mois et se poursuit. Il est financé par Money Trail un projet qui soutient des journalistes africains, asiatiques et européens pour enquêter en réseau sur les flux financiers illicites et la corruption en Afrique, en Asie et en Europe.

Les Nigérians ne viennent pas en Europe pour obtenir l’asile

L’équipe a d’abord tenté d’élucider cette énigme : pourquoi tant de nigérians choisissent de migrer vers l’Europe alors qu’ils n’obtiennent quasiment jamais l’asile. Le Nigéria est un pays de plus de 190 millions d’habitants et l’économie la plus riche d’Afrique. Sa population représente le plus grand groupe de migrants africains qui arrivent en Europe de manière irrégulière. Sur les 180 000 migrants qui ont atteint les côtes italiennes en 2016, 21% étaient nigérians. Le Nigéria figure aussi régulièrement parmi les cinq premiers pays d’origine des demandeurs d’asile de l’Union européenne. Près de 60% des requérants nigérians proviennent de l’Etat d’Edo dont la capitale est Bénin City. Pourtant leurs chance d’obtenir un statut de protection sont minimes. En effet, seuls 9% des demandeurs d’asile nigérians reçoivent l’asile dans l’UE. Les 91% restants sont renvoyés chez eux ou disparaissent dans la nature.

Dans l’article Want to make sense of migration ? Ask the people who stayed behind, Maite Vermeulen explique que Bénin City a été construite grâce aux nigérians travaillant illégalement en Italie. Et les femmes sont peut-être bien à l’origine d’un immense trafic de prostituées. Elle nous explique ceci :

“Pour comprendre le présent, il faut revenir aux années 80. À cette époque, des entreprises italiennes étaient établies dans l’État d’Edo. Certains hommes d’affaires italiens ont épousé des femmes de Benin City, qui sont retournées en Italie avec leur conjoint. Ils ont commencé à exercer des activités commerciales, à commercialiser des textiles, de la dentelle et du cuir, de l’or et des bijoux. Ces femmes ont été les premières à faire venir d’autres femmes de leur famille en Italie – souvent légalement, car l’agriculture italienne avait cruellement besoin de travailleurs pour cueillir des tomates et des raisins. Mais lorsque, à la fin des années 80, la chute des prix du pétrole a plongé l’économie nigériane à l’arrêt, beaucoup de ces femmes d’affaires ont fait faillite. Les femmes travaillant dans l’agriculture ont également connu une période difficile : leur emploi est allé à des ouvriers d’Europe de l’Est. Ainsi, de nombreuses femmes Edo en Italie n’avaient qu’une seule alternative : la prostitution. Ce dernier recours s’est avéré être lucratif. En peu de temps, les femmes ont gagné plus que jamais auparavant. Elles sont donc retournées à Benin City dans les années 1990 avec beaucoup de devises européennes – avec plus d’argent, en fait, que beaucoup de gens de leur ville n’en avaient jamais vu. Elles ont construit des appartements pour gagner des revenus locatifs. Ces femmes étaient appelées « talos », ou mammas italiennes. Tout le monde les admirait. Les jeunes femmes les considéraient comme des modèles et voulaient également aller en Europe. Certains chercheurs appellent ce phénomène la « théorie de la causalité cumulative » : chaque migrant qui réussit entraîne plus de personnes de sa communauté à vouloir migrer. A cette époque, presque personne à Benin City ne savait d’où venait exactement l’argent. Les talos ont commencé à prêter de l’argent aux filles de leur famille afin qu’elles puissent également se rendre en Italie. Ce n’est que lorsque ces femmes sont arrivées qu’on leur a dit comment elles devaient rembourser le prêt. Certaines ont accepté, d’autres ont été forcées. Toutes gagnaient de l’argent. Dans les premières années, le secret des mammas italiennes était gardé au sein de la famille. Mais de plus en plus de femmes ont payé leurs dettes – à cette époque, cela prenait environ un an ou deux – et elles ont ensuite décidé d’aller chercher de l’argent elles-mêmes. En tant que « Mamas », elles ont commencé à recruter d’autres femmes dans leur ville natale. Puis, lentement, l’argent a commencé à manquer à Benin City : un grand nombre de leurs femmes travaillaient dans l’industrie du sexe en Italie.”

Aujourd’hui, l’Union européenne considère le Nigéria comme son plus important “partenaire migratoire”et depuis quelques années les euros s’y déversent à flots afin de financer des programmes des sécurisation des frontières, de création d’emploi, de lutte contre la traite d’être humains et des programmes de sensibilisation sur les dangers de la migration vers l’Europe.
Le “cartel migratoire” ou comment peu d’organisation monopolisent les projets sur le terrain

Dans un autre article intitulé A breakdown of Europe’s € 1.5 billion migration spending in Nigeria, les journalistes se demandent comment les fonds européens sont alloués au Nigéria. Encore une fois on parle ici des projets destinés à freiner la migration. En tout ce sont 770 millions d’euros investis dans ces “projets migration”. En plus, le Nigéria bénéficie d’autres fonds supplémentaires à travers les “projets régionaux” qui s’élèvent à 775 millions d’euros destinés principalement à coordonner et organiser les retours vers les pays d’origines. Mais contrairement aux engagements de l’Union européenne les fonds alloués aux projets en faveur de la migration légale sont très inférieurs aux promesses et représentent 0.09% des aides allouées au Nigéria.

A qui profitent ces fonds ? Au “cartel migratoire” constitué du Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés (HCR), de l’Organisation internationale des migrations (OIM), de l’UNICEF, de l’Organisation internationale du travail (OIL), de l’Organisation internationale des Nations Unies contre la drogue et le crime (UNODC). Ces organisations récoltent près de 60% des fonds alloués par l’Union européenne aux “projets migration” au Nigéria et dans la région. Les ONG et les consultants privés récupèrent 13% du total des fonds alloués, soit 89 millions d’euros, le double de ce qu’elles reçoivent en Europe.
Les montants explosent, la transparence diminue

Où va vraiment l’argent et comment mesurer les effets réels sur les populations ciblées. Quels sont les impacts de ces projets ? Depuis 2015, l’Europe a augmenté ses dépenses allouées à la migration qui s’élèvent désormais à plusieurs milliards.

La plus grande partie de ces fonds est attribuée à l’Afrique. Dans l’article Europe spends billions stopping migration. Good luck figuring out where the money actually goes, Maite Vermeulen, Ajibola Amzat et Giacomo Zandonini expliquent que l’UE prévoit de doubler ces dépenses dans le budget 2021-2027 et quadrupler les dépenses sur le contrôle des frontières.

Des mois de recherche n’ont pas permis de comprendre comment étaient alloués les fonds pour la migration. Les sites internet sont flous et de nombreux bureaucrates européens se disent incapables concilier les dépenses car la transparence fait défaut. Difficile de comprendre l’allocation précise des fonds de l’Union européenne et celle des fonds des Etats européens. Le tout ressemble, selon les chercheurs, à un immense plat de spaghettis. Ils se posent une question importante : si eux n’y arrivent pas après des mois de recherche comment les députés européens pourraient s’y retrouver ? D’autres chercheurs et fonctionnaires européens qualifient les dépenses de migration de l’UE d’opaques. La consultation de nombreux sites internet, documents officiels, rapports annuels et budgets, et les nombreuses demandes d’accès à l’information auprès de plusieurs pays européens actifs au Nigéria ainsi que les demandes d’explications adressées à la Commission européenne n’ont pas permis d’arriver à une vision globale et précise des budgets attribués à la politique migratoire européenne. Selon Tineke Strik, député vert au parlement européen, ce manque de clarté a des conséquences importantes sur le processus démocratique, car sans vision globale précise, il n’y a pas vraiment de surveillance possible sur les dépenses réelles ni sur l’impact réel des programmes sur le terrain.

▻https://thecorrespondent.com/154/europe-spends-billions-stopping-migration-good-luck-figuring-out-where-the-money-actually-goes/102663569008-2e2c2159

Au Nigeria, la difficile réintégration des migrants rapatriés au lendemain du cauchemar libyen

Après avoir été la proie des passeurs dans l’espoir d’une traversée pour l’Europe, 14 000 Nigérians sont revenus au pays, où ils sont souvent stigmatisés et rejetés.

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Gloria se considère comme une « privilégiée ». Elle est partie avec quatre autres filles vers l’Europe, mais, après avoir vécu l’enfer pendant près d’un an bloquée en Libye, elle est la seule à avoir été rapatriée au Nigeria. Trois de ses amies sont mortes pendant le voyage.

La jeune femme de 26 ans a même trouvé un petit boulot de retour à Benin City, grâce à un programme de formation mis en place par l’Etat d’Edo, une région du sud du Nigeria d’où partent encore la majorité des candidats nigérians à l’exil.

Gloria rêvait de devenir styliste. A la place, elle coud des survêtements synthétiques à la chaîne dans un atelier miteux pour 15 000 nairas par mois (40 euros), mais « remercie Dieu d’avoir un travail ».

« Après avoir payé le transport pour rentrer à la maison, il ne reste presque rien, assure Gloria, dans un joli tee-shirt jaune. Mais je ne me plains pas. Je ne veux pas en demander trop. J’ai juste besoin d’un toit et de quoi manger », confie-t-elle.
« Ne pas en demander trop »

Comme beaucoup parmi les 14 000 jeunes Nigérians rentrés de Libye depuis 2017, Gloria « ne “veut” pas en demander trop ». Elle s’en veut encore d’avoir un jour osé rêver que la vie pouvait être meilleure ailleurs, et d’avoir cru naïvement des passeurs promettant de rejoindre l’Europe en moins de deux semaines.

La plupart des Nigérians rapatriés via le programme de retour volontaire des Nations unies ont entre 17 et 35 ans et sont sans diplôme. Pendant des mois, et pour certains des années, ils sont restés bloqués en Libye, vendus, maltraités, extorqués par leurs passeurs, et incapables de traverser la Méditerranée avec le durcissement des politiques d’immigration de l’Union européenne.

De retour dans leur pays d’origine, ils se retrouvent souvent confrontés à une vie encore plus difficile que lorsqu’ils sont partis : criblés de dettes, sans emploi, brisés par les tortures de leurs trafiquants et par leurs rêves échoués.

Un rapport de Human Rights Watch publié le 27 août dénonce l’état terrible des « survivants de la traite » à leur retour. Beaucoup souffrent notamment de « troubles psychologiques graves », de « problèmes de santé et sont stigmatisés ». Les quelques centres ou associations qui existent pour s’occuper d’eux disposent de très peu d’aide financière et « sont incapables de répondre aux besoins des survivants sur le long terme ».

https://img.lemde.fr/2019/09/20/0/0/6720/4480/688/0/60/0/9431e3a_xABfJCGhbzh8ATAK492awdS8.jpg

L’Etat d’Edo, qui a dû accueillir à lui seul 4 800 des 14 000 rapatriés nigérians depuis 2017, a mis en place un rare programme de soutien pour ces populations extrêmement vulnérables : un transport gratuit à leur descente de l’avion de l’aéroport de Lagos jusqu’à Benin City, deux nuits d’hôtel, une heure de soutien psychologique et une allocation d’une centaine d’euros environ. C’est une goutte d’eau pour affronter une nouvelle vie, mais assez pour alimenter les jalousies dans un pays où les aides d’Etat sont quasiment inexistantes et où 83 millions de personnes vivent sous le seuil de l’extrême pauvreté (1,90 dollar par jour et par personne).
« Retrouver la vie »

La société les montre du doigt et les surnomme avec dédain les « retournés » ou les « déportés ». « Les gens disent que les “retournés” ont des traitements préférentiels », explique Ukinebo Dare, responsable du programme Edo Innovates de formation professionnelle ouvert à tous à Benin City. Il en fait la visite guidée : des salles de classe ultra modernes où des étudiants apprennent à « coder », à faire de la photographie, à monter une petite entreprise ou le B.A. ba du marketing.

« Nous veillons à les mélanger avec d’autres jeunes. Nous ne voulons pas qu’ils soient stigmatisés, explique la jeune femme. C’est une priorité d’offrir des formations pour tous les jeunes, car ce sont autant de potentiels migrants. »

Selon le Bureau national des statistiques, 55 % des moins de 35 ans n’avaient pas d’emploi au Nigeria fin 2018. Des chiffres particulièrement inquiétants dans ce pays qui a l’une des croissances démographiques les plus élevées au monde.

Tike, lui, avait un petit boulot avant de tenter de gagner l’Europe en février 2017. « Quand je pense au passé, j’ai envie de pleurer », lâche-t-il dans son minuscule appartement où il vit avec sa petite amie, elle aussi de retour de Libye, et leur fille de 4 mois. Tike est rentré « physiquement » en décembre 2017. Son esprit, lui, était encore « là-haut », paralysé dans la « paranoïa » et les « traumas », confie-t-il.

Mais quelques mois plus tard, sans aucun soutien psychologique, il a « retrouvé la vie », comme il dit, et a décidé de suivre une formation en boucherie. Cela fait plus d’un an qu’il a monté des dossiers auprès de diverses organisations d’aide à la réintégration, dont l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM), mais il n’a pas trouvé d’emploi et n’a aucun argent pour démarrer sa propre société. « Beaucoup de jeunes se tournent vers les “cultes”, les gangs locaux, reconnaît Tike. Ils sont facilement recrutés par les mafias qui leur promettent un peu d’argent. »
Spirale de pauvreté

Depuis l’année 2018, une période très difficile économiquement pour le pays, la criminalité a augmenté dans l’Etat d’Edo, selon les données officielles. « Les “retournés” sont tenus pour responsables, regrette Lilian Garuba, de la Force spéciale contre la migration illégale, une antenne contre le trafic des êtres humains mise en place par l’Etat d’Edo. La société les perçoit comme des problèmes et non pour ce qu’ils sont : des victimes. »

https://img.lemde.fr/2019/09/20/0/0/6720/4480/688/0/60/0/6dfd935_dixmQn1ibkLI7ZTaPnkHQldv.jpg

Peter, 24 ans, a été arrêté quelques jours après son retour. Sa mère avait emprunté de l’argent à un créancier du quartier pour réunir le millier d’euros nécessaire afin de payer les passeurs. « Dès qu’il a entendu dire que j’étais revenu, il a menacé ma famille. La police est venue m’arrêter », raconte-t-il à l’AFP, encore tremblant.

Sa mère a dû réemprunter de l’argent à un autre créancier pour éponger ses dettes. Une spirale de pauvreté dont Peter ne sait comment s’extraire, sauf peut-être en rêvant, encore et toujours de l’Europe. Il en est déjà à deux tentatives infructueuses.
« Quand je suis rentré la première fois de Libye, je me suis dit que j’allais essayer en passant par un autre pays. Mais au Maroc, c’était encore pire et, grâce à Dieu j’ai pu rentrer au Nigeria. » C’était il y a quelques semaines. « Depuis je n’ai plus rien, rien, lâche-t-il la gorge nouée. Une voix à l’intérieur de moi me dit “Tue-toi, finis-en !” Mais bon… Ça servirait à quoi ? Je ne peux pas faire ça à ma mère. »

▻https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/09/20/au-nigeria-la-reintegration-difficile-des-migrants-rapatries-au-lendemain-du

#pauvreté #OIM #IOM

#MNA #renvois #expulsions #mineurs_non-accompagnés #migrations #asile #réfugiés #mineurs #enfants #enfance #réintégration

Deux articles sur les affaires de l’Italie (notamment via l’entreprise #Cantieri_navali_Vittoria ) avec #Egypte , Niger, Tunisie et Libye :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/759608
#business

Le rapport « Expanding the fortress » et des liens associés à la sortie de ce rapport :

Dans le rapport sont abordées à la fois les conséquences de l’externalisation (notamment en termes de #droits_humains) et les profiteurs (#complexe_militaro-industriel).
Cas d’étude : #Libye #Turquie #Niger #Egypte #Soudan #Mauritanie #Mali
►https://seenthis.net/messages/694887

Le lien entre #fonds_fiduciaire_pour_l'Afrique et externalisation :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/707133

Avril 2019 : enveloppe de 115,5 millions pour le Fonds fiduciaire :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/773289
#fonds_fiduciaire

v. aussi plus de détail sur la métaliste migrations et développement :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/733358

Dans le cadre du fonds fiduciaire pour l’Afrique —> privatisation du business des cartes d’identité biométriques :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/764850
#biométrique

v. aussi le communiqué de presse de la commission européenne, mars 2019 :

Grâce au #fonds_fiduciaire d’urgence de l’UE pour l’Afrique, plus de 5,3 millions de personnes vulnérables bénéficient actuellement d’une aide de première nécessité et plus de 60 000 personnes ont reçu une aide à la réintégration après leur retour dans leur pays d’origine.

►https://seenthis.net/messages/765959

–—

Plainte déposée à la #cour_des_comptes_européenne contre l’Europe complice des horreurs perpétrées en #Libye :
L’UE a alloué, en juillet 2017, 91,3 millions d’euros au programme « #Gestion_intégrée_des_frontières_et_des_migrations_en_Libye » (#GIF) qui doit durer jusqu’à la fin de 2021. Ce programme a pour objectif « d’améliorer la capacité de la Libye à contrôler ses frontières et à assurer le sauvetage en mer, d’une manière pleinement conforme aux obligations et aux normes internationales en matière de droits de l’homme. » Ces #fonds ont été engagés par le biais du #Fonds_fiduciaire_d’urgence_de_l’Union_européenne_pour_la stabilité_et_la_lutte_contre_les_causes_profondes_des-migrations_irrégulières_et_des personnes_déplacées_en_Afrique (#EUTFA), lui-même principalement financé par le #Fonds_européen_de_développement.
►https://seenthis.net/messages/848481

Budget européen pour la migration : plus de contrôles aux frontières, moins de respect pour les droits humains :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/867813

Report to the EU Parliament on #Frontex cooperation with third countries in 2017 :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/760914

#Frontex_plus :
►https://seenthis.net/tag/frontex_plus

Frontex, version 2019 : + d’hommes, + de pouvoirs opérationnels + de coopérations avec des pays non-EU, + de retours, + de matériel + + + +
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/771558

Autour de #EUROSUR et du #complexe_militaro-industriel

Rôle du #Portugal et de la #European_Maritime_Safety_Agency (#EMSA) :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/764491

Plus en général avec le tag Eurosur :
▻https://seenthis.net/tag/eurosur

Et avec le tag complexe militaro-industriel :
▻https://seenthis.net/tag/complexe_militaro-industriel

Voir notamment le livre de #Claire_Rodier, #Xénophobie_business :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/305703
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/187137
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/135750
►https://seenthis.net/messages/115086

Le #post-Cotonou :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/681114
#accord_de_Cotonou

Externalisation des contrôles frontaliers en #Libye :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/705401
(lien avec #droits_humains)
►https://seenthis.net/messages/623809
Commissaire aux droits humains Conseil Europe :

EU member states to show urgently that the support to the Libyan Coast Guard is not contributing to human rights violations, and to suspend this support if they cannot do so.

▻https://seenthis.net/messages/770463#message770466

–----

"Dossier Libia" —> un site d’information et dénonciation de ce qui se passe en Libye :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/742662

–-----

Reportage en allemand :
Das Geschäft mit den Flüchtlingen - Endstation Libyen
►https://seenthis.net/messages/744384

–----

#Statistiques et #chiffres du nombre de personnes migrantes présentes en Libye (chiffres OIM) :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/751596
Et de celles rapatriées par l’#OIM :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/763151
#organisation_contre_la_migration

–------

Sur les #centres_de_détention en Libye, voulus, soutenus et financés par l’UE ou des pays de l’UE :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/772984
►https://seenthis.net/messages/621902
►https://seenthis.net/messages/615857
#torture #viols #abus_sexuels #détention
Marché aux esclaves en Libye :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/598508
#esclavage #néo-esclavage

–-------

Rapport sur les viols contre hommes et garçons en Libye :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/771994
–-> et ce chiffres de 90% qui apparaît 2 fois :

Il 90% dei migranti visitati nelle cliniche del Medu ha parlato di violenza estrema e torture

►https://seenthis.net/messages/598508#message599359

A UN officer estimated that 90% of male refugees and migrants being hosted in the Italian reception system had experienced sexual violence during their journey.

►https://seenthis.net/messages/615857#message770193

–--------

Les migrants présents dans les camps enrôlés dans les #milices du général Haftar pour combattre à Tripoli (avril 2019) :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/773233

–-----------

Février 2019 : #retours_volontaires de "migrants" (c’est le mot employé) érythréens vers l’#Erythrée, avec l’aide de l’#OIM (#IOM) :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/763088
#retour_volontaire

–--------

Le rôle de l’#HCR (un piège) dans un dessin :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/770785
#UNHCR

–--------

Un analyse intéressante des centres de détention en Libye, avec #chronologie (et #cartographie) depuis les années 1980 :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/752742

Ici en #dessins :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/747869
#dessin
►https://seenthis.net/messages/612089
Et des mesures-sparadrap en lien avec l’#OMS cette fois-ci —> projet “Enhancing Diagnosis and Treatment for Migrants in detention centers in Libya” :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/737102

D’autres liens où l’on parle aussi des centres de détention en Libye :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/689187
►https://seenthis.net/messages/612089

Des #témoignages audio depuis la Libye, un projet audio-documentaire de #Michelangelo_Severgnini :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/772503
Michelangelo Severgnini est aussi le réalisateur du #film "Schiavi di riserva"

–-------

#Poursuites_judiciaires —> "Un demandeur d’asile va poursuivre le Royaume-Uni pour le financement de centres de détention libyens"
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/746025

–---------

Et l’excellent film de #Andrea_Segre "L’ordine delle cose" , qui montre les manoeuvres de l’Italie pour créer ces centres en Libye :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/677462

–--------

Autour des #gardes-côtes_libyens et les #refoulements (#push-back, #pull-back) en Libye :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/719759

Migrants : des #enregistrements attestent de la #collaboration entre #UE et #gardes-côtes_libyens :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/830340

–---------

Les pull-back vers la Libye :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/730613
–-> et centres de détention
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/651505
Le reconstruction d’un naufrage et d’un pull-back vers la Libye effectué par les gardes-côtes libyen. Reconstruction #vidéo par #Charles_Heller et #Lorenzo_Pezzani :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/747918

11.04.2019 : #Minniti déclare que laisser les gardes-côtes libyen coordonner les sauvetages en mer a été une #dramatique_erreur :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/774010

Avril 2019 : les gardes-côtes libyens ont arrêtés de faire des secours :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/776098

–-> #Operation_Sophia et... "L’UE sait que certaines de ses politiques ont rendu la traversée plus dangereuse pour les migrants, toutefois, elle a décidé de continuer cette stratégie" :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/763871
D’ailleurs, depuis juillet 2018, aucune personne n’a été sauvée par l’#opération_Sophia :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/770463#message770472

–----------

Résistance de migrants sauvetés en Méditerranée, qui refusent d’être ramenés en Libye en refusant de descendre du navire ( #Nivin ) qui les a secourus :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/735627

–--------

#évacuation de migrants/réfugiés depuis la Libye vers le #Niger :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/737065
#réinstallation
Un #rapport sur les #returnees #returning_migrants :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/765311
–-> attention, il y a peut-être d’autres articles sur ce sujet dans les longs fils de discussions sur le Niger et/ou la Libye (à contrôler)

... et évacuation vers le #Rwanda :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/796723

–-----------

L’aide de la #Suisse aux gardes-côtes libyens :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/623935

Et la #France...
►https://seenthis.net/messages/760908

Et de l’UE à travers le #Trust_Fund :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/763529

Et l’#Italie :
Italy strengthens Libya accord, another four patrol boats :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/763660
Aerei da pattugliamento e #radar. Ecco il piano segreto anti-sbarchi :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/794614
(attention : ce n’est pas la première "livraison" italienne, il y en a eu par le passé, il faudrait voir dans les autres listes)
#Trust_Fund #Trust_Fund_for_Africa

En 2013 :
Italia-Libia, al via accordo di cooperazione su controllo frontiere :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/201853
Le 2 novembre 2019, l’#accord de #2017 entre #Italie et #Libye se renouvellera automatiquement :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/808872

–----------

Et quelques lignes sur le #traité_de_Benghazi , le fameux #pacte_d'amitié entre l’#Italie et la #Libye (2009)
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/717799
J’en parle aussi dans ce billet que j’ai écrit pour Visionscarto sur les films #Mare_chiuso et #Mare_deserto :
Vaincre une mer déserte et fermée
►https://visionscarto.net/vaincre-une-mer-deserte-et-fermee
–-> il y a certainement plus sur seenthis, mais je ne trouve pas pour l’instant... j’ajouterai au fur et à mesure

–---------------

Communiqué de presse Commission européenne, mars 2019 :

améliorer les conditions d’accueil déplorables en #Libye : les efforts déployés par l’intermédiaire du groupe de travail trilatéral UA-UE-NU doivent se poursuivre pour contribuer à libérer les migrants se trouvant en #rétention, faciliter le #retour_volontaire (37 000 retours jusqu’à présent) et évacuer les personnes les plus vulnérables (près de 2 500 personnes évacuées).

►https://seenthis.net/messages/765959

–----------

Plainte contre le gouvernement anglais pour participation au #Trust_Fund_for_Africa par lequel l’UE finance des centres de détention en Libye :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/768134

–--------

Des #timbres produits par la poste libyenne :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/745453

–--------

Rapport Arci 2019 :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/783060

–----------

Accord / pacte entre la Libye et #Malte :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/827362
►https://seenthis.net/messages/810329

Externalisation des contrôles frontaliers au #Niger (+ implication de l’#OIM (#IOM) et #Agadez ) :

Mission #Eucap_Sahel et financement et création de #Compagnies_mobiles_de_contrôle_des_frontières (#CMCF), financé par #Pays-Bas et Allemagne financés par l’Allemagne :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/733601
Financement de la #police_locale au Niger :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/763890

Le Niger, #nouvelle frontière de l’Europe et #laboratoire de l’asile :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/801799

Et des #camps_militaires :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/736433

Autres liens sur le Niger :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/696283
–-> plein de choses, il faudra un jour faire un meilleur archivage !

▻https://seenthis.net/messages/586729
–-> rapport de #Frontex sur les #routes_migratoires empruntées par les migrants dans le #désert (avec #images_satellitaires)
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/370536
–-> sujet inclus dans ce fil de discussion : #loi anti-passeurs au Niger ; création de #camps (appelé #centres)... but : convaincre les migrants de ne pas partir... faire un premier #tri...

Le Niger et l’Italie se félicitent de la chute des flux migratoires... (sic)
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/752551
–-> v. aussi : « Baisse des demandes d’asile. Pas de quoi se réjouir » :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/693203
L’impact de la diminution des flux migratoires via Agadez, dans ce rapport :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/853585

Conséquences de l’externalisation des politiques migratoires sur le #Niger, mais aussi le #Soudan et le #Tchad :
▻https://asile.ch/wp/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/multilateral-damage.pdf
signalé ici :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/741956

v. aussi le communiqué de presse de la commission européenne, mars 2019 :

La lutte contre les réseaux de passeurs et de trafiquants a encore été renforcée. En 2018, le centre européen chargé de lutter contre le trafic de migrants, établi au sein d’#Europol, a joué un rôle majeur dans plus d’une centaine de cas de trafic prioritaires et des équipes communes d’enquête participent activement à la lutte contre ce trafic dans des pays comme le #Niger.

►https://seenthis.net/messages/765959

Note de Migreurop sur l’#OIM :
L’#OIM, une organisation au service des #frontières… fermées.
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/779989

Rapport Arci 2019 sur le Niger :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/783060

Juin 2019 : #Italie et #OIM financent le renforcement des frontières à #Assamaka (à la frontière entre le Niger et l’#Algérie) et à la frontière avec le #Nigeria :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/788517
... et en octobre 2019, l’OIM organise des « charters humanitaires » de l’Algérie au Niger. Programme financé par l’#Italie et le #UK (#Angleterre) :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/806477

v. aussi ce rapport sur l’externalisation des frontières au Niger, mais aussi Soudan et Tchad :
Multilateral DamageThe impact of EU migration policies on central Saharan routes
►https://seenthis.net/messages/804173

Une belle synthèse de Alizée Dauchy en 3 pages de la situation au Niger :
–-> « Des trajectoires immobilisées : #protection et #criminalisation des migrations au #Niger » :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/844250

Et implication de l’#OIM dans le contrôle des frontières en #Guinée (#campagne de #dissuasion financée par l’UE) :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/757474

Il y a d’autres campagnes qui ont été mise en place notamment par la #Suisse pour convaincre les migrants à rentrer au pays :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/385940
#retour_au_pays #Nigeria #Cameroun #Balkans #Afrique_de_l'Ouest #Kosovo #Serbie #Macédoine, #Albanie #Monténégro #Bosnie-Herzégovine

Et le #Danemark, même politique :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/385940#message397757

Evidemment l’#Australie aussi :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/474986
►https://seenthis.net/messages/305573
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/302153

Et l’#Allemagne :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/432534

Autres types de dissuasion... un projet de formation à la #photographie en #Côte_d'Ivoire :

The aim of this pilot project was to offer returned migrants an opportunity to become visual storytellers of their daily life back home and help local journalists change the narrative on migration in the country.
This training is the first of a series that will be organized by IOM across West Africa in 2020. It was organized in the frame of an EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration in the Sahel and Lake Chad regions.

▻https://seenthis.net/messages/819414

Externalisation des frontières au #Sénégal et en #Mauritanie :

Chronique Monde | #Mauritanie. Un partenariat européen au goût amer
►https://seenthis.net/messages/858930

▻https://seenthis.net/messages/740468
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/668973
►https://seenthis.net/messages/608653
►https://seenthis.net/messages/320101

Italie, Allemagne, France, Espagne

Les efforts de l’ #Italie d’externaliser les contrôles frontaliers :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/600874
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/595057

L’Italie avec l’ #Allemagne :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/566194

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#France et ses tentatives d’externalisation les frontières (proposition de Macron notamment de créer des #hub, de faire du #tri et de la #catégorisation de migrants) :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/704970
►https://seenthis.net/messages/618133
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/677172

La #France et « sa » #CIVIPOL (programmes de coopération technique et de contrôles migratoires au #Soudan, et en #Erythrée) :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/795208
Plus sur CIVIPOL : ▻https://seenthis.net/tag/civipol

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L’#Espagne :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/737099
#modèle_espagnol
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/737095
v. aussi plus bas la partie consacrée au Maroc...

L’externalisation des politiques migratoires espagnoles : cadre légal (Migreurop, 2019) :
▻http://www.migreurop.org/IMG/pdf/fiche_3_fr-def.pdf

L’externalisation en #Tunisie (accords avec l’Italie notamment) :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/511895
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/573526

Livraison d’avions et radar à la Tunisie de la part de l’Italie (juillet 2019) :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/794614

Et avec l’UE :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/737477

Comment l’Europe contrôle ses frontières en #Tunisie ?
►https://seenthis.net/messages/833041

The new installation is entitled „#Integrated_System_for_Maritime_Surveillance“ (#ISMariS), an EU projet for Gulf of Tunis’ surveillance :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/866952

Les #accords_de_réadmission , autre panel de l’externalisation des contrôles frontaliers :
▻https://seenthis.net/tag/accords_de_r%C3%A9admission

Cet inventaire des accords en lien avec les réadmissions (2015) avec visualisation :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/413779

Et cette carte de Reka pour Vivre Ensemble concernant les accords signés par les pays européens :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/443738
Voir aussi cette liste « de travail » autour de la question :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/736091

Europe et #Afghanistan :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/528689

Négociations #France-#Mali :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/765027
Et l’Europe avec le Mali :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/550612

Les accords de réadmissions signés par la #Suisse :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/444316

Et les tentatives de la Suisse de signer des accords de réadmission avec l’#Erythrée (sic) :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/685650
►https://seenthis.net/messages/538851

Et la Suisse avec la #Turquie :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/567121
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/563101

L’#Italie et le #Soudan :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/518543

Accord de l’Europe avec l’#Ethiopie :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/684082

Accord entre #Allemagne et #Algérie :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/723089

Accord signé entre le #Kenya et la #Somalie :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/194871

Ci-dessous, le fameux accord UE-Turquie.

L’ #accord_UE-Turquie :
▻https://seenthis.net/tag/accord_ue-turquie
Et plus en général sur l’externalisation vers la #Tuquie :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/427270
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/419432
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/679603

Erdogan accuse les Européens de ne pas tenir leurs promesses d’aide financière...
►https://seenthis.net/messages/512196

Et le #monitoring de l’accord (#observatoire) :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/478621

Sur la « #facilité » en faveur des réfugiés en Turquie, le rapport de la Cour des comptes européenne :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/737085
#aide_financière

Un lien sur comment l’aide a été utilisée en faveur des #réfugiés_syriens à #Gaziantep :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/667241

Accord de réadmission signé par la Turquie avec l’#Irak et l’#Iran :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/483667

Tag #réintégration dans les pays d’origine après #renvois (#expulsions) :
▻https://seenthis.net/tag/r%C3%A9int%C3%A9gration